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THE    LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON    I 


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The  Life  of  Napoleon  I 

INCLUDING    NEW    MATERIALS 
FROM   THE    BRITISH    OFFICIAL   RECORDS 


BY 

JOHN    HOLLAND    ROSE,    M.A. 

LATE  SCHOLAR  OF  CHRIST'S  COLLEGE,   CAMBRIDGE 


"  Let  my  son  often  read  and  reflect  on  history :   this  is  the  only 
true  philosophy." 

—  Napoleon's  last  Instructions  for  the  King  of  Romt . 


TWO  VOLUMES    IN   ONE 
VOL.    I 


Nefo  gorfe 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

1918 


All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1901, 
By  THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  November,  1901.     Reprinted 
September,  iqo2. 

New  edition,  two  volumes  in  one,  May,  1907  ;  August,  1910; 
February,  1913  ;  December,  1916. 


Norfoooo  $«bs 

J.  8.  Cushlng  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


1 


DEDICATED 

TO    THE 

EIGHT  HONOURABLE  LORD  ACTON 

K.C.V.O.,    D.C.L.,    LL.D. 

REGIUS   PROFESSOR   OF   MODERN   HISTORY 

IN    THE    UNIVERSITY   OF 

CAMBRIDGE 

IN   ADMIRATION   OF   HIS   PROFOUND 

HISTORICAL   LEARNING 

AND    IN 

GRATITUDE    FOR    ADVICE    AND   HELP 

GENEROUSLY   GIVEN 


PREFACE 

An  apology  seems  to  be  called  for  from  anyone  who 
gives  to  the  world  a  new  Life  of  Napoleon  I.  My  excuse 
must  be  that  for  many  years  I  have  sought  to  revise  the 
traditional  story  of  his  career  in  the  light  of  facts  gleaned 
from  the  British  Archives  and  of  the  many  valuable  mate- 
rials that  have  recently  been  published  by  continental 
historians.  To  explain  my  manner  of  dealing  with  these 
sources  would  require  an  elaborate  critical  Introduction ; 
but,  as  the  limits  of  my  space  absolutely  preclude  any 
such  attempt,  I  can  only  briefly  refer  to  the  most  impor- 
tant topics. 

To  deal  with  the  published  sources  first,  I  would  name 
as  of  chief  importance  the  works  of  MM.  Aulard,  Chuquet, 
Houssaye,  Sorel,  and  Vandal  in  France ;  of  Herren  Beer, 
Delbriick,  Fournier,  Lehmann,  Oncken,  and  Wertheimer 
in  Germany  and  Austria  ;  and  of  Baron  Lumbroso  in 
Italy.  I  have  also  profited  largely  by  the  scholarly  mono- 
graphs or  collections  of  documents  due  to  the  labours  of 
the  "  Societe  d'Histoire  Contemporaine,"  the  General  Staff 
of  the  French  Army,  of  MM.  Bouvier,  Caudrillier,  Capi- 
taine  "  J.  G.,"  Levy,  Madelin,  Sagnac,  Sciout,  Zivy,  and 
others  in  France ;  and  of  Herren  Bailleu,  Demelitsch, 
Hansing,  Klinkowstrom,  Luckwaldt,  Ulmann,  and  others 
in  Germany.  Some  of  the  recently  published  French 
Memoirs  dealing  with  those  times  are  not  devoid  of  value, 
though  this  class  of  literature  is  to  be  used  with  caution. 
The  new  letters  of  Napoleon  published  by  M.  Leon  Le- 
cestre  and  M.  Leonce  de  Brotonne  have  also  opened  up 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

fresh  vistas  into  the  life  of  the  great  man  ;  and  the  time 
seems  to  have  come  when  we  may  safely  revise  our  judg- 
ments on  many  of  its  episodes. 

But  I  should  not  have  ventured  on  this  great  undertak- 
ing, had  I  not  been  able  to  contribute  something  new  to 
Napoleonic  literature.  During  a  study  of  this  period  for 
an  earlier  work  published  in  the  "  Cambridge  Historical 
Series,"  I  ascertained  the  great  value  of  the  British  Rec- 
ords for  the  years  1795-1815.  It  is  surely  discreditable 
to  our  historical  research  that,  apart  from  the  fruitful 
labours  of  the  Navy  Records  Society,  of  Messrs.  Oscar 
Browning  and  Hereford  George,  and  of  Mr.  Bowman  of 
Toronto,  scarcely  any  English  work  has  appeared  that  is 
based  on  the  official  records  of  this  period.  Yet  they  are 
of  great  interest  and  value.  Our  diplomatic  agents  then 
had  the  knack  of  getting  at  State  secrets  in  most  foreign 
capitals,  even  when  we  were  at  war  with  their  Govern- 
ments ;  and  our  War  Office  and  Admiralty  Records  have 
also  yielded  me  some  interesting  "finds."  M.  Levy,  in 
the  preface  to  his  "  Napoleon  intime "  (1893),  has  well 
remarked  that  "  the  documentary  history  of  the  wars  of 
the  Empire  has  not  yet  been  written.  To  write  it  accu- 
rately, it  will  be  more  important  thoroughly  to  know  for- 
eign archives  than  those  of  France."  Those  of  Russia, 
Austria,  and  Prussia  have  now  for  the  most  part  been 
examined ;  and  I  think  that  I  may  claim  to  have  searched 
all  the  important  parts  of  our  Foreign  Office  Archives  for 
the  years  in  question,  as  well  as  for  part  of  the  St.  Helena 
period.  I  have  striven  to  embody  the  results  of  this 
search  in  the  present  volumes  as  far  as  was  compatible 
with  limits  of  space  and  with  the  narrative  form  at  which, 
in  my  judgment,  history  ought  always  to  aim. 

On  the  whole,  British  policy  comes  out  the  better  the 
more  fully  it  is  known.    Though  often  feeble  and  vacillat- 


PREFACE  ix 

ing,  it  finally  attained  to  firmness  and  dignity ;  and  Min- 
isters closed  the  cycle  of  war  with  acts  of  magnanimity 
towards  the  French  people  which  are  studiously  ignored 
by  those  who  bid  us  shed  tears  over  the  martyrdom  of 
St.  Helena.  Nevertheless,  the  splendour  of  the  finale 
must  not  blind  us  to  the  flaccid  eccentricities  that  made 
British  statesmanship  the  laughing-stock  of  Europe  in 
1801-3,  1806-7,  and  1809.  Indeed,  it  is  questionable 
whether  the  renewal  of  war  between  England  and  Napo- 
leon in  1803  was  due  more  to  his  innate  forcefulness  or 
to  the  contempt  which  he  felt  for  the  Addington  Cabinet. 
When  one  also  remembers  our  extraordinary  blunders  in 
the  war  of  the  Third  Coalition,  it  seems  a  miracle  that 
the  British  Empire  survived  that  life  and  death  struggle 
against  a  man  of  superhuman  genius  who  was  determined 
to  effect  its  overthrow.  I  have  called  special  attention  to 
the  extent  and  pertinacity  of  Napoleon's  schemes  for  the 
foundation  of  a  French  Colonial  Empire  in  India,  Egypt, 
South  Africa,  and  Australia ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  events  of  the  years  1803-13  determined,  not  only 
the  destinies  of  Europe  and  Napoleon,  but  the  general 
trend  of  the  world's  colonization. 

As  it  has  been  necessary  to  condense  the  story  of  Napo- 
leon's life  in  some  parts,  I  have  chosen  to  treat  with  special 
brevity  the  years  1809-11,  which  may  be  called  the  con- 
stans  aeta8  of  his  career,  in  order  to  have  more  space  for 
the  decisive  events  that  followed  ;  but  even  in  these  less 
eventful  years  I  have  striven  to  show  how  his  Continental 
System  was  setting  at  work  mighty  economic  forces  that 
made  for  his  overthrow,  so  that  after  the  dSbdcle  of  1812 
it  came  to  be  a  struggle  of  Napoleon  and  France  contra 
mundum. 

While  not  neglecting  the  personal  details  of  the  great 
man's  life,  I  have   dwelt   mainly  on   his   public   career. 


%  PREFACE 

Apart  from  his  brilliant  conversations,  his  private  life 
lias  few  features  of  abiding  interest,  perhaps  because  he 
early  tired  of  the  shallowness  of  Josephine  and  the  Corsi- 
can  angularity  of  his  brothers  and  sisters.  But  the  cause 
also  lay  in  his  own  disposition.  He  once  said  to  M.  Gal- 
lois :  "Je  n'aime  pas  beaucoup  les  femmes,  ni  le  jeu  — 
enfin  rien:  je  suis  tout  d  fait  un  etre  politique."  In  deal- 
ing with  him  as  a  warrior  and  statesman,  and  in  sparing 
my  readers  details  as  to  his  bolting  his  food,  sleeping  at 
concerts,  and  indulging  in  amours  where  for  him  there 
was  no  glamour  of  romance,  I  am  laying  stress  on  what 
interested  him  most  —  in  a  word,  I  am  taking  him  at 
his  best. 

I  could  not  have  accomplished  this  task,  even  in  the 
present  inadequate  way,  but  for  the  help  generously 
accorded  from  many  quarters.  My  heartfelt  thanks  are 
due  to  Lord  Acton,  Regius  Professor  of  Modern  History 
in  the  University  of  Cambridge,  for  advice  of  the  highest 
importance ;  to  Mr.  Hubert  Hall,  of  the  Public  Record 
Office,  for  guidance  in  my  researches  there ;  to  Baron 
Lumbroso  of  Rome,  editor  of  the  "  Bibliografia  ragionata 
dell'  Epoca  Napoleonica,"  for  hints  on  Italian  and  other 
affairs  ;  to  Dr.  Luckwaldt,  Privat  Docent  of  the  University 
of  Bonn,  and  author  of  "  Oesterreich  und  die  Anfange  des 
Befreiungs-Krieges,"  for  his  very  scholarly  revision  of  the 
chapters  on  German  affairs ;  to  Mr.  F.  H.  E.  Cunliffe,  M.A., 
Fellow  of  All  Souls'  College,  Oxford,  for  valuable  advice 
on  the  campaigns  of  1800,  1805,  and  1806  ;  to  Professor 
Caudrillier  of  Grenoble,  author  of  "  Pichegru,"  for  infor- 
mation respecting  the  royalist  plot ;  and  to  Messrs.  J.  E. 
Morris,  M.A.,  and  E.  L.  S.  Horsburgh,  B.A.,  for  detailed 
communications  concerning  Waterloo.  The  nieces  of  the 
]ate  Professor  Westwood  of  Oxford  most  kindly  allowed 
the  facsimile  of  the  new  Napoleon  letter,  printed  opposite 


PREFACE  XI 

p.  143  of  vol.  i.,  to  be  made  from  the  original  in  their 
possession ;  and  Miss  Lowe  courteously  placed  at  my  dis- 
posal the  papers  of  her  father  relating  to  the  years  1813- 
1815,  as  well  as  to  the  St.  Helena  period.  I  wish  here  to 
record  my  grateful  obligations  for  all  these  friendly  cour- 
tesies, which  have  given  value  to  the  book,  besides  sav- 
ing me  from  many  of  the  pitfalls  with  which  the  subject 
abounds.  That  I  have  escaped  them  altogether  is  not 
to  be  imagined ;  but  I  can  honestly  say,  in  the  words  of 
the  late  Bishop  of  London,  that  "I  have  tried  to  write 
true  history." 

J.  II.  R. 


[Note.  —  The  references  to  Napoleon's  "Correspondence"  in  the 
notes  are  to  the  official  French  edition,  published  under  the  auspices  of 
Napoleon  III.  The  "  New  Letters  of  Napoleon  "  are  those  edited  by  L6on 
Lecestre,  and  translated  into  English  by  Lady  Mary  Loyd,  except  in  a 
very  few  cases  where  M.  L6once  de  Brotonne's  still  more  recent  edition 
is  cited  under  his  name.  By  "  F.  O.,"  France,  No.  — ,  and  "F.  O.," 
Prussia,  No.  — ,  are  meant  the  volumes  of  our  Foreign  Office  despatches 
relating  to  France  and  Prussia.  For  the  sake  of  brevity  I  have  called 
Napoleon's  Marshals  and  high  officials  by  their  names,  not  by  their  titles  ; 
but  a  list  of  these  is  given  at  the  close  of  vol.  ii.] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Note  on  the  Republican  Calendar       .        .        .    xvii 

I.    Parentage  and  Early  Years  ...  .1 

II.    The  French  Revolution  and  Corsica  .  .      22 

III.  Toulon .40 

IV.  Vendemiaire 52 

V.     The  Italian  Campaign  (1796)  .....      70 

VI.     The  Fights  for  Mantua 96 

VII.  Leoben  to  Campo  Formio          .....  128 

VIII.     Egypt 159 

IX.     Syria 184 

X.     Brumaire 198 

XI.     Marengo  :   Luneville 221 

XII.  The  New  Institutions  of  France  ....  245 

XIII.  The  Consulate  for  Life 279 

XIV.  The  Peace  of  Amiens 306 

XV.  A    French    Colonial    Empire  :     St.    Domingo  — 

Louisiana  —  India  —  Australia   ....  329 

XVI.  Napoleon's  Interventions 357 

XVII.  The  Renewal  of  War       ...  ...  371 

XVIII.  Europe  and  the  Bonapartes   .  397 

XIX.  The  Royalist  Plot 412 

XX.  The  Dawn  of  the  Empire  «...  429 

XXI.  The  Boulogne  Flotilla    ......  445 


APPENDIX 

Reports    hitherto    unpublished    on    (a)    The    Sale    of 

Louisiana;    (b)    The   Irish    Division    in    Napoleon's 

Service 469 

xiii 


MAPS   AND   PLANS 


The  Siege  of  Toulon,  1793     .... 

Map  to  illustrate  the  Campaigns  in  North  Italy 

Plan  to  illustrate  the  Victory  of  Areola 

The  Neighbourhood  of  Rivoli 

Central  Europe,  after  the  Peace  of  Campo  Formio,  1797 

Plan  of  the  Siege  of  Acre,  from  a  Contemporary  Sketch 

The  Battle  of  Marengo,  to  illustrate  Kellermann's  Charge 


PAUJJ 

47 
73 
115 
122 
157 
187 
235 


NOTE  ON  THE  REPUBLICAN  CALENDAR 

The  republican  calendar  consisted  of  twelve  months  of  thirty  days 
each,  each  month  being  divided  into  three  "  decades  "  of  ten  days.  Five 
days  (in  leap  years  six)  were  added  at  the  end  of  the  year  to  bring  it 
into  coincidence  with  the  solar  year. 

An        I  began  Sept.  22,  1792. 
„        II      „         „  1793. 

»       III       »  »>  1794. 

„       IV  (leap  year)         1795. 

*  #  *  # 

„  VIII  began  Sept.  22,  1799. 
„   IX   „   Sept.  23,  1800. 

„    X   „    „    1801. 

#  *     *     * 

„  XIV   „    „     1805. 

The  new  computation,  though  reckoned  from  Sept.  22,  1792,  was 
not  introduced  until  Nov.  26,  1793  (An  II).  It  ceased  after  Dec.  31, 
1805. 

The  months  are  as  follows : 

Vendemiaire    ....  Sept.  22  to  Oct.  21. 

Brumaire Oct.  22  „  Nov.  20. 

Frimaire Nov.  21  „  Dec.  20. 

Nivdse Dec.  21  „  Jan.  19. 

Pluviose Jan.  20  „  Feb.  18. 

Ventose Feb.  19  „  Mar.  20. 

Germinal Mar.  21  „  April  19. 

Floreal April  20  „  May  19. 

Prairial May  20  „  June  18. 

Messidor June  19  „  July  18. 

Thermidor July  19  „  Aug.  17. 

Fructidor Aug.  18  „  Sept.  16. 

Add  five  (in  leap  years  six)  "  Sansculottides  "  or  "  Jours  comple*- 
mentaires." 

In  1796  (leap  year)  the  numbers  in  the  table  of  months,  so  far  as 
concerns  all  dates  between  Feb.  28  and  Sept.  22,  will  have  to  be  reduced 
by  one,  owing  to  the  intercalation  of  Feb.  29,  which  is  not  compensated 
for  until  the  end  of  the  republican  year. 

The  matter  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  republicans 
reckoned  An  VIII  as  a  leap  year,  though  it  is  not  one  in  the  Gregorian 
Calendar.  Hence  that  year  ended  on  Sept.  22,  and  An  IX  and  suc- 
ceeding years  began  on  Sept.  23.  Consequently  in  the  above  table  of 
months  the  numbers  of  all  days  from  Venddmiaire  1,  An  IX  (Sept.  23, 
1800),  to  Nivdse  10,  An  XIV  (Dec.  31,  1805),  inclusive,  will  have  to 
be  increasrd  hi/  one,  except  only  in  the  next  leap  year  between  Ventose 
!).  An  XII,  and  Vendemiaire  1,  An  XIII  (Feb.  28-Sept.  28,  1804), 
when  the  two  Revolutionary  aberrations  happen  to  neutralize  each 
other. 

xvi 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I 

CHAPTER   I 

PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS 

"  I  WAS  born  when  my  country  was  perishing.  Thirty 
thousand  French  vomited  upon  our  coasts,  drowning  the 
throne  of  Liberty  in  waves  of  blood,  such  was  the  sight 
which  struck  my  eyes."  This  passionate  utterance,  penned 
by  Napoleon  Buonaparte  at  the  beginning  of  the  French 
Revolution,  describes  the  state  of  Corsica  in  his  natal  year. 
The  words  are  instinct  with  the  vehemence  of  the  youth 
and  the  extravagant  sentiment  of  the  age  :  they  strike 
the  keynote  of  his  career.  His  life  was  one  of  strain  and 
stress  from  his  cradle  to  his  grave. 

In  his  temperament  as  in  the  circumstances  of  his  time 
the  young  Buonaparte  was  destined  for  an  extraordinary 
career.  Into  a  tottering  civilization  he  burst  with  all  the 
masterful  force  of  an  Alaric.  But  he  was  an  Alaric  of 
the  south,  uniting  the  untamed  strength  of  his  island  kin- 
dred with  the  mental  powers  of  his  Italian  ancestry.  In 
his  personality  there  is  a  complex  blending  of  force  and 
grace,  of  animal  passion  and  mental  clearness,  of  northern 
common  sense  with  the  promptings  of  an  oriental  imagina- 
tion ;  and  this  union  in  his  nature  of  seeming  opposites 
explains  many  of  the  mysteries  of  his  life.  Fortunately 
for  lovers  of  romance,  genius  cannot  be  wholly  analyzed, 
even  by  the  most  adroit  historical  philosophizer  or  the 
most  exacting  champion  of  heredity.  But  in  so  far  as 
the  sources  of  Napoleon's  power  can  be  measured,  they 
may  be  traced  to  the  unexampled  needs  of  mankind  in 
the  revolutionary  epoch  and  to  his  own  exceptional  endow- 
ments.    Evidently,  then,  the  characteristics  of  his  family 


2  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

claim  some  attention  from  all  who  would  understand  the 
man  and  the  influence  which  he  was  to  wield  over  modern 
Europe. 

It  has  been  the  fortune  of  his  House  to  be  the  subject 
of  dispute  from  first  to  last.  Some  writers  have  endeav- 
oured to  trace  its  descent  back  to  the  Caesars  of  Rome, 
others  to  the  Byzantine  Emperors  ;  one  genealogical  ex- 
plorer has  tracked  the  family  to  Majorca,  and,  altering  its 
name  to  Bonpart,  has  discovered  its  progenitor  in  the 
Man  of  the  Iron  Mask;  while  the  Duchesse  d'Abrantes, 
voyaging  eastwards  in  quest  of  its  ancestors,  has  confi- 
dently claimed  for  the  family  a  Greek  origin.  Painstak- 
ing research  has  dispelled  these  romancings  of  historical 
trouveurs,  and  has  connected  this  enigmatic  stock  with  a 
Florentine  named  William,  who  in  the  year  1261  took  the 
surname  of  Bonaparte  or  Buonaparte.  The  name  seems 
to  have  been  assumed  when,  amidst  the  unceasing  strifes 
between  Guelfs  and  Ghibellines  that  rent  the  civic  life  of 
Florence,  William's  party,  the  Ghibellines,  for  a  brief 
space  gained  the  ascendancy.  But  perpetuity  was  not  to 
be  found  in  Florentine  politics  ;  and  in  a  short  time  he 
was  a  fugitive  at  a  Tuscan  village,  Sarzana,  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  victorious  Guelfs.  Here  the  family  seems  to 
have  lived  for  wellnigh  three  centuries,  maintaining  its 
Ghibelline  and  aristocratic  principles  with  surprising  te- 
nacity. The  age  was  not  remarkable  for  the  virtue  of  con- 
stancy, or  any  other  virtue.  Politics  and  private  life  were 
alike  demoralized  by  unceasing  intrigues ;  and  amidst 
strifes  of  Pope  and  Emperor,  duchies  and  republics,  cities 
and  autocrats,  there  was  formed  that  type  of  Italian  char- 
acter which  is  delineated  in  the  pages  of  Macchiavelli. 
From  the  depths  of  debasement  of  that  cynical  age  the 
Buonapartes  were  saved  by  their  poverty,  and  by  the  iso- 
lation of  their  life  at  Sarzana.  Yet  the  embassies  dis- 
charged at  intervals  by  the  more  talented  members  of 
the  family  showed  that  the  gifts  for  intrigue  were  only 
dormant ;  and  they  were  certainly  transmitted  in  their 
intensity  to  the  greatest  scion  of  the  race. 

In  the  year  1529  Francis  Buonaparte,  whether  pressed 
by  poverty  or  distracted  by  despair  at  the  misfortunes 
which    then    overwhelmed    Italy,    migrated    to    Corsica. 


I  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  8 

There  the  family  was  grafted  upon  a  tougher  branch  of 
the  Italian  race.  To  the  vulpine  characteristics  devel- 
oped under  the  shadow  of  the  Medici  there  were  now 
added  qualities  of  a  more  virile  stamp.  Though  domi- 
nated in  turn  by  the  masters  of  the  Mediterranean,  by 
Carthaginians,  Romans,  Vandals,  by  the  men  of  Pisa, 
and  finally  by  the  Genoese  Republic,  the  islanders  re- 
tained a  striking  individuality.  The  rock-bound  coast 
and  mountainous  interior  helped  to  preserve  the  essen- 
tial features  of  primitive  life.  Foreign  Powers  might 
affect  the  towns  on  the  sea-board,  but  they  left  the  clans 
of  the  interior  comparatively  untouched.  Their  life  cen- 
tred around  the  family.  The  Government  counted  for 
little  or  nothing ;  for  was  it  not  the  symbol  of  the  de- 
tested foreign  rule  ?  Its  laws  were  therefore  as  naught 
when  they  conflicted  with  the  unwritten  but  omnipotent 
code  of  family  honour.  A  slight  inflicted  on  a  neighbour 
would  call  forth  the  warning  words  —  "  Guard  thyself  :  I 
am  on  my  guard."  Forthwith  there  began  a  blood  feud, 
a  vendetta,  which  frequently  dragged  on  its  dreary  course 
through  generations  of  conspiracy  and  murder,  until,  the 
principals  having  vanished,  the  collateral  branches  of  the 
families  were  involved.  No  Corsican  was  so  loathed  as 
the  laggard  who  shrank  from  avenging  the  family  honour, 
even  on  a' distant  relative  of  the  first  offender.  The  mur- 
der of  the  Due  d'Enghien  by  Napoleon  in  1804  sent  a 
thrill  of  horror  through  the  Continent.  To  the  Corsicans 
it  seemed  little  more  than  an  autocratic  version  of  the 
vendetta  tr  aver  sale.1 

The  vendetta  was  the  chief  law  of  Corsican  society  up 
to  comparatively  recent  times  ;  and  its  effects  are  still 
visible  in  the  life  of  the  stern  islanders.  In  his  charming 
romance,  "  Colomba,"  M.   Prosper  Merimee  has  depicted 

1  From  a  French  work,  "  Mceurs  et  Coutumes  des  Corses"  (Paris, 
1802),  I  take  the  following  incident.  A  priest,  charged  with  the  duty 
of  avenging  a  relative  for  some  fourteen  years,  met  his  enemy  at  the  gate 
of  Ajaccio  and  forthwith  shot  him,  under  the  eyes  of  an  official  —  who 
did  nothing.  A  relative  of  the  murdered  man.  happening  to  be  near,  shot 
the  priest.  Both  victims  were  quickly  buried,  the  priest  being  interred 
under  the  altar  of  the  church,  "because  of  his  sacred  character."  See 
too  Miot  de  Melito.  "  M^moires,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xiii.,  as  to  the  utter  collapse 
of  the  jury  system  in  1800-1,  because  no  Corsican  would  "deny  his  party 
or  desert  his  blood." 


4  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  typical  Corsican,  even  of  the  towns,  as  preoccupied, 
gloomy,  suspicious,  ever  on  the  alert,  hovering  about  his 
dwelling,  like  a  falcon  over  his  nest,  seemingly  in  prepa- 
ration for  attack  or  defence.  Laughter,  the  song,  the 
dance,  were  rarely  heard  in  the  streets ;  for  the  women, 
after  acting  as  the  drudges  of  the  household,  were  kept 
jealously  at  home,  while  their  lords  smoked  and  watched. 
If  a  game  at  hazard  were  ventured  upon,  it  ran  its  course 
in  silence,  which  not  seldom  was  broken  by  the  shot  or 
the  stab  —  first  warning  that  there  had  been  underhand 
play.     The  deed  always  preceded  the  word. 

In  such  a  life,  where  commerce  and  agriculture  were 
despised,  where  woman  was  mainly  a  drudge  and  man  a 
conspirator,  there  grew  up  the  typical  Corsican  tempera- 
ment, moody  and  exacting,  but  withal  keen,  brave,  and 
constant,  which  looked  on  the  world  as  a  fencing-school 
for  the  glorification  of  the  family  and  the  clan.1  Of  this 
type  Napoleon  was  to  be  the  supreme  exemplar ;  and  the 
fates  granted  him  as  an  arena  a  chaotic  France  and  a  dis- 
tracted Europe. 

Amidst  that  grim  Corsican  existence  the  Buonapartes 
passed  their  lives  during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries.  Occupied  as  advocates  and  lawyers  with  such 
details  of  the  law  as  were  of  any  practical  importance, 
they  must  have  been  involved  in  family  feuds  and  the 
oft-recurring  disputes  between  Corsica  and  the  suzerain 
Power,  Genoa.  As  became  dignitaries  in  the  munici- 
pality of  Ajaccio,  several  of  the  Buonapartes  espoused 
the  Genoese  side  ;  and  the  Genoese  Senate  in  a  docu- 
ment of  the  year  1652  styled  one  of  them,  Jerome, 
"  Egregius  Hieronimus  di  Buonaparte,  procurator  Nobi- 
lium."      These    distinctions    they    seem    to    have    little 

1  As  to  the  tenacity  of  Corsican  devotion,  I  may  cite  a  curious  proof 
from  the  unpublished  portion  of  the  "Memoirs  of  Sir  Hudson  Lowe." 
He  was  colonel  in  command  of  the  Royal  Corsican  Rangers,  enrolled  dur- 
ing the  British  occupation  of  Corsica,  and  gained  the  affections  of  his 
men  during  several  years  of  fighting  in  Egypt  and  elsewhere.  When 
stationed  at  Capri  in  1808  he  relied  on  his  Corsican  levies  to  defend  that 
island  against  Murat's  attacks ;  and  he  did  not  rely  in  vain.  Though 
confronted  by  a  French  Corsican  regiment,  they  remained  true  to  their 
salt,  even  during  a  truce,  when  they  could  recognize  their  compatriots. 
The  partisan  instinct  was  proof  against  the  promises  of  Murat's  envoys 
and  the  shouts  even  of  kith  and  kin 


\  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  5 

coveted.  Very  few  families  belonged  to  the  Corsican 
noblesse,  and  their  fiefs  were  unimportant.  In  Corsica, 
as  in  the  Forest  Cantons  of  Switzerland  and  the  High- 
lands of  Scotland,  class  distinctions  were  by  no  means 
so  coveted  as  in  lands  that  had  been  thoroughly  feudal- 
ized; and  the  Buonapartes,  content  with  their  civic 
dignities  at  Ajaccio  and  the  attachment  of  their  par- 
tisans on  their  country  estates,  seem  rarely  to  have  used 
the  prefix  which  implied  nobility.  Their  life  was  not 
unlike  that  of  many  an  old  Scottish  laird,  who,  though 
possibly  bourgeois  in  origin,  yet  by  courtesy  ranked  as 
chieftain  among  his  tenants,  and  was  ennobled  by  the 
parlance  of  the  countryside,  perhaps  all  the  more  readily 
because  he  refused  to  wear  the  honours  that  came  from 
over  the  Border. 

But  a  new  influence  was  now  to  call  forth  all  the  powers 
of  this  tough  stock.  In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury we  find  the  head  of  the  family,  Charles  Marie  Buona- 
parte, aglow  with  the  flame  of  Corsican  patriotism  then 
being  kindled  by  the  noble  career  of  Paoli.  This  gifted 
patriot,  the  champion  of  the  islanders,  first  against  the 
Genoese  and  later  against  the  French,  desired  to  cement 
by  education  the  framework  of  the  Corsican  Common- 
wealth and  founded  a  university.  It  was  here  that  the 
father  of  the  future  French  Emperor  received  a  training 
in  law,  and  a  mental  stimulus  which  was  to  lift  his  family 
above  the  level  of  the  caporali  and  attorneys  with  whom 
its  lot  had  for  centuries  been  cast.  His  ambition  is  seen 
in  the  endeavour,  successfully  carried  out  by  his  uncle, 
Lucien,  Archdeacon  of  Ajaccio,  to  obtain  recognition  of 
kinship  with  the  Buonapartes  of  Tuscany  who  had  been 
ennobled  by  the  Grand  Duke.  His  patriotism  is  evinced 
in  his  ardent  support  of  Paoli,  by  whose  valour  and  energy 
the  Genoese  were  finally  driven  from  the  island.  Amidst 
these  patriotic  triumphs  Charles  confronted  his  destiny  in 
the  person  of  Letizia  Ramolino,  a  beautiful  girl,  descended 
from  an  honourable  Florentine  family  which  had  for  cen- 
turies been  settled  in  Corsica.  The  wedding  took  place 
in  1764,  the  bridegroom  being  then  eighteen  and  the  bride 
fifteen  years  of  age.  The  union,  if  rashly  undertaken  in 
the  midst  of   civil  strifes,  was  yet  well  assorted.     Both 


6  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

parties  to  it  were  of  patrician,  if  not  definitely  noble  de- 
scent, and  came  of  families  which  combined  the  intellec- 
tual gifts  of  Tuscany  with  the  vigour  of  their  later  island 
home.1  From  her  mother's  race,  the  Pietra  Santa  family, 
Letizia  imbibed  the  habits  of  the  most  backward  and  sav- 
age part  of  Corsica,  where  vendettas  were  rife  and  educa- 
tion was  almost  unknown.  Left  in  ignorance  in  her  early 
days,  she  yet  was  accustomed  to  hardships,  and  often 
showed  the  fertility  of  resource  which  such  a  life  always 
develops.  Hence,  at  the  time  of  her  marriage,  she  pos- 
sessed a  firmness  of  will  far  beyond  her  years ;  and  her 
strength  and  fortitude  enabled  her  to  survive  the  terrible 
adversities  of  her  early  days,  as  also  to  meet  with  quiet 
matronly  dignity  the  extraordinary  honours  showered  on 
her  as  the  mother  of  the  French  Emperor.  She  was  inured 
to  habits  of  frugality,  which  reappeared  in  the  personal 
tastes  of  her  son.  In  fact,  she  so  far  retained  her  old 
parsimonious  habits,  even  amidst  the  splendours  of  the 
French  Imperial  Court,  as  to  expose  herself  to  the  charge 
of  avarice.  But  there  is  a  touching  side  to  all  this.  She 
seems  ever  to  have  felt  that  after  the  splendour  there 
would  come  again  the  old  days  of  adversity,  and  her 
instincts  were  in  one  sense  correct.  She  lived  on  to  the 
advanced  age  of  eighty-six,  and  died  twenty-one  3'ears 
after  the  break-up  of  her  son's  empire  —  a  striking  proof 
of  the  vitality  and  tenacity  of  her  powers. 

A  kindly  Providence  veiled  the  future  from  the  young 
couple.  Troubles  fell  swiftly  upon  them  both  in  private 
and  in  public  life.  Their  first  two  children  died  in  in- 
fancy. The  third,  Joseph,  was  born  in  1768,  when  the 
Corsican  patriots  were  making  their  last  successful  efforts 
against  their  new  French  oppressors :  the  fourth,  the 
famous  Napoleon,  saw  the  light  on  August  15th,  1769, 
when  the  liberties  of  Corsica  were  being  finally  extin- 
guished. Nine  other  children  were  born  before  the  out- 
break of  the  French  Revolution  reawakened  civil  strifes, 

1  The  facts  as  to  the  family  of  Napoleon's  mother  are  given  in  full 
detail  by  M.  Masson  in  his  "Napoleon  Ineonnu,1'  ch.  i.  They  correct 
the  statement  often  made  as  to  her  "  lowly,"  "  peasant "  origin.  Masson 
also  proves  that  the  house  at  Ajacci<>.  which  is  shown  as  Napoleon's 
birthplace,  is  of  later  construction,  though  on  the  same  site. 


I  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  7 

amidst  which  the  then  fatherless  family  was  tossed  to  and 
fro,  and  finally  whirled  away  to  France. 

Destiny  had  already  linked  the  fortunes  of  the  young 
Napoleon  Buonaparte  with  those  of  France.  After  the 
downfall  of  Genoese  rule  in  Corsica,  France  had  taken 
over,  for  empty  promises,  the  claims  of  the  hard-pressed 
Italian  republic  to  its  troublesome  island  possession.  It 
was  a  cheap  and  practical  way  of  restoring,  at  least  in 
the  Mediterranean,  the  shattered  prestige  of  the  French 
Bourbons.  They  had  previously  intervened  in  Corsican 
affairs  on  the  side  of  the  Genoese.  Yet  in  1764  Paoli 
appealed  to  Louis  XV.  for  protection.  It  was  granted, 
in  the  form  of  troops  that  proceeded  quietly  to  occupy  the 
coast  towns  of  the  island  under  cover  of  friendly  assur- 
ances. In  1768,  before  the  expiration  of  an  informal 
truce,  Marbeuf,  the  French  commander,  commenced  hos- 
tilities against  the  patriots.1  In  vain  did  Rousseau  and 
many  other  champions  of  popular  liberty  protest  against 
this  bartering  away  of  insular  freedom :  in  vain  did  Paoli 
rouse  his  compatriots  to  another  and  more  unequal  struggle, 
and  seek  to  hold  the  mountainous  interior.  Poor,  badly 
equipped,  rent  by  family  feuds  and  clan  schisms,  his  fol- 
lowers were  no  match  for  the  French  troops ;  and  after 
the  utter  break-up  of  his  forces  Paoli  fled  to  England, 
taking  with  him  three  hundred  and  forty  of  the  most 
determined  patriots.  With  these  irreconcilables  Charles 
Buonaparte  did  not  cast  in  his  lot,  but  accepted  the  par- 
don offered  to  those  who  should  recognize  the  French 
sway.  With  his  wife  and  their  little  child  Joseph  he 
returned  to  Ajaccio  ;  and  there,  shortly  afterwards,  Napo- 
leon was  born.  As  the  patriotic  historian,  Jacobi,  has 
finely  said,  "  The  Corsican  people,  when  exhausted  byj 
producing  martyrs  to  the  cause  of  liberty,  produced] 
Napoleon  Buonaparte."2 

1  See  Jacobi,  "  Hist,  de  la  Corse,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  viii.  The  whole  story 
is  told  with  prudent  brevity  by  French  historians,  even  by  Masson  and 
Chuquet.  The  few  words  in  which  Thiers  dismisses  this  subject  are 
altogether  misleading. 

2  Much  has  been  written  to  prove  that  Napoleon  was  born  in  17(58,  and 
was  really  the  eldest  surviving  son.  The  reasons,  stated  briefly,  are : 
(1)  that  the  first  baptismal  name  of  Joseph  Buonaparte  was  merely 
Nabulione  (Italian  for  Napoleon),  and  that  Joseph  was  a  later  addition 


8  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

Seeing  that  Charles  Buonaparte  had  been  an  ardent 
adherent  of  Faoli,  his  sudden  change  of  front  has  exposed 
him  to  keen  censure.  He  certainly  had  not  the  grit  of 
which  heroes  are  made.  His  seems  to  have  been  an  ill- 
balanced  nature,  soon  buoyed  up  by  enthusiasms,  and  as 
speedily  depressed  by  their  evaporation ;  endowed  with 
enough  of  learning  and  culture  to  be  a  Voltairean  and 
write  second-rate  verses  ;  and  with  a  talent  for  intrigue 
which  sufficed  to  embarrass  his  never  very  affluent  for- 
tunes. Napoleon  certainly  derived  no  world-compelling 
qualities  from  his  father  :  for  these  he  was  indebted  to 
the  wilder  strain  which  ran  in  his  mother's  blood.  The 
father  doubtless  saw  in  the  French  connection  a  chance 
of  worldly  advancement  and  of  liberation  from  pecuniary 
difficulties ;  for  the  new  rulers  now  sought  to  gain  over 
the  patrician  families  of  the  island.  Many  of  them  had 
resented  the  dictatorship  of  Paoli ;  and  they  now  gladly 
accepted  the  connection  with  France,  which  promised  to 
enrich  their  country  and  to  open  up  a  brilliant  career  in 
the  French  army,  where  commissions  were  limited  to  the 
scions  of  nobility. 

Much  may  be  said  in  excuse  of  Charles  Buonaparte's 
decision,  and  no  one  can  deny  that  Corsica  has  ultimately 
gained  much  by  her  connection  with  France.  But  his 
change  of  front  was  open  to  the  charge  that  it  was 
prompted  by  self-interest  rather  than  by  philosophic 
foresight.  At  any  rate,  his  second  son  throughout  his 
boyhood  nursed  a  deep  resentment  against  his  father  for 
his  desertion  of  the  patriots'  cause.  The  youth's  sym- 
pathies were  with  the  peasants,  whose  allegiance  was  not 
to  be  bought  by  baubles,  whose  constancy  and  bravery 
long  held  out  against  the  French  in  a  hopeless  guerilla 
warfare.  His  hot  Corsican  blood  boiled  at  the  stories  of 
oppression  and  insult  which  he  heard  from  his  humbler 

to  his  name  on  the  baptismal  register  of  January  7th,  1768,  at  Corte  ; 
(2)  certain  statements  that  Joseph  was  born  at  Ajaccio ;  (3)  Napoleon's 
own  statement  at  his  marriage  that  he  was  born  in  1708.  To  this  it  may 
be  replied  that :  (a)  other  letters  and  statements,  still  more  decisive,  prove 
that  Joseph  was  born  at  Corte  in  1768  and  Napoleon  at  Ajaccio  in  1769; 
(6)  Napoleon's  entry  in  the  marriage  register  was  obviously  designed  to 
lessen  the  disparity  of  years  of  his  bride,  who,  on  her  side,  subtracted 
four  years  from  her  age.     See  Chuquet,  "  La  Jeunesse  de  Napoleon,"  p.  65. 


i  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  9 

compatriots.  When,  at  eleven  years  of  age,  he  saw  in 
the  military  college  at  Brienne  the  portrait  of  Choiseul, 
the  French  Minister  who  had  urged  on  the  conquest  of 
Corsica,  his  passion  burst  forth  in  a  torrent  of  impreca- 
tions against  the  traitor ;  and,  even  after  the  death  of  his 
father  in  1785,  he  exclaimed  that  he  could  never  forgive 
him  for  not  following  Paoli  into  exile. 

What  trifles  seem,  at  times,  to  alter  the  current  of 
human  affairs !  Had  his  father  acted  thus,  the  young 
Napoleon  would  in  all  probability  have  entered  the  mili- 
tary or  naval  service  of  Great  Britain ;  he  might  have 
shared  Paoli's  enthusiasm  for  the  land  of  his  adoption, 
and  have  followed  the  Corsican  hero  in  his  enterprises 
against  the  French  Revolution,  thenceforth  figuring  in 
history  merely  as  a  greater  Marlborough,  crushing  the 
military  efforts  of  democratic  France,  and  luring  England 
into  a  career  of  Continental  conquest.  Monarchy  and 
aristocracy  would  have  gone  unchallenged,  except  within 
the  "  natural  limits  "  of  France  ;  and  the  other  nations, 
never  shaken  to  their  inmost  depths,  would  have  dragged 
on  their  old  inert  fragmentary  existence. 

The  decision  of  Charles  Buonaparte  altered  the  destiny 
of  Europe.  He  determined  that  his  eldest  boy,  Joseph, 
should  enter  the  Church,  and  that  Napoleon  should  be 
a  soldier.  His  perception  of  the  characters  of  his  boys 
was  correct.  An  anecdote,  for  which  the  elder  brother 
is  responsible,  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  their  tempera- 
ments. The  master  of  their  school  arranged  a  mimic 
combat  for  his  pupils  —  Romans  against  Carthaginians. 
Joseph,  as  the  elder,  was  ranged  under  the  banner  of 
Rome,  while  Napoleon  was  told  off  among  the  Cartha- 
ginians ;  but,  piqued  at  being  chosen  for  the  losing  side, 
the  child  fretted,  begged,  and  stormed  until  the  less  bel- 
licose Joseph  agreed  to  change  places  with  his  exacting 
junior.  The  incident  is  prophetic  of  much  in  the  later 
history  of  the  family. 

Its  imperial  future  was  opened  up  by  the  deft  complai- 
sance now  shown  by  Charles  Buonaparte.  The  reward 
for  his  speedy  submission  to  France  was  soon  forthcom- 
ing. The  French  commander  in  Corsica  used  his  influ- 
ence to  secure  the  admission  of  the  young  Napoleon  to 


JO  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

the  military  school  of  Brienne  in  Champagne  ;  and  as  the 
father  was  able  to  satisfy  the  authorities  not  only  that  he 
was  without  fortune,  but  also  that  his  family  had  been 
noble  for  four  generations,  Napoleon  was  admitted  to  this 
school  to  be  educated  at  the  charges  of  the  King  of  France 
(April,  1779).  He  was  now,  at  the  tender  age  of  nine, 
a  stranger  in  a  strange  land,  among  a  people  whom  he 
detested  as  the  oppressors  of  his  countrymen.  Worst  of 
all,  he  had  to  endure  the  taunt  of  belonging  to  a  subject 
race.  What  a  position  for  a  proud  and  exacting  child  ! 
Little  wonder  that  the  official  report  represented  him  as 
silent  and  obstinate ;  but,  strange  to  say,  it  added  the 
word  "imperious."  It  was  a  tough  character  which 
could  defy  repression  amidst  such  surroundings.  As  to 
his  studies,  little  need  be  said.  In  his  French  history 
he  read  of  the  glories  of  the  distant  past  (when  "  Ger- 
many was  part  of  the  French  Empire "),  the  splendours 
of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.,  the  disasters  of  France  in  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  and  the  "prodigious  conquests  of  the 
English  in  India."  But  his  imagination  was  kindled  from 
other  sources.  Boys  of  pronounced  character  have  always 
owed  far  more  to  their  private  reading  than  to  their  set 
studies ;  and  the  young  Buonaparte,  while  grudgingly 
learning  Latin  and  French  grammar,  was  feeding  his  mind 
on  Plutarch's  "Lives"  —  in  a  French  translation.  The 
artful  intermingling  of  the  actual  and  the  romantic,  the 
historic  and  the  personal,  in  those  vivid  sketches  of  ancient 
worthies  and  heroes,  has  endeared  them  to  many  minds. 
Rousseau  derived  unceasing  profit  from  their  perusal;  and 
Madame  Roland  found  in  them  "the  pasture  of  great  souls." 
It  was  so  with  the  lonely  Corsican  youth.  Holding  aloof 
from  his  comrades  in  gloomy  isolation,  he  caught  in  the 
exploits  of  Greeks  and  Romans  a  distant  echo  of  the  tragic 
romance  of  his  beloved  island  home.  The  librarian  of  the 
school  asserted  that  even  then  the  young  soldier  had  mod- 
elled his  future  career  on  that  of  the  heroes  of  antiquity; 
and  we  may  well  believe  that,  in  reading  of  the  exploits  of 
Leonidas,  Curtius,  and  Cincinnatus,  he  saw  the  figure  of 
his  own  antique  republican  hero,  Paoli.  To  fight  side  by 
side  with  Paoli  against  the  French  was  his  constant  dream. 
"  Paoli  will  return,"  he  once  exclaimed,  "  and  as  soon  as  I 


I  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  U 

have  strength,  I  will  go  to  help  him :  and  perhaps  togethei 
we  shall  be  able  to  shake  the  odious  yoke  from  off  the 
neck  of  Corsica." 

But  there  was  anothe*r  work  which  exercised  a  great  in- 
fluence on  his  young  mind — the  "  Gallic  War"  of  Caesar. 
To  the  young  Italian  the  conquest  of  Gaul  by  a  man  of  his 
own  race  must  have  been  a  congenial  topic,  and  in  Caesar 
himself  the  future  conqueror  may  dimly  have  recognized 
a  kindred  spirit.  The  masterful  energy  and  all-conquering 
will  of  the  old  Roman,  his  keen  insight  into  the  heart  of  a 
problem,  the  wide  sweep  of  his  mental  vision,  ranging  over 
the  intrigues  of  the  Roman  Senate,  the  shifting  politics  of 
a  score  of  tribes,  and  the  myriad  administrative  details 
of  a  great  army  and  a  mighty  province  —  these  were  the 
qualities  that  furnished  the  chief  mental  training  to  the 
young  cadet.  Indeed,  the  career  of  Caesar  was  destined  to 
exert  a  singular  fascination  over  the  Napoleonic  dynasty, 
not  only  on  its  founder,  but  also  on  Napoleon  III.;  and 
the  change  in  the  character  and  career  of  Napoleon  the 
Great  may  be  registered  mentally  in  the  effacement  of  the 
portraits  of  Leonidas  and  Paoli  by  those  of  Caesar  and 
Alexander.  Later  on,  during  his  sojourn  at  Ajaccio  in 
1790,  when  the  first  shadows  were  flitting  across  his  hith- 
erto unclouded  love  for  Paoli,  we  hear  that  he  spent  whole 
nights  poring  over  Caesar's  history,  committing  many 
passages  to  memory  in  his  passionate  admiration  of  those 
wondrous  exploits.  Eagerly  he  took  Caesar's  side  as 
against  Pompey,  and  no  less  warmly  defended  him  from 
the  charge  of  plotting  against  the  liberties  of  the  common- 
wealth.1 It  was  a  perilous  study  for  a  republican  youth 
in  whom  the  military  instincts  were  as  ingrained  as  the 
genius  for  rule. 

Concerning  the  young  Buonaparte's  life  at  Brienne  there 
exist  few  authentic  records  and  many  questionable  anec- 
dotes. Of  these  last,  that  which  is  the  most  credible  and 
suggestive  relates  his  proposal  to  his  schoolfellows  to  con- 
struct ramparts  of  snow  during  the  sharp  winter  of  1783-4. 
According  to  his  schoolfellow,  Bourrienne,  these  mimic 
fortifications  were  planned  by  Buonaparte,  who  also 
directed  the  methods  of  attack  and  defence:  or,  as  others 

1  Nasica,  "M&noires,"  p.  102. 


12  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

say,  he  reconstructed  the  walls  according  to  the  needs  of 
modern  war.  In  either  case,  the  incident  bespeaks  for 
him  great  power  of  organization  and  control.  But  there 
were  in  general  few  outlets  for  his  originality  and  vigour. 
He  seems  to  have  disliked  all  his  comrades,  except  Bourri- 
enne,  as  much  as  they  detested  him  for  his  moody  humours 
and  fierce  outbreaks  of  temper.  He  is  even  reported  to 
have  vowed  that  he  would  do  as  much  harm  as  possible 
to  the  French  people ;  but  the  remark  smacks  of  the  story- 
book. Equally  doubtful  are  the  two  letters  in  which  he 
prays  to  be  removed  from  the  indignities  to  which  he  was 
subjected  at  Brienne.1  In  other  letters  which  are  un- 
doubtedly genuine,  he  refers  to  his  future  career  with 
ardour,  and  writes  not  a  word  as  to  the  bullying  to  which 
his  Corsican  zeal  subjected  him.  Particularly  noteworthy 
is  the  letter  to  his  uncle  begging  him  to  intervene  so  as 
to  prevent  Joseph  Buonaparte  from  taking  up  a  military 
career.  Joseph,  writes  the  younger  brother,  would  make 
a  good  garrison  officer,  as  he  was  well  formed  and  clever 
at  frivolous  compliments  —  "  good  therefore  for  society, 

but  for  a  fight ?" 

Napoleon's  determination  had  been  noticed  by  his 
teachers.  They  had  failed  to  bend  his  will,  at  least  on 
important  points.  In  lesser  details  his  Italian  adroit- 
ness seems  to  have  been  of  service ;  for  the  officer  who 
inspected  the  school  reported  of  him :  "  Constitution, 
health  excellent:  character  submissive,  sweet,  honest, 
grateful  :  conduct  very  regular  :  has  always  distinguished 
himself  by  his  application  to  mathematics :  knows  history 
and  geography  passably :  very  weak  in  accomplishments. 
He  will  be  an  excellent  seaman :  is  worthy  to  enter  the 
School  at  Paris."  To  the  military  school  at  Paris  he  was 
accordingly  sent  in  due  course,  entering  there  in  October, 
1784.  The  change  from  the  semi-monastic  life  at  Brienne 
to  the  splendid  edifice  which  fronts  the  Champ  de  Mars 
had  less  effect  than  might  have  been  expected  in  a  youth 
of  fifteen  years.     Not  yet  did  he  become  French  in  sym- 

1  Both  letters  are  accepted  as  authentic  by  Jung,  "  Bonaparte  et  son 
Temps,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  84,  02;  but  Masson,  "Napoleon  Inconnu,"  vol.  i., 
p.  55,  tracking  them  to  their  source,  discredits  them,  as  also  from  internal 
evidence. 


I  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  U 

pathy.  His  love  of  Corsica  and  hatred  of  the  French 
monarchy  steeled  him  against  the  luxuries  of  his  new 
surroundings.  Perhaps  it  was  an  added  sting  that  he  was 
educated  at  the  expense  of  the  monarchy  which  had  con- 
quered his  kith  and  kin.  He  nevertheless  applied  himself 
with  energy  to  his  favourite  studies,  especially  mathe- 
matics. Defective  in  languages  he  still  was,  and  ever 
remained  ;  for  his  critical  acumen  in  literature  ever  fas- 
tened on  the  matter  rather  than  on  style.  To  the  end  of 
his  days  he  could  never  write  Italian,  much  less  French, 
with  accuracy  ;  and  his  tutor  at  Paris  not  inaptly  described 
his  boyish  composition  as  resembling  molten  granite.  The 
same  qualities  of  directness  and  impetuosity  were  also  fatal 
to  his  efforts  at  mastering  the  movements  of  the  dance. 
In  spite  of  lessons  at  Paris  and  private  lessons  which  he 
afterwards  took  at  Valence,  he  was  never  a  dancer :  his  j 
bent  was  obviously  for  the  exact  sciences  rather  than  the 
arts,  for  the  geometrical  rather  than  the  rhythmical :  he 
thought,  as  he  moved,  in  straight  lines,  never  in  curves. 

The  death  of  his  father  during  the  year  which  the 
youth  spent  at  Paris  sharpened  his  sense  of  responsibility 
towards  his  seven  younger  brothers  and  sisters.  His 
own  poverty  must  have  inspired  him  with  disgust  at  the 
luxury  which  he  saw  around  him;  but  there  are  good 
reasons  for  doubting  the  genuineness  of  the  memorial 
which  he  is  alleged  to  have  sent  from  Paris  to  the  second 
master  at  Brienne  on  this  subject.  The  letters  of  the 
scholars  at  Paris  were  subject  to  strict  surveillance ;  and, 
if  he  had  taken  the  trouble  to  draw  up  a  list  of  criticisms 
on  his  present  training,  most  assuredly  it  would  have  been 
destroyed.  Undoubtedly,  however,  he  would  have  sym- 
pathized with  the  unknown  critic  in  his  complaint  of  the 
unsuitableness  of  sumptuous  meals  to  youths  who  were 
destined  for  the  hardships  of  the  camp.  At  Brienne  he 
had  been  dubbed  "  the  Spartan,"  an  instance  of  that  almost 
uncanny  faculty  of  schoolboys  to  dash  off  in  a  nickname 
the  salient  features  of  character.  The  phrase  was  correct, 
almost  for  Napoleon's  whole  life.  At  any  rate,  the  pomp 
of  Paris  served  but  to  root  his  youthful  affections  more 
tenaciously  in  the  rocks  of  Corsica. 

In  September,  1785,  that  is,  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  Buona- 


14  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  CHAP. 

parte  was  nominated  for  a  commission  as  junior  lieutenant 
in  La  Fere  regiment  of  artillery  quartered  at  Valence  on 
the  Rhone.  This  was  his  first  close  contact  with  real  life. 
The  rules  of  the  service  required  him  to  spend  three  months 
of  rigorous  drill  before  he  was  admitted  to  his  commission. 
The  work  was  exacting  :  the  pay  was  small,  viz.,  1,120 
francs,  or  less  than  £45,  a  year;  but  all  reports  agree  as  to 
his  keen  zest  for  his  profession  and  the  recognition  of  his 
transcendent  abilities  by  his  superior  officers.1  There  it 
was  that  he  mastered  the  rudiments  of  war,  for  lack  of 
which  many  generals  of  noble  birth  have  quickly  closed  in 
disaster  careers  that  began  with  promise  :  there,  too,  he 
learnt  that  hardest  and  best  of  all  lessons,  prompt  obedi- 
ence. "  To  learn  obeying  is  the  fundamental  art  of  gov- 
erning," says  Carlyle.  It  was  so  with  Napoleon :  at  Valence 
he  served  his  apprenticeship  in  the  art  of  conquering  and 
the  art  of  governing. 

This  springtime  of  his  life  is  of  interest  and  importance 
in  many  ways:  it  reveals  many  amiable  qualities,  which 
had  hitherto  been  blighted  by  the  real  or  fancied  scorn  of 
the  wealthy  cadets.  At  Valence,  while  shrinking  from  his 
brother  officers,  he  sought  society  more  congenial  to  his 
simple  tastes  and  restrained  demeanour.  In  a  few  of  the 
best  bourgeois  families  of  Valence  he  found  happiness. 
There,  too,  blossomed  the  tenderest,  purest  idyll  of  his  life. 
At  the  country  house  of  a  cultured  lady  who  had  be- 
friended him  in  his  solitude,  he  saw  his  first  love,  Caroline 
de  Colombier.  It  was  a  passing  fancy;  but  to  her  all  the 
passion  of  his  southern  nature  welled  forth.  She  seems  to 
have  returned  his  love;  for  in  the  stormy  sunset  of  his  life 
at  St.  Helena  he  recalled  some  delicious  walks  at  dawn 
when  Caroline  and  he  had  —  eaten  cherries  together.  One 
lingers  fondly  over  these  scenes  of  his  otherwise  stern 
career,  for  they  reveal  his  capacity  for  social  joys  and  for 
deep  and  tender  affection,  had  his  lot  been  otherwise  cast. 
How  different  might  have  been  his  life,  had  France  never 
conquered  Corsica,  and  had  the  Revolution  never  burst 
forth!  But  Corsica  was  still  his  dominant  passion.  When 
he  was  called  away  from  Valence  to  repress  a  riot  at  Lyons, 
his  feelings,  distracted   for  a  time  by  Caroline,  swerved 

1  Chaptal,  '•  Mes  Souvenirs  sur  Napoleon,"  p.  177. 


i  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  15 

back  towards  his  island  home  ;  and  in  September,  1786,  he 
had  the  joy  of  revisiting  the  scenes  of  his  childhood. 
Warmly  though  he  greeted  his  mother,  brothers  and  sis- 
ters, after  an  absence  of  nearly  eight  years,  his  chief 
delight  was  in  the  rocky  shores,  the  verdant  dales  and 
mountain  heights  of  Corsica.  The  odour  of  the  forests, 
the  setting  of  the  sun  in  the  sea  "  as  in  the  bosom  of  the 
infinite,"  the  quiet  proud  independence  of  the  mountain- 
eers themselves,  all  enchanted  him.  His  delight  reveals 
almost  Wertherian  powers  of  "sensibility."  Even  the 
family  troubles  could  not  damp  his  ardour.  His  father 
had  embarked  on  questionable  speculations,  which  now 
threatened  the  Buonapartes  with  bankruptcy,  unless  the 
French  Government  proved  to  be  complacent  and  generous. 
With  the  hope  of  pressing  one  of  the  family  claims  on  the 
royal  exchequer,  the  second  son  procured  an  extension  of 
furlough  and  sped  to  Paris.  There  at  the  close  of  1787  he 
spent  several  weeks,  hopefully  endeavouring  to  extract 
money  from  the  bankrupt  Government.  It  was  a  season 
of  disillusionment  in  more  senses  than  one  ;  for  there  he 
saw  for  himself  the  seamy  side  of  Parisian  life,  and  drifted 
for  a  brief  space  about  the  giddy  vortex  of  the  Palais 
Royale.  What  a  contrast  to  the  limpid  life  of  Corsica 
was  that  turbid  frothy  existence — already  swirling  towards 
its  mighty  plunge  ! 

After  a  furlough  of  twenty-one  months  he  rejoined  his 
regiment,  now  at  Auxonne.  There  his  health  suffered 
considerably,  not  only  from  the  miasma  of  the  marshes  of 
the  river  Saone,  but  also  from  family  anxieties  and  arduous 
literary  toils.  To  these  last  it  is  now  needful  to  refer. 
Indeed,  the  external  events  of  his  early  life  are  of  value 
only  as  they  reveal  the  many-sidedness  of  his  nature  and 
the  growth  of  his  mental  powers. 

How  came  he  to  outgrow  the  insular  patriotism  of  his 
early  years?  The  foregoing  recital  of  facts  must  have 
already  suggested  one  obvious  explanation.  Nature  had 
dowered  him  so  prodigally  with  diverse  gifts,  mainly  of  an 
imperious  order,  that  he  could  scarcely  have  limited  his 
sphere  of  action  to  Corsica.  Profoundly  as  he  loved  his 
island,  it  offered  no  sphere  commensurate  with  his  varied 
powers    and   masterful    will.       It   was    no    empty   vaunt 


16  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

which  his  father  had  uttered  on  his  deathbed  that  his 
Napoleon  would  one  day  overthrow  the  old  monarchies 
and  conquer  Europe.1  Neither  did  the  great  commander 
himself  overstate  the  peculiarity  of  his  temperament,  when 
he  confessed  that  his  instincts  had  ever  prompted  him  that 
his  will  must  prevail,  and  that  what  pleased  him  must  of 
necessity  belong  to  him.  Most  spoilt  children  harbour 
the  same  illusion,  for  a  brief  space.  But  all  the  buffetings 
of  fortune  failed  to  drive  it  from  the  young  Buonaparte ; 
and  when  despair  as  to  his  future  might  have  impaired 
the  vigour  of  his  domineering  instincts,  his  mind  and  will 
acquired  a  fresh  rigidity  by  coming  under  the  spell  of  that 
philosophizing  doctrinaire,  Rousseau. 

There  was  every  reason  why  he  should  early  be  attracted 
by  this  fantastic  thinker.  In  that  notable  work,  "  Le  Con- 
trat  Social "  (1762),  Rousseau  called  attention  to  the  an- 
tique energy  shown  by  the  Corsicans  in  defence  of  their 
liberties,  and  in  a  startlingly  prophetic  phrase  he  exclaimed 
that  the  little  island  would  one  day  astonish  Europe.  The 
source  of  this  predilection  of  Rousseau  for  Corsica  is 
patent.  Born  and  reared  at  Geneva,  he  felt  a  Switzer's 
love  for  a  people  which  was  "  neither  rich  nor  poor  but 
self-sufficing  "  ;  and  in  the  simple  life  and  fierce  love  of 
liberty  of  the  hardy  islanders  he  saw  traces  of  that  social 
contract  which  he  postulated  as  the  basis  of  society.  Ac- 
cording to  him,  the  beginnings  of  all  social  and  political 
institutions  are  to  be  found  in  some  agreement  or  contract 
between  men.  Thus  arise  the  clan,  the  tribe,  the  nation. 
The  nation  may  delegate  many  of  its  powers  to  a  ruler ; 
but  if  he  abuse  such  powers,  the  contract  between  him  and 
his  people  is  at  an  end,  and  they  may  return  to  the  primi- 
tive state,  which  is  founded  on  an  agreement  of  equals 
with  equals.  Herein  lay  the  attractiveness  of  Rousseau 
for  all  who  were  discontented  with  their  surroundings. 
He  seemed  infallibly  to  demonstrate  the  absurdity  of 
tyranny  and  the  need  of  returning  to  the  primitive  bliss 
of  the  social  contract.  It  mattered  not  that  the  said  con- 
tract was  utterly  unhistorical  and  that  his  argument  teemed 
with  fallacies.     He  inspired  a  whole  generation  with  detes- 

1  Joseph  Buonaparte,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  p.  29.  So  too  Miot  de  Melito, 
"Meuis.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  x. 


i  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  17 

tation  of  the  present  and  with  longings  for  the  golden  age. 
Poets  had  sung  of  it,  but  Rousseau  seemed  to  bring  it 
within  the  grasp  of  long-suffering  mortals. 

The  first  extant  manuscript  of  Napoleon,  written  at 
Valence  in  April,  1786,  shows  that  he  sought  in  Rousseau's 
armoury  the  logical  weapons  for  demonstrating  the  "right" 
of  the  Corsicans  to  rebel  against  the  French.  The  young 
hero-worshipper  begins  by  noting  that  it  is  the  birthday 
of  Paoli.  He  plunges  into  a  panegyric  on  the  Corsican 
patriots,  when  he  is  arrested  by  the  thought  that  many 
censure  them  for  rebelling  at  all.  "  The  divine  laws  for- 
bid revolt.  But  what  have  divine  laws  to  do  with  a  purely 
human  affair  ?  Just  think  of  the  absurdity  —  divine  laws 
universally  forbidding  the  casting  off  of  a  usurping  yoke  ! 
.  .  .  As  for  human  laws,  there  cannot  be  any  after  the 
prince  violates  them."  He  then  postulates  two  origins 
for  government  as  alone  possible.  Either  the  people  has 
established  laws  and  submitted  itself  to  the  prince,  or  the 
prince  has  established  laws.  In  the  first  case,  the  prince 
is  engaged  by  the  very  nature  of  his  office  to  execute  the 
covenants.  In  the  second  case,  the  laws  tend,  or  do  not 
tend,  to  the  welfare  of  the  people,  which  is  the  aim  of  all 
government :  if  they  do  not,  the  contract  with  the  prince 
dissolves  of  itself,  for  the  people  then  enters  again  into  its 
primitive  state.  Having  thus  proved  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people,  Buonaparte  uses  his  doctrine  to  justify  Corsi- 
can revolt  against  France,  and  thus  concludes  his  curious 
medley  :  "  The  Corsicans,  following  all  the  laws  of  justice, 
have  been  able  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of  the  Genoese,  and 
may  do  the  same  with  that  of  the  French.     Amen." 

Five  days  later  he  again  gives  the  reins  to  his  melan- 
choly. "  Always  alone,  though  in  the  midst  of  men,"  he 
faces  the  thought  of  suicide.  With  an  innate  power  of 
summarizing  and  balancing  thoughts  and  sensations,  he 
draws  up  arguments  for  and  against  this  act.  He  is  in 
the  dawn  of  his  days  and  in  four  months'  time  he  will  see 
"la  patrie,"  which  he  has  not  seen  since  childhood.  What 
joy  !  And  yet  —  how  men  have  fallen  away  from  nature  : 
how  cringing  are  his  compatriots  to  their  conquerors: 
they  are  no  longer  the  enemies  of  tyrants,  of  luxury,  of 
vile  courtiers :  the  French  have  corrupted  their  morals, 


18  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

and  when  "  la  patrie  "  no  longer  survives,  a  good  patriot 
ought  to  die.  Life  among  the  French  is  odious :  their 
modes  of  life  differ  from  his  as  much  as  the  light  of  the 
moon  differs  from  that  of  the  sun.  —  A  strange  effusion 
this  for  a  youth  of  seventeen  living  amidst  the  full  glories 
of  the  spring  in  Dauphine.  It  was  only  a  few  weeks 
before  the  ripening  of  cherries.  Did  that  cherry-idyll 
with  Mdlle.  de  Colombier  lure  him  back  to  life?  Or  did 
the  hope  of  striking  a  blow  for  Corsica  stay  his  suicidal 
hand?  Probably  the  latter;  for  we  find  him  shortly 
afterwards  tilting  against  a  Protestant  minister  of  Geneva 
who  had  ventured  to  criticise  one  of  the  dogmas  of  Rous- 
seau's evangel. 

The  Genevan  philosopher  had  asserted  that  Christianity, 
by  enthroning  in  the  hearts  of  Christians  the  idea  of  a 
Kingdom  not  of  this  world,  broke  the  unity  of  civil  society, 
because  it  detached  the  hearts  of  its  converts  from  the 
State,  as  from  all  earthly  things.  To  this  the  Genevan 
minister  had  successfully  replied  by  quoting  Christian 
teachings  on  the  subject  at  issue.  But  Buonaparte  fiercely 
accuses  the  pastor  of  neither  having  understood,  nor  even 
read,  "  Le  Contrat  Social "  :  he  hurls  at  his  opponent 
texts  of  Scripture  which  enjoin  obedience  to  the  laws :  he 
accuses  Christianity  of  rendering  men  slaves  to  an  anti- 
social tyranny,  because  its  priests  set  up  an  authority  in 
opposition  to  civil  laws ;  and  as  for  Protestantism,  it 
propagated  discords  between  its  followers,  and  thereby 
violated  civic  unity.  Christianity,  he  argues,  is  a  foe  to 
civil  government,  for  it  aims  at  making  men  happy  in  this 
life  by  inspiring  them  with  hope  of  a  future  life  ;  while 
the  aim  of  civil  government  is  "  to  lend  assistance  to  the 
feeble  against  the  strong,  and  by  this  means  to  allow 
everyone  to  enjoy  a  sweet  tranquillity,  the  road  of  happi- 
ness." He  therefore  concludes  that  Christianity  and  civil 
government  are  diametrically  opposed. 

In  this  tirade  we  see  the  youth's  spirit  of  revolt  flinging 
him  not  only  against  French  law,  but  against  the  religion 
which  sanctions  it.  He  sees  none  of  the  beauty  of  the 
Gospels  which  Rousseau  had  admitted.  His  views  are 
more  rigid  than  those  of  his  teacher.  Scarcely  can  he 
conceive  of  two  influences,  the  spiritual  and  the  govern- 


I  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  19 

mental,  working  on  parallel  lines,  on  different  parts  of 
man's  nature.  His  conception  of  human  society  is  that  of 
an  indivisible,  indistinguishable  whole,  wherein  material- 
ism, tinged  now  and  again  by  religious  sentiment  and 
personal  honour,  is  the  sole  noteworthy  influence.  He 
finds  no  worth  in  a  religion  which  seeks  to  work  from 
within  to  without,  which  aims  at  transforming  character, 
and  thus  transforming  the  world.  In  its  headlong  quest 
of  tangible  results  his  eager  spirit  scorns  so  tardy  a 
method  :  he  will  "  compel  men  to  be  happy,"  and  for  this 
result  there  is  but  one  practicable  means,  the  Social  Con- 
tract, the  State.  Everything  which  mars  the  unity  of  the 
Social  Contract  shall  be  shattered,  so  that  the  State  may 
have  a  clear  field  for  the  exercise  of  its  beneficent  despot- 
ism. Such  is  Buonaparte's  political  and  religious  creed  at 
the  age  of  seventeen,  and  such  it  remained  (with  many 
reservations  suggested  by  maturer  thought  and  self-in- 
terest) to  the  end  of  his  days.  It  reappears  in  his  policy 
anent  the  Concordat  of  1802,  by  which  religion  was  re- 
duced to  the  level  of  handmaid  to  the  State,  as  also  in  his 
frequent  assertions  that  he  would  never  have  quite  the 
same  power  as  the  Czar  and  the  Sultan,  because  he  had 
not  undivided  sway  over  the  consciences  of  his  people.1 
In  this  boyish  essay  we  may  perhaps  discern  the  funda- 
mental reason  of  his  later  failures.  He  never  completely 
understood  religion,  or  the  enthusiasm  which  it  can  evoke; 
neither  did  he  ever  fully  realize  the  complexity  of  human 
nature,  the  many-sidedness  of  social  life,  and  the  limita- 
tions that  beset  the  action  even  of  the  most  intelligent 
law-maker.2 

1  Chaptal,  "  Souvenirs  sur  Napoleon,"  p.  237.  See  too  MassoL,  "  Na- 
poleon Inconnu,"  vol.  i.,  p.  158,  note. 

2  In  an  after-dinner  conversation  on  January  11th,  1803,  with  Roe- 
derer,  Buonaparte  exalted  Voltaire  at  the  expense  of  Rousseau  in  these 
significant  words  :  "The  more  I  read  Voltaire,  the  more  I  like  him:  he 
is  always  reasonable,  never  a  charlatan,  never  a  fanatic :  he  is  made  for 
mature  minds.  Up  to  sixteen  years  of  ag<>  I  would  have  fought  for  Rous- 
seau against  all  the  friends  of  Voltaire.  Now  it  is  the  contrary.  /  have 
been  especially  disgusted  ivith  Rousseau  since  I  have  seen  the  East. 
Savage  man  is  a  dor/."     ("  (Euvres  de  Roederer,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  401.) 

In  1804  he  even  denied  his  indebtedness  to  Rousseau.  During  a  family 
discussion,  wherein  he  also  belittled  Corsica,  he  called  Rousseau  "  a  bab- 
bler, or,  if  you  prefer  it,  an  eloquent  enough  ideologue.  I  never  liked 
him,  nor  indeed  well  understood  him  :  truly  I  had  not  the  courage  to  read 


20  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

His  reading  of  Rousseau  having  equipped  him  for  the 
study  of  human  society  and  government,  he  now,  dur- 
ing his  first  sojourn  at  Auxonne  (June,  1788-September, 
1789),  proceeds  to  ransack  the  records  of  the  ancient  and 
modern  world.  Despite  ill-health,  family  troubles,  and  the 
outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution,  he  grapples  with  this 
portentous  task.  The  history,  geography,  religion,  and 
social  customs  of  the  ancient  Persians,  Scythians,  Thra- 
cians,  Athenians,  Spartans,  Egyptians,  and  Carthaginians 
—  all  furnished  materials  for  his  encyclopaedic  note-books. 
Nothing  came  amiss  to  his  summarizing  genius.  Here  it 
was  that  he  gained  that  knowledge  of  the  past  which  was 
to  astonish  his  contemporaries.  Side  by  side  with  sugges- 
tions on  regimental  discipline  and  improvements  in  artil- 
lery, we  find  notes  on  the  opening  episodes  of  Plato's 
"  Republic,"  and  a  systematic  summary  of  English  history 
from  the  earliest  times  down  to  the  Revolution  of  1688. 
This  last  event  inspired  him  with  special  interest,  because 
the  Whigs  and  their  philosophic  champion,  Locke,  main- 
tained that  James  II.  had  violated  the  original  contract 
between  prince  and  people.  Everywhere  in  his  notes 
Napoleon  emphasizes  the  incidents  which  led  to  conflicts 
between  dynasties  or  between  rival  principles.  In  fact, 
through  all  these  voracious  studies  there  appear  signs  of 
his  determination  to  write  a  history  of  Corsica;  and,  while 
inspiriting  his  kinsmen  b}r  recalling  the  glorious  past,  he 
sought  to  weaken  the  French  monarchy  by  inditing  a 
"  Dissertation  sur  l'Autorite  Royale."  His  first  sketch  of 
this  work  runs  as  follows: 

"23  October,  1788.     Auxonne. 

"  This  work  will  begin  with  general  ideas  as  to  the  origin  and  the 
enhanced  prestige  of  the  name  of  king.     Military  rule  is  favourable  to 

him  all,  because   I  thought  him  for  the  most  part  tedious."     (Lucien 
Buonaparte,  "  Me'moires,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xi.) 

His  later  views  on  Rousseau  are  strikingly  set  forth  by  Stanislas 
Girardin,  who,  in  his  "Memoirs,"  relates  that  Buonaparte,  on  his  visit  to 
the  tomb  of  Rousseau,  said  :  "  '  It  would  have  been  better  for  the  repose 
of  France  that  this  man  had  never  been  born.'  '  Why,  First  Consul  ?  ' 
said  I.  '  He  prepared  the  French  Revolution.'  '  I  thought  it  was  not  for 
you  to  complain  of  the  Revolution.'  '  Well,'  he  replied,  « the  future  will 
show  whether  it  would  not  have  been  better  for  the  repose  of  the  world 
that  neither  I  nor  Rousseau  had  existed.'"  Me"neval  confirms  this  re- 
markable statement. 


\  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  YEARS  21 

it:  this  work  will  afterwards  enter  into  the  details  of  the  usurped 
authority  enjoyed  by  the  Kings  of  the  twelve  Kingdoms  of  Europe. 
"There  are  very  few  Kings  who  have  not  deserved  dethronement."  ' 

This  curt  pronouncement  is  all  that  remains  of  the  pro- 
jected work.  It  sufficiently  indicates,  however,  the  aim 
of  Napoleon's  studies.  One  and  all  they  were  designed 
to  equip  him  for  the  great  task  of  re-awakening  the  spirit 
of  the  Corsicans  and  of  sapping  the  base  of  the  French 
monarchy. 

But  these  reams  of  manuscript  notes  and  crude  literary 
efforts  have  an  even  wider  source  of  interest.  They  show 
how  narrow  was  his  outlook  on  life.  It  all  turned  on  the 
regeneration  of  Corsica  by  methods  which  he  himself  pre- 
scribed. We  are  therefore  able  to  understand  why,  when 
his  own  methods  of  salvation  for  Corsica  were  rejected,  he 
tore  himself  away  and  threw  his  undivided  energies  into 
the  Revolution. 

Yet  the  records  of  his  early  life  show  that  in  his  char- 
acter there  was  a  strain  of  true  sentiment  and  affection. 
In  him  Nature  carved  out  a  character  of  rock-like  firm- 
ness, but  she  adorned  it  with  flowers  of  human  sympathy 
and  tendrils  of  family  love.  At  his  first  parting  from  his 
brother  Joseph  at  Autun,  when  the  elder  brother  was 
weeping  passionately,  the  little  Napoleon  dropped  a  tear  : 
but  that,  said  the  tutor,  meant  as  much  as  the  flood  of 
tears  from  Joseph.  Love  of  his  relatives  was  a  potent 
factor  of  his  policy  in  later  life;  and  slander  has  never 
been  able  wholly  to  blacken  the  character  of  a  man  who 
loved  and  honoured  his  mother,  who  asserted  that  her  ad- 
vice had  often  been  of  the  highest  service  to  him,  and  that 
her  justice  and  firmness  of  spirit  marked  her  out  as  a 
natural  ruler  of  men.  But  when  these  admissions  are  freely 
granted,  it  still  remains  true  that  his  character  was  natu- 
rally hard  ;  that  his  sense  of  personal  superiority  made 
him,  even  as  a  child,  exacting  and  domineering ;  and  the 
sequel  was  to  show  that  even  the  strongest  passion  of  his 
youth,  his  determination  to  free  Corsica  from  France, 
could  be  abjured  if  occasion  demanded,  all  the  force  of  his 
nature  being  thenceforth  concentrated  on  vaster  adven- 
tures. 

1  Masson,  "Napoleon  Inconnu,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  53. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION  AND  CORSICA 

"  They  seek  to  destroy  the  Revolution  by  attacking  my 
person  :  I  will  defend  it,  for  I  am  the  Revolution."  Such 
were  the  words  uttered  by  Buonaparte  after  the  failure  of 
the  royalist  plot  of  1804.  They  are  a  daring  transcript 
of  Louis  XIV. 's  "  L'etat,  c'est  moi."  That  was  a  bold 
claim,  even  for  an  age  attuned  to  the  whims  of  autocrats : 
but  this  of  the  young  Corsican  is  even  more  daring,  for  he 
thereby  equated  himself  with  a  movement  which  claimed 
to  be  wide  as  humanity  and  infinite  as  truth.  And  yet 
when  he  spoke  these  words,  they  were  not  scouted  as  pre- 
sumptuous folly  :  to  most  Frenchmen  they  seemed  sober 
truth  and  practical  good  sense.  How  came  it,  one  asks  in 
wonder,  that  after  the  short  space  of  fifteen  years  a  world- 
wide movement  depended  on  a  single  life,  that  the  infini- 
tudes of  1789  lived  on  only  in  the  form,  and  by  the 
pleasure,  of  the  First  Consul  ?  Here  surely  is  a  political 
incarnation  unparalleled  in  the  whole  course  of  human 
history.  The  riddle  cannot  be  solved  by  history  alone. 
It  belongs  in  part  to  the  domain  of  psychology,  when  that 
science  shall  undertake  the  study,  not  merely  of  man  as  a 
unit,  but  of  the  aspirations,  moods,  and  whims  of  com- 
munities and  nations.  Meanwhile  it  will  be  our  far  hum- 
bler task  to  strive  to  point  out  the  relation  of  Buonaparte 
to  the  Revolution,  and  to  show  how  the  mighty  force  of 
his  will  dragged  it  to  earth. 

The  first  questions  that  confront  us  are  obviously  these. 
Were  the  lofty  aims  and  aspirations  of  the  Revolution 
attainable?  And,  if  so,  did  the  men  of  1789  follow  them 
by  practical  methods  ?  To  the  former  of  these  questions 
the  present  chapter  will,  in  part  at  least,  serve  as  an 
answer.  On  the  latter  part  of  the  problem  the  events 
described  in  later  chapters  will  throw  some  light :  in  them 

22 


chap,  ii     THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION    AND   CORSICA  23 

we  shall  see  that  the  great  popular  upheaval  let  loose 
mighty  forces  that  bore  Buonaparte  on  to  fortune. 

Here  we  may  notice  that  the  Revolution  was  not  a  sim- 
ple and  therefore  solid  movement.  It  was  complex  and 
contained  the  seeds  of  discord  which  lurk  in  many-sided 
and  militant  creeds.  The  theories  of  its  intellectual  cham- 
pions were  as  diverse  as  the  motives  which  spurred  on  their 
followers  to  the  attack  on  the  outworn  abuses  of  the  age. 

Discontent  and  faith  were  the  ultimate  motive  powers 
of  the  Revolution.  I  Faith  prepared  the  Revolution  and 
discontent  accomplished  it.  Idealists  who,  in  varied 
planes  of  thought,  preached  the  doctrine  of  human  per- 
fectibility, succeeded  in  slowly  permeating  the  dull  toiling 
masses  of  France  with  hope.  Omitting  here  any  notice  of 
philosophic  speculation  as  such,  we  may  briefly  notice  the 
teachings  of  three  writers  whose  influence  on  revolution- 
ary politics  was  to  be  definite  and  practical.  These  were 
Montesquieu,  Voltaire,  and  Rousseau.  The  first  was  by 
no  means  a  revolutionist,  for  he  decided  in  favour  of  a 
mixed  form  of  government,  like  that  of  England,  which 
guaranteed  the  State  against  the  dangers  of  autocracy, 
oligarchy,  and  mob-rule.  Only  by  a  ricochet  did  he  assail 
the  French  monarchy.  But  he  re-awakened  critical  in- 
quiry ;  and  any  inquiry  was  certain  to  sap  the  base  of  the 
ancien  regime  in  France.  Montesquieu's  teaching  inspired 
the  group  of  moderate  reformers  who  in  1789  desired  tore- 
fashion  the  institutions  of  France  on  the  model  of  those  of 
England.  But  popular  sentiment  speedily  swept  past  these 
Anglophils  towards  the  more  attractive  aims  set  forth  by 
Voltaire. 

This  keen  thinker  subjected  the  privileged  classes,  es- 
pecially the  titled  clergy,  to  a  searching  fire  of  philosophic 
bombs  and  barbed  witticisms.  Never  was  there  a  more 
dazzling  succession  of  literary  triumphs  over  a  tottering 
system.  The  satirized  classes  winced  and  laughed,  and 
the  intellect  of  France  was  conquered,  for  the  Revolution. 
Thenceforth  it  was  impossible  that  peasants  who  were 
nominally  free  should  toil  to  satisfy  the  exacting  needs  of 
the  State,  and  to  support  the  brilliant  bevy  of  nobles  who 
flitted  gaily  round  the  monarch  at  Versailles.  The  young 
King  Louis  XVI.,  it  is  true,  carried  through  several  re- 


24  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

forms,  but  he  had  not  enough  strength  of  will  to  abolish 
the  absurd  immunities  from  taxation  which  freed  the 
nobles  and  titled  clergy  from  the  burdens  of  the  State. 
Thus,  down  to  1789,  the  middle  classes  and  peasants  bore 
nearly  all  the  weight  of  taxation,  while  the  peasants  were 
also  encumbered  by  feudal  dues  and  tolls.  These  were  the 
crying  grievances  which  united  in  a  solid  phalanx  both 
thinkers  and  practical  men,  and  thereby  gave  an  immense 
impetus  to  the  levelling  doctrines  of  Rousseau. 

Two  only  of  his  political  teachings  concern   us   here, 
namely,  social  equality  and  the  unquestioned  supremacy 
of   the    State  ;  for  to  these   dogmas,  when   they   seemed 
doomed  to  political  bankruptcy,  Napoleon  Buonaparte  was 
to  act  as    residuary   legatee.       According   to    Rousseau, 
society  and  government  originated  in  a  social  contract, 
whereby  all  members  of  the  community  have  equal  rights. 
It  matters  not  that  the  spirit  of  the  contract  may  have 
evaporated  amidst  the  miasma  of  luxury.     That  is  a  viola- 
tion of  civil  society  ;  and  members  are  justified  in  revert- 
ing at  once  to  the  primitive  ideal.     If  the  existence  of  the 
body  politic  be  endangered,  force  may  be  used  :  "  Who- 
ever refuses  to  obey  the  general  will  shall  be  constrained 
to  do  so  by  the  whole  body  ;  which  means  nothing  else 
than  that  he  shall  be  forced  to  be  free."     Equally  plaus- 
ible and  dangerous  was  his  teaching  as  to  the  indivisibility 
of  the  general  will.     Deriving  every  public  power  from 
his  social  contract,  he  finds  it  easy  to  prove  that  the  sov- 
ereign  power,    vested   in   all   the   citizens,   must   be   in- 
corruptible, inalienable,  unrepresentable,  indivisible,  and 
indestructible.     Englishmen  may  now  find  it  difficult  to 
understand  the  enthusiasm  called  forth  by  this  quintes- 
sence of  negations  ;  but  to  Frenchmen  recently  escaped 
from  the  age  of  privilege  and  warring  against  the  coali- 
tion of  kings,  the  cry  of  the  Republic  one  and  indivisible 
was  a  trumpet  call  to  death  or  victory.     Any  shifts,  even 
that  of  a  dictatorship,   were  to  be  borne,  provided  that 
social  equality  could  be  saved.     As  republican  Rome  had 
saved  her  early  liberties  by  intrusting  unlimited  powers 
to  a  temporary  dictator,  so,  claimed  Rousseau,  a  young 
commonwealth  must  by  a  similar  device  consult  Nature's 
first  law  of  self-preservation.     The  dictator  saves  liberty 


ii  THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION  AND   CORSICA  25 

by  temporarily  abrogating  it  :  by  momentary  gagging  of 
the  legislative  power  he  renders  it  truly  vocal. 

The  events  of  the  French  Revolution  form  a  tragic 
commentary  on  these  theories.  In  the  first  stage  of  that 
great  movement  we  see  the  followers  of  Montesquieu, 
Voltaire,  and  Rousseau  marching  in  an  undivided  host 
against  the  ramparts  of  privilege.  The  walls  of  the  Bas- 
tille fall  down  even  at  the  blast  of  their  trumpets.  Odi- 
ous feudal  privileges  disappear  in  a  single  sitting  of  the 
National  Assembly  ;  and  the  Parlements,  or  supreme  law 
courts  of  the  provinces,  are  swept  away.  The  old  prov- 
inces themselves  are  abolished,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
1790  France  gains  social  and  political  unity  by  her  new 
system  of  Departments,  which  grants  full  freedom  of 
action  in  local  affairs,  though  in  all  national  concerns 
it  binds  France  closely  to  the  new  popular  government 
at  Paris.  But  discords  soon  begin  to  divide  the  re- 
formers :  hatred  of  clerical  privilege  and  the  desire  to 
fill  the  empty  coffers  of  the  State  dictate  the  first  acts 
of  spoliation.  Tithes  are  abolished  :  the  lands  of  the 
Church  are  confiscated  to  the  service  of  the  State  ;  mo- 
nastic orders  are  suppressed  ;  and  the  Government  un- 
dertakes to  pay  the  stipends  of  bishops  and  priests. 
Furthermore,  their  subjection  to  the  State  is  definitely 
secured  by  the  Civil  Constitution  of  the  Clergy  (July, 
1790),  which  invalidates  their  allegiance  to  the  Pope. 
Most  of  the  clergy  refuse  :  these  are  termed  non-jurors 
or  orthodox  priests,  while  their  more  complaisant  col- 
leagues are  known  as  constitutional  priests.  Hence  arises 
a  serious  schism  in  the  Church,  which  distracts  the  reli- 
gious life  of  the  land,  and  separates  the  friends  of  liberty 
from  the  champions  of  the  rigorous  equality  preached  by 
Rousseau. 

The  new  constitution  of  1791  was  also  a  source  of 
discord.  In  its  jealousy  of  the  royal  authority,  the 
National  Assembly  seized  very  many  of  the  executive 
functions  of  government.  The  results  were  disastrous. 
Laws  remained  without  force,  taxes  went  uncollected, 
the  army  was  distracted  by  mutinies,  and  the  monarchy 
sank  slowly  into  the  gulf  of  bankruptcy  and  anarchy. 
Thus,  in   the   course   of   three   years,  the   revolutionists 


26  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

goaded  the  clergy  to  desperation,  they  were  about  to 
overthrow  the  monarchy,  every  month  was  proving  their 
local  self-government  to  be  unworkable,  and  they  them- 
selves  split  into  factions  that  plunged  France  into  war 
and  drenched  her  soil  by  organized  massacres. 

We  know  very  little  about  the  impression  made  on  the 
young  Buonaparte  by  the  first  events  of  the  Revolution. 
His  note-book  seems  even  to  show  that  he  regarded  them 
as  an  inconvenient  interference  with  his  plans  for  Corsica. 
But  gradually  the  Revolution  excites  his  interest.  In 
September,  1789,  we  find  him  on  furlough  in  Corsica 
sharing  the  hopes  of  the  islanders  that  their  representa- 
tives in  the  French  National  Assembly,  will  obtain  the 
boon  of  independence.  He  exhorts  his  compatriots  to 
favour  the  democratic  cause,  which  promises  a  speedy 
deliverance  from  official  abuses.  He  urges  them  to  don 
the  new  tricolour  cockade,  symbol  of  Parisian  triumph 
over  the  old  monarchy  ;  to  form  a  club  ;  above  all,  to 
organize  a  National  Guard.  The  young  officer  knew  that 
military  power  was  passing  from  the  royal  army,  now 
honeycombed  with  discontent,  to  the  National  Guard. 
Here  surely  was  Corsica's  means  of  salvation.  But  the 
French  governor  of  Corsica  intervenes.  The  club  is 
closed,  and  the  National  Guard  is  dispersed.  Thereupon 
Buonaparte  launches  a  vigorous  protest  against  the  tyr- 
anny of  the  governor  and  appeals  to  the  National  Assem- 
bly of  France  for  some  guarantee  of  civil  liberty.  His 
name  is  at  the  head  of  this  petition,  a  sufficiently  daring 
step  for  a  junior  lieutenant  on  furlough.  But  his  patri- 
otism and  audacity  carry  him  still,  further.  He  journeys 
to  Bastia,  the  official  capital  of  his  island,  and  is  concerned 
in  an  affray  between  the  populace  and  the  royal  troops  (No- 
vember 5th,  1789).  The  French  authorities,  fortunately 
for  him,  are  nearly  powerless  :  he  is  merely  requested  to 
return  to  Ajaccio  ;  and  there  he  organizes  anew  the  civic 
force,  and  sets  the  dissident  islanders  an  example  of  good 
discipline  by  mounting  guard  outside  the  house  of  a  per- 
sonal opponent. 

Other  events  now  transpired  which  began  to  assuage  his 
opposition  to  France.     Thanks  to  the  eloquent  efforts  of 


ii  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION   AND   CORSICA  27 

Mirabeau,  the  Corsican  patriots  who  had  remained  in  exile 
since  1768  were  allowed  to  return  and  enjoy  the  full  rights 
of  citizenship.  Little  could  the  friends  of  liberty  at  Paris, 
or  even  the  statesman  himself,  have  foreseen  all  the  conse- 
quences of  this  action  :  it  softened  the  feelings  of  many 
Corsicans  towards  their  conquerors ;  above  all,  it  caused 
the  heart  of  Napoleon  Buonaparte  for  the  first  time  to 
throb  in  accord  with  that  of  the  French  nation.  His 
feelings  towards  Paoli  also  began  to  cool.  The  conduct  of 
this  illustrious  exile  exposed  him  to  the  charge  of  ingrati- 
tude towards  France.  The  decree  of  the  French  National 
Assembly,  which  restored  him  to  Corsican  citizenship,  was 
graced  by  acts  of  courtesy  such  as  the  generous  French 
nature  can  so  winningly  dispense.  Louis  XVI.  and  the 
National  Assembly  warmly  greeted  him,  and  recognized 
him  as  head  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  island.  Yet, 
amidst  all  the  congratulations,  Paoli  saw  the  approach  of 
anarchy,  and  behaved  with  some  reserve.  Outwardly, 
however,  concord  seemed  to  be  assured,  when  on  July 
14th,  1790,  he  landed  in  Corsica ;  but  the  hatred  long 
nursed  by  the  mountaineers  and  fisherfolk  against  France 
was  not  to  be  exorcised  by  a  few  demonstrations.  In  truth, 
the  island  was  deeply  agitated.  The  priests  were  rousing 
the  people  against  the  newly  decreed  Civil  Constitution 
of  the  Clergy ;  and  one  of  these  disturbances  endangered 
the  life  of  Napoleon  himself.  He  and  his  brother  Joseph 
chanced  to  pass  by  when  one  of  the  processions  of  priests 
and  devotees  was  exciting  the  pity  and  indignation  of  the 
townsfolk.  The  two  brothers,  who  were  now  well  known 
as  partisans  of  the  Revolution,  were  threatened  with  vio- 
lence, and  were  saved  only  by  their  own  firm  demeanour 
and  the  intervention  of  peacemakers. 

Then  again,  the  concession  of  local  self-government  to 
the  island,  as  one  of  the  Departments  of  France,  revealed 
unexpected  difficulties.  Bastia  and  Ajaccio  struggled 
hard  for  the  honour  of  being  the  official  capital.  Paoli 
favoured  the  claims  of  Bastia,  thereby  annoying  the 
champions  of  Ajaccio,  among  whom  the  Buonapartes  were 
prominent.  The  schism  was  widened  by  the  dictatorial 
tone  of  Paoli,  a  demeanour  which  ill  became  the  chief  of 
a  civic  force.     In  fact,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  Cor- 


28  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

sica  was  too  small  a  sphere  for  natures  so  able  and  master- 
ful as  those  of  Paoli  and  Napoleon  Buonaparte. 

The  first  meeting  of  these  two  men  must  have  been  a 
scene  of  deep  interest.  It  was  on  the  fatal  field  of  Ponte 
Nuovo.  Napoleon  doubtless  came  there  in  the  spirit  of 
true  hero-worship.  But  hero-worship  which  can  stand 
the  strain  of  actual  converse  is  rare  indeed,  especially 
when  the  expectant  devotee  is  endowed  with  keen  insight 
and  habits  of  trenchant  expression.  One  phrase  has  come 
down  to  us  as  a  result  of  the  interview;  but  this  phrase 
contains  a  volume  of  meaning.  After  Paoli  had  explained 
the  disposition  of  his  troops  against  the  French  at  Ponte 
Nuovo,  Buonaparte  drily  remarked  to  his  brother  Joseph, 
"The  result  of  these  dispositions  was  what  was  inevit- 
able."1 

For  the  present,  Buonaparte  and  other  Corsican  demo- 
crats were  closely  concerned  with  the  delinquencies  of  the 
Comte  de  Buttafuoco,  the  deputy  for  the  twelve  nobles  of 
the  island  to  the  National  Assembly  of  France.  In  a  letter 
written  on  January  23rd,  1791,  Buonaparte  overwhelms 
this  man  with  a  torrent  of  invective. — He  it  was  who  had 
betrayed  his  country  to  France  in  1768.  Self-interest  and 
that  alone  prompted  his  action  then,  and  always.  French 
rule  was  a  cloak  for  his  design  of  subjecting  Corsica  to 
"  the  absurd  feudal  regime  "  of  the  barons.  In  his  selfish 
royalism  he  had  protested  against  the  new  French  consti- 
tution as  being  unsuited  to  Corsica,  "  though  it  was  exactly 
the  same  as  that  which  brought  us  so  much  good  and  was 
wrested  from  us  only  amidst  streams  of  blood." — The  letter 
is  remarkable  for  the  southern  intensity  of  its  passion,  and 
for  a  certain  hardening  of  tone  towards  Paoli.  Buona- 
parte writes  of  Paoli  as  having  been  ever  "  surrounded  by 
enthusiasts,  and  as  failing  to  understand  in  a  man  any 
other  passion  than  fanaticism  for  liberty  and  indepen- 
dence," and  as  duped  by  Buttafuoco  in  1768.2    The  phrase 

1  Joseph  Buonaparte,  "  Memoires,,r  vol.  i.,  p.  44. 

2  M.  Chuquet,  in  his  work  "La  Jeunesse  de  Napoleon"  (Paris,  1898), 
gives  a  different  opinion  :  but  I  think  this  passage  shows  a  veiled  hostility 
to  Paoli.  Probably  we  may  refer  to  this  time  an  incident  stated  by  Na- 
poleon at  St.  Helena  to  Lady  Malcolm  ("Diary,"  p.  88),  namely,  that 
Paoli  urged  on  him  the  acceptance  of  a  commission  in  the  British  array  : 
"  But  I  preferred  the  French,  because  I  spoke  the  language,  was  of  their 


ii  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION   AND   CORSICA  29 

has  an  obvious  reference  to  the  Paoli  of  1791,  surrounded 
by  men  who  had  shared  his  long  exile  and  regarded  the 
English  constitution  as  their  model.  Buonaparte,  on  the 
contrary,  is  the  accredited  champion  of  French  democracy, 
his  furious  epistle  being  printed  by  the  Jacobin  Club  of 
Ajaccio. 

After  firing  off  this  tirade  Buonaparte  returned  to  his 
regiment  at  Auxonne  (February,  1791).  It  was  high 
time;  for  his  furlough,  though  prolonged  on  the  plea  of 
ill-health,  had  expired  in  the  preceding  October,  and  he 
was  therefore  liable  to  six  months'  imprisonment.  But  the 
young  officer  rightly  gauged  the  weakness  of  the  moribund 
monarchy;  and  the  officers  of  his  almost  mutinous  regi- 
ment were  glad  to  get  him  back  on  any  terms.  Every- 
where in  his  journey  through  Provence  and  Dauphine, 
Buonaparte  saw  the  triumph  of  revolutionary  principles. 
He  notes  that  the  peasants  are  to  a  man  for  the  Revolu- 
tion ;  so  are  the  rank  and  file  of  the  regiment.  The  officers 
are  aristocrats,  along  with  three-fourths  of  those  who 
belong  to  "good  society":  so  are  all  the  women,  for 
"Liberty  is  fairer  than  they,  and  eclipses  them."  The 
Revolution  was  evidently  gaining  completer  hold  over  his 
mind  and  was  somewhat  blurring  his  insular  sentiments, 
when  a  rebuff  from  Paoli  further  weakened  his  ties  to 
Corsica.  Buonaparte  had  dedicated  to  him  his  work  on 
Corsica,  and  had  sent  him  the  manuscript  for  his  approval. 
After  keeping  it  an  unconscionable  time,  the  old  man  now 
coldly  replied  that  he  did  not  desire  the  honour  of  Buona- 
parte's panegyric,  though  he  thanked  him  heartily  for  it; 
that  the  consciousness  of  having  done  his  duty  sufficed  for 
him  in  his  old  age;  and,  for  the  rest,  history  should  not  be 
written  in  youth.  A  further  request  from  Joseph  Buona- 
parte for  the  return  of  the  slighted  manuscript  brought  the 
answer  that  he,  Paoli,  had  no  time  to  search  his  papers. 
After  this,  how  could  hero-worship  subsist  ? 

religion,  understood  and  liked  their  manners,  and  I  thought  the  Revolu- 
tion a  fine  time  for  an  enterprising  young  man.  Paoli  was  angry  —  we  did 
not  speak  afterwards."     It  is  hard  to  reconcile  all  these  statements. 

Lucien  Buonaparte  states  that  liis  brother  seriously  thought  for  a  time 
of  taking  a  commission  in  the  forces  of  the  British  East  India  Company  ; 
but  I  am  assured  by  our  officials  that  no  record  of  any  application  now 
exists. 


30 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


The  four  months  spent  by  Buonaparte  at  Auxonne  were, 
indeed,  a  time  of  disappointment  and  hardship.  Out  of 
his  slender  funds  he  paid  for  the  education  of  his  younger 
brother,  Louis,  who  shared  his  otherwise  desolate  lodging. 
A  room  almost  bare  but  for  a  curtainless  bed,  a  table 
heaped  with  books  and  papers,  and  two  chairs—  such  were 
the  surroundings  of  the  lieutenant  in  the  spring  of  1791. 
He  lived  on  bread  that  he  might  rear  his  brother  for  the 
army,  and  that  he  might  buy  books,  overjoyed  when  his 
savings  mounted  to  the  price  of  some  coveted  volume. 

Perhaps  the  depressing  conditions  of  his  life  at  Aux- 
onne may  account  for  the  acrid  tone  of  an  essay  which  he 
there  wrote  in  competition  for  a   prize    offered   by  the 
Academy  of  Lyons  on  the  subject  — "  What  truths  and 
sentiments  ought  to  be  inculcated  to  men  for  their  happi- 
ness."     It  was  unsuccessful;    and  modern   readers  will 
agree  with  the  verdict  of  one  of  the  judges  that  it  was 
incongruous  in  arrangement  and  of   a  bad  and  ragged 
style.      The  thoughts  are  set  forth  in  jerky,  vehement 
clauses  ;    and,  in  place  of   the  sensibilite  of   some  of  his 
earlier  effusions,  we  feel  here  the  icy  breath  of  material- 
ism.    He  regards  an  ideal  human  society  as  a  geometrical 
structure  based  on  certain  well-defined  postulates.     All 
men  ought  to  be  able  to  satisfy  certain  elementary  needs 
of  their  nature  ;  but  all  that  is  beyond  is  questionable  or 
harmful.     The  ideal  legislator  will  curtail  wealth  so  as  to 
restore  the  wealthy  to  their  true  nature  —  and  so  forth. 
Of   any  generous  outlook  on  the  wider  possibilities   of 
human  life  there  is  scarcely  a  trace.     His  essay  is  the 
apotheosis  of  social  mediocrity.     By  Procrustean  methods 
he  would  have  forced  mankind  back  to  the  dull  levels  ot 
Sparta :  the  opalescent  glow  of  Athenian  life  was  beyond 
his  ken.     But  perhaps  the  most  curious  passage  is  that  in 
which  he  preaches  against  the  sin  and  folly  of  ambition 
He  pictures  Ambition  as  a  figure  with  pallid  cheeks,  wild 
eyes,  hasty  step,  jerky  movements  and  sardonic  smile,  for 
whom  crimes  are  a  sport,  while  lies  and  calumnies  are 
merely  arguments  and  figures  of  speech.     Then,  in  words 
that  recall  Juvenal's  satire  on  Hannibal's  career,  he  con- 
tinues:  "What  is  Alexander  doing  when  he  rushes  from 
Thebes  into  Persia  and  thence  into  India?     He  is  ever 


it  THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION  AND   CORSICA  31 

restless,  he  loses  his  wits,  he  believes  himself  God.  What 
is  the  end  of  Cromwell?  He  governs  England.  But  is 
he  not  tormented  by  all  the  daggers  of  the  furies  ?  "  —  The 
words  ring  false,  even  for  this  period  of  Buonaparte's 
life ;  and  one  can  readily  understand  his  keen  wish  in 
later  years  to  burn  every  copy  of  these  youthful  essays. 
But  they  have  nearly  all  survived;  and  the  diatribe 
against  ambition  itself  supplies  the  feather  wherewith 
history  may  wing  her  shaft  at  the  towering  flight  of  the 
imperial  eagle.1 

At  midsummer  he  is  transferred,  as  first  lieutenant,  to 
another  regiment  which  happened  to  be  quartered  at 
Valence  ;  but  his  second  sojourn  there  is  remarkable  only 
for  signs  of  increasing  devotion  to  the  revolutionary 
cause.  In  the  autumn  of  1791  he  is  again  in  Corsica  on 
furlough,  and  remains  there  until  the  month  of  May  fol- 
lowing. He  finds  the  island  rerft  by  strifes  which  it  would 
be  tedious  to  describe.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  breach 
between  Paoli  and  the  Buonapartes  gradually  widened 
owing  to  the  dictator's  suspicion  of  all  who  favoured  the 
French  Revolution.  The  young  officer  certainly  did  noth- 
ing to  close  'the  breach.  Determined  to  secure  his  own 
election  as  lieutenant-colonel  in  the  new  Corsican  National 
Guard,  he  spent  much  time  in  gaining  recruits  who  would 
vote  for  him.  He  further  assured  his  success  by  having 
one  of  the  commissioners,  who  was  acting  in  Paoli's  inter- 
est, carried  off  from  his  friends  and  detained  at  the  Buona- 
partes' house  in  Ajaccio  —  his  first  coup.2.  Stranger  events 
were  to  follow.  At  Easter,  when  the  people  were  excited 
by  the  persecuting  edicts  against  the  clergy  and  the  clos- 
ing of  a  monastery,  there  was  sharp  fighting  between  the 

1  The  whole  essay  is  evidently  influenced  by  the  works  of  the  democrat 
Raynal,  to  whom  Buonaparte  dedicated  his  "  Lettres  sur  la  Corse."  To 
the  "  Discours  de  Lyons  "  he  prefixed  as  motto  the  words,  "  Morality  will 
exist  when  governments  are  free,"  which  he  modelled  on  a  similar  phrase 
of  Raynal.  The  following  sentences  are  also  noteworthy  :  "  Notre  organi- 
sation animale  a  des  besoins  indispensables :  manger,  dormir,  engendrer. 
Une  nourriture,  une  cabane,  des  vetements,  une  femme,  sont  done  une 
stricte  n^cessite'  pour  le  bonheur.  Notre  organisation  intellectuelle  a  des 
app^tits  non  moins  impe'rieux  et  dont  la  satisfaction  est  beaucoup  plus 
pricieuse.  C'est  dans  leur  entier  d^veloppement  que  consiste  vraiment 
le  bonheur.     Sentir  et  raisonner,  voila  proprement  le  fait  de  l'hoinme." 

2  Nasica  ;  Chuquet,  p.  248. 


32  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

populace  and  Buonaparte's  companies  of  National  Guards. 
Originating  in  a  petty  quarrel,  which  was  taken  up  by 
eager  partisans,  it  embroiled  the  whole  of  the  town  and 
gave  the  ardent  young  Jacobin  the  chance  of  overthrow- 
ing his  enemies.  His  plans  even  extended  to  the  seizure 
of  the  citadel,  where  he  tried  to  seduce  the  French  regi- 
ment from  its  duty  to  officers  whom  he  dubbed  aristocrats. 
The  attempt  was  a  failure.  The  whole  truth  can,  per- 
haps, scarcely  be  discerned  amidst  the  tissue  of  lies  which 
speedily  enveloped  the  affair ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  on  the  second  day  of  strife  Buonaparte's  National 
Guards  began  the  fight  and  subsequently  menaced  the 
regular  troops  in  the  citadel.  The  conflict  was  finally 
stopped  by  commissioners  sent  by  Paoli ;  and  the  volun- 
teers were  sent  away  from  the  town. 

Buonaparte's  position  now  seemed  desperate.  His 
conduct  exposed  him  to  the  hatred  of  most  of  his  fellow- 
citizens  and  to  the  rebukes  of  the  French  War  Depart- 
ment. In  fact,  he  had  doubly  sinned :  he  had  actually 
exceeded  his  furlough  by  four  months  :  he  was  technically 
guilty,  first  of  desertion,  and  secondly  of  treason.  In 
ordinary  times  he  would  have  been  shot,  but  the  times 
were  extraordinary,  and  he  rightly  judged  that  when  a 
Continental  war  was  brewing,  the  most  daring  course  was 
also  the  most  prudent,  namely,  to  go  to  Paris.  Thither 
Paoli  allowed  him  to  proceed,  doubtless  on  the  principle 
of  giving  the  young  madcap  a  rope  wherewith  to  hang 
himself. 

On  his  arrival  at  Marseilles,  he  hears  that  war  has  been 
declared  by  France  against  Austria;  for  the  republican 
Ministry,  which  Louis  XVI.  had  recently  been  compelled 
to  accept,  believed  that  war  against  an  absolute  monarch 
would  intensify  revolutionary  fervour  in  France  and 
hasten  the  advent  of  the  Republic.  Their  surmises  were 
correct.  Buonaparte,  on  his  arrival  at  Paris,  witnessed 
the  closing  scenes  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XVI.  On  June 
20th  he  saw  the  crowd  burst  into  the  Tuileries,  when  for 
some  hours  it  insulted  the  king  and  queen.  Warmly 
though  lie  had  espoused  the  principles  of  the  Revolution, 
his  patrician  blood  boiled  at  the  sight  of  these  vulgar  out- 
rages, and  he  exclaimed  :   "  Why  don't  they  sweep  off  four 


ii  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION   AND   CORSICA  33 

or  five  hundred  of  that  canaille  with  cannon?  The  rest 
would  then  run  away  fast  enough."  The  remark  is  sig- 
nificant. If  his  brain  approved  the  Jacobin  creed,  his 
/  instincts  were  always  with  monarchy.  His  career  was  to 
reconcile  his  reason  with  his  instincts,  and  to  impose  on 
weary  France  the  curious  compromise  of  a  revolutionary 
Imperialism. 

On  August  10th,  from  the  window  of  a  shop  near  the 
Tuileries,  he  looked  down  on  the  strange  events  which 
dealt  the  coup  de  grace  to  the  dying  monarchy.  Again 
the  chieftain  within  him  sided  against  the  vulture  rabble 
and  with  the  well-meaning  monarch  who  kept  his  troops 
to  a  tame  defensive.  "If  Louis  XVI."  (so  wrote  Buona- 
parte to  his  brother  Joseph)  "  had  mounted  his  horse,  the 
victory  would  have  been  his  —  so  I  judge  from  the  spirit 
which  prevailed  in  the  morning."  When  all  was  over, 
when  Louis  sheathed  his  sword  and  went  for  shelter  to 
the  National  Assembly,  when  the  fierce  Marseillais  were 
slaughtering  the  Swiss  Guards  and  bodyguards  of  the 
king,  Buonaparte  dashed  forward  to  save  one  of  these 
unfortunates  from  a  southern  sabre.  "  Southern  comrade, 
let  us  save  this  poor  wretch.  —  Are  you  of  the  south  ?  — 
Yes.  — Well,  we  will  save  him." 

Altogether,  what  a  time  of  disillusionment  this  was  to 
the  young  officer.  What  depths  of  cruelty  and  obscenity 
it  revealed  in  the  Parisian  rabble.  What  folly  to  treat 
them  with  the  Christian  forbearance  shown  by  Louis  XVI. 
How  much  more  suitable  was  grapeshot  than  the  beati- 
tudes. The  lesson  was  stored  up  for  future  use  at  a  some- 
what similar  crisis  on  this  very  spot. 

During  the  few  days  when  victorious  Paris  left  Louis 
with  the  sham  title  of  king,  Buonaparte  received  his 
captain's  commission,  which  was  signed  for  the  king  by 
Servan,  the  War  Minister.  Thus  did  the  revolutionary 
Government  pass  over  his  double  breach  of  military  dis- 
cipline at  Ajaccio.  The  revolutionary  motto,  "  La  carriere 
ouverte  aux  talents,"  was  never  more  conspicuously  illus- 
trated than  in  the  facile  condoning  of  his  offences  and  in 
this  rapid  promotion.  It  was  indeed  a  time  fraught  with 
vast  possibilities  for  all  republican  or  Jacobinical  officers. 
Their   monarchist   colleagues    were   streaming    over    the 


34  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

frontiers  to  join  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  invaders. 
But  National  Guards  were  enrolling  by  tens  of  thousands 
to  drive  out  the  Prussian  and  Austrian  invaders;  and 
when  Europe  looked  to  see  France  fall  for  ever,  it  saw 
with  wonder  her  strength  renewed  as  by  enchantment. 
Later  on  it  learnt  that  that  strength  was  the  strength  of 
Antaeus,  of  a  peasantry  that  stood  firmly  rooted  in  their 
native  soil.  Organization  and  good  leadership  alone  were 
needed  to  transform  these  ardent  masses  into  the  must 
formidable  soldiery;  and  the  brilliant  military  prospects 
now  opened  up  certainly  knit  Buonaparte's  feelings  more 
closely  with  the  cause  of  France.  Thus,  on  September 
21st,  when  the  new  National  Assembly,  known  as  the 
Convention,  proclaimed  the  Republic,  we  maj'  well  believe 
that  sincere  convictions  no  less  than  astute  calculations 
moved  him  to  do  and  dare  all  things  for  the  sake  of  the 
new  democratic  commonwealth.1 

For  the  present,  however,  a  family  duty  urges  him  to 
return  to  Corsica.  He  obtains  permission  to  escort  home 
his  sister  Elise,  and  for  the  third  time  we  find  him  on 
furlough  in  Corsica.  This  laxity  of  military  discipline  at 
such  a  crisis  is  explicable  only  on  the  supposition  that  the 
revolutionary  chiefs  knew  of  his  devotion  to  their  cause 
and  believed  that  his  influence  in  the  island  would  render 
his  informal  services  there  more  valuable  than  his  regi- 
mental duties  in  the  army  then  invading  Savoy.  For  the 
word  Republic,  which  fired  his  imagination,  was  an  offence 
to  Paoli  and  to  most  of  the  islanders ;  and  the  phrase 
"  Republic  one  and  indivisible,"  ever  on  the  lips  of  the 
French,  seemed  to  promise  that  the  island  must  become  a 
petty  replica  of  France  —  France  that  was  now  dominated 
by  the  authors  of  the  vile  September  massacres.  The 
French  party  in  the  island  was  therefore  rapidly  declin- 
ing,   and    Paoli   was  preparing  to  sever  the  union   with 


1  His  recantation  of  Jacobinism  was  so  complete  that  some  persons 
have  doubted  whether  he  ever  sincerely  held  it.  The  doubt  argues  a 
singular  naivete;  it  is  laid  to  rest  by  Buonaparte's  own  writings,  by  his 
eagerness  to  disown  or  destroy  them,  by  the  testimony  of  everyone  who 
knew  his  early  career,  and  by  his  own  confession:  "There  have  been 
good  Jacobins.  At  one  time  every  man  of  spirit  was  bound  to  be  one.  I 
was  one  myself."     (Thibaudeau,  "  MSmoires  sur  le  Consulat,"  p.  59.) 


ii  THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION   AND   CORSICA  35 

France.  For  this  he  has  been  bitterly  assailed  as  a  trai- 
tor. But,  from  Paoli's  point  of  view,  the  acquisition  of 
the  island  by  France  was  a  piece  of  rank  treachery ;  and 
his  allegiance  to  France  was  technically  at  an  end  when 
the  king  was  forcibly  dethroned  and  the  Republic  was 
proclaimed.  The  use  of  the  appellation  "traitor"  in 
such  a  case  is  merely  a  piece  of  childish  abuse.  It  can  be 
justified  neither  by  reference  to  law,  equity,  nor  to  the 
popular  sentiment  of  the  time.  Facts  were  soon  to  show 
that  the  islanders  were  bitterly  opposed  to  the  party  then 
dominant  in  France.  This  hostility  of  a  clannish,  reli- 
gious, and  conservative  populace  against  the  bloodthirsty 
and  atheistical  innovators  who  then  lorded  it  over  France 
was  not  diminished  by  the  action  of  some  six  thousand 
French  volunteers,  the  off-scourings  of  the  southern  ports, 
who  were  landed  at  Ajaccio  for  an  expedition  against 
Sardinia.  In  their  zeal  for  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fra- 
ternity, these  bonnets  rouges  came  to  blows  with  the  men 
of  Ajaccio,  three  of  whom  they  hanged.  So  fierce  was 
the  resentment  caused  by  this  outrage  that  the  plan  of  a 
joint  expedition  for  the  liberation  of  Sardinia  from  monar- 
chical tyranny  had  to  be  modified ;  and  Buonaparte,  who 
was  again  in  command  of  a  battalion  of  Corsican  guards, 
proposed  that  the  islanders  alone  should  proceed  to  attack 
the  Madalena  Isles. 

These  islands,  situated  between  Corsica  and  Sardinia, 
have  a  double  interest  to  the  historical  student.  One  of 
them,  Caprera,  was  destined  to  shelter  another  Italian 
hero  at  the  close  of  his  career,  the  noble  self-denying 
Garibaldi  :  the  chief  island  of  the  group  was  the  ob- 
jective of  Buonaparte's  first  essay  in  regular  warfare. 
After  some  delays  the  little  force  set  sail  under  the  com- 
mand of  Cesari-Colonna,  the  nephew  of  Paoli.  Accord- 
ing to  Buonaparte's  own  official  statement  at  the  close  of 
the  affair,  he  had  successfully  landed  his  men  near  the 
town  to  be  assailed,  and  had  thrown  the  Sardinian 
defences  into  confusion,  when  a  treacherous  order  from 
his  chief  bade  him  to  cease  firing  and  return  to  the  ves- 
sels. It  has  also  been  stated  that  this  retreat  was  the  out- 
come of  a  secret  understanding  between  Paoli  and  Cesari- 
Colonna  that  the  expedition  should  miscarry.     This  seems 


36  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

highly  probable.  A  mutiny  on  board  the  chief  ship  of  the 
flotilla  was  assigned  by  Cesari-Colonna  as  the  cause  of  his 
order  for  a  retreat;  but  there  are  mutinies  and  mutinies, 
and  this  one  may  have  been  a  trick  of  the  Paolists  for 
thwarting  Buonaparte's  plan  and  leaving  him  a  prisoner. 
In  any  case,  the  young  officer  only  saved  himself  and  his 
men  by  a  hasty  retreat  to  the  boats,  tumbling  into  the  sea 
a  mortar  and  four  cannon.  Such  was  the  ending  to  the 
great  captain's  first  military  enterprise. 

On  his  return  to  Ajaccio  (March  3rd,  1793),  Buona- 
parte found  affairs  in  utter  confusion.  News  had  recently 
arrived  of  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  French  Republic 
against  England  and  Holland.  Moreover,  Napoleon's 
young  brother,  Lucien,  had  secretly  denounced  Paoli  to 
the  French  authorities  at  Toulon ;  and  three  commis- 
sioners were  now  sent  from  Paris  charged  with  orders  to 
disband  the  Corsican  National  Guards,  and  to  place  the 
Corsican  dictator  under  the  orders  of  the  French  general 
commanding  the  army  of  Italy.1 

A  game  of  truly  Macchiavellian  skill  is  now  played. 
The  French  commissioners,  among  whom  the  Corsican 
deputy,  Salicetti,  is  by  far  the  most  able,  invite  Paoli  to 
repair  to  Toulon,  there  to  concert  measures  for  the  defence 
of  Corsica.  Paoli,  seeing  through  the  ruse  and  discerning 
a  guillotine,  pleads  that  his  age  makes  the  journey  impos- 
sible ;  but  with  his  friends  he  quietly  prepares  for  resist- 
ance and  holds  the  citadel  of  Ajaccio.  Meanwhile  the 
commissioners  make  friendly  overtures  to  the  old  chief  ; 
in  these  Napoleon  participates,  being  ignorant  of  Lucien's 
action  at  Toulon.  The  sincerity  of  these  overtures  may 
well  be  called  in  question,  though  Buonaparte  still  used 
the  language  of  affection  to  his  former  idol.  However 
this  may  be,  all  hope  of  compromise  is  dashed  by  the 
zealots  who  are  in  power  at  Paris.  On  April  2nd  they 
order  the  French  commissioners  to  secure  Paoli's  person, 
by  whatever  means,  and  bring  him  to  the  French  capitol. 
At  once  a  cry  of  indignation  goes  up  from  all  parts  of  Cor- 
sica ;  and  Buonaparte  draws  up  a  declaration,  vindicating 
Paoli's  conduct  and  begging  the   French  Convention  to 

1 1  use  the  term  commissioner  as  equivalent  to  the  French  representant 
en  mission,  whose  powers  were  almost  limitless. 


ii  THE    FRENCH   REVOLUTION  AND   CORSICA  37 

revoke  its  decree.1  Again,  one  cannot  but  suspect  that 
this  declaration  was  intended  mainly,  if  not  solely,  for 
local  consumption.  In  any  case,  it  failed  to  cool  the  resent- 
ment of  the  populace ;  and  the  partisans  of  France  soon 
came  to  blows  with  the  Paolists. 

Salicetti  and  Buonaparte  now  plan  by  various  artifices 
to  gain  the  citadel  of  Ajaccio  from  the  Paolists,  but  guile 
is  three  times  foiled  by  guile  equally  astute.  Failing  here, 
the  young  captain  seeks  to  communicate  with  the  French 
commissioners  at  Bastia.  He  sets  out  secretly,  with  a 
trusty  shepherd  as  companion,  to  cross  the  island  :  but  at 
the  village  of  Bocognano  he  is  recognized  and  imprisoned 
by  the  partisans  of  Paoli.  Some  of  the  villagers,  how- 
ever, retain  their  old  affection  to  the  Buonaparte  family, 
which  here  has  an  ancestral  estate,  and  secretly  set  him 
free.  He  returns  to  Ajaccio,  only  to  find  an  order  for  his 
arrest  issued  by  the  Corsican  patriots.  This  time  he 
escapes  by  timely  concealment  in  the  grotto  of  a  friend's 
garden ;  and  from  the  grounds  of  another  family  connec- 
tion he  finally  glides  away  in  a  vessel  to  a  point  of  safety, 
whence  he  reaches  Bastia.  Still,  though  a  fugitive,  he 
persists  in  believing  that  Ajaccio  is  French  at  heart,  and 
urges  the  sending  of  a  liberating  force.  The  French  com- 
missioners agree,  and  the  expedition  sails  —  only  to  meet 
with  utter  failure.  Ajaccio,  as  one  man,  repels  the  par- 
tisans of  France ;  and,  a  gale  of  wind  springing  up,  Buon- 
aparte and  his  men  regain  their  boats  with  the  utmost 
difficulty.  At  a  place  hard  by,  he  finds  his  mother,  uncle, 
brothers  and  sisters.  Madame  Buonaparte,  with  the  ex- 
traordinary tenacity  of  will  that  characterized  her  famous 
son,  had  wished  to  defend  her  house  at  Ajaccio  against  tlie 
hostile  populace ;  but,  yielding  to  the  urgent  warnings  of 
friends,  finally  fled  to  the  nearest  place  of  safety,  and  left 
the  house  to  the  fury  of  the  populace,  by  whom  it  was 
nearly  wrecked. 

For  a  brief  space  Buonaparte  clung  to  the  hope  of  re- 
gaining Corsica  for  the  Republic,  but  now  only  by  the  aid 
of  French  troops.     For  the  islanders,  stung  by  the  demand 

1  See  this  curious  document  in  Jung,  "  Bonaparte  et  son  Temps,"  vol. 
ii.,  p.  249.  Masson  ignores  it,  but  admits  that  the  Paolists  and  partisans 
of  France  were  only  seeking  to  dupe  one  another. 


38  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

of  the  French  Convention  that  Paoli  should  go  to  Paris, 
had  rallied  to  the  dictator's  side  ;  and  the  aged  chief  made 
overtures  to  England  for  alliance.  The  partisans  of 
France,  now  menaced  by  England's  naval  power,  were  in 
an  utterly  untenable  position.  Even  the  steel-like  will  of 
Buonaparte  was  bent.  His  career  in  Corsica  was  at  an 
end  for  the  present ;  and  with  his  kith  and  kin  he  set  sail 
for  France. 

The  interest  of  the  events  above  described  lies,  not  in 
their  intrinsic  importance,  but  in  the  signal  proof  which 
they  afford  of  Buonaparte's  wondrous  endowments  of  mind 
and  will.  In  a  losing  cause  and  in  a  petty  sphere  he  dis- 
plays all  the  qualities  which,  when  the  omens  were  favour- 
able, impelled  him  to  the  domination  of  a  Continent.  He 
fights  every  inch  of  ground  tenaciously ;  at  each  emer- 
gency he  evinces  a  truly  Italian  fertility  of  resource,  gliding 
round  obstacles  or  striving  to  shatter  them  by  sheer  au- 
dacity, seeing  through  men,  cajoling  them  by  his  insinua- 
tions or  overawing  them  by  his  mental  superiority,  ever 
determined  to  try  the  fickle  jade  Fortune  to  the  very 
utmost,  and  retreating  only  before  the  inevitable.  The 
sole  weakness  discoverable  in  this  nature,  otherwise  com- 
pact of  strength,  is- an  excess  of  will-power  over  all  the 
faculties  that  make  for  prudence.  His  vivid  imagination 
only  serves  to  fire  him  with  the  full  assurance  that  he  must 
prevail  over  all  obstacles. 

And  yet,  if  he  had  now  stopped  to  weigh  well  the  lessons 
of  the  past,  hitherto  fertile  only  in  failures  and  contradic- 
tions, he  must  have  seen  the  powerlessness  of  his  own  will 
when  in  conflict  with  the  forces  of  the  age  ;  for  he  had 
now  severed  his  connection  with  the  Corsican  patriots,  of 
whose  cause  he  had  only  two  years  before  been  the  most 
passionate  champion.  It  is  evident  that  the  schism  which 
finally  separated  Buonaparte  and  Paoli  originated  in  their 
divergence  of  views  regarding  the  French  Revolution. 
Paoli  accepted  revolutionary  principles  only  in  so  far  as 
they  promised  to  base  freedom  on  a  due  balance  of  class 
interests.  He  was  a  follower  of  Montesquieu.  He  longed 
to  see  in  Corsica  a  constitution  similar  to  that  of  England 
or  to  that  of  1791  in  France.  That  hope  vanished  alike 
for  France  and  Corsica  after  the  fall  of  the  monarchy  ;  and 


ii  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION   AND   CORSICA  39 

towards  the  Jacobinical  Republic,  which  banished  ortho- 
dox priests  and  guillotined  the  amiable  Louis,  Paoli 
thenceforth  felt  naught  but  loathing :  "  We  have  been 
the  enemies  of  kings,"  he  said  to  Joseph  Buonaparte  ;  "  let 
us  never  be  their  executioners."  Thenceforth  he  drifted 
inevitably  into  alliance  with  England. 

Buonaparte,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  follower  of  Rous- 
seau, whose  ideas  leaped  to  power  at  the  downfall  of  the 
monarchy.  Despite  the  excesses  which  he  ever  deplored, 
this  second  Revolution  appeared  to  him  to  be  the  dawn  of 
a  new  and  intelligent  age.  The  clear-cut  definitions  of 
the  new  political  creed  dovetailed  in  with  his  own  rigid 
views  of  life.  Mankind  was  to  be  saved  by  law,  society 
being  levelled  down  and  levelled  up  until  the  ideals  of 
Lycurgus  were  attained.  Consequently  he  regarded  the 
Republic  as  a  mighty  agency  for  the  social  regeneration 
not  only  of  France,  but  of  all  peoples.  His  insular  senti- 
ments were  gradually  merged  in  these ,  vaster  schemes. 
Self-interest  and  the  differentiating  effects  of  party  strifes 
undoubtedly  assisted  the  mental  transformation  ;  but  it  is 
clear  that  the  study  of  the*  "  Social  Contract "  was  the 
touchstone  of  his  early  intellectual  growth.  He  had  gone 
to  Rousseau's  work  to  deepen  his  Corsican  patriotism  :  he 
there  imbibed  doctrines  which  drew  him  irresistibly  into 
the  vortex  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  of  its  wars  of 
propaganda  and  conquest. 


CHAPTER  III 

TOULON 

When  Buonaparte  left  Corsica  for  the  coast  of  Provence, 
his  career  had  been  remarkable  only  for  the  strange  con- 
trast between  the  brilliance  of  his  gifts  and  the  utter  fail- 
ure of  all  his  enterprises.  His  French  partisanship  had,  as 
it  seemed,  been  the  ruin  of  his  own  and  his  family's  fortunes. 
At  the  age  of  twenty-four  he  was  known  only  as  the  un- 
lucky leader  of  forlorn  hopes  and  an  outcast  from  the  island 
around  which  his  fondest  longings  had  been  entwined. 
His  land-fall  on  the  French  coast  seemed  no  more  promis- 
ing ;  for  at  that  time  Provence  was  on  the  verge  of  revolt 
against  the  revolutionary  Government.  Even  towns  like 
Marseilles  and  Toulon,  which  a  year  earlier  had  been  noted 
for  their  republican  fervour,  were  now  disgusted  with  the 
course  of  events  at  Paris.  In  the  third  climax  of  revolu- 
tionary fury,  that  of  June  2nd,  1793,  the  more  enlightened 
of  the  two  republican  factions,  the  Girondins,  had  been 
overthrown  by  their  opponents,  the  men  of  the  Mountain, 
who,  aided  by  the  Parisian  rabble,  seized  on  power.  Most 
of  the  Departments  of  France  resented  this  violence  and 
took  up  arms.  But  the  men  of  the  Mountain  acted  with 
extraordinary  energy:  they  proclaimed  the  Girondins  to 
be  in  league  with  the  invaders,  and  blasted  their  opponents 
with  the  charge  of  conspiring  to  divide  France  into  federal 
republics.  The  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  now  installed 
in  power  at  Paris,  decreed  a  levSe  en  masse  of  able-bodied 
patriots  to  defend  the  sacred  soil  of  the  Republic,  and  the 
"  organizer  of  victory,"  Carnot,  soon  drilled  into  a  terrible 
efficiency  the  hosts  that  sprang  from  the  soil.  On  their 
side  the  Girondins  had  no  organization  whatever,  and 
were  embarrassed  by  the  adhesion  of  very  many  royalists. 
Consequently  their  wavering  groups  speedily  gave  way 
before  the  impact  of  the  new,  solid,  central  power. 

40 


chap,  in  TOULON  41 

A  movement  so  wanting  in  definiteness  as  that  of  the 
Girondins  was  destined  to  slide  into  absolute  opposition 
to  the  men  of  the  Mountain  :  it  was  doomed  to  become 
royalist.  Certainly  it  did  not  command  the  adhesion  of 
Napoleon.  His  inclinations  are  seen  in  his  pamphlet, 
"  Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire,"  which  he  published  in  August, 
1793.  He  wrote  it  in  the  intervals  of  some  regimental 
work  which  had  come  to  hand:  and  his  passage  through 
the  little  town  of  Beaucaire  seems  to  have  suggested  the 
scenic  setting  of  this  little  dialogue.  It  purports  to 
record  a  discussion  between  an  officer  —  Buonaparte  him- 
self —  two  merchants  of  Marseilles,  and  citizens  of  Nimes 
and  Montpellier.  It  urges  the  need  of  united  action 
under  the  lead  of  the  Jacobins.  The  officer  reminds  the 
Marseillais  of  the  great  services  which  their  city  has  ren- 
dered to  the  cause  of  liberty.  Let  Marseilles  never 
disgrace  herself  by  calling  in  the  Spanish  fleet  as  a  pro- 
tection against  Frenchmen.  Let  her  remember  that  this 
civil  strife  was  part  of  a  fight  to  the  death  between 
French  patriots  and  the  despots  of  Europe.  That  was, 
indeed,  the  practical  point  at  issue  ;  the  stern  logic  of 
facts  ranged  on  the  Jacobin  side  all  clear-sighted  men 
who  were  determined  that  the  Revolution  should  not  be 
stamped  out  by  the  foreign  invaders.  On  the  ground  of 
mere  expediency,  men  must  rally  to  the  cause  of  the  Jaco- 
binical Republic.  Every  crime  might  be  condoned,  pro- 
vided that  the  men  now  in  power  at  Paris  saved  the 
country.  Better  their  tyranny  than  the  vengeance  of  the 
emigrant  noblesse.  Such  was  the  instinct  of  most  French- 
men, and  it  saved  France. 

As  an  expose  of  keen  policy  and  all-dominating  oppor- 
tunism, "  Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire  "  is  admirable.  In  a 
national  crisis  anything  that  saves  the  State  is  justifiable 
— that  is  its  argument.  The  men  of  the  Mountain  are 
abler  and  stronger  than  the  Girondins  :  therefore  the  Mar- 
seillais are  foolish  not  to  bow  to  the  men  of  the  Mountain. 
The  author  feels  no  sympathy  with  the  generous  young 
Girondins,  who,  under  the  inspiration  of  Madame  Roland, 
sought  to  establish  a  republic  of  the  virtues  even  while 
they  converted  monarchical  Europe  by  the  sword.  Few 
men  can  now  peruse  with  undimmed  eyes  the  tragic  story 


42  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  their  fall.  But  the  scenes  of  1793  had  transformed  the 
Corsican  youth  into  a  dry-eyed  opportunist  who  rejects 
the  Gironclins  as  he  would  have  thrown  aside  a  defective 
tool  :  nay,  he  blames  them  as  "  guilty  of  the  greatest  of 
crimes."  1 

Nevertheless  Buonaparte  was  alive  to  the  miseries  of 
the  situation.  He  was  weary  of  civil  strifes,  in  which  it 
seemed  that  no  glory  could  be  won.  He  must  hew  his 
way  to  fortune,  if  only  in  order  to  support  his  family, 
which  was  now  drifting  about  from  village  to  village  of 
Provence  and  subsisting  on  the  slender  sums  doled  out 
by  the  Republic  to  Corsican  exiles. 

He  therefore  applied,  though  without  success,  for  a 
regimental  exchange  to  the  army  of  the  Rhine.  But 
while  toiling  through  his  administrative  drudgery  in 
Provence,  his  duties  brought  him  near  to  Toulon,  where 
the  Republic  was  face  to  face  with  triumphant  royalism. 
The  hour  had  struck  :  the  man  now  appeared. 

In  July,  1793,  Toulon  joined  other  towns  of  the  south 
in  declaring  against  Jacobin  tyranny  ;  and  the  royalists 
of  the  town,  despairing  of  making  headway  against  the 
troops  of  the  Convention,  admitted  English  and  Spanish 
squadrons  to  the  harbour  to  hold  the  town  for  Louis  XVII. 
(August  28th).  This  event  shot  an  electric  thrill  through 
France.  It  was  the  climax  of  a  long  series  of  disasters. 
Lyons  had  hoisted  the  white  flag  of  the  Bourbons,  and 
was  making  a  desperate  defence  against  the  forces  of  the 
Convention :  the  royalist  peasants  of  La  Vendee  had 
several  times  scattered  the  National  Guards  in  utter  rout : 
the  Spaniards  were  crossing  the  Eastern  Pyrenees  :  the 
Piedmontese  were  before  the  gates  of  Grenoble ;  and  in 
the  north  and  on  the  Rhine  a  doubtful  contest  was  raging. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  France  when  Buonaparte 
drew  near  to  the  republican  forces  encamped  near  Olli- 
oules,  to  the  north-west  of  Toulon.  He  found  them  in 
disorder :  their  commander,  Carteaux,  had  left  the  easel  to 

1  Buonaparte,  when  First  Consul,  was  dunned  for  payment  by  the 
widow  of  the  Avignon  bookseller  who  published  the  "  Souper  de  Beau- 
caire."  He  paid  her  well  for  having  all  the  remaining  copies  destroyed. 
Yet  Panckoucke  in  1818  procured  one  copy,  which  preserved  the  memory 
of  Buonaparte's  early  Jacobinism. 


in  TOULON  43 

learn  the  art  of  war,  and  was  ignorant  of  the  range  of  his 
few  cannon  ;  Dommartin,  their  artillery  commander,  had 
been  disabled  by  a  wound  ;  and  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Convention,  who  were  charged  to  put  new  vigour  into 
the  operations,  were  at  their  wits'  end  for  lack  of  men  and 
munitions.  One  of  them  was  Salicetti,  who  hailed  Ins 
coming  as  a  godsend,  and  urged  him  to  take  Dommartirfs 
place.  Thus,  on  September  16th,  the  thin,  sallow,  thread- 
bare figure  took  command  of  the  artillery. 

The  republicans  menaced  the  town  on  two  sides.  Car- 
teaux  with  some  8,000  men  held  the  hills  between  Toulon 
and  Ollioules,  while  a  corps  3,000  strong,  under  Lapoype, 
observed  the  fortress  on  the  side  of  La  Valette.  Badly 
led  though  they  were,  they  wrested  the  valley  north  of 
Mount  Faron  from  the  allied  outposts,  and  nearly  com- 
pleted the  besiegers'  lines  (September  18th).  In  fact, 
the  garrison,  which  comprised  only  2,000  British  troops, 
4,000  Spaniards,  1,500  French  royalists,  together  with  some 
Neapolitans  and  Piedmontese,  was  insufficient  to  defend 
the  many  positions  around  the  city  on  which  its  safety 
depended.  Indeed,  General  Grey  wrote  to  Pitt  that  50,000 
men  were  needed  to  garrison  the  place  ;  but,  as  that  was 
double  the  strength  of  the  British  regular  army  then,  the 
English  Minister  could  only  hold  out  hopes  of  the  arrival 
of  an  Austrian  corps  and  a  few  hundred  British.1 

Before  Buonaparte's  arrival  the  Jacobins  had  no  artil- 
lery :  true,  they  had  a  few  field-pieces,  four  heavier  guns 
and  two  mortars,  which  a  sergeant  helplessly  surveyed ; 
but  they  had  no  munitions,  no  tools,  above  all  no  method 
and  no  discipline.  Here  then  was  the  opportunity  for 
which  he  had  been  pining.  At  once  he  assumes  the  tone 
of  a  master.     "  You  mind  your  business,  and  let  me  look 

1 1  have  chiefly  followed  the  careful  account  of  the  siege  given  by  Cottin 
in  his  "  Toulon  et  les  Anglais  en  179:}  "  (Paris,  1898). 

The  following  official  figures  show  the  weakness  of  the  British  army. 
In  December,  1792,  the  parliamentary  vote  was  for  17,344  men  as  "  guards 
and  garrisons,"  besides  a  few  at  Gibraltar  and  Sydney.  In  February,  1793, 
9,945  additional  men  were  voted  and  100  "  independent  companies"  :  Han- 
overians were  also  embodied.  In  February,  1794,  the  number  of  British 
regulars  was  raised  to  00,244.  For  the  navy  the  figures  were  :  December, 
1792,  20,000  sailors  and  5,000  marines;  February,  1793,  20,000  additional 
seamen  ;  for  1794,  73,000  seamen  and  12,000  marines.     ("  Ann.  Reg.") 


44 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


after  mine,"  he  exclaims  to  officious  infantrymen ;  "  it  is 
artillery  that  takes  fortresses:  infantry  gives  its  help. 
The  druoVery  of  the  last  weeks  now  yields  fruitful  results  : 
his  methodical  mind,  brooding  over  the  chaos  before  him, 
flashes  back  to  this  or  that  detail  in  some  coast  lort  or 
magazine:  his  energy  hustles  on  the  leisurely  Provencaux, 
and  in  a  few  days  he  has  a  respectable  park  of  artillery  — 
fourteen  cannon,  four  mortars,  and  the  necessary  stores. 
In  a  brief  space  the  Commissioners  show  their  approval 
of  his  services  by  promoting  him  to  the  rank  of  chef  de 

bataillon.  .     . 

By  this  time  the  tide  was  beginning  to  turn  in  favour 
of  the  Republic.     On  October  9th  Lyons  fell  before  the 
Jacobins.     The  news  lends  a  new  zest  to  the  Jacobins, 
whose  left  wing  had  (October  1st)  been  severely  handled 
by  the  allies  on  Mount  Faron.     Above  all,  Buonaparte  s 
artillery  can  be  still  further  strengthened.     « I  have  de- 
spatched," he  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War,  "an  intelli- 
gent officer  to  Lyons,  Briancon,  and  Grenoble,  to  procure 
what  might  be  useful  to  us.     I  have  requested  the  Army 
of  Italy  to  furnish  us  with  the  cannon  now  useless  tor  the 
defence  of  Antibes  and  Monaco.   .  .  .     I  have  established 
at  Ollioules  an  arsenal  with  80  workers.     I  have  requi- 
sitioned  horses  from  Nice  right  to  Valence  and   Mont- 
pellier.   .  .  .     I  am  having  5,000  gabions  made  every  day 
at  Marseilles."     But  he  was  more  than  a  mere  organizer. 
He  was  ever  with  his  men,  animating  them  by  his  own 
ardour:  "I  always  found  him  at  his  post,"  wrote  Doppet, 
who  now  succeeded  Carteaux ;  "  when  he  needed  rest  he 
lay  on  the  ground  wrapped  in  his  cloak :  he  never  left  the 
batteries."    There,  amidst  the  autumn  rains,  he  contracted 
the  febrile  symptoms  which  for  several  years  deepened  the 
pallor  of  his  cheeks  and  furrowed  the  rings  under  his  eyes, 
giving  him  that  uncanny,  almost  spectral,  look  which  struck 
a  chill  to  all  who  saw  him  first  and  knew  not  the  fiery 
energy  that  burnt  within.     There,  too,  his  zeal,  his  un- 
failing resource,  his  bulldog  bravery,  and  that  indefinable 
quality  which  separates  genius  from  talent  speedily  con- 
quered the  hearts  of  the  French  soldiery.     One  example 
of  this  magnetic  power  must  here  suffice.    He  had  ordered 
a  battery  to  be  made  so  near  to  Fort  Mulgrave  that  ball- 


in  TOULON  45 

cetti  described  it  as  within  a  pistol-shot  of  the  English 
guns.  Could  it  be  worked,  its  effect  would  be  decisive. 
But  who  could  work  it?  The  first  day  saw  all  its  gun- 
ners killed  or  wounded,  and  even  the  reckless  Jacobins 
flinched  from  facing  the  iron  hail.  "  Call  it  the  battery  of 
the  fearless"  ordered  the  young  captain.  The  generous 
French  nature  was  touched  at  its  tenderest  point,  personal 
and  national  honour,  and  the  battery  thereafter  never  lacked 
its  full  complement  of  gunners,  living  and  dead. 

The  position  at  Fort  Mulgrave,  or  the  Little  Gibraltar, 
was,  indeed,  all  important ;  for  if  the  republicans  seized 
that  commanding  position,  the  allied  squadrons  could  be 
overpowered,  or  at  least  compelled  to  sail  away ;  and  with 
their  departure  Toulon  must  fall. 

Here  we  come  on  to  ground  that  has  been  fiercely  fought 
over  in  wordy  war.  Did  Buonaparte  originate  the  plan  of 
attack?  Or  did  he  throw  his  weight  and  influence  into  a 
scheme  that  others  beside  him  had  designed?  Or  did  he 
merely  carry  out  orders  as  a  subordinate  ?  According  to  the 
Commissioner  Barras,  the  last  was  the  case.  But  Barras 
was  with  the  eastern  wing  of  the  besiegers,  that  is,  some 
miles  away  from  the  side  of  La  Seyne  and  L'Eguillette, 
where  Buonaparte  fought.  Besides,  Barras'  "Memoires" 
are  so  untruthful  where  Buonaparte  is  concerned,  as  to  be 
unworthy  of  serious  attention,  at  least  on  these  points.1 
The  historian  M.  Jung  likewise  relegates  Buonaparte  to  a 
quite  subordinate  position.2  But  his  narrative  omits  some 
of  the  official  documents  which  show  that  Buonaparte 
played  a  very  important  part  in  the  siege.  Other  writers 
claim  that  Buonaparte's  influence  on  the  whole  conduct  of 
operations  was  paramount  and  decisive.  Thus,  M.  Duruy 
quotes  the  letter  of  the  Commissioners  to  the  Convention: 
"  We  shall  take  care  not  to  lay  siege  to  Toulon  by  ordi- 
nary means,  when  we  have  a  surer  means  to  reduce  it,  that 
is,  by  burning  the  enemy's  fleet.  .  .  .  We  are  only  wait- 
ing for  the  siege-guns  before  taking  up  a  position  whence 
we  may  reach  the  ships  with  red-hot  balls ;  and  we  shall 
see  if  we  are  not  masters  of  Toulon."     Hut  this  very  let- 

1  Barras'  "M6moires"  are  not  by  any  means  wholly  his.     They  are 
a  compilation  by  Rousselin  de  Saint-Albin  from  the  Barras  papers. 

2  Jung,  "  Bonaparte  et  son  Temps,"  vol.  ii. 


46  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  hi 

ter  disproves  the  Buonapartist  claim.  It  was  written  on 
September  13th.  Thus,  three  days  before  Buonaparte '« 
arrival,  the  Commissioners  had  fully  decided  on  attacking 
the  Little  Gibraltar  ;  and  the  claim  that  Buonaparte 
originated  the  plan  can  only  be  sustained  by  antedating 
his  arrival  at  Toulon.1  In  fact,  every  experienced  officer 
among  besiegers  and  besieged  saw  the  weak  point  of  the 
defence :  early  in  September  Hood  and  Mulgrave  began 
the  fortification  of  the  heights  behind  L'Eguillette.  In 
face  of  these  facts,  the  assertion  that  Buonaparte  was  the 
first  to  design  the  movements  which  secured  the  surrender 
of  Toulon  must  be  relegated  to  the  domain  of  hero-wor- 
ship. 

Carteaux  having  been  superseded  by  Doppet,  more  energy 
was  thrown  into  the  operations.  Yet  for  him  Buonaparte 
had  scarcely  more  respect.  On  November  15th  an  affair 
of  outposts  near  Fort  Mulgrave  showed  his  weakness. 
The  soldiers  on  both  sides  eagerly  took  up  the  affray ; 
line  after  line  of  the  French  rushed  up  towards  that 
frowning  redoubt:  O'Hara,  the  leader  of  the  allied 
troops,  encouraged  the  British  in  a  sortie  that  drove 
back  the  blue-coats ;  whereupon  Buonaparte  headed  the 
rallying  rush  to  the  gorge  of  the  redoubt,  when  Doppet 
sounded  the  retreat.  Half  blinded  by  rage  and  by  the 
blood  trickling  from  a  slight  wound  in  his  forehead,  the 
young  Corsican  rushed  back  to  Doppet  and  abused  him 
in  the  language  of  the  camp  :   "  Our  blow  at  Toulon  has 

missed,  because  a has  beaten  the  retreat."     The  sol-. 

.diery  applauded  this  revolutionary  licence,  and  bespattered 
their  chief  with  similar  terms. 

A  few  days  later  the  tall  soldierly  Dugommier  took  the 
command  :  reinforcements  began  to  pour  in,  finally  raising 
the  strength  of  the  besiegers  to  37,000  men.  Above  all, 
the  new  commander  gave  Buonaparte  carte  blanche  for 
the  direction  of  the  artillery.  New  batteries  accordingly 
began  to  ring  the  Little  Gibraltar  on  the  landward  side ; 

1  M.  G.  Duruy's  elaborate  plea  (Barras,  "Mems.,"  Introduction, 
pp.  69-79)  rests  on  the  supposition  that  his  hero  arrived  at  Toulon  on 
September  7th.  But  M.  Chuquet  has  shown  ("Cosmopolis,"  January, 
1897)  that  he  arrived  there  not  earlier  than  September  16th.  So  too 
Cottin,  ch.  xi. 


48  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

O'Hara,  while  gallantly  heading  a  sortie,  fell  into  the 
republicans'  hands,  and  the  defenders  began  to  lose  heart. 
The  worst  disappointment  was  the  refusal  of  the  Austrian 
Court  to  fulfil  its  promise,  solemnly  given  in  September, 
to  send  5,000  regular  troops  for  the  defence  of  Toulon. 

The  final  conflict  took  place  on  the  night  of  December 
16-17,  when  torrents  of  rain,  a  raging  wind,  and  flashes 
of  lightning  added  new  horrors  to  the  strife.  Scarcely 
had  the  assailants  left  the  sheltering  walls  of  La  Seyne, 
than  Buonaparte's  horse  fell  under  him,  shot  dead :  whole 
companies  went  astray  in  the  darkness :  yet  the  first 
column  of  2,000  men  led  by  Victor  rush  at  the  palisades 
of  Fort  Mulgrave,  tear  them  down,  and  sweep  into  the 
redoubt,  only  to  fall  in  heaps  before  a  second  line  of  de- 
fence :  supported  by  the  second  column,  they  rally,  only 
to  yield  once  more  before  the  murderous  fire.  In  despair 
Dugommier  hurries  on  the  column  of  reserve,  with  which 
Buonaparte  awaits  the  crisis  of  the  night.  Led  by  the 
gallant  young  Muiron,  the  reserve  sweeps  into  the  gorge 
of  death  ;  Muiron,  Buonaparte,  and  Dugommier  hack 
their  way  through  the  same  embrasure  :  their  men  swarm 
in  on  the  overmatched  red -coats  and  Spaniards,  cut  them 
down  at  their  guns,  and  the  redoubt  is  won. 

This  event  was  decisive.  The  Neapolitans,  who  were 
charged  to  hold  the  neighbouring  forts,  flung  themselves 
into  the  sea  ;  and  the  ships  themselves  began  to  weigh 
anchor  ;  for  Buonaparte's  guns  soon  poured  their  shot 
on  the  fleet  and  into  the  city  itself.  But  even  in  that 
desperate  strait  the  allies  turned  fiercely  to  bay.  On 
the  evening  of  December  17th  a  young  officer,  who  was 
destined  once  more  to  thwart  Buonaparte's  designs,  led 
a  small  body  of  picked  men  into  the  dockyard  to  snatch 
from  the  rescuing  clutch  of  the  Jacobins  the  French  war- 
ships that  could  not  be  carried  off.  Then  was  seen  a 
weird  sight.  The  galley  slaves,  now  freed  from  their 
chains  and  clustering  in  angry  groups,  menaced  the  in- 
truders. Yet  the  British  seamen  spread  the  combustibles 
and  let  loose  the  demon  of  destruction.  Forthwith  the 
flames  shot  up  the  masts,  and  licked  up  the  stores  of  hemp, 
tar,  and  timber  :  and  the  explosion  of  two  powder  ships 
by  the  Spaniards  shook  the  earth  for  many  miles  around. 


m  TOULON  49 

Napoleon  ever  retained  a  vivid  mental  picture  of  the 
scene,  which  amid  the  hated  calm  of  St.  Helena  he  thus 
described  :  "  The  whirlwind  of  flames  and  smoke  from  the 
arsenal  resembled  the  eruption  of  a  volcano,  and  the  thir- 
teen vessels  blazing  in  the  roads  were  like  so  many  dis- 
plays of  fireworks  :  the  masts  and  forms  of  the  vessels 
were  distinctly  traced  out  by  the  flames,  which  lasted 
many  hours  and  formed  an  unparalleled  spectacle."  1  The 
sight  struck  horror  to  the  hearts  of  the  royalists  of  Tou- 
lon, who  saw  in  it  the  signal  of  desertion  by  the  allies  ; 
and  through  the  lurid  night  crowds  of  panic-stricken 
wretches  thronged  the  quays  crying  aloud  to  be  taken 
away  from  the  doomed  city.  The  glare  of  the  flames,  the 
crash  of  the  enemy's  bombs,  the  explosion  of  the  two 
powder-ships,  frenzied  many  a  soul  ;  and  scores  of  those 
who  could  find  no  place  in  the  boats  flung  themselves  into 
the  sea  rather  than  face  the  pikes  and  guillotines  of  the 
Jacobins.  Their  fears  were  only  too  well  founded  ;  for 
a  fortnight  later  Freron,  the  Commissioner  of  the  Con- 
vention, boasted  that  two  hundred  royalists  perished 
daily. 

It  remains  briefly  to  consider  a  question  of  special  inter- 
est to  English  readers.  Did  the  Pitt  Ministry  intend  to 
betray  the  confidence  of  the  French  royalists  and  keep 
Toulon  for  England  ?  The  charge  has  been  brought  by 
certain  French  writers  that  the  British,  after  entering 
Toulon  with  promise  that  they  would  hold  it  in  pledge 
for  Louis  XVII.,  nevertheless  lorded  it  over  the  other 
allies  and  revealed  their  intention  of  keeping  that  strong- 
hold. These  writers  aver  that  Hood,  after  entering  Tou- 
lon as  an  equal  with  the  Spanish  admiral,  Langara,  laid 
claim  to  entire  command  of  the  land  forces  ;  that  English 
commissioners  were  sent  for  the  administration  of  the 
town  ;  and  that  the  English  Government  refused  to  allow 
the  coming  of  the  Comte  de  Provence,  who,  as  the  elder  of 

1  As  the  burning  of  the  French  ships  and  stores  has  been  said  to  be 
solely  due  to  the  English,  we  may  note  that,  as  early  as  October  3rd,  the 
Spanish  Foreign  Minister,  the  Due  d'Alcuida,  suggested  it  to  our  ambas- 
sador, Lord  St.  Helens :  "  If  it  becomes  necessary  to  abandon  the  har- 
bour, these  vessels  shall  be  sunk  or  set  on  fire  in  order  that  the  enemy 
may  not  make  use  of  them  ;  for  which  purpose  preparations  shall  be  made 
beforehand." 


60  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

the  two  surviving  brothers  of  Louis  XVI.,  was  entitled  to 
act  on  behalf  of  Louis  XVII.1  The  facts  in  the  main  are 
correct,  but  the  interpretation  put  upon  them  may  well 
be  questioned.  Hood  certainly  acted  with  much  arro- 
gance towards  the  Spaniards.  But  when  the  more  cour- 
teous O'Hara  arrived  to  take  command  of  the  British, 
Neapolitan,  and  Sardinian  troops,  the  new  commander 
agreed  to  lay  aside  the  question  of  supreme  command.  It 
was  not  till  November  30th  that  the  British  Government 
sent  off  any  despatch  on  the  question,  which  meanwhile 
had  been  settled  at  Toulon  by  the  exercise  of  that  tact  in 
which  Hood  seems  signally  to  have  been  lacking.  The 
whole  question  was  personal,  not  national. 

Still  less  was  the  conduct  of  the  British  Government 
towards  the  Comte  de  Provence  a  proof  of  its  design  to 
keep  Toulon.  The  records  of  our  Foreign  Office  show 
that,  before  the  occupation  of  that  stronghold  for  Louis 
XVII.,  we  had  declined  to  acknowledge  the  claims  of  his 
uncle  to  the  Regency.  He  and  his  brother,  the  Comte 
d'Artois,  were  notoriously  unpopular  in  France,  except 
with  royalists  of  the  old  school;  and  their  presence  at 
Toulon  would  certainly  have  raised  awkward  questions 
about  the  future  government.  The  conduet  of  Spain  had 
hitherto  been  similar.2  But  after  the  occupation  of  Tou- 
lon, the  Court  of  Madrid  judged  the  presence  of  the  Comte 
de  Provence  in  that  fortress  to  be  advisable ;  whereas  the 
Pitt  Ministry  adhered  to  its  former  belief,  insisted  on  the 
difficulty  of  conducting  the  defence  if  the  Prince  were 
present  as  Regent,  instructed  Mr.  Drake,  our  Minister  at 
Genoa,  to  use  ever}r  argument  to  deter  him  from  proceed- 
ing to  Toulon,  and  privately  ordered  our  officers  there,  in 
the  last  resort,  to  refuse  him  permission  to  land.  The  in- 
structions of  October  18th  to  the  royal  commissioners  at 
Toulon  show  that  George  III.  and  his  Ministers  believed 
they  would  be  compromising  the  royalist  cause  by  recog- 

1  Thiers,  ch.  xxx.  ;  Cottin,  "  L'Angleterre  et  les  Princes." 

2  See  Lord  Grenville's  despatch  of  August  9th,  1793,  to  Lord  St. 
Helens  ("  F.  O.  Records,  Spain,"  No.  28),  printed  by  M.  Cottin,  p.  428. 
He  does  not  print  the  more  important  despatch  of  October  22nd,  where 
Grenville  asserts  that  the  admission  of  the  French  princes  would  tend  to 
invalidate  the  constitution  of  1791,  for  which  the  allies  were  working. 


in  TOULON  61 

nizing  a  regency  ;  and  certainly  any  effort  by  the  allies  to 
prejudice  the  future  settlement  would  at  once  have  shat- 
tered any  hopes  of  a  general  rally  to  the  royalist  side.1 

Besides,  if  England  meant  to  keep  Toulon,  why  did  she 
send  only  2,200  soldiers  ?  Why  did  she  admit,  not  only 
6,900  Spaniards,  but  also  4,900  Neapolitans  and  1,600  Pied- 
montese  ?  Why  did  she  accept  the  armed  help  of  1,600 
French  royalists  ?  Why  did  she  urgently  plead  with  Aus- 
tria to  send  5,000  white-coats  from  Milan?  Why,  finally, 
is  there  no  word  in  the  British  official  despatches  as  to  the 
eventual  keeping  of  Toulon ;  while  there  are  several  ref- 
erences to  indemnities  which  George  III.  would  require  for 
the  expenses  of  the  war  —  such  as  Corsica  or  some  of  the 
French  West  Indies  ?  Those  despatches  show  conclusively 
that  England  did  not  wish  to  keep  a  fortress  that  required 
a  permanent  garrison  equal  to  half  of  the  British  army 
on  its  peace  footing ;  but  that  she  did  regard  it  as  a  good 
base  of  operations  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Jacobin  rule 
and  the  restoration  of  monarchy  ;  whereupon  her  services 
must  be  requited  with  some  suitable  indemnity,  either  one 
of  the  French  West  Indies  or  Corsica.  These  plans  were 
shattered  by  Buonaparte's  skill  and  the  valour  of  Dugom- 
mier's  soldiery  ;  but  no  record  has  yet  leaped  to  light  to 
convict  the  Pitt  Ministry  of  the  perfidy  which  Buonaparte, 
in  common  with  nearly  all  Frenchmen,  charged  to  their 
account. 

1  A  letter  of  Lord  Mulgrave  to  Mr.  Trevor,  at  Turin  ("  F.  O.  Records, 
Sardinia,"  No.  13),  states  that  he  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  getting  on 
with  the  French  royalists:  "You  must  not  send  us  one  emigre  of  any 
sort  —  they  would  be  a  nuisance  :  they  are  all  so  various  and  so  violent, 
whether  for  despotism,  constitution,  or  republic,  that  we  should  be  dis- 
tracted with  their  quarrels  ;  and  they  are  so  assuming,  forward,  dictatorial, 
and  full  of  complaints,  that  no  business  could  go  on  with  them.  Lord 
Hood  is  averse  to  receiving  any  of  them." 


CHAPTER  IV 

VENDEMIAIRE 

The  next  period  of  Buonaparte's  life  presents  few 
features  of  interest.  He  was  called  upon  to  supervise 
the  guns  and  stores  for  the  Army  of  Italy,  and  also  to 
inspect  the  fortifications  and  artillery  of  the  coast.  At 
Marseilles  his  zeal  outstripped  his  discretion.  He  ordered 
the  reconstruction  of  the  fortress  which  had  been  de- 
stroyed during  the  Revolution ;  but  when  the  townsfolk 
heard  the  news,  they  protested  so  vehemently  that  the 
work  was  stopped  and  an  order  was  issued  for  Buona- 
parte's arrest.  From  this  difficulty  the  friendship  of  the 
younger  Robespierre  and  of  Salicetti,  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Convention,  availed  to  rescue  him  ;  but  the  incident 
proves  that  his  services  at  Toulon  were  not  so  brilliant  as 
to  have  raised  him  above  the  general  level  of  meritorious 
officers,  who  were  applauded  while  they  prospered,  but 
might  be  sent  to  the  guillotine  for  any  serious  offence. 

In  April,  1794,  he  was  appointed  at  Nice  general  in 
command  of  the  artillery  of  the  Army  of  Italy,  which 
drove  the  Sardinian  troops  from  several  positions  between 
Ventimiglia  and  Oneglia.  Thence,  swinging  round  by 
passes  of  the  Maritime  Alps,  they  outflanked  the  positions 
of  the  Austro-Sardinian  forces  at  the  Col  di  Tenda,  which 
had  defied  all  attack  in  front.  Buonaparte's  share  in  this 
turning  operation  seems  to  have  been  restricted  to  the 
effective  handling  of  artillery,  and  the  chief  credit  here 
rested  with  Massena,  who  won  the  first  of  his  laurels  in 
the  country  of  his  birth.  He  was  of  humble  parentage; 
yet  his  erect  bearing,  proud  animated  glance,  curt  pene- 
trating speech,  and  keen  repartees,  proclaimed  a  nature  at 
once  active  and  wary,  an  intellect  both  calculating  and 
confident.     Such  was  the  man  who  was  to  immortalize  his 

62 


chap,  iv  VENDEMIAIRE  63 

name  in  many  a  contest,  until  his  glory  paled  before  the 
greater  genius  of  Wellington. 

Much  of  the  credit  of  organizing  this  previously  unsuc- 
cessful army  belongs  to  the  younger  Robespierre,  who,  as 
Commissioner  of  the  Convention,  infused  his  energy  into 
all  departments  of  the  service.  For  some  months  his  rela- 
tions to  Buonaparte  were  those  of  intimacy  ;  but  whether 
they  extended  to  complete  sympathy  on  political  matters 
may  be  doubted.  The  younger  Robespierre  held  the  revo- 
lutionary creed  with  sufficient  ardour,  though  one  of  his 
letters  dated  from  Oneglia  suggests  that  the  fame  of  the 
Terror  was  hurtful  to  the  prospects  of  the  campaign.  It 
states  that  the  whole  of  the  neighbouring  inhabitants  had 
fled  before  the  French  soldiers,  in  the  belief  that  they 
were  destroyers  of  religion  and  eaters  of  babies  :  this  was 
inconvenient,  as  it  prevented  the  supply  of  provisions  and 
the  success  of  forced  loans.  The  letter  suggests  that  he 
was  a  man  of  action  rather  than  of  ideas,  and  probably  it 
was  this  practical  quality  which  bound  Buonaparte  in 
friendship  to  him.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  fathom  Buona- 
parte's ideas  about  the  revolutionary  despotism  which  was 
then  deluging  Paris  with  blood.  Outwardly  he  appeared 
to  sympathize  with  it.  Such  at  least  is  the  testimony  of 
Marie  Robespierre,  with  whom  Buonaparte's  sisters  were 
then  intimate.  "  Buonaparte,"  she  said,  "  was  a  repub- 
lican :  I  will  even  say  that  he  took  the  side  of  the  Moun- 
tain :  at  least,  that  was  the  impression  left  on  my  mind  by 
his  opinions  when  I  was  at  Nice.  .  .  .  His  admiration  for 
my  elder  brother,  his  friendship  for  my  younger  brother, 
and  perhaps  also  the  interest  inspired  by  my  misfortunes, 
gained  for  me,  under  the  Consulate,  a  pension  of  3,600 
francs."1  Equally  noteworthy  is  the  later  declaration  of 
Napoleon  that  Robespierre  was  the  "  scapegoat  of  the 
Revolution."2  It  appears  probable,  then,  that  he  shared 
the  Jacobinical  belief  that  the  Terror  was  a  necessary 
though  painful  stage  in  the  purification  of  the  body  poli- 
tic. His  admiration  of  the  rigour  of  Lycurgus,  and  his 
dislike  of  all  superfluous  luxury,  alike  favour  this  suppo- 

1  Jung,  "  Bonaparte  et  son  Temps,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  430. 

2  "Memorial,"  ch.  ii.,  November,  1815.  See  also  Thibaudeau,  '•  M6- 
moires  sur  le  Consulat,"  vol.  i.,  p.  59. 


54  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

sition  ;  and  as  he  always  had  the  courage  of  his  convictions, 
it  is  impossible  to  conceive  him  clinging  to  the  skirts  of 
the  terrorists  merely  from  a  mean  hope  of  prospective 
favours.  That  is  the  alternative  explanation  of  his  inti- 
macy with  young  Robespierre.  Some  of  his  injudicious 
admirers,  in  trying  to  disprove  his  complicity  with  the 
terrorists,  impale  themselves  on  this  horn  of  the  dilemma. 
In  seeking  to  clear  him  from  the  charge  of  Terrorism, 
they  stain  him  with  the  charge  of  truckling  to  the  terror- 
ists. They  degrade  him  from  the  level  of  St.  Just  to  that 
of  Barrere. 

A  sentence  in  one  of  young  Robespierre's  letters  shows 
that  he  never  felt  completely  sure  about  the  young  officer. 
After  enumerating  to  his  brother  Buonaparte's  merits,  he 
adds  :  "  He  is  a  Corsican,  and  offers  only  the  guarantee  of 
a  man  of  that  nation  who  has  resisted  the  caresses  of  Paoli 
and  whose  property  has  been  ravaged  by  that  traitor." 
Evidently,  then,  Robespierre  regarded  Buonaparte  with 
some  suspicion  as  an  insular  Proteus,  lacking  those  sure- 
ties, mental  and  pecuniary,  which  reduced  a  man  to  dog- 
like fidelity. 

Yet,  however  warily  Buonaparte  picked  his  steps  along 
the  slopes  of  the  revolutionary  volcano,  he  was  destined  to 
feel  the  scorch  of  the  central  fires.  He  had  recently  been 
intrusted  with  a  mission  to  the  Genoese  Republic,  which 
was  in  a  most  difficult  position.  It  was  subject  to  pressure 
from  three  sides ;  from  English  men-of-war  that  had 
swooped  down  on  a  French  frigate,  the  "  Modeste,"  in 
Genoese  waters ;  and  from  actual  invasion  by  the  French 
on  the  west  and  by  the  Austrians  on  the  north.  Despite 
the  great  difficulties  of  his  task,  the  young  envoy  bent  the 
distracted  Doge  and  Senate  to  his  will.  He  might,  there- 
fore, have  expected  gratitude  from  his  adopted  country; 
but  shortly  after  he  returned  to  Nice  he  was  placed  under 
arrest,  and  was  imprisoned  in  a  fort  near  Antibes. 

The  causes  of  this  swift  reverse  of  fortune  were  curi- 
ously complex.  The  Robespierres  had  in  the  meantime 
been  guillotined  at  Paris  (July  24th,  or  Thermidor  10th); 
and  tins  '* Thermidorian  "  reaction  alone  would  have  suf- 
ficed to  endanger  Buonaparte's  head.  But  his  position 
was  further  imperilled  by  his  recent  strategic  suggestions, 


IV 


VENDEMIAIRE  55 


which  had  served  to  reduce  to  a  secondary  rSle  the  French 
Army  of  the  Alps.  The  operations  of  that  force  had  of 
late  been  strangely  thwarted ;  and  its  leaders,  searching 
for  the  paralyzing  influence,  discovered  it  in  the  advice  of 
Buonaparte.  Their  suspicions  against  him  were  formu- 
lated in  a  secret  letter  to  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety, 
which  stated  that  the  Army  of  the  Alps  had  been  kept 
inactive  by  the  intrigues  of  the  younger  Robespierre  and 
of  Ricord.  Many  a  head  had  fallen  for  reasons  less  serious 
than  these.  But  Buonaparte  had  one  infallible  safeguard  : 
he  could  not  well  be  spared.  After  a  careful  examination 
of  his  papers,  the  Commissioners,  Salicetti  and  Albitte, 
provisionally  restored  him  to  liberty,  but  not,  for  some 
weeks,  to  his  rank  of  general  (August  20th,  1794).  The 
chief  reason  assigned  for  his  liberation  was  the  service 
which  his  knowledge  and  talents  might  render  to  the  Re- 
public, a  reference  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Italian  coast- 
line which  he  had  gained  during  the  mission  to  Genoa. 

For  a  space  his  daring  spirit  was  doomed  to  chafe  in 
comparative  inactivity,  in  supervising  the  coast  artillery. 
But  his  faults  were  forgotten  in  the  need  which  was  soon 
felt  for  his  warlike  prowess.  An  expedition  was  prepared 
to  free  Corsica  from  "  the  tyranny  of  the  English  " ;  and 
in  this  Buonaparte  sailed,  as  general  commanding  the 
artillery.  With  him  were  two  friends,  Junot  and  Mar- 
mont,  who  had  clung  to  him  through  his  recent  troubles ; 
the  former  was  to  be  helped  to  wealth  and  fame  by  Buona- 
parte's friendship,  the  latter  by  his  own  brilliant  gifts.1 
In  this  expedition  their  talent  was  of  no  avail.  The 
French  were  worsted  in  an  engagement  with  the  British 
fleet,  and  fell  back  in  confusion  to  the  coast  of  France. 
Once  again  Buonaparte's  Corsican  enterprises  were  frus- 
trated by  the  ubiquitous  lords  of  the  sea :  against  them 
he  now  stored  up  a  double  portion  of  hate,  for  in  the 
meantime  his  inspectorship  of  coast  artillery  had  been 
given  to  his  fellow-countryman,  Casabianca. 

1  Marmont  (1774-18^2)  became  sub-lieutenant  in  1789,  served  with 
Buonaparte  in  Italy,  Egypt,  etc.,  received  the  title  Due  de  Ragusa  in 
1808,  Marshal  in  180°;  was  defeated  by  Wellington  at  Salamanca  in 
1812,  deserted  to  the  allies  in  1814.  Junot  (1771-1818)  entered  the  army 
in  1791  ;  was  famed  as  a  cavalry  general  in  the  wars  17!t(i-1807;  conquered 
Portugal  in  1808,  and  received  the  title  Due  d'Abrantes ;  died  mad. 


56  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

The  fortunes  of  these  Corsican  exiles  drifted  hither 
and  thither  in  many  perplexing  currents,  as  Buonaparte 
was  once  more  to  discover.  It  was  a  prevalent  complaint 
that  there  were  too  many  of  them  seeking  employment  in 
the  army  of  the  south ;  and  a  note  respecting  the  career 
of  the  young  officer  made  by  General  Scherer,  who  now 
commanded  the  French  Army  of  Italy,  shows  that  Buona- 
parte had  aroused  at  least  as  much  suspicion  as  admira- 
tion. It  runs  :  "  This  officer  is  general  of  artillery,  and 
in  this  arm  has  sound  knowledge,  but  has  somewhat  too 
much  ambition  and  intriguing  habits  for  his  advancement." 
All  things  considered,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  transfer 
him  to  the  army  which  was  engaged  in  crushing  the  Ven- 
dean  revolt,  a  service  which  he  loathed  and  was  deter- 
mined, if  possible,  to  evade.  Accompanied  by  his  faithful 
friends,  Marmont  and  Junot,  as  also  by  his  young  brother 
Louis,  he  set  out  for  Paris  (May,  1795). 

In  reality  Fortune  never  favoured  him  more  than 
when  she  removed  him  from  the  coteries  of  intriguing 
Corsicans  on  the  coast  of  Provence  and  brought  him  to 
the  centre  of  all  influence.  An  able  schemer  at  Paris 
could  decide  the  fate  of  parties  and  governments.  At  the 
frontiers  men  could  only  accept  the  decrees  of  the  om- 
nipot  nt  capital.  Moreover,  the  Revolution,  after  passing 
through  the  molten  stage,  was  now  beginning  to  solidify, 
an  important  opportunity  for  the  political  craftsman.  The 
spring  of  the  year  1795  witnessed  a  strange  blending  of  the 
new  fanaticism  with  the  old  customs.  Society,  dammed 
up  for  a  time  by  the  Spartan  rigour  of  Robespierre,  was 
now  flowing  back  into  its  wonted  channels.  Gay  equi- 
pages were  seen  in  the  streets  ;  theatres,  prosperous  even 
during  the  Terror,  were  now  filled  to  overflowing  ;  gam- 
bling, whether  in  money  or  in  stocks  and  assignats,  was 
now  permeating  all  grades  of  society  ;  and  men  who  had 
grown  rich  by  amassing  the  confiscated  State  lands  now 
vied  with  bankers,  stock-jobbers,  and  forestallers  of  grain 
in  vulgar  ostentation.  As  for  the  poor,  they  were  meet- 
ing their  match  in  the  gilded  youth  of  Paris,  who  with 
clubbed  sticks  asserted  the  right  of  the  rich  to  be  merry. 
If  the  sansculottes  attempted  to  restore  the  days  of  the 
Terror,    the   National    Guards   of    Paris    were    ready   to 


IV 


VENDEMIAIRE  67 


sweep  them  back  into  the  slums.  Such  was  their  fate 
on  May  20th,  shortly  after  Buonaparte's  arrival  at  Paris. 
Any  dreams  which  he  may  have  harboured  of  restoring 
the  Jacobins  to  power  were  dissipated,  for  Paris  now 
plunged  into  the  gaieties  of  the  aneien  rSgime.  The 
Terror  was  remembered  only  as  a  horrible  nightmare, 
which  served  to  add  zest  to  the  pleasures  of  the  present. 
In  some  circles  no  one  was  received  who  had  not  lost  a 
relative  by  the  guillotine.  With  a  ghastly  merriment 
characteristic  of  the  time,  "  victim  balls "  were  given,  to 
which  those  alone  were  admitted  who  could  produce  the 
death  warrant  of  some  family  connection  :  these  secured 
the  pleasure  of  dancing  in  costumes  which  recalled  those 
of  the  scaffold,  and  of  beckoning  ever  and  anon  to  their 
partners  with  nods  that  simulated  the  fall  of  the  severed 
head.  It  was  for  this,  then,  that  the  amiable  Louis,  the 
majestic  Marie  Antoinette,  the  Minerva-like  Madame 
Roland,  the  Girondins  vowed  to  the  utter  quest  of  liberty, 
the  tyrant-quelling  Danton,  the  incorruptible  Robespierre 
himself,  had  felt  the  fatal  axe  ;  in  order  that  the  mimicry 
of  their  death  agonies  might  tickle  jaded  appetites,  and 
help  to  weave  anew  the  old  Circean  spells.  So  it  seemed 
to  the  few  who  cared  to  think  of  the  frightful  sacrifices  of 
the  past,  and  to  measure  them  against  the  seemingly  hope- 
less degradation  of  the  present. 

Some  such  thoughts  seem  to  have  flitted  across  the  mind 
of  Buonaparte  in  those  months  of  forced  inactivity.  It 
was  a  time  of  disillusionment.  Rarely  do  we  find  thence- 
forth in  his  correspondence  any  gleams  of  faith  respecting 
the  higher  possibilities  of  the  human  race.  The  golden 
visions  of  youth  now  vanish  along  with  the  bonnet  rouge 
and  the  jargon  of  the  Terror.  His  bent  had  ever  been 
for  the  material  and  practical :  and  now  that  faith  in  the 
Jacobinical  creed  was  vanishing,  it  was  more  than  ever 
desirable  to  grapple  that  errant  balloon  to  substantial  facts. 
Evidently,  the  Revolution  must  now  trust  to  the  clinging 
of  the  peasant  proprietors  to  the  recently  confiscated  lands 
of  the  Church  and  of  the  emigrant  nobles.  If  all  else  was 
vain  and  transitory,  here  surely  was  a  solid  basis  of  mate- 
rial interests  to  which  the  best  part  of  the  manhood  o\ 
France  would  tenaciously  adhere,  defying  alike  the  plots 


58  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

of  reactionaries  and  the  forces  of  monarchical  Europe. 
Of  these  interests  Buonaparte  was  to  be  the  determined 
guarantor.  Amidst  much  that  was  visionary  in  his  later 
policy  he  never  wavered  in  his  championship  of  the  new 
peasant  proprietors.  He  was  ever  the  peasants'  General, 
the  peasants'  Consul,  the  peasants'  Emperor. 

The  transition  of  the  Revolution  to  an  ordinary  form  of 
polity  was  also  being  furthered  by  its  unparalleled  series  of 
military  triumphs.  When  Buonaparte's  name  was  as  yet 
unknown,  except  in  Corsica  and  Provence,  France  prac- 
tically gained  her  "natural  boundaries,"  the  Rhine  and 
the  Alps.  In  the  campaigns  of  1793-4,  the  soldiers  of 
Pichegru,  Kleber,  Hoche,  and  Moreau  overran  the  whole 
of  the  Low  Countries  and  chased  the  Germans  beyond  the 
Rhine;  the  Piedmontese  were  thrust  behind  the  Alps; 
the  Spaniards  behind  the  Pyrenees.  In  quick  succession 
State  after  State  sued  for  peace  :  Tuscany  in  February, 
1795  ;  Prussia  in  April ;  Hanover,  Westphalia,  and  Saxony 
in  May  ;  Spain  and  Hesse-Cassel  in  July ;  Switzerland  and 
Denmark  in  August. 

Such  was  the  state  of  France  when  Buonaparte  came  to 
seek  his  fortunes  in  the  Sphinx-like  capital.  His  artillery 
command  had  been  commuted  to  a  corresponding  rank  in 
the  infantry— a  step  that  deeply  incensed  him.  He  at- 
tributed it  to  malevolent  intriguers;  but  all  his  efforts 
to  obtain  redress  were  in  vain.  Lacking  money  and  pat- 
ronage, known  only  as  an  able  officer  and  facile  intriguer 
of  the  bankrupt  Jacobinical  party,  he  might  well  have 
despaired.  He  was  now  almost  alone.  Marmont  had 
gone  off  to  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  ;  but  Junot  was  still 
with  him,  allured  perhaps  by  Madame  Pennon's  daughter, 
whom  he  subsequently  married.  At  the  house  of  this 
amiable  hostess,  an  old  friend  of  his  family,  Buonaparte 
found  occasional  relief  from  the  gloom  of  his  existence. 
The  future  Madame  Junot  has  described  him  as  at  this 
time  untidy,  unkempt,  sickly,  remarkable  for  his  extreme 
thinness  and  the  almost  yellow  tint  of  his  visage,  which 
was,  however,  lit  up  by  "two  eyes  sparkling  with  keen- 
ness and  will-power  "  —  evidently  a  Corsican  falcon,  pining 
for  action,  and  fretting  its  soaring  spirit  in  that  vapid  town 
life.     Action  Buonaparte  might  have  had,  but  only  of  a 


rv 


VENDEMIAIRE  59 


kind  that  he  loathed.  He  might  have  commanded  the 
troops  destined  to  crush  the  brave  royalist  peasants  of 
La  Vendee.  But,  whether  from  scorn  of  such  vulture- 
work,  or  from  an  instinct  that  a  nobler  quarry  might  be 
started  at  Paris,  he  refused  to  proceed  to  the  Army  of  the 
West,  and  on  the  plea  of  ill-health  remained  in  the  capital. 
There  he  spent  his  time  deeply  pondering  on  politics  and 
strategy.  He  designed  a  history  of  the  last  two  years, 
and  drafted  a  plan  of  campaign  for  the  Army  of  Italy, 
which,  later  on,  was  to  bear  him  to  fortune.  Probably 
the  geographical  insight  which  it  displayed  may  have  led 
to  his  appointment  (August  21st,  1795)  to  the  topographi- 
cal bureau  of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety.  His  first 
thought  on  hearing  of  this  important  advancement  was 
that  it  opened  up  an  opportunity  for  proceeding  to  Turkey 
to  organize  the  artillery  of  the  Sultan ;  and  in  a  few  days 
he  sent  in  a  formal  request  to  that  effect — the  first  tangi- 
ble proof  of  that  yearning  after  the  Orient  which  haunted 
him  all  through  life.  But,  while  straining  his  gaze  east- 
wards, he  experienced  a  sharp  rebuff.  The  Committee 
was  on  the  point  of  granting  his  request,  when  an  exami- 
nation of  his  recent  conduct  proved  him  guilty  of  a  .breach 
of  discipline  in  not  proceeding  to  his  Vendean  command. 
On  the  very  day  when  one  department  of  the  Committee 
empowered  him  to  proceed  to  Constantinople,  the  Central 
Committee  erased  his  name  from  the  list  of  general  officers 
(September  15th). 

This  time  the  blow  seemed  fatal.  But  Fortune  appeared 
to  compass  his  falls  only  in  order  that  he  might  the  more 
brilliantly  tower  aloft.  Within  three  weeks  he  was  hailed 
as  the  saviour  of  the  new  republican  constitution.  The 
cause  of  this  almost  magical  change  in  his  prospects  is  to 
be  sought  in  the  political  unrest  of  France,  to  which  we 
must  now  briefly  advert. 

All  through  this  summer  of  1795  there  were  conflicts 
between  Jacobins  and  royalists.  In  the  south  the  latter 
party  had  signally  avenged  itself  for  the  agonies  of  the 
preceding  years,  and  the  ardour  of  the  French  tempera- 
ment seemed  about  to  drive  that  hapless  people  from  the 
"Red  Terror"  to  a  veritable  "  White  Terror,"  when  two 
disasters  checked  the  course  of  the  reaction.      An  attempt 


60  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  a  large  force  of  emigrant  French  nobles,  backed  up  by 
British  money  and  ships,  to  rouse  Brittany  against  the  Con- 
vention was  utterly  crushed  by  the  able  young  Hoche  ;  and 
nearly  seven  hundred  prisoners  were  afterwards  shot  down 
in  cold  blood  (July).  Shortly  before  this  blow,  the  little 
prince  styled  Louis  XVII.  succumbed  to  the  brutal  treat- 
ment of  his  gaolers  at  the  Temple  in  Paris  ;  and  the  hopes 
of  the  royalists  now  rested  on  the  unpopular  Comte  de 
Provence.  Nevertheless,  the  political  outlook  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1795  was  not  reassuring  to  the  republicans  ;  and 
the  Commission  of  Eleven,  empowered  by  the  Convention 
to  draft  new  organic  laws,  drew  up  an  instrument  of  gov- 
ernment, which,  though  republican  in  form,  seemed  to  offer 
all  the  stabilit}r  of  the  most  firmly  rooted  oligarchy.  Some 
such  compromise  was  perhaps  necessary  ;  for  the  common- 
wealth was  confronted  by  three  dangers :  anarchy  resulting 
from  the  pressure  of  the  mob,  an  excessive  centralization 
of  power  in  the  hands  of  two  committees,  and  the  possi- 
bility of  a  coup  d'etat  by  some  pretender  or  adventurer. 
Indeed,  the  student  of  French  history  cannot  fail  to  see 
that  this  is  the  problem  which  is  ever  before  the  people  of 
France.  It  has  presented  itself  in  acute  though  diverse 
phases  in  1797,  1799,  1814,  1830,  1818,  1851,  and  in  1871. 
Who  can  say  that  the  problem  has  yet  found  its  complete 
solution  ? 

In  some  respects  the  constitution  which  the  Convention 
voted  in  August,  1795,  was  skilfully  adapted  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  time.  Though  democratic  in  spirit,  it  granted 
a  vote  only  to  those  citizens  who  had  resided  for  a  year  in 
some  dwelling  and  had  paid  taxes,  thus  excluding  the 
rabble  who  had  proved  to  be  dangerous  to  any  settled  gov- 
ernment. It  also  checked  the  hasty  legislation  which  had 
brought  ridicule  on  successive  National  Assemblies.  In 
order  to  moderate  the  zeal  for  the  manufacture  of  decrees, 
which  had  often  exceeded  one  hundred  a  month,  a  second 
or  revising  chamber  was  now  to  be  formed  on  the  basis  of 
age  ;  for  it  had  been  found  that  the  younger  the  deputies 
the  faster  came  forth  the  fluttering  flocks  of  decrees,  that 
often  came  home  to  roost  in  the  guise  of  curses.  A  sena- 
torial guillotine,  it  was  now  proposed,  should  thin  out  the 
fledglings  before  they  flew  abroad  at  all.     Of  the  seven 


IV  VENDEMIAIRE  61 

hundred  and  fifty  deputies  of  France,  the  two  hundred  and 
fifty  oldest  men  were  to  form  the  Council  of  Ancients,  hav- 
ing powers  to  amend  or  reject  the  proposals  emanating  from 
the  Council  of  Five  Hundred.  In  this  Council  were  the 
younger  deputies,  and  with  them  rested  the  sole  initiation 
of  laws.  Thus  the  young  deputies  were  to  make  the  laws, 
but  the  older  deputies  were  to  amend  or  reject  them  ;  and 
this  nice  adjustment  of  the  characteristics  of  youth  and 
age,  a  due  blending  of  enthusiasm  with  caution,  promised  to 
invigorate  the  body  politic  and  yet  guard  its  vital  inter- 
ests. Lastly,  in  order  that  the  two  Councils  should  con- 
tinuously represent  the  feelings  of  France,  one  third  of 
their  members  must  retire  for  a  re-election  every  year,  a 
device  which  promised  to  prevent  any  violent  change  in 
their  composition,  such  as  might  occur  if,  at  the  end  of 
their  three  years'  membership,  all  were  called  upon  to  re- 
sign at  once. 

But  the  real  crux  of  constitution  builders  had  hitherto 
been  in  the  relations  of  the  Legislature  to  the  Executive. 
How  should  the  brain  of  the  body  politic,  that  is,  the 
Legislature,  be  connected  with  the  hand,  that  is,  the 
Executive  ?  Obviously,  so  argued  all  French  political 
thinkers,  the  two  functions  were  distinct  and  must  be 
kept  separate.  The  results  of  this  theory  of  the  separa- 
tion of  powers  were  clearly  traceable  in  the  course  of  the 
Revolution.  When  the  hand  had  been  left  almost  power- 
less, as  in  1791-2,  owing  to  democratic  jealousy  of  the 
royal  Ministry,  the  result  had  been  anarchy.  The  su- 
preme needs  of  the  State  in  the  agonies  of  1793  had 
rendered  the  hand  omnipotent :  the  Convention,  that  is, 
the  brain,  was  for  some  time  powerless  before  its  own 
instrument,  the  two  secret  committees.  Experience  now 
showed  that  the  brain  must  exercise  a  general  control 
over  the  hand,  without  unduly  hampering  its  actions. 
Evidently,  then,  the  deputies  of  France  must  intrust  the 
details  of  administration  to  responsible  Ministers,  though 
some  directing  agency  seemed  needed  as  a  spur  to  energy 
and  a  check  against  royalist  plots.  In  brief,  the  Commit- 
tee of  Public  Safety,  purged  of  its  more  dangerous  powers, 
was  to  furnish  the  model  for  a  new  body  of  five  members, 
termed  the  Directory.     This  organism,  which  was  to  give 


62  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

its  name  to  the  whole  period  1795-1799,  was  not  the  Min- 
istry. There  was  no  Ministry  as  we  now  use  the  term. 
There  were  Ministers  who  were  responsible  individually 
for  their  departments  of  State  :  but  they  never  met  for 
deliberation,  or  communicated  with  the  Legislature ;  they 
were  only  heads  of  departments,  who  were  responsible 
individually  to  the  Directors.  These  five  men  formed  a 
powerful  committee,  deliberating  in  private  on  the  whole 
policy  of  the  State  and  on  all  the  work  of  the  Ministers. 
The  Directory  had  not,  it  is  true,  the  right  of  initiating 
laws  and  of  arbitrary  arrest  which  the  two  committees  had 
freely  exercised  during  the  Terror.  Its  dependence  on 
the  Legislature  seemed  also  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  Di- 
rectors being  appointed  by  the  two  legislative  Councils  ; 
while  one  of  the  five  was  to  vacate  his  office  for  re-election 
every  year.  But  in  other  respects  the  directorial  powers 
were  almost  as  extensive  as  those  wielded  by  the  two 
secret  committees,  or  as  those  which  Buonaparte  was  to 
inherit  from  the  Directory  in  1799.  They  comprised  the 
general  control  of  policy  in  peace  and  war,  the  right  to 
negotiate  treaties  (subject  to  ratification  by  the  legislative 
councils),  to  promulgate  laws  voted  by  the  Councils  and 
watch  over  their  execution,  and  to  appoint  or  dismiss  the 
Ministers  of  State. 

Such  was  the  constitution  which  was  proclaimed  on 
September  22nd,  1795,  or  1st  Vendemiaire,  Year  IV.,  of 
the  revolutionary  calendar.  An  important  postscript  to 
the  original  constitution  now  excited  fierce  commotions 
which  enabled  the  young  officer  to  repair  his  own  shat- 
tered fortunes.  The  Convention,  terrified  at  the  thought  of 
a  general  election,  which  might  send  up  a  malcontent  or 
royalist  majority,  decided  to  impose  itself  on  France  for  at 
least  two  years  longer. '  With  an  effrontery  unparalleled  in 
parliamentary  annals,  it  decreed  that  the  law  of  the  new 
constitution,  requiring  the  re-election  of  one-third  of  the 
deputies  every  year,  should  now  be  applied  to  itself  ;  and 
that  the  rest  of  its  members  should  sit  in  the  forthcoming 
Councils.  At  once  a  cry  of  disgust  and  rage  arose  from 
all  who  were  weary  of  the  Convention  and  all  its  works. 
"  Down  with  the  two-thirds  ! '*  was  the  cry  that  resounded 
through  the  streets  of  Paris.     The  movement  was  not  so 


IV 


VENDEMIAIRE  63 


much  definitely  royalist  as  vaguely  malcontent.  The  many 
were  enraged  by  the  existing  dearth  and  by  the  failure  of 
the  Revolution  to  secure  even  cheap  bread.  Doubtless  the 
royalists  strove  to  drive  on  the  discontent  to  the  desired 
goal,  and  in  many  parts  they  tinged  the  movement  with  an 
unmistakably  Bourbon  tint.  But  it  is  fairly  certain  that 
in  Paris  they  could  not  alone  have  fomented  a  discontent 
so  general  as  that  of  Vendemiaire.  That  they  would  have 
profited  by  the  defeat  of  the  Convention  is,  however, 
equally  certain.  The  history  of  the  Revolution  proves 
that  those  who  at  first  merely  opposed  the  excesses  of  the 
Jacobins  gradually  drifted  over  to  the  royalists.  The  Con- 
vention now  found  itself  attacked  in  the  very  city  which 
had  been  the  chosen  abode  of  Liberty  and  Equality.  Some 
thirty  thousand  of  the  Parisian  National  Guards  were  de- 
termined to  give  short  shrift  to  this  Assembly  that  clung 
so  indecently  to  life  ;  and  as  the  armies  were  far  away,  the 
Parisian  malcontents  seemed  masters  of  the  situation. 
Without  doubt  they  would  have  been  but  for  their  own 
precipitation  and  the  energy  of  Buonaparte. 

But  how  came  he  to  receive  the  military  authority  which 
was  so  potently  to  influence  the  course  of  events  ?  We 
left  him  in  Fructidor  disgraced  :  we  find  him  in  the  middle 
of  Vendemiaire  leading  part  of  the  forces  of  the  Conven- 
tion. This  bewildering  change  was  due  to  the  pressing 
needs  of  the  Republic,  to  his  own  signal  abilities,  and  to  the 
discerning  eye  of  Barras,  whose  career  claims  a  brief  notice. 

Paul  Barras  came  of  a  Provencal  family,  and  had  an 
adventurous  life  both  on  land  and  in  maritime  expeditions. 
Gifted  with  a  robust  frame,  consummate  self-assurance,  and 
a  ready  tongue,  he  was  well  equipped  for  intrigues,  both 
amorous  and  political,  when  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolu- 
tion gave  his  thoughts  a  more  serious  turn.  Espousing 
the  ultra-democratic  side,  he  yet  contrived  to  emerge  un- 
scathed from  the  schisms  which  were  fatal  to  less  dextrous 
trimmers.  He  was  present  at  the  siege  of  Toulon,  and 
has  striven  in  his  "  Memoires  "  to  disparage  Buonaparte's 
services  and  exalt  his  own.  At  the  crisis  of  Thermidor 
the  Convention  intrusted  him  with  the  command  of  the 
"army  of  the  interior,"  and  the  energy  which  he  then  dis- 
played gained  for  him  the  same  position  in  the  equally 


64  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

critical  days  of  Vendemiaire.  Though  he  subsequently 
carped  at  the  conduct  of  Buonaparte,  his  action  proved  his 
complete  confidence  in  that  young  officer's  capacity  :  he  at 
once  sent  for  him,  and  intrusted  him  with  most  important 
duties.  Herein  lies  the  chief  chance  of  immortality  for 
the  name  of  Barras ;  not  that,  as  a  terrorist,  he  slaughtered 
royalists  at  Toulon  ;  not  that  he  was  the  military  chief  of 
the  Thermidorians,  who,  from  fear  of  their  own  necks, 
ended  the  supremacy  of  Robespierre  ;  not  even  that  he 
degraded  the  new  regime  by  a  cynical  display  of  all  the 
worst  vices  of  the  old  ;  but  rather  because  he  was  now 
privileged  to  hold  the  stirrup  for  the  great  captain  who 
vaulted  lightly  into  the  saddle. 

The  present  crisis  certainly  called  for  a  man  of  skill  and 
determination.  The  malcontents  had  been  emboldened  by 
the  timorous  actions  of  General  Menou,  who  had  previously 
been  intrusted  with  the  task  of  suppressing  the  agitation. 
Owing  to  a  praiseworthy  desire  to  avoid  bloodshed,  that 
general  wasted  time  in  parleying  with  the  most  rebellious 
of  the  "sections"  of  Paris.  The  Convention  now  ap- 
pointed Barras  to  the  command,  while  Buonaparte,  Brune, 
Carteaux,  Dupont,  Loison,  Vachot,  and  Vezu  were  charged 
to  serve  under  him.1  Such  was  the  decree  of  the  Conven- 
tion, which  therefore  refutes  Napoleon's  later  claim  that 
he  was  in  command,  and  that  of  his  admirers  that  he  was 
second  in  command.  Yet,  intrusted  from  the  outset  by 
Barras  with  important  duties,  he  unquestionably  became 
the  animating  spirit  of  the  defence.  "From  the  first," 
says  Thiebault,  "his  activity  was  astonishing  :  he  seemed 
to  be  everywhere  at  once  :  he  surprised  people  by  his  la- 
conic, clear,  and  prompt  orders  :  everybody  was  struck  by 
the  vigour  of  his  arrangements,  and  passed  from  admi- 
ration to  confidence,  from  confidence  to  enthusiasm." 
Everything  now  depended  on  skill  and  enthusiasm.  The 
defenders  of  the  Convention,  comprising  some  four  or  five 
thousand  troops  of  the  line,  and  between  one  and  two 
thousand  patriots,  gendarmes,  and  Invalides,  were    con- 

1  M.  Zivy,  "Le  treize  Vendemiaire,"  pp.  60-62,  quotes  the  decree  as- 
signing the  different  commands.  A  MS.  written  by  Buonaparte,  now  in 
the  French  War  Office  Archives,  proves  also  that  it  was  Barras  who  gave 
the  order  to  fetch  the  cannon  from  the  Sablons  camp. 


IV 


VENDEMIAIRE  65 


fronted  by  nearly  thirty  thousand  National  Guards.  The 
odds  were  therefore  wellnigh  as  heavy  as  those  which 
menaced  Louis  XVI.  on  the  day  of  his  final  overthrow.  But 
the  place  of  the  yielding  king  was  now  filled  by  determined 
men,  who  saw  the  needs  of  the  situation.  In  the  earlier 
scenes  of  the  Revolution,  Buonaparte  had  pondered  on  the 
efficacy  of  artillery  in  street-fighting  —  a  fit  subject  for  his 
geometrical  genius.  With  a  few  cannon,  he  knew  that  he 
could  sweep  all  the  approaches  to  the  palace  ;  and,  on 
Barras'  orders,  he  despatched  a  dashing  cavalry  officer, 
Murat —  a  name  destined  to  become  famous  from  Madrid 
to  Moscow  —  to  bring  the  artillery  from  the  neighbouring 
camp  of  Sablons.  Murat  secured  them  before  the  malcon- 
tents of  Paris  could  lay  hands  on  them  ;  and  as  the  "  sec- 
tions "  of  Paris  had  yielded  up  their  own  cannon  after  the 
affrays  of  May,  they  now  lacked  the  most  potent  force  in 
street-fighting.  Their  actions  were  also  paralyzed  by 
divided  counsels  :  their  commander,  an  old  general  named 
Danican,  moved  his  men  hesitatingly  ;  he  wasted  precious 
minutes  in  parleying,  and  thus  gave  time  to  Barras'  small 
but  compact  force  to  fight  them  in  detail.  Buonaparte 
had  skilfully  disposed  his  cannon  to  bear  on  the  royalist 
columns  that  threatened  the  streets  north  of  the  Tuileries. 
But  for  some  time  the  two  parties  stood  face  to  face,  seek- 
ing to  cajole  or  intimidate  one  another.  As  the  autumn 
afternoon  waned,  shots  were  fired  from  some  houses  near 
the  church  of  St.  Roch,  where  the  malcontents  had  their 
headquarters.1  At  once  the  streets  became  the  scene  of 
a  furious  fight  ;  furious  but  unequal  ;  for  Buonaparte's 
cannon  tore  away  the  heads  of  the  malcontent  columns. 
In  vain  did  the  royalists  pour  in  their  volleys  from  behind 
barricades,  or  from  the  neighbouring  houses  ;  finally  they 
retreated  on  the  barricaded  church,  or  fled  down  the  Rue 
St.  Honore.  Meanwhile  their  bands  from  across  the  river, 
5,000  strong,  were  filing  across  the  bridges,  and  menaced 
the  Tuileries  from  that  side,  until  here  also  they  melted 
away  before  the  grapeshot  and  musketry  poured  into  their 
front  and  flank.  By  six  o'clock  the  conflict  was  over. 
The  fight  presents  few,  if  any,  incidents  which  are  authen- 

1  Buonaparte  afterwards  asserted  that  it  was  he  who  had  given  the 
order  to  fire,  and  certainly  delay  was  all  in  favour  of  his  opponents. 


66  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

tic.  The  well-known  engraving  of  Helman,  which  shows 
Buonaparte  directing  the  storming  of  the  church  of  St. 
Roch  is  unfortunately  quite  incorrect.  He  was  not  engaged 
there,  but  in  the  streets  further  east  :  the  church  was  not 
stormed  :  the  malcontents  held  it  all  through  the  night, 
and  quietly  surrendered  it  next  morning. 

Such  was  the  great  day  of  Vendemiaire.  It  cost  the 
lives  of  about  two  hundred  on  each  side  ;  at  least,  that  is 
the  usual  estimate,  which  seems  somewhat  incongruous 
with  the  stories  of  fusillading  and  cannonading  at  close 
quarters,  until  we  remember  that  it  is  the  custom  of  me- 
moir writers  and  newspaper  editors  to  trick  out  the  details 
of  a  fight,  and  in  the  case  of  civil  warfare  to  minimize  the 
bloodshed.  Certainly  the  Convention  acted  with  clem- 
ency in  the  hour  of  victory  :  two  only  of  the  rebel  leaders 
were  put  to  death  ;  and  it  is  pleasing  to  remember  that 
when  Menou  was  charged  with  treachery,  Buonaparte  used 
his  influence  to  procure  his  freedom. 

Bourrienne  states  that  in  his  later  days  the  victor  deeply 
regretted  his  action  in  this  day  of  Vendemiaire.  The 
assertion  seems  incredible.  The  "  whiff  of  grapeshot " 
crushed  a  movement  which  could  have  led  only  to  present 
anarchy,  and  probably  would  have  brought  France  back  to 
royalism  of  an  odious  type.  It  taught  a  severe  lesson  to 
a  fickle  populace  which,  according  to  Mine,  de  Stael,  was 
hungering  for  the  spoils  of  place  as  much  as  for  any  polit- 
ical object.  Of  all  the  events  of  his  post-Corsican  life, 
Buonaparte  need  surely  never  have  felt  compunctions  for 
Vendemiaire.1 

After  four  signal  reverses  in  his  career,  he  now  enters 
on  a  path  strewn  with  glories.  The  first  reward  for  his 
signal  services  to  the  Republic  was  his  appointment  to  be 
second  in  command  of  the  army  of  the  interior ;  and  when 
Barras  resigned  the  first  command,  he  took  that  responsible 
post.  But  more  brilliant  honours  were  soon  to  follow,  the 
first  of  a  social  character,  the  second  purely  military. 

1  I  caution  readers  against  accepting  the  statement  of  Carlyle  ("  French 
Revolution,"  vol.  iii.  ad  Jin.)  that  "the  thing  we  specifically  call  French 
Revolution  is  blown  into  space  by  the  whiff  of  grapeshot."  On  the  con- 
trary, it  was  perpetuated,  though  in  a  more  organic  and  more  orderly 
governmental  form. 


IV 


VENDEMIAIRE  67 


Buonaparte  had  already  appeared  timidly  and  awkwardly 
at  the  salon  of  the  voluptuous  Barras,  where  the  fair  but 
frail  Madame  Tallien  —  Notre  Dame  de  Thermidor  she  was 
styled  —  dazzled  Parisian  society  by  her  classic  features 
and  the  uncinctured  grace  of  her  attire.  There  he  reap- 
peared, not  in  the  threadbare  uniform  that  had  attracted 
the  giggling  notice  of  that  giddy  throng,  but  as  the  lion 
of  the  society  which  his  talents  had  saved.  His  previous 
attempts  to  gain  the  hand  of  a  lady  had  been  unsuccessful. 
He  had  been  refused,  first  by  Mile.  Clary,  sister  of  his 
brother  Joseph's  wife,  and  quite  recently  by  Madame  Per- 
mon.  Indeed,  the  scarecrow  young  officer  had  not  been  a 
brilliant  match.  But  now  he  saw  at  that  salon  a  charming 
widow,  Josephine  de  Beauharnais,  whose  husband  had  per- 
ished in  the  Terror.  The  ardour  of  his  southern  tempera- 
ment, long  repressed  by  his  privations,  speedily  rekindles 
in  her  presence :  his  stiff,  awkward  manners  thaw  under 
her  smiles  :  his  silence  vanishes  when  she  praises  his  mili- 
tary gifts  :  he  admires  her  tact,  her  sympathy,  her  beauty : 
he  determines  to  marry  her.  The  lady,  on  her  part,  seems 
to  have  been  somewhat  terrified  by  her  uncanny  wooer :  she 
comments  questioningly  on  his  "  violent  tenderness  almost 
amounting  to  frenzy  "  :  she  notes  uneasily  his  "  keen  inex- 
plicable gaze  which  imposes  even  on  our  Directors  " :  how 
would  this  eager  nature,  this  masterful  energy,  consort 
with  her  own  "Creole  nonchalance"?  She  did  well  to 
ask  herself  whether  the  general's  almost  volcanic  passion 
would  not  soon  exhaust  itself,  and  turn  from  her  own  fad- 
ing charms  to  those  of  women  who  were  his  equals  in  age. 
Besides,  when  she  frankly  asked  her  own  heart,  she  found 
that  she  loved  him  not :  she  only  admired  him.  Her  chief 
consolation  was  that  if  she  married  him,  her  friend  Barras 
would  help  to  gain  for  Buonaparte  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  Italy.  The  advice  of  Barras  undoubtedly  helped 
to  still  the  questioning  surmises  of  Josephine ;  and  the 
wedding  was  celebrated,  as  a  civil  contract,  on  March  9th, 
1796.  With  a  pardonable  coquetry,  the  bride  entered  her 
age  on  the  register  as  four  years  less  than  the  thirty-four 
which  had  passed  over  her:  while  her  husband,  desiring 
still  further  to  lessen  the  disparity,  entered  his  date  of 
birth  as  1768. 


68  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

A  fortnight  before  the  wedding,  he  had  been  appointed 
to  command  the  Army  of  Italy :  and  after  a  honeymoon 
of  two  days  at  Paris,  he  left  his  bride  to  take  up  his  new 
military  duties.  Clearly,  then,  there  was  some  connec- 
tion between  this  brilliant  fortune  and  his  espousal  of 
Josephine.  But  the  assertion  that  this  command  was 
the  "  dowry  "  offered  by  Barras  to  the  somewhat  reluctant 
bride  is  more  piquant  than  correct.  That  the  brilliance 
of  Buonaparte's  prospects  finally  dissipated  her  scruples 
may  be  frankly  admitted.  But  the  appointment  to  a 
command  of  a  French  army  did  not  rest  with  Barras. 
He  was  only  one  of  the  five  Directors  who  now  decided 
the  chief  details  of  administration.  His  colleagues  were 
Letourneur,  Rewbell,  La  Reveilliere-Lepeaux,  and  the 
great  Carnot ;  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  the  last- 
named  who  chiefly  decided  the  appointment  in  question. 
He  had  seen  and  pondered  over  the  plan  of  campaign 
which  Buonaparte  had  designed  for  the  Army  of  Italy ; 
and  the  vigour  of  the  conception,  the  masterly  apprecia- 
tion of  topographical  details  which  it  displayed,  and  the 
trenchant  energy  of  its  style  had  struck  conviction  to  his 
strategic  genius.  Buonaparte  owed  his  command,  not  to 
a  backstairs  intrigue,  as  was  currently  believed  in  the 
army,  but  rather  to  his  own  commanding  powers.  Dur- 
ing his  mission  to  Genoa  in  1794,  he  had  carefully  studied 
the  coast-line  and  the  passes  leading  inland ;  and,  accord- 
ing to  the  well-known  savant,  Volney,  the  young  officer, 
shortly  after  his  release  from  imprisonment,  sketched  out 
to  him  and  to  a  Commissioner  of  the  Convention  the  de- 
tails of  the  very  plan  of  campaign  which  was  to  carry  him 
victoriously  from  the  Genoese  Riviera  into  the  heart  of 
Austria.1  While  describing  this  masterpiece  of  strategy, 
says  Volney,  Buonaparte  spoke  as  if  inspired.  We  can 
fancy  the  wasted  form  dilating  with  a  sense  of  power,  the 
thin  sallow  cheeks  aglow  with  enthusiasm,  the  hawk-like 
eyes  flashing  at  the  sight  of  the  helpless  Imperial  quarry, 
as  he  pointed  out  on  the  map  of  Piedmont  and  Lombardy 
the  features  which  would  favour  a  dashing  invader  and 
carry  him  to  the  very  gates  of  Vienna.  The  splendours 
of  the  Imperial  Court  at  the  Tuileries  seem  tawdry  and 

1  Chaptal,  "  Mes  Souvenirs  sur  Napoleon,"  p.  198. 


iv  VENDEMIAIRE  69 

insipid  when  compared  with  the  intellectual  grandeur 
which  lit  up  that  humble  lodging  at  Nice  with  the  first 
rays  that  heralded  the  dawn  of  Italian  liberation. 

With  the  fuller  knowledge  which  he  had  recently 
acquired,  he  now,  in  January,  1796,  elaborated  this  plan  of 
campaign,  so  that  it  at  once  gained  Carnot's  admiration. 
The  Directors  forwarded  it  to  General  Scherer,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  Army  of  Italy,  but  promptly  received 
the  "  brutal "  reply  that  the  man  who  had  drafted  the 
plan  ought  to  come  and  carry  it  out.  Long  dissatisfied 
with  Scherer's  inactivity  and  constant  complaints,  the 
Directory  now  took  him  at  his  word,  and  replaced  him 
by  Buonaparte.  Such  is  the  truth  about  Buonaparte's 
appointment  to  the  Army  of  Italy. 

To  Nice,  then,  the  young  general  set  out  (March  21st) 
accompanied,  or  speedily  followed,  by  his  faithful  friends, 
Marmont  and  Junot,  as  well  as  by  other  officers  of  whose 
energy  he  was  assured,  Berthier,  Murat,  and  Duroc. 
How  much  had  happened  since  the  early  summer  of 
1795,  when  he  had  barely  the  means  to  pay  his  way  to 
Paris  !  A  sure  instinct  had  drawn  him  to  that  hot-bed 
of  intrigues.  He  had  played  a  desperate  game,  risking 
his  commission  in  order  that  he  might  keep  in  close  touch 
with  the  central  authority.  His  reward  for  this  almost 
superhuman  confidence  in  his  own  powers  was  correspond- 
ingly great  ;  and  now,  though  he  knew  nothing  of  the 
handling  of  cavalry  and  infantry  save  from  books,  he 
determined  to  lead  the  Army  of  Italy  to  a  series  of  con- 
quests that  would  rival  those  of  Ctesar.  In  presence  of  a 
will  so  stubborn  and  genius  so  fervid,  what  wonder  that  a 
friend  prophesied  that  his  halting-place  would  be  either 
the  throne  or  the  scaffold  ? 


CHAPTER   V 

THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN 

(1796) 

In  the  personality  of  Napoleon  nothing  is  more  remark- 
able than  the  combination  of  gifts  which  in  most  natures 
are  mutually  exclusive  ;  his  instincts  were  both  political 
and  military  ;  his  survey  of  a. land  took  in  not  only  the 
geographical  environment  but  also  the  material  welfare  of 
the  people.  Facts,  which  his  foes  ignored,  offered  a  firm 
fulcrum  for  the  leverage  of  his  will  :  and  their  political 
edifice  or  their  military  policy  crumbled  to  ruin  under  an 
assault  planned  with  consummate  skill  and  pressed  home 
with  relentless  force. 

For  the  exercise  of  all  these  gifts  what  land  was  so 
fitted  as  the  mosaic  of  States  which  was  dignified  with  the 
name  of  Italy  ? 

That  land  had  long  been  the  battle-ground  of  the 
Bourbons  and  the  Hapsburgs  ;  and  their  rivalries,  aided 
by  civic  dissensions,  had  reduced  the  people  that  once  had 
given  laws  to  Europe  into  a  condition  of  miserable  weak- 
ness. Europe  was  once  the  battle-field  of  the  Romans  : 
Italy  was  now  the  battle-field  of  Europe.  The  Haps- 
burgs dominated  the  north,  where  they  held  the  rich 
Duchy  of  Milan,  along  with  the  great  stronghold  of  Man- 
tua, and  some  scattered  imperial  fiefs.  A  scion  of  the 
House  of  Austria  reigned  at  Florence  over  the  prosperous 
Duchy  of  Tuscany.  Modena  and  Lucca  were  under  the 
general  control  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  The  south  of 
the  peninsula,  along  with  Sicily,  was  swayed  by  Ferdi- 
nand IV.,  a  descendant  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons,  who  kept 
his  people  in  a  condition  of  mediaeval  ignorance  and  servi- 
tude ;  and  this  dynasty  controlled  the  Duchy  of  Parma. 
The    Papal    States   were   also  sunk  in  the  torpor  of  the 

70 


chap,  v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  71 

Middle  Ages  ;  but  in  the  northern  districts  of  Bologna 
and  Ferrara,  known  as  the  "  Legations,"  the  inhabitants 
still  remembered  the  time  of  their  independence,  and 
chafed  under  the  irritating  restraints  of  Papal  rule.  This 
was  seen  when  the  leaven  of  French  revolutionary  thought 
began  to  ferment  in  Italian  towns.  Two  young  men  of 
Bologna  were  so  enamoured  of  the  new  ideas,  as  to  raise 
an  Italian  tricolour  flag,  green,  white,  and  red,  and  sum- 
mon their  fellow-citizens  to  revolt  against  the  rule  of  the 
Pope's  legate  (November,  1794).  The  revolt  was  crushed, 
and  the  chief  offenders  were  hanged  ;  but  elsewhere  the 
force  of  democracy  made  itself  felt,  especially  among  the 
more  virile  peoples  of  Northern  Italy.  Lombardy  and 
Piedmont  throbbed  with  suppressed  excitement.  Even 
when  the  King  of  Sardinia,  Victor  Amadeus  III.,  was 
waging  war  against  the  French  Republic,  the  men  of 
Turin  were  with  difficulty  kept  from  revolt ;  and,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  Austro-Sardinian  alliance  was  powerless  to 
recover  Savoy  and  Nice  from  the  soldiers  of  liberty  or  to 
guard  the  Italian  Riviera  from  invasion. 

In  fact,  Bonaparte  —  for  he  henceforth  spelt  his  name 
thus  —  detected  the  political  weakness  of  the  Hapsburgs' 
position  in  Italy.  Masters  of  eleven  distinct  peoples 
north  of  the  Alps,  how  could  they  hope  permanently  to 
dominate  a  wholly  alien  people  south  of  that  great  moun- 
tain barrier  ?  The  many  failures  of  the  old  Ghibelline  or 
Imperial  party  in  face  of  any  popular  impulse  which 
moved  the  Italian  nature  to  its  depths  revealed  the  arti- 
ficiality of  their  rule.  Might  not  such  an  impulse  be 
imparted  by  the  French  Revolution  ?  And  would  not 
the  hopes  of  national  freedom  and  of  emancipation  from 
feudal  imposts  fire  these  peoples  with  zeal  for  the  French 
cause?  Evidently  there  were  vast  possibilities  in  a  dem- 
ocratic propaganda.  At  the  outset  Bonaparte's  racial 
sympathies  were  warmly  aroused  for  the  liberation  of 
Italy  ;  and  though  his  judgment  was  to  be  warped  by 
the  promptings  of  ambition,  he  never  lost  sight  of  the 
welfare  of  the  people  whence  he  was  descended.  In  his 
"Memoirs  written  at  St.  Helena"  he  summed  up  his 
convictions  respecting  the  Peninsula  in  this  statesman- 
like utterance  :   "Italy,  isolated  within  its  natural  limits, 


72  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap,  v 

separated  by  the  sea  and  by  very  high  mountains  from 
the  rest  of  Europe,  seems  called  to  be  a  great  and  power- 
ful nation.  .  .  .  Unity  in  manners,  language,  literature, 
ought  finally,  in  a  future  more  or  less  remote,  to  unite  its 
inhabitants  under  a  single  government.  .  .  .  Rome  is 
beyond  doubt  the  capital  which  the  Italians  will  one  day 
choose."  A  prophetic  saying  :  it  came  from  a  man  who, 
as  conqueror  and  organizer,  awakened  that  people  from 
the  torpor  of  centuries  and  breathed  into  it  something  of 
his  own  indomitable  energy. 

And  then  again,  the  Austrian  possessions  south  of  the 
Alps  were  difficult  to  hold  for  purely  military  reasons. 
They  were  separated  from  Vienna  by  difficult  mountain 
ranges  through  which  armies  struggled  with  difficulty. 
True,  Mantua  was  a  formidable  stronghold,  but  no  for- 
tress could  make  the  Milanese  other  than  a  weak  and 
straggling  territory,  the  retention  of  which  by  the  Court 
of  Vienna  was  a  defiance  to  the  gospel  of  nature  of  which 
Rousseau  was  the  herald  and  Bonaparte  the  militant 
exponent. 

The  Austro-Sardinian  forces  were  now  occupying  the 
pass  which  separates  the  Apennines  from  the  Maritime 
Alps  north  of  the  town  of  Savona.  They  were  accord- 
ingly near  the  headwaters  of  the  Bormida  and  the  Tanaro, 
two  of  the  chief  affluents  of  the  River  Po  :  and  roads  fol- 
lowing those  river  valleys  led,  the  one  north-east,  in  the 
direction  of  Milan,  the  other  north-west  towards  Turin, 
the  Sardinian  capital.  A  wedge  of  mountainous  country 
separated  these  roads  as  they  diverged  from  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Montenotte.  Here  obviously  was  the  vulnerable 
point  of  the  Austro-Sardinian  position.  -*Here  therefore 
Bonaparte  purposed  to  deliver  his  first  strokes,  foreseeing 
that,  should  he  sever  the  allies,  he  would  have.in  his  favour 
every  advantage  both  political  and  topographical. 

All  this  was  possible  to  a  commander  who  could  over- 
come the  initial  difficulties.  But  these  difficulties  were 
enormous.  The  position  of  the  French  Army  of  Italy  in 
March,  1796,  was  precarious.  Its  detachments,  echelonned 
near  the  coast  from  Savona  to  Loano,  and  thence  to  Nice, 
or  inland  to  the  Col  di  Tenda,  comprised  in  all  42,000 
men,  as  against  the  Austro-Sardinian  forces  amounting  to 


74  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

52,000  men.1  Moreover,  the  allies  occupied  strong  posi- 
tions on  the  northern  slopes  of  the  Maritime  Alps  and 
Apennines,  and,  holding  the  inner  and  therefore  shorter 
curve,  they  could  by  a  dextrous  concentration  have  pushed 
their  more  widely  scattered  opponents  on  to  the  shore,  where 
the  republicans  would  have  been  harassed  by  the  guns  of 
the  British  cruisers.  Finally,  Bonaparte's  troops  were 
badly  equipped,  worse  cladv  and  were  not  paid  at  all.  On 
his  arrival  at  Nice  at  the  close  of  March,  the  young  com- 
mander had  to  disband  one  battalion  for  mutinous  conduct.2 
For  a  brief  space  it  seemed  doubtful  how  the  army  would 
receive  this  slim,  delicate-looking  youth,  known  hitherto 
only  as  a  skilful  artillerist  at  Toulon  and  in  the  streets  of 
Paris.  But  he  speedily  gained  the  respect  and  confidence 
of  the  rank  and  file,  not  only  by  stern  punishment  of  the 
mutineers,  but  by  raising  money  from  a  local  banker,  so 
as  to  make  good  some  of  the  long  arrears  of  pay.  Other 
grievances  he  rectified  by  prompt  reorganization  of  the 
commissariat  and  kindred  departments.  But,  above  all,  by 
his  burning  words  he  thrilled  them:  "  Soldiers,  you  are 
half  starved  and  half  naked.  The  Government  owes  you 
much,  but  can  do  nothing  for  you.  Your  patience  and 
courage  are  honourable  to  you,  but  they  procure  you  neither 
advantage  nor  glory.  I  am  about  to  lead  you  into  the 
most  fertile  valleys  of  the  world  :  there  you  will  find  flour- 
ishing cities  and  teeming  provinces :  there  you  will  reap 
honour,  glory,  and  riches.  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Italy, 
will  you  lack  courage  ?  "  Two  years  previously  so  open 
a  bid  for  the  soldiers'  allegiance  would  have  conducted 
any  French  commander  forthwith  to  the  guillotine.  But 
much  had  changed  since  the  days  of  Robespierre's  su- 
premacy ;  Spartan  austerity  had  vanished ;  and  the  former 
insane  jealousy  of  individual  pre-eminence  was  now  favour- 
ing a  startling  reaction  which  was  soon  to  install  the  one 
supremely  able  man  as  absolute  master  of  France. 

Bonaparte's  conduct  produced  a  deep  impression  alike  on 

1  Koch,  "  M^moires  de  Mass^na,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  13,  credits  the  French  with 
only  37,775  men  present  with  the  colours,  the  Austrians  with  32,000,  and 
the  Sardinians  with  20,000.  All  these  figures  omit  the  troops  in  garrison 
or  guarding  communications. 

2  Napoleon's  "  Correspondence,"  March  28th,  1796. 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  75 

troops  and  officers.  From  Massena  his  energy  and  his  tren- 
chant orders  extorted  admiration:  and  the  tall  swaggering 
Augereau  shrank  beneath  the  intellectual  superiority  of  his 
gaze.  Moreover,  at  the  beginning  of  April  the  French  re- 
ceived reinforcements  which  raised  their  total  to  49,300  men, 
and  gave  them  a  superiority  of  force ;  for  though  the  allies 
had  52,000,  yet  they  were  so  widely  scattered  as  to  be  infe- 
rior in  any  one  district.  Besides,  the  Austrian  commander, 
Beaulieu,  was  seventy-one  years  of  age,  had  only  just  been 
sent  into  Italy,  with  which  land  he  was  ill-acquainted,  and 
found  one-third  of  his  troops  down  with  sickness.1 

Bonaparte  now  began  to  concentrate  his  forces  near 
Savona.  Fortune  favoured  him  even  before  the  cam- 
paign commenced.  The  snows  of  winter,  still  lying  on 
the  mountains,  though  thawing  on  the  southern  slopes, 
helped  to  screen  his  movements  from  the  enen^'s  out- 
posts ;  and  the  French  vanguard  pushed  along  the  coast- 
line even  as  far  as  Voltri.  This  movement  was  designed 
to  coerce  the  Senate  of  Genoa  into  payment  of  a  fine  for 
its  acquiescence  in  the  seizure  of  a  French  vessel  by  a 
British  cruiser  within  its  neutral  roadstead  ;  but  it  served 
to  alarm  Beaulieu,  who,  breaking  up  his  cantonments, 
sent  a  strong  column  towards  that  citv-  At  the  time 
this  circumstance  greatly  annoyed  Bonaparte,  who  had 
hoped  to  catch  the  Imperialists  dozing  in  their  winter 
quarters.  Yet  it  is  certain  that  the  hasty  move  of  their 
left  flank  towards  Voltri  largely  contributed  to  that 
brilliant  opening  of  Bonaparte's  campaign,  which  his 
admirers  have  generally  regarded  as  due  solely  to  his 
genius.2     For,  when  Beaulieu  had  thrust  his  column  into 

1  See  my  articles  on  Colonel  Graham's  despatches  from  Italy  in  the 
"Eng.  Hist.  Review"  of  January  and  April,  18'.)0. 

2  Thus  Mr.  Sargent  ("  Bonaparte's  First  Campaign  ")  says  that  Bona. 
parte  was  expecting  Beaulieu  to  move  on  Genoa,  and  saw  herein  a  chance 
of  crushing  the  Austrian  centre.  But  Bonaparte,  in  his  despatch  of 
April  6th  to  the  Directory,  referrinir  to  the  French  advance  towards 
Genoa,  writes  :  "J'ai  £te"  tres  facile"  et  extremement  m^content  de  ce 
mouvement.  sur  Genes,  d'autant  plus  d^place'  qu'il  a  oblige"  cette  republique 
a  prendre  une  attitude  hostile,  et  a  r£veill£  Pennenii  que  j'auiais  pris 
tranquille  :  ce  sont  des  homines  de  plus  qu'il  nous  en  coutera."  For  the 
question  how  far  Napoleon  was  indebted  to  Marshal  Maillebois'  campaign 
of  1745  for  his  general  design,  see  the  brochure  of  M.  Pierron.  I  agree 
with  "J.  G."  that  this  design  was  in  the  main  Napoleon's  own.  But  Bee 
Bouvier's  "  Bonaparte  en  Italie,"  p.  197. 


76  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

the  broken  coast  district  between  Genoa  and  Voltri,  he 
severed  it  dangerously  far  from  his  centre,  which  marched 
up  the  valley  of  the  eastern  branch  of  the  Bormida  to 
occupy  the  passes  of  the  Apennines  north  of  Savona. 
Tins,  again,  was  by  no  means  in  close  touch  with  the 
Sardinian  allies  encamped  further  to  the  west  in  and  be- 
yond Ceva.  Beaulieu,  writing  at  a  later  date  to  Colonel 
Graham,  the  English  attache  at  his  headquarters,  ascribed 
his  first  disasters  to  Argenteau,  his  lieutenant  at  Monte- 
notte,  who  employed  only  a  third  of  the  forces  placed 
under  his  command.  But  division  of  forces  was  charac- 
teristic of  the  Austrians  in  all  their  operations,  and  they 
now  gave  a  fine  opportunity  to  any  enterprising  opponent 
who  should  crush  their  weak  and  unsupported  centre. 
In  obedience  to  orders  from  Vienna,  Beaulieu  assumed 
the  offensive  ;  but  he  brought  his  chief  force  to  bear  on 
the  French  vanguard  at  Voltri,  which  he  drove  in  with 
some  loss.  While  he  was  occupying  Voltri,  the  boom  of 
cannon  echoing  across  the  mountains  warned  his  outposts 
that  the  real  campaign  was  opening  in  the  broken  country 
north  of  Savona.1  There  the  weak  Austrian  centre  had 
occupied  a  ridge  or  plateau  above  the  village  of  Monte- 
notte,  through  which  ran  the  road  leading  to  Alessandria 
and  Milan.  Argenteau's  attack  partly  succeeded  ;  but 
the  stubborn  bravery  of  a  French  detachment  checked  it 
before  the  redoubt  which  commanded  the  southern  pro- 
longation of  the  heights  named  Monte-Legino.2 

1  Nelson  was  then  endeavouring  to  cut  off  the  vessels  conveying  stores 
from  Toulon  to  the  French  forces.  The  following  extracts  from  his  de- 
spatches are  noteworthy.  January  6th,  1796  :  "  If  the  French  mean  to 
carry  on  the  war,  they  must  penetrate  into  Italy.  Holland  and  Flanders, 
with  their  own  country,  they  have  entirely  stripped :  Italy  is  the  gold 
mine,  and  if  once  entered,  is  without  the  means  of  resistance."  Then  on 
April  28th,  after  Piedmont  was  overpowered  by  the  French  :  "  We  Eng- 
lish have  to  regret  that  we  cannot  always  decide  the  fate  of  Empires  on 
the  Sea."  Again,  on  May  16th:  "I  very  much  believe  that  England, 
who  commenced  the  war  with  all  Europe  for  her  allies,  will  finish  it  by 
having  nearly  all  Europe  for  her  enemies." 

2  The  picturesque  story  of  the  commander  (who  was  not  Rampon, 
butForn&sy)  summoning  the  defenders  of  the  central  redoubt  to  swear 
on  their  colours  and  on  the  cannon  that  they  would  defend  it  to  the  death 
has  been  endlessly  repeated  by  historians.  But  the  documents  which 
furnish  the  only  authentic  details  show  that  there  was  in  the  redoubt  no 
cannon  and  no  flag.     Forn^sy's  words  simply  were  :  "  C'estici,  mes  amis, 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  17 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs  when  Bonaparte  hurried 
up.  On  the  following  day  (April  12th),  massing  the 
French  columns  of  attack  under  cover  of  an  early  morn- 
ing mist,  he  moved  them  to  their  positions,  so  that  the 
first  struggling  rays  of  sunlight  revealed  to  the  astonished 
Austrians  the  presence  of  an  army  ready  to  crush  their 
front  and  turn  their  flanks.  For  a  time  the  Imperialists 
struggled  bravely  against  the  superior  forces  in  their 
front ;  but  when  Massena  pressed  round  their  right  wing, 
they  gave  way  and  beat  a  speedy  retreat  to  save  them- 
selves from  entire  capture.  Bonaparte  took  no  active 
share  in  the  battle  :  he  was,  very  properly,  intent  on  the 
wider  problem  of  severing  the  Austrians  from  their  allies, 
first  by  the  turning  movement  of  Massena,  and  then  by 
pouring  other  troops  into  the  gap  thus  made.  In  this  he 
entirely  succeeded.  The  radical  defects  in  the  Austrian 
dispositions  left  them  utterly  unable  to  withstand  the 
blows  which  he  now  showered  upon  them.  The  Sardinians 
were  too  far  away  on  the  west  to  help  Argenteau  in  his 
hour  of  need :  they  were  in  and  beyond  Ceva,  intent  on 
covering  the  road  to  Turin :  whereas,  as  Napoleon  him- 
self subsequently  wrote,  they  should  have  been  near 
enough  to  their  allies  to  form  one  powerful  army,  which, 
at  Dego  or  Montenotte,  would  have  defended  both  Turin 
and  Milan.  "  United,  the  two  forces  would  have  been 
superior  to  the  French  army:  separated,  they  were  lost." 

The  configuration  of  the  ground  favoured  Bonaparte's 
plan  of  driving  the  Imperialists  down  the  valley  of  the 
Bormida  in  a  north-easterly  direction  ;  and  the  natural 
desire  of  a  beaten  general  to  fall  back  towards  his  base  of 
supplies  also  impelled  Beaulieu  and  Argenteau  to  retire 
towards  Milan.  But  that  would  sever  their  connections 
with  the  Sardinians,  whose  base  of  supplies,  Turin,  lay  in 
a  north-westerly  direction. 

Bonaparte  therefore  hurled  his  forces  at  once  against 
the  Austrians  and  a  Sardinian  contingent  at  Millesimo, 
and  defeated  them,  Augereau's  division  cutting  off  the 
retreat  of  twelve  hundred  of  their  men  under  Provera. 

qu'il  faut  vaincre  ou  mourir  "  — surely  much  grander  than  the  histrionic 
oath.  (See  "Memoires  de  Massena,"  vol.  ii. ;  "Pieces  Just.,"  No.  3; 
also  Bouvier,  op.  cit.) 


78  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Weakened  by  this  second  blow,  the  allies  fell  back  on  the 
intrenched    village    of  Dego.     Their   position    was   of   a 
strength  proportionate  to  its  strategic  importance  ;  for  its 
loss  would  completely  sever  all  connection  between  their 
two  main   armies  save  by  devious  routes  many  miles  in 
their  rear.     They  therefore  clung  desperately  to  the  six 
mamelons  and  redoubts  which  barred  the  valley  and  domi- 
nated some  of  the  neighbouring  heights.     Yet  such  was 
the  superiority  of  the  French  in  numbers  that  these  posi- 
tions were  speedily  turned  by  Massena,  whom  Bonaparte 
again  intrusted  with  the  movement  on  the  enemy's  flank 
and  rear.     A  strange  event  followed.     The  victors,  while 
pillaging  the  country  for  the  supplies  which  Bonaparte's 
sharpest  orders  failed  to  draw  from  the   magazines   and 
stores  on  the  sea-coast,  were  attacked  in  the  dead  of  night 
by  five  Austrian  battalions  that  had  been  ordered  up  to 
support  their  countrymen  at  Dego.     These,  after  straying 
among  the  mountains,  found  themselves  among  bands  of 
the  marauding  French,  whom  they  easily  scattered,  seizing 
Dego  itself.     Apprised  of  this  mishap,  Bonaparte  hurried 
up  more  troops  from  the  rear,  and  on  the  15th  recovered 
the  prize  which  had  so  nearly  been   snatched    from   his 
grasp.     Had  Beaulieu  at  this  time  thrown  all  his  forces  on 
the  French,  he  might  have  retrieved  his  first  misfortunes ; 
but  foresight  and  energy  were  not  to  be  found  at  the  Aus- 
trian headquarters  :  the  surprise  at  Dego  was  the  work  of  a 
colonel ;  and  for  many  years  to  come  the  incompetence  of 
their  aged  commanders  was  to  paralyze  the  fine  fighting 
qualities  of    the  "white-coats."     In  three  conflicts   they 
had  been  outmanoeuvred  and  outnumbered,  and  drew  in 
their  shattered  columns  to  Acqui. 

The  French  commander  now  led  his  columns  westward 
against  the  Sardinians,  who  had  fallen  back  on  their  forti- 
fied camp  at  Ceva,  in  the  upper  valley  of  the  Tanaro. 
There  they  beat  off  one  attack  of  the  French.  A  check 
in  front  of  a  strongly  intrenched  position  was  serious.  It 
might  have  led  to  a  French  disaster,  had  the  Austrians 
been  able  to  bring  aid  to  their  allies.  Bonaparte  even 
summoned  a  council  of  war  to  deliberate  on  the  situation. 
As  a  rule,  a  council  of  war  gives  timid  advice.  This  one 
strongly  advised  a  second  attack  on  the  camp  —  a  striking 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  79 

proof  of  the  ardour  which  then  nerved  the  republican 
generals.  Not  yet  were  they  condottieri  carving  out  for- 
tunes by  their  swords  :  not  yet  were  they  the  pampered 
minions  of  an  autocrat,  intent  primarily  on  guarding  the 
estates  which  his  favour  had  bestowed.  Timidity  was 
rather  the  mark  of  their  opponents.  When  the  assault 
on  the  intrenchments  of  Ceva  was  about  to  be  renewed, 
the  Sardinian  forces  were  discerned  filing  away  westwards. 
Their  general  indulged  the  fond  hope  of  holding  the 
French  at  bay  at  several  strong  natural  positions  on  his 
march.  He  was  bitterly  to  rie  his  error.  The  French 
divisions  of  Serurier  and  Dommartin  closed  in  on  him, 
drove  him  from  Mondovi,  and  away  towards  Turin. 

Bonaparte  had  now  completely  succeeded.  Using  to 
the  full  the  advantage  of  his  central  position  between  the 
widely  scattered  detachments  of  his  foes,  he  had  struck 
vigorously  at  their  natural  point  of  junction,  Montenotte, 
and  by  three  subsequent  successes  —  for  the  evacuation  of 
Ceva  can  scarcely  be  called  a  French  victory  —  had  forced 
them  further  and  further  apart  until  Turin  was  almost 
within  his  power. 

It  now  remained  to  push  these  military  triumphs  to 
their  natural  conclusion,  and  impose  terms  of  peace  on 
the  House  of  Savoy,  which  was  secretly  desirous  of  peace. 
The  Directors  had  ordered  Bonaparte  that  he  should  seek 
to  detach  Sardinia  from  the  Austrian  alliance  by  holding 
out  the  prospect  of  a  valuable  compensation  for  the  loss 
of  Savoy  and  Nice  in  the  fertile  Milanese.1  The  prospect 
of  this  rich  prize  would,  the  Directors  surmised,  dissolve 
the  Austro-Sardinian  alliance,  as  soon  as  the  allies  had 
felt  the  full  vigour  of  the  French  arms.  Not  that  Bona- 
parte himself  was  to  conduct  these  negotiations.  He  was 
to  forward  to  the  Directory  all  offers  of  submission.  Nay, 
he  was  not  empowered  to  grant  on  his  own  responsibility 
even  an  armistice.  He  was  merely  to  push  the  foe  hard, 
and  feed  his  needy  soldiers  on  the  conquered  territory. 
He  was  to  be  solely  a  general,  never  a  negotiator. 

The  Directors  herein  showed  keen  jealousy  or  striking 
ignorance  of  military  affairs.  How  could  he  keep  the  Aus- 
trians  quiet  while  envoys  passed  between  Turin  and  Paris? 

1  Jomini,  vol.  viii.,  p.  340  ;  "  Pifcces  Justifs." 


80  THE   LIFE   OF   NAFOLEON   I  chap. 

All  the  dictates  of  common  sense  required  him  to  grant  an 
armistice  to  the  Court  of  Turin  before  the  Austrians  could 
recover  from  their  recent  disasters.  But  the  King  of  Sar- 
dinia drew  him  from  a  perplexing  situation  by  instructing 
Colli  to  make  overtures  for  an  armistice  as  preliminary  to 
a  peace.  At  once  the  French  commander  replied  that  such 
powers  belonged  to  the  Directory  ;  but  as  for  an  armistice, 
it  would  only  be  possible  if  the  Court  of  Turin  placed  in 
his  hands  three  fortresses,  Coni,  Tortona,  and  Alessandria, 
besides  guaranteeing  the  transit  of  French  armies  through 
Piedmont  and  the  passage  of  the  Po  at  Valenza.  Then, 
with  his  unfailing  belief  in  accomplished  facts,  Bonaparte 
pushed  on  his  troops  to  Cherasco. 

Near  that  town  he  received  the  Piedmontese  envoys; 
and  from  the  pen  of  one  of  them  we  have  an  account  of 
the  general's  behaviour  in  his  first  essay  in  diplomacy. 
His  demeanour  was  marked  by  that  grave  and  frigid 
courtesy  which  was  akin  to  Piedmontese  customs.  In 
reply  to  the  suggestions  of  the  envoys  that  some  of  the 
conditions  were  of  little  value  to  the  French,  he  answered  : 
"The  Republic,  in  intrusting  to  me  the  command  of  an 
army,  has  credited  me  with  possessing  enough  discern- 
ment to  judge  of  what  that  army  requires,  without  having 
recourse  to  the  advice  of  my  enemy."  Apart,  however, 
from  this  sarcasm,  which  was  uttered  in  a  hard  and  biting 
voice,  his  tone  was  coldly  polite.  He  reserved  his  home 
thrust  for  the  close  of  the  conference.  When  it  had 
dragged  on  till  considerably  after  noon  with  no  definite 
result,  he  looked  at  his  watch  and  exclaimed :  "  Gentle- 
men, I  warn  you  that  a  general  attack  is  ordered  for  two 
o'clock,  and  that  if  I  am  not  assured  that  Coni  will  be 
put  in  my  hands  before  nightfall,  the  attack  will  not  be 
postponed  for  one  moment.  It  may  happen  to  me  to 
lose  battles,  but  no  one  shall  ever  see  me  lose  minutes 
either  by  over-confidence  or  by  sloth."  The  terms  of  the 
armistice  of  Cherasco  were  forthwith  signed  (April  28th)  ; 
they  were  substantially  the  same  as  those  first  offered  by 
the  victor.  During  the  luncheon  which  followed,  the 
envoys  were  still  further  impressed  by  his  imperturbable 
confidence  and  trenchant  phrases ;  as  when  he  told  them 
that  the   campaign   was  the  exact  counterpart  of    what 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  81 

he  had  planned  in  1794 ;  or  described  a  council  of  war  as 
a  convenient  device  for  covering  cowardice  or  irresolution 
in  the  commander ;  or  asserted  that  nothing  could  now 
stop  him  before  the  walls  of  Mantua.1 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  French  army  was  at  that  time 
so  disorganized  by  rapine  as  scarcely  to  have  withstood  a 
combined  and  vigorous  attack  by  Beaulieu  and  Colli.  The 
republicans,  long  exposed  to  hunger  and  privations,  were 
now  revelling  in  the  fertile  plains  of  Piedmont.  Large 
bands  of  marauders  ranged  the  neighbouring  country, 
and  the  regiments  were  often  reduced  to  mere  companies. 
From  the  grave  risks  of  this  situation  Bonaparte  was  res- 
cued by  the  timidity  of  the  Court  of  Turin,  which  signed 
the  armistice  at  Cherasco  eighteen  days  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign.  A  fortnight  later  the  pre- 
liminaries of  peace  were  signed  between  France  and  the 
King  of  Sardinia,  by  which  the  latter  yielded  up  his  prov- 
inces of  Savoy  and  Nice,  and  renounced  the  alliance  with 
Austria.  Great  indignation  was  felt  in  the  Imperialist 
camp  at  this  news  ;  and  it  was  freely  stated  that  the  Pied- 
montese  had  let  themselves  be  beaten  in  order  to  compass 
a  peace  that  had  been  tacitly  agreed  upon  in  the  month 
of  January.2 

Even  before  this  auspicious  event,  Bonaparte's  de- 
spatches to  the  Directors  were  couched  in  almost  imperious 
terms,  which  showed  that  he  felt  himself  the  master  of  the 
situation.  He  advised  them  as  to  their  policy  towards 
Sardinia,  pointing  out  that,  as  Victor  Amadeus  had  yielded 
up  three  important  fortresses,  he  was  practically  in  the 
hands  of  the  French  :  "  If  you  do  not  accept  peace  with 
him,  if  your  plan  is  to  dethrone  him,  you  must  amuse  him 
for  a  few  decades3  and  must  warn  me  :  I  then  seize  Va- 
lenza  and  march  on  Turin."  In  military  affairs  the  young 
general  showed  that  he  would  brook  no  interference  from 
Paris.  He  requested  the  Directory  to  draft  15,000  men 
from  Kellermann's  Army  of  the  Alps  to  reinforce  him  : 

1  "  Un  Homme  d'autrefois,"  par  Costa  de  Beauregard. 

2  These  were  General  Beaulieu's  words  to  Colonel  Graham  on  May 
22nd. 

8  Periods  of  ten  days,  which,  in  the  revolutionary  calendar,  superseded 
the  week. 


82  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

"  That  will  give  me  an  army  of  45,000  men,  of  which  pos- 
sibly I  may  send  a  part  to  Rome.  If  you  continue  your 
confidence  and  approve  these  plans,  I  am  sure  of  success: 
Italy  is  yours."  Somewhat  later,  the  Directors  proposed 
to  grant  the  required  reinforcements,  but  stipulated  for 
the  retention  of  part  of  the  army  in  the  Milanese  under 
the  command  of  Kellermann.  Thereupon  Bonaparte  re- 
plied (May  14th)  that,  as  the  Austrians  had  been  rein- 
forced, it  was  highly  impolitic  to  divide  the  command. 
Each  general  had  his  own  way  of  making  war.  Keller- 
mann, having  more  experience,  would  doubtless  do  it 
better  :  but  both  together  would  do  it  very  badly. 

Again  the  Directors  had  blundered.  In  seeking  to  sub- 
ject Bonaparte  to  the  same  rules  as  had  been  imposed  on 
all  French  generals  since  the  treason  of  Dumouriez  in  1793, 
they  were  doubtless  consulting  the  vital  interests  of  the 
Commonwealth.  But,  while  striving  to  avert  all  possibili- 
ties of  Csesarism,  they  now  sinned  against  that  elementary 
principle  of  strategy  which  requires  unity  of  design  in 
military  operations.  Bonaparte's  retort  was  unanswerable, 
and  nothing  more  was  heard  of  the  luckless  proposal. 

Meanwhile  the  peace  with  the  House  of  Savoy  had 
thrown  open  the  Milanese  to  Bonaparte's  attack.  Hold- 
ing three  Sardinian  fortresses,  he  had  an  excellent  base  of 
operations  ;  for  the  lands  restored  to  the  King  of  Sardinia 
were  to  remain  subject  to  requisitions  for  the  French  army 
until  the  general  peace.  The  Austrians,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  weakened  by  the  hostility  of  their  Italian  subjects, 
and,  worst  of  all,  they  depended  ultimately  on  reinforce- 
ments drawn  from  beyond  the  Alps  by  way  of  Mantua. 
In  the  rich  plains  of  Lombardy  they,  however,  had  one 
advantage  which  was  denied  to  them  among  the  rocks  of 
the  Apennines.  Their  generals  could  display  the  tactical 
skill  on  which  they  prided  themselves,  and  their  splendid 
cavalry  had  some  chance  of  emulating  the  former  exploits 
of  the  Hungarian  and  Croatian  horse.  They  therefore 
awaited  the  onset  of  the  French,  little  dismayed  by  recent 
disasters,  and  animated  by  the  belief  that  their  antagonist, 
unversed  in  regular  warfare,  would  at  once  lose  in  the 
plains  the  bubble  reputation  gained  in  ravines.  But  the 
country  in  the  second  part  of  this  campaign  was  not  less 


v  THE   ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  83 

favourable  to  Bonaparte's  peculiar  gifts  than  that  in  which 
he  had  won  his  first  laurels  as  commander.  Amidst  the 
Apennines,  where  only  small  bodies  of  men  could  be 
moved,  a  general  inexperienced  in  the  handling  of  cavalry 
and  infantry  could  make  his  first  essays  in  tactics  with  fair 
chances  of  success.  Speed,  energy,  and  the  prompt  seiz- 
ure of  a  commanding  central  position  were  the  prime 
requisites  ;  the  handling  of  vast  masses  of  men  was  impos- 
sible. The  plains  of  Lombardy  facilitated  larger  move- 
ments ;  but  even  here  the  numerous  broad  swift  streams 
fed  by  the  Alpine  snows,  and  the  network  of  irrigating 
dykes,  favoured  the  designs  of  a  young  and  daring  leader 
who  saw  how  to  use  natural  obstacles  so  as  to  baffle  and 
ensnare  his  foes.  Bonaparte  was  now  to  show  that  he  ex- 
celled his  enemies,  not  only  in  quickness  of  eye  and  vigour 
of  intellect,  but  also  in  the  minutiae  of  tactics  and  in  those 
larger  strategic  conceptions  which  decide  the  fate  of 
nations.  In  the  first  place,  having  the  superiority  of  force, 
he  was  able  to  attack.  This  is  an  advantage  at  all  times  : 
for  the  aggressor  can  generally  mislead  his  adversary  by  a 
series  of  feints  until  the  real  blow  can  be  delivered  with 
crushing  effect.  Such  has  been  the  aim  of  all  great 
leaders  from  the  time  of  Epaminondas  and  Alexander, 
Hannibal  and  Caesar,  down  to  the  age  of  Luxembourg, 
Marlborough,  and  Frederick  the  Great.  Aggressive  tac- 
tics were  particularly  suited  to  the  French  soldiery,  always 
eager,  active,  and  intelligent,  and  now  endowed  with 
boundless  enthusiasm  in  their  cause  and  in  their  leader. 

Then  again  he  was  fully  aware  of  the  inherent  vice  of 
the  Austrian  situation.  It  was  as  if  an  unwieldy  organ- 
ism stretched  a  vulnerable  limb  across  the  huge  barrier  of 
the  Alps,  exposing  it  to  the  attack  of  a  compacter  body. 
It  only  remained  for  Bonaparte  to  turn  against  his  foes  the 
smaller  geographical  features  on  which  they  too  implicitly 
relied.  Beaulieu  had  retired  beyond  the  Po  and  the  Ticino, 
expecting  that  the  attack  on  the  Milanese  would  be  deliv- 
ered across  the  latter  stream  by  the  ordinary  route,  which 
crossed  it  at  Pavia.  Near  that  city  the  Austrians  occupied 
a  strong  position  with  26,000  men,  while  other  detachments 
patrolled  the  banks  of  the  Ticino  further  north,  and  those 
of  the   Po  towards  Valenza,  only  5,000  men  being  sent 


84  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

towards  Piacenza.  Bonaparte,  however,  was  not  minded 
to  take  the  ordinary  route.  He  determined  to  march,  not 
as  yet  on  the  north  of  the  River  Po,  where  snow-swollen 
streams  coursed  down  from  the  Alps,  but  rather  on  the 
south  side,  where  the  Apennines  throw  off  fewer  streams 
and  also  of  smaller  volume.  From  the  fortress  of  Tortona 
he  could  make  a  rush  at  Piacenza,  cross  the  Po  there,  and 
thus  gain  the  Milanese  almost  without  a  blow.  To  this 
end  he  had  stipulated  in  the  recent  terms  of  peace  that  he 
might  cross  the  Po  at  Valenza  ;  and  now,  amusing  his  foes 
by  feints  on  that  side,  he  vigorously  pushed  his  main 
columns  along  the  southern  bank  of  the  Po,  where  they 
gathered  up  all  the  available  boats.  The  vanguard,  led 
by  the  impetuous  Lannes,  seized  the  ferry  at  Piacenza, 
before  the  Austrian  horse  appeared,  and  scattered  a  squad- 
ron or  two  which  strove  to  drive  them  back  into  the  river 
(May  7th). 

Time  was  thus  gained  for  a  considerable  number  of 
French  to  cross  the  river  in  boats  or  by  the  ferry.  Work- 
ing under  the  eye  of  their  leader,  the  French  conquered 
all  obstacles  :  a  bridge  of  boats  soon  spanned  the  stream, 
and  was  defended  by  a  tete  de  pont;  and  with  forces  about 
equal  in  number  to  Liptay's  Austrians,  the  republicans  ad- 
vanced northwards,  and,  after  a  tough  struggle,  dislodged' 
their  foes  from  the  village  of  Fombio.  This  success  drove 
a  solid  wedge  between  Liptay  and  his  commander-in-chief, 
who  afterwards  bitterly  blamed  him,  first  for  retreating, 
and  secondly  for  not  reporting  his  retreat  to  headquarters. 
It  would  appear,  however,  that  Liptay  had  only  5,000 
men  (not  the  8,000  which  Napoleon  and  French  historians 
have  credited  to  him),  that  he  was  sent  by  Beaulieu  to 
Piacenza  too  late  to  prevent  the  crossing  by  the  French, 
and  that  at  the  close  of  the  fight  on  the  following  day  he 
was  completely  cut  off  from  communicating  with  his  supe- 
rior. Beaulieu,  with  his  main  force,  advanced  on  Fombio, 
stumbled  on  the  French,  where  he  looked  to  find  Liptay, 
and  after  a  confused  fight  succeeded  in  disengaging  him- 
self and  withdrawing  towards  Lodi,  where  the  high-road 
leading  to  Mantua  crossed  the  River  Adda.  To  that  stream 
he  directed  his  remaining  forces  to  retire.  He  thereby  left 
Milan  uncovered  (except  for  the  garrison  which  held  the 


v  THE   ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  85 

citadel),  and  abandoned  more  than  the  half  of  Lombardy; 
but,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  his  retreat  to  the  Adda 
was  thoroughly  sound.  Yet  here  again  a  movement  stra- 
tegically correct  was  marred  by  tactical  blunders.  Had  he 
concentrated  all  his  forces  at  the  nearest  point  of  the  Adda 
which  the  French  could  cross,  namely  Pizzighetone,  he 
would  have  rendered  any  flank  march  of  theirs  to  the 
northward  extremely  hazardous  ;  but  he  had  not  yet  suffi- 
ciently learned  from  his  terrible  teacher  the  need  of  con- 
centration ;  and,  having  at  least  three  passages  to  guard, 
he  kept  his  forces  too  spread  out  to  oppose  a  vigorous 
move  against  any  one  of  them.  Indeed,  he  despaired  of 
holding  the  line  of  the  Adda,  and  retired  eastwards  with 
a  great  part  of  his  army. 

Consequently,  when  Bonaparte,  only  three  days  after 
the  seizure  of  Piacenza,  threw  his  almost  undivided  force 
against  the  town  of  Lodi,  his  passage  was  disputed  only 
by  the  rearguard,  whose  anxiety  to  cover,  the  retreat  of 
a  belated  detachment  far  exceeded  their  determination 
to  defend  the  bridge  over  the  Adda.  This  was  a  narrow 
structure,  some  eighty  fathoms  long,  standing  high  above 
the  swift  but  shallow  river.  Resolutely  held  by  well- 
massed  troops  and  cannon,  it  might  have  cost  the  French 
a  severe  struggle  ;  but  the  Imperialists  were  badly 
handled  :  some  were  posted  in  and  around  the  town, 
which  was  between  the  river  and  the  advancing  French  ; 
and  the  weak  walls  of  Lodi  were  soon  escaladed  by  the 
impetuous  republicans.  The  Austrian  commander,  Sebot- 
tendorf,  now  hastily  ranged  his  men  along  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  river,  so  as  to  defend  the  bridge  and  prevent 
any  passage  of  the  river  by  boats  or  by  a  ford  above  the 
town.  The  Imperialists  numbered  only  9,627  men  ;  they 
were  discouraged  by  defeats  and  by  the  consciousness  that 
no  serious  stand  could  be  attempted  before  they  reached 
the  neighbourhood  of  Mantua  ;  and  their  efforts  to  break 
down  the  bridge  were  now  frustrated  by  the  French,  who, 
posted  behind  the  walls  of  Lodi  on  the  higher  bank  of  the 
stream,  swept  their  opponents'  position  with  a  searching 
artillery  fire.  Having  shaken  the  constancy  of  his  foes 
and  refreshed  his  own  infantry  by  a  brief  rest  in  Lodi, 
Bonaparte    at  6  p.m.   secretly  formed  a  column    of   his 


86  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

choicest  troops  and  hurled  it  against  the  bridge.  A  hot  ' 
fire  of  grapeshot  and  musketry  tore  its  front,  and  for  a 
time  the  column  bent  before  the  iron  hail.  But,  encour- 
aged by  the  words  of  their  young  leader,  generals,  cor- 
porals, and  grenadiers  pressed  home  their  charge.  This 
time,  aided  by  sharp-shooters  who  waded  to  islets  in  the 
river,  the  assailants  cleared  the  bridge,  bayoneted  the 
Austrian  cannoneers,  attacked  the  first  and  second  lines 
of  supporting  foot,  and,  when  reinforced,  compelled  horse 
and  foot  to  retreat  towards  Mantua.1 

Such  was  the  affair  of  Lodi  (May  10th).  A  legendary 
glamour  hovers  around  all  the  details  of  this  conflict  and 
invests  it  with  fictitious  importance.  Beaulieu's  main 
force  was  far  away,  and  there  was  no  hope  of  entrapping 
anything  more  than  the  rear  of  his  army.  Moreover,  if 
this  were  the  object,  why  was  not  the  flank  move  of  the 
French  cavalry  above  Lodi  pushed  home  earlier  in  the 
fight?  This,  if  supported  by  infantry,  could  have  out- 
flanked the  enemy  while  the  perilous  rush  was  made 
against  the  bridge  ;  and  such  a  turning  movement  would 
probably  have  enveloped  the  Austrian  force  while  it  was 
being  shattered  in  front.  That  is  the  view  in  which  the 
strategist,  Clausewitz,  regards  this  encounter.  Far  differ- 
ent was  the  impression  which  it  created  among  the  soldiers 
and  Frenchmen  at  large.  They  valued  a  commander 
more  for  bravery  of  the  bull-dog  type  than  for  any  powers 
of  reasoning  and  subtle  combination.  These,  it  is  true, 
Bonaparte  had  already  shown.  He  now  enchanted  the 
soldiery  by  dealing  a  straight  sharp  blow.  It  had  a 
magical  effect  on  their  minds.  On  the  evening  of  that 
day  the  French  soldiers,  with  antique  republican  cama- 
raderie, saluted  their  commander  as  le  petit  eaporal  for 

1  I  have  followed  the  accounts  given  by  Joniini,  vol.  viii.,  pp.  120-130  ; 
that  by  Schels  in  the  "Oest.  Milit.  Zeitschrift "  for  1825,  vol.  ii. ;  also 
Bouvier,  "Bonaparte  en  Italie,"  ch.  xiii.  ;  and  J.  G.'s  "Etudes  sur  la 
Campagne  de  1796-97."  Most  French  accounts,  being  based  on  Napo- 
leon's "  Me^noires,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  212  et  seq.,  are  a  tissue  of  inaccuracies. 
Bonaparte  affected  to  believe  that  at  Lodi  he  defeated  an  army  of  sixteen 
thousand  men.  Thiers  states  that  the  French  cavalry,  after  fording  the 
river  at  Montanasso,  influenced  the  result :  but  the  official  report  of  May 
11th,  1796,  expressly  states  that  the  French  horse  could  not  cross  the 
river  at  that  place  till  the  fight  was  over.  See  too  Desvernois,  "  Mems.," 
ch.  vii. 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  87 

his  personal  bravery  in  the  fray,  and  this  endearing 
phrase  helped  to  immortalize  the  affair  of  the  bridge  of 
Lodi.1  It  shot  a  thrill  of  exultation  through  France. 
With  pardonable  exaggeration,  men  told  how  he  charged 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  and,  with  Lannes,  was  the 
first  to  reach  the  opposite  side  ;  and  later  generations 
have  figured  him  charging  before  his  tall  grenadiers  —  a 
feat  that  was  actually  performed  by  Lannes,  Berthier, 
Massena,  Cervoni,  and  Dallemagne.  It  was  all  one. 
Bonaparte  alone  was  the  hero  of  the  day.  He  reigned 
supreme  in  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers,  and  he  saw  the  im- 
portance of  this  conquest.  At  St.  Helena  he  confessed  to 
Montholon  that  it  was  the  victory  of  Lodi  which  fanned 
his  ambition  into  a  steady  flame. 

A  desire  of  stimulating  popular  enthusiasm  throughout 
Italy  impelled  the  young  victor  to  turn  away  from  his 
real  objective,  the  fortress  of  Mantua,  to  the  political 
capital  of  Lombardy.  The  people  of  Milan  hailed  their 
French  liberators  with  enthusiasm  :  they  rained  flowers 
on  the  bronzed  soldiers  of  liberty,  and  pointed  to  their 
tattered  uniforms  and  worn-out  shoes  as  proofs  of  their 
triumphant  energy  :  above  all,  they  gazed  with  admira- 
tion, not  unmixed  with  awe,  at  the  thin  pale  features 
of  the  young  commander,  whose  plain  attire  bespoke  a 
Spartan  activity,  whose  ardent  gaze  and  decisive  gestures 
proclaimed  a  born  leader  of  men.  Forthwith  he  arranged 
for  the  investment  of  the  citadel  where  eighteen  hundred 
Austrians  held  out  :  he  then  received  the  chief  men  of 
the  city  with  easy  Italian  grace  ;  and  in  the  evening  he 
gave  a  splendid  ball,  at  which  all  the  dignity,  wealth,  and 
beauty  of  the  old  Lombard  capital  shone  resplendent. 
For  a  brief  space  all  went  well  between  the  Lombards  and 
their  liberators.  He  received  with  flattering  distinction 
the  chief  artists  and  men  of  letters,  and  also  sought  to 
quicken  the  activity  of  the  University  of  Pavia.  Politi- 
cal clubs  and  newspapers  multiplied  throughout  Lom- 
bardy ;  and  actors,  authors,  and  editors  joined  in  a  paean 
of  courtly  or  fawning  praise,  to  the  new  Scipio,  Caesar, 
Hannibal,  and  Jupiter. 

There  were  other  reasons  why  the  Lombards  should  wor- 

1  Bouvier  (p.  533)  traces  this  story  to  Las  Cases  and  discredits  it. 


88  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ship  the  young  victor.  Apart  from  the  admiration  which 
a  gifted  race  ever  feels  for  so  fascinating  a  combination  of 
youthful  grace  with  intellectual  power  and  martial  prow- 
ess, they  believed  that  this  Italian  hero  would  call  the 
people  to  political  activity,  perchance  even  to  national 
independence.  For  this  their  most  ardent  spirits  had 
sighed,  conspired,  or  fought  during  the  eighty-three  years 
of  the  Austrian  occupation.  Ever  since  the  troublous 
times  of  Dante  there  had  been  prophetic  souls  who  caught 
the  vision  of  a  new  Italy,  healed  of  her  countless  schisms, 
purified  from  her  social  degradations,  and  uniting  the 
prowess  of  her  ancient  life  with  the  gentler  arts  of  the 
present  for  the  perfection  of  her  own  powers  and  for  the 
welfare  of  mankind.  The  gleam  of  this  vision  had  shone 
forth  even  amidst  the  thunder  claps  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion ;  and  now  that  the  storm  had  burst  over  the  plains  of 
Lombardy,  ecstatic  youths  seemed  to  see  the  vision  em- 
bodied in  the  person  of  Bonaparte  himself.  At  the  first 
news  of  the  success  at  Lodi  the  national  colours  were 
donned  as  cockades,  or  waved  defiance  from  balconies  and 
steeples  to  the  Austrian  garrisons.  All  truly  Italian 
hearts  believed  that  the  French  victories  heralded  the 
dawn  of  political  freedom  not  only  for  Lombardy,  but  for 
the  whole  peninsula.  * 

Bonaparte's  first  actions  increased  these  hopes.  He 
abolished  the  Austrian  machinery  of  government,  except- 
ing the  Council  of  State,  and  approved  the  formation  of 
provisional  municipal  councils  and  of  a  National  Guard. 
At  the  same  time,  he  wrote  guardedly  to  the  Directors  at 
Paris,  asking  whether  they  proposed  to  organize  Lombardy 
as  a  republic,  as  it  was  much  more  ripe  for  this  form  of 
government  than  Piedmont.  Further  than  this  he  could 
not  go ;  but  at  a  later  date  he  did  much  to  redeem  his  first 
promises  to  the  people  of  Northern  Italy. 

The  fair  prospect  was  soon  overclouded  by  the  financial 
measures  urged  on  the  young  commander  from  Paris, 
measures  which  were  disastrous  to  the  Lombards  and  de- 
grading to  the  liberators  themselves.  The  Directors  had 
recently  bidden  him  to  press  hard  on  the  Milanese,  and 
levy  large  contributions  in  money,  provisions,  and  objects 
of  art,  seeing  that  they  did  not  intend  to  keep  this  coun- 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  89 

try.1  Bonaparte  accordingly  issued  a  proclamation  (May 
19th),  imposing  on  Lombardy  the  sum  of  twenty  million 
francs,  remarking  that  it  was  a  very  light  sum  for  so  fer- 
tile a  country.  Only  two  days  before  he  had  in  a  letter 
to  the  Directors  described  it  as  exhausted  by  five  years  of 
war.  As  for  the  assertion  that  the  army  needed  this  sum, 
it  may  be  compared  with  his  private  notification  to  the 
Directory,  three  days  after  his  proclamation,  that  they 
might  speedily  count  on  six  to  eight  millions  of  the  Lom- 
bard contribution,  as  lying  ready  at  their  disposal,  "  it 
being  over  and  above  what  the  army  requires."  This  is 
the  first  definite  suggestion  by  Bonaparte  of  that  system 
of  bleeding  conquered  lands  for  the  benefit  of  the  French 
Exchequer,  which  enabled  him  speedily  to  gain  power  over 
the  Directors.  Thenceforth  they  began  to  connive  at  his 
diplomatic  irregularities,  and  even  to  urge  on  his  expe- 
ditions into  wealthy  districts,  provided  that  the  spoils  went 
to  Paris ;  while  the  conqueror,  on  his  part,  was  able  tacitly 
to  assume  that  tone  of  authority  with  which  the  briber 
treats  the  bribed.2 

The  exaction  of  this  large  sum,  and  of  various  requisites 
for  the  army,  as  well  as  the  "  extraction  "  of  works  of  art 
for  the  benefit  of  French  museums,  at  once  aroused  the 
bitterest  feelings.  The  loss  of  priceless  treasures,  such  as 
the  manuscript  of  Virgil  which  had  belonged  to  Petrarch, 
and  the  masterpieces  of  Raphael  and  Leonardo  da  Vinci, 
might  perhaps  have  been  borne :  it  concerned  only  the 
cultured  few,  and  their  effervescence  was  soon  quelled  by 
patrols  of  French  cavalry.  Far  different  was  it  with  the 
peasants  between  Milan  and  Pavia.  Drained  by  the  white- 
coats,  they  now  refused  to  be  bled  for  the  benefit  of  the 
blue-coats  of  France.  They  rushed  to  arms.  The  city  of 
Pavia  defied  the  attack  of  a  French  column  until  cannon 
battered  in  its  gates.  Then  the  republicans  rushed  in, 
massacred  all  the  armed  men  for  some  hours,  and  glutted 
their  lust  and  rapacity.  By  order  of  Bonaparte,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  municipal  council  were  condemned  to  execu- 

1  Directorial  despatch  of  May  7th,  1706.  The  date  rebuts  the  statement 
of  M.  Aulard,  in  M.  Lavisse's  recent  volume,  "  La  Involution  Francaise," 
p.  435,  that  Bonaparte  suggested  to  the  Directory  the  pillage  of  Lombardy. 

2  "  Corresp.,"  June  6th,  1797. 


90  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

tion ;  but  a  delay  occurred  before  this  ferocious  order  was 
carried  out,  and  it  was  subsequently  mitigated.  Two  hun- 
dred hostages  were,  however,  sent  away  into  France  as  a 
guarantee  for  the  good  behaviour  of  the  unfortunate  city : 
whereupon  the  chief  announced  to  the  Directory  that  this 
would  serve  as  a  useful  lesson  to  the  peoples  of  Italy. 

In  one  sense  this  was  correct.  It  gave  the  Italians  a 
true  insight  into  French  methods ;  and  painful  emotions 
thrilled  the  peoples  of  the  peninsula  when  they  realized  at 
what  a  price  their  liberation  was  to  be  effected.  Yet  it  is 
unfair  to  lay  the  chief  blame  on  Bonaparte  for  the  pillage 
of  Lombardy.  His  actions  were  only  a  development  of 
existing  revolutionary  customs ;  but  never  had  these  de- 
moralizing measures  been  so  thoroughly  enforced  as  in  the 
present  system  of  liberation  and  blackmail.  Lombardy 
was  ransacked  with  an  almost  Vandal  rapacity.  Bonaparte 
desired  little  for  himself.  His  aim  ever  was  power  rather 
than  wealth.  Riches  he  valued  only  as  a  means  to  politi- 
cal supremacy.  But  he  took  care  to  place  the  Directors 
and  all  his  influential  officers  deeply  in  his  debt.  To  the 
five  soi-disant  rulers  of  France  he  sent  one  hundred  horses, 
the  finest  that  could  be  found  in  Lombardy,  to  replace  "  the 
poor  creatures  which  now  draw  your  carriages'"; x  to  his 
officers  his  indulgence  was  passive,  but  usually  effective. 
Marmont  states  that  Bonaparte  once  reproached  him  for 
his  scrupulousness  in  returning  the  whole  of  a  certain  sum 
which  he  had  been  commissioned  to  recover.  "  At  that 
time,"  says  Marmont,  "  we  still  retained  a  flower  of  deli- 
cacy on  these  subjects."  This  Alpine  gentian  was  soon 
to  fade  in  the  heats  of  the  plains.  Some  generals  made 
large  fortunes,  eminently  so  Massena,  first  in  plunder  as 
in  the  fray.  And  yet  the  commander,  who  was  so  lenient 
to  his  generals,  filled  his  letters  to  the  Directory  with  com- 
plaints about  the  cloud  of  French  commissioners,  dealers, 
and  other  civilian  harpies  who  battened  on  the  spoil  of 
Lombardy.  It  seems  impossible  to  avoid  the  conclusion 
that  this  indulgence  towards  the  soldiers  and  severity 
towards  civilians  was  the  result  of  a  fixed  determination 
to  link  indissolubly  to  his  fortunes  the  generals  and  rank 
and  file.     The  contrast  in  his  behaviour  was  often  star- 

1  "Corresp.,"  June  1st,  1796. 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  91 

tling.  Some  of  the  civilians  he  imprisoned :  others  he 
desired  to  shoot ;  but  as  the  hardiest  robbers  had  gen- 
erally made  to  themselves  friends  of  the  military  mammon 
of  unrighteousness,  they  escaped  with  a  fine  ridiculously 
out  of  proportion  to  their  actual  gains.1 

The  Dukes  of  Parma  and  Modena  were  also  mulcted. 
The  former  of  these,  owing  to  his  relationship  with  the 
Spanish  Bourbons,  with  whom  the  Directory  desired  to 
remain  on  friendly  terms,  was  subjected  to  the  fine  of 
merely  two  million  francs  and  twenty  masterpieces  of  art, 
these  last  to  be  selected  by  French  commissioners  from 
the  galleries  of  the  duchy;  but  the  Duke  of  Modena,  who 
had  assisted  the  Austrian  arms,  purchased  his  pardon  by 
an  indemnity  of  ten  million  francs,  and  by  the  cession  of 
twenty  pictures,  the  chief  artistic  treasures  of  his  States.2 
As  Bonaparte  naively  stated  to  the  Directors,  the  duke 
had  no  fortresses  or  guns ;  consequently  these  could  not 
be  demanded  from  him. 

From  this  degrading  work  Bonaparte  strove  to  wean  his 
soldiers  by  recalling  them  to  their  nobler  work  of  carry- 
ing on  the  enfranchisement  of  Italy.  In  a  proclamation 
(May  20th)  which  even  now  stirs  the  blood  like  a  trumpet 
call,  he  bade  his  soldiers  remember  that,  though  much  had 
been  done,  a  far  greater  task  yet  awaited  them.  Posterity 
must  not  reproach  them  for  having  found  their  Capua  in 
Lombardy.  Rome  was  to  be  freed :  the  Eternal  City  was 
to  renew  her  youth,  and  show  again  the  virtues  of  her 
ancient  worthies,  Brutus  and  Scipio.  Then  France  would 
give  a  glorious  peace  \o  Europe  ;  then  their  fellow-citizens 
would  say  of  each  champion  of  liberty  as  he  returned  to 
his  hearth:  "He  was  of  the  Arm)'  of  Italy."  By  such 
stirring  words  did  he  entwine  with  the  love  of  liberty  that 
passion  for  military  glory  which  was  destined  to  strangle 
the  Republic. 

Meanwhile  the  Austrians  had  retired  behind  the  banks 
of  the  Mincio  and  the  walls  of  its  guardian  fortress,  Man- 
tua. Their  position  was  one  of  great  strength.  The 
river,  which  carries  off  the  surplus  waters  of  Lake  Garda, 
joins  the  River  Po  after  a  course  of  some  thirty  miles. 

1  Gaffarel,  "Bonaparte  et  les  Rfipubliques  Italiennes,"  p.  22. 

2  "  Corresp.,"  May  17th,  1796. 


92  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Along  with  the  tongue-like  cavity  occupied  by  its  parent 
lake,  the  river  forms  the  chief  inner  barrier  to  all  invaders 
of  Italy.  From  the  earliest  times  down  to  those  of  the 
two  Napoleons,  the  banks  of  the  Mincio  have  witnessed 
many  of  the  contests  which  have  decided  the  fortunes  of 
the  peninsula.  On  its  lower  course,  where  the  river  widens 
out  into  a  semicircular  lagoon  flanked  by  marshes  and  back- 
waters, is  the  historic  town  of  Mantua.  For  this  position, 
if  we  may  trust  the  picturesque  lines  of  Mantua's  noblest 
son,1  the  three  earliest  races  of  Northern  Italy  had  striven ; 
and  when  the  power  of  imperial  Rome  was  waning,  the 
fierce  Attila  pitched  his  camp  on  the  banks  of  the  Min- 
cio, and  there  received  the  pontiff  Leo,  whose  prayers  and 
dignity  averted  the  threatening  torrent  of  the  Scythian 
horse. 

It  was  by  this  stream,  famed  in  war  as  in  song,  that  the 
Imperialists  now  halted  their  shattered  forces,  awaiting 
reinforcements  from  Tyrol.  These  would  pass  down  the 
valley  of  the  Adige,  and  in  the  last  part  of  their  march 
would  cross  the  lands  of  the  Venetian  Republic.  For  this 
action  there  was  a  long-established  right  of  way,  which 
did  not  involve  a  breach  of  the  neutrality  of  Venice.  But, 
as  some  of  the  Austrian  troops  had  straggled  on  to  the 
Venetian  territory  south  of  Brescia,  the  French  commander 
had  no  hesitation  in  openly  violating  Venetian  neutrality 
by  the  occupation  of  that  town  (May  26th).  Augereau's 
division  was  also  ordered  to  push  on  towards  the  west 
shore  of  Lake  Garda,  and  there  collect  boats  as  if  a  cross- 
ing were  intended.  Seeing  this,  the*  Austrians  seized  the 
small  Venetian  fortress  of  Peschiera,  which  commands  the 
exit  of  the  Mincio  from  the  lake,  and  Venetian  neutrality 
was  thenceforth  wholly  disregarded. 

By  adroit  moves  on  the  borders  of  the  lake,  Bonaparte 
now  sought  to  make  Beaulieu  nervous  about  his  communi- 
cations with  Tyrol  through  the  river  valley  of  the  Adige ; 
he  completely  succeeded:  seeking  to  guard  the  important 
positions  on  that  river  between  Rivoli  and  Roveredo,  Beau- 
lieu  so  weakened  his  forces  on  the  Mincio,  that  at  Bor- 
ghetto  and  Valeggio  he  had  only  two  battalions  and  ten 
squadrons  of  horse,  or  about  two  thousand  men.     Lannes' 

1  Virgil,  jEneid,  x.,  200. 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  93 

grenadiers,  therefore,  had  little  difficulty  in  forcing  a  pas- 
sage on  May  30th,  whereupon  Beaulieu  withdrew  to  the 
upper  Adige,  highly  satisfied  with  himself  for  having  vict- 
ualled the  fortress  of  Mantua  so  that  it  could  withstand 
a  long  siege.  This  was,  practically,  his  sole  achievement 
in  the  campaign.  Outnumbered,  outgeneralled,  bankrupt 
in  health  as  in  reputation,  he  soon  resigned  his  command, 
but  not  before  he  had  given  signs  of  "downright  dotage."1 
He  had,  however,  achieved  immortality  :  his  incapacity 
threw  into  brilliant  relief  the  genius  of  his  young  antago- 
nist, and  therefore  appreciably  affected  the  fortunes  of 
Italy  and  of  Europe. 

Bonaparte  now  despatched  Massena's  division  north- 
wards, to  coop  up  to  the  Austrians  in  the  narrow  valley  of 
the  upper  Adige,  while  other  regiments  began  to  close  in 
on  Mantua.  The  peculiarities  of  the  ground  favoured  its 
investment.  The  semicircular  lagoon  which  guards  Man- 
tua on  the  north,  and  the  marshes  on  the  south  side,  render 
an  assault  very  difficult ;  but  they  also  limit  the  range  of 
ground  over  which  sorties  can  be  made,  thereby  lightening 
the  work  of  the  besiegers  ;  and  during  part  of  the  block- 
ade Napoleon  left  fewer  than  five  thousand  men  for  this 
purpose.  It  was  clear,  however,  that  the  reduction  of 
Mantua  would  be  a  tedious  undertaking,  such  as  Bona- 
parte's daring  and  enterprising  genius  could  ill  brook,  and 
that  his  cherished  design  of  marching  northwards  to  effect 
a  junction  with  Moreau  on  the  Danube  was  impossible. 
Having  only  40,400  men  with  him  at  midsummer,  he  had 
barely  enough  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Adige,  to  block- 
ade Mantua,  and  to  keep  open  his  communications  with 
France. 

At  the  command  of  the  Directory  he  turned  southward 
against  feebler  foes.  The  relations  between  the  Papal 
States  and  the  French  Republic  had  been  hostile  since  the 
assassination  of  the  French  envoy,  Basse ville,  at  Rome,  in 
the  early  days  of  1793  ;  but  the  Pope,  Pius  VI.,  had  con- 
fined himself  to  anathemas  against  the  revolutionists  and 
prayers  for  the  success  of  the  First  Coalition.  This  con- 
duct now  drew  upon  him  a  sharp  blow.  French  troops 
crossed  the  Po  and  seized  Bologna,  whereupon  the  terrified 

1  Colonel  Graham's  despatches. 


94  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

cardinals  signed  an  armistice  with  the  republican  com- 
mander, agreeing  to  close  all  their  States  to  the  English, 
and  to  admit  a  French  garrison  to  the  port  of  Ancona. 
The  Pope  also  consented  to  yield  up  "one  hundred  pic- 
tures, busts,  vases,  or  statues,  as  the  French  Commissioners 
shall  determine,  among  which  shall  especially  be  included 
the  bronze  bust  of  Junius  Brutus  and  the  marble  bust  of 
Marcus  Brutus,  together  with  five  hundred  manuscripts." 
He  was  also  constrained  to  pay  15,500,000  francs,  besides 
animals  and  goods  such  as  the  French  agents  should  requi- 
sition for  their  army,  exclusive  of  the  money  and  mate- 
rials drawn  from  the  districts  of  Bologna  and  Ferrara. 
The  grand  total,  in  money,  and  in  kind,  raised  from  the 
Papal  States  in  this  profitable  raid,  was  reckoned  by  Bona- 
parte himself  as  34,700,000  francs,1  or  about  £1,400,000 
—  a  liberal  assessment  for  the  life  of  a  single  envoy  and 
the  bruti  fulmina  of  the  Vatican. 

Equally  lucrative  was  a  dash  into  Tuscany.  As  the 
Grand  Duke  of  this  fertile  land  had  allowed  English  cruis- 
ers and  merchants  certain  privileges  at  Leghorn,  this  was 
taken  as  a  departure  from  the  neutrality  which  he  osten- 
sibly maintained  since  the  signature,  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
with  France  in  1795.  A  column  of  the  republicans  now 
swiftly  approached  Leghorn  and  seized  much  valuable 
property  from  British  merchants.  Yet  the  invaders  failed 
to  secure  the  richest  of  the  hoped-for  plunder ;  for  about 
forty  English  merchantmen  sheered  off  from  shore  as  the 
troops  neared  the  seaport,  and  an  English  frigate,  swoop- 
ing down,  carried  off  two  French  vessels  almost  under  the 
eyes  of  Bonaparte  himself.  This  last  outrage  gave,  it  is  true, 
a  slight  excuse  for  the  levying  of  requisitions  in  Leghorn 
and  its  environs  ;  yet,  according  to  the  memoir-writer, 
Miot  de  Melito,  this  unprincipled  action  must  be  attrib- 
uted not  to  Bonaparte,  but  to  the  urgent  needs  of  the 
French  treasury  and  the  personal  greed  of  some  of  the 
Directors.  Possibly  also  the  French  commissioners  and 
agents,  who  levied  blackmail  or  selected  pictures,  may 
have  had  some  share  in  the  shaping  of  the  Directorial 
policy  :  at  least,  it  is  certain  that  some  of  them,  notably 
Salicetti,  amassed  a  large  fortune  from    the    plunder   of 

1  "  Corresp.,"  June  26th,  1796. 


v  THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN  95 

Leghorn.  In  order  to  calm  the  resentment  of  the  Grand 
Duke,  Bonaparte  paid  a  brief  visit  to  Florence.  He  was 
received  in  respectful  silence  as  he  rode  through  the  streets 
where  his  ancestors  had  schemed  for  the  Ghibelline  cause. 
By  a  deft  mingling  of  courtesy  and  firmness  the  new  con- 
queror imposed  his  will  on  the  Government  of  Florence, 
and  then  sped  northward  to  press  on  the  siege  of  Mantua. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA 

The  circumstances  which  recalled  Bonaparte  to  the 
banks  of  the  Mincio  were  indeed  serious.  The  Emperor 
Francis  was  determined  at  all  costs  to  retain  his  hold  on 
Italy  by  raising  the  siege  of  that  fortress  ;  and  unless 
the  French  commander  could  speedily  compass  its  fall,  he 
had  the  prospect  of  fighting  a  greatly  superior  army  while 
his  rear  was  threatened  by  the  garrison  of  Mantua.  Aus- 
tria was  making  unparalleled  efforts  to  drive  this  pre- 
sumptuous young  general  from  a  land  which  she  regarded 
as  her  own  political  preserve.  Military  historians  have 
always  been  puzzled  to  account  for  her  persistent  efforts 
in  1796-97  to  re-conquer  Lombardy.  But,  in  truth,  the 
reasons  are  diplomatic,  not  military,  and  need  not  be  de- 
tailed here.  Suffice  it  to  say  that,  though  the  Hapsburg 
lands  in  Swabia  were  threatened  by  Moreau's  Army  of 
the  Rhine,  Francis  determined  at  all  costs  to  recover  his 
Italian  possessions. 

To  this  end  the  Emperor  now  replaced  the  luckless 
Beaulieu  by  General  Wurmser,  who  had  gained  some 
reputation  in  the  Rhenish  campaigns  ;  and,  detaching 
25,000  men  from  his  northern  armies  to  strengthen  his 
army  on  the  Adige,  he  bade  him  carry  the  double-headed 
eagle  of  Austria  victoriously  into  the  plains  of  Italy. 
Though  too  late  to  relieve  the  citadel  of  Milan,  he  was  to 
strain  every  nerve  to  relieve  Mantua  ;  and,  since  the 
latest  reports  represented  the  French  as  widely  dispersed 
for  the  plunder  of  Central  Italy,  the  Emperor  indulged 
the  highest  hopes  of  Wurmser's  success.1  Possibly  this 
might  have  been  attained  had  the  Austrian  Emperor  and 
staff  understood  the  absolute  need  of  concentration  in 
attacking  a  commander  who  had  already  demonstrated  its 
1  Despatch  of  Francis  to  Wurmser,  July  14th,  1796. 

96 


chap,  vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  97 

supreme  importance  in  warfare.  Yet  the  difficulties  of 
marching  an  army  of  47,000  men  through  the  narrow  de- 
file carved  by  the  Adige  through  the  Tyrolese  Alps,  and 
the  wide  extent  of  the  French  covering  lines,  led  to  the 
adoption  of  a  plan  which  favoured  rapidity  at  the  expense 
of  security.  Wiirmser  was  to  divide  his  forces  for  the 
difficult  march  southward  from  Tyrol  into  Italy.  In 
defence  of  this  arrangement  much  could  be  urged.  To 
have  cumbered  the  two  roads,  which  run  on  either  side 
of  the  Adige  from  Trient  towards  Mantua,  with  infantry, 
cavalry,  artilleiy,  and  the  countless  camp-followers,  ani- 
mals, and  wagons  that  follow  an  army,  would  have  been 
fatal  alike  to  speed  of  marching  and  to  success  in  moun- 
tain warfare.  Even  in  the  campaign  of  1866  the  greatest 
commander  of  this  generation  carried  out  his  maxim, 
"  March  in  separate  columns  :  unite  for  fighting."  But 
Wiirmser  and  the  Aulic  Council 1  at  Vienna  neglected  to 
insure  that  reunion  for  attack,  on  which  von  Moltke  laid 
such  stress  in  his  Bohemian  campaign.  The  Austrian 
forces  in  1796  were  divided  by  obstacles  which  could  not 
quickly  be  crossed,  namely,  by  Lake  Garda  and  the  lofty 
mountains  which  tower  above  the  valley  of  the  Adige. 
Assuredly  the  Imperialists  were  not  nearly  strong  enough 
to  run  any  risks.  The  official  Austrian  returns  show  that 
the  total  force  assembled  in  Tyrol  for  the  invasion  of 
Italy  amounted  to  46,937  men,  not  to  the  60,000  as  pic- 
tured by  the  imagination  of  Thiers  and  other  French 
historians.  As  Bonaparte  had  in  Lombardy-Venetia  fully 
45,000  men  (including  10,000  now  engaged  in  the  siege 
of  Mantua),  scattered  along  a  front  of  fifty  miles  from 
Milan  to  Brescia  and  Legnago,  the  incursion  of  Wiirmser's 
force,  if  the  French  were  held  to  their  separate  positions 
by  diversions  against  their  flanks,  must  have  proved  de- 
cisive. But  the  fault  was  committed  of  so  far  dividing 
the  Austrians  that  nowhere  could  they  deal  a  crushing 
blow.      Quosdanovich   with   17,600  men  was  to  take    the 

1  Jomini  (vol.  viii.,  p.  305)  blames  Weyrother,  the  chief  of  Wiirmser's 
staff,  for  the  plan.  Jomini  gives  the  precise  figures  of  the  French  on  July 
25th  :  Mass^na  had  15,000  men  on  the  upper  Adige  ;  Augereau,  5,000 
near  Legnago;  Sauret,  4,000  at  Salo  ;  SSrurier,  10,500  near  Mantua  ;  and 
with  others  at  and  near  Peschiera  the  total  fighting  strength  was  45,000. 
So  "J.  G.,"  p.  103. 


98  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

western  side  of  Lake  Garda,  seize  the  French  magazines 
at  Brescia,  and  cut  their  communications  with  Milan  and 
France  :  the  main  body  under  Wurmser,  24,300  strong, 
was  meanwhile  to  march  in  two  columns  on  either  bank 
of  the  Adige,  drive  the  French  from  Rivoli  and  push  on 
towards  Mantua:  and  yet  a  third  division,  led  by  Da- 
vidovich  from  the  district  of  Friuli  on  the  east,  received 
orders  to  march  on  Vicenza  and  Legnago,  in  order  to 
distract  the  French  from  that  side  and  possibly  relieve 
Mantua  if  the  other  two  onsets  failed. 

Faulty  as   these  dispositions  were,  they   yet   seriously 
disconcerted  Bonaparte.     He  was  at  Montechiaro,  a  vil- 
lage situated  on   the  road  between  Brescia  and  Mantua, 
when,  on  July  29th,  he    heard  that  the  white-coats  had 
driven  in  Massena's  vanguard  above  Rivoli  on  the  Adige, 
were  menacing  other  positions  near  Verona  and  Legnago, 
and   were  advancing   on  Brescia.      As  soon  as  the   full 
extent  of  the  peril  was  manifest,  he  sent  off  ten  despatches 
to  his  generals,  ordering  a  concentration  of  troops  —  these, 
of  course,  fighting  so  as  to  delay  the  pursuit  —  towards 
the  southern  end  of  Lake  Garda.     This  wise  step  proba- 
bly saved  his  isolated  forces  from  disaster.     It  was  at  that 
point  that  the  Austrians  proposed  to  unite  their  two  chief 
columns   and    crush    the    French    detachments.     But   by 
drawing  in  the  divisions  of  Massena  and  Augereau  towards 
the   Mincio,   Bonaparte  speedily  assembled  a  formidable 
array,  and  held  the  central  position  between  the  eastern 
and  western  divisions  of  the  Imperialists.     He  gave  up 
the  important  defensive  line  of  the  Adige,  it  is  true ;  but 
by  promptly  rallying  on  the  Mincio,  he  occupied  a  base 
that  was  defended  on  the  north  by  the  small  fortress  of 
Peschiera  and  the  waters  of  Lake  Garda.     Holding  the 
bridges  over  the  Mincio,  he  could  strike  at  his  assailants 
wherever  they  should  attack  ;  above  all,  he  still  covered 
the  siege  of  Mantua.     Such  were  his  dispositions  on  July 
29th  and  30th.     On  the  latter  day  he  heard  of  the  loss  of 
Brescia,  and  the  consequent  cutting  of  his  communica- 
tions with  Milan.     Thereupon  he  promptly  ordered  Seru- 
rier,  who  was  besieging  Mantua,  to  make  a  last  vigorous 
effort  to  take  that  fortress,  but  also  to  assure  his  retreat 
westwards  if  fortune  failed  him.      Later  in  the  day  he 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  99 

ordered  him  forthwith  to  send  away  his  siege-train, 
throwing  into  the  lake  or  burying  whatever  he  could  not 
save  from  the  advancing  Imperialists. 

This  apparently  desperate  step,  which  seemed  to  fore- 
bode the  abandonment  not  only  of  the  siege  of  Mantua, 
but  of  the  whole  of  Loinbardy,  was  in  reality  a  master- 
stroke. Bonaparte  had  perceived  the  truth,  which  the 
campaigns  of  1813  and  1870  were  abundantly  to  illus- 
trate —  that  the  possession  of  fortresses,  and  consequently 
their  siege  by  an  invader,  is  of  secondary  importance 
when  compared  with  a  decisive  victory  gained  in  the  open. 
When  menaced  by  superior  forces  advancing  towards  the 
south  of  Lake  Garda,  he  saw  that  he  must  sacrifice  his 
siege  works,  even  his  siege-train,  in  order  to  gain  for  a  few 
precious  days  that  superiority  in  the  field  which  the  divi- 
sion of  the  Imperialist  columns  still  left  to  him. 

The  dates  of  these  occurrences  deserve  close  scrutiny  ; 
for  they  suffice  to  refute  some  of  the  exorbitant  claims 
made  at  a  later  time  by  General  Augereau,  that  only  his 
immovable  firmness  forced  Bonaparte  to  fight  and  to 
change  his  dispositions  of  retreat  into  an  attack  which 
re-established  everything.  This  extraordinary  assertion, 
published  by  Augereau  after  he  had  deserted  Napoleon 
in  1814,  is  accompanied  by  a  detailed  recital  of  the  events 
of  July  30th- August  5th,  in  which  Bonaparte  appears  as 
the  dazed  and  discouraged  commander,  surrounded  by 
pusillanimous  generals,  and  urged  on  to  fight  solely  by 
the  confidence  of  Augereau.  That  the  forceful  energy  of 
this  general  had  a  great  influence  in  restoring  the  morale 
of  the  French  army  in  the  confused  and  desperate  move- 
ments which  followed  may  freely  be  granted.  But  his 
claims  to  have  been  the  mainspring  of  the  French  move- 
ments in  those  anxious  days  deserve  a  brief  examination. 
He  asserts  that  Bonaparte,  "  devoured  by  anxieties,"  met 
him  at  Roverbella  late  in  the  evening  of  July  30th,  and 
spoke  of  retiring  beyond  the  River  Po.  The  official  cor- 
respondence disproves  this  assertion.  Bonaparte  had 
already  given  orders  to  Serurier  to  retire  beyond  the  Po 
with  his  artillery  train  ;  but  this  was  obviously  an  attempt 
to  save  it  from  the  advancing  Austrians  ;  and  the  com- 
mander had  ordered  the    northern  part   of    the    French 


100  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

besieging  force  to  join  Augereau  between  Roverbella 
and  Goito.  Augereau  further  asserts  that,  after  he 
had  roused  Bonaparte  to  the  need  of  a  dash  to  re- 
cover Brescia,  the  commander-in-chief  remarked  to  Ber- 
thier,  "  In  that  case  we  must  raise  the  siege  of  Mantua," 
which  again  he  (Augereau)  vigorously  opposed.  This 
second  statement  is  creditable  neither  to  Augereau's 
accuracy  nor  to  his  sagacity.  The  order  for  the  raising 
of  the  siege  had  been  issued,  and  it  was  entirely  necessary 
for  the  concentration  of  French  troops,  on  which  Bona- 
parte now  relied  as  his  only  hope  against  superior  force. 
Had  Bonaparte  listened  to  Augereau's  advice  and  per- 
sisted still  in  besieging  Mantua,  the  scattered  French 
forces  must  have  been  crushed  in  detail.  Augereau's 
words  are  those  of  a  mere  fighter,  not  of  a  strategist ; 
and  the  timidity  which  he  ungenerously  attributed  to 
Bonaparte  was  nothing  but  the  caution  which  a  superior 
intellect  saw  to  be  a  necessary  prelude  to  a  victorious 
move. 

That  the  fighting  honours  of  the  ensuing  days  rightly 
belong  to  Augereau  may  be  frankly  conceded.  With 
forces  augmented  by  the  northern  part  of  the  besiegers 
of  Mantua,  he  moved  rapidly  westwards  from  the  Mincio 
against  Brescia,  and  rescued  it  from  the  vanguard  of 
Quosdanovich  (August  1st).  On  the  previous  day  other 
Austrian  detachments  had  also,  after  obstinate  conflicts, 
been  worsted  near  Salo  and  Lonato.  Still,  the  position 
was  one  of  great  perplexity :  for  though  Massena's  divi- 
sion from  the  Adige  was  now  beginning  to  come  into 
touch  with  Bonaparte's  chief  force,  yet  the  fronts  of 
Wiirmser's  columns  were  menacing  the  French  from  that 
side,  while  the  troops  of  Quosdanovich,  hovering  about 
Lonato  and  Salo,  struggled  desperately  to  stretch  a 
guiding  hand  to  their  comrades  on  the  Mincio. 

Wurmser  was  now  discovering  his  error.  Lured  towards 
Mantua  by  false  reports  that  the  French  were  still  cover- 
ing the  siege,  he  had  marched  due  south  when  he  ought  to 
have  .rushed  to  the  rescue  of  his  hard-pressed  lieutenant 
at  Brescia.  Entering  Mantua,  he  enjoyed  a  brief  spell  of 
triumph,  and  sent  to  the  Emperor  Francis  the  news  of  the 
capture  of  40  French  cannon  in  the  trenches,  and  of  139 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR  TVIANTUA  101 

more  on  the  banks  of  the  Po.  But,  while  he  was  indulg- 
ing the  fond  hope  that  the  French  were  in  full  retreat 
from  Italy,  came  the  startling  news  that  they  had  checked 
Quosdanovich  at  Brescia  and  Salo.  Realizing  his  errors, 
and  determining  to  retrieve  them  before  all  was  lost,  he 
at  once  pushed  on  his  vanguard  towards  Castiglione,  and 
easily  gained  that  village  and  its  castle  from  a  French 
detachment  commanded  by  General  Valette. 

The  feeble  defence  of  so  important  a  position  threw 
Bonaparte  into  one  of  those  transports  of  fury  which 
occasionally  dethroned  his  better  judgment.  Meeting 
Valette  at  Montechiaro,  he  promptly  degraded  him  to  the 
ranks,  refusing  to  listen  to  his  plea  of  having  received  a 
written  order  to  retire.  A  report  of  General  Landrieux 
asserts  that  the  rage  of  the  commander-in-chief  was  so 
extreme  as  for  the  time  even  to  impair  his  determination. 
The  outlook  was  gloomy.  The  French  seemed  about  to 
be  hemmed  in  amidst  the  broken  country  between  Cas- 
tiglione, Brescia,  and  Salo.  A  sudden  attack  on  the 
Austrians  was  obviously  the  only  safe  and  honourable 
course.  But  no  one  knew  precisely  their  numbers  or 
their  position.  Uncertainty  ever  preyed  on  Bonaparte's 
ardent  imagination.  His  was  a  mind  that  quailed  not 
before  visible  dangers ;  but,  with  all  its  powers  of  decisive 
action,  it  retained  so  much  of  Corsican  eeriness  as  to  chafe 
at  the  unknown,1  and  to  lose  for  the  moment  the  faculty 
of  forming  a  vigorous  resolution.  Like  the  python,  which 
grips  its  native  rock  by  the  tail  in  order  to  gain  its  full 
constricting  power,  so  Bonaparte  ever  needed  a  ground- 
work of  fact  for  the  due  exercise  of  his  mental  force. 

One  of  a  group  of  generals,  whom  he  had  assembled 
about  him  near  Montechiaro,  proposed  that  they  should 
ascend  the  hill  which  dominated  the  plain.  Even  from 
its  ridge  no  Austrians  were  to  be  seen.  Again  the  com- 
mander burst  forth  with  petulant  reproaches,  and  even 
talked  of  retiring  to  the  Adda.  Whereupon,  if  we  may 
trust  the  "  Memoirs "  of    General    Landrieux,  Augereau 

1  See  Thtebault's  amusing  account  ("  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xvi.)  of 
Bonaparte's  contempt  for  any  officer  who  could  not  give  him  definite 
information,  and  of  the  devices  by  which  his  orderlies  played  on  this 
foible.    See  too  Bourrienne  for  Bonaparte's  dislil*e  of  new  faces. 


102  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

protested  against  retreat,  and  promised  success  for  a  vig- 
orous charge.  "  I  wash  my  hands  of  it,  and  I  am  going 
away,"  replied  Bonaparte.  "  And  who  will  command,  if 
you  go?"  inquired  Augereau.  "You,"  retorted  Bona- 
parte, as  he  left  the  astonished  circle. 

However  this  may  be,  the  first  attack  on  Castiglione 
was  certainly  left  to  this  determined  fighter;  and  the 
mingling  of  boldness  and  guile  which  he  showed  on  the 
following  day  regained  for  the  French  not  only  the  vil- 
lage, but  also  the  castle,  perched  on  a  precipitous  rock. 
Yet  the  report  of  Colonel  Graham,  who  was  then  at  Mar- 
shal Wiirmser's  headquarters,  somewhat  dulls  the  lustre  of 
Augereau's  exploit ;  for  the  British  officer  asserts  that  the 
Austrian  position  had  been  taken  up  quite  by  haphazard, 
and  that  fewer  than  15,000  white-coats  were  engaged  in 
this  first  battle  of  Castiglione.  Furthermore,  the  narra- 
tives of  this  mSlSe  written  by  Augereau  himself  and  by 
two  other  generals,  Landrieux  and  Verdier,  who  were  dis- 
affected towards  Bonaparte,  must  naturally  be  received 
with  much  reserve.  The  effect  of  Augereau's  indomitable 
energy  in  restoring  confidence  to  the  soldiers  and  victory 
to  the  French  tricolour  was,  however,  generously  admitted 
by  the  Emperor  Napoleon  ;  for,  at  a  later  time,  when  com- 
plaints were  being  made  about  Augereau,  he  generously 
exclaimed:  "Ah,  let  us  not  forget  that  he  saved  us  at 
Castiglione."  * 

While  Augereau  was  recovering  this  important  posi- 
tion, confused  conflicts  were  raging  a  few  miles  further 
north  at  Lonato.  Massena  at  first  was  driven  back  by 
the  onset  of  the  Imperialists  ;  but  while  they  were  endeav- 
ouring to  envelop  the  French,  Bonaparte  arrived,  and  in 
conjunction  with  Massena  pushed  on  a  central  attack  such 
as  often  wrested  victory  from  the  enemy.  The  white-coats 
retired  in  disorder,  some  towards  Gavardo,  others  towards 
the  lake,  hotly  followed  by  the  French.  In  the  pursuit 
towards  Gavardo,  Bonaparte's  old  friend,  Junot,  distin- 
guished himself  by  his  dashing  valour.  He  wounded  a 
colonel,  slew  six  troopers,  and,  covered  with  wounds,  was 
finally  overthrown  into  a  ditch.     Such  is  Bonaparte's  own 

1  Marbot,  "  Memoires,"  ch.  xvi.  J.  G.,  in  his  recent  work,  "  Etudes 
sur  la  Campagnr  de  1700-97,"  p.  11"),  also  defends  Augereau. 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  103 

account.  It  is  gratifying  to  know  that  the  wounds  neither 
singly  nor  collectively  were  dangerous,  ,and  did  not  long 
repress  Junot's  activity.  A  tinge  of  romance  seems,  in- 
deed, to  have  gilded  many  of  these  narratives ;  and  a  criti- 
cal examination  of  the  whole  story  of  Lonato  seems  to 
suggest  doubts  whether  the  victory  was  as  decisive  as 
historians  have  often  represented.  If  the  Austrians  were 
"thrown  back  on  Lake  Garda  and  Desenzano," 1  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  why  the  pursuers  did  not  drive  them  into  the 
lake.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  nearly  all  the  beaten  troops 
escaped  to  Gavardo,  while  others  joined  their  comrades 
engaged  in  the  blockade  of  Peschiera. 

A  strange  incident  serves  to  illustrate  the  hazards  of 
war  and  the  confusion  of  this  part  of  the  campaign.  A 
detachment  of  the  vanquished  Austrian  forces  some  4,000 
strong,  unable  to  join  their  comrades  at  Gavardo  or  Pes- 
chiera, and  yet  unharmed  by  the  victorious  pursuers, 
wandered  about  on  the  hills,  and  on  the  next  day  chanced 
near  Lonato  to  come  upon  a  much  smaller  detachment  of 
French.  Though  unaware  of  the  full  extent  of  their  good 
fortune,  the  Imperialists  boldly  sent  an  envoy  to  summon 
the  French  commanding  officer  to  surrender.  When  the 
bandage  was  taken  from  his  eyes,  he  was  abashed  to  find 
himself  in  the  presence  of  Bonaparte,  surrounded  by  the 
generals  of  his  staff.  The  young  commander's  eyes  flashed 
lire  at  the  seeming  insult,  and  in  tones  vibrating  with 
well-simulated  passion  he  threatened  the  envoy  with  con- 
dign punishment  for  daring  to  give  such  a  message  to  the 
commander-in-chief  at  his  headquarters  in  the  midst  of  his 
army.  Let  him  and  his  men  forthwith  lay  down  their 
arms.  Dazed  by  the  demand,  and  seeing  only  the  vic- 
torious chief  and  not  the  smallness  of  his  detachment,  4,000 
Austrians  surrendered  to  1,200  French,  or  rather  to  the 
address  and  audacity  of  one  master-mind. 

Elated  by  this  augury  of  further  victory,  the  repub- 
licans prepared  for  the  decisive  blow.  Wiirmser,  though 
checked  on  August  3rd,  had  been  so  far  reinforced  from 
Mantua  as  still  to  indulge  hopes  of  driving  the  French 
from  Castiglione  and  cutting  his  way  through  to  rescue 
Quosdanovich.      He   was,    indeed,    in    honour   bound    to 

1  Jomini,  vol.  viii.,  p.  321. 


104 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


make  the  attempt ;  for  the  engagement  had  been  made, 
with  the  usual  futility  that  dogged  the  Austrian  councils, 
to  reunite  their  forces  and  fight  the  French  on  the  1th  of 
August.     These  cast-iron  plans  were  now  adhered  to  in 
spite  of  their  dislocation  at  the  hands  of  Bonaparte  and 
Augereau.     Wiirmser's  line  stretched  from  near  the  vil- 
lage of   Medole  in  a  north-easterly  direction  across  the 
high-road  between  Brescia  and  Mantua  ;  while  his  right 
wing  was  posted  in  the  hilly  country  around  Solferino. 
In  fact,  his  extreme  right  rested  on  the  tower-crowned 
heights  of   Solferino,  where   the   forces   of   Austria  two 
generations    later   maintained    so    desperate    a    defence 
against  the  onset   of   Napoleon   III.   and  his  liberating 

"Swing  to  the  non-arrival  of  Mezaros'  corps  marching 
from  Legnago,  Wurmser   mustered   scarcely  twenty-hve 
thousand  men  on  his  long  line  ;  while  the  very  opportune 
approach  of  part  of  Serurier's  division,  under  the  lead  ot 
Fiorella,  from  the  south,  gave  the  French  an  advantage 
even  in  numbers.     Moreover  Fiorella's  advance   on  the 
south   of    Wiirmser's    weaker   flank,   that    near    Medole, 
threatened  to  turn  it  and  endanger  the  Austrian  commu- 
nications with  Mantua.     The  Imperialists  seem  to  have 
been  unaware  of  this  danger  ;  and  their  bad  scouting  here 
as  elsewhere  was  largely  responsible  for  the  issue  ot  the 
day      Wiirmser's   desire   to   stretch   a  helping  hand   to 
Quosdanovich   near   Lonato   and   his   confidence    in    the 
strength  of  his  own  right  wing  betrayed  him  into  a  fatal 
imprudence.     Sending  out  feelers  after  his  hard-pressed 
colleague  on  the  north,  he  dangerously  prolonged  his  line, 
an  error  in  which  he  was  deftly  encouraged  by  Bonaparte, 
who  held  back  his  own  left  wing.     Meanwhile  the  *  rench 
were  rolling  in  the  other  extremity  of  the  Austrian  line. 
Marmont,  dashing  forward  with  the  horse  artillery,  took 
the  enemy's  left  wing  in  flank  and  silenced  many  of  their 
pieces.     Under  cover  of   this   attack,  tiorellas   division 
was  able  to  creep  up  within  striking  distance  ;  and  the 
French  cavalry,  swooping  round  the  rear  of   this   hard- 
pressed  wing,  nearly  captured  Wurmser  and  his  statt.     A 
vigorous  counter-attack  by  the  Austrian  reserves,  or  an 
immediate  wheeling  round  of  the  whole  line,  was  needed 


VI 


THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  105 


to  repulse  this  brilliant  flank  attack  ;  but  the  Austrian 
reserves  had  been  expended  in  the  north  of  their  line  ; 
and  an  attempt  to  change  front,  always  a  difficult  opera- 
tion, was  crushed  by  a  headlong  charge  of  Massena's  and 
Augereau's  divisions  on  their  centre.  Before  these  at- 
tacks the  whole  Austrian  line  gave  way  ;  and,  according 
to  Colonel  Graham,  nothing  but  this  retreat,  undertaken 
"  without  orders,"  saved  the  whole  force  from  being  cut 
off.  The  criticisms  of  our  officer  sufficiently  reveal  the 
cause  of  the  disaster.  The  softness  and  incapacity  of 
Wurmser,  the  absence  of  a  responsible  second  in  command, 
the  ignorance  of  the  number  and  positions  of  the  French, 
the  determination  to  advance  towards  Castiglione  and  to 
wait  thereabouts  for  Quosdanovich  until  a  battle  could  be 
fought  with  combined  forces  on  the  7th,  the  taking  up  a 
position  almost  by  haphazard  on  the  Castiglione-Medole 
line,  and  the  failure  to  detect  Fiorella's  approach,  present 
a  series  of  defects  and  blunders  which  might  have  given 
away  the  victory  to  a  third-rate  opponent. 1 

The  battle  was  by  no  means  sanguinary  :  it  was  a  series 
of  manoeuvres  rather  than  of  prolonged  conflicts.  Hence 
its  interest  to  all  who  by  preference  dwell  on  the  intel- 
lectual problems  of  warfare  rather  than  on  the  details  of 
fighting.  Bonaparte  had  previously  shown  that  he  could 
deal  blows  with  telling  effect.  The  ease  and  grace  of  his 
moves  at  the  second  battle  of  Castiglione  now  redeemed 
the  reputation  which  his  uncertain  behaviour  on  the  four 
preceding  days  had  somewhat  compromised. 

A  complete  and  authentic  account  of  this  week  of  con- 
fused fighting  has  never  been  written.  The  archives  of 
Vienna  have  not  as  yet  yielded  up  all  their  secrets ;  and 
the  reputations  of  so  many  French  officers  were  overclouded 
by  this  prolonged  melee  as  to  render  even  the  victors' 
accounts  vague  and  inconsistent.  The  aim  of  historians 
everywhere  to  give  a  clear  and  vivid  account,  and  the 
desire  of  Napoleonic  enthusiasts  to  represent  their  hero  as 
always  thinking  clearly  and  acting  decisively,  have  fused 
trusty  ores  and  worthless  slag  into  an  alloy  which  has 
passed  for  true  metal.  But  no  student  of  Napoleon's 
"  Correspondence,"  of  the  "  Memoirs"  of  Marmont,  and 


1  " 


English  Hist.  Review,"  January,  1899. 


106  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  the  recitals  of  Augereau,  Dumas,  Landrieux,  Verdier, 
Despinois  and  others,  can  hope  wholly  to  unravel  the 
complications  arising  from  the  almost  continuous  conflicts 
that  extended  over  a  dozen  leagues  of  hilly  country.  War 
is  not  always  dramatic,  however  much  the  readers  of  cam- 
paigns may  yearn  after  thrilling  narratives.  In  regard  to 
this  third  act  of  the  Italian  compaign,  all  that  can  safely 
be  said  is  that  Bonaparte's  intuition  to  raise  the  siege  of 
Mantua,  in  order  that  he  might  defeat  in  detail  the  reliev- 
ing armies,  bears  the  imprint  of  genius :  but  the  execution 
of  this  difficult  movement  was  unequal,  even  at  times  halt- 
ing ;  and  the  French  army  was  rescued  from  its  difficulties 
only  by  the  grand  fighting  qualities  of  the  rank  and  file, 
and  by  the  Austrian  blunders,  which  outnumbered  those 
of  the  republican  generals. 

Neither  were  the  results  of  the  Castiglione  cycle  of  bat- 
tles quite  so  brilliant  as  have  been  represented.  Wiirmser 
and  Quosdanovich  lost  in  all  17,000  men,  it  is  true :  but 
the  former  had  re-garrisoned  and  re-victualled  Mantua, 
besides  capturing  all  the  French  siege-train.  Bonaparte's 
primary  aim  had  been  to  reduce  Mantua,  so  that  he  might 
be  free  to  sweep  through  Tyrol,  join  hands  with  Moreau, 
and  overpower  the  white-coats  in  Bavaria.  The  aim  of 
the  Aulic  Council  and  Wiirmser  had  been  to  relieve  Mantua 
and  restore  the  Hapsburg  rule  over  Lombardy.  Neither 
side  had  succeeded.  But  the  Austrians  could  at  least 
point  to  some  successes ;  and,  above  all,  Mantua  was  in  a 
better  state  of  defence  than  when  the  French  first  ap- 
proached its  walls :  and  while  Mantua  was  intact,  Bona- 
parte was  held  to  the  valley  of  the  Mincio,  and  could  not 
deal  those  lightning  blows  on  the  Inn  and  the  Danube 
which  he  ever  regarded  as  the  climax  of  the  campaign. 
Viewed  on  its  material  side,  his  position  was  no  better 
than  it  was  before  Wiirmser's  incursion  into  the  plains  of 

Venetia.1 

With  true  Hapsburg  tenacity,  Francis  determined  on 

i  Such  is  the  judgment  of  Clause witz  ("  Werke,"  vol.  iv.),  and  it  is 
partly  endorsed  by  J.  G.  in  his  "  Etudes  sur  la  Campagne  de  179(5-97. 
St.  Cyr,  in  his  "Memoirs"  on  the  Rhenish  campaigns,  also  blames  Bona- 
parte for  not  having  earlier  sent  away  his  siege-train  to  a  place  of  safety. 
Its  loss  made  the  resumed  siege  of  Mantua  little  more  than  a  blockade. 


ti  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  107 

further  efforts  for  the  relief  of  Mantua.  Apart  from  the 
promptings  of  dynastic  pride,  his  reason  for  thus  obstinately 
struggling  against  Alpine  gorges,  Italian  sentiment,  and 
Bonaparte's  genius,  are  wellnigh  inscrutable  ;  and  military 
writers  have  generally  condemned  this  waste  of  resources 
on  the  Brenta,  which,  if  hurled  against  the  French  on  the 
Rhine,  would  have  compelled  the  withdrawal  of  Bonaparte 
from  Italy  for  the  defence  of  Lorraine.  But  the  pride  of 
the  Emperor  Francis  brooked  no  surrender  of  his  Italian 
possessions,  and  again  Wurmser  was  spurred  on  from 
Vienna  to  another  invasion  of  Venetia.  It  would  be 
tedious  to  give  an  account  of  Wurmser's  second  attempt, 
which  belongs  rather  to  the  domain  of  political  fatuit}- 
than  that  of  military  history.  Colonel  Graham  states  that 
the  Austrian  rank  and  file  laughed  at  their  generals,  and 
bitterly  complained  that  they  were  being  led  to  the  sham- 
bles, while  the  officers  almost  openly  exclaimed  :  "  We  must 
make  peace,  for  we  don't  know  how  to  make  war."  This 
was  again  apparent.  Bonaparte  forestalled  their  attack. 
Their  divided  forces  fell  an  easy  prey  to  Massena,  who  at 
Bassano  cut  Wurmser's  force  to  pieces  and  sent  the  debris 
flying  down  the  valley  of  the  Brenta.  Losing  most  of  their 
artillery,  and  separated  in  two  chief  bands,  the  Imperial- 
ists seemed  doomed  to  surrender:  but  Wurmser,  doubling 
on  his  pursuers,  made  a  dash  westwards,  finally  cutting 
his  way  to  Mantua.  There  again  he  vainly  endeavoured 
to  make  a  stand.  He  was  driven  from  his  positions  in 
front  of  St.  Georges  and  La  Favorita,  and  was  shut  up 
in  the  town  itself.  This  addition  to  the  numbers  of  the 
garrison  was  no  increase  to  its  strength  ;  for  the  fortress, 
though  well  provisioned  for  an  ordinary  garrison,  could 
not  support  a  prolonged  blockade,  and  the  fevers  of  the 
early  autumn  soon  began  to  decimate  troops  worn  out  by 
forced  marches  and  unable  to  endure  the  miasma  ascend- 
ing from  the  marshes  of  the  Mincio. 

The  French  also  were  wearied  by  their  exertions  in  the 
fierce  heats  of  September.  Murmurs  were  heard  in  the 
ranks  and  at  the  mess  tables  that  Bonaparte's  reports  of 
these  exploits  were  tinged  by  favouritism  and  by  undue 
severity  against  those  whose  fortune  had  been  less  con- 
spicuous than  their  merits.     One  of  these  misunderstand- 


108 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


ings  was  of  some  importance.     Massena,  whose  services 
had  been  brilliant  at  Bassano  but  less  felicitous  since  the 
crossing  of  the  Adige,  reproached  Bonaparte  for  denying 
praise  to  the  most  deserving  and  lavishing  it  on  men  who 
had  come  in  opportunely  to  reap  the  labours  of  others. 
His  written  protest,  urged  with  the  old  republican  frank- 
ness, only  served  further  to  cloud  over  the  relations  be- 
tween them,  which,  since  Lonato,  had  not  been  cordial. 
Even  thus  early  in  his  career  Bonaparte  gained  the  repu- 
tation of  desiring  brilliant  and  entire  success,  and  of  vis- 
iting with  his  displeasure  men  who,  from  whatever  cause, 
did  not  wrest  from  Fortune  her  utmost  favours.    That  was 
his  own  mental  attitude  towards  the  fickle  goddess.    After 
entering  Milan  he  cynically  remarked  to  Marmont :  "for- 
tune is  a  woman ;  and  the  more  she  does  for  me,  the  more 
I  will  require  of  her."    Suggestive  words,  which  explain  at 
once  the  splendour  of  his  rise  and  the  rapidity  of  his  fall. 
During  the  few  weeks  of  comparative  inaction  which 
ensued,  the  affairs  of  Italy  claimed  his  attention.     The 
prospect  of  an  Austrian  re-conquest  had  caused  no  less 
concern  to  the  friends  of  liberty  in  the  peninsula  than  joy 
to  the   reactionary  coteries  of   the  old   sovereigns.      At 
Rome  and  Naples  threats  against  the  French  were  whis- 
pered or  openly  vaunted.     The  signature  of  the  treaties 
of  peace  was  delayed,  and  the  fulminations  of  the  Vatican 
were  prepared  against  the   sacrilegious   spoilers.     Alter 
the  Austrian  war-cloud  had  melted  away,  the  time  had 
come  to  punish  prophets  of  evil.     The  Duke  of  Modena 
was  charged  with  allowing  a  convoy  to  pass  from  his  btate 
to  the  garrison  of  Mantua,  and  with  neglecting  to  pay  the 
utterly  impossible  fine  to  which  Bonaparte  had  condemned 
him.     The  men  of  Reggio  and  Modena  were  also  encour- 
aged to  throw  off  his  yoke  and  to  confide  in  the  French. 
Those  of  Reggio  succeeded  ;  but  in  the  city  of  Modena 
itself  the  ducal  troops  repressed  the  rising.     Bonaparte 
accordingly  asked  the  advice  of  the  Directory  ;   but  his 
resolution  was  already  formed.     Two  days  after  seeking 
their  counsel,  he  took  the  decisive  step  of  declaring  Mo- 
dena and  Reggio  to  be  under  the  protection  of  *  ranee. 
This  act  formed  an  exceedingly  important  departure  in 
i  Koch,  "  M^moires  de  Massena,"  vol.  i.,  p.  199. 


vi  THE  FIGHTS  FOR  MANTUA  109 

the  history  of  France  as  well  as  in  that  of  Italy.  Hitherto 
the  Directory  had  succeeded  in  keeping  Bonaparte  from 
active  intervention  in  affairs  of  high  policy.  In  particular, 
it  had  enjoined  on  him  the  greatest  prudence  with  regard 
to  the  liberated  lands  of  Italy,  so  as  not  to  involve  France 
in  prolonged  intervention  in  the  peninsula,  or  commit  her 
to  a  war  a  outranee  with  the  Hapsburgs  ;  and  its  warnings 
were  now  urged  with  all  the  greater  emphasis  because 
news  had  recently  reached  Paris  of  a  serious  disaster  to 
the  French  arms  in  Germany.  But  while  the  Directors 
counselled  prudence,  Bonaparte  forced  their  hand  by  de- 
claring the  Duchy  of  Modena  to  be  under  the  protection 
of  France  ;  and  when  their  discreet  missive  reached  him, 
he  expressed  to  them  his  regret  that  it  had  come  too  late. 
By  that  time  (October  24th)  he  had  virtually  founded  a 
new  State,  for  whose  security  French  honour  was  deeply 
pledged.  This  implied  the  continuance  of  the  French 
occupation  of  Northern  Italy  and  therefore  a  prolongation 
of  Bonaparte's  command. 

It  was  not  the  Duchy  of  Modena  alone  which  felt  the 
invigorating  influence  of  democracy  and  nationality.  The 
Papal  cities  of  Bologna  and  Ferrara  had  broken  away 
from  the  Papal  sway,  and  now  sent  deputies  to  meet  the 
champions  of  liberty  at  Modena  and  found  a  free  com- 
monwealth. There  amidst  great  enthusiasm  was  held 
the  first  truly  representative  Italian  assembly  that  had 
met  for  many  generations ;  and  a  levy  of  2,800  volun- 
teers, styled  the  Italian  legion,  was  decreed.  Bonaparte 
visited  these  towns,  stimulated  their  energy,  and  bade 
the  turbulent  beware  of  his  vengeance,  which  would  be 
like  that  of  "the  exterminating  angel."  In  a  brief  space 
these  districts  were  formed  into  the  Cispadane  Republic, 
destined  soon  to  be  merged  into  a  yet  larger  creation.  A 
new  life  breathed  from  Modena  and  Bologna  into  Central 
Italy.  The  young  republic  forthwith  abolished  all  feudal 
laws,  decreed  civic  equality,  and  ordered  the  convocation 
at  Bologna  of  a  popularly  elected  Assembly  for  the  Christ- 
mas following.  These  events  mark  the  first  stage  in  the 
beginning  of  that  grand  movement,  II  Risorgimento,  which 
after  long  delays  was  finally  consummated  in  18T<». 

This  period  of  Bonaparte's  career  may  well  be  lingered 


110  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

over  by  those  who  value  his  invigorating  influence  on 
Italian  life  more  highly  than  his  military  triumphs.     At 
this  epoch  he  was  still  the  champion  of   the  best  prin- 
ciples of   the  Revolution;    he  had  overthrown  Austrian 
domination  in  the  peninsula,  and   had   shaken    to  their 
base  domestic  tyrannies  worse  than  that  of   the  Haps- 
burgs.     His  triumphs  were  as  yet  untarnished.      If   we 
except  the  plundering  of   the   liberated   and  conquered 
lands,  an  act  for  which  the  Directory  was  primarily  re- 
sponsible, nothing  was  at  this  time  lacking  to  the  full 
orb  of  his  glory.     An  envoy  bore  him  the  welcome  news 
that  the  English,  wearied   by  the  intractable   Corsicans, 
had  evacuated  the  island  of  his  birth ;  and  he  forthwith 
arranged  for  the  return  of   many  of  the  exiles  who  had 
been  faithful  to  the  French  Republic.     Among  these  was 
Salicetti,  who  now  returned  for  a  time  to  his  old  insular 
sphere ;  while  his  former  protege  was  winning  a  world- 
wide fame.     Then,  turning  to  the  affairs  of  Central  Italy, 
the  young  commander  showed  his  diplomatic  talents  to  be 
not  a  whit  inferior  to  his  genius  for  war.     One  instance 
of  this  must  here  suffice.    He  besought  the  Pope,  who  had 
broken  off  the  lingering  negotiations  with  France,  not  to 
bring  on  his  people  the  horrors  of  war.1     The  beauty  of 
this  appeal,  as  also  of  a  somewhat  earlier  appeal  to  the  Em- 
peror Francis  at  Vienna,  is,  however,  considerably  marred 
by  other  items  which  now  stand  revealed  in  Bonaparte's 
instructive  correspondence.     After  hearing  of  the  French 
defeats  in  Germany,  he  knew  that  the  Directors  could  spare 
him  very  few  of  the  25,000  troops  whom  he  demanded  as 
reinforcements.     He  was   also  aware  that  the  Pope,  in- 
censed at  his  recent  losses  in  money  and  lands,  was  seek- 
ing to  revivify  the  First  Coalition.     The  pacific  precepts 
addressed  by  the   young    Corsican    to  the  Papacy  must 
therefore   be    viewed   in    the    light   of   merely   mundane 
events  and  of  his  secret  advice  to   the  French  agent  at 
Rome :  "  The  great  thing  is  to  gain  time.   .   .   .     Finally, 
the  game  really  is  for  us  to  throw  the  ball  from  one  to 
the  other,  so  as  to  deceive  this  old  fox."2 

i  "Corresp.,"  October  21st.  1796. 

2  "Corresp  "  October  24th,  1796.  The  same  policy  was  employed 
towards  Genoa.  This  republic  was  to  be  lulled  into  security  until  it 
could  easily  be  overthrown  or  absorbed. 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  111 

From  these  diplomatic  amenities  the  'general  was 
forced  to  turn  to  the  hazards  of  war.  Gauging  Bona- 
parte's missive  at  its  true  worth,  the  Emperor  determined 
to  re-conquer  Italy,  an  enterprise  that  seemed  well  within 
his  powers.  In  the  month  of  October  victory  had 
crowned  the  efforts  of  his  troops  in  Germany.  At 
Wurzburg  the  Archduke  Charles  had  completely  beaten 
Jourdan,  and  had  thrown  both  his  army  and  that  of 
Moreau  back  on  the  Rhine.  Animated  by  reviving 
hopes,  the  Imperialists  now  assembled  some  60,000  strong. 
Alvintzy,  a  veteran  of  sixty  years,  renowned  for  his 
bravery,  but  possessing  little  strategic  ability,  was  in 
command  of  some  35,000  men  in  the  district  of  Friuli, 
north  of  Trieste,  covering  that  seaport  from  a  threatened 
French  attack.  With  this  large  force  he  was  to  advance 
due  west,  towards  the  River  Brenta,  while  Davidovich, 
marching  through  Tyrol  by  the  valley  of  the  Adige,  was 
to  meet  him  with  the  remainder  near  Verona.  As  Jomini 
has  observed,  the  Austrians  gave  themselves  infinite 
trouble  and  encountered  grave  risks  in  order  to  compass  a 
junction  of  forces  which  they  might  quietly  have  effected 
at  the  outset.  Despite  all  Bonaparte's  lessons,  the  Aulic 
Council  still  clung  to  its  old  plan  of  enveloping  the  foe 
and  seeking  to  bewilder  them  by  attacks  delivered  from 
different  sides.  Possibly  also  they  were  emboldened  by 
the  comparative  smallness  of  Bonaparte's  numbers  to 
repeat  this  hazardous  manoeuvre.  The  French  could 
muster  little  more  than  40,000  men  ;  and  of  these  at  least 
8,000  were  needed  opposite  Mantua. 

At  first  the  Imperialists  gained  important  successes  ; 
for  though  the  French  held  their  own  on  the  Brenta,  yet 
their  forces  in  the  Tyrol  were  driven  down  the  valley  of 
the  Adige  with  losses  so  considerable  that  Bonaparte 
was  constrained  to  order  a  general  retreat  on  Verona. 
He  discerned  that  from  this  central  position  he  could 
hold  in  check  Alvintzy's  troops  marching  westwards  from 
Vicenza  and  prevent  their  junction  with  the  Imperialists 
under  Davidovich,  who  were  striving  to  thrust  Vaubois' 
division  from  the  plateau  of  Rivoli. 

But  before  offering  battle  to  Alvintzy  outside  Verca? 
Bonaparte  paid  a  flying  visit  to  his  men  posted  on  that 


112  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

plateau  in  order  to  rebuke  the  wavering  and  animate  the 
whole  body  with  his  own  dauntless  spirit.  Forming  the 
troops  around  him,  he  addressed  two  regiments  in  tones 
of  grief  and  anger.  He  reproached  them  for  abandoning 
strong  positions  in  a  panic,  and  ordered  his  chief  staff 
officer  to  inscribe  on  their  colours  the  ominous  words  : 
"They  are  no  longer  of  the  Army  of  Italy."1  Stung  by 
this  reproach,  the  men  begged  with  sobs  that  the  general 
would  test  their  valour  before  disgracing  them  for  ever. 
The  young  commander,  who  must  have  counted  on  such 
a  result  to  his  words,  when  uttered  to  French  soldiers, 
thereupon  promised  to  listen  to  their  appeals  ;  and  their 
bravery  in  the  ensuing  fights  wiped  every  stain  of  dis- 
grace from  their  colours.  By  such  acts  as  these  did  he 
nerve  his  men  against  superior  numbers  and  adverse 
fortune. 

Their  fortitude  was  to  be  severely  tried  at  all  points. 
Alvintzy  occupied  a  strong  position  on  a  line  of  hills  at 
Caldiero,  a  few  miles  to  the  east  of  Verona.  His  right 
wing  was  protected  by  the  spurs  of  the  Tyrolese  Alps, 
while  his  left  was  flanked  by  the  marshes  which  stretch 
between  the  rivers  Alpon  and  Adige  ;  and  he  protected 
his  front  by  cannon  skilfully  ranged  along  the  hills.  All 
the  bravery  of  Massena's  troops  failed  to  dislodge  the 
right  wing  of  the  Imperialists.  The  French  centre  was 
torn  by  the  Austrian  cannon  and  musketry.  A  pitiless 
storm  of  rain  and  sleet  hindered  the  advance  of  the  French 
guns  and  unsteadied  the  aim  of  the  gunners ;  and  finally 
they  withdrew  into  Verona,  leaving  behind  2,000  killed 
and  wounded,  and  750  prisoners  (November  12th).  This 
defeat  at  Caldiero  —  for  it  is  idle  to  speak  of  it  merely  as 
a  check  —  opened  up  a  gloomy  vista  of  disasters  for  the 
French ;  and  Bonaparte,  though  he  disguised  his  fears 
before  his  staff  and  the  soldierv,  forthwith  wrote  to  the 
Directors  that  the  army  felt  itself  abandoned  at  the  fur- 
ther end  of  Italy,  and  that  this  fair  conquest  seemed  about 
to  be  lost.  With  his  usual  device  of  under-rating  his  own 
forces  and  exaggerating  those  of  his  foes,  he  stated  that 
the  French  both  at  Verona  and  Rivoli  were  only  18,000, 
while  the  grand  total  of  the  Imperialists  was  upwards  of 

1  "  Ordre  du  Jour,"  November  7th,  1796. 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOIl   MANTUA  113 

50,000.  But  he  must  have  known  that  for  the  present  he 
had  to  deal  with  rather  less  than  half  that  number.  The 
greater  part  of  the  Tyrolese  force  had  not  as  yet  descended 
the  Adige  below  Roveredo  ;  and  allowing  for  detachments 
and  losses,  Alvintzy's  array  at  Caldiero  barely  exceeded 
20,000  effectives. 

Bonaparte  now  determined  to  hazard  one  of  the  most 
daring  turning  movements  which  history  records.  It  was 
necessary  at  all  costs  to  drive  Alvintzy  from  the  heights 
of  Caldiero  before  the  Tyrolese  columns  should  over- 
power Vaubois'  detachment  at  Rivoli  and  debouch  in  the 
plains  west  of  Verona.  But,  as  Caldiero  could  not  be 
taken  by  a  front  attack,  it  must  be  turned  by  a  flanking 
movement.  To  any  other  general  than  Bonaparte  this 
would  have  appeared  hopeless  ;  but  where  others  saw 
nothing  but  difficulties,  his  eye  discerned  a  means  of 
safety.  South  and  south-east  of  those  hills  lies  a  vast  de- 
pression swamped  by  the  flood  waters  of  the  Alpon  and  the 
Adige.  Morasses  stretch  for  some  miles  west  of  the  vil- 
lage of  Areola,  through  which  runs  a  road  up  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  Alpon,  crossing  that  stream  at  the  aforenamed 
village  and  leading  to  the  banks  of  the  Adige  opposite  the 
village  of  Ronco;  another  causeway,  diverging  from  the 
former  a  little  to  the  north  of  Ronco,  leads  in  a  north- 
westerly direction  towards  Porcil.  By  advancing  from 
Ronco  along  these  causeways,  and  by  seizing  Areola,  Bona- 
parte designed  to  outflank  the  Austrians  and  tempt  them 
into  an  arena  where  the  personal  prowess  of  the  French 
veterans  would  have  ample  scope,  and  where  numbers 
would  be  of  secondary  importance.  Only  heads  of  col- 
umns could  come  into  direct  contact ;  and  the  formidable 
Austrian  cavalry  could  not  display  its  usual  prowess.  On 
these  facts  Bonaparte  counted  as  a  set-off  to  his  slight 
inferiority  in  numbers. 

In  the  dead  of  night  the  divisions  of  Augereau  and 
Massena  retired  through  Verona.  Officers  and  soldiers 
were  alike  deeply  discouraged  by  this  movement,  which 
seemed  to  presage  a  retreat  towards  the  Mincio  and  the 
abandonment  of  Lombardy.  To  their  surprise,  when 
outside  the  gate  they  received  the  order  to  turn  to  the 
left  down  the  western  bank  of  the  Adige.     At  Ronco  the 


114 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


mystery  was  solved.     A  bridge  of  boats  had  there  been 
thrown   across   the    Adige  ;    and,    crossing   this    without 
opposition,  Augereau's  troops  rapidly  advanced  along  the 
causeway  leading  to  Areola  and   menaced  the  Austrian 
rear,   while   Massena's   column  defiled  north-west,  so  as 
directly  to  threaten  his  flank  at  Caldiero.     The  surprise, 
however,  was  by  no  means  complete  ;  for  Alvintzy  him- 
self purposed  to  cross  the  Adige  at  Zevio,  so  as  to  make 
a  dash  on  Mantua,  and  in  order  to  protect  his  flank  he  had 
sent  a  detachment  of  Croats  to  hold  Areola.     These  now 
stoutly  disputed  Augereau's  progress,  pouring  m  from  the 
loopholed  cottages  volleys  which  tore  away  the  front  ot 
every  column  of  attack.     In  vain  did  Augereau,  seizing 
the  colours,  lead  his  foremost  regiment  to  the  bridge  ot 
Areola.     Riddled  by  the  musketry,  his  men  fell  back  m 
disorder      In   vain  did  Bonaparte  himself,    dismounting 
from  his  charger,  seize  a  flag,  rally  these  veterans  and  lead 
them  towards  the  bridge.     The  Croats,  constantly  rein- 
forced, poured  in  so  deadly  a  fire  as  to  check  the  advance: 
Muiron,    Marmont,  and   a  handful   of   gallant   men  still 
pressed  on,  thereby  screening  the  body  of  their  chief  ;  but 
Muiron  fell  dead,  and  another  officer,  seizing  Bonaparte, 
sought  to  drag  him  back  from  certain  death.     The  column 
wavered  under  the  bullets,  fell  back  to  the  further  side  of 
the  causeway,  and  in  the  confusion  the  commander  tell 
into  the  deep  dyke  at  the  side.     Agonized  at  the  sight, 
the  French  rallied,  while  Marmont  and  Louis  Bonaparte 
rescued  their  beloved  chief  from  capture  or  from  a  miry 
death,  and  he  retired  to  Ronco,  soon  followed  by  the  wea- 
ried  troops.1     This  memorable   first   day  of   fighting   at 
Areola  (November  15th)  closed  on  the  strange  scene  ot 
two  armies  encamped  on  dykes,  exhausted  by  an  almost 
amphibious  conflict,  like  that  waged  by  the  Dutch  "Beg- 

iMarmont,  "  Memoires,"  vol.  i.,  p.  237.  I  have  followed  Marraont's 
narrative,  as  that  of  the  chief  actor  in  this  strange  scene  It  is  less  dra- 
matic than  the  usual  account,  as  found  in  Thiers,  and  therefore  is  more 
probable.  The  incident  illustrates  the  folly  of  a  commander  doing  the 
work  of  a  sergeant.  Marmont  points  out  that  the  best  tactics  would  have 
been  to  send  one  division  to  cross  the  Adige  at  Albaredo,  and I  so  take 
Areola  in  the  rear.  Thiers'  criticism,  that  this  would  have  involved  too 
sreat  a  diffusion  of  the  French  line,  is  refuted  by  the  fact  that  on i  the 
third  day  a  move  on  that  side  induced  the  Austnans  to  evacuate  Areola. 


VI 


THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA 


115 


gars  "  in  their  war  of  liberation  against  Spain.  Though 
at  Areola  the  republicans  had  been  severely  checked,  yet 
further  west  Massena  had  held  his  own ;  and  the  French 
movement  as  a  whole  had  compelled  Alvintzy  to  suspend 
any  advance  on  Verona  or  on  Mantua,  to  come  down  from 


Sfun/vrds  Gayraph-  Estub'  London 

Plan  to  illustrate  the  Victory  of  Arcola. 


the  heights  of  Caldiero,  and  to  fight  on  ground  where  his 
superior  numbers  were  of  little  avail.  This  was  seen  on 
the  second  day  of  fighting  on  the  dykes  opposite  Arcola, 
which  was,  on  the  whole,  favourable  to  the  smaller  veteran 
force.     On  the  third  day  Bonaparte  employed  a  skilful 


116 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


ruse  to  add  to  the  discouragement  of  his  foes.  He  posted 
a  small  body  of  horsemen  behind  a  spinney  near  the  Aus- 
trian flank,  with  orders  to  sound  their  trumpets  as  if  for  a 
great  cavalry  charge.  Alarmed  by  the  noise  and  by  the 
appearance  of  French  troops  from  the  side  of  Legnago  and 
behind  Areola,  the  demoralized  white-coats  suddenly  gave 
way  and  retreated  for  Vicenza. 

Victory  again  declared  for  the  troops  who  could  dare 
the  longest,  and  whose  general  was  never  at  a  loss  in  face 
of  any  definite  danger.     Both  armies  suffered  severely  in 
these  desperate  conflicts ; 1  but,  while  the  Austrians  felt 
that  the  cup  of  victory  had  been  snatched  from  their  very 
lips,  the  French  soldiery  were  dazzled  by  this  transcendent 
exploit  of  their  chief.     They  extolled  his  bravery,  which 
almost  vied  with  the  fabulous  achievement  of   Horatius 
Codes,  and  adored  the  genius  which  saw  safety  and  vic- 
tory for  his  discouraged  army  amidst  swamps  and  dykes. 
Bonaparte  himself,  with  that  strange  mingling  of  the  prac- 
tical and  the  superstitious  which  forms  the  charm  of  his 
character,  ever  afterwards  dated  the  dawn  of  his  fortune 
in  its  full  splendour  from  those  hours  of  supreme  crisis 
among  the  morasses  of  Areola.    But  we  may  doubt  whether 
this  posing  as  the  favourite  of  fortune  was  not  the  result 
of  his  profound  knowledge  of  the  credulity  of  the  vulgar 
herd,  which  admires  genius  and  worships  bravery,  but 
grovels  before  persistent  good  luck. 

'  Though  it  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  skill  and  bravery 
of  the  French  leader  and  his  troops,  the  failure  of  his  op- 
ponents is  inexplicable  but  for  the  fact  that  most  of  their 
troops  were  unable  to  manoeuvre  steadily  in  the  open,  that 
Alvintzy  was  inexperienced  as  a  commander-in-chief,  and 
was  hampered  throughout  by  a  bad  plan  of  campaign. 
Meanwhile  the  other  Austrian  army,  led  by  Davidovich, 
had  driven  Vaubois  from  his  position  at  Rivoli ;  and  had 
the  Imperialist  generals  kept  one  another  informed  of  their 
moves,  or  had  Alvintzy,  disregarding  a  blare  of  trumpets 
and  a  demonstration  on  his  flank  and  rear,  clung  to  Areola 

i  Koch,  "  Memoires  de  Massena,"  vol.  i.,  p.  255,  in  his  very  complete 
account  of  the  battle,  gives  the  enemy's  losses  as  upwards  of  2,000  killed 
or  wounded,  and  4,000  prisoners  with  11  cannon  Thiers  gives  40,000  as 
Alvintzy' s  force  before  the  battle  —  an  impossible  number,     bee,  ante. 


ti  THE   FIGHTS  FOR   MANTUA  117 

for  two  days  longer,  the  French  would  have  been  nipped 
between  superior  forces.  But,  as  it  was,  the  lack  of  accord 
in  the  Austrian  movements  nearly  ruined  the  Tyrolese 
wing,  which  pushed  on  triumphantly  towards  Verona, 
while  Alvintzy  was  retreating  eastwards.  Warned  just 
in  time,  Davidovich  hastily  retreated  to  Roveredo,  leav- 
ing a  whole  battalion  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  To 
crown  this  chapter  of  blunders,  Wurrnser,  whose  sortie 
after  Caldiero  might  have  been  most  effective,  tardily 
essayed  to  break  through  the  blockaders,  when  both  his 
colleagues  were  in  retreat.  How  different  were  these  ill- 
assorted  moves  from  those  of  Bonaparte.  His  maxims 
throughout  this  campaign,  and  his  whole  military  career, 
were :  (1)  divide  for  foraging,  concentrate  for  fighting ; 
(2)  unity  of  command  is  essential  for  success ;  (3)  time  is 
everything.  This  firm  grasp  of  the  essentials  of  modern 
warfare  insured  his  triumph  over  enemies  who  trusted  to 
obsolete  methods  for  the  defence  of  antiquated  polities.1 
The  battle  of  Areola  had  an  important  influence  on  the 
fate  of  Italy  and  Europe.  In  the  peninsula  all  the  ele- 
ments hostile  to  the  republicans  were  preparing  for  an 
explosion  in  their  rear  which  should  reaffirm  the  old  say- 
ing that  Italy  was  the  tomb  of  the  French.  Naples  had 
signed  terms  of  peace  with  them,  it  is  true  ;  but  the  natural 
animosity  of  the  Vatican  against  its  despoilers  could  easily 
have  leagued  the  south  of  Italy  with  the  other  States  that 
were  working  secretly  for  their  expulsion.  While  the  Aus- 
trians  were  victoriously  advancing,  these  aims  were  almost 
openly  avowed,  and  at  the  close  of  the  year  1796  Bona- 
parte moved  south  to  Bologna  in  order  to  guide  the  Italian 
patriots  in  their  deliberations  and  menace  the  Pope  with 
an  invasion  of  the  Roman  States.  From  this  the  Pontiff 
was  for  the  present  saved  by  new  efforts  on  the  part  of 
Austria.  But  before  describing  the  final  attempt  of  the 
Hapsburgs  to  wrest  Italy  from  their  able  adversary,  it  will 
be  well  to  notice  his  growing  ascendancy  in  diplomatic 
affairs. 

1  The  Austrian  official  figures  for  the  loss  in  the  three  days  at  Areola 
give  2,046  killed  and  wounded,  4,090  prisoners,  and  11  cannon.  Napoleon 
put  it  down  as  13,000  in  all!  See  Schels  in  "Oust.  Milit.  Zeitschrift " 
for  1829. 


118  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

While  Bonaparte  was  struggling  in  the  marshes  of  Areola, 
the  Directory  was  on  the  point  of  sending  to  Vienna  an 
envoy,  General  Clarke,  with  proposals  for  an  armistice  pre- 
liminary to  negotiations  for. peace  with  Austria.    This  step 
was  taken,  because  France  was  distracted  by  open  revolt 
in  the  south,  by  general  discontent  in  the  west,  and  by 
the  retreat  of  her  Rhenish  armies,  now  flung  back  on  the 
soil  of  the  Republic  by  the  Austrian  Archduke  Charles. 
Unable  to  support  large  forces  in  the  east  of  France  out 
of  its  bankrupt  exchequer,  the  Directory  desired  to  be 
informed  of  the  state  of  feeling  at  Vienna.     It  therefore 
sent  Clarke  with  offers,  which  might  enable  him  to  look 
into  the  political  and  military  situation  at  the  enemy's 
capital,  and  see  whether  peace  could  not  be  gained  at  the 
price  of  some  of  Bonaparte's  conquests.     The  envoy  was 
an   elegant  and  ambitious  young   man,  descended   from 
an  Irish  family  long  settled  in  France,  who  had  recently 
gained  Carnot's  favour,  and  now  desired  to  show  his  dip- 
lomatic skill  by  subjecting  Bonaparte  to  the  present  aims 
of  the  Directory. 

The  Directors'  secret  instructions  reveal  the  plans  which 
they  then  harboured  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  Conti- 
nent. Having  arranged  an  armistice  which  should  last 
up  to  the  end  of  the  next  spring,  Clarke  was  to  set  forth 
arrangements  which  might  suit  the  House  of  Hapsburg. 
He  might  discuss  the  restitution  of  all  their  possessions  in 
Italy,  and  the  acquisition  of  the  Bishopric  of  Salzburg 
and  other  smaller  German  and  Swabian  territories  :  or, 
if  she  did  not  recover  the  Milanese,  Austria  might  gain 
the  northern  parts  of  the  Papal  States  as  compensation  ; 
and  the  Duke  of  Tuscany  — a  Hapsburg  —  might  reign 
at  Rome,  yielding  up  his  duchy  to  the  Duke  of  Parma ; 
while,  as  this  last  potentate  was  a  Spanish  Bourbon, 
France  might  for  her  good  offices  to  this  House  gain 
largely  from  Spain  in  America.1  In  these  and  other  pro- 
posals two  methods  of  bargaining  are  everywhere  promi- 
nent. The  great  States  are  in  every  case  to  gain  at  the 
expense  of  their  weaker  neighbours  ;  Austria  is  to  be 
appeased  ;    and  France  is  to   reap  enormous  gains   ulti- 

i  A  forecast  of  the  plan  realized  in  1801-2,  whereby  Bonaparte  gained 
Louisiana  for  a  time. 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  110 

mately  at  the  expense  of  smaller  Germanic  or  Italian 
(States.  These  facts  should  clearly  be  noted.  Napoleon 
was  afterwards  deservedly  blamed  for  carrying  out  these 
unprincipled  methods  ;  but,  at  the  worst,  he  only  devel- 
oped them  from  those  of  the  Directors,  who,  with  the  cant 
of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity  on  their  lips,  battened 
on  the  plunder  of  the  liberated  lands,  and  cynically  pro- 
posed to  share  the  spoil  of  weaker  States  with  the  poten- 
tates against  whom  they  publicly  declaimed  as  t}-rants. 

The  chief  aim  of  these  negotiations,  so  Clarke  was 
assured,  was  to  convince  the  Court  of  Vienna  that  it 
would  get  better  terms  by  treating  with  France  directly 
and  alone,  rather  than  by  joining  in  the  negotiations 
which  had  recently  been  opened  at  Paris  b}*  England. 
But  the  Viennese  Ministers  refused  to  allow  Clarke  to 
proceed  to  their  capital,  and  appointed  Vicenza  as  the 
seat  of  the  deliberations. 

They  were  brief.  Through  the  complex  web  of  civilian 
intrigue,  Bonaparte  forthwith  thrust  the  mailed  hand  of 
the  warrior.  He  had  little  difficulty  in  proving  to  Clarke 
that  the  situation  was  materially  altered  by  the  battle  of 
Areola.  The  fall  of  Mantua  was  now  only  a  matter  of 
weeks.  To  allow  its  provisions  to  be  replenished  for  the 
term  of  the  armistice  was  an  act  that  no  successful  gen- 
eral could  tolerate.  For  that  fortress  the  whole  campaign 
had  been  waged,  and  three  Austrian  armies  had  been 
hurled  back  into  Tyrol  and  Friuli.  Was  it  now  to  be 
provisioned,  in  order  that  the  Directory  might  barter 
away  the  Cispadane  Republic  ?  He  speedily  convinced 
Clarke  of  the  fatuity  of  the  Directors'  proposals.  He 
imbued  him  with  his  own  contempt  for  an  armistice  that 
would  rob  the  victors  of  their  prize  ;  and,  as  the  Court  of 
Vienna  still  indulged  hopes  of  success  in  Italy,  Clarke's 
negotiations  at  Vicenza  came  to  a  speedy  conclusion. 

In  another  important  matter  the  Directory  also  com- 
pletely failed.  Nervous  as  to  Bonaparte's  ambition,  it 
had  secretly  ordered  Clarke  to  wateh  his  conduct  and 
report  privately  to  Paris.  ,  Whether  warned  by  a  friend 
at  Court,  or  forearmed  by  his  own  sagacity,  Bonaparte 
knew  of  this,  and  in  his  intercourse  with  Clarke  deftly 
let  the  fact  be  seen.     He  quickly  gauged  Clarke's  powers, 


120 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


and  the  aim  of  his  mission.  "  He  is  a  spy,  he  remarked 
a  little  later  to  Miot,  "  whom  the  Directory  have  set  upon 
me  :  he  is  a  man  of  no  talent— only  conceited.  lne 
splendour  of  his  achievements  and  the  mingled  grace  and 
authority  of  his  demeanour  so  imposed  on  the  envoy  that 
he  speedily  fell  under  the  influence  of  the  very  man  whom 
he  was  to  watch,  and  became  his  enthusiastic  adherent. 

Bonaparte  was  at  Bologna,  supervising  the   affairs   of 
the  Cispadane  Republic,  when  he  heard  that  the  Austnans 
were  making  a  last  effort  for  the  relief  of  Mantua.     An- 
other plan  had  been  drawn  up  by  the  Aulic  Council  at 
Vienna.      Alvintzy,    after   recruiting  his   wearied    force 
at  Bassano,  was  quickly  to  join  the  T^^°™£ 
Roveredo,  thereby  forming  an  army  of  28,000  men  where 
with  to  force  the  position  of  Rivoli  and  drive  the  French 
in  on  Mantua  :  9,000   Imperialists  under   Provera   were 
also  to  advance  from  the  Brenta  upon  Legnago,  in  order 
to  withdraw  the  attention  of  the   French  from  the  real 
attempt  made  by  the  valley  of  the  Adige  ;  .^10,000 
others  at  Bassano  and  elsewhere  were  to  assail  the  French 
front  at  different  points  and  hinder  their  concentration. 
It  will  be  observed  that  the  errors  of  July  and  November, 
1796,  were  now  yet  a  third  time  to  be  committed:    the 
forces  destined  merely  to  make  diversions  were  so  strength- 
ened as  not  to  be  merely  light  bodies  distracting  the  aim 
of  the  French,  while  Alvintzy's  main  force  was  thereby 
so  weakened  as  to  lack  the  impact  necessary  for  victory. 

Nevertheless,  the  Imperialists  at  first  threw  back  their 
foes  with  some  losses  ;  and  Bonaparte,  hurrying  north- 
wards to  Verona,  was  for  some  hours  in  a  fever  of  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  movements  and  strength  of  the  assailants. 
Late  at  night  on  January  14th  he  knew  that  Provera  s 
advance  was  little  more  than  a  demonstration,  and  that 
the  real  blow  would  fall  on  the  10,000  men  marshalled 
by  Joubert  at  Monte  Baldo  and  Rivoli.  Forthwith  he 
rode  to  the  latter  place,  and  changed  retreat  and  discour- 
agement into  a  vigorous  offensive  by  the  news  that  13,000 
more  men  were  on  the  march  to  defend  the  strong  position 

'  Thl Vreat  defensive  strength  of  this  plateau  had  from 
the  first  attracted  his  attention.     There  the  Adige  in  a 


71  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  121 

sharp  bend  westward  approaches  within  six  miles  of  Lake 
Garda.  There,  too,  the  mountains,  which  hem  in  the  gorge 
of  the  river  on  its  right  bank,  bend  away  towards  the  lake 
and  leave  a  vast  natural  amphitheatre,  near  the  centre  of 
which  rises  the  irregular  plateau  that  commands  the  exit 
from  Tyrol.  Over  this  plateau  towers  on  the  north  Monte 
Baldo,  which,  near  the  river  gorge,  sends  out  southward  a 
sloping  ridge,  known  as  San  Marco,  connecting  it  with  the 
plateau.  At  the  foot  of  this  spur  is  the  summit  of  the  road 
which  leads  the  traveller  from  Trent  to  Verona ;  and,  as  he 
halts  at  the  top  of  the  zigzag,  near  the  village  of  Rivoli,  his 
eye  sweeps  over  the  winding  gorge  of  the  river  beneath, 
the  threatening  mass  of  Monte  Baldo  on  the  north,  and  on 
the  west  of  the  village  he  gazes  down  on  a  natural  depres- 
sion which  has  been  sharply  furrowed  by  a  torrent.  The 
least  experienced  eye  can  see  that  the  position  is  one  of 
great  strength.  It  is  a  veritable  parade  ground  among 
the  mountains,  almost  cut  off  from  them  by  the  ceaseless 
action  of  water,  and  destined  for  the  defence  of  the  plains 
of  Italy.  A  small  force  posted  at  the  head  of  the  winding 
roadway  can  hold  at  bay  an  army  toiling  up  from  the  valley ; 
but,  as  at  Thermopylae,  the  position  is  liable  to  be  outflanked 
by  an  enterprising  foe,  who  should  scale  the  footpath  lead- 
ing over  the  western  offshoots  of  Monte  Baldo,  and,  ford- 
ing the  stream  at  its  foot,  should  then  advance  eastwards 
against  the  village.  This,  in  part,  was  Alvintzy's  plan, 
and  having  nearly  28,000  men,1  he  doubted  not  that  his 
enveloping  tactics  must  capture  Joubert's  division  of 
10,000  men.  So  daunted  was  even  this  brave  general  by 
the  superior  force  of  his  foes  that  he  had  ordered  a  retreat 
southwards  when  an  aide-de-camp  arrived  at  full  gallop 
and  ordered  him  to  hold  Rivoli  at  all  costs.  Bonaparte's 
arrival  at  4  a.m.  explained  the  order,  and  an  attack  made 

1  Estimates  of  the  Austrian  force  differ  widely.  Bonaparte  guessed 
it  at  45,000,  which  is  accepted  by  Thiers  ;  Alison  says  40,000  ;  Thi^bault 
opines  that  it  was  75,000  ;  Marmont  gives  the  total  as  26,217.  The  Aus- 
trian official  figures  are  28,022  before,  the  fighting  north  of  Monte  Baldo. 
See  my  article  in  the  "  Eng.  Hist.  Review"  for  April,  1890.  I  have 
largely  followed  the  despatches  of  Colonel  Graham,  who  was  present  at 
this  battle.  As  "J.  G."  points  out  (op.  cit.,  p.  237),  the  French  had 
1,500  horse  and  some  forty  cannon,  which  gave  them  a  great  advantage 
over  foes  who  could  make  no  effective  use  of  these  arms. 


122 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I 


CHAP. 


daring  the  darkness  wrested  from  the  Austrians  the  chapel 
on  the  San  Marco  ridge  which  stands  on  the  ridge  above 
the  zigzag  track.  The  reflection  of  the  Austrian  watch- 
fires  in  the  wintry  sky  showed  him  their  general  position. 
To  an  unskilled  observer  the  wide  sweep  of  the  glare 
portended  ruin  for  the  French.  To  the  eye  of  Bonaparte 
the  sight  brought  hope.  It  proved  that  his  foes  were 
still  bent  on  their  old  plan  of  enveloping  him  :  and  from 


Neighbourhood  of  Rivoli. 


information  which  he  treacherously  received  from  Al- 
vintzy's  staff  he  must  have  known  that  that  commander 
had  far  fewer  than  the  45,000  men  which  he  ascribed  to 
him  in  bulletins. 

Yet  the  full  dawn  of  that  January  day  saw  the  Imperi- 
alists flushed  with  success,  as  their  six  separate  columns 
drove  in  the  French  outposts  and  moved  towards  Rivoli. 
Of  these,  one  was  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Adige  and 
merely  cannonaded  across  the  valley  :  another  column 
wound  painfully  with  most  of  the  artillery  and  cavalry 


rx  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  123 

along  the  western  bank,  making  for  the  village  of  Incanale 
and  the  foot  of  the  zigzag  leading  up  to  Rivoli  :  three 
others  defiled  over  Monte  Baldo  by  difficult  paths  impas- 
sable to  cannon  :  while  the  sixth  and  westernmost  column, 
winding  along  the  ridge  near  Lake  Garda,  likewise  lacked 
the  power  which  field-guns  and  horsemen  would  have 
added  to  its  important  turning  movement.  Never  have 
natural  obstacles  told  more  potently  on  the  fortunes  of 
war  than  at  Rivoli  ;  for  on  the  side  where  the  assailants 
most  needed  horses  and  guns  they  could  not  be  used ; 
while  on  the  eastern  edge  of  their  broken  front  their  can- 
non and  horse,  crowded  together  in  the  valley  of  the 
Adige,  had  to  climb  the  winding  road  under  the  plunging 
fire  of  the  French  infantry  and  artillery.  Nevertheless, 
such  was  the  ardour  of  the  Austrian  attack,  that  the  tide  of 
battle  at  first  set  strongly  in  their  favour.  Driving  the 
French  from  the  San  Marco  ridge  and  pressing  their  cen- 
tre hard  between  Monte  Baldo  and  Rivoli,  they  made  it 
possible  for  their  troops  in  the  valley  to  struggle  on 
towards  the  foot  of  the  zigzag  ;  and  on  the  west  their 
distant  right  wing  was  already  beginning  to  threaten  the 
French  rear.  Despite  the  arrival  of  Massena's  troops 
from  Verona  about  9  A.M.,  the  republicans  showed  signs 
of  unsteadiness.  Joubert  on  the  ground  above  the  Adige, 
Berthier  in  the  centre,  and  Massena  on  the  left,  were 
gradually  forced  back.  An  Austrian  column,  advancing 
from  the  side  of  Monte  Baldo  by  the  narrow  ravine,  stole 
round  the  flank  of  a  French  regiment  in  front  of  Massena's 
division,  and  by  a  vigorous  charge  sent  it  flying  in  a  panic 
which  promised  to  spread  to  another  regiment  thus  un- 
covered. This  was  too  much  for  the  veteran,  already 
dubbed  "  the  spoilt  child  of  victory "  ;  he  rushed  to  its 
captain,  bitterly  upbraided  him  and  the  other  officers,  and 
finally  showered  blows  on  them  with  the  flat  of  his  sword. 
Then,  riding  at  full  speed  to  two  tried  regiments  of  his 
own  division,  he  ordered  them  to  check  the  foe ;  and  these 
invincible  heroes  promptly  drove  back  the  assailants. 
Even  so,  however,  the  valour  of  the  best  French  regiments 
and  the  skill  of  Massena,  Berthier,  and  Joubert  barely  suf- 
ficed to  hold  back  the  onstreaming  tide  of  white-coats 
opposite  Rivoli. 


i24  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Yet  even  at  this  crisis  the  commander,  confident  in  his 
central  position,  and  knowing  his  ability  to  ward  off  the 
encircling  swoops  of  the  Austrian  eagle,  maintained  that 
calm  demeanour  which  moved  the  wonder  of  smaller 
minds.  His  confidence  in  his  seasoned  troops  was  not 
misplaced.  The  Imperialists,  overburdened  by  long 
marches  and  faint  now  for  lack  of  food,  could  not  maintain 
their  first  advantage.  Some  of  their  foremost  troops,  that 
had  won  the  broken  ground  in  front  of  St.  Mark's  Chapel, 
were  suddenly  charged  by  French  horse  ;  they  fled  in 
panic,  crying  out,  "  French  cavalry  !  "  and  the  space  won 
was  speedily  abandoned  to  the  tricolour.  This  sudden 
rebuff  was  to  dash  all  their  hopes  of  victory ;  for  at  that 
crisis  of  the  day  the  chief  Austrian  column  of  nearly  8,000 
men  was  struggling  up  the  zigzag  ascent  leading  from  the 
valley  of  the  Adige  to  the  plateau,  in  the  fond  hope  that 
their  foes  were  by  this  time  driven  from  the  summit. 
Despite  the  terrible  fire  that  tore  their  flanks,  the  Im- 
perialists were  clutching  desperately  at  the  plateau,  when 
Bonaparte  put  forth  his  full  striking  power.  He  could 
now  assail  the  crowded  ranks  of  the  doomed  column  in 
front  and  on  both  flanks.  A  charge  of  Leclerc's  house 
and  of  Joubert's  infantry  crushed  its  head  ;  volleys  of 
cannon  and  musketry  from  the  plateau  tore  its  sides  ;  an 
ammunition  wagon  exploded  in  its  midst ;  and  the  great 
constrictor  forthwith  writhed  its  bleeding  coils  back  into 
the  valley,  where  it  lay  crushed  and  helpless  for  the"  rest 
of  the  fight. 

Animated  by  this  lightning  stroke  of  their  commander, 
the  French  turned  fiercely  towards  Monte  Baldo  and  drove 
back  their  opponents  into  the  depression  at  its  foot.  But 
already  at  their  rear  loud  shouts  warned  them  of  a  new 
danger.  The  western  detachment  of  the  Imperialists  had 
meanwhile  worked  round  their  rear,  and,  ignorant  of  the 
fate  of  their  comrades,  believed  that  Bonaparte's  army 
was  caught  in  a  trap.  The  eyes  of  all  the  French  staff 
officers  were  now  turned  anxiously  on  their  commander, 
who  quietly  remarked,  "  We  have  them  now."  He  knew, 
in  fact,  that  other  French  troops  marching  up  from  Verona 
would  take  these  new  foes  in  the  rear  ;  and  though  Junot 
and  his  horsemen  failed  to  cut  their  way  through  so  as  to 


n  THE  FIGHTS  FOR  MANTUA  125 

expedite  their  approach,  yet  speedily  a  French  regiment 
burst  through  the  encircling  line  and  joined  in  the  final 
attack  which  drove  these  last  assailants  from  the  heights 
south  of  Rivoli,  and  later  on  compelled  them  to  sur- 
render. 

Thus  closed  the  desperate  battle  of  Rivoli  (January 
14th).  Defects  in  the  Austrian  position  and  the  opportune 
arrival  of  French  reinforcements  served  to  turn  an  Aus- 
trian success  into  a  complete  rout.  Circumstances  which 
to  a  civilian  may  seem  singly  to  be  of  small  account  suf- 
ficed to  tilt  the  trembling  scales  of  warfare,  and  Alvintzy's 
army  now  reeled  helplessly  back  into  Tyrol  with  a  total 
loss  of  15,000  men  and  of  nearly  all  its  artillery  and  stores. 
Leaving  Joubert  to  pursue  it  towards  Trent,  Bonaparte 
now  flew  southwards  towards  Mantua,  whither  Provera 
had  cut  his  way.  Again  his  untiring  energy,  his  insatia- 
ble care  for  all  probable  contingencies,  reaped  a  success 
which  the  ignorant  may  charge  to  the  account  of  his  for- 
tune. Strengthening  Augereau's  division  by  light  troops,  he 
captured  the  whole  of  Provera's  army  at  La  Favorita,  near 
the  walls  of  Mantua  (January  16th).  The  natural  result 
of  these  two  dazzling  triumphs  was  the  fall  of  the  fortress 
for  which  the  Emperor  Francis  had  risked  and  lost  five 
armies.  Wurmser  surrendered  Mantua  on  February  2nd 
with  18,000  men  and  immense  supplies  of  arms  and  stores. 
The  close  of  this  wondrous  campaign  was  graced  by  an 
act  of  clemenc}'.  Generous  terms  were  accorded  to  the 
veteran  marshal,  whose  fidelity  to  blundering  councillors 
at  Vienna  had  thrown  up  in  brilliant  relief  the  prudence, 
audacity,  and  resourcefulness  of  the  young  war-god. 

It  was  now  time  to  chastise  the  Pope  for  his  support  of 
the  enemies  of  France.  The  Papalini  proved  to  be  con- 
temptible as  soldiers.  They  fled  before  the  republicans, 
and  a  military  promenade  brought  the  invaders  to  Ancona, 
and  then  inland  to  Tolentino,  where  Pius  VI.  sued  for 
peace.  The  resulting  treaty  signed  at  that  place  (Febru- 
ary 19th)  condemned  the  Holy  See  to  close  its  ports  to 
the  allies,  especially  to  the  English  ;  to  acknowledge  the 
acquisition  of  Avignon  by  France,  and  the  establishment 
of  the  Cispadane  Republic  at  Bologna,  Ferrara,  and  the 
surrounding   districts ;    to  pay  30,000,000  francs   to  the 


126  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

French  Government ;  and  to  surrender  one  hundred  works 
of  art  to  the  victorious  republicans. 

It   is    needless    to    describe    the    remaining   stages    in 
Bonaparte's  campaign  against  Austria.     Hitherto  he  had 
contended  against  fairly  good,  though  discontented  and 
discouraged  troops,  badly  led,  and  hampered  by  the  moun- 
tain barrier  which  separated  them  from  their  real  base  of 
operations.     In  the  last  part  of  the  war  he  fought  against 
troops  demoralized  by  an  almost  unbroken  chain  of  disas- 
ters.    The  Austrians  were  now  led  by  a  brave  and  intel- 
ligent general,  the  Archduke  Charles ;  but  he  was  hampered 
by  rigorous  instructions  from  Vienna,  by  senile  and  indo- 
lent generals,  by  the  indignation  or  despair  of  the  younger 
officers  at  the  official  favouritism  which  left  them  in  ob- 
scurity, and  by  the  apathy  of  soldiers  who  had  lost  heart. 
Neither  his  skill  nor  the  natural  strength  of  their  positions 
in  Friuli  and  Carinthia  could  avail  against  veterans  flushed 
with  victory  and  marshalled  with  unerring  sagacity.     The 
rest  of  the  war  only  served  to  emphasize  the  truth  of  Napo- 
leon's later  statement,  that  the  moral  element  constitutes 
three-fourths  of  an  army's  strength.     The  barriers  offered 
by  the  River   Tagliamento  and  the   many   commanding 
heights  of  the  Carnic  and  the  Noric  Alps  were  as  nothing 
to  the  triumphant  republicans  ;  and  from  the  heights  that 
guard   the   province    of   Styria,  the  genius  of  Napoleon 
flashed  as  a  terrifying  portent  to  the  Court  of  Vienna  and 
the  potentates  of  Central  Europe.     When  the  tricolour 
standards  were  nearing  the  town  of  Leoben,  the  Emperor 
Francis  sent  envoys  to  sue  for  peace ; 1  and  the  prelimi- 
naries signed  there,  within  one  hundred  miles  of  the  Aus- 
trian capital,  closed  the  campaign  which  a  year  previously 
had  opened  with  so  little  promise  for  the  French  on  the 
narrow  strip  of  land  between  the  Maritime  Alps  and  the 
petty  township  of  Savona. 

These  brilliant  results  were  due  primarily  to  the  con- 
summate leadership  of  Bonaparte.     His  geographical  in- 

1  This  was  doubtless  facilitated  by  the  death  of  the  Czarina,  Catherine 
II.,  in  December,  1796.  She  had  been  on  the  point  of  entering  the  Coali- 
tion against  France.  The  new  Czar  Paul  was  at  that  time  for  peace.  The 
Austrian  Minister  Thugut,  on  hearing  of  her  death,  exclaimed,  "This  is 
the  cliK.»x  of  our  disasters." 


vi  THE   FIGHTS   FOR   MANTUA  127 

stincts  discerned  the  means  of  profiting  by  natural  obstacles 
and  of  turning  them  when  they  seemed  to  screen  his  oppo- 
nents. Prompt  to  divine  their  plans,  he  bewildered  them 
by  the  audacity  of  his  combinations,  which  overbore  their 
columns  with  superior  force  at  the  very  time  when  he 
seemed  doomed  to  succumb.  Genius  so  commanding  had 
not  been  displayed  even  by  Frederick  or  Marlborough. 
And  yet  these  brilliant  results  could  not  have  been  achieved 
by  an  army  which  rarely  exceeded  45,000  men  without 
the  strenuous  bravery  and  tactical  skill  of  the  best  generals 
of  division,  Augereau,  Masscna,  and  Joubert,  as  well  as 
of  officers  who  had  shown  their  worth  in  many  a  doubtful 
fight  ;  Lannes,  the  hero  of  Lodi  and  Areola ;  Marmont, 
noted  for  his  daring  advance  of  the  guns  at  Castiglione  ; 
Victor,  who  justified  his  name  by  hard  fighting  at  La 
Favorita  ;  Murat,  the  beau  sabreur,  and  Junot,  both  dash- 
ing cavalry  generals  ;  and  many  more  whose  daring  earned 
them  a  soldier's  death  in  order  to  gain  glory  for  France 
and  liberty  for  Italy.  Still  less  ought  the  soldiery  to  be 
forgotten  ;  those  troops,  whose  tattered  uniforms  bespoke 
their  ceaseless  toils,  who  grumbled  at  the  frequent  lack  of 
bread,  but,  as  Massena  observed,  never  before  a  battle, 
who  even  in  retreat  never  doubted  the  genius  of  their 
chief,  and  fiercely  rallied  at  the  longed-for  sign  of  fighting. 
The  source  of  this  marvellous  energy  is  not  hard  to  dis- 
cover. Their  bravery  was  fed  by  that  wellspring  of  hope 
which  had  made  of  France  a  nation  of  free  men  determined 
to  free  the  millions  beyond  their  frontiers.  The  French 
columns  were  "  equality  on  the  march"  ;  and  the  soldiery, 
animated  by  this  grand  enthusiasm,  found  its  militant 
embodiment  in  the  great  captain  who  seemed  about  to 
liberate  Italy  and  Central  Europe. 


CHAPTER  VII 

LEOBEN  TO  CAMPO  FORMIO 

In  signing  the  preliminaries  of  peace  at  Leoben,  which 
formed  in  part  the  basis  for  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio, 
Bonaparte  appears  as  a  diplomatist  of  the  first  rank.  He 
had  already  signed  similar  articles  with  the  Court  of 
Turin  and  with  the  Vatican.  But  such  a  transaction  with 
the  Emperor  was  infinitely  more  important  than  with  the 
third-rate  powers  of  the  peninsula.  He  now  essays  his 
first  flight  to  the  highest  levels  of  international  diplomacy. 
In  truth,  his  mental  endowments,  like  those  of  many  of 
the  greatest  generals,  were  no  less  adapted  to  success  in 
the  council-chamber  than  on  the  field  of  battle  ;  for, 
indeed,  the  processes  of  thought  and  the  methods  of  action 
are  not  dissimilar  in  the  spheres  of  diplomacy  and  war. 
To  evade  obstacles  on  which  an  opponent  relies,  to  mul- 
tiply them  in  his  path,  to  bewilder  him  by  feints  before 
overwhelming  him  by  a  crushing  onset,  these  are  the  arts 
which  yield  success  either  to  the  negotiator  or  to  the 
commander. 

In  imposing  terms  of  peace  on  the  Emperor  at  Leoben 
(April  18th,  1797),  Bonaparte  reduced  the  Directory, 
and  its  envoy,  Clarke,  who  was  absent  in  Italy,  to  a  sub- 
ordinate role.  As  commander-in-chief,  he  had  power  only 
to  conclude  a  brief  armistice,  but  now  he  signed  the  pre- 
liminaries of  peace.  His  excuse  to  the  Directory  was 
ingenious.  While  admitting  the  irregularity  of  his  con- 
duct, he  pleaded  the  isolated  position  of  his  army,  and  the 
absence  of  Clarke,  and  that,  under  the  circumstances,  his 
act  had  been  merely  "a  military  operation."  He  could 
also  urge  that  he  had  in  his  rear  a  disaffected  Venetia, 
and  that  he  believed  the  French  armies  on  the  Rhine  to 
be  stationary  and  unable  to  cross  that  river.  But  the 
very  tardy  advent  of  Clarke  on  the  scene  strengthens  the 

128 


tti  LEOBEN   TO   CAMPO   FORMIO  129 

supposition  that  Bonaparte  was  at  the  time  by  no  means 
loth  to  figure  as  the  pacifier  of  the  Continent.  Had  he 
known  the  whole  truth,  namely,  that  the  French  were 
gaining  a  battle  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rhine  while  the 
terms  of  peace  were  being  signed  at  Leoben,  he  would 
most  certainly  have  broken  off  the  negotiations  and  have 
dictated  harsher  terms  at  the  gates  of  Vienna.  That  was 
the  vision  which  shone  before  his  eyes  three  years  pre- 
viously, when  he  sketched  to  his  friends  at  Nice  the  plan 
of  campaign,  beginning  at  Savona  and  ending  before  the 
Austrian  capital  ;  and  great  was  his  chagrin  at  hearing 
the  tidings  of  Moreau's  success  on  April  20th.  The  news 
reached  him  on  his  return  from  Leoben  to  Italy,  when  he 
was  detained  for  a  few  hours  by  a  sudden  flood  of  the 
River  Tagliamento.  At  once  he  determined  to  ride  back 
and  make  some  excuse  for  a  rupture  with  Austria ;  and 
only  the  persistent  remonstrances  of  Berthier  turned 
him  from  this  mad  resolve,  which  would  forthwith  have 
exhibited  him  to  the  world  as  estimating  more  highly  the 
youthful  promptings  of  destiny  than  the  honour  of  a 
French  negotiator. 

The  terms  which  he  had  granted  to  the  Emperor  were 
lenient  enough.  The  only  definitive  gain  to  France  was 
the  acquisition  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  (Belgium), 
for  which  troublesome  possession  the  Emperor  was  to 
have  compensation  elsewhere.  Nothing  absolutely  bind- 
ing was  said  about  the  left,  or  west,  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
except  that  Austria  recognized  the  "  constitutional  limits  " 
of  France,  but  reaffirmed  the  integrity  of  "The  Empire."1 
These  were  contradictory  statements  ;  for  France  had 
declared  the  Rhine  to  be  her  natural  boundary,  and  the 
old  "  Empire  "included  Belgium,  Treves,  and  Luxemburg. 
But,  for  the  interpretation  of  these  vague  formularies,  the 
following  secret  and  all-important  articles  were  appended. 
While  the  Emperor  renounced  that  part  of  his  Italian 
possessions  which  lay  to  the  west  of  the  Oglio,  he  was  to 
receive  all  the  mainland  territories  of  Venice  east  of  that 
river,  including  Dalmatia  and  Istria.  Venice  was  also  to 
cede  her  lands  west  of  the  Oglio  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment ;  and  in  return  for  these  sacrifices  she  was  to  gain 

1Huffer,  "Oesterreich  und  Preussen,"  p.  203. 

K 


13o  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the   three   legations  of  Romagna,    Ferrara,  and  Bologna 

the  very  lands  which  Bonaparte  had  recently  formed 

into  the  Cispadane  Republic  !  For  the  rest,  the  Emperor 
would  have  to  recognize  the  proposed  Republic  at  Milan, 
as  also  that  already  existing  at  Modena,  "  compensation  " 
being  somewhere  found  for  the  deposed  duke. 

From  the  correspondence  of  Thugut,  the  Austrian  Min- 
ister, it  appears  certain  that  Austria  herself  had  looked 
forward  to  the  partition  of  the  Venetian  mainland  terri- 
tories, and  this  was  the  scheme  which  Bonaparte  actually 
proposed  to  her  at  Leoben.     Still  more  extraordinary  was 
his  proposal  to  sacrifice,  ostensibly  to  Venice  but  ultimately 
to  Austria,  the  greater  part  of  the  Cispadane  Republic. 
It  is,  indeed,  inexplicable,  except  on  the  ground  that  his 
military  position  at  Leoben  was  more  brilliant  than  secure. 
His  uneasiness  about  this  article  of  the  preliminaries  is 
seen  in  his  letter  of  April  22nd  to  the  Directors,  which 
explains  that  the  preliminaries  need  not  count  for  much. 
But  most  extraordinary  of  all  was  his  procedure  concern- 
ing the  young  Lombard  Republic.     He  seems  quite  calmly 
to  have  discussed  its  retrocession  to  the  Austrians,  and  that, 
too,  after  he  had  encouraged  the  Milanese  to  found  a  re- 
public, and  had  declared  that  every  French  victory  was  "a 
line  of  the  constitutional  charter." 1    The  most  reasonable 
explanation  is  that  Bonaparte  over-estimated  the  military 
strength  of  Austria,  and  undervalued  the  energy  of  the 
men  of  Milan,  Modena,  and  Bologna,  of  whose  levies  he 
spoke  most  contemptuously.     Certain  it  is  that  he  desired 
to  disengage  himself  from  their  affairs  so  as  to  be  free  for 
the  grander  visions  of  oriental  conquest  that  now  haunted 
his  imagination.     Whatever  were  his  motives  in  signing 
the  preliminaries  at  Leoben,  he  speedily  found  means  for 
their  modification  in  the  ever-enlarging  area  of  negotiable 

lands.  .  „ 

It  is  now  time  to  return  to  the  affairs  of  Venice.  *or 
seven  months  the  towns  and  villages  of  that  republic  had 
been  a  prey  to  pitiless  warfare  and  systematic  rapacity,  a 
fate  which  the  weak  ruling  oligarchy  could  neither  avert 
nor  avenge.     In  the  western  cities,  Bergamo  and  Brescia, 

i"Moniteur,"  20  Floreal,  Year  V. ;  Sciout,  "Le  Directoire,"  vol.  ii., 
ch.  vii. 


vii  LEOBEN  TO   CAMPO   FOBMIO  181 

whose  interests  and  feelings  linked  them  with  Milan 
rather  than  Venice,  the  populace  desired  an  alliance  with 
the  nascent  republic  on  the  west  and  a  severance  from  the 
gloomy  despotism  of  the  Queen  of  the  Adriatic.  Though 
glorious  in  her  prime,  she  now  governed  with  the  cruelty 
inspired  by  fear  of  her  weakness  becoming  manifest ;  and 
Bonaparte,  tearing  off  the  mask  which  hitherto  had 
screened  her  dotage,  left  her  despised  by  the  more  pro- 
gressive of  her  own  subjects.  Even  before  he  first  entered 
the  Venetian  territory,  he  set  forth  to  the  Directory  the 
facilities  for  plunder  and  partition  which  it  offered.  Re- 
ferring to  its  reception  of  the  Comte  de  Provence  (the 
future  Louis  XVIII.)  and  the  occupation  of  Peschiera  by 
the  Austrians,  he  wrote  (June  6th,  1796)  : 

"  If  your  plan  is  to  extract  five  or  six  million  francs  from  Venice, 
I  have  expressly  prepared  for  you  this  sort  of  rupture  with  her.  .  .  . 
If  you  have  intentions  more  pronounced,  I  think  that  you  ought  to 
continue  this  subject  of  contention,  instruct  me  as  to  your  desires, 
and  wait  for  the  favourable  opportunity,  which  I  will  seize  according 
to  circumstances,  for  we  must  not  have  everybody  on  our  hands  at  the 
same  time." 

The  events  which  now  transpired  in  Venetia  gave  him 
excuses  for  the  projected  partition.  The  weariness  felt 
by  the  Brescians  and  Bergamesques  for  Venetian  rule  had 
been  artfully  played  on  by  the  Jacobins  of  Milan  and  by 
the  French  Generals  Kilmaine  and  Landrieux  ;  and  an 
effort  made  by  the  Venetian  officials  to  repress  the  grow- 
ing discontent  brought  about  disturbances  in  which  some 
men  of  the  "  Lombard  legion "  were  killed.  The  com- 
plicity of  the  French  in  the  revolt  is  clearly  established 
by  the  Milanese  journals  and  by  the  fact  that  Landrieux 
forthwith  accepted  the  command  of  the  rebels  at  Bergamo 
and  Brescia.1  But  while  these  cities  espoused  the  Jacobin 
cause,  most  of  the  Venetian  towns  and  all  the  peasantry 
remained  faithful  to  the  old  Government.  It  was  clear 
that  a  conflict  must  ensue,  even  if  Bonaparte  and  some  of 

1  See  Landrieux's  letter  on  the  subject  in  Koch's  "Memoires  de  Mas- 
sena,"  vol.  ii.  ;  "  Pieces  Justif.,"  ad  fin. ;  and  Bonaparte's  "Corresp.," 
letter  of  March  24th,  1797.  The  evidence  of  this  letter,  as  also  of  those 
of  April  9th  and  19th,  is  ignored  by  Thiers,  whose  account  of  Venetian 
affairs  is  misleading.  It  is  clear  that  Bonaparte  contemplated  partition 
long  before  the  revolt  of  Brescia. 


132  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

his  generals  had  not  secretly  worked  to  bring  it  about. 
That  he  and  they  did  so  work  cannot  now  be  disputed. 
The  circle  of  proof  is  complete.  The  events  at  Brescia 
and  Bergamo  were  part  of  a  scheme  for  precipitating  a 
rupture  with  Venice  ;  and  their  success  was  so  far  assured 
that  Bonaparte  at  Leoben  secretly  bargained  away  nearly 
the  whole  of  the  Venetian  lands.  Furthermore,  a  fort- 
night before  the  signing  of  these  preliminaries,  he  had 
suborned  a  vile  wretch,  Salvatori  by  name,  to  issue  a 
proclamation  purporting  to  come  from  the  Venetian  au- 
thorities, which  urged  the  people  everywhere  to  rise  and 
massacre  the  French.  It  was  issued  on  April  5th,  though 
it  bore  the  date  of  March  20th.  At  once  the  Doge  warned 
his  people  that  it  was  a  base  fabrication.  But  the  mis- 
chief had  been  done.  On  Easter  Monday  (April  17th) 
a  chance  affray  in  Verona  let  loose  the  passions  which  had 
been  rising  for  months  past  :  the  populace  rose  in  fury 
against  the  French  detachment  quartered  on  them  :  and 
all  the  soldiers  who  could  not  find  shelter  in  the  citadel, 
even  the  sick  in  the  hospitals,  fell  victims  to  the  craving 
for  revenge  for  the  humiliations  and  exactions  of  the  last 
seven  months.1  Such  was  Easter-tide  at  Verona  —  les 
Pdquea  veronaises  —  an  event  that  recalls  the  Sicilian  Ves- 
pers of  Palermo  in  its  blind  southern  fury. 

The  finale  somewhat  exceeded  Bonaparte's  expecta- 
tions, but  he  must  have  hailed  it  with  a  secret  satisfaction. 
It  gave  him  a  good  excuse  for  wholly  extinguishing 
Venice  as  an  independent  power.  According  to  the 
secret  articles  signed  at  Leoben,  the  city  of  Venice  was 
to  have  retained  her  independence  and  gained  the  Lega- 
tions. But  her  contumacy  could  now  be  chastised  by 
annihilation.  Venice  could,  in  fact,  indemnify  the  Haps- 
burgs  for  the  further  cessions  which  France  exacted  from 
them  elsewhere  ;  and  in  the  process  Bonaparte  would 
free  himself  from  the  blame  which  attached  to  his  hasty 
signature  of  the  preliminaries  at  Leoben.2  He  was  now 
determined  to  secure  the  Rhine  frontier  for  France,  to 

1  Botta,  "Storia  d'ltalia,"  vol.  ii.,  chs.  x.,  etc.  ;  Daru,  "Hist,  de 
Venise,"  vol.  v.  ;  Gaffarel,  "Bonaparte  et  les  Republiques  Italiennes," 
pp.  137-139  ;  and  Sciout,  "  Le  Directoire,"  vol.  ii.,  chs.  v.  and  vii. 

2Sorel,  "Bonaparte  et  Hoche  en  1797,"  p.  65. 


tii  LEOBEN   TO   CAMPO   FORMIO  133 

gain  independence,  under  French  tutelage,  not  only  for 
the  Lombard  Republic,  but  also  for  Modenaand  the  Lega- 
tions. These  were  his  aims  during  the  negotiations  to 
which  he  gave  the  full  force  of  his  intellect  during  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1797. 

The  first  thing  was  to  pour  French  troops  into  Italy  so 
as  to  extort  better  terms  :  the  next  was  to  declare  war  on 
Venice.  For  this  there  was  now  ample  justification  ;  for, 
apart  from  the  massacre  at  Verona,  another  outrage  had 
been  perpetrated.  A  French  corsair,  which  had  persisted 
in  anchoring  in  a  forbidden  part  of  the  harbour  of  Venice, 
had  been  riddled  by  the  batteries  and  captured.  For  this 
act,  and  for  the  outbreak  at  Verona,  the  Doge  and  Senate 
offered  ample  reparation:  but  Bonaparte  refused  to  listen 
to  these  envoys,  "  dripping  with  French  blood,"  and 
haughtily  bade  Venice  evacuate  her  mainland  territories.1 
For  various  reasons  he  decided  to  use  guile  rather  than 
force.  He  found  in  Venice  a  secretary  of  the  French 
legation,  Villetard  by  name,  who  could  be  trusted  dex- 
trously  to  undermine  the  crumbling  fabric  of  the  oli- 
garchy.2 This  man  persuaded  the  terrified  populace  that 
nothing  would  appease  the  fury  of  the  French  general 
but  the  deposition  of  the  existing  oligarchy  and  the  for- 
mation of  a  democratic  municipality.  The  people  and  the 
patricians  alike  swallowed  the  bait ;  and  the  once  haughty 
Senate  tamely  pronounced  its  own  doom.  Disorders  natu- 
rally occurred  on  the  downfall  of  the  ancient  oligarchy, 
especially  when  the  new  municipality  ordered  the  re- 
moval of  Venetian  men-of-war  into  the  hands  of  the 
French  and  the  introduction  of  French  troops  by  help  of 
Venetian  vessels.  A  mournful  silence  oppressed  even 
the  democrats  when  5,000  French  troops  entered  Venice 
on  board  the  flotilla.  The  famous  State,  which  for  cen- 
turies had  ruled  the  waters  of  the  Levant,  and  had  held 
the  fierce  Turks  at  bay,  a  people  numbering  3,000,000 
souls  and  boasting  a  revenue  of  9,000,000  ducats,  now 
struck  not  one  blow  against  conquerors  who  came  in  the 
guise  of  liberators. 

On  the  same  day  Bonaparte  signed  at  Milan  a  treaty  of 
alliance  with  the  envoys  of   the  new  Venetian   Govern- 

1  Letter  of  April  30th,  1797.  *  Letter  of  May  13th,  1797. 


134  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

ment.  His  friendship  was  to  be  dearly  bought.  In 
secret  articles,  which  were  of  more  import  than  the  vague 
professions  of  amity  which  filled  the  public  document,  it 
was  stipulated  that  the  French  and  Venetian  Republics 
should  come  to  an  understanding  as  to  the  exchange  of 
certain  territories,  that  Venice  should  pay  a  contribution 
in  money  and  in  materials  of  war,  should  aid  the  French 
navy  by  furnishing  three  battleships  and  two  frigates, 
and  should  enrich  the  museums  of  her  benefactress  by  20 
paintings  and  500  manuscripts.  While  he  was  signing 
these  conditions  of  peace,  the  Directors  were  despatching 
from  Paris  a  declaration  of  war  against  Venice.  Their 
decision  was  already  obsolete  :  it  was  founded  on  Bona- 
parte's despatch  of  April  30th  ;  but  in  the  interval  their 
proconsul  had  wholly  changed  the  situation  by  over- 
throwing the  rule  of  the  Doge  and  Senate,  and  by  setting 
up  a  democracy,  through  which  he  could  extract  the 
wealth  of  that  land.  The  Directors'  declaration  of  war 
was  accordingly  stopped  at  Milan,  and  no  more  was  heard 
of  it.  They  were  thus  forcibly  reminded  of  the  truth  of 
his  previous  warning  that  things  would  certainly  go  wrong 
unless  they  consulted  him  on  all  important  details.1 

This  treaty  of  Milan  was  the  fourth  important  conven- 
tion concluded  by  the  general,  who,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  campaign  of  1796,  had  been  forbidden  even  to  sign  an 
armistice  without  consulting  Salicetti  ! 

It  was  speedily  followed  by  another,  which  in  many 
respects  redounds  to  the  credit  of  the  young  conqueror. 
If  his  conduct  towards  Venice  inspires  loathing,  his 
treatment  of  Genoa  must  excite  surprise  and  admiration. 
Apart  from  one  very  natural  outburst  of  spleen,  it  shows 
little  of  that  harshness  which  might  have  been  expected 
from  the  man  who  had  looked  on  Genoa  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  mean  despotism.  Up  to  the  summer  of  1796 
Bonaparte  seems  to  have  retained  something  of  his  old 
detestation  of  that  republic ;  for  at  midsummer,  when  he 
was  in  the  full  career  of  his  Italian  conquests,  he  wrote  to 

1  It  would  even  seem,  from  Bonaparte's  letter  of  July  12th,  1797,  that 
not  till  then  did  he  deign  to  send  on  to  Paris  the  terms  of  the  treaty  with 
Venice.  He  accompanied  it  with  the  cynical  suggestion  that  they  could 
do  what  they  liked  with  the  treaty,  and  even  annul  it  1 


vn  LEOBEN   TO   CAMPO   FORM  10  135 

Faypoult,  the  French  envoy  at  Genoa,  urging  him  to  keep 
open  certain  cases  that  were  in  dispute,  and  three  weeks 
later  he  again  wrote  that  the  time  for  Genoa  had  not  yet 
come.  Any  definite  action  against  this  wealthy  city  was, 
indeed,  most  undesirable  during  the  campaign ;  for  the 
bankers  of  Genoa  supplied  the  French  army  with  the 
sinews  of  war  by  means  of  secret  loans,  and  their  mer- 
chants were  equally  complaisant  in  regard  to  provisions. 
These  services  were  appreciated  by  Bonaparte  as  much  as 
they  were  resented  by  Nelson ;  and  possibly  the  succour 
which  Genoese  money  and  shipping  covertly  rendered  to 
the  French  expeditions  for  the  recovery  of  Corsica  may 
have  helped  to  efface  from  Bonaparte's  memory  the  asso- 
ciations clustering  around  the  once-revered  name  of  Paoli. 
From  ill-concealed  hostility  he  drifted  into  a  position  of 
tolerance  and  finally  of  friendship  towards  Genoa,  pro- 
vided that  she  became  democratic.  If  her  institutions 
could  be  assimilated  to  those  of  France,  she  might  prove 
a  valuable  intermediary  or  ally. 

The  destruction  of  the  Genoese  oligarchy  presented  no 
great  difficulties.  Both  Venice  and  Genoa  had  long  out- 
lived their  power,  and  the  persistent  violation  of  their 
neutrality  had  robbed  them  of  that  last  support  of  the 
weak,  self-respect.  The  intrigues  of  Faypoult  and  Sali- 
cetti  were  undermining  the  influence  of  the  Doge  and 
Senate,  when  the  news  of  the  fall  of  the  Venetian 
oligarchy  spurred  on  the  French  party  to  action.  But 
the  Doge  and  Senate  armed  bands  of  mountaineers  and 
fishermen  who  were  hostile  to  change  ;  and  in  a  long  and 
desperate  conflict  in  the  narrow  streets  of  Genoa  the  demo- 
crats were  completely  worsted  (May  23rd).  The  victors 
thereupon  ransacked  the  houses  of  the  opposing  faction 
and  found  lists  of  names  of  those  who  were  to  have  been 
proscribed,  besides  documents  which  revealed  the  complic- 
ity of  the  French  agents  in  the  rising.  Bonaparte  was 
enraged  at  the  folly  of  the  Genoese  democrats,  which  de- 
ranged his  plans.  As  he  wrote  to  the  Directory,  if  they 
had  only  remained  quiet  for  a  fortnight,  the  oligarchy 
would  have  collapsed  from  sheer  weakness.  The  murder 
of  a  few  Frenchmen  and  Milanese  now  gave  him  an  ex- 
cuse for  intervention.     He  sent  an  aide-de-camp,  Lava- 


136  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

lette,  charged  with  a  vehement  diatribe  against  the  Doge 
and  Senate,  which  lost  nothing  in  its  recital  before  that 
august  body.  At  the  close  a  few  senators  called  out,  "  Let 
us  fight " :  but  the  spirit  of  the  Dorias  flickered  away 
with  these  protests  ;  and  the  degenerate  scions  of  mighty 
sires  submitted  to  the  insults  of  an  aide-de-camp'  and  the 
dictation  of  his  master. 

The  fate  of  this  ancient  republic  was  decided  by  Bona- 
parte at  the  Castle  of  Montebello,  near  Milan,  where  he 
had  already  drawn  up  her  future  constitution.  After 
brief  conferences  with  the  Genoese  envoys,  he  signed  with 
them  the  secret  convention  which  placed  their  republic  — 
soon  to  be  renamed  the  Ligurian  Republic  —  under  the 
protection  of  France  and  substituted  for  the  close  patri- 
cian rule  a  moderate  democracy.  The  fact  is  significant. 
His  military  instincts  had  now  weaned  him  from  the  stiff 
Jacobinism  of  his  youth ;  and,  in  conjunction  with  Fay- 
poult  and  the  envoys,  he  arranged  that  the  legislative 
powers  should  be  intrusted  to  two  popularly  elected 
chambers  of  300  and  150  members,  while  the  executive 
functions  were  to  be  discharged  by  twelve  senators,  pre- 
sided over  by  a  Doge  ;  these  officers  were  to  be  appointed 
by  the  chambers :  for  the  rest,  the  principles  of  religious 
liberty  and  civic  equality  were  recognized,  and  local  self- 
government  was  amply  provided  for.  Cynics  may,  of 
course,  object  that  this  excellent  constitution  was  but  a 
means  of  insuring  French  supremacy  and  of  peacefully 
installing  Bonaparte's  regiments  in  a  very  important  city; 
but  the  close  of  his  intervention  may  be  pronounced  as 
creditable  to  his  judgment  as  its  results  were  salutary  to 
Genoa.  He  even  upbraided  the  demagogic  party  of  that 
city  for  shivering  in  pieces  the  statue  of  Andrea  Doria  and 
suspending  the  fragments  on  some  of  the  innumerable 
trees  of  liberty  recently  planted. 

"  Andrea  Doria,"  he  wrote,  "  was  a  great  sailor  and  a  great  states- 
man. Aristocracy  was  liberty  in  his  time.  The  whole  of  Europe 
envies  your  city  the  honour  of  having  produced  that  celebrated  man. 
You  will,  I  doubt  not,  take  pains  to  rear  his  statue  again  :  I  pray  you 
to  let  me  bear  a  part  of  the  expense  which  that  will  entail,  which  I 
desire  to  share  with  those  who  are  most  zealous  for  the  glory  and 
welfare  of  your  country." 


vii  LEOBEN  TO  CAMPO   FORMIO  137 

In  contrasting  this  wise  and  dignified  conduct  with  the 
hatred  which  most  Corsicans  still  cherished  against  Genoa, 
Bonaparte's  greatness  of  soul  becomes  apparent  and  inspires 
the  wish  :  Utinam  semper  sie  fuisses  ! 

Few  periods  of  his  life  have  been  more  crowded  with 
momentous  events  than  his  sojourn  at  the  Castle  of  Monte- 
bello  in  May-July,  1797.  Besides  completing  the  down- 
fall of  Venice  and  reinvigorating  the  life  of  Genoa,  he 
was  deeply  concerned  with  the  affairs  of  the  Lombard  or 
Cisalpine  Republic,  with  his  family  concerns,  with  the  con- 
solidation of  his  own  power  in  French  politics,  and  with 
the  Austrian  negotiations.  We  will  consider  these  affairs 
in  the  order  here  indicated. 

The  future  of  Lombardy  had  long  been  a  matter  of  con- 
cern to  Bonaparte.  He  knew  that  its  people  were  the  fittest 
in  all  Italy  to  benefit  by  constitutional  rule,  but  it  must  be 
dependent  on  France.  He  felt  little  confidence  in  the  Lom- 
bards if  left  to  themselves,  as  is  seen  in  his  conversation 
with  Melzi  and  Miot  de  Melito  at  the  Castle  of  Montebello. 
He  was  in  one  of  those  humours,  frequent  at  this  time  of 
dawning  splendour,  when  confidence  in  his  own  genius 
betrayed  him  into  quite  piquant  indiscretions.  After 
referring  to  the  Directory,  he  turned  abruptly  to  Melzi,  a 
Lombard  nobleman  : 

"  As  for  your  country,  Monsieur  de  Melzi,  it  possesses  still  fewer 
elements  of  republicanism  than  France,  and  can  be  managed  more 
easily  than  any  other.  You  know  better  than  anyone  that  we  shall 
do  what  we  like  with  Italy.  But  the  time  has  not  yet  come.  We 
must  give  way  to  the  fever  of  the  moment.  We  are  going  to  have 
one  or  two  republics  here  of  our  own  sort.  Monge  will  arrange  that 
for  us." 

He  had  some  reason  for  distrusting  the  strength  of  the 
democrats  in  Italy.  At  the  close  of  1796  he  had  written 
that  there  were  three  parties  in  Lombardy,  one  which 
accepted  French  guidance,  another  which  desired  liberty 
even  with  some  impatience,  and  a  third  faction,  friendly 
to  the  Austrians  :  he  encouraged  the  first,  checked  the 
second,  and  repressed  the  last.  He  now  complained  that 
the  Cispadanes  and  Cisalpines  had  behaved  very  badly  in 
their  first  elections,  which  had  been  conducted  in  his 
absence  ;  for  they  had  allowed  clerical  influence  to  over- 


138 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


ride  all  French  predilections.  And,  a  little  later,  he 
wrote  to  Talleyrand  that  the  genuine  love  of  liberty  was 
feeble  in  Italy,  and  that,  as  soon  as  French  influences 
were  withdrawn,  the  Italian  Jacobins  would  be  murdered 
by  the  populace.  The  sequel  was  to  justify  his  misgiv- 
ings, and  therefore  to  refute  the  charges  of  those  who  see 

n  h  s  conduct  respecting  the  Cisalpine  Republic  nothing 
but Mating  egotism.  The  difficulty  of  freeing  a .popu- 
lace that  had  learnt  to  hug  its  chains  was  so  great  that 

he  temporary  and  partial  success  which  his  new  creation 
achieved?  may  be   regarded   as   a  proof   of  his   political 

^  After '  long   preparations   by   four   committees    which 
Bonaparte  kept  at  Milan  closely  engaged  m  the  drafting 
of  laws,  the  constitution  of  the  Cisalpine   Republic  was 
compTeted.    It  was  a  miniature  of  that  of  France,  and  lest 
rW  should  be  any  further  mistakes   in   the  elections, 
^pSSThbSelf  apposed,  not  only  the  five  directors 
and  the  Ministers .  whom  they  were  to  control,  but  even 
the  180  legislators,  both  Ancients  and  Juniors.     In  this 
strange  fashion  did  democracy  descend  on  Italy,  not  mainly 
as  the  work  of  the  people,  but  at  the  behest  of  a  great 
organirng  genius.     It  Is  only  fair  to  add  that  he  sum- 
moned to  the  work  of  civic  reconstruction  many  c  f  the 
best  intellects  of  Italy.     He  appointed  a  noble,  Serbelloni, 
to  be  the  first  President  of  the  Cisalpine  Republic  and  a 
scion  of  the  august  House  of  the  Visconti  was  sent  as  its 
ambassador  to  Paris.     Many  able  men  that  had  left  Lom- 
bard v  during  the  Austrian  occupation  or  the  recent  wars 
were  attracted  back  by  Bonaparte's  politic  clemency  ;  and 
the  festival  of  July  9th  at  Milan,  which  graced  the  inau- 
guration of  the  new  Government,  presented  a  scene  ot 
civic  ioy  to  which  that  unhappy  province  had  long  been  a 
stranger.     A  vast  space  was  thronged  with  an  enormous 
crowd  which  took  up  the  words  of  the  civic  oath  uttered 
by  The  President.     The  Archbishop  of  Milan  celebrated 
Mass  and  blessed  the  banners  of   the  National  Guards; 
and  the  day  closed  with  games,  dances,  and  invocations  to 
the  memory  of  the  Italians  who  had  fought  and  died  for 
heir  nascent  liberties.    Amidst  all  the  vivas  and  the  clash 
of  bells  Bonaparte  took  care  to  sound  a  sterner  note.     On 


vii  LEOBEN   TO   JAMPO   FORMIO  136 

that  very  day  he  ordered  the  suppression  of  a  Milanese 
club  which  had  indulged  in  Jacobinical  extravagances,  and 
he  called  on  the  people  "  to  show  to  the  world  by  their 
wisdom,  energy,  and  by  the  good  organization  of  their 
army,  that  modern  Italy  has  not  degenerated  and  is  still 
worthy  of  liberty." 

The  contagion  of  Milanese  enthusiasm  spread  rapidly. 
Some  of  the  Venetian  towns  on  the  mainland  now  peti- 
tioned for  union  with  the  Cisalpine  Republic ;  and  the 
deputies  of  the  Cispadane,  who  were  present  at  the  festival, 
urgently  begged  that  their  little  State  might  enjoy  the 
same  privilege.  Hitherto  Bonaparte  had  refused  these 
requests,  lest  he  should  hamper  the  negotiations  with 
Austria,  which  were  still  tardily  proceeding ;  but  within 
a  month  their  wish  was  gratified,  and  the  Cispadane  State 
was  united  to  the  larger  and  more  vigorous  republic  north 
of  the  River  Po,  along  with  the  important  districts  of 
Como,  Bergamo,  Brescia,  Crema,  and  Peschiera.  Dis- 
turbances in  the  Swiss  district  of  the  Valteline  soon 
enabled  Bonaparte  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the  oppressed 
peasants,  and  to  merge  this  territory  also  in  the  Cisalpine 
Republic,  which  consequently  stretched  from  the  high  Alps 
southward  to  Rimini,  and  from  the  Ticino  on  the  west 
to  the  Mincio  on  the  east.1 

Already,  during  his  sojourn  at  the  Castle  of  Montebello, 
Bonaparte  figured  as  the  all-powerful  proconsul  of  the 
French  Republic.  Indeed,  all  his  surroundings  —  his 
retinue  of  complaisant  generals,  and  the  numerous  envoys 
and  agents  who  thronged  his  ante-chambers  to  beg  an 
audience  —  befitted  a  Sulla  or  a  Wallenstein,  rather  than 
a  general  of  the  regicide  Republic.  Three  hundred  Polish 
soldiers  guarded  the  approaches  to  the  castle  ;  and  semi- 
regal  state  was  also  observed  in  its  spacious  corridors  and 
saloons.  There  were  to  be  seen  Italian  nobles,  literati, 
and  artists,  counting  it  the  highest  honour  to  visit  the 
liberator  of  their  land ;  and  to  them  Bonaparte  behaved 
with  that  mixture  of  affability  and  inner  reserve,  of  seduc- 

1  The  name  Italian  was  rejected  by  Bonaparte  as  too  aggressively 
nationalistic;  but  the  prefix  Cis  —  applied  to  a  State  which  stretched 
southward  to  the  Rubicon  —  was  a  concession  to  Italian  nationality.  It 
implied  that  Florence  or  Rome  was  the  natural  capital  of  the  new  State. 


140 


THE  LIFE  OP  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


tive   charm   alternating  with  incisive  cross-examination, 
which  proclaimed  at  once  the  versatility  of  his  gifts,  the 
keenness  of   his  intellect,  and  his  determination  to  gam 
social,  as  well  as  military  and  political,  supremacy.     And 
yet  the  occasional  abruptness  of  his  movements,  and  the 
strident  tones  of   command  lurking  beneath   his  silkiest 
speech,  now  and  again  reminded  beholders  that  he  was  of 
the  camp  rather  than  of  the  court.     To  his  generals  he 
was  distant ;  for  any  fault  even  his  favourite  officers  felt 
the  full  force  of  his  anger  ;  and  aides-de-camp  were  not 
often  invited  to  dine  at  his  table.     Indeed,  he  frequently 
dined  before  his  retinue,  almost  in  the  custom  of  the  old 
Kings  of  France. 

With   him  was  his  mother,  also   his  brothers,  Joseph 
and  Louis,  whom  he  was  rapidly  advancing  to  fortune. 
There,  too,  were  his  sisters  :    Elisa,  proud  and  self-con- 
tained, who  at  this  period  married  a  noble  but  somewhat 
boorish   Corsican,  Bacciocchi ;    and    Pauline,  a  charming 
girl   of    sixteen,   whose   hand    the   all-powerful    brother 
offered  to  Marmont,  to  be  by  him  unaccountably  refused, 
owing,  it  would  seem,  to  a  prior  attachment.1     This  lively 
and   luxurious  young  creature  was  not   long   to   remain 
unwedded.     The   adjutant-general,  Leclerc,  became   her 
suitor ;  and,  despite  his  obscure  birth  and  meagre  talents, 
speedily  gained  her  as  his  bride.     Bonaparte  granted  her 
40,000  francs  as  her  dowry;  and  —  significant  fact  — the 
nuptials  were  privately  blessed  by  a  priest  m  the  chapel 
of  the  Palace  of  Montebello. 

There,  too,  at  Montebello  was  Josephine. 
Certainly  the  Bonapartes  were  not  happy  in  their  loves  : 
the  one  dark  side  to  the  young  conqueror's  life,  all  through 
this   brilliant   campaign,   was   the   cruelty  of   his    bride. 
From  her  side  he  had  in  March,  1796,  torn  himself  away, 
distracted  between  his  almost  insane  love  for  her  and  his 
determination  to   crush   the  chief   enemy  of  France  :    to 
her  he  had  written  long  and  tender  letters  even  amidst 
the   superhuman   activities  of   his    campaign.     Ten   long 
despatches   a   day   had   not  prevented   him   covering   as 
many  sheets  of   paper  with  protestations  of   devotion  to 
her  and  with  entreaties  that  she  would  likewise  pour  out 
'  Marmont,  "Mems.,\'  vol.  i.,  p.  286. 


vii  LEOBEN  TO   CAMPO   FORMIO  W 

her  heart  to  him.  Then  came  complaints,  some  tenderly 
pleading,  others  passionately  bitter,  of  her  cruelly  rare 
and  meagre  replies.  The  sad  truth,  that  Josephine  cares 
much  for  his  fame  and  little  for  him  himself,  that  she 
delays  coming  to  Italy,  these  and  other  afflicting  details 
rend  his  heart.  At  last  she  comes  to  Milan,  after  a 
passionate  outburst  of  weeping  —  at  leaving  her  beloved 
Paris.  In  Italy  she  shows  herself  scarcely  more  than 
affectionate  to  her  doting  spouse.  Marlborough's  letters 
to  his  peevish  duchess  during  the  Blenheim  campaign  are 
not  more  crowded  with  maudlin  curiosities  than  those  of 
the  fierce  scourge  of  the  Austrians  to  his  heartless  fair. 
He  writes  to  her  agonizingly,  begging  her  to  be  less 
lovely,  less  gracious,  less  good  —  apparently  in  order  that 
he  may  love  her  less  madly :  but  she  is  never  to  be 
jealous,  and,  above  all,  never  to  weep  :  for  her  tears  burn 
his  blood :  and  he  concludes  by  sending  millions  of 
kisses,  and  also  to  her  dog  !  And  this  mad  effusion  came 
from  the  man  whom  the  outside  world  took  to  be  of 
steel-like  coldness :  yet  his  nature  had  this  fevered, 
passionate  side,  just  as  the  moon,  where  she  faces  the 
outer  void,  is  compact  of  ice,  but  turns  a  front  of  molten 
granite  to  her  blinding,  all-compelling  luminary. 

Undoubtedly  this  blazing  passion  helped  to  spur  on 
the  lover  to  that  terrific  energy  which  makes  the  Italian 
campaign  unique  even  amidst  the  Napoleonic  wars. 
Beaulieu,  Wiirmser,  and  Alvintzy  were  not  rivals  in 
war ;  they  were  tiresome  hindrances  to  his  unsated  love. 
On  the  eve  of  one  of  his  greatest  triumphs  he  penned  to 
her  the  following  rhapsody  : 

"  I  am  far  from  you,  I  seem  to  be  surrounded  by  the  blackest  night : 
I  need  the  lurid  light  of  the  thunder-bolts  which  we  are  about  to  hurl 
on  our  enemies  to  dispel  the  darkness  into  which  your  absence  has 
plunged  me.  Josephine,  you  wept  when  we  parted :  you  wept !  At 
that  thought  all  my  being  trembles.  But  be  consoled !  Wiirmser 
shall  pay  dearly  for  the  tears  which  I  have  seen  you  shed." 

What  infatuation  !  to  appease  a  woman's  fancied  grief, 
he  will  pile  high  the  plains  of  Mincio  with  corpses,  reck- 
ing not  of  the  thousand  homes  where  scalding  tears  will 
flow.     It  is  the  apotheosis  of   sentimental   egotism    and 


142  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

social  callousness.  And  yet  this  brain,  with  its  moral 
vision  hopelessly  blurred,  judged  unerringly  in  its  own 
peculiar  plane.  What  power  it  must  have  possessed, 
that,  unexhausted  by  the  flames  of  love,  it  grasped  in- 
fallibly the  myriad  problems  of  war,  scanning  them  the 
more  clearly,  perchance,  in  the  white  heat  of  its  own 
passion. 

At  last  there  came  the  time  of  fruition  at  Montebello  : 
of  fruition,  but  not  of  ease  or  full  contentment ;  for  not 
only  did  an  average  of  eight  despatches  a  day  claim  several 
hours,  during  which  he  jealously  guarded  his  solitude  ; 
but  Josephine's  behaviour  served  to  damp  his  ardour. 
As,  during  the  time  of  absence,  she  had  slighted  his  urgent 
entreaties  for  a  daily  letter,  so  too,  during  the  sojourn  at 
Montebello,  she  revealed  the  shallowness  and  frivolity  of 
her  being.  Fetes,  balls,  and  receptions,  provided  they 
were  enlivened  by  a  light  crackle  of  compliments  from 
an  admiring  circle,  pleased  her  more  than  the  devotion 
of  a  genius.  She  had  admitted,  before  marriage,  that 
her  "  Creole  nonchalance. "  shrank  wearily  away  from  his 
keen  and  ardent  nature  ;  and  now,  when  torn  away  from 
the  salons  of  Paris,  she  seems  to  have  taken  refuge  in 
entertainments  and  lap-dogs.1  Doubtless  even  at  this 
period  Josephine  evinced  something  of  that  warm  feeling 
which  deepened  with  ripening  years  and  lit  up  her  later 
sorrows  with  a  mild  radiance  ;  but  her  recent  association 
with  Madame  Tallien  and  that  giddy  cohue  had  accentu- 
ated her  habits  of  feline  complaisance  to  all  and  sundry. 
Her  facile  fondnesses  certainly  welled  forth  far  too  widely 
to  carve  out  a  single  channel  of  love  and  mingle  with  the 
deep  torrent  of  Bonaparte's  early  passion.  In  time,  there- 
fore, his  affections  strayed  into  many  other  courses  ;  and 
it  would  seem  that  even  in  the  later  part  of  this 
Italian  epoch  his  conduct  was  irregular.  For  this  Jose- 
phine had  herself  mainly  to  thank.  At  last  she  awakened 
to  the  real  value  and  greatness  of  the  love  which  her 
neglect  had  served  to  dull  and  tarnish,  but  then  it  was 
too  late  for  complete  reunion  of  souls  :  the  Corsican  eagle 


1  See  Arnault's  "Souvenirs  d'un  sexag^naire"  (vol.  iii.,  p.  31)  and 
Levy's  "Napoleon  intime,"  p.  131. 


vii  LEOBEN   TO   CAMl'O   FOKMIO  143 

had  by  that  time  soared  far  beyond  reach  of  her  highest 
flutterings.1 

At  Montebello,  as  also  at  Passeriano,  whither  the 
Austrian  negotiations  were  soon  transferred,  Bonaparte, 
though  strictly  maintaining  the  ceremonies  of  his  pro- 
consular court,  yet  showed  the  warmth  of  his  social 
instincts.  After  the  receptions  of  the  day  and  the  semi- 
public  dinner,  he  loved  to  unbend  in  the  evening. 
Sometimes,  when  Josephine  formed  a  party  of  ladies  for 
vingt-et-un,  he  would  withdraw  to  a  corner  and  indulge 
in  the  game  of  goose ;  and  bystanders  noted  with  amuse- 
ment that  his  love  of  success  led  him  to  play  tricks  and 
cheat  in  order  not  to  "fall  into  the  pit."  At  other  times, 
if  the  conversation  languished,  he  proposed  that  each 
person  should  tell  a  story  ;  and  when  no  Boccaccio-like 
facility  inspired  the  company,  he  sometimes  launched  out 
into  one  of  those  eerie  and  thrilling  recitals,  such  as  he 
must  often  have  heard  from  the  improvisatori  of  his 
native  island.  Bourrienne  states  that  Bonaparte's  realism 
required  darkness  and  daggers  for  the  full  display  of  his 
gifts,  and  that  the  climax  of  his  dramatic  monologue  was 
not  seldom  enhanced  by  the  screams  of  the  ladies,  a  con- 


1  For  the  subjoined  version  of  the  accompanying  new  letter  of  Bona- 
parte (referred  to  in  my  Preface)  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  H.  A.  L.  Fisher, 
in  the  "  Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,"  July,  1900  : 

"  Milan,  20  Thermidor  [l'an  IV.]. 

"A    LA    CITOYENNE    TALLIEN  : 

"  Je  vous  dois  des  remerciements,  belle  citoyenne,  pour  le  souvenir 
que  vous  me  conservez  et  pour  les  choses  aimables  contenues  dans  votre 
apostille.  Je  sais  bien  qu'en  vous  disant  que  je  regrette  les  moments 
heureux  que  j'ai  passe  dans  votre  soci^te"  je  ne  vous  r^pete  que  ce  que 
tout  le  monde  vous  dit.  Vous  connaitre  c'est  ne  plus  pouvoir  vous 
oublier :  §tre  loin  de  votre  aimable  personne  lorsque  l'on  a  goute"  les 
charmes  de  votre  soci^te"  c'est  dfeirer  viveinent  de  s'en  rapprocher  ;  mais 
l'on  dit  que  vous  allez  en  Espagne.  Fi  !  c'est  tres  vilain  a  moins  que  vous 
ne  soyez  de  retour  avant  trois  mois,  enfin  que  cethiver  nous  ayons  le  bon- 
heur  de  vous  voir  a  Paris.  Allez  done  en  Espagne  visiter  la  caverne  de 
Gil  Bias.  Moi  je  crois  aussi  visiter  toutes  les  antiquity  possibles,  enfin 
que  dans  le  cours  de  novembre  jusqu'a  f^vrier  nous  puissions  raconter 
l'ensemble  (?).  Croyez-moi  avec  toute  la  consideration,  je  voulais  dire  le 
respect,  mais  je  sais  qu'en  g£n£ral  les  jolies  femmes  n'aiment  pas  ce 
mot-la.  "Bonaparte. 

"  Mille  e  mille  chose  a  Tallien." 


J44  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   X  c«AP 

summation   which  gratified    rather    than    perturbed    the 

aT^fo?B°™v^  multifarious  activity  in  Italy 
enables  th/reader  to  realize  somethi ng  f  J^wo^aod 
awe  excited  by  his  achievements.  Like  an  Athena  ne 
Ced  forth  from  the  Revolution,  fully  armed  for  every 
kTnd  of  contest.  His  mental  superiority  impressed  diplo- 
mats as  his  strategy  baffled  the  Imperialist  =^>-* 
now  he  was  to  give  further  proofs  of  his  astuteness  by 
intervening  in  the  internal  affairs  ol  trance. 

In  orSo  understand  Bonaparte's  share  in  the  coup  d 
Statoi  Fructidor,  we  must  briefly  review  the  course  of 
political  events  at  Paris.     At  the  time  of  the >  mstallat  on 
of  the  Directory  the  hope  was  widely  cherished  that  the 
Revolution  was  now  entirely  a  thing  of  the  pask     But   he 
unrest  of  the  time  was  seen  in  the  renewal  of  the  loyalist 
revolts  in  the  west,  and  in  the  communistic  plot  of  Babeul 
for  the  overthrow  if  the  whole  existing  system  of  private 
property.     The  aims  of  these  desperadoes  were  revealed 
£^n  accomplice;  the  ringleaders  were  arrested  and ^after 
a  Ions  trial  Babeuf  was  guillotined  and  his  confederates 
were  transported  (May,  1797).     The  disclosure  of  these 
Ttraievolutionary  aims  shocked  not  only  the  bourgeois 
but  even  the  peasants  who  were  settled  on  the  confiscated 
lands  of  the  nobles  and  clergy.     The  very  class  which  lad 
given  to  the  events  of  1789  their  irresistible  momentum 
was  now  inclined  to  rest   and  be  thankful  ;  and  in  this 
Twfft"  vulsion  of  popular  feeling  the  royalists  beg* i  to 
o-ain   o-round.     The  elections  for  the  renewal  ol  a  third 
part  of  the  Councils  resulted  in  large  gains  for  them  and 
they  could  therefore  somewhat  influence  the  composition 
of  The  Directory  by  electing  Barthelemy,  a  ^n^onal 
royalist.     Still,  he  could  not  overbear  the  other  four  regi 
eide    Directors,    even   though  one  of  these,    Carno t,  also 
favoured   moderate    opinions   more   and   more.     A   crisis 
Sore  rapidly  developed  between  the  still  Jacobinical 
Dfwcto^y  aSd   the   two   legislative  Councils,  in   each   of 
wS  the   royalists,  or   moderates,  had  the   upper  hand 
Th  "aim  of  tnis  majority  was  to  strengthen .the .royalist 
elements  in  France  by  the  ^V^oimmy^yo\nUonm 
laws.     Their  man  of  action  was  Pichegru,  the  conqueior 


vii  LEOBEN  TO   CAMPO   FOKMIO  145 

of  Holland,  who,  abjuring  Jacobinism,  now  schemed  with 
a  club  of  royalists,  which  met  at  Clichy,  on  the  outskirts 
of  Paris.  That  their  intrigues  aimed  at  the  restoration  of 
the  Bourbons  had  recently  been  proved.  The  French 
agents  in  Venice  seized  the  Comte  d'Entraigues,  the  con- 
fidante of  the  soi-disant  Louis  XVIII.;  and  his  papers, 
when  opened  by  Bonaparte,  Clarke,  and  Berthier  at  Mon- 
tebello,  proved  that  there  was  a  conspiracy  in  France  for 
the  recall  of  the  Bourbons.  With  characteristic  skill, 
Bonaparte  held  back  these  papers  from  the  Directory 
until  he  had  mastered  the  difficulties  of  the  situation.  As 
for  the  count,  he  released  him  ;  and  in  return  for  this  sig- 
nal act  of  clemency,  then  very  unusual  towards  an  emigre, 
he  soon  became  the  object  of  his  misrepresentation  and 
slander. 

The  political  crisis  became  acute  in  July,  when  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Councils  sought  to  force  on  the  Directory 
Ministers  who  would  favour  moderate  or  royalist  aims. 
Three  Directors,  Barras,  La  Reveilliere-Lepeaux,  and  Rew- 
bell,  refused  to  listen  to  these  behests,  and  insisted  on  the 
appointment  of  Jacobinical  Ministers  even  in  the  teeth  of 
a  majority  of  the  Councils.  This  defiance  of  the  deputies 
of  France  was  received  with  execration  by  most  civilians, 
but  with  jubilant  acclaim  by  the  armies  ;  for  the  soldiery, 
far  removed  from  the  partisan  strifes  of  the  capital,  still 
retained  their  strongly  republican  opinions.  The  news 
that  their  conduct  towards  Venice  was  being  sharply  criti- 
cised by  the  moderates  in  Paris  aroused  their  strongest 
feelings,  military  pride  and  democratic  ardour. 

Nevertheless,  Bonaparte's  conduct  was  eminently  cau- 
tious and  reserved.  In  the  month  of  May  he  sent  to  Paris 
his  most  trusted  aide-de-camp,  Lavalette,  instructing  him 
to  sound  all  parties,  to  hold  aloof  from  all  engagements, 
and  to  report  to  him  dispassionately  on  the  state  of  public 
opinion.1  Lavalette  judged  the  position  of  the  Directory, 
or  rather  of  the  Triumvirate  which  swayed  it,  to  be  so  pre- 
carious that  he  cautioned  his  chief  against  any  definite 
espousal  of  its  cause  ;  and  in  June- July,  1797,  Bonaparte 

1  Lavalette,  "  M<*ms.,"  ch.  xiii. ;  Barras,  "  Me"ms.,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  511-512  ; 
and  Duchesse  d'Abrantes,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xxviii. 


146  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

almost  ceased  to  correspond  with  the  Directors  except  on 
Italian  affairs,  probably  because  he  looked  forward  to  their 
overthrow  as  an  important  step  towards  his  own  suprem- 
acy. There  was,  however,  the  possibility  of  a  royalist 
reaction  sweeping  all  before  it  in  France  and  ranging  the 
armies  against  the  civil  power.  He  therefore  waited  and 
watched,  fully  aware  of  the  enhanced  importance  which  an 
uncertain  situation  gives  to  the  outsider  who  refuses  to 
show  his  hand. 

Duller  eyes  than  his  had  discerned  that  the  constitu- 
tional conflict  between  the  Directory  and  the  Councils 
could  not  be  peaceably  adjusted.  The  framers  of  the 
constitution  had  designed  the  slowly  changing  Directory 
as  a  check  on  the  Councils,  which  were  renewed  to  the 
extent  of  one-third  every  year ;  but,  while  seeking  to  put 
a  regicide  drag  on  the  parliamentary  coach,  they  had 
omitted  to  provide  against  a  complete  overturn.  The 
Councils  could  not  legally  override  the  Directory  ;  neither 
could  the  Directory  veto  the  decrees  of  the  Councils,  nor, 
by  dissolving  them,  compel  an  appeal  to  the  country. 
This  defect  in  the  constitution  had  been  clearly  pointed 
out  by  Necker,  and  it  now  drew  from  Barras  the  lament : 

"  Ah,  if  the  constitution  of  the  Year  III.,  which  offers  so  many  sage 
precautions,  had  not  neglected  one  of  the  most  important ;  if  it  had 
foreseen  that  the  two  great  powers  of  the  State,  engaged  in  heated 
debates,  must  end  with  open  conflicts,  when  there  is  no  high  court  of 
appeal  to  arrange  them ;  if  it  had  sufficiently  armed  the  Directory 
with  the  right  of  dissolving  the  Chamber !  " J 

As  it  was,  the  knot  had  to  be  severed  by  the  sword :  not, 
as  yet,  by  Bonaparte's  trenchant  blade  :  he  carefully  drew 
back  ;  but  where  as  yet  he  feared  to  tread,  Hoche  rushed 
in.  This  ardently  republican  general  was  inspired  by  a 
self-denying  patriotism,  that  flinched  not  before  odious 
duties.  While  Bonaparte  was  culling  laurels  in  Northern 
Italy,  Hoche  was  undertaking  the  most  necessary  task  of 
quelling  the  Vendeari  risings,  and  later  on  braved  the  fogs 
and  storms  of  the  Atlantic  in  the  hope  of  rousing  all 
Ireland   in    revolt.      His    expedition  to    Bantry    Bay    in 

1  Barras,  "M£ms.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xxxi.  ;  Madame  de  Stael,  "  Direc- 
toire,"  ch.  viii. 


vii  LEOBEN  TO   CAMPO   FORMIO  147 

December,  1796,  having  miscarried,  he  was  sent  into  the 
Khineland.  The  conclusion  of  peace  by  Bonaparte  at 
Leoben  again  dashed  his  hopes,  and  he  therefore  received 
with  joy  the  orders  of  the  Directory  that  he  should  march 
a  large  part  of  his  army  to  Brest  for  a  second  expedition 
to  Ireland.  The  Directory,  however,  intended  to  use 
those  troops  nearer  home,  and  appointed  him  Minister  of 
War  (July  16th).  The  choice  was  a  good  one  ;  Hoche 
was  active,  able,  and  popular  with  the  soldiery ;  but  he 
had  not  yet  reached  the  thirtieth  year  of  his  age,  the  limit 
required  by  the  constitution.  On  this  technical  defect 
the  majority  of  the  Councils  at  once  fastened ;  and  their 
complaints  were  redoubled  when  a  large  detachment  of 
his  troops  came  within  the  distance  of  the  capital  for- 
bidden to  the  army.  The  moderates  could  therefore 
accuse  the  triumvirs  and  Hoche  of  conspiracy  against  the 
laws  ;  he  speedily  resigned  the  Ministry  (July  22nd),  and 
withdrew  his  troops  into  Champagne,  and  finally  to  the 
Rhineland. 

Now  was  the  opportunity  for  Bonaparte  to  take  up  the 
role  of  Cromwell  which  Hoche  had  so  awkwardly  played. 
And  how  skilfully  the  conqueror  of  Italy  plays  it — through 
subordinates.  He  was  too  well  versed  in  statecraft  to  let 
his  sword  flash  before  the  public  gaze.  By  this  time  he 
had  decided  to  act,  and  doubtless  the  fervid  Jacobinism 
of  the  soldiery  was  the  chief  cause  determining  his  action. 
At  the  national  celebration  on  July  14th  he  allowed  it  to 
have  free  vent,  and  thereupon  wrote  to  the  Directory,  bit- 
terly reproaching  them  for  their  weakness  in  face  of  the 
royalist  plot  :  "  I  see  that  the  Clichy  Club  means  to  march 
over  my  corpse  to  the  destruction  of  the  Republic."  He 
ended  the  diatribe  by  his  usual  device,  when  he  desired  to 
remind  the  Government  of  his  necessity  to  them,  of  offer- 
ing his  resignation,  in  case  they  refused  to  take  vigorous 
measures  against  the  malcontents.  Yet  even  now  his 
action  was  secret  and  indirect.  On  July  27th  he  sent  to 
the  Directors  a  brief  note  stating  that  Augereau  had  re- 
quested leave  to  go  to  Paris,  "  where  his  affairs  call  him  "; 
and  that  he  sent  by  this  general  the  originals  of  the  ad- 
dresses of  the  army,  avowing  its  devotion  to  the  constitu- 
tion.    No  one  would  suspect  from  this  that  Augereau  was 


148 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


in  Bonaparte's  confidence  and  came  to  carry  out  the  coup 
d'Stat.  The  secret  was  well  preserved  Lavalette  was 
Bonaparte's  official  representative  ;  and  his  neutrality  was 
now  maintained  in  accordance  with  a  note  received  from 
his  chief:  "  Augereau  is  coming  to  Paris:  do  not  put 
yourself  in  his  power  :  he  has  sown  disorder  in  the  army : 

he  is  a  factious  man."  .     ,  .       -i        u    *.  t,„ 

But  while  Lavalette  was  left  to  trim  his  sails  as  best  he 
might,  Augereau  was  certain  to  act  with  energy.     Bona- 
parte knew  well  that  his  Jacobinical  lieutenant  famed  as 
the  first  swordsman  of  the  day,  and  the  leader  of  the  fight- 
ing division  of  the  army,  would  do  his  work  thoroughly 
always  vaunting  his  own  prowess  and  decrying  that  ol  his 
commander.    It  was  so.    Augereau  rushed  to  Pans,  breath- 
ing threats  of  slaughter  against  the  royalists.    Checked  tor 
a  time  by  the  calculating  finesse  of  the  triumvirs,  he  pre- 
pared to  end  matters  by  a  single  blow;  and,  when  the  time 
had  come,  he  occupied  the  strategic  points  of  the  capital, 
drew  a  cordon  of  troops  round  the  Tuilenes,  where  the 
Councils  sat,  invaded  the  chambers  of  deputies,  and  con- 
signed to  the  Temple  the  royalists  and  moderates  there 
present,  with  their  leader,  Pichegru.    Barthelemy  was  also 
seized  ;  but  Carnot,  warned  by  a  friend,  fled  during j  the 
early  hours  of  this  eventful  day- September  4th  (or  18 
Fructidor).     The  mutilated  Councils  forthwith  annulled 
the  late  elections  in  fifty-three  Departments,  and  passed 
severe  laws  against  orthodox  priests  and  the  unpardoned 
SmiqrSs  who   had    ventured   to  return   to    trance.     The 
Directory  was  also  intrusted  with  complete  power  to  sup- 
press newspapers,  to  close  political  clubs,  and  to  declare 
any  commune  in  a  state  of  siege.     Its  functions  were  now 
wellnigh  as  extensive  and  absolute  as  those  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety,  its  powers  being  limited  only  by 
the  incompetence  of  the  individual  Directors  and  by  their 
paralyzing  consciousness  that  they  ruled  only  by  favour  of 
the  army.     They  had  taken  the  sword  to  solve  a  politica 
problem*  two  years  later  they  were  to  fall  by  that  sword.* 
Augereau  fully  expected  that  he  would  be  one  of  the 
two  Directors  who  were  elected  in  place  of  Carnot  and 
Barthelemy  ;  but  the  Councils  had  no  higher  opinion  of 
i  «  Memoires  de  Gohier  »  ;  Roederer,  "  (Euvres,"  tome  iii.,  p.  294. 


vii  LEOBEN  TO   CAMPO   FORMIO  149 

his  civic  capacity  than  Bonaparte  had  formed  ;  and,  to  his 
great  disgust,  Merlin  of  Douai  and  Francois  of  Neufchatel 
were  chosen.  The  last  scenes  of  the  coup  oVStat  centred 
around  the  transportation  of  the  condemned  deputies.  One 
of  the  early  memories  of  the  future  Due  de  Broglie  recalled 
the  sight  of  the  "  deputes  fructidorises  travelling  in  closed 
carriages,  railed  up  like  cages,"  to  the  seaport  whence  they 
were  to  sail  to  the  lingering  agonies  of  a  tropical  prison  in 
French  Guiana.  "  It  was  a  painful  spectacle  :  the  indig- 
nation was  great,  but  the  consternation  was  greater  still. 
Everybody  foresaw  the  renewal  of  the  Reign  of  Terror 
and  resignedly  prepared  for  it." 

Such  were  the  feelings,  even  of  those  who,  like  Madame 
de  Stael  and  her  friend  Benjamin  Constant,  had  declared 
before  the  coup  d'etat  that  it  was  necessary  to  the  salva- 
tion of  the  Republic.  That  accomplished  woman  was 
endowed  Avith  nearly  every  attribute  of  genius  except 
political  foresight  and  self-restraint.  No  sooner  had  the 
blow  been  dealt  than  she  fell  to  deploring  its  results, 
which  any  fourth-rate  intelligence  might  have  foreseen. 
"Liberty  was  the  only  power  really  conquered"  —  such 
was  her  later  judgment  on  Fructidor.  Now  that  Liberty 
fled  affrighted,  the  errant  enthusiasms  of  the  gifted  author- 
ess clung  for  a  brief  space  to  Bonaparte.  Her  eulogies  on 
his  exploits,  says  Lavalette,  who  listened  to  her  through  a 
dinner  in  Talleyrand's  rooms,  possessed  all  the  mad  dis- 
order and  exaggeration  of  inspiration ;  and,  after  the 
repast  was  over,  the  votaress  refused  to  pass  out  before 
an  aide-de-camp  of  Bonaparte  !  The  incident  is  char- 
acteristic both  of  Madame  de  StaeTs  moods  and  of  the 
whims  of  the  populace.  Amidst  the  disenchantments  of 
that  time,  when  the  pursuit  of  liberty  seemed  but  an  idle 
quest,  when  royalists  were  the  champions  of  parliament- 
ary rule  and  republicans  relied  on  military  force,  all  eyes 
turned  wearily  away  from  the  civic  broils  at  Paris  to  the 
visions  of  splendour  revealed  by  the  conqueror  of  Italy. 
Few  persons  knew  how  largely  their  new  favourite  was 
responsible  for  the  events  of  Fructidor  ;  all  of  them  had 
by  heart  the  names  of  his  victories;  and  his  popularity 
flamed  to  the  skies  when  he  re-crossed  the  Alps,  bringing 
with  him  a  lucrative  peace  with  Austria. 


15o  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

The  negotiations  with  that  Power  had  dragged  on  slowly 
through  the  whole  summer  and  far  into  the  autumn,  mainly 
owing  to  the  hopes  of  the  Emperor  Francis  that  the  dis- 
order in  France  would  filch  from  her  the  meed  of  victory. 
Doubtless  that  would  have  been  the  case,  had  not  Bona- 
parte, while  striking  down  the  royalists  at  Paris  through 
his  lieutenant,  remained  at  the  head  of  his  victorious  legions 
in  Venetia  ready  again  to  invade  Austria,  if  occasion  should 

arise. 

In  some  respects,  the  coup  d'etat  of  Fructidor  helped  on 
the  progress  of  the  negotiations.  That  event  postponed, 
if  it  did  not  render  impossible,  the  advent  of  civil  war  in 
France ;  and,  like  Pride's  Purge  in  our  civil  strifes,  it 
installed  in  power  a  Government  which  represented  the 
feelings  of  the  army  and  of  its  chief.  Moreover,  it  rid 
him  of  the  presence  of  Clarke,  his  former  colleague  in  the 
negotiations,  whose  relations  with  Carnot  aroused  the  sus- 
picions of  Barras  and  led  to  his  recall.  Bonaparte  was  now 
the  sole  plenipotentiary  of  France.  The  final  negotiations 
with  Austria  and  the  resulting  treaty  of  Campo  Formio 
may  therefore  be  considered  as  almost  entirely  his  handi- 
work. 

And  yet,  at  this  very  time,  the  head  of  the  foreign 
Office  at  Paris  was  a  man  destined  to  achieve  the  greatest 
diplomatic  reputation  of  the  age.  Charles  Maurice  de 
Talleyrand  seemed  destined  for  the  task  of  uniting  the 
society  of  the  old  regime  with  the  France  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. To  review  his  life  would  be  to  review  the  Revolu- 
tion. With  a  reforming  zeal  begotten  of  his  own  intellectual 
acuteness  and  of  resentment  against  his  family,  which  had 
disinherited  him  for  the  crime  of  lameness,  he  had  led  the 
first  assaults  of  1789  against  the  privileges  of  the  nobles 
and  of  the  clerics  among  whom  his  lot  had  perforce  been 
cast.  He  acted  as  the  head  of  the  new  "  constitutional  " 
clergy,  and  bestowed  his  episcopal  blessing  at  the  Feast 
of  Pikes  in  1790 ;  but,  owing  to  his  moderation,  he  soon 
fell  into  disfavour  with  the  extreme  men  who  seized  on 
power.  After  a  sojourn  in  England  and  the  United  States, 
he  came  back  to  France,  and  on  the  suggestion  of  Madame 
de  Stael  was  appointed  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  (July, 
1797).     To  this  post  he  brought  the  highest  gifts:    his 


fh  LEOBEN   TO   CAM  I'D   FORMIO  151 

early  clerical  training  gave  a  keen  edge  to  an  intellect 
naturally  subtle  and  penetrating  :  his  intercourse  with 
Mirabeau  gave  him  a  grip  on  the  essentials  of  sound  policy 
and  diplomacy :  his  sojourn  abroad  widened  his  vision, 
and  imbued  him  with  an  admiration  for  English  institu- 
tions and  English  moderation.  Yet  he  loved  France  with 
a  deep  and  fervent  love.  For  her  he  schemed  ;  for  her  he 
threw  over  friends  or  foes  with  a  Macchiavellian  facility. 
Amidst  all  the  glamour  of  the  Napoleonic  Empire  he  dis- 
cerned the  dangers  that  threatened  France  ;  and  he  warned 
his  master  —  as  uselessly  as  he  warned  reckless  nobles, 
priestly  bigots,  and  fanatical  Jacobins  in  the  past,  or  the 
unteachable  zealots  of  the  restored  monarchy.  His  life, 
when  viewed,  not  in  regard  to  its  many  sordid  details, 
but  to  its  chief  guiding  principle,  was  one  long  campaign 
against  French  elan  and  partisan  obstinacy ;  and  he  sealed 
it  with  the  quaint  declaration  in  his  will  that,  on  review- 
ing his  career,  he  found  he  had  never  abandoned  a  party 
before  it  had  abandoned  itself.  Talleyrand  was  equipped 
with  a  diversity  of  gifts  :  his  gaze,  intellectual  yet  com- 
posed, blenched  not  when  he  uttered  a  scathing  criticism 
or  a  diplomatic  lie  :  his  deep  and  penetrating  voice  gave 
force  to  all  his  words,  and  the  curl  of  his  lip  or  the  scorn- 
ful lifting  of  his  eyebrows  sometimes  disconcerted  an 
opponent  more  than  his  biting  sarcasm.  In  brief,  this 
disinherited  noble,  this  unfrocked  priest,  this  disen- 
chanted Liberal,  was  the  complete  expression  of  the 
inimitable  society  of  the  old  regime,  when  quickened 
intellectually  by  Voltaire  and  dulled  by  the  Terror. 
After  doing  much  to  destroy  the  old  society,  he  was 
now  to  take  a  prominent  share  in  its  reconstruction  on 
a  modern  basis.1 

Such  was  the  man  who  now  commenced  his  chief  life- 
work,  the  task  of  guiding  Napoleon.  "  The  mere  name 
of  Bonaparte  is  an  aid  which  ought  to  smooth  away  all 
my  difficulties "  —  these  were  the  obsequious  terms  in 
which  he  began  his  correspondence  with  the  great  general. 
In  reality,  he  distrusted  him  ;  but  whether  from  diffidence 

1  Brougham,  "  Sketches  of  Statesmen;"  Ste.  Beuve,  "Talleyrand;" 
Lady  Blennerhasset,  "Talleyrand." 


152 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 


or  from  the  weakness  of  his  own  position,  which  as  yet 
was  little  more  than  that  of  the  head  clerk  of  his  depart- 
ment, he  did  nothing  to  assert  the  predominance  ot  civil 
over  military  influence  in  the  negotiations  now  proceed- 

^Two  months  before  Talleyrand  accepted  office,  Bona- 
parte had  enlarged  his  original  demands  on  Austria,  and 
claimed  for  France  the  whole  of  the  lands  on  the  leitor 
west  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  for  the  Cisalpine  Republic 
all  the  territory  up  to  the  River  Adige.  To  these  demands 
the  Court  of  Vienna  offered  a  tenacious  resistance  which 
greatly  irritated  him.  "These  people  are  so  slow,  he 
exclaimed,  "they  think  that  a  peace Jike  this  ought  to  be 
meditated  upon  for  three  years  first." 

Concurrently  with   the    Franco-Austrian  negotiations, 
overtures  for  a  peace  between  France  and  England  were 
being  discussed  at  Lille.     Into  these  it  is  impossible  to 
ente?  farther  than  to  notice  that  in  these  efforts  Pitt  and 
the  other  British  Ministers  (except  Grenville)  were  sin- 
cerely desirous  of  peace,  and  that  negotiations  broke  down 
owincr  to  the  masterful  tone  adopted  by  the  Directory. 
It  was,  perhaps,  unfortunate  that  Lord  Malmesbury  was 
selected  as  the  English  negotiator,  for  his  behaviour  in  the 
previous  year  had  been  construed  by  the  Irench  as  dila- 
tory  and  insincere.     But  the    Directors   may  on   better 
evidence  be  charged  with  postponing  a  settlement  until 
they  had  struck  down  their  foes  within   I  ranee.     Bona- 
parte's letters  at  this  time   show  that  he  hoped  for  the 
conclusion  of  a  peace  with   England  doubtless  m  order 
that  his  own  pressure  on  Austria  might  be  redoubled.     In 
this  he  was   to   be    disappointed.     After   Iructidor   the 
Directory   assumed    overweening    airs.     Talleyrand  was 
bidden  to  enjoin  on  the  French  plenipotentiaries  the  adop- 
tion of  a  loftier  tone.     Maret,  the  French  envoy  at  Lille, 
whose  counsels  had  ever  been  on  the  side  of  moderation, 
was  abruptly  replaced  by  a  «  Fructidorian     ;  and  a  deci- 
sive refusal  was  given  to  the  English  demand  for  the 
retention  of    Trinidad  and  the   Cape,  at  the  expense  of 
Spain  and  the  Batavian  Republic  respectively.     Indeed, 
the   Directory  intended  to  press  for  the  cession   of  the 
Channel  Islands  to  France  and  of  Gibraltar  to  Spain,  and 


vii  LEOBEN   TO   CAMPO   FORMIO  153 

that,  too,  at  the  end  of  a  maritime  war  fruitful   in  victo- 
ries for  the  Union  Jack.1 

Towards  the  King  of  Sardinia  the  new  Directory  was 
equally  imperious.  The  throne  of  Turin  was  now  occu- 
pied by  Charles  Emmanuel  IV.  He  succeeded  to  a  troub- 
lous heritage.  Threatened  by  democratic  republics  at 
Milan  and  Genoa,  and  still  more  by  the  effervescence  of 
his  own  subjects,  he  strove  to  gain  an  offensive  and  defen- 
sive alliance  with  France,  as  the  sole  safeguard  against 
revolution.  To  this  end  he  offered  10,000  Piedmontese 
for  service  with  Bonaparte,  and  even  secretly  offered  to 
cede  the  island  of  Sardinia  to  France.  But  these  offers 
could  not  divert  Barras  and  his  colleagues  from  their 
revolutionary  policy.  They  spurned  the  alliance  with 
the  House  of  Savoy,  and,  despite  the  remonstrances  of 
Bonaparte,  they  fomented  civil  discords  in  Piedmont 
such  as  endangered  his  communications  with  France.  In- 
deed, the  Directory  after  Fructidor  was  deeply  imbued 
with  fear  of  their  commander  in  Italy.  To  increase 
his  difficulties  was  now  their  paramount  desire  ;  and 
under  the  pretext  of  extending  liberty  in  Italy,  they  in- 
structed Talleyrand  to  insist  on  the  inclusion  of  Venice 
and  Friuli  in  the  Cisalpine  Republic.  Austria  must  be 
content  with  Trieste,  Istria,  and  Dalmatia,  must  renounce 
all  interest  in  the  fate  of  the   Ionian   Isles,  and  find  in 

1  Instructions  of  Talleyrand  to  the  French  envoys  (September  11th)  ; 
also  Ernoufs  "  Maret,  Due  de  Bassano,"  chs.  xxvii.  and  xxviii.,  for  the 
bona  fides  of  Pitt  in  these  negotiations. 

It  seems  strange  that  Baron  du  Casse,  in  his  generally  fair  treatment  of 
the  English  case,  in  his  "  Negotiations  relatives  aux  Trait^s  de  Lun^ville 
et  d' Amiens,"  should  have  prejudiced  his  readers  at  the  outset  by  refer- 
ring to  a  letter  which  he  attributes  to  Lord  Malmesbury.  It  bears  no 
date,  no  name,  and  purports  to  be  "Une  Lettre  de  Lord  Malmesbury, 
oubli^e  a  Lille."  How  could  the  following  sentences  have  been  penned 
by  Malmesbury,  and  written  to  Lord  Grenville  ? —  "  Mais  enfin,  outre  les 
regrets  sinceres  de  M£ot  et  des  danseuses  de  POp^ra,  j'eus  la  consolation 
de  voir  en  quittant  Paris,  que  des  Francais  et  une  multitude  de  nouveaux 
converted  a  la  religion  catholique  m'accompagnaient  de  leurs  vceux,  de 
leurs  prieres,  et  presque  de  leurs  larmes.  .  .  .  L'^venement  de  Fructidor 
porta  la  desolation  dans  le  cceur  de  tous  les  bons  ennemis  de  la  France. 
Pour  ma  part,  j'en  fut  consterne"  :  je  ne  Vavais point  prevu."  It  is  obvi- 
ously the  clumsy  fabrication  of  a  Fructidorian,  designed  for  Parisian  con- 
sumption :  it  was  translated  by  a  Whig  pamphleteer  under  the  title  "  The 
Voice  of  Truth  !  "  — a  fit  sample  of  that  partisan  malevolence  which  dis- 
torted a  great  part  of  our  political  literature  in  that  age. 


154  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Germany  all  compensation  for  her  losses  in  Italy.     Such 
was  the  ultimatum  of   the   Directory  (September  15th). 
But  a  loophole  of  escape  was  left  to  Bonaparte  ;  the  con- 
duct of  these  negotiations  was  confided  solely  to  him,  and 
he  had  already  decided  their  general  tenor  by  giving  his 
provisional  assent  to  the  acquisition  by  Austria  of  the  east 
bank  of  the  Adige  and  the  city  of  Venice.     From  these 
terms  he  was  disinclined  to  diverge.     He  was  weary  of 
"  this  old  Europe  "  :  his  gaze  was  directed  towards  Corfu, 
Malta,  and  Egypt  ;  and  when  he  received  the  official  ulti- 
matum, he  saw  that  the  Directory  desired  a  renewal  of 
the  war  under  conditions  highly  embarrassing  for  him. 
".Yes  :  I  see  clearly  that  they  are  preparing  defeats  for 
me,"  he  exclaimed  to  his  aide-de-camp  Lavalette.     They 
angered  him  still  more  when,  on  the  death  of  Hoche,  they 
intrusted  their  Rhenish  forces,  numbering  120,000  men, 
to  the  command  of  Augereau,  and  sent  to  the  Army  of 
Italy  an  officer  bearing  a  manifesto  written  by  Augereau 
concerning  Fructidor,  which  set  forth  the  anxiety  felt  by 
the  Directors  concerning  Bonaparte's  political  views.     .At 
this  Bonaparte  fired  up  and  again  offered  his  resignation 
(September  25th) : 

"  No  power  on  earth  shall,  after  this  horrible  and  most  unexpected 
act  of  ingratitude  by  the  Government,  make  me  continue  to  serve  it. 
My  health  imperiously  demands  calm  and  repose.  ...  My  recom- 
pense is  in  my  conscience  and  in  the  opinion  of  posterity.  Believe 
me,  that  at  any  time  of  danger,  I  shall  be  the  first  to  defend  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  Year  III." 

The  resignation  was  of  course  declined,  in  terms  most 
flattering  to  Bonaparte  ;  and  the  Directors  prepared  to 
ratify  the  treaty  with  Sardinia. 

Indeed,  the  fit  of  passion  once  passed,  the  determina- 
tion to  dominate  events  again  possessed  him,  and  he  de- 
cided to  make  peace,  despite  the  recent  instructions  of 
the  Directory  that  no  peace  would  be  honourable  which 
sacrificed  Venice  to  Austria.  There  is  reason  to  believe 
that  he  now  regretted  this  sacrifice.  His  passionate  out- 
bursts against  Venice  after  the  Pdques  vSronaises,  his  de- 
nunciations of  "that  fierce  and  blood-stained  rule,"  had 
now  given  place  to  some  feelings  of  pity  for  the  people 
whose  ruin  he  had  so  artfully  compassed ;  and  the  social 


vii  LEOBEN   TO   CAMI'O   FORMIO  155 

intercourse  with  Venetians  which  he  enjoyed  at  Passeriano, 
the  castle  of  the  Doge  Manin,  may  well  have  inspired 
some  regard  for  the  proud  city  which  he  was  now  about 
to  barter  away  to  Austria.  Only  so,  however,  could  he 
peacefully  terminate  the  wearisome  negotiations  with  the 
Emperor.  The  Austrian  envoy,  Count  Cobenzl,  struggled 
hard  to  gain  the  whole  of  Venetia,  and  the  Legations, 
along  with  the  half  of  Lombardy.1  From  these  exorbi- 
tant demands  he  was  driven  by  the  persistent  vigour  of 
Bonaparte's  assaults.  The  little  Corsican  proved  himself 
an  expert  in  diplomatic  wiles,  now  enticing  the  Imperial- 
ist on  to  slippery  ground,  and  occasionally  shocking  him 
by  calculated  outbursts  of  indignation  or  bravado.  After 
many  days  spent  in  intellectual  fencing,  the  discussions 
were  narrowed  down  to  Mainz,  Mantua,  Venice,  and  the 
Ionian  Isles.  On  the  fate  of  these  islands  a  stormy  dis- 
cussion arose,  Cobenzl  stipulating  for  their  complete  inde- 
pendence, while  Bonaparte  passionately  claimed  them  for 
France.  In  one  of  these  sallies  his  vehement  gestures 
overturned  a  cabinet  with  a  costly  vase  ;  but  the  story 
that  he  smashed  the  vase,  as  a  sign  of  his  power  to  crush 
the  House  of  Austria,  is  a  later  refinement  on  the  inci- 
dent, about  which  Cobenzl  merely  reported  to  Vienna  — 
"He  behaved  like  a  fool."  Probably  his  dextrous  dis- 
closure of  the  severe  terms  which  the  Directory  ordered 
him  to  extort  was  far  more  effective  than  this  boisterous 
gasconnade.  Finally,  after  threatening  an  immediate  at- 
tack on  the  Austrian  positions,  he  succeeded  on  three  of 
the  questions  above  named,  but  at  the  sacrifice  of  Venice 
to  Austria. 

The  treaty  was  signed  on  October  17th  at  the  village 
of  Campo  Formio.  The  published  articles  may  be  thus 
summarized  :  Austria  ceded  to  the  French  Republic  her 
Belgic  provinces.  Of  the  once  extensive  Venetian  pos- 
sessions France  gained  the  Ionian  Isles,  while  Austria 
acquired  Istria,  Dalmatia,  the  districts  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Cattaro,  the  city  of  Venice,  and  the  mainland  of 
Venetia  as  far  west  as  Lake  Garda,  the  Adige,  and  the 
lower  part  of  the  River  Po.  The  Hapsburgs  recognized 
the  independence  of  the  now  enlarged  Cisalpine  Republic. 

1  Bonaparte's  letters  of  September  28th  and  October  7th  to  Talleyrand. 


156  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  vii 

France  and  Austria  agreed  to  frame  a  treaty  of  com- 
merce on  the  basis  of  "the  most  favoured  nation. 
The  Emperor  ceded  to  the  dispossessed  Duke  of  Modena 
the  territory  of  Breisgau  on  the  east  of  the  Rhine.  A 
congress  was  to  be  held  at  Rastadt,  at  which  the  pleni- 
potentiaries of  France  and  of  the  Germanic  Empire  were 
to  regulate  affairs  between  these  two  Powers. 

Secret  articles  bound  the  Emperor  to  use  his  influence 
in  the  Empire  to  secure  for  France  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine;  while  France  was  to  use  her  good  offices  to 
procure  for  the  Emperor  the  Archbishopric  of  Salzburg 
and  the  Bavarian  land  between  that  State  and  the  River 
Inn.  Other  secret  articles  referred  to  the  indemnities 
which  were  to  be  found  in  Germany  for  some  of  the 
potentates  who  suffered  by  the  changes  announced  in 
the  public  treaty.  . 

The  bartering  away  of  Venice  awakened  profound  indig- 
nation.    After  more  than  a  thousand  years  of   indepen- 
dence, that  city  was  abandoned  to  the  Emperor  by  the  very 
general  who  had  promised  to  free  Italy.     It  was  in  vain 
that  Bonaparte  strove  to  soothe  the  provisional  govern- 
ment of  that  city  through  the  influence  of  a  Venetian  Jew, 
who,  after  his  conversion,  had  taken  the  famous  name  of. 
Dandolo.     Summoning  him  to  Passeriano,  he  explained  to 
him  the  hard  necessity  which  now  dictated  the  transfer  of 
Venice  to  Austria.     France  could  not  now  shed  any  more 
of  her  best  blood  for  what  was,  after  all,  only  "  a  moral 
cause  "  :  the  Venetians  therefore  must  cultivate  resigna- 
tion for  the  present  and  hope  for  the  future.     The  advice 
was  useless.     The  Venetian  democrats  determined  on  a 
last  desperate  venture.     They  secretly  sent  three  deputies, 
among  them  Dandolo,  with  a  large  sum  of  money  where- 
with to  bribe  the  Directors  to  reject  the  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio.     This  would  have  been  quite  practicable,  had  not 
their  errand  become  known  to  Bonaparte.     Alarmed  and 
enraged  at  this  device,  which,  if  successful,  would  have 
consigned  him  to  infamy,  he  sent  Duroc  in  chase ;  and 
the  envoys,  caught  before  they  crossed  the  Maritime  Alps, 
were  brought  before  the  general  at  Milan.    To  his  vehe- 
ment  reproaches    and   threats   they   opposed  a  dignified 
silence,  until  Dandolo,  appealing  to  his  generosity,  awak- 


CENTRAL  EUROPE 

AFTER    THE    PEACE    OP  CAMPIO    PORMIO     179?. 


NORTH     S 


The  boundaries  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  are  indicated  by  thick  dots. 
The  Austrian  Dominions  are  indicated  by  vertical  lines. 
The  Prussian  Dominions  are  indicated  by  horizontal  lines. 
The  Ecclesiastical  States  are  indicated  by  dotted  areas. 


158  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  vii 

ened  those  nobler  feelings  which  were  never  long  dormant. 
Then  he  quietly  dismissed  them  —  to  witness  the  downfall 
of  their  beloved  city. 

Acribus  initiis,  ut  ferine  talia,  incur iosa  fine;  these  cyni- 
cal words,  with  which  the  historian  of  the  Roman  Empire 
blasted  the  movements  of  his  age,  may  almost  serve  as  the 
epitaph  to  Bonaparte's  early  enthusiasms.  Proclaiming 
at  the  beginning  of  his  Italian  campaigns  that  he  came  to 
free  Italy,  he  yet  finished  his  course  of  almost  unbroken 
triumphs  by  a  surrender  which  his  panegyrists  have 
scarcely  attempted  to  condone.  But  the  fate  of  Venice 
was  almost  forgotten  amidst  the  jubilant  acclaim  which 
greeted  the  conqueror  of  Italy  on  his  arrival  at  Paris. 
All  France  rang  with  the  praises  of  the  hero  who  had 
spread  liberty  throughout  Northern  and  Central  Italy, 
had  enriched  the  museums  of  Paris  with  priceless  master- 
pieces of  art,  whose  army  had  captured  150,000  prisoners, 
and  had  triumphed  in  18  pitched  battles  —  for  Caldiero 
was  now  reckoned  as  a  French  victory  —  and  47  smaller 
engagements.  The  Directors,  shrouding  their  hatred  and 
fear  of  the  masterful  proconsul  under  their  Roman  togas, 
greeted  him  with  uneasy  effusiveness.  The  climax  of  the 
official  comedy  was  reached  when,  at  the  reception  of  the 
conqueror,  Barras,  pointing  northwards,  exclaimed :  "  Go 
there  and  capture  the  giant  corsair  that  infests  the  seas  : 
go  punish  in  London  outrages  that  have  too  long  been 
unpunished  "  :  whereupon,  as  if  overcome  by  his  emotions, 
he  embraced  the  general.  Amidst  similar  attentions  be- 
stowed by  the  other  Directors,  the  curtain  falls  on  the 
first,  or  Italian,  act  of  the  young  hero's  career,  soon  to  rise 
on  oriental  adventures  that  were  to  recall  the  exploits  of 
Alexander. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

EGYPT 

Among  the  many  misconceptions  of  the  French  revolu- 
tionists none  was  more  insidious  than  the  notion  that  the 
wealth  and  power  of  the  British  people  rested  on  an  arti- 
ficial basis.  This  mistaken  belief  in  England's  weakness 
arose  out  of  the  doctrine  taught  by  the  Economistes  or 
Physiocrates  in  the  latter  half  of  last  century,  that  com- 
merce was  not  of  itself  productive  of  wealth,  since  it 
only  promoted  the  distribution  of  the  products  of  the 
earth  ;  but  that  agriculture  was  the  sole  source  of  true 
wealth  and  prosperity.  They  therefore  exalted  agricul- 
ture at  the  expense  of  commerce  and  manufactures,  and 
the  course  of  the  Revolution,  which  turned  largely  on 
agrarian  questions,  tended  in  the  same  direction.  Robes- 
pierre and  St.  Just  were  never  weary  of  contrasting  the 
virtues  of  a  simple  pastoral  life  with  the  corruptions  and 
weakness  engendered  by  foreign  commerce  ;  and  when, 
early  in  1793,  Jacobinical  zeal  embroiled  the  young  Re- 
public with  England,  the  orators  of  the  Convention  confi- 
dently prophesied  the  downfall  of  the  modern  Carthage. 
Kersaint  declared  that  "  the  credit  of  England  rests  upon 
fictitious  wealth :  .  .  .  bounded  in  territory,  the  public 
future  of  England  is  found  almost  wholly  in  its  bank,  and 
this  edifice  is  entirely  supported  by  naval  commerce.  It 
is  easy  to  cripple  this  commerce,  and  especially  so  for  a 
power  like  France,  which  stands  alone  on  her  own  riches."1 

Commercial  interests  played  a  foremost  part  all  through 
the  struggle.  The  official  correspondence  of  Talleyrand 
in  1797  proves  that  the  Directory  intended  to  claim  the 
Channel  Islands,  the  north  of  Newfoundland,  and  all  our 

1  See  too  Marsh's  "  Politicks  of  Great  Britain  and  France,"  ch.  xiii.  ; 
"Correspondence  of  W.  A.  Miles  on  the  French  Revolution,"  letters  of 
January  7th  and  January  18th,  1793 ;  also  Sybel's  "  Europe  during  the 
French  Revolution,"  vol.  ii. 

169 


160  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

conquests  in  the  East  Indies  made  since  1754,  besides  the 
restitution  of  Gibraltar  to  Spain.1  Nor  did  these  hopes 
seem  extravagant.  The  financial  crisis  in  London  and 
the  mutiny  at  the  Nore  seemed  to  betoken  the  exhaustion 
of  England,  while  the  victories  of  Bonaparte  raised  the 
power  of  France  to  heights  never  known  before.  Before 
the  victory  of  Duncan  over  the  Dutch  at  Camperdown 
(October  11th,  1797),  Britain  seemed  to  have  lost  her 
naval  supremacy. 

The  recent  admission  of  State  bankruptcy  at  Paris, 
when  two-thirds  of  the  existing  liabilities  were  practi- 
cally expunged,  sharpened  the  desire  of  the  Directory  to 
compass  England's  ruin,  an  enterprise  which  might  serve 
to  restore  French  credit  and  would  certainly  engage  those 
vehement  activities  of  Bonaparte  that  could  otherwise 
work  mischief  in  Paris.  On  his  side  he  gladly  accepted 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  England. 

"  The  people  of  Paris  do  not  remember  anything,"  he  said  to 
Bourrienne.  "  Were  I  to  remain  here  long,  doing  nothing,  I  should 
be  lost.  In  this  great  Babylon  everything  wears  out :  my  glory  has 
already  disappeared.  This  little  Europe  does  not  supply  enough  of 
it  for  me.  I  must  seek  it  in  the  East :  all  great  fame  comes  from 
that  quarter.  However,  I  wish  first  to  make  a  tour  along  the  [north- 
ern] coast  to  see  for  myself  what  may  be  attempted.  If  the  success 
of  a  descent  upon  England  appear  doubtful,  as  I  suspect  it  will,  the 
Army  of  England  shall  become  the  Army  of  the  East,  and  I  go  to 
Egypt."  ^ 

In  February,  1798,  he  paid  a  brief  visit  to  Dunkirk 
and  the  Flemish  coast,  and  concluded  that  the  invasion 
of  England  was  altogether  too  complicated  to  be  hazarded 
except  as  a  last  desperate  venture.  In  a  report  to  the 
Government  (February  23rd)  he  thus  sums  up  the  whole 
situation  : 

"  Whatever  efforts  we  make,  we  shall  not  for  some  years  gain  the 
naval  supremacy.  To  invade  England  without  that  supremacy  is 
the  most  daring  and  difficult  task  ever  undertaken.  ...  If,  having 
regard  to  the  present  organization  of  our  navy,  it  seems  impossible  to 

1  Pallain,  u  Le  Ministere  de  Talleyrand  sous  le  Directoire,"  p.  42. 

2  Bourrienne,  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xii.  See  too  the  despatch  of 
Sandoz-Rollin  to  Berlin  of  February  28th,  1798,  in  Bailleu's  "Preussen 
und  Frankreich,"  vol.  i.,  No.  160. 


VIII 


EGYPT  1G1 


gain  the  necessary  promptness  of  execution,  then  we  must  really  give 
up  the  expedition  against  England,  be  satisfied  with  keeping  up  the  pre- 
tence of  it,  and  concentrate  all  our  attention  and  resources  on  the 
Rhine,  in  older  to  try  to  deprive  England  of  Hanover  and  Hamburg  : x 
...  or  else  undertake  an  eastern  expedition  which  would  menace 
her  trade  with  the  Indies.  And  if  none  of  these  three  operations  is 
practicable,  I  see  nothing  else  for  it  but  to  conclude  peace  with 
England." 

The  greater  part  of  his  career  serves  as  a  commentary 
on  these  designs.  To  one  or  other  of  them  he  was  con- 
stantly turning  as  alternative  schemes  for  the  subjuga- 
tion of  his  most  redoubtable  foe.  The  first  plan  he  now 
judged  to  be  impracticable  ;  the  second,  which  appears 
later  in  its  fully  matured  form  as  his  Continental  System, 
was  not  for  the  present  feasible,  because  France  was 
about  to  settle  German  affairs  at  the  Congress  of  Ra- 
stadt  ;  to  the  third  he  therefore  turned  the  whole  force 
of  his  genius. 

The  conquest  of  Egypt  and  the  restoration  to  France 
of  her  Supremacy  in  India  appealed  to  both  sides  of 
Bonaparte's  nature.  The  vision  of  the  tricolour  floating 
above  the  minarets  of  Cairo  and  the  palace  of  the  Great 
Mogul  at  Delhi  fascinated  a  mind  in  which  the  mysticism 
of  the  south  was  curiously  blent  with  the  practicality 
and  passion  for  details  that  characterize  the  northern 
races.  To  very  few  men  in  the  world's  history  has  it 
been  granted  to  dream  grandiose  dreams  and  all  but 
realize  them,  to  use  by  turns  the  telescope  and  the  micro- 
scope of  political  survey,  to  plan  vast  combinations  of 
force,  and  yet  to  supervise  with  infinite  care  the  adjust- 
ment of  every  adjunct.  Csesar,  in  the  old  world,  was 
possibly  the  mental  peer  of  Bonaparte  in  this  majestic 
equipoise  of  the  imaginative  and  practical  qualities  ;  but 
of  CaBsar  we  know  comparatively  little  ;  whereas  the 
complex  workings  of  the  greatest  mind  of  the  modern 
world  stand  revealed  in  that  storehouse  of  facts  and 
fancies,  the    "  Correspondance  de  Napoleon."       The  mo- 

1  The  italics  are  my  own.  I  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  statement  in 
view  of  the  much-debated  question  whether  in  1804-5  Napoleon  intended 
to  invade  our  land,  unless  he  gained  maritime  supremacy.  See  Des- 
briere's  "  Projets  de  D6barquement  aux  lies  Britanniques,"  vol.  i.,  ad 
fin. 


162 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


tives  which  led  to  the  Eastern  Expedition  are  there  un- 
folded. In  the  letter  which  he  wrote  to  Talleyrand 
shortly  before  the  signature  of  the  peace  of  Campo  tor- 
mio  occurs  this  suggestive  passage  : 

«  The  character  of  our  nation  is  to  be  far  too  vivacious  amidst  pros- 
oeritv      If  we  take  for  the  basis  of  all  our  operations  true  policy,  which 

?53is^^ 

tt  extreme"  cool,  persistent,  and  calculating  man  will  alone  attain. 

This  letter  was  written  when   Bonaparte  was  bartering 
away  Venice  to  the  Emperor  in  consideration  ot  the  acqui- 
sition by  France  of  the  Ionian  Isles.     Its  reference  to  the 
v'vacit/ of  the  French  was  doubtless  eVoked  by  the  orders 
which  he  then  received  to  "revolutionize  Italy.        lo  do 
thai!  while  the  Directory  further  extorted  from  England 
Gibraltar,  the  Channel  Islands,  and  her  eastern  conquests, 
was  a  programme  dictated  by  excessive  vivacity.       I  he 
Directory  lacked  the  practical  qualities  that  selected  one 
great  enterprise  at  a  time  and  brought  to  bear  on  it  the 
needful   concentration   of   effort.      In   brief,  he   selected 
the  war  against  England's  eastern  commerce  as  his  next 
sphere  of  action  ;    for  it  offered  "an  arena  vaster,  more 
necessary  and  resplendent "  than  war  with  Austria  ;       if 
we  compel  the  [British]  Government  to  a  peace,  the  advan- 
tages we  shall  gain  for  our  commerce  in  both  hemispheres 
will  be  a  great  step  towards  the  consolidation  of  liberty 
and  the  public  welfare."  1  a„n^A 

For  this  eastern  expedition  he  had  already  prepared. 
In  May,  1797,  he  had  suggested  the  seizure  of  Malta  irom 
the  Knights  of  St.  John  ;  and  when,  on  September  27th, 
the  Directory  gave  its  assent,  he  sent  thither  a  trench  com- 
missioner, Poussielgue,  on  a  "  commercial  mission,  to  in- 
spect those  ports,  and  also,  doubtless,  to  undermine  the 
discipline  of  the  Knights.     Now  that  the  British  had  re- 

i  Letter  of  October  10th,  1797  ;  see  too  those  of  August  16th  and  Sep- 
tember  13th. 


vni  EGYPT  163 

tired  from  Corsica,  and  France  disposed  of  the  maritime 
resources  of  Northern  Italy,  Spain,  and  Holland,  it  seemed 
quite  practicable  to  close  the  Mediterranean  to  those  "in- 
triguing and  enterprising  islanders,"  to  hold  them  at  bay 
in  their  dull  northern  seas,  to  exhaust  them  by  ruinous 
preparations  against  expected  descents  on  their  southern 
coasts,  on  Ireland,  and  even  on  Scotland,  while  Bonaparte's 
eastern  conquests  dried  up  the  sources  of  their  wealth  in 
the  Orient  :  "  Let  us  concentrate  all  our  activity  on  our 
navy  and  destroy  England.  That  done,  Europe  is  at  our 
feet."  » 

But  he  encountered  opposition  from  the  Directory. 
They  still  clung  to  their  plan  of  revolutionizing  Italy  ; 
and  only  by  playing  on  their  fear  of  the  army  could  he 
bring  these  civilians  to  assent  to  the  expatriation  of  35,000 
troops  and  their  best  generals.  On  La  Reveilliere-Le- 
peaux  the  young  commander  worked  with  a  skill  that 
veiled  the  choicest  irony.  This  Director  was  the  high- 
priest  of  a  newly-invented  cult,  termed  Theo-philanthropie, 
into  the  dull  embers  of  which  he  was  still  earnestly  blow- 
ing. To  this  would-be  prophet  Bonaparte  now  suggested 
that  the  eastern  conquests  would  furnish  a  splendid  field 
for  the  spread  of  the  new  faith  ;  and  La  Reveilliere  was 
forthwith  converted  from  his  scheme  of  revolutionizing 
Europe  to  the  grander  sphere  of  moral  proselytism  opened 
out  to  him  in  the  East  by  the  very  chief  who,  on  landing 
in  Egypt,  forthwith  professed  the  Moslem  creed. 

After  gaining  the  doubtful  assent  of  the  Directory, 
Bonaparte  had  to  face  urgent  financial  difficulties.  The 
dearth  of  money  was,  however,  met  by  two  opportune  inter- 
ventions. The  first  of  these  was  in  the  affairs  of  Rome. 
The  disorders  of  the  preceding  year  in  that  city  had  cul- 
minated at  Christmas  in  a  riot  in  which  General  Duphot 

1  The  plan  of  menacing  diverse  parts  of  our  coasts  was  kept  up  by  Bona- 
parte as  late  as  April  13th,  1798.  In  his  letter  of  this  date  he  still  speaks 
of  the  invasion  of  England  and  Scotland,  and  promises  to  return  from 
Egypt  in  three  or  four  months,  so  as  to  proceed  with  the  invasion  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  in  his  work,  "  Le  Directoire  et 
l'Expgdition  d'Egypte,"  ch.  i.,  seems  to  take  this  promise  seriously.  >In 
any  case  the  Directors'  hopes  for  the  invasion  of  Ireland  were  dashed  by 
the  premature  rising  of  the  Irish  malcontents  in  Mav,  1798.  For  Pous- 
sielgue's  mission  to  Malta,  see  Lavalette's  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xiv. 


164 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 


had  been  assassinated  ;    this  outrage  furnished  the  pie- 
text  desired  by  the  Directory  for  revolutionizing  Central 
Italy      Berthier  was  at  once  ordered  to  lead  French  troops 
ao-ainst  the  Eternal  City.     He  entered  without  resistance 
CFebruary  13th,  1798),  declared  the  civil  authority  of   he 
l'nne  at  an    end,  and   proclaimed  the   restoration   ot   the 
Roman    Republic.      The   practical  side  of  the  liberating 
poTcy  Wsoon  revealed.     A  second  time  the  treasures 
of  Rome,  both  artistic  and  financial,  were  rifled  ;  and,  as 
Lucien  Bonaparte  caustically  remarked  in  his  «  Memoirs 
the  chief  duty  of  the  newly-appointed  consuls  and  qmes- 
tors  was  to  superintend  the  packing  up  of  pictures  and 
statues  designed  for   Paris.     Berthier  not  only  laid  the 
W  of  a  Urge  private  fortune,  but  showed  his  sense  of 
the  object  of  L  expedition  by  sending  large  sums  for  the 
equipment  of  the  armada  at  Toulon.     «  In  sending  me  to 
Z2e  »  wrote   Berthier  to   Bonaparte,  "you  appoint  me 
treasurer  to  the  expedition  against  England.     I  will  try 
to  fill  the  exchequer."  .         - 

The  intervention  of    the   Directory  in  the   affairs  of 
Switzerland  was  equally  lucrative      The  ^b.tants  of 
the  district  of  Vaud,  in  their  struggles  against  the  oppres- 
sive rule  of   the   Bernese  oligarchy,  had  offered  to   the 
French  Government  the  excuse  for  interference  :  and  a 
force  invading  that  land  overpowered  the  levies  of  the 
central   cantons.'    The  imposition  of  a  centralized  form 
of— men"  modelled  on  that  of  France,  the  wresting 
of  Geneva  f rom  this  ancient  confederation,  and  its  incor- 
poration with  France,  were  not  the  only  evils  suffered by 
Switzerland.     Despite  the  proclamation  of  General  iSiune 
Siat  Ae  French  came  as  friends  to  the  descendants  of 
Wi  Ham  Tell,  and  would  respect  their  independence  and 
the  r  property,  French  commissioners  proceeded  to  rifle 
'he  trcasnriesyof  Berne,  Zurich,  Solothurn  Fi .honrg  a nd 
T  ucerne  of  sums  which  amounted  in  all  to  eight  and  a 
hamuli  francs;    fifteen    millions  were  "tortodm 

Slo,^  n^eTXch  Scathe  JSLW 

SnaUsis  contre  les  Francis  "  -  a  suggestive  remark. 


via  EGYPT  166 

liberators.1  The  destination  of  part  of  the  treasure  was 
already  fixed  ;  on  April  13th  Bonaparte  wrote  an  urgent 
letter  to  General  Lannes,  directing  him  to  expedite  the 
transit  of  the  booty  to  Toulon,  where  three  million  francs 
were  forthwith  expended  on  the  completion  of  the  armada. 
This  letter,  and  also  the  testimony  of  Madame  de 
Stael,  Barras,  Bourrienne,  and  Mallet  du  Pan,  show  that 
he  must  have  been  a  party  to  this  interference  in  Swiss 
affairs,  which  marks  a  debasement,  not  only  of  Bona- 
parte's character,  but  of  that  of  the  French  army  and 
people.  It  drew  from  Coleridge,  who  previously  had  seen 
in  the  Revolution  the  dawn  of  a  nobler  era,  an  indignant 
protest  against  the  prostitution  of  the  ideas  of  1789  : 

"  Oh  France  that  mockest  Heaven,  adulterous,  blind, 
Are  these  thy  boasts,  champion  of  human  kind? 
To  mix  with  Kings  in  the  low  lust  of  sway, 
Yell  in  the  hunt  and  join  the  murderous  prey?  .  .  . 
The  sensual  and  the  dark  rebel  in  vain 
Slaves  by  their  own  compulsion.     In  mad  game 
They  burst  their  manacles  :  but  wear  the  name 
Of  Freedom,  graven  on  a  heavier  chain." 

The  occupation  by  French  troops  of  the  great  central 
bastion  of  the'  European  system  seemed  a  challenge,  not 
only  to  idealists,  but  to  German  potentates.  It  nearly 
precipitated  a  rupture  with  Vienna,  where  the  French 
tricolour  had  recently  been  torn  down  by  an  angry  crowd. 
But  Bonaparte  did  his  utmost  to  prevent  a  renewal  of 
war  that  would  blight  his  eastern  prospects  ;  and  he  suc- 
ceeded. One  last  trouble  remained.  At  his  final  visit  to 
the  Directory,  when  crossed  about  some  detail,  he  pas- 
sionately threw  up  his  command.  Thereupon  Rewbell, 
noted  for  his  incisive  speech,  drew  up  the  form  of  resig- 
nation, and  presenting  it  to  Bonaparte,  firmly  said,  "  Sign, 
citizen  general."  The  general  did  not  sign,  but  retired 
from  the  meeting  apparently  crestfallen,  but  really  medi- 
tating a  coup  oVStat.  This  last  statement  rests  on  the  evi- 
dence of  Mathieu  Dumas,  who  heard  it  through  General 
Desaix,  a  close  friend  of  Bonaparte  ;  and  it  is  clear  from 
the  narratives  of  Bourrienne,  Barras,  and  Madame  Junot 

1Dandliker,  "  Geschichte  der  Schweiz,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  350  (edition  of 
1895)  ;  also  Lavisse,  "La  Rev.  Franc.,"  p.  821. 


166  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

that,  during  his  last  days  in  Paris,  the  general  was  moody, 
preoccupied,  and  fearful  of  being  poisoned. 
P  At  last  the  time  of  preparation  and  suspense  wasat  an 
end      The  aims  of  the  expedition  as  officially  defined  by 
a  secret  decree  on  April  12th  included  the  capture  of 
Egypt  and  the  exclusion  of  the  English  from  "all  their 
possessions  in  the  East  to  which  the  general  can  come    ; 
Bonaparte  was   also   to  have   the   isthmus   of   Suez   cut 
through ;  to  "  assure  the  free  and  exclusive  possession  ot 
the  Red  Sea  to  the  French  Republic";   to  improve  the 
condition  of  the  natives  of  Egypt,  and  to  cultivate  good 
delations  with  the  Grand  Siguier.     Another  secret  decree 
empowered  Bonaparte  to  seize  Malta.     To  these  schemes 
he  added  another  of  truly  colossal  dimensions     tftTnihev 
quering  the  East,  he  would  rouse  the  Greeks  and  other 
Christians  of  the  East,  overthrow  the  Turks,  seize  Con- 
stantinople, and  "  take  Europe  in  the  rear. 

Generous  support  was  accorded  to  the  savants  who  were 
desirous  of  exploring  the  artistic  and  literary  treasures  of 
Egypt  and  Mesopotamia.     It  has  been  affirmed  by  the 
bio-rapher  of  Monge  that  the  enthusiasm  of  this  cele- 
brated physicist  first  awakened  Bonaparte's  desire  for  the 
eastern  expedition  ;  but  this  seems  to  have  been  aroused 
eaiiier  by  Volney,  who  saw  a  good  deal  of  Bonaparte  in 
1791      In  truth,  the  desire  to  wrest  the  secrets  ot  learn- 
ing  from   the    mysterious   East    seems   always    to   have 
spurred  on  his  keenly  inquisitive  nature.     During   the 
winter  months  of  1797-8  he  attended  the  chemical  lec- 
tures of  the  renowned  Berthollet ;   and  it  was  no  per- 
functory choice  which  selected  him  for  the  place  in  the 
famous  institute  left  vacant  by  the  exile  of  Carnot.      lhe 
manner  in  which  he  now  signed  his  orders  and  proclama- 
tions—Member of  the  Institute,  General  in  Chief  ot  the 
Army  of  the  East  — showed  his  determination  to  banish 
from  the  life  of  France  that  affectation  of  boorish  igno- 
rance by  which  the  Terrorists  had  rendered  themselves 

uniquely  odious.  .    _     ...  ,a 

After  long  delays,  caused  by  contrary  winds,  the  armada 
set  sail  from  Toulon.  Along  with  the  convoys  from  Mar- 
seilles, Genoa,  and  Civita  Vecchia,  it  finally  re  ached  the 
grand  total  of  13  ships  of  the  line,  14  frigates,  72  cor- 


viii  EGYPT  167 

vettes,  and  nearly  400  transports  of  various  sizes,  convey- 
ing 35,000  troops.  Admiral  Brueys  was  the  admiral,  but 
acting  under  Bonaparte.  Of  the  generals  whom  the  com- 
mander-in-chief took  with  him,  the  highest  in  command 
were  the  divisional  generals  Kleber,  Desaix,  Bon,  Menou, 
Reynier,  for  the  infantry  :  under  them  served  14  generals, 
a  few  of  whom,  as  Marmont,  were  to  achieve  a  wider  fame. 
The  cavalry  was  commanded  by  the  stalwart  mulatto, 
General  Alexandre  Dumas,  under  whom  served  Leclerc, 
the  husband  of  Pauline  Bonaparte,  along  with  two  men 
destined  to  world-wide  renown,  Murat  and  Davoust. 
The  artillery  was  commanded  by  Dommartin,  the  engi- 
neers by  Caffarelli  :  and  the  heroic  Lannes  was  quarter- 
master-general. 

The  armada  appeared  off  Malta  without  meeting  with 
any  incident.  This  island  was  held  by  the  Knights  of 
St.  John,  the  last  of  those  companies  of  Christian  war- 
riors who  had  once  waged  war  on  the  infidels  in  Pales- 
tine. Their  courage  had  evaporated  in  luxurious  ease, 
and  their  discipline  was  a  prey  to  intestine  schisms  and 
to  the  intrigues  carried  on  with  the  French  Knights  of 
the  Order.  A  French  fleet  had  appeared  off  Valetta  in 
the  month  of  March  in  the  hope  of  effecting  a  surprise ; 
but  the  admiral,  Brueys,  judging  the  effort  too  hazard- 
ous, sent  an  awkward  explanation,  which  only  served  to 
throw  the  knights  into  the  arms  of  Russia.  One  of  the 
chivalrous  dreams  of  the  Czar  Paul  was  that  of  spreading 
his  influence  in  the  Mediterranean  by  a  treaty  with  this 
Order.  It  gratified  his  crusading  ardour  and  promised  to 
Russia  a  naval  base  for  the  partition  of  Turkey  which  was 
then  being  discussed  with  Austria  :  to  secure  the  control 
of  the  island,  Russia  was  about  to  expend  400,000  roubles, 
when  Bonaparte  anticipated  Muscovite  designs  by  a  prompt 
seizure.1  An  excuse  was  easily  found  for  a  rupture  with 
the  Order  :  some  companies  of  troops  were  disembarked, 
and  hostilities  commenced. 

Secure  within  their  mighty  walls,  the  knights  might  have 
held  the  intruders  at  bay,  had  they  not  been  divided  by 
internal  disputes :  the  French  knights  refused  to  fight 
against  their  countrymen  ;  and  a  revolt  of  the  native  Mal- 

1  "Correspondance,"  No.  2676. 


168 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  cha*. 


tese,  long  restless  under  the  yoke  of  the  Order,  now  helped 
to  bring  the  Grand  Master  to  a  surrender.  The  Evidence 
of  the  English  consul,  Mr.  Williams,  seems  to  show  that 
the  discontent  of  the  natives  was  even  more  potent  than 
the  influence  of  French  gold  in  bringing  about  this  result. 
At  any  rate,  one  of  the  strongest  places  in  Europe  admit- 
ted a  French  garrison,  after  so  tame  a  defence  that  Gen- 
eral Caffarelli,  on  viewing  the  fortifications,  remarked  to 
Bonaparte  :  "  Upon  my  word,  general,  it  is  lucky  there 
was  some  one  in  the  town  to  open  the  gates  to  us. 

During  his  stay  of  seven  days  at  Malta,  Bonaparte  re- 
vealed the  vigour  of  those  organizing  powers  for  which 
the  half  of  Europe  was  soon  to  present  all  too  small  an 
arena.     He    abolished    the    Order,  pensioning   off    those 
French  knights  who  had  been  serviceable  :  he  abolished 
the  religious  houses  and  confiscated  their  domains  to  the 
service  of  the  new  government :  he  established  a  govern- 
mental commission  acting  under  a  military  governor  :  he 
continued  provisionally  the  existing  taxes,  and  provided 
for  the  imposition  of  customs,  excise,  and  octroi  dues  :  he 
prepared  the  way  for  the  improvement  of  the  streets,  the 
erection  of  fountains,  the  reorganization  of  the  hospitals 
and  the  post  office.     To   the  university  he  gave  special 
attention,  rearranging  the  curriculum  on  the  model  ot  the 
more  advanced  Scoles  centrales  of    France,  but   inclining 
the  studies  severely  to  the  exact  sciences  and  the  useful 
arts.      On  all  sides  he  left  the  imprint   of  his  practical 
mind,  that  viewed  life  as  a  game  at  chess,  whence  bishops 
and  knights  were  carefully  banished,  and  wherein  nothing 
was  left  but  the  heavy  pieces  and  subservient  pawns. 

After  dragging  Malta  out  of  its  mediaeval  calm  and 
plunging  it  into  the  full  swirl  of  modern  progress,  Bona- 
parte set  sail  for  Egypt.  His  exchequer  was  the  richer 
by  all  the  gold  and  silver,  whether  in  bullion  or  in  vessels, 
discoverable  in  the  treasury  of  Malta  or  in  the  Church  ot 

i- Forei-n  Office  Records,"  Malta  (No.  1).  Mr.  Williams  states  hi 
his  despatch  of  June  30th,  1798,  that  Bonaparte  knew  there  were  ,  four 
thousand  Maltese  in  his  favour,  and  that  most  of  the  French  knights 
were  publicly  known  to  be  so ;  but  he  adds :  "  I  do  be  heve 'the  Malt ees 
[sic]  have  given  the  island  to  the  French  m  order  to  get  rid  of  the 
knighthood." 


viii  EGYPT 

St.  John.  Fortunately,  the  silver  gates  of  this  church  bad 
been  coloured  over,  and  thus  escaped  the  fate  of  the  other 
treasures.1  On  the  voyage  to  Alexandria  he  studied  the 
library  of  books  which  he  had  requested  Bourrienne  to 
purchase  for  him.  The  composition  of  this  library  is  of 
interest  as  showing  the  strong  trend  of  his  thoughts 
towards  history,  though  at  a  later  date  he  was  careful  to 
limit  its  study  in  the  university  and  schools  which  he 
founded.  He  had  with  him  125  volumes  of  historical 
works,  among  which  the  translations  of  Thucydides,  Plu- 
tarch, Tacitus,  and  Livy  represented  the  life  of  the  ancient 
world,  while  in  modern  life  he  concentrated  his  attention 
chiefly  on  the  manners  and  institutions  of  peoples  and  the 
memoirs  of  great  generals  —  as  Turenne,  Conde,  Luxem- 
bourg, Saxe,  Marlborough,  Eugene,  and  Charles  XII.  Of 
the  poets  he  selected  the  so-called  Ossian,  Tasso,  Ariosto, 
Homer,  Virgil,  and  the  masterpieces  of  the  French  theatre; 
but  he  especially  affected  the  turgid  and  declamatory  style 
of  Ossian.  In  romance,  English  literature  was  strongly 
represented  by  forty  volumes  of  novels,  of  course  in  trans- 
lations. Besides  a  few  works  on  arts  and  sciences,  he 
also  had  with  him  twelve  volumes  of  "  Barclay's  Geog- 
raphy," and  three  volumes  of  "Cook's  Voyages,"  which 
show  that  his  thoughts  extended  to  the  antipodes;  and 
under  the  heading  of  Politics  he  included  the  Bible,  the 
Koran,  the  Vedas,  a  Mythology,  and  Montesquieu's  "  Es- 
prit des  Lois "  !  The  composition  and  classification  of 
this  library  are  equally  suggestive.  Bonaparte  carefully 
searched  out  the  weak  places  of  the  organism  which  he 
was  about  to  attack  —  in  the  present  campaign,  Egypt  and 
the  British  Empire.  The  climate  and  natural  products, 
the  genius  of  its  writers  and  the  spirit  of  its  religion  — 
nothing  came  amiss  to  his  voracious  intellect,  which  as- 
similated the  most  diverse  materials  and  pressed  them 
all  into  his  service.  Greek  mythology  provided  allusions 
for  the  adornment  of  his  proclamations,  the  Koran  would 
dictate  his  behaviour  towards  the  Moslems,  and  the  Bible 
was  to  be  his  guide-book  concerning  the  Druses  and  Ar- 

1  I  am  indebted   for  this   fact  to  the  Librarian  of  the  Priory  of   the 
Knights  of  St.  John,  Clerkenwell. 


17o  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

menians.      All   three   were    therefore   grouped   together 
under  the  head  of  Politics. 

And  this,  on  the  whole,  fairly  well  represents  his  men- 
tal attitude  towards  religion  :  at  least,  it  was  his  work-a- 
day  attitude.     There   were  moments,  it  is  true,  when  an 
overpowering  sense  of  the  majesty  of  the  universe  lifted 
his  whole  being  far  above  this  petty  opportunism  :  and  in 
those  moments,  which,  in  regard  to  the  declaration  of  char- 
acter may  surely  be  held  to  counterbalance  whole  months 
spent  in  tactical  shifts  and  diplomatic  wiles,  he  was  capa- 
ble of  soaring  to  heights  of  imaginative  reverence.     Such 
an  episode,  lighting  up  for  us  the  recesses  of  his  mind, 
occurred  during  his  voyage  to  Egypt.     The  savants  on 
board  his  ship,  "  L'Orient,"  were  discussing  one  of  those 
questions  which  Bonaparte   often    propounded,   in    order 
that,  as  arbiter  in  this  contest  of  wits,  he  might  gauge 
their  mental  powers.     Mental  dexterity,  rather  than  the 
Socratic  pursuit  after  truth,  was  the  aim  of  their  dialec- 
tic; but  on  one  occasion,  when  religion   was  being  dis- 
cussed, Bonaparte  sounded  a  deeper  note  :  looking  up  into 
the  midnight  vault  of  sky,  he  said  to  the  philosophizing 
atheists  :  "  Very  ingenious,  sirs,  but  who  made  all  that  ?  ' 
As  a  retort  to  the  tongue-fencers,  what  could  be  better  ? 
The  appeal  away  from  words  to  the  star-studded  canopy 
was  irresistible :  it  affords  a  signal  proof  of  what  Carlyle 
has  finely  called  his  "  instinct  for  nature  "  and  his  "  ine- 
radicable  feeling   for  reality."      This  probably  was  the 
true  man,  lying  deep  under  his  Moslem  shifts  and  Con- 
cordat bargainings.  , 
That  there  was  a  tinge  of  superstition  in  Bonaparte  s 
nature,  such  as  usually  appears  in  gifted  scions  of  a  coast- 
dwelling  family,  cannot  be  denied ; l  but  his  usual  attitude 
towards  religion  was  that  of  the  political  mechanician,  not 
of  the  devotee,  and  even  while  professing  the  forms  of 
fatalistic  belief,  he  really  subordinated  them  to  his  own 
designs.     To  this  profound  calculation   of  the  credulity 
of  mankind  we  may  probably  refer   his  allusions  to  his 
star.      The    present  writer  regards  it  as  almost   certain 
that  his  star  was  invoked  in  order  to  dazzle  the  vulgar 
herd.     Indeed,  if  we  may  trust  Miot  de  Melito,  the  First 
1  See,  for  a  curious  instance,  Chaptal,  "  Mes  Souvenirs,"  p.  243. 


vm  EGYPT  171 

Consul  once  confessed  as  much  to  a  circle  of  friends. 
"  Caesar,"  he  said,  "  was  right  to  cite  his  good  fortune 
and  to  appear  to  believe  in  it.  That  is  a  means  of  acting 
on  the  imagination  of  others  without  offending  anyone's 
self-love."  A  strange  admission  this;  what  boundless 
self-confidence  it  implies  that  he  should  have  admitted 
the  trickery.  The  mere  acknowledgment  of  it  is  a  proof 
that  he  felt  himself  so  far  above  the  plane  of  ordinary 
mortals  that,  despite  the  disclosure,  he  himself  would 
continue  to  be  his  own  star.  For  the  rest,  is  it  credible 
that  this  analyzing  genius  could  ever  have  seriously 
adopted  the  astrologer's  creed  ?  Is  there  anything  in 
his  early  note-books  or  later  correspondence  which  war- 
rants such  a  belief  ?  Do  not  all  his  references  to  his 
star  occur  in  proclamations  and  addresses  intended  for 
popular  consumption  ? 

Certainly  Bonaparte's  good  fortune  was  conspicuous 
all  through  these  eastern  adventures,  and  never  more  so 
than  when  he  escaped  the  pursuit  of  Nelson.  The  Eng- 
lish admiral  had  divined  his  aim.  Setting  all  sail,  he 
came  almost  within  sight  of  the  French  force  near  Crete, 
and  he  reached  Alexandria  barely  two  days  before  his 
foes  hove  in  sight.  Finding  no  hostile  force  there,  he 
doubled  back  on  his  course  and  scoured  the  seas  between 
Crete,  Sicily,  and  the  Morea,  until  news  received  from  a 
Turkish  official  again  sent  him  eastwards.  On  such  trifles 
does  the  fate  of  empires  sometimes  depend. 

Meanwhile  events  were  crowding  thick  and  fast  upon 
Bonaparte.  To  free  himself  from  the  terrible  risks  which 
had  menaced  his  force  off  the  Egyptian  coast,  he  landed 
his  troops,  35,000  strong,  with  all  possible  expedition  at 
Marabout  near  Alexandria,  and,  directing  his  columns  of 
attack  on  the  walls  of  that  city,  captured  it  by  a  rush 
(July  2nd). 

For  this  seizure  of  neutral  territory  he  offered  no  ex- 
cuse other  than  that  the  Beys,  who  were  the  real  rulers  of 
Egypt,  had  favoured  English  commerce  and  were  guilty 
of  some  outrages  on  French  merchants.  He  strove,  how- 
ever, to  induce  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  to  believe  that  the 
French  invasion  of  Egypt  was  a  friendly  act,  as  it  would 
overthrow  the  power  of  the  Mamelukes,  who  had  reduced 


172 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


Turkish  authority  to  a  mere  shadow.     This  was  the  argu- 
ment which  he  addressed  to  the  Turkish  officials,  but  it 
proved  to  be  too  subtle  even  for  the  oriental  mind  fully 
to  appreciate.     Bonaparte's  chief  concern  was  to  win  over 
the  subject  population,  which  consisted  of  diverse  races. 
At    the   surface  were   the  Mamelukes,  a  powerful  mili- 
tary order,  possessing  a  magnificent  cavalry,  governed  by 
two  Beys,  and  scarcely  recognizing  the  vague  suzerainty 
claimed  by  the  Porte.     The  rivalries  of  the  Beys,  Murad 
and  Ibrahim,  produced  a  fertile  crop  of  discords  in  this 
governing   caste,    and   their    feuds   exposed   the   subject 
races,   both   Arabs   and    Copts,  to   constant   forays   and 
exactions.     It  seemed  possible,  therefore,  to  arouse  them 
against  the  dominant  caste,  provided  that  the   Moham- 
medan scruples  of  the  whole  population  were  carefully 
respected.     To   this   end,  the  commander  cautioned   his 
troops  to  act  towards  the   Moslems   as    towards  "Jews 
and  Italians,"  and  to  respect  their  muftis  and  imams  as 
much  as  «  rabbis  and  bishops."     He  also  proclaimed  to  the 
Egyptians  his  determination,  while  overthrowing  Mame- 
luke tyranny,  to  respect  the  Moslem  faith:    «  Have  we 
not  destroyed  the  Pope,  who  bade  men  wage  war  on  Mos- 
lems'    Have  we   not   destroyed  the  Knights  of   Malta, 
because  those  fools  believed  it  to  be  God's  will  to  war 
against   Moslems?"      The   French   soldiers   were   vastly 
amused   by   the   humour  of   these  proceedings,  and  the 
liberated  people  fully  appreciated  the  menaces  with  which 
Bonaparte's  proclamation  closed,  backed  up  as  these  were 

by  irresistible  force.1  ,114. 

After  arranging  affairs  at  Alexandria,  where  the  gallant 
Kleber  was  left  in  command,  Bonaparte  ordered  an 
advance  into  the  interior.  Never,  perhaps,  did  he  show 
the  value  of  swift  offensive  action  more  decisively  than  in 
this  prompt  march  on  Damanhour  across  the  desert.  I  he 
other  route  by  way  of  Rosetta  would  have  been  easier  ; 
but,  as  it  was  longer,  he  rejected  it,  and  told  off  General 
Menou  to  capture  that  city  and  support  a  flotilla  of  boats 

1  The  Arab  accounts  of  these  events,  drawn  up  by  Nakoula  and 
Abdurrahman,  are  of  much  interest.  They  have  been  well  used  by 
MDufou"cq,  editor  of  Desvernois'  "Memoirs,"  for  many  suggestive 
footnotes. 


vm  EGYPT  173 

which  was  to  ascend  the  Nile  and  meet  the  army  on  its  march 
to  Cairo.  On  July  4th  the  first  division  of  the  main  force 
set  forth  by  night  into  the  desert  south  of  Alexandria. 
All  was  new  and  terrible  ;  and,  when  the  rays  of  the  sun 
smote  on  their  weary  backs,  the  murmurings  of  the  troops 
grew  loud.  This,  then,  was  the  land,  "  more  fertile  than 
Lombardy,"  which  was  the  goal  of  their  wanderings. 
"  See,  there  are  the  six  acres  of  land  which  you  are 
promised,"  exclaimed  a  waggish  soldier  to  his  comrade 
as  they  first  gazed  from  ship-board  on  the  desert  east  of 
Alexandria  ;  and  all  the  sense  of  discipline  failed  to  keep 
this  and  other  gibes  from  the  ears  of  staff  officers  even 
before  they  reached  that  city.  Far  worse  was  their  posi- 
tion now  in  the  shifting  sand  of  the  desert,  beset  by  hover- 
ing Bedouins,  stung  by  scorpions,  and  afflicted  by  intoler- 
able thirst.  The  Arabs  had  filled  the  scanty  wells  with 
stones,  and  only  after  long  toil  could  the  sappers  reach 
the  precious  fluid  beneath.  Then  the  troops  rushed  and 
fought  for  the  privilege  of  drinking  a  few  drops  of  mudd}' 
liquor.  Thus  they  struggled  on,  the  succeeding  divisions 
faring  worst  of  all.  Berthier,  chief  of  the  staff,  relates 
that  a  glass  of  water  sold  for  its  weight  in  gold.  Even 
brave  officers  abandoned  themselves  to  transports  of  rage 
and  despair  which  left  them  completely  prostrate.1 

But  Bonaparte  flinched  not.  His  stern  composure  offered 
the  best  rebuke  to  such  childish  sallies ;  and  when  out  of 
a  murmuring  group  there  came  the  bold  remark,  "  Well, 
General,  are  you  going  to  take  us  to  India  thus,"  he  abashed 
the  speaker  and  his  comrades  by  the  quick  retort,  "  No, 
I  would  not  undertake  that  with  such  soldiers  as  you." 
French  honour,  touched  to  the  quick,  reasserted  itself  even 
above  the  torments  of  thirst ;  and  the  troops  themselves, 
when  they  tardily  reached  the  Nile  and  slacked  their 
thirst  in  its  waters,  recognized  the  pre-eminence  of  his  will 
and  his  profound  confidence  in  their  endurance.  French 
gaiety  had  not  been  wholly  eclipsed  even  by  the  miseries 
of  the  desert  march.  To  cheer  their  drooping  spirits  the 
commander  had  sent  some  of  the  staunchest  generals  along 
the  line  of  march.     Among  them  was  the  gifted  Caffarelli, 

1  Desgenettes,  "  Histoire  mgdicale  de  PArin^e  d'Orient "  (Paris,  1802); 
Belliard,  uM6moires,"  vol.  L 


174 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


who  had  lost  a  leg  in  the  Rhenish  campaign  ;  his  reassur- 
ing words  called  forth  the  inimitable  retort  from  the  ranks: 
"  Ah  !  he  don't  care,  not  he :  he  has  one  leg  in  t  ranee. 
Scarcely  less  witty  was  the  soldier's  description  of  the 
prowling  Bedouins,  who  cut  off  stragglers  and  plunderers, 
as  "  The  mounted  highway  police." 

After  brushing  aside  a  charge  of   800   Mamelukes   at 
Chebreiss,  the  army  made  its  way  up  the  banks of  the  Mile 
to  Embabeh,  opposite  Cairo.     There  the  Mamelukes,  led 
by  Ibrahim  and    Murad,  had  their  fortified    camp;    and 
there  that  superb  cavalry  prepared  to  overwhelm  the  in- 
vaders in  a  whirlwind  rush  of  horse  (July  21st,  1798). 
The  occasion  and  the  surroundings  were  such  as  to  inspire 
both  sides  with   desperate   resolution.     It  was   the  first 
fierce  shock  on  land  of  eastern  chivalry  and  western  enter- 
prise since  the  days  of  St.  Louis ;  and  the  ardour  of  the 
republicans  was  scarcely  less  than  that  which  had  kindled 
the  soldiers  of  the  cross.     Beside  the  two  armies  rolled  the 
mysterious  Nile  ;  beyond  glittered  the  slender  minarets  ot 
Cairo  ;  and  on  the  south  there  loomed  the  massy  Pyramids. 
To  the  forty  centuries  that  had  rolled  over  them,  Bona- 
parte now  appealed,  in  one  of  those  imaginative  touches 

•  which  ever  brace  the  French  nature  to  the  utmost  tension 
of  daring  and  endurance.  Thus  they  advanced  in  close 
formation  towards  the  intrenched  camp  of  the  Mamelukes. 
The  divisions  on  the  left  at  once  rushed  at  its  earthworks, 
silenced  its  feeble  artillery,  and  slaughtered  the  fellahin 

inside.  .   .  ,.. 

But  the  other  divisions,  now  ranged  in  squares,  while 

gazing  at  this  exploit,  were  assailed  by  the  Mamelukes. 
From  out  the  haze  of  the  mirage,  or  from  behind  the 
ridges  of  sand  and  the  scrub  of  the  water-melon  plants 
that  dotted  the  plain,  some  10,000  of  these  superb  horse- 
men suddenly  appeared  and  rushed  at  the  squares  com- 

•  manded  by  Desaix  and  Reynier.  Their  richly  caparisoned 
chargers,  their  waving  plumes,  their  wild  battle-cries,  and 
their  marvellous  skill  with  carbine  and  sword,  lent  pictu- 
resqueness  and  terror  to  the  charge.  Musketry  and  grape- 
shot  mowed  down  their  front  coursers  in  ghastly  swaths; 
but  the  living  mass  swept  on,  wellnigh  overwhelming  the 
fronts  of  the  squares,  and  then,  swerving  aside,  poured 


vin  EGYPT  176 

through  the  deadly  funnel  between.  Decimated  here 
also  by  the  steady  fire  of  the  French  files,  and  by  the  dis- 
charges of  the  rear  face,  they  fell  away  exhausted,  leaving 
heaps  of  dead  and  dying  on  the  fronts  of  the  squares,  and 
in  their  very  midst  a  score  of  their  choicest  cavaliers, 
whose  bravery  and  horsemanship  had  carried  them  to  cer- 
tain death  amidst  the  bayonets.  The  French  now  assumed 
the  offensive,  and  Desaix's  division,  threatening  to  cut  off 
the  retreat  of  Murad's  horsemen,  led  that  wary  chief  to 
draw  off  his  shattered  squadrons  ;  while  his  rival  Ibrahim 
sought  safety  in  flight  towards  Cairo  and  the  isthmus  of 
Suez,  but  with  ranks  frightfully  thinned  by  the  French 
fire  and  the  waters  of  the  Nile.  Such  was  the  battle  of 
the  Pyramids,  which  gained  a  colony  at  the  cost  of  some 
thirty  killed  and  about  ten  times  as  many  wounded  :  of 
the  killed  about  twenty  fell  victims  to  the  cross  fire  of  the 
two  squares.1 

After  halting  for  a  fortnight  at  Cairo  to  recruit  his 
weary  troops  and  to  arrange  the  affairs  of  his  conquest, 
Bonaparte  marched  eastwards  in  pursuit  of  Ibrahim  and 
drove  him  into  Syria,  while  Desaix  waged  an  arduous  but 
successful  campaign  against  Murad  in  Upper  Egypt.  But 
the  victors  were  soon  to  learn  the  uselessness  of  merely 
military  triumphs  in  Egypt.  As  Bonaparte  returned  to 
complete  the  organization  of  the  new  colony,  he  heard 
that  Nelson  had  destroyed  his  fleet. 

On  July  3rd,  before  setting  out  from  Alexandria,  the 
French  commander  gave  an  order  to  his  admiral,  the  chief 
sentences  of  which  were  as  follows  : 

"The  admiral  will  to-morrow  acquaint  the  commander-in-chief  by 
a  report  whether  the  squadron  can  enter  the  port  of  Alexandria,  or 
whether,  in  Aboukir  Roads,  bringing  its  broadside  to  bear,  it  can 
defend  itself  against  the  enemy's  superior  force ;  and  in  case  both 
these  plans  should  be  impracticable,  he  must  sail  for  Corfu  .  .  .  leav- 
ing the  light  ships  and  the  flotilla  at  Alexandria." 

Brueys  speedily  discovered  that  the  first  plan  was  beset 
by  grave  dangers  :  the  entrance  to  the  harbour  of  Alex- 
andria, when  sounded,  proved  to  be  most  difficult  for  large 


u 


1 1   have  followed  chiefly   the  account  of    Savary,    Due    de   Rovigo, 
Mems."  eh.  iv.    See  too  Desvernois,  "  Mems.,"  cli.  iv 


176  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

ships -such  was  his  judgment  and  that   of  Villeneuve 
and"  Casablanca-  and  the  exit  could  be  blocked  by  a  sm- 
X T English  battleship.     As  regards   the    alternatives   of 
iboukfr  or  Corfu,  Brueys  went  on  to  state  :  -My  firm 
desire  is  to  be  useful  to  you  in  every  possible  way  :  and  as 
I  have  already  said,  every  post  will  suit  me  well,  provided 
that   vou   placed   me   there  in  an  active  way.       By  this 
rather  ambiguous  phrase  it  would  seem  that  he   scouted 
the  altema Uve  of  Corfu  as  consigning  him  to  a  degrading 
inLtivtty  ;  while  at  Aboukir  he  held  that  he  could  be 
actively  useful  in  protecting  the  rear  of  the  army.     In 
that  bay  he  therefore  anchored  his  largest  ships  trusting 
that  the7  dancers  of  the  approach  would  screen  him    rom 
any  sudden  attack,  but  nSdng  also  special  Preparations 
ii/case  he  should  be   compelled  to  fight  at  anchor^    His 
decision  was  probably  less  sound  than  that  of  Bonaparte, 
who,    while   marching    to    Cairo     and   again    during   his 
soiourn  there,  ordered  him  to  make  for  Corfu  or  Toulon  , 
or  the  general  saw  clearly  that  the  French  fleet,  riding  n 
safetv  in  those    well-protected    roadsteads,  would   really 
dominate    the    Mediterranean    better   than   in  the   open 
exmnse  of  Aboukir.     But  these  orders  did  not  reach  the 
admiral  before  the  blow  fell  ;  and  it  is,  after  all,  somewhat 
fng  nlut te  censure  Brueys  for  his  decision  to  remain 
at  Aboukir  and  risk  a  fight  rather  than  comply  with  the 
dictates  of  a  prudent  but  inglorious  strategy. 

The  British  admiral,  after  sweeping  the  eastern  Med,, 
terranean,  at  last  found  the  French  fleet  in  Abukir  Bay 
*hmit  tpn  miles  from  the  Rosetta  mouth  of  the  JNile.     it 
\        wis  Lchorefunder  the  lee  of  a  shoal  which  would  have 

\        ^ZteHny  ordinary  admiral  ^.g-^MStoS 
at  sundown.     But  Nelson,  knowing  that  the  head  ship ^ot 
the    French  was  free  to  swing   at    anchor     rightly    co. i 
eluded  that  there  must  be  room  for  British  ships  to  sail 

iSee  his  orders  published  in  the  «  Co^pondance  ^\*™™i 
de  Nap.  Bonaparte,  Egypte  »  vol.  i.  (1 ^  181p9' J £  ^  the  jjr.  Rev. 
Captain  Mahan's  statement  C'  Influence ,  of  Sea  Power  up^t 
and  Erap.,"  vol.  i.,  p.  263)  as  to  nrueyb  u  rivwnterv  and  worried 
Aboukir.  On  the  contrary,  though  ^^^^^^  certainly 
by  lack  of  provisions  and  the  l™to?m**on*h»^S^^AwJ- 
did  what  he  could  under  the  circumstances.  See  his  letters  in  me  yy 
Six  of  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  »  Queries  Mant.mes,"  vol.  i. 


vin  EGYPT  177 

between  Brueys'  stationary  line  and  the  shallows.  The 
British  captains  thrust  live  ships  between  the  French  and 
the  shoal,  while  the  others,  passing  down  the  enemy's 
line  on  the  seaward  side,  crushed  it  in  detail  ;  and,  after 
a  night  of  carnage,  the  light  of  August  2nd  dawned  on  a 
scene  of  destruction  unsurpassed  in  naval  warfare.  Two 
French  ships  of  the  line  and  two  frigates  alone  escaped : 
one,  the  gigantic  "  Orient,"  had  blown  up  with  the  spoils 
of  Malta  on  board  :  the  rest,  eleven  in  number,  were 
captured  or  burnt. 

To  Bonaparte  this  disaster  came  as  a  bolt  from  the 
blue.  Only  two  days  before,  he  had  written  from  Cairo 
to  Brueys  that  all  the  conduct  of  the  English  made  him 
believe  them  to  be  inferior  in  numbers  and  fully  satisfied 
with  blockading  Malta.  Yet,  in  order  to  restore  the 
morale  of  his  army,  utterly  depressed  by  this  disaster, 
he  affected  a  confidence  which  he  could  no  longer  feel, 
and  said  :  "  Well !  here  we  must  remain  or  achieve  a 
grandeur  like  that  of  the  ancients."1  He  had  recently 
assured  his  intimates  that  after  routing  the  Beys'  forces 
he  would  return  to  France  and  strike  a  blow  direct  at 
England.  Whatever  he  may  have  designed,  he  was  now 
a  prisoner  in  his  conquest.  His  men,  even  some  of  his 
highest  officers,  as  Berthier,  Bessieres,  Lannes,  Murat, 
Dumas,  and  others,  bitterly  complained  of  their  miser- 
able position.  But  the  commander,  whose  spirits  rose 
with  adversity,  took  effective  means  for  repressing  such 
discontent.  To  the  last-named,  a  powerful  mulatto,  he 
exclaimed  :  "  You  have  held  seditious  parleys  :  take  care 
that  I  do  not  perform  my  duty  :  your  six  feet  of  stature 
shall  not  save  you  from  being  shot "  :  and  he  offered 
passports  for  France  to  a  few  of  the  most  discontented 
and  useless  officers,  well  knowing  that  after  Nelson's 
victory  they  could  scarcely  be  used.  Others,  again,  out- 
Heroding  Herod,  suggested  that  the  frigates  and  trans- 
ports at  Alexandria  should  be  taken  to  pieces  and 
conveyed  on  camels'  backs  to  Suez,  there  to  be  used  for 
the  invasion  of  India.2 

The  versatility  of  Bonaparte's  genius  was  never  more 
marked   than    at   this   time    of   discouragement.      While 

1  Devernois,  "  Metna  .*'  oh.  v.  >  7ft.,  ch.  vi. 

N 


178 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


his   enemies   figured   him   and   his   exhausted   troops   as 
vSnlv  seeking  to  escape  from  those  and  wastes  ;  while 

Nelson  "as   Lding   <£.    \^  ^ZT^oZZ^Z 
increase   his   embarrassment   about   food,  Bonaparte  ana 
h s  slvants  were  developing   constructive   powers  of  the 
hthest    orZv,   which   made   the   army   independent    of 
Europe      It  was  a  vast  undertaking.     Deprived  of  most 
of  tE  treasure  and  many  of  their  mechanical  appliances 
bv  the  loss  of  the  fleet,  the  savants  and  engineers  had,  as 
^were    to     tart   from   the   beginning.     Some  strove  to 
melt   the   difficulties   of   food-supply   by   extending   the 
station  of   corn   and  rice,  or  by  ^^M^ 
laro-e  ovens  and   bakeries,  or  of   windmills  lor  grinding 
large  ovens  ji  vineyards  for  the  future,  or  sought 

to° —e th  ctseTess^hi/st  of  the  soldiery  by  the  manu- 
facture o?  a  kind  of  native  beer.  Foundries  and  work- 
shops  be"  an,  though  slowly,  to  supply  tools  and  machines  ; 
?he  earth  was  rifled  of  her  treasures,  natron  was  wrought 
saltpetre  works  were  established,  and  gunpowder  was 
theS;  procured  for  the  army  with  an  energy  which 
trailed  the  prodigies  of  activity  ot  J-'yrf-  . 

Wifthis  usu/ardour  in  the  cause  of  learning  Bona- 
uarte  several   times  a  week   appeared   in  the  chemical 
Faboratory,  or  witnessed  the  experiments  performed  by 
Berthollet  and  Monge.    '  Desirons  of  giving  cohesion  to 
The  efforts  of  his  savants,  and  of  honouring  not ^onl the 
useful  arts  but  abstruse  research,  he  united  these  P'oneers 
o   science  in  a  society  termed  the  I-^^&J^ 
Anmut  21st    1798,  it  was  installed  with  much  ceremony 
^  the  palace  o   one  of  the  Beys,  Monge  being  president 
'an!  BoCarte  vice-president.     The  genera    a  so  enrolled 
himself  in  the  mathematical  section  of  ^institute.     ^ 
deed  he  sought  by  all  possible  means  to  aid  the  lahoms 
of  the  La  J,  whlse  dissertations  were  now  tadmlto 
large  hall  of  the  harem  that  formerly  resounded  only -to 
the   twanging  of  lutes,  weary  jests,  and    die   laughter 
The  labours  of  the  savants  were  not  confined It .Cairo  and 
the  Delta.     As  soon  as  the  victories  of  Desa.x  ,n .Upper 
Egypt  opened  the  middle  reaches  of  the  Nile  to peaceful 
Schfthe  treasures  of  Memphis  -^  revealed  to  the 
astonished  gaze  of  western  learning.     Many  ot  the  more 


VIII 


EGYPT  170 


portable  relics  were  transferred  to  Cairo,  and  thence  to 
Rosetta  or  Alexandria,  in  order  to  grace  the  museums  of 
Paris.  The  savants  proposed,  but  seapower  disposed,  of 
these  treasures.  They  are  now,  with  few  exceptions,  in 
the  British  Museum. 

Apart  from  archaeology,  much  was  done  to  extend  the 
bounds  of  learning.  Astronomy  gained  much  by  the 
observations  of  General  Caffarelli.  A  series  of  measure- 
ments was  begun  for  an  exact  survey  of  Egypt  :  the  ge- 
ologists and  engineers  examined  the  course  of  the  Nile, 
recorded  the  progress  of  alluvial  deposits  at  its  mouth  or 
on  its  banks,  and  therefrom  calculated  the  antiquity  of 
divers  parts  of  the  Delta.  No  part  of  the  great  con- 
queror's career  so  aptly  illustrates  the  truth  of  his  noble 
words  to  the  magistrates  of  the  Ligurian  Republic  :  "  The  "J 
true  conquests,  the  only  conquests  which  cost  no  regrets, 
are  those  achieved  over  ignorance." 

Such,  in  brief  outline,  is  the  story  of  the  renascence  in 
Egypt.  The  mother-land  of  science  and  learning,  after  a 
wellnigh  barren  interval  of  1,100  years  since  the  Arab 
conquest,  was  now  developed  and  illumined  by  the  appli- 
cation of  the  arts  with  which  in  the  dim  past  she  had 
enriched  the  life  of  barbarous  Europe. .  The  repayment 
of  this  incalculable  debt  was  due  primarily  to  the  enter- 
prise of  Bonaparte.  It  is  one  of  his  many  titles  to  fame 
and  to  the  homage  of  posterity.  How  poor  by  the  side  of 
this  encyclopaedic  genius  are  the  gifts  even  of  his  most 
brilliant  foes  !  At  that  same  time  the  Archduke  Charles 
of  Austria  was  vegetating  in  inglorious  ease  on  his  estates. 
As  for  Beaulieu  and  Wiirmser,  they  had  subsided  into 
their  native  obscurity.  Nelson,  after  his  recent  triumph, 
persuading  himself  that  "  Bonaparte  had  gone  to  the  devil," 
was  bending  before  the  whims  of  a  professional  beauty  and 
the  odious  despotism  of  the  worst  Court  in  Europe.  While 
the  admiral  tarnished  his  fame  on  the  Syren  coast  of 
Naples,  his  great  opponent  bent  all  the  resources  of  a  fer- 
tile intellect  to  retrieve  his  position,  and  even  under  the 
gloom  of  disaster  threw  a  gleam  of  light  into  the  dark 
continent.  While  his  adversaries  were  merely  generals 
or  admirals,  hampered  by  a  stupid  education  and  a  narrow 
nationality,  Bonaparte  had  eagerly  imbibed  the  new  learn- 


180  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

ing  of  his  age  and  saw  its  possible  influence  on  the  reor- 
ganization of  society.  He  is  not  merely  a  general.  Even 
when  he  is  scattering  to  the  winds  the  proud  chivalry  of 
the  East,  and  is  prescribing  to  Brueys  his  safest  course 
of  action,  he  finds  time  vastly  to  expand  the  horizon  of 
human  knowledge. 

Nor  did  he  neglect  Egyptian  politics.  He  used  a  native 
council  for  consultation  and  for  the  promulgation  of  his 
own  ideas.  Immediately  after  his  entry  into  Cairo  he  ap- 
pointed nine  sheikhs  to  form  a  divan,  or  council,  consult- 
ing daily  on  public  order  and  the  food-supplies  of  the  city. 
He  next  assembled  a  general  divan  for  Egypt,  and  a  smaller 
council  for  each  province,  and  asked  their  advice  concern- 
ing the  administration  of  justice  and  the  collection  of  taxes.1 
In  its  use  of  oriental  terminology,  this  scheme  was  undeni- 
ably clever  ;  but  neither  French,  Arabs,  nor  Turks  were 
deceived  as  to  the  real  government,  which  resided  entirely 
in  Bonaparte  ;  and  his  skill  in  reapportioning  the  imposts 
had  some  effect  on  the  prosperity  of  the  land,  enabling  it 
to  bear  the  drain  of  his  constant  requisitions.  The  welfare 
of  the  new  colony  was  also  promoted  by  the  foundation  of 
a  mint  and  of  an  Egyptian  Commercial  Company. 

His  inventive  genius  was  by  no  means  exhausted  by  these 
varied  toils.  On  his  journey  to  Suez  he  met  a  camel  cara- 
van in  the  desert,  and  noticing  the  speed  of  the  animals,  he 
determined  to  form  a  camel  corps  ;  and  in  the  first  month 
of  1799  the  experiment  was  made  with  such  success  that 
admission  into  the  ranks  of  the  camelry  came  to  be  viewed 
as  a  favour.  Each  animal  carried  two  men  with  their  arms 
and  baggage  :  the  uniform  was  sky-blue  with  a  white  tur- 
ban ;  and  the  speed  and  precision  of  their  movements  en- 
abled them  to  deal  terrible  blows,  even  at  distant  tribes  of 
Bedouins,  who  bent  before  a  genius  that  could  outwit  them 
even  in  their  own  deserts. 

The  pleasures  of  his  officers  and  men  were  also  met  by 
the  opening  of  the  Tivoli  Gardens  ;  and  there,  in  sight  of 
the  Pyramids,  the  life  of  the  Palais  Royal  took  root :  the 
glasses  clinked,  the  dice  rattled,  and  heads  reeled  to  the 
lascivious  movements  of  the  eastern  dance  ;  and  Bonaparte 
himself  indulged  a  passing  passion  for  the  wife  of  one  of 

i  Order  of  July  27th,  1798. 


vm  EGYPT  181 

his  officers,  with  an  openness  that  brought  on  him  a  rebuke 
from  his  stepson,  Eugene  Beauharnais.  But  already  he 
had  been  rendered  desperate  by  reports  of  the  unfaithful- 
ness of  Josephine  at  Paris  ;  the  news  wrung  from  him  this 
pathetic  letter  to  his  brother  Joseph  —  the  death-cry  of  his 
long  drooping  idealism  : 

"I  have  much  to  worry  me  privately,  for  the  veil  is  entirely  torn 
aside.  You  alone  remain  to  me ;  your  affection  is  very  dear  to  me  : 
nothing  more  remains  to  make  me  a  misanthrope  than  to  lose  her  and 
see  you  betray  me.  .  .  .  Buy  a  country  seat  against  my  return,  either 
near  Paris  or  in  Burgundy.  I  need  solitude  and  isolation:  grandeur 
wearies  me:  the  fount  of  feeling  is  dried  up:  glory  itself  is  insipid. 
At  twenty-nine  years  of  age  I  have  exhausted  everything.  It  only 
remains  to  me  to  become  a  thorough  egoist."  x 

Many  rumours  were  circulated  as  to  Bonaparte's  public 
appearance  in  oriental  costume  and  his  presence  at  a  reli- 
gious service  in  a  mosque.  It  is  even  stated  by  Thiers  that 
at  one  of  the  chief  festivals  he  repaired  to  the  great  mosque, 
repeated  the  prayers  like  a  true  Moslem,  crossing  his  legs 
and  swaying  his  body  to  and  fro,  so  that  he  "edified  the 
believers  by  his  orthodox  piety."  But  the  whole  incident, 
however  attractive  scenically  and  in  point  of  humour,  seems 
to  be  no  better  authenticated  than  the  religious  results 
about  which  the  historian  cherished  so  hopeful  a  belief. 
The  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  general  went  to  the  celebra- 
tion of  the  birth  of  the  Prophet  as  an  interested  spectator, 
at  the  house  of  the  sheikh,  El  Bekri.  Some  hundred  sheikhs 
were  there  present  :  they  swayed  their  bodies  to  and  fro 
while  the  story  of  Mahomet's  life  was  recited  ;  and  Bona- 
parte afterwards  partook  of  an  oriental  repast.  But  he 
never  forgot  his  dignity  so  far  as  publicly  to  appear  in  a 
turban  and  loose  trousers,  which  he  donned  only  once  for 
the  amusement  of  his  staff.2  That  he  endeavoured  to  pose 
as  a  Moslem  is  beyond  doubt.  Witness  his  endeavour  to 
convince  the  imams  at  Cairo  of  his  desire  to  conform  to 
their  faith.  If  we  may  believe  that  dubious  compilation, 
"  A  Voice  from  St.  Helena,"  he  bade  them  consult  together 
as  to  the  possibility  of  admission  of  men,  who  were  not  cir- 

1  Ducasse,  "  Les  Rois,  Freres  de  Napoleon,"  p.  8. 

2  "  Memoires  de  Napoleon,"  vol.  ii.  ;  Bourrienne,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i., 
ch.  xvii. 


182  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

cumcised  and  did  not  abstain  from  wine,  into  the  true  fold. 
As  to  the  latter  disability,  he  stated  that  the  French  were 
poor  cold  people,  inhabitants  of  the  north,  who  could  not 
exist  without  wine.  For  a  long  time  the  imams  demurred 
to  this  plea,  which  involved  greater  difficulties  than  the 
question  of  circumcision  :  but  after  long  consultations  they 
decided  that  both  objections  might  be  waived  in  considera- 
tion of  a  superabundance  of  good  works.  The  reply  was 
prompted  by  an  irony  no  less  subtle  than  that  which  accom- 
panied the  claim,  and  neither  side  was  deceived  in  this 
contest  of  wits. 

A  rude  awakening  soon  came.  For  some  few  days  there 
had  been  rumours  that  the  division  under  Desaix  which  was 
fighting  the  Mamelukes  in  Upper  Egypt  had  been  engulfed 
in  those  sandy  wastes  ;  and  this  report  fanned  to  a  flame 
the  latent  hostility  against  the  unbelievers.  From  many 
minarets  of  Cairo  a  summons  to  arms  took  the  place  of  the 
customary  call  to  prayer  :  and  on  October  21st  the  French 
garrison  was  so  fiercely  and  suddenly  attacked  as  to  leave 
the  issue  doubtful.  Discipline  and  grapeshot  finally  pre- 
vailed, whereupon  a  repression  of  oriental  ferocity  cowed  the 
spirits  of  the  townsfolk  and  of  the  neighbouring  country. 
Forts  were  constructed  in  Cairo  and  at  all  the  strategic 
points  along  the  lower  Nile,  and  Egypt  seemed  to  be 
conquered. 

Feeling  sure  now  of  his  hold  on  the  populace,  Bonaparte, 

at  the  close  of  the  year,  undertook  a  journey  to  Suez  and 

the  Sinaitic   peninsula.     It  offered   that  combination  of 

utility  and  romance  which  ever  appealed  to  him.     At  Suez 

he  sought  to  revivify  commerce  by  lightening  the  customs' 

dues,  by  founding  a  branch  of  his  Egyptian  commercial 

company,  and  by  graciously  receiving  a  deputation  of  the 

Arabs  of  Tor  who  came  to  sue  for  his  friendship.1     Then, 

journeying  on,  he  visited  the  fountains  of  Moses ;  but  it  is 

not  true  that  (as  stated   by  Lanfrey)    he   proceeded   to 

Mount  Sinai  and  signed  his  name  in  the  register  of  the 

monastery  side  by  side  with  that  of  Mahomet.     On  his 

return  to  the  isthmus  he  is  said  to  have  narrowly  escaped 

from  the  rising  tide  of  the  Red  Sea.     If  we  may  credit 

Savary,  who  was  not  of  the  party,  its  safety  was  due  to 

1 "  M6ms.  de  Berthier." 


viii  EGYPT  183 

the  address  of  the  commander,  who,  as  darkness  fell  on  the 
bewildered  band,  arranged  his  horsemen  in  files,  until  the 
higher  causeway  of  the  path  was  again  discovered.  North 
of  Suez  the  traces  of  the  canal  dug  by  Sesostris  revealed 
themselves  to  the  trained  eye  of  the  commander.  The 
observations  of  his  engineers  confirmed  his  conjecture, 
but  the  vast  labour  of  reconstruction  forbade  any  attempt 
to  construct  a  maritime  canal.  On  his  return  to  Cairo  he 
wrote  to  the  Imam  of  Muscat,  assuring  him  of  his  friend- 
ship and  begging  him  to  forward  to  Tippoo  Sahib  a  letter 
offering  alliance  and  deliverance  from  "  the  iron  yoke  of 
England,"  and  stating  that  the  French  had  arrived  on  the 
shores  of  the  Red  Sea  "  with  a  numerous  and  invincible 
army."  The  letter  was  intercepted  by  a  British  cruiser  ; 
and  the  alarm  caused  by  these  vast  designs  only  served 
to  spur  on  our  forces  to  efforts  which  cost  Tippoo  his  life 
and  the  French  most  of  their  Indian  settlements. 


CHAPTER  IX 

SYRIA 


Meanwhile  Turkey  had  declared  war  on  France,  and 
was  sending  an  army  through  Syria  f or  the  J^overy  of 
Eevpt,  while  another  expedition  was  assembling  at  Rhodes. 
Like  all  great  captains,  Bonaparte  was  never  content  with 
the  defensive  :  his  convictions  and  his  pugnacious  instincts 
alike  urged  him  to  give  rather  than  to  receive  the  blow ; 
and  he  argued  that  he  could  attack  and  destroy  the  Syrian 
force  before  the  cessation  of   the  winter's   gales  would 
allow  the  other  Turkish  expedition  to  attempt  a  disem- 
barkation at  Aboukir.     If  he  waited  in  Egypt  he  might 
have  to  meet  the  two  attacks  at  once  whereas,  if  he  struck 
at  Jaffa  and  Acre,  he  would  rid  himself  of  the  chief  mass  of 
his  foes.     Besides,  as  he  explained  in  his  letter  of  H ebru- 
arv  10th,  1799,  to  the  Directors,  his  seizure  of  those  towns 
would  rob  the  English  fleet  of  its  base  of  supplies  and 
thereby  cripple  its  activities  off  the  coast  of  Egypt.     So 
far,  his  reasons  for  the  Syrian  campaign  are  intelligible 
and  sound.     But  he  also  gave  out  that   leaving  Desaix 
and  his  Ethiopian  supernumeraries  to  defend  J^gypt,  ne 
himself  would  accomplish  the  conquest  of  Syria  and  the 
East :  he  would  raise  in  revolt  the  Christians  of  the  Leba- 
non and  Armenia,  overthrow  the  Turkish  power  in  Asia, 
and  then  march  either  on  Constantinople  or  Delhi. 

It  is  difficult  to  take  this  quite  seriously,  considering 
that  he  had  only  12,000  men  available  for  these  adven- 
tures ;  and  with  anyone  but  Bonaparte  they  might  be 
dismissed  as  utterly  Quixotic.  But  in  his  case  we  must 
seek  for  some  practical  purpose  ;  for  he  never  divorced 
fancy  from  fact,  and  in  his  best  days  imagination  was  the 
handmaid  of  politics  and  strategy  rather  than  the  mis- 
tress. Probably  these  gorgeous  visions  were  bodied  forth 
so  as  to  inspirit  the  soldiery  and  enthrall  the  imagination 
of  France.  He  had  already  proved  the  immense  power 
of  imagination  over  that  susceptible  people.     In  one  sense, 


CHAP.   IX 


SYRIA  185 


his  whole  expedition  was  but  a  picturesque  drama ;  and 
an  imposing  climax  could  now  be  found  in  the  plan  of  an 
Eastern  Empire,  that  opened  up  dazzling  vistas  of  glory  and 
veiled  his  figure  in  a  grandiose  mirage,  beside  which  the 
civilian  Directors  were  dwarfed  into  ridiculous  puppets. 

If  these  vast  schemes  are  to  be  taken  seriously,  another 
explanation  of  them  is  possible,  namely,  that  he  relied  on 
the  example  set  by  Alexander  the  Great,  who  with  a 
small  but  highly-trained  army  had  shattered  the  stately 
dominions  of  the  East.  If  Bonaparte  trusted  to  this  prece- 
dent, he  erred.  True,  Alexander  began  his  enterprise 
with  a  comparatively  small  force  :  but  at  least  he  had  a 
sure  base  of  operations,  and  his  army  in  Thessaly  was 
strong  enough  to  prevent  Athens  from  exchanging  her 
sullen  but  passive  hostility  for  an  offensive  that  would 
endanger  his  communications  by  sea.  The  Athenian  fleet 
was  therefore  never  the  danger  to  the  Macedonians  that 
Nelson  and  Sir  Sidney  Smith  were  to  Bonaparte.  Since 
the  French  armada  weighed  anchor  at  Toulon,  Britain's 
position  had  became  vastly  stronger.  Nelson  was  lord  of 
the  Mediterranean :  the  revolt  in  Ireland  had  completely 
failed  :  a  coalition  against  France  was  being  formed  ;  and 
it  was  therefore  certain  that  the  force  in  Egypt  could  not 
be  materially  strengthened.  Bonaparte  did  not  as  yet 
know  the  full  extent  of  his  country's  danger;  but  the 
mere  fact  that  he  would  have  to  bear  the  pressure  of  Eng- 
land's naval  supremacy  along  the  Syrian  coast  should  have 
dispelled  any  notion  that  he  could  rival  the  exploits  of 
Alexander  and  become  Emperor  of  the  East.1 

1  On  November  4th,  1708,  the  French  Government  forwarded  to  Bona- 
parte, in  triplicate  copies,  a  despatch  which,  after  setting  forth  the  failure 
of  their  designs  on  Ireland,  urged  him  either  (1)  to  remain  in  Egypt,  of 
which  they  evidently  disapproved,  or  (2)  to  march  towards  India  and 
co-operate  with  Tippoo  Sahib,  or  (3)  to  advance  on  Constantinople  in 
order  that  France  might  have  a  share  in  the  partition  of  Turkey,  which 
was  then  being  discussed  between  the  Courts  of  Petersburg  and  Vienna. 
No  copy  of  this  despatch  seems  to  have  reached  Bonaparte  before  he  set 
out  for  Syria  (February  <5th).  This  curious  and  perhaps  guileful  despatch 
is  Riven  in  full  by  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  "  Le  Directoire  et  l'Expedition 
d'Egypte,"  Appendix,  No.  5. 

On  the  whole,  1  am  compelled  to  dissent  from  Captain  Mahan  ("  Influ- 
ence of  Sea  Power,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  324-320),  and  to  regard  the  larger  schemes 
of  Bonaparte  in  this  Syrian  enterprise  as  visionary. 


186  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap, 

From  conjectures  about  motives  we  turn  to  facts.     Set- 
ting forth  early  in  February,  the  French  captured  most  of 
the  Turkish  advanced  guard  at  the  fort  of  El  Arisch,  but 
sent  their  captives  away  on  condition  of  not  bearing  arms 
against  France  for  at  least  one  year.     The  victors  then 
marched  on  Jaffa,  and,  in  spite  of  a  spirited  defence,  took 
it  by  storm  (March  6th).     Flushed  with   their  triumph 
over  a  cruel  and  detested  foe,  the  soldiers  were  giving  up 
the  city  to  pillage  and  massacre,  when  two  aides-de-camp 
promised  quarter  to  a  large  body  of  the  defenders,  who 
had  sought  refuge  in  a  large  caravanserai  ;  and  their  lives 
were  grudgingly  spared  by  the  victors.     Bonaparte  vehe- 
mently reproached   his  aides-de-camp  for  their   ill-timed 
clemency.     What  could  he  now  do  with   these  2,500  or 
3,000  prisoners  ?    They  could  not  be  trusted  to  serve  with 
the  French  ;  besides,  the  provisions  scarcely  sufficed  for 
Bonaparte's  own  men,  who  began  to  complain  loudly  at 
sharing  any  with  Turks  and  Albanians.     They  could  not 
be  sent  away  to  Egypt,  there  to  spread  discontent  :  and 
only  300  Egyptians  were  so  sent  away.1     Finally,  on  the 
demand  of  his  generals  and  troops,  the  remaining  prisoners 
were  shot  down  on  the  seashore.     There  is,  however,  no 
warrant  for  the  malicious  assertion  that  Bonaparte  readily 
gave  the  fatal  order.     On  the  contrary,  he  delayed  it  for 
three  days,  until  the  growing  difficulties  and  the  loud  com- 
plaints of  his  soldiers  wrung  it  from  him  as  a  last  resort. 
Moreover,  several  of   the  victims  had   already   fought 
against  him  at  El  Arisch,  and  had  violated  their  promise 
that  they  would  fight  no  more  against  the  French  in  that 
campaign.    M.  Lanfrey's  assertion  that  there  is  no  evidence 
for  the  identification  'is  untenable,  in  view  of  a  document 
which   I  have  discovered  in  the   Records  of  the  British 
Admiralty.     Inclosed  with  Sir  Sidney  Smith's  despatches 
is  one  from  the  secretary  of  Gezzar,  dated  Acre,  March 
1st,  1799,  in  which  the  Pacha  urgently  entreats  the  British 
commodore   to  come  to  his  help,  because  his  (Gezzar's) 
troops  had  failed  to  hold  El  Arisch,  and  the  same  troops 
had  also  abandoned  Gaza  and  were  in  great  dread  of  the 

i  Berthier,  »  Memoires"  ;  Belliard,  "  Bourrienne  et  ses  Erreurs,"  also 
corrects  Bourrienne.  As  to  the  dearth  of  food,  denied  by  Lanfrey,  see 
Captain  Krettly,  "  Souvenirs  historiques." 


IX 


SYRIA 


187 


French  at  Jaffa.     Considered  from  the  military  point  of 
view,  the  massacre  at   Jaffa  is    perhaps  defensible  ;   and 


PLAN  OF  THE   SIEGB    OF  ACRE 

FROM      A    CONTEMPORARY       SKETCH. 


*.A 


Theseus 


1  Town  Gate 

2  South  RateJin 
3.  Garden  of  the  Seraglio 
4-.  Ghezzar  fychat  fSlace 

5  North  Ravelin 

6  Principal  Breach 


ta  qiAa*&  tli.  fWii 


Britmh  Guntcft.  Lmtmehu  SOierme 

^  Alliance' 


SHIPS     TAKEN    FROM   THE    FRENCH 
18"'  March  1738 
A  'Jorride*.   B.'Deuifrires'.  C'Oanfertut' 
O.'Oamede  Grace",  E'/tefresse'  F. "mane Rose' 


Scale    of    1  Mil* 
r>  T*  * 


SCmmUt  AVyV  '• 


Bonaparte's  reluctant  assent  contrasts  favourably  with  the 
unhesitating  conduct  of  Cromwell  at  Drogheda.  Perhaps 
an  episode  like  that  at  Jaffa  is  not  without  its  uses  in  open- 
ing the  eyes  of  mankind  to  the  ghastly  shifts  by  which 


188 


THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


military  glory  may  have  to  be  won.  The  alternative  to 
the  massacre  was  the  detaching  of  a  French  battalion  to 
conduct  their  prisoners  to  Egypt.  As  that  would  seriously 
have  weakened  the  little  army,  the  prisoners  were  shot. 

A  deadlier  foe  was  now  to  be  faced.      Already  at  El 
Arisch  a  few  cases  of  the  plague  had  appeared  in  Kleber  s 
division,  which  had  come  from  Rosetta  and  Dannetta  ;  and 
the  relics  of  the  retreating  Mameluke  and  Turkish  forces 
seem  also  to  have  bequeathed  that  disease  as  a  fatal  legacy 
to  their  pursuers.     After  Jaffa  the  malady  attacked  most 
battalions  of  the  army ;  and  it  may  have  quickened  Bona- 
parte's march  towards  Acre.    Certain  it  is  that  he  rejected 
Kleber's  advice   to  advance  inland   towards   Nablus,  the 
ancient   Shechem,  and  from  that  commanding  centre   to 
dominate  Palestine  and  defy  the  power  of  Gezzar.1    Al- 
ways prompt  to  strike  at  the  heart,  the  commander-in-chiet 
determined  to  march  straight  on  Acre,  where  that  notori- 
ous Turkish  pacha  sat  intrenched  behind  weak  walls  and 
the  ramparts  of  terror  which  his  calculating  ferocity  had 
reared  around  him.     Ever  since  the  age  of  the  Crusades 
that  seaport  had  been  the  chief  place  of  arms  of  Palestine  ; 
but  the  harbour  was  now  nearly  silted  up,  and  even  the 
neighbouring  roadstead  of  Hayfa  was  desolate.     The  tor- 
treSs  was  formidable  only  to  orientals.     In  his  work,  "Les 
Ruines,"  Volney  had  remarked  about   Acre  :   "  Through 
all  this  part  of  Asia  bastions,  lines  of  defence,  covered  ways, 
ramparts,  and  in  short  everything  relating  to  modern  for- 
tification are  utterly  unknown  ;  and  a  single  thirty-gun 
frigate  would  easily  bombard  and  lay  in  ruins  the  whole 
coast."     This  judgment  of  his  former  friend  undoubtedly 
lulled  Bonaparte  into  illusory  confidence,  and  the  rank  and 
file  after  their  success  at  Jaffa  expected  an  easy  triumph  at 

This  would  doubtless  have  happened  but  for  the  British 
help.  Captain  Miller  of  H.M.S.  "Theseus,"  thus  re- 
ported on  the  condition  of  Acre  before  Sir  Sidney 
Smith's  arrival : 

« I  found  almost  every  embrasure  empty  except  those  towards  the 
sea.    Many  years'  collection  of  the  dirt  of  the  town  thrown  in  such  a 

lErnouf,  "Le  General  Kleber,"  p.  201. 


ix  SYRIA  189 

situation  as  completely  covered  the  approach  to  the  gate  from  the  only 
guns  that  could  flank  it  and  from  the  sea  .  .  .  none  of  their  batteries 
have  casemates,  traverses,  or  splinter-proofs :  they  have  many  guns, 
but  generally  small  and  defective  —  the  carriages  in  general  so."1 

Captain  Miller's  energy  made  good  some  of  these  de- 
fects ;  but  the  place  was  still  lamentably  weak  when, 
on  March  15th,  Sir  Sidney  Smith  arrived.  The  Eng- 
lish squadron  in  the  east  of  the  Mediterranean  had,  to 
Nelson's  chagrin,  been  confided  to  the  command  of 
this  ardent  young  officer,  who  now  had  the  good  for- 
tune to  capture  off  the  promontory  of  Mount  Carmel 
seven  French  vessels  containing  Bonaparte's  siege-train. 
This  event  had  a  decisive  influence  on  the  fortunes  of 
the  siege  and  of  the  whole  campaign.  The  French  can- 
non were  now  hastily  mounted  on  the  very  walls  that 
they  had  been  intended  to  break ;  while  the  gun 
vessels  reinforced  the  two  English  frigates,  and  were 
ready  to  pour  a  searching  fire  on  the  assailants  in  their 
trenches  or  as  they  rushed  against  the  walls.  These 
had  also  been  hastily  strengthened  under  the  direction 
of«  a  French  royalist  officer  named  Phelippeaux,  an  old 
schoolfellow  of  Bonaparte,  and  later  on  a  comrade  of 
Sidney  Smith,  alike  in  his  imprisonment  and  in  his 
escape  from  the  clutches  of  the  revolutionists.  Sharing 
the  lot  of  the  adventurous  young  seaman,  Phelippeaux 
sailed  to  the  Levant,  and  now  brought  to  the  defence  of 
Acre  the  science  of  a  skilled  engineer.  Bravely  seconded 
by  British  officers  and  seamen,  he  sought  to  repair  the 
breach  effected  by  the  P^rench  field-pieces,  and  con- 
structed at  the  most  exposed  points  inner  defences,  be- 
fore which  the  most  obstinate  efforts  of  the  storming 
parties  melted  away.  Nine  times  did  the  assailants 
advance  against  the  breaches  with  the  confidence  born 
of  unfailing  success  and  redoubled  by  the  gaze  of  their 
great  commander ;  but  as  often  were  they  beaten  back  by 
the  obstinate  bravery  of  the  British  seamen  and  Turks. 

The  monotony  was  once  relieved  by  a  quaint  incident. 
In  the  course  of  a  correspondence  with  Bonaparte,  Sir 
Sidney  Smith  showed  his  annoyance  at  some  remark  by 
sending  him  a  challenge  to  a  duel.     It  met  with  the  very 

1  "Admiralty  Records,"  Mediterranean,  No.  19. 


190  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

proper  reply  that  he  would   fight  if   the  English  would 

^Xa£Z"*A   inflicts   Bonaparte   detached 
a  considerable  number   of   troops   inland   to   beat   oil    a 
k4e  Turkish  and  Mameluke  force  destined  for  the  relief 
of  gAcre  and  the  invasion  of  Egypt.     The  first  encounter 
was  near  Nazareth,  where  Junot  displayed  the  dash  and 
resource  which  had  brought  him  fame  in  Italy ;  but  the 
ded've  battle  was  fought  in  the  Plain  of  Esdrae on  no 
far  from  the  base  of  Mount  Tabor.     There  Kleber  s  dm 
sion  of  2,000  men  was  for  some  hours  hard  pressed  by  a 
motley  array  of  horse  and  foot  drawn  from  diverse  parts 
of   the  Sultan's  dominions.     The   heroism   of   the   burly 
Alsacian  and  the  toughness  of   his  men  bare  y  kept  off 
the  fierce  rushes  of  the  Moslem  horse  and  foot.     At  last 
Bonaparte's   cannon   were   heard.     The   cbef    ma-kng 
swiftly  on  with  his  troops  drawn  up   in   three   squares 
speedily  brushed  aside  the  enveloping  clouds  of  orientals 
finally,  by  well-combined  efforts  the  French  hurled  back 
the  enemyy  on  passes,  some  of  which  had  been  seized  by 
the  commander's  prescience.     At  the  close  of :  thu  mem- 
orable  dav  (April  15th)  an  army  of   nearly  30,000  men 
™  compiky  routed/and  dispersed  by  the ,  valoor ^  and 
skilful    dispositions    of    two    divisions    which    together 
amounted  to  less  than  a  seventh  of  that  number.    No  battle 
7  modern  times  more  closely  resembles  the  exploits  of 
Alexander  than  this  masterly  concentration  of  force ;  ana 
possibly  some  memory  of  this  may  haye   prompted   the 
words  of  Kleber -"General,  how  grea j  you  an -as 
he  met  and  embraced  his  commander  on  the  field  of  battle 
Bonaparte  and  his  staff  spent  the  night  at  the  Convent  of 
Nazareth  ;  and  when  his  officers  burst  ont  laughing  at  the 
story  told  by  the  Prior  of  the  breaking  of  a  pillar  by  the 
angel  Gabriel  at  the  time  of  the  Annunciation,  their  un- 
timely levity  was  promptly  checked  by  the  frown  of  the 

C0Trntriumph  seemed   to  decide  the  Christians  of   the 
Lebanon   to   ally  themselves   with    Bonaparte,  and   they 
secretly  covenanted  to  furnish  12,000  troops  at  his  cost 
but   this  question  ultimately  depended  on  the   siege   ol 
Acre.      On   rejoining   their   comrades   before   Acre,   the 


ix  SYRIA  191 

victors  found  that  the  siege  had  made  little  progress  :  for 
a  time  the  besiegers  relied  on  mining  operations,  but  with 
little  success ;  though  Phelippeaux  succumbed  to  a  sun- 
stroke (May  1st),  his  place  was  filled  by  Colonel  Douglas, 
who  foiled  the  efforts  of  the  French  engineers  and 
enabled  the  place  to  hold  out  till  the  advent  of  the  long- 
expected  Turkish  succours.  On  May  7th  their  sails 
were  visible  far  out  on  an  almost  windless  sea.  At  once 
Bonaparte  made  desperate  efforts  to  carry  the  "mud- 
hole  :'  by  storm.  Led  with  reckless  gallantry  by  the 
heroic  Lannes,  his  troops  gained  part  of  the  wall  and 
planted  the  tricolour  on  the  north-east  tower ;  but  all 
further  progress  was  checked  by  English  blue-jackets, 
whom  the  commodore  poured  into  the  town ;  and  the 
Turkish  reinforcements,  wafted  landwards  by  a  favour- 
ing breeze,  were  landed  in  time  to  wrest  the  ramparts 
from  the  assailants'  grip.  On  the  following  day  an 
assault  was  again  attempted :  from  the  English  ships 
Bonaparte  could  be  clearly  seen  on  Richard  Coeur  de 
Lion's  mound  urging  on  the  French;  but  though,  under 
Lannes'  leadership,  they  penetrated  to  the  garden  of 
Gezzar's  seraglio,  they  fell  in  heaps  under  the  bullets, 
pikes,  and  scimitars  of  the  defenders,  and  few  returned 
alive  to  the  camp.  Lannes  himself  was  dangerously 
wounded,  and  saved  only  by  the  devotion  of  an  officer. 

Both  sides  were  now  worn  out  by  this  extraordinary 
siege.  "  This  town  is  not,  nor  ever  has  been,  defensible 
according  to  the  rules  of  art ;  but  according  to  every  other 
rule  it  must  and  shall  be  defended" — so  wrote  Sir  Sid- 
ney Smith  to  Nelson  on  May  9th.  But  a  fell  influence 
was  working  against  the  besiegers ;  as  the  season  advanced, 
they  succumbed  more  and  more  to  the  ravages  of  the 
plague;  and,  after  failing  again  on  May  10th,  many  of 
their  battalions  refused  to  advance  to  the  breach  over  the 
putrid  remains  of  their  comrades.  Finally,  Bonaparte, 
after  clinging  to  his  enterprise  with  desperate  tenacity,  on 
the  night  of  May  20th  gave  orders  to  retreat. 

This  siege  of  nine  weeks'  duration  had  cost  him  severe 
losses,  among  them  being  Generals  Caffarelli  and  Bon  : 
but  worst  of  all  was  the  loss  of  that  reputation  for  invinci- 
bility which  he  had  hitherto  enjoyed.     His  defeat  at  Cal- 


192 


THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap, 


diero,  near  Verona,  in  1796  had  been  officially  converted 
S  victory  :  but  Acre  could  not  be  termed  anything 
but  a  reverse.     In  vain  did  the  commander  and  his  staff 
proclaim  that,  after  dispersing  the  Turks  at  Mount  Tabor 
the  capture  of  Acre  was  superfluous ;  his  desperate  efforts 
in  the  early  part  of  May  revealed  the  hollowness  of  his 
words     There  were,  it  is  true,  solid  reasons  or  his  retreat 
He  had  just  heard  of  the  breaking  out  of  the  war  of  the 
Second  Coalition  against  France ;  and  revolts  in   Egypt 
also  demanded  his  presence.^     But  these >  last  e™n^  ; 
nished  a  damning  commentary  on  his .whole  Synan  enter^ 
prise  which  had  led  to  a  dangerous  diffusion  of  the  *  rencli 
orces      And  for  what  ?     For  the  conquest  of  Constanti- 
nople or  of  India?     That  dream  seems  to  have  haunted 
Bonaparte's  brain  even  down  to  the  close  of  the  siege  of 
Acre     During  the  siege,  and  later,  he  was  heard  to  inveigh 
agafnst  "tie  liserableW hole''  which h ad  co-e  between 
him  and  his  destiny -the  Empire  of  the East     and  it  is 
possible  that  ideas  which  he  may  at  first  have  set ^forth  in 
order  to  dazzle  his  comrades  came  finally  to  master  his  who  e 
being      Certainly  the  words  just  quoted  betoken  a  quite 
abnormal  wilfulness    as  well   as   a   peculiarly  subjective 
notion  of  fatalism.     His  «  destiny  "  was  to  be  mapped  out 
by  Ms  own  prescience,  decided  by  his  own  will,  gripped 
by  his  own  powers.     Such  fatalism  had  nothing  in  com- 
mon with  the  sombre  creed  of  the  East  :  it  was  merely  an 
excess  of  individualism  :  it  was  the  matured  expression  rf 
that  feature  of  his  character,  curiously  dominant  even  in 
chuVhootthat  WUt  he  .anted  he  must  of  ne^ntyh^ 
How  strange  that  this  imperious  obstinacy,  this  sublima 
Uon  of  weftern  will-power,  should  not  have  been  tamed 
even    by    the    overmastering    might    of    Nature    in    the 

0rAsnfor  the  Empire  of  the  East,  the  declared  hostility  of 
the  tribes  around  Nablus  had  shown  ho* 'futile  were  Bona- 
parte's efforts  to  win  over  Moslems  :  and  his ;  earlier  Mos- 
lem proclamations  were  skilfully  distributed  by  Sir  Sidney 
Smith  among  the  Christians  of  Syria,  and  served  partly  to 
iTutoS  t£  efforts  which  Bonaparte  made  to  win  them 

i«Corresp.,M  No.  4124  ;  Lavelette,  "Mems.,"  ch.  xxi. 


ix  SYRIA  193 

over.1  Vain  indeed  was  the  effort  to  conciliate  the  Mos- 
lems in  Egypt,  and  yet  in  Syria  to  arouse  the  Christians 
against  the  Commander  of  the  Faithful.  Such  religious 
opportunism  smacked  of  the  Parisian  boulevards:  it  utterly 
ignored  the  tenacity  of  belief  of  the  East,  where  the  creed 
is  the  very  life.  The  outcome  of  all  that  finesse  was  seen 
in  the  closing  days  of  the  siege  and  during  the  retreat 
towards  Jaffa,  when  the  tribes  of  the  Lebanon  and  of  the 
Nablus  district  watched  like  vultures  on  the  hills  and 
swooped  down  on  the  retreating  columns.  The  pain  of 
disillusionment,  added  to  his  sympathy  with  the  sick 
and  wounded,  once  broke  down  Bonaparte's  nerves. 
Having  ordered  all  horsemen  to  dismount  so  that  there 
might  be  sufficient  transport  for  the  sick  and  maimed, 
the  commander  was  asked  by  an  equerry  which  horse 
he  reserved  for  his  own  use.  "  Did  you  not  hear  the 
order,"  he  retorted,  striking  the  man  with  his  whip, 
"everyone  on  foot."  Rarely  did  this  great  man  mar  a 
noble  action  by  harsh  treatment :  the  incident  sufficiently 
reveals  the  tension  of  feelings,  always  keen,  and  now 
overwrought  by  physical  suffering  and  mental  disap- 
pointment. 

There  was  indeed  much  to  exasperate  him.  At  Acre 
he  had  lost  nearly  5,000  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
plague-stricken,  though  he  falsely  reported  to  the  Direc- 
tory that  his  losses  during  the  whole  expedition  did  not 
exceed  that  number  :  and  during  the  terrible  retreat  to 
Jaffa  he  was  shocked,  not  only  by  occasional  suicides  of 
soldiers  in  his  presence,  but  by  the  utter  callousness  of 
officers  and  men  to  the  claims  of  the  sick  and  wounded. 
It  was  as  a  rebuke  to  this  inhumanity  that  he  ordered  all 
to  march  on  foot,  and  his  authority  seems  even  to  have 
been  exerted  to  prevent  some  attempts  at  poisoning  the 
plague-stricken.  The  narrative  of  J.  Miot,  commissary 
of  the  army,  shows  that  these  suggestions  originated 
among  the  soldiery  at  Acre  when  threatened  with  the  toil 
of  transporting  those  unfortunates  back  to  Egypt  ;  and, 
as  his  testimony  is  generally  adverse  to  Bonaparte,  and  he 
mentions  the  same  horrible  device,  when  speaking  of  the 

1  Sidney  Smith's  "Despatch  to  Nelson  "  of  May  30th,  1799. 


194  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

hospitals  at  Jaffa,  as  a  camp  rumour,  it  may  be  regarded 
as  scarcely  worthy  of  credence.1 

Undoubtedly  the  scenes  were  heartrending   at   J  aria  ; 
and  it  has  been  generally  believed  that   the  victims  of 
the  plague  were  then  and  there  put  out  of  their  miseries 
bv  large  doses  of  opium.     Certainly   the  hospitals  were 
crowded  with  wounded   and  victims  of  the  plague  ;  but 
during  the  seven  days'  halt  at  that  town  adequate  meas- 
ures were  taken  by  the  chief  medical  officers,  Desgenettes 
and  Larrey,  for  their  transport  to  Egypt.     More  than  a 
thousand  were  sent  away  on  ships,  seven  of  which  were 
fortunately  present ;  and  800  were  conveyed  to  Egypt  in 
carts  or  litters  across  the  desert.2     Another  fact  suffices 
to  refute  the  slander   mentioned  above.     1  rom  the  de- 
spatch of  Sir  Sidney  Smith  to  Nelson  of  May  80th, ,1799, 
it  appears  that,  when  the  English  commodore  touched  at 
Jaffa,  he  found  some  of  the   abandoned  ones  still  alive: 
«  We  have  found  seven  poor  fellows  in  the  hospital  and 
will  take  care  of  them."     He  also  supplied   the  French 
ships  conveying  the  wounded  with  water,  provisions,  and 
stores,  of  which   they  were  much  in  need,  and  allowed 
them  to  proceed  to  their  destination.     It  is  true  that  the 
evidence  of    Las  Casas  at  St.  Helena,  eagerly  cited  by 
Lanfrey,  seems  to  show  that  some  of  the  worst  cases  in 
the  Jaffa  hospitals  were  got  rid  of  by  opium  ;   but  the 
admission  by  Napoleon  that  the  administering  of  opium 
was  iustifiable  occurred  in  one  of  those  casuistical  discus- 
sions which  turn,  not  on  facts,  but  on  motives.     Conclu- 
sions drawn    from   such   conversations,  sixteen   years  or 
more   after   the  supposed  occurrence,  must   in  any  case 
give  o-round  before  the  evidence  of  contemporaries,  which 
proves  that  every  care  was  taken  of  the  sick  and  wounded, 
that  the  proposals  of  poisoning  first  came  from  the  sol- 
diery, that  Napoleon  both  before  and  after  Jaffa  set  the 
noble  example  of  marching  on  foot  so  that  there  might  be 


ix  SYRIA  195 

sufficiency  of  transport,  that  nearly  all  the  unfortunates 
arrived  in  Egypt  and  in  fair  condition,  and  that  seven 
survivors  were  found  alive  at  Jaffa  by  English  officers.1 

The  remaining  episodes  of  the  Eastern  Expedition  may 
be  briefly  dismissed.  After  a  painful  desert  march  the 
army  returned  to  Egypt  in  June  ;  and,  on  July  25th, 
under  the  lead  of  Murat  and  Lannes,  drove  into  the  sea 
a  large  force  of  Turks  which  had  effected  a  landing  in 
Aboukir  Bay.  Bonaparte  was  now  weary  of  gaining  tri- 
umphs over  foes  whom  he  and  his  soldiers  despised. 
While  in  this  state  of  mind,  he  received  from  Sir  Sidney 
Smith  a  packet  of  English  and  German  newspapers  giving 
news  up  to  June  6th,  which  brought  him  quickly  to  a 
decision.  The  formation  of  a  powerful  coalition,  the  loss 
of  Italy,  defeats  on  the  Rhine,  and  the  schisms,  disgust, 
and  despair  prevalent  in  France  — all  drew  his  imagination 
westwards  away  from  the  illusory  Orient  ;  and  he  deter- 
mined to  leave  his  army  to  the  care  of  Kleber  and  sail  to 
France. 

The  morality  of  this  step  has  been  keenly  discussed. 
The  rank  and  file  of  the  army  seem  to  have  regarded  it  as 
little  less  than  desertion,2  and  the  predominance  of  per- 
sonal motives  in  this  important  decision  can  scarcely  be 
denied.  His  private  aim  in  undertaking  the  Eastern  Ex- 
pedition, that  of  dazzling  the  imagination  of  the  French 
people  and  of  exhibiting  the  incapacity  of  the  Directory, 
had  been  abundantly  realized.  His  eastern  enterprise  had 
now  shrunk  to  practical  and  prosaic  dimensions,  namely, 
the  consolidation  of  French  power  in  Egypt.  Yet,  as  will 
appear  in  later  chapters,  he  did  not  give  up  his  oriental 
schemes  ;  though  at  St.  Helena  he  once  oddly  spoke  of  the 
Egyptian  expedition  as  an  "exhausted  enterprise,"  it  is 
clear  that  he  worked  hard  to  keep  his  colony.  The  career 
of  Alexander  had  for  him  a  charm  that  even  the  conquests 

1  See  Belliard,  "  Bourrienne  et  ses  Erreurs"  ;  also  a  letter  of  d'Aure, 
formerly  Intendant  General  of  this  army,  to  the  "Journal  des  D^bats" 
of  April  16th,  1829,  in  reply  to  Bourrienne. 

3  "On  disait  tout  haut  qu'il  se  sauvait  lachement,"  Merme  in  Guitry's 
"L'Arm^e  en  Egypte."  But  Bonaparte  had  prepared  for  this  discour- 
agement and  worse  eventualities  by  warning  Kleber  in  the  letter  of  Au- 
gust 22nd,  1799,  that  if  he  lost  1,500  men  by  the  plague  he  was  free  to 
treat  for  the  evacuation  of  Egypt. 


196  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

of  Caesar  could  not  rival  ;  and  at  the  height  of  his  Euro- 
pean triumphs,  the  hero  of  Austerlitz  was  heard  to  mur- 
mur :  "J'ai  manque  a  ma  fortune  a  Saint-Jean  d'Acre."1 

In  defence  of  his  sudden  return  it  may  be  urged  that  he 
had  more  than  once  promised  the  Directory  that  his  stay 
in  Egypt  would  not  exceed  five  months ;  and  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  now,  as  always,  he  had  an  alternative  plan 
before  him  in  case  of  failure  or  incomplete  success  in  the 
East.  To  this  alternative  he  now  turned  with  that  swift- 
ness and  fertility  of  resource  which  astonished  both  friends 
and  foes  in  countless  battles  and  at  many  political  crises. 

It  has  been  stated  by  Lanfrey  that  his  appointment  of 
Kleber  to  succeed  him  was  dictated  by  political  and  per- 
sonal hostility  ;  but  it  may  more  naturally  be  considered 
a  tribute  to  his  abilities  as  a  general  and  to  his  influence 
over  the  soldiery,  which  was  only  second  to  that  of  Bona- 
parte and  Desaix.  He  also  promised  to  send  him  speedy 
succour  ;  and  as  there  seemed  to  be  a  probability  of  France 
regaining  her  naval  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean  by 
the  union  of  the  fleet  of  Bruix  with  that  of  Spain,  he  might 
well  hope  to  send  ample  reinforcements.  He  probably  did 
not  know  the  actual  facts  of  the  case,  that  in  July  Bruix 
tamely  followed  the  Spanish  squadron  to  Cadiz,  and  that 
the  Directory  had  ordered  Bruix  to  withdraw  the  French 
army  from  Egypt.  But,  arguing  from  the  facts  as  known 
to  him,  Bonaparte  might  well  believe  that  the  difficulties 
of  France  would  be  fully  met  by  his  own  return,  and  that 
Egypt  could  be  held  with  ease.  The  duty  of  a  great  com- 
mander is  to  be  at  the  post  of  greatest  danger,  and  that 
was  now  on  the  banks  of  the  Rhine  or  Mincio. 

The  advent  of  a  south-east  wind,  a  rare  event  there  at 
that  season  of  the  year,  led  him  hastily  to  embark  at  Alex- 
andria in  the  night  of  August  22nd-23rd.  His  two  frig- 
ates bore  with  him  some  of  the  greatest  sons  of  France  ; 
his  chief  of  the  staff,  Berthier,  whose  ardent  love  for  Mad- 
ame Visconti  had  been  repressed  by  his  reluctant  deter- 
mination to  share  the  fortunes  of  his  chief  ;  Lannes  and 
Murat,  both  recently  wounded,  but  covered  with  glory  by 
their  exploits  in  Syria  and  at  Aboukir  ;  his  friend  Mar- 
mont,  as  well  as  Duroc,  Andreossi,  Bessieres,  Lavalette, 

1Lucien  Bonaparte,  "  Memoires,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xiv. 


ix  SYRIA  197 

Admiral  Gantheaume,  Monge,  and  Berthollet,  his  secretary 
Bourrienne,  and  the  traveller  Denon.  He  also  left  orders 
that  Desaix,  who  had  been  in  charge  of  Upper  Egj-pt, 
should  soon  return  to  France,  so  that  the  rivalry  between 
him  and  Kleber  might  not  distract  French  councils  in 
Egypt.  There  seems  little  ground  for  the  assertion  that 
he  selected  for  return  his  favourites  and  men  likely  to  be 
politically  serviceable  to  him.  If  he  left  behind  the  ar- 
dently republican  Kleber,  he  also  left  his  old  friend  Junot : 
if  he  brought  back  Berthier  and  Marmont,  he  also  ordered 
the  return  of  the  almost  Jacobinical  Desaix.  Sir  Sidney 
Smith  having  gone  to  Cyprus  for  repairs,  Bonaparte  slipped 
out  unmolested.  By  great  good  fortune  his  frigates  eluded 
the  English  ships  cruising  between  Malta  and  Cape  Bon, 
and  after  a  brief  stay  at  Ajaccio,  he  and  his  comrades 
landed  at  Frejus  (October  9th).  So  great  was  the  enthu- 
siasm of  the  people  that,  despite  all  the  quarantine  regula- 
tions, they  escorted  the  party  to  shore.  "  We  prefer  the 
plague  to  the  Austrians,"  they  exclaimed  ;  and  this  feeling 
but  feebly  expressed  the  emotion  of  France  at  the  return 
of  the  Conqueror  of  the  East. 

And  yet  he  found  no  domestic  happiness.  Josephine's 
liaison  with  a  young  officer,  M.  Charles,  had  become  noto- 
rious owing  to  his  prolonged  visits  to  her  country  house, 
La  Malmaison.  Alarmed  at  her  husband's  return,  she 
now  hurried  to  meet  him,  but  missed  him  on  the  way  ; 
while  he,  finding  his  home  at  Paris  empty,  raged  at  her 
infidelity,  refused  to  see  her  on  her  return,  and  declared 
he  would  divorce  her.  From  this  he  was  turned  by  the 
prayers  of  Eugene  and  Hortense  Beauharnais,  and  the 
tears  of  Josephine  herself.  A  reconciliation  took  place  ; 
but  there  was  no  reunion  of  hearts,  and  Mme.  Reinhard 
echoed  the  feeling  of  respectable  society  when  she  wrote 
that  he  should  have  divorced  her  outright.  Thenceforth 
he  lived  for  Glory  alone. 


CHAPTER  X 

BRUMAIRE 

Rarely  has  France  been  in  a  more  distracted  state  than 
in  the  summer  of  1799.  Royalist  revolts  in  the  west 
and  south  rent  the  national  life.  The  religious  schism 
was  unhealed  ;  education  was  at  a  standstill ;  commerce 
had  been  swept  from  the  seas  by  the  British  fleets  ;  and 
trade  with  Italy  and  Germany  was  cut  off  by  the  war  of 
the  Second  Coalition. 

The  formation  of  this  league  between  Russia,  Austria, 
England,  Naples,  Portugal,  and  Turkey  was  in  the  main 
the  outcome  of  the  alarm  and  indignation  aroused  by  the 
reckless  conduct  of  the  Directory,  which  overthrew  the 
Bourbons  at  Naples,  erected  the  Parthenopsean  Republic, 
and  compelled  the  King  of  Sardinia  to  abdicate  at  Turin 
and  retire  to  his  island.  Russia  and  Austria  took  a  lead- 
ing part  in  forming  the  Coalition.  Great  Britain,  ever 
hampered  bj'  her  inept  army  organization,  offered  to  sup- 
ply money  in  place  of  the  troops  which  she  could  not 
properly  equip. 

But  under  the  cloak  of  legitimacy  the  monarchical 
Powers  harboured  their  own  selfish  designs.  This  Nessus' 
cloak  of  the  First  Coalition  soon  galled  the  limbs  of  the 
allies  and  rendered  them  incapable  of  sustained  and  vigor- 
ous action.  Yet  they  gained  signal  successes  over  the  raw 
conscripts  of  France.  In  July,  1799,  the  Austro-Russian 
army  captured  Mantua  and  Alessandria  ;  and  in  the  fol- 
lowing month  Suvoroff  gained  the  decisive  victory  of  Novi 
and  drove  the  remains  of  the  French  forces  towards  Genoa. 
The  next  months  were  far  more  favourable  to  the  tricolour 
flag,  for,  owing  to  Austro-Russian  jealousies,  Masse'na 
was  able  to  gain  an  important  victory  at  Zurich  over  a 
Russian  army.  In  the  north  the  republicans  were  also 
in  the  end  successful.     Ten  days  after  Bonaparte's  arrival 

198 


CHAP.  X 


BRUMAIRE  199 


at  Frejus,  they  compelled  an  Anglo-Russian  force  cam- 
paigning in  Holland  to  the  capitulation  of  Alkmaar, 
whereby  the  Duke  of  York  agreed  to  withdraw  all  his 
troops  from  that  coast.  Disgusted  by  the  conduct  of 
his  allies,  the  Czar  Paul  withdrew  his  troops  from  any 
active  share  in  the  operations  by  land,  thenceforth  con- 
centrating his  efforts  on  the  acquisition  of  Corsica,  Malta, 
and  posts  of  vantage  in  the  Adriatic.  These  designs, 
which  were  well  known  to  the  British  Government, 
served  to  hamper  our  naval  strength  in  those  seas,  and  to 
fetter  the  action  of  the  Austrian  arms  in  Northern  Italy.1 
Yet,  though  the  schisms  of  the  allies  finally  yielded  a 
victory  to  the  French  in  the  campaigns  of  1799,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Republic  was  precarious.  The  danger  was 
rather  internal  than  external.  It  arose  from  embar- 
rassed finances,  from  the  civil  war  that  burst  out  with 
new  violence  in  the  north-west,  and,  above  all,  from  a 
sense  of  the  supreme  difficulty  of  attaining  political 
stability  and  of  reconciling  liberty  with  order.  The 
struggle  between  the  executive  and  legislative  powers, 
which  had  been  rudely  settled  by  the  coup  d'etat  of 
Fructidor,  had  been  postponed,  not  solved.  Public 
opinion  was  speedily  ruffled  by  the  Jacobinical  violence 
which  ensued.  The  stifling  of  liberty  of  the  press  and 
the  curtailment  of  the  right  of  public  meeting  served 
only  to  instil  new  energy  into  the  party  of  resistance  in 
the  elective  Councils,  and  to  undermine  a  republican 
government  that  relied  *on  Venetian  methods  of  rule. 
Reviewing  the  events  of  those  days,  Madame  de  Stael 
finely  remarked  that  only  the  free  consent  of  the  people 
could  breathe  life  into  political  institutions  ;  and  that 
the  monstrous  system  of  guaranteeing  freedom  by  des- 
potic means  served  only  to  manufacture  governments 
that  had  to  be  wound  up  at  intervals  lest  they  should 
stop  dead.2  Such  a  sarcasm,  coming  from  the  gifted 
lady  who  had  aided  and  abetted  the  stroke  of  Fructidor, 
shows  how  far  that  event  had  falsified  the  hopes  of  the 

1  In  our  "Admiralty  Records"   (Mediterranean,   No.  21)  are  docu- 
ments which  prove  the  reality  of  Russian  designs  on  Corsica. 

2  "  Consid.  sur  la  R6v.  Francaise,"  bk.  hi.,  ch.  xiii.     See  too  Sciout, 
"Le  Directoire,"  vol.  iv.,  chs.  xiii.-xiv. 


200  •    THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

sincerest  friends  of  "the  Revolution.  Events  were  there- 
fore now  favourable  to  a  return  from  the  methods  of 
Rousseau  to  those  of  Richelieu  ;  and  the  genius  who 
was  skilfully  to  adapt  republicanism  to  autocracy  was 
now  at  hand.  Though  Bonaparte  desired  at  once  to 
attack  the  Austrians  in  Northern  Italy,  yet  a  sure  in- 
stinct impelled  him  to  remain  at  Paris,  for,  as  he  said  to 
Marmont  :  "  When  the  house  is  crumbling,  is  it  the  time 
1/  to  busy  oneself  with  the  garden  ?  A  change  here  is  in- 
dispensable." 

The  sudden  rise  of  Bonaparte  to  supreme  power  can- 
not be  understood  without   some    reference    to  the  state 
of  French  politics  in  the  months  preceding  his  return  to 
France.     The  position  of  parties  had  been  strangely  com- 
plicated by  the  unpopularity  of  the  Directors.     Despite 
their  illegal  devices,  the  elections  of  1798  and  1799  for 
the  renewal  of  a  third  part  of  the  legislative  Councils  had 
signally  strengthened  the  anti-directorial  ranks.     Among 
the  Opposition  were   some    royalists,  a  large  number  of 
constitutionals,    whether   of   the    Feuillant    or    Girondin 
type,  and  many  deputies,  who  either  vaunted  the  name 
of  Jacobins  or  veiled  their  advanced  opinions  under  the 
convenient  appellation  of  "patriots."     Many  of  the  dep- 
uties were  young,  impressionable,    and   likely   to    follow 
any  able  leader  who  promised  to  heal  the  schisms  of  the 
country.     In  fact,  the  old  party  lines  were  being  effaced. 
The  champions  of  the  constitution  of   1795  (Year  III.) 
saw  no    better  means  of  defending  it   than  by  violating 
electoral  liberties— always  in  the   sacred  name   of  Lib- 
erty ;  and  the   Directory,  while   professing   to  hold  the 
balance  between  the  extreme  parties,  repressed  them  by 
turns  with  a  vigour  which   rendered   them  popular  and 
official  moderation  odious. 

In  this  general  confusion  and  apathy  the  dearth  of  states- 
men was  painfully  conspicuous.  Only  true  grandeur  of 
character  can  defy  the  withering  influences  of  an  age  of 
disillusionment  ;  and  France  had  for  a  time  to  rely  upon 
Sieyes.  Perhaps  no  man  has  built  up  a  reputation  for 
political  capacity  on  performances  so  slight  as  the  Abbe 
Sieyes.  In  the  States  General  of  1789  he  speedily  acquired 
renown  for  oracular  wisdom,  owing  to  the  brevity  and  wit 


BANTA    BARI  •  'fOHNI" 

X  BRUMAIRlP  201 

of  his  remarks  in  an  assembly  where  such  virtues  were 
rare.  But  the  course  of  the  Revolution  soon  showed 
the  barrenness  of  his  mind  and  the  timidity  of  his  char- 
acter. He  therefore  failed  to  exert  any  lasting  influence 
upon  events.  In  the  time  of  the  Terror  his  insignificance 
was  his  refuge.  His  witty  reply  to  an  inquiry  how  he 
had  then  fared  —  "  J'ai  vecu" — ;  sufficiently  characterizes 
the  man.  In  the  Directorial  period  he  displayed  more 
activity.  He  was  sent  as  French  ambassador  to  Berlin, 
and  plumed  himself  on  having  persuaded  that  Court  to  a 
neutrality  favourable  to  France.  But  it  is  clear  that  the 
neutrality  of  Prussia  was  the  outcome  of  selfish  considera- 
tions. While  Austria  tried  the  hazards  of  war,  her 
northern  rival  husbanded  her  resources,  strengthened  her 
position  as  the  protectress  of  Northern  Germany,  and  dex- 
trously.  sought  to  attract  the  nebula  of  middle  German 
States  into  her  own  sphere  of  influence.  From  his  task 
of  tilting  a  balance  which  was  already  decided,  Sieyes  was 
recalled  to  Paris  in  May,  1799,  by  the  news  of  his  election 
to  the  place  in  the  Directory  vacated  by  Rewbell.  The 
other  Directors  had  striven,  but  in  vain,  to  prevent  his 
election  :  they  knew  well  that  this  impracticable  theorist 
would  speedily  paralyze  the  Government  ;  for,  when 
previously  elected  Director  in  1795,  he  had  refused  to 
serve,  on  the  ground  that  the  constitution  was  thoroughly 
bad.  He  now  declared  his  hostility  to  the  Directory, 
and  looked  around  for  some  complaisant  military  chief 
who  should  act  as  his  tool  and  then  be  cast  away.  His 
first  choice,  Joubert,  was  killed  at  the  battle  of  Novi. 
Moreau  seems  then  to  have  been  looked  on  with  favour  ; 
he  was  a  republican,  able  in  warfare  and  singularly  devoid 
of  skill  or  ambition  in  political  matters.  Relying  on  Mo- 
reau, Sieyes  continued  his  intrigues,  and  after  some  pre- 
liminary fencing  gained  over  to  his  side  the  Director 
Barras.  But  if  we  may  believe  the  assertions  of  the 
royalist,  Hyde  de  Neuville,  Barras  was  also  receiving 
the  advances  of  the  royalists  with  a  view  to  a  restora- 
tion of  Louis  XVIII.,  an  event  which  was  then  quite 
within  the  bounds  of  probability.  For  the  present, 
however,  Barras  favoured  the  plans  of  Sieyes,  and  helped 
him   to  get  rid  of   the    firmly   republican   Directors,   La 


202  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Reveilliere-Lepeaux  and  Merlin,  who  were  deposed  (30th 

PrThealnew   Directors  were   Gohier,  Roger    Ducos,   and 
Moulin  ;  the   first,  an  elderly  respectable    advocate  ;  the 
econd,  'a  Girondin  by  early  associations,  but  a  trimmer  by 
instinct,    and   therefore    easily    gamed    over    by    Sieyes, 
while  the  recommendations  of  the  third,  Moulin,  seem  to 
have  been  his  political  nullity  and  some  third-rate  mitary 
services  in  the  Vendean  war.     Yet  the  Directory  of  Prai- 
r  al was  not  devoid  of  a  spasmodic  energy  which  served 
to  throw  back  the  invaders  of  France.     Bernadotte,  the 
fiery  Gascon,  remarkable  for  his  ardent  gaze  his  encircling 
masses  of  coal-black  hair,  and  the  dash  of  Moorish  blood 
whch  ever  aroused  Bonaparte's  respectful  apprehensions 
was  Minister  of  War,  and  speedily  formed  a  new  army  of 
100  000  men  :  Lindet  undertook  to  re-establish  the  finances 
bV  means  of  progressive  taxes  ;  the  Chouan  movement  in 
the  northern  and  western  departments  was  repressed  by  a 
law  legalizing  the  seizure  of  hostages ;  and  there  seemed 
some  hope  that  France  would  roll  back  the  tide  of  invasion 
keep  her  «  natural  frontiers,"  and  return  to  normal  methods 

°f  Swathe  position  of  affairs  when  Bonaparte's  arrival 
inspired  France  with  joy  and  the  Directory  with  ill-con- 
ceaS  dread.     As  in  \ 795,  so  now  in  1799   he  appeared 
at  Paris  when  French  political  life  was  in  a  stage  of .tran- 
sition.    If  ever  the  Napoleonic  star  shone  auspiciously,  it 
was  in  the  months   when  he  threaded  his  path .between 
Nelson's   cruisers   and  cut  athwart  the   maze  of  Sieves 
intrigues.     To   the   philosopher's  "J'ai^vecu"   he  could 
oppose  the  crushing  retort  "J'aivaincu. 
The  general,  on  meeting  the  thinker  at  Gohier  s  house 
studiously  ignored  him.     In  truth,  he  was  at  first  disposed 
fo  oust  bothgSieyes  and  Barras  from  the  Directory.     The 
latter  of  these  men  was  odious  to  him  for  reasons  both 
pdvate  and  public.     In  time  past  he  had  had  good  reasons 
L  suspecting  Josephine's  relations  with  the  volnptuous 
Director,  and  with  the  men  whom  she  met  at  his  . house. 
During   the    Egyptian  campaign    his   jealousy  had   been 
i  La  R^eilliere-Lepeaux,    "  Mem^,"  vol    U.,^.  xliv.;  Hyde   de 
Neuville,  vol.  i,  chs.  vi.-vii. ;  Lavisse,  »  Rev.  Francaise,    p.  <W4. 


x  BRUMAIRE  203 

fiercely  roused  in  another  quarter,  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
led  to  an  almost  open  breach  with  his  wife.  But  against 
Barras  he  still  harboured  strong  suspicions ;  and  the  fre- 
quency of  his  visits  to  the  Director's  house  after  returning 
from  Egypt  was  doubtless  due  to  his  desire  to  sound  the 
depths  of  his  private  as  well  as  of  his  public  immorality. 
If  we  may  credit  the  embarras  de  mensonges  which  has 
been  dignified  by  the  name  of  Barras'  "  Memoirs,"  Jose- 
phine once  fled  to  his  house  and  flung  herself  at  his  knees, 
begging  to  be  taken  away  from  her  husband  ;  but  the  story 
is  exploded  by  the  moral  which  the  relator  clumsily  tacks 
on,  as  to  the  good  advice  which  he  gave  her.1  While 
Bonaparte  seems  to  have  found  no  grounds  for  suspecting 
Barras  on  this  score,  he  yet  discovered  his  intrigues  with 
various  malcontents ;  and  he  saw  that  Barras,  holding 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  Directory  between  the  oppos- 
ing pairs  of  colleagues,  was  intriguing  to  get  the  highest 
possible  price  for  the  betrayal  of  the  Directory  and  of  the 
constitution  of  1705. 

For  Sieyes  the  general  felt  dislike  but  respect.  He  soon 
saw  the  advantage  of  an  alliance  with  so  learned  a  thinker, 
so  skilful  an  intriguer,  and  so  weak  a  man.  It  was  in- 
deed, necessary  ;  for,  after  making  vain  overtures  to 
Gohier  for  the  alteration  of  the  law  which  excluded  from 
the  Directory  men  of  less  than  forty  years  of  age,  the 
general  needed  the  alliance  of  Sieyds  for  the  overthrow  of 
the  constitution.  In  a  short  space  he  gathered  around 
him  the  malcontents  whom  the  frequent  crises  had  de- 
prived of  office,  Roederer,  Admiral  Bruix,  Real,  Camba- 
cere.j,  and,  above  all,  Talleyrand.  The  last-named,  already 
known  for  his  skill  in  diplomacy,  had  special  reasons  for 
favouring  the  alliance  of  Bonaparte  and  Sieyes :  he  had 
been  dismissed  from  the  Foreign  Office  in  the  previous 
month  of  July  because  in  his  hands  it  had  proved  to  be 
too  lucrative  to  the  holder  and  too  expensive  for  France. 
It  was  an  open  secret  that,  when  American  commissioners 
arrived  in  Paris  a  short  time  previously,  for  the  settle- 
ment of  various  disputes  between  the  two  countries,  they 
found  that  the  negotiations  would  not  progress  until 
250,000  dollars  had  changed  hands.     The  result  was  that 

1  Barras,  "Meins.,"  vol.  iv.,  ch.  ii. 


204  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

hostilities  continued,  and  that  Talleyrand  soon  found  him- 
self deprived  of  office,  until  another  turn  of  the  revolution- 
ary kaleidoscope  should  restore  him  to  his  coveted  place.1 
He  discerned  in  the  Bonaparte-Sieyes  combination  the 
force  that  would  give  the  requisite  tilt  now  that  Moreau 
gave  up  politics. 

The  army  and  most  of  the  generals  were  also  ready  for 
some  change,  only  Bernadotte  and  Jourdan  refusing  to 
listen  to  the  new  proposals  ;  and  the  former  of  these  came 
"with  sufficiently  bad  grace  "  to  join  Bonaparte  at  the  time 
of  action.  The  police  was  secured  through  that  dextrous 
trimmer,  the  regicide  Fouche,  who  now  turned  against 
the  very  men  who  had  recently  appointed  him  to  office. 
Feeling  sure  of  the  soldiery  and  police,  the  innovators 
fixed  the  18th  of  Brumaire  as  the  date  of  their  enterprise. 
There  were  many  conferences  at  the  houses  of  the  conspira- 
tors ;  and  one  of  the  few  vivid  touches  which  relieve  the 
dull  tones  of  the  Talleyrand  "  Memoirs  "  reveals  the  con- 
sciousness of  these  men  that  they  were  conspirators.  Late 
on  a  night  in  the  middle  of  Brumaire,  Bonaparte  came  to 
Talleyrand's  house  to  arrange  details  of  the  coup  d'Stat, 
when  the  noise  of  carriages  stopping  outside  caused  them 
to  pale  with  fear  that  their  plans  were  discovered.  At 
once  the  diplomatist  blew  out  the  lights  and  hurried  to 
the  balcony,  when  he  found  that  their  fright  was  due 
merely  to  an  accident  to  the  carriages  of  the  revellers  and 
gamesters  returning  from  the  Palais  Royal,  which  were 
guarded  by  gendarmes.  The  incident  closed  with  laugh- 
ter and  jests  ;  but  it  illustrates  the  tension  of  the  nerves 
of  the  political  gamesters,  as  also  the  mental  weakness  of 
Bonaparte  when  confronted  by  some  unknown  danger. 
It  was  perhaps  the  only  weak  point  in  his  intellectual 
armour  ;  but  it  was  to  be  found  out  at  certain  crises  of 
his  career. 

Meanwhile  in  the  legislative  Councils  there  was  a  feel- 
ing of  vague  disquiet.  The  Ancients  were,  on  the  whole, 
hostile  to  the  Directory,  but  in  the  Council  of  Five  Hun- 
dred the  democratic  ardour  of  the  younger  deputies  fore- 
boded a  fierce  opposition.      Yet  there   also  the   plotters 

1  "  Hist,  of  the  United  States"  (1801-1813),  by  H.  Adams,  vol.  L,  ch. 
xiv.,  and  Ste.  Beuve's  "Talleyrand." 


x  BRUMAIRE  205 

found  many  adherents,  who  followed  the  lead  now  cautiously 
given  by  Lucien  Bonaparte.  This  young  man,  whose  im- 
passioned speeches  had  marked  him  out  as  an  irreproach- 
able patriot,  was  now  President  of  that  Council.  No  event 
could  have  been  more  auspicious  for  the  conspirators.  With 
Sieyes,  Barras,  and  Ducos,  as  traitors  in  the  Directory,  with 
the  Ancients  favourable,  and  the  junior  deputies  under 
the  presidency  of  Lucien,  the  plot  seemed  sure  of  success. 

The  first  important  step  was  taken  by  the  Council  of 
Ancients,  who  decreed  the  transference  of  the  sessions  of 
the  Councils  to  St.  Cloud.  'The  danger  of  a  Jacobin  plot 
was  urged  as  a  plea  for  this  motion,  which  was  declared 
carried  without  the  knowledge  either  of  the  Directory  as 
a  whole,  or  of  the  Five  Hundred,  whose  opposition  would 
have  been  vehement.  The  Ancients  then  appointed  Bona- 
parte to  command  the  armed  forces  in  and  near  Paris. 
The  next  step  was  to  insure  the  abdication  of  Gohier  and 
Moulin.  Seeking  to  entrap  Gohier,  then  the  President 
of  the  Directory,  Josephine  invited  him  to  breakfast  on 
the  morning  of  18th  Brumaire  ;  but  Gohier,  suspecting  a 
snare,  remained  at  his  official  residence,  the  Luxemburg 
Palace.  None  the  less  the  Directory  was  doomed  ;  for 
the  two  defenders  of  the  institution  had  not  the  necessary 
quorum  for  giving  effect  to  their  decrees.  Moulin  there- 
upon escaped,  and  Gohier  was  kept  under  guard  —  by 
Moreau's  soldiery  !  1 

Meanwhile,  accompanied  by  a  brilliant  group  of  generals, 
Bonaparte  proceeded  to  the  Tuileries,  where  the  Ancients 
were  sitting  ;  and  by  indulging  in  a  wordy  declamation 
he  avoided  taking  the  oath  to  the  constitution  required 
of  a  general  on  entering  upon  a  new  command.  In 
the  Council  of  Five  Hundred,  Lucien  Bonaparte  stopped 
the  eager  questions  and  murmurs,  on  the  pretext  that  the 
session  was  only  legal  at  St.  Cloud. 

There,  on  the  next  day  (19th  Brumaire  or  10th  Novem- 
ber), a  far  more  serious  blow  was  to  be  struck.  The  over- 
throw of  the  Directory  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  But 
with  the  Legislature  it  was  far  otherwise,  for  its  life  was 
still  whole  and  vigorous.     Yet,  while  amputating  a  mori- 

1  Gohier,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  i. ;  Lavalette's  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xxii. ;  Roederer, 
"CEuvres,"  vol.  ill. ,  p.  301 ;  Madelin's  "  FoucheY'  p.  267. 


206  THE  LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap 

bund  limb,  the  plotters  did  not  scruple  to  paralyze  the 
brain  of  the  body  politic. 

Despite  the  adhesion  of  most  of  the  Ancients  to  his 
plans,  Bonaparte,  on  appearing  before  them,  could  only 
utter  a  succession  of  short,  jerky  phrases  which  smacked 
of  the  barracks  rather  than  of  the  Senate.  Retiring  in 
some  confusion,  he  regains  his  presence  of  mind  among 
the  soldiers  outside,  and  enters  the  hall  of  the  Five  Hun- 
dred, intending  to  intimidate  them  not  only  by  threats, 
but  by  armed  force.  At  the  sight  of  the  uniforms  at  the 
door,  the  republican  enthusiasm  of  the  younger  deputies 
catches  fire.  They  fiercely  assail  him  with  cries  of  "  Down 
with  the  tyrant !  down  with  the  Dictator  !  outlaw  him  !  " 
In  vain  Lucien  Bonaparte  commands  order.  Several 
deputies  rush  at  the  general,  and  fiercely  shake  him  by 
the  collar.  He  turns  faint  with  excitement  and  chagrin  ; 
but  Lefebvre  and  a  few  grenadiers  rushing  up  drag  him 
from  the  hall.  He  comes  forth  like  a  somnambulist  (says 
an  onlooker),  pursued  by  the  terrible  cry,  "  Hors  la  loi !  " 
Had  the  cries  at  once  taken  form  in  a  decree,  the  history 
of  the  world  might  have  been  different.  One  of  the  depu- 
ties, General  Augereau,  fiercely  demands  that  the  motion 
of  outlawry  be  put  to  the  vote.  Lucien  Bonaparte  refuses, 
protests,  weeps,  finally  throws  off  his  official  robes,  and  is 
rescued  from  the  enraged  deputies  by  grenadiers  whom 
the  conspirators  send  in  for  this  purpose.  Meanwhile 
Bonaparte  and  his  friends  were  hastily  deliberating,  when 
one  of  their  number  brought  the  news  that  the  deputies 
had  declared  the  general  an  outlaw.  The  news  chased 
the  blood  from  his  cheek,  until  Sieyes,  whose  sang  froid 
did  not  desert  him  in  these  civilian  broils,  exclaims,  "  Since 
they  outlaw  you,  they  are  outlaws."  This  revolutionary 
logic  recalls  Bonaparte  to  himself.  He  shouts,  "  To  arms  ! 
Lucien,  too,  mounting  a  horse,  appeals  to  the  soldiers  to 
free  the  Council  from  the  menaces  of  some  deputies  armed 
with  daggers,  and  in  the  pay  of  England,  who  are  terror- 
izing the  majority.  The  shouts  of  command,  clinched  by 
the  adroit  reference  to  daggers  and  English  gold,  cause 
the  troops  to  waver  in  their  duty  ;  and  Lucien,  pressing 
his  advantage  to  the  utmost,  draws  a  sword,  and,  holding 
it  towards  his  brother,  exclaims  that  he  will  stab  him  if 


x  BRUMAIRE  207 

ever  he  attempts  anything  against  liberty.  Murat,  Leclerc, 
and  other  generals  enforce  this  melodramatic  appeal  by 
shouts  for  Bonaparte,  which  the  troops  excitedly  take  up. 
The  drums  sound  for  an  advance,  and  the  troops  forth- 
with enter  the  hall.  In  vain  the  deputies  raise  the  shout, 
"  Vive  la  Republique,"  and  invoke  the  constitution.  Ap- 
peals to  the  law  are  overpowered  by  the  drum  and  by 
shouts  for  Bonaparte  ;  and  the  legislators  of  France  fly 
pell-mell  from  the  hall  through  doors  and  windows.1 

Thus  was  fulfilled  the  prophecy  which  eight  years  pre- 
viously Burke  had  made  in  his  immortal  work  on  the 
French  Revolution.  That  great  thinker  had  predicted 
that  French  liberty  would  fall  a  victim  to  the  first  great 
general  who  drew  the  eyes  of  all  men  upon  himself. 
"  The  moment  in  which  that  event  shall  happen,  the  per- 
son who  really  commands  the  army  is  your  master,  the 
master  of  your  king,  the  master  of  your  Assembly,  the 
master  of  your  whole  republic." 

Discussions  about  the  coup  d'etat  of  Brumaire  general^ 
confuse  the  issue  at  stake  by  ignoring  the  difference  be- 
tween the  overthrow  of  the  Directory  and  that  of  the 
Legislature.  The  collapse  of  the  Directory  was  certain 
to  take  place  ;  but  few  expected  that  the  Legislature  of 
France  would  likewise  vanish.  For  vanish  it  did  :  not 
for  nearly  half  a  century  had  France  another  free  and 
truly  democratic  representative  assembly.  This  result  of 
Brumaire  was  unexpected  by  several  of  the  men  who 
plotted  the  overthrow  of  unpopular  Directors,  and  hoped 
for  the  nipping  of  Jacobinical  or  royalist  designs.  In- 
deed, no  event  in  French  history  is  more  astonishing  than 
the  dispersal  of  the  republican  deputies,  most  of  whom 
desired  a  change  of  personnel  but  not  a  revolution  in 
methods  of  government.  Until  a  few  days  previously  the 
Councils  had  the  allegiance  of  the  populace  and  of  the 
soldiers  ;  the  troops  at  St.  Cloud  were  loyal  to  the  consti- 
tution, and   respected  the  persons  of   the  deputies  until 

1  For  the  story  about  Arena's  dagger,  raised  against  Bonaparte,  see 
Sciout,  vol.  iv.,  p.  652.  It  seems  due  to  Lucien  Bonaparte.  I  take  the 
curious  details  about  Bonaparte's  sudden  pallor  from  Roederer  ("  CEuvres," 
vol.  iii.,  p.  302),  who  heard  it  from  Montrond,  Talleyrand's  secretary.  So 
Aulard,  "  Hist,  de  la  Rev.  Fr.,"  p.  099. 


208  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

they  were  deluded  by  Lucien.  For  a  few  minutes  the 
fate  of  France  trembled  in  the  balance ;  and  the  conspira- 
tors knew  it.1  Bonaparte  confessed  it  by  his  incoherent 
gaspings  ;  Sieyes  had  his  carriage  ready,  with  six  horses, 
for  flight  ;  the  terrible  cry,  "  Hors  la  loi  !  "  if  raised 
against  Bonaparte  in  the  heart  of  Paris,  would  certainly 
have  roused  the  populace  to  fury  in  the  cause  of  liberty 
and  have  swept  the  conspirators  to  the  guillotine.  But, 
as  it  was,  the  affair  was  decided  in  the  solitudes  of  St. 
Cloud  by  Lucien  and  a  battalion  of  soldiers. 

Efforts  have  frequently  been  made  to  represent  the 
events  of  Brumaire  as  inevitable  and  to  dovetail  them  in 
with  a  pretended  philosophy  of  history.  But  it  is  impos- 
sible to  study  them  closely  without  observing  how  narrow 
was  the  margin  between  the  success  and  failure  of  the 
plot,  and  how  jagged  was  the  edge  of  an  affair  which 
philosophizers  seek  to  fit  in  with  their  symmetrical  expla- 
nations. In  truth,  no  event  of  world-wide  importance 
was  ever  decided  by  circumstances  so  trifling.  "  There  is 
but  one  step  from  triumph  to  a  fall.  I  have  seen  that  in 
the  greatest  affairs  a  little  thing  has  always  decided  im- 
portant events  "  —  so  wrote  Bonaparte  three  years  before 
his  triumph  at  St.  Cloud :  he  might  have  written  it  of 
that  event.  It  is  equally  questionable  whether  it  can  be 
regarded  as  saving  France  from  anarchy.  His  admirers, 
it  is  true,  have  striven  to  depict  France  as  trodden  down 
by  invaders,  dissolved  by  anarchy,  and  saved  only  by  the 
stroke  of  Brumaire.  But  she  was  already  triumphant :  it 
was  quite  possible  that  she  would  peacefully  adjust  her 
governmental  difficulties  :  they  were  certainly  no  greater 
than  they  had  been  in  and  since  the  year  1797 :  Fouche 
had  closed  the  club  of  the  Jacobins  :  the  Councils  had 
recovered  their  rightful  influence,  and,  but  for  the  plotters 
of  Brumaire,  might  have  effected  a  return  to  ordinary 
government  of  the  type  of  1795-7.  This  was  the  real 
blow  ;  that  the  vigorous  trunk,  the  Legislature,  was 
struck  down  along  with  the  withering  Directorial  branch. 

The  friends  of  liberty  might  well  be  dismayed  when 
they  saw  how  tamely  France  accepted  this  astounding 
stroke.     Some    allowance   was    naturally  to   be  made,  at 

1  Talleyrand,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  part  ii. ;  Marmont,  bk.  v. 


x  BRUMAIRE  209 

first,  for  the  popular  apathy  :  the  Jacobins,  already  dis- 
couraged by  past  repression,  were  partly  dazed  b}r  the 
suddenness  of  the  blow,  and  were  also  ignorant  of  the 
aims  of  the  men  who  dealt  it ;  and  while  they  were  wait- 
ing to  see  the  import  of  events,  power  passed  rapidly  into 
the  hands  of  Bonaparte  and  his  coadjutors.  Such  is  an 
explanation,  in  part  at  least,  of  the  strange  docility  now 
shown  by  a  populace  which  still  vaunted  its  loyalty  to 
the  democratic  republic.  But  there  is  another  explana- 
tion, which  goes  far  deeper.  The  revolutionary  strifes 
had  wearied  the  brain  of  France  and  had  predisposed  it  to 
accept  accomplished  facts.  Distracted  by  the  talk  about 
royalist  plots  and  Jacobin  plots,  cowering  away  from  the 
white  ogre  and  the  red  spectre,  the  more  credulous  part 
of  the  populace  was  fain  to  take  shelter  under  the  cloak 
of  a  great  soldier,  who  at  least  promised  order.  Every- 
thing favoured  the  drill-sergeant  theory  of  government. 
The  instincts  developed  by  a  thousand  years  of  monarchy 
had  not  been  rooted  out  in  the  last  decade.  They  now 
prompted  France  to  rally  round  her  able  man ;  and,  aban- 
doning political  liberty  as  a  hopeless  quest,  she  obeyed 
the  imperious  call  which  promised  to  revivify  the  order 
and  brilliance  of  her  old  existence  with  the  throbbing 
blood  of  her  new  life. 

The  French  constitution  was  now  to  be  reconstructed 
by  a  self-appointed  commission  which  sat  with  closed 
doors.  This  strange  ending  to  all  the  constitution-build- 
ing of  a  decade  was  due  to  the  adroitness  of  Lucien  Bona- 
parte. At  the  close  of  that  eventful  day,  the  19th  of 
Brumaire,  he  gathered  about  him  in  the  deserted  hall  at 
St.  Cloud  some  score  or  so  of  the  dispersed  deputies  known 
to  be  favourable  to  his  brother,  declaimed  against  the 
Jacobins,  whose  spectral  plot  had  proved  so  useful  to  the 
real  plotters,  and  proposed  to  this  "  Rump  "  of  the  Coun- 
cil the  formation  of  a  commission  who  should  report  on 
measures  that  were  deemed  necessary  for  the  public  safety. 
The  measures  were  found  to  be  the  deposition  of  the 
Directory,  the  expulsion  of  sixty-one  members  from  the 
Councils,  the  nomination  of  Sieyes,  Roger  Ducos,  and 
Bonaparte  as  provisional  Consuls,  and  the  adjournment 
of  the  Councils  for  four  months.     The   Consuls  accord- 


210  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ingly  took  up  their  residence  in  the  Luxemburg  Palace, 
just  vacated  by  the  Directors,  and  the  drafting  of  a  con- 
stitution was  confided  to  them  and  to  an  interim  com- 
mission of  fifty  members  chosen  equally  from  the  two 
Councils. 

The  illegality  of  these  devices  was  hidden  beneath  a 
cloak  of  politic  clemency.  To  this  commission  the  Con- 
suls, or  rather  Bonaparte  —  for  his  will  soon  dominated 
that  of  Sieyes  —  proposed  two  most  salutary  changes. 
He  desired  to  put  an  end  to  the  seizure  of  hostages  from 
villages  suspected  of  royalism  ;  and  also  to  the  exaction 
of  taxes  levied  on  a  progressive  scale,  which  harassed  the 
wealthy  without  proportionately  benefiting  the  exchequer. 
These  two  expedients,  adopted  by  the  Directory  in  the 
summer  of  1799,  were  temporary  measures  adopted  to 
stem  the  tide  of  invasion  and  to  crush  revolts  ;  but  they 
were  regarded  as  signs  of  a  permanently  terrorist  policy, 
and  their  removal  greatly  strengthened  the  new  consular 
rule.  The  blunder  of  nearly  all  the  revolutionary  govern- 
ments had  been  in  continuing  severe  laws  after  the  need 
for  them  had  ceased  to  be  pressing.  Bonaparte,  with 
infinite  tact,  discerned  this  truth,  and,  as  will  shortly 
appear,  set  himself  to  found  his  government  on  the  sup- 
port of  that  vast  neutral  mass  which  was  neither  royalist 
nor  Jacobin,  which  hated  the  severities  of  the  reds  no  less 
than  the  abuses  of  the  ancien  regime. 

While  Bonaparte  was  conciliating  the  many,  Sieyes  was 
striving  to  body  forth  the  constitution  which  for  many 
years  had  been  nebulously  floating  in  his  brain.  The 
function  of  the  Socratic  paievTr)*;  was  discharged  by  Bou- 
lay  de  la  Meurthe,  who  with  difficulty  reduced  those  ideas 
to  definite  shape.  The  new  constitution  was  based  on  the 
principle  :  "  Confidence  comes  from  below,  power  from 
above."  This  meant  that  the  people,  that  is,  all  adult 
males,  were  admitted  only  to  the  preliminary  stages  of 
election  of  deputies,  while  the  final  act  of  selection  was 
to  be  made  by  higher  grades  or  powers.  The  "confi- 
dence "  required  of  the  people  was  to  be  shown  not  only 
towards  their  nominees,  but  towards  those  who  were 
charged  with  the  final  and  most  important  act  of  selec- 
tion.    The  winnowing  processes  in  the  election  of  repre- 


x  BRUMAIKE  211 

sentatives  were  to  be  carried  out  on  a  decimal  system. 
The  adult  voters  meeting  in  their  several  districts  were 
to  choose  one-tenth  of  their  number,  this  tenth  being 
named  the  Notabilities  of  the  Commune.  These,  some 
five  or  six  hundred  thousand  in  number,  meeting  in  their 
several  Departments,  were  thereupon  to  choose  one-tenth 
of  their  number;  and  the  resulting  fifty  or  sixty  thou- 
sand men,  termed  Notabilities  of  the  Departments,  were 
again  to  name  one-tenth  of  their  number,  who  were  styled 
Notabilities  of  the  Nation.  But  the  most  important  act 
of  selection  was  still  to  come  —  from  above.  From  this 
last-named  list  the  governing  powers  were  to  select  the 
members  of  the  legislative  bodies  and  the  chief  officials 
and  servants  of  the  Government. 

The  executive  now  claims  a  brief  notice.  The  well- 
worn  theory  of  the  distinction  of  powers,  that  is,  the  leg- 
islative and  executive  powers,  was  maintained  in  Sieyes' 
plan.  At  the  head  of  the  Government  the  philosopher 
desired  to  enthrone  an  august  personage,  the  Grand  Elec- 
tor, who  was  to  be  selected  by  the  Senate.  This  Grand 
Elector  was  to  nominate  two  Consuls,  one  for  peace,  the 
other  for  war;  they  were  to  nominate  the  Ministers  of 
State,  who  in  their  turn  selected  the  agents  of  power  from 
the  list  of  Notabilities  of  the  Nation.  The  two  Consuls 
and  their  Ministers  administered  the  executive  affairs. 
The  Senate,  sitting  in  dignified  ease,  was  merely  to  safe- 
guard the  constitution,  to  elect  the  Grand  Elector,  and  to 
select  the  members  of  the  Corps  Legislatif  (proper)  and 
the  Tribunate. 

Distrust  of  the  former  almost  superhuman  activity  in 
law-making  now  appeared  in  divisions,  checks,  and  balances 
quite  ingenious  in  their  complexity.  The  Legislature  was 
divided  into  three  councils  :  the  Corps  Legislatif,  properly 
so  called,  which  listened  in  silence  to  proposals  of  laws 
offered  by  the  Council  of  State  and  criticised  or  orally 
approved  by  the  Tribunate.1    These  three  bodies  were  not 

1  Napoleon  explained  to  Metternich  in  1812  why  he  wished  to  silence 
the  Corps  Legislatif:  "In  France  everyone  runs  after  applause;  they 
want  to  be  noticed  and  applauded.  .  .  .  Silence  an  Assembly,  which,  if 
it  is  anything,  must  be  deliberative,  and  you  discredit  it."  — Metter- 
nich's  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  151. 


212  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

only  divided,  but  were  placed  \W^ffSddSS 
two  talking  bodies,  which  resembled  plaintiff  and  defend 
ant  pleading  before  a  gagged  judge.  But  even  so  the  con- 
stitution wfs  not  sufficiently  guarded  against  Jacobins  or 
fovalists  If  by  any  chance  a  dangerous  proposal  were 
Sd  through  Vese  mutually  distrustful  bodies  the 
Senate  was  charged  with  the  task  of  vetoing  it,  and  if  the 
"  Elector,  Sr  any  other  high  official  strove  to  gain  a 
perpetual  dictatorship,  the  Senate  was  at  once  to  absorb 

hl  Moreover8  leaf  toe  voters  should  send  up  too  large  a 

.pro"n  of  Jacobins  or  "T^ft^^f^S^ 
members  of  the  great  Councils  and  the  chief  functionaries 
SrW  affairs  was  to  be  made  by  the  Consuls  whothus 
nrimarilv  exercised  not  only  the  »  power  from  above,    but 
also  the 7"  confidence  "  which  ought  to  have  come  from 
beTow      Perhaps  this  device  was  necessary  to  set  in  motion 
Sievls'  system  of  wheels  within  wheels  ;  for  the  Senate, 
which  was  to  elect  the  Grand  Elector,  by  whom  the  ex- 
^cutte  officers  were  indirectly  to  be  chosen,  was  in  part 
iCfficlent :  the  Consuls  named  the  first  J nembera  who 
thpn  no-oDtecl  that  is,  chose  the  new  members.     Some  im 
p« Z from  wUhout  was  also  needed  to  give  the  consUtu- 
Hon  life  ■    and  this  impulse  was  now  to  come.     Wheie 
Sieves  had  only  contrived  wheels,  checks,  regulator,  break, 
and  slfetv-valve,  there  now  rushed  in  an  impenous  will 
which  not  only  simplified  the  parts  but  supphed  an  irre- 

^com^uToT  much  of  the  nrechanism   especially 

^u'l^Bon&nr  xL  tppSrth 

triofe  winnovving,  to  which  Sieyes  subjected  the  results  of 
nthZ&s-Ts*il  and  the  subordination  of  the  tagij*™ 
To  the  executive  authority,'  the  genera '  ^pressed  h;s 
entire  disapproval  of  the  limitation,  of  tkeG^toj 
nowers  The  name  was  anti-republican :  let  it  be  change" 
L  First   Consul.      And  whereas  Sieyes   condemned   h,s 

.  This  was  >«..  funher  assured  by  the  t Im ^"n'^e'S.S 

&?&?£»*«  rlr^r  nation  w,thoul  vote' 

The  constitution  was  put  in  force  Dec.  25th,  1799. 


X  BRUMAIRE  213 

grand  functionary  to  the  repose  of  a  roi  faineant,  Bona- 
parte secured  to  him  practically  all  the  powers  assigned 
by  Sieyes  to  the  Consuls  for  Peace  and  for  War.  Lastly, 
Bonaparte  protested  against  the  right  of  absorbing  him 
being  given  to  the  Senate.  Here  also  he  was  successful  ; 
and  thus  a  delicately  poised  bureaucracy  was  turned  into 
an  almost  unlimited  dictatorship. 

This  metamorphosis  may  well  excite  wonder.  But,  in 
truth,  Sieyes  and  his  colleagues  were  too  weary  and  scep- 
tical to  oppose  the  one  "intensely  practical  man."  To 
Bonaparte's  trenchant  reasons  and  incisive  tones  the 
theorist  could  only  reply  by  a  scornful  silence  broken  by 
a  few  bitter  retorts.  To  the  irresistible  power  of  the 
general  he  could  only  oppose  the  subtlety  of  a  student. 
And,  indeed,  who  can  picture  Bonaparte,  the  greatest 
warrior  of  the  age,  delegating  the  control  of  all  warlike 
operations  to  a  Consul  for  War  while  Austrian  cannon 
were  thundering  in  the  county  of  Nice  and  British 
cruisers  were  insulting  the  French  coasts?  It  was  inevi- 
table that  the  reposeful  Grand  Elector  should  be  trans-  j 
formed  into  the  omnipotent  First  Consul,  and  that  these 
powers  should  be  wielded  by  Bonaparte  himself.1 

The  extent  of  the  First  Consul's  powers,  as  finally 
settled  by  the  joint  commission,  was  as  follows.  He  had 
the  direct  and  sole  nomination  of  the  members  of  the 
general  administration,  of  those  of  the  departmental  and 
municipal  councils,  and  of  the  administrators,  afterwards 
called  prefects  and  sub-prefects.  He  also  appointed  all 
military  and  naval  officers,  ambassadors  and  agents  sent  to 
foreign  Powers,  and  the  judges  in  civil  and  criminal  suits, 
except  the  juges  de  paix  and,  later  on,  the  members  of  the 
Cour  de  Cassation.  He  therefore  controlled  the  army, 
navy,  and  diplomatic  service,  as  well  as  the  general  admin- 
istration. He  also  signed  treaties,  though  these  might  be 
discussed,  and  must  be  ratified,  by  the  legislative  bodies. 
The  three  Consuls  were  to  reside  in  the  Tuileries  palace  ; 
but,  apart  from  the  enjoyment  of  150,000  francs  a  year,  and 
occasional  consultation  by  the  First  Consul,  the  position 
of  these  officials  was  so  awkward  that  Bonaparte  frankly 

1  Roederer,  "  CEuvres,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  303.  He  was  the  go-between  for 
Bonaparte  and  Sieyes. 


214  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

remarked  to  Roederer  that  it  would  have  been  better  to 
call  them  Grand  Councillors.  They  were,  in  truth,  super- 
numeraries added  to  the  chief  of  the  State,  as  a  concession 
to  the  spirit  of  equality  and  as  a  blind  to  hide  the  reality 
of  the  new  despotism.  All  three  were  to  be  chosen  for 
ten  years,  and  were  re-eligible. 

Such  is  an  outline  of  the  constitution  of  1799  (Year 
VIII.).  It  was  promulgated  on  December  15th,  1799, 
and  was  offered  to  the  people  for  acceptance,  in  a  proc- 
lamation which  closed  with  the  words :  "  Citizens,  the 
Revolution  is  confined  to  the  principles  which  commenced 
it.  It  is  finished."  The  news  of  this  last  fact  decided 
the  enthusiastic  acceptance  of  the  constitution.  In  a 
plebiscite,  or  mass  vote  of  the  people,  held  in  the  early 
days  of  1800,  it  was  accepted  by  an  overwhelming  major- 
ity, viz.,  by  3,011,007  as  against  only  1,562  negatives. 
No  fact  so  forcibly  proves  the  failure  of  absolute  democ- 
racy in  France ;  and,  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  meth- 
ods of  securing  this  national  acclaim,  it  was,  and  must 
ever  remain,  the  soundest  of  Bonaparte's  titles  to  power. 
To  a  pedant  who  once  inquired  about  his  genealogy  he 
significantly  replied  :  "  It  dates  from  Brumaire." 

Shortly  before  the  plebiscite,  Sieyes  and  Ducos  resigned 
their  temporary  commissions  as  Consuls :  they  were  re- 
warded with  seats  in  the  Senate ;  and  Sieyes,  in  consid- 
eration of  his  constitutional  .work,  received  the  estate  of 
Crosne  from  the  nation. 

"  Sieyes  a  Bonaparte  a  fait  present  du  trone, 
Sous  un  pompeux  debris  croyant  l'ensevelir. 
Bonaparte  a  Sieyes  a  fait  present  de  Crosne 
Pour  le  payer  et  l'avilir." 

The  sting  in  the  tail  of  Lebrun's  epigram  struck  home. 
Sieyes'  acceptance  of  Crosne  was,  in  fact,  his  acceptance 
of  notice  to  quit  public  affairs,  in  which  he  had  always 
moved  with  philosophic  disdain.  He  lived  on  to  the  year 
1836  in  dignified  ease,  surveying  with  Olympian  calm  the 
storms  of  French  and  Continental  politics. 

The  two  new  Consuls  were  Cambaceres  and  Lebrun. 
The  former  w.as  known  as  a  learned  jurist  and  a  tactful 
man.     He  had  voted  for  the  death  of  Louis  XVI.,  but 


x  BRUMAIRE  215 

his  subsequent  action  had  been  that  of  a  moderate,  and 
his  knowledge  of  legal  affairs  was  likely  to  be  of  the  high- 
est service  to  Bonaparte,  who  intrusted  him  with  a  gen- 
eral oversight  of  legislation.  His  tact  was  seen  in  his 
refusal  to  take  up  his  abode  in  the  Tuileries,  lest,  as  he 
remarked  to  Lebrun,  he  might  have  to  move  out  again 
soon.  The  third  Consul,  Lebrun,  was  a  moderate  with 
leanings  towards  constitutional  royalty.  He  was  to  prove 
another  useful  satellite  to  Bonaparte,  who  intrusted  him 
with  the  general  oversight  of  finance  and  regarded  him 
as  a  connecting  link  with  the  moderate  royalists.  The 
chief  secretary  to  the  Consuls  was  Maret,  a  trusty  politi- 
cal agent,  who  had  striven  for  peace  with  England  both 
in  1793  and  in  1797. 

As  for  the  Ministers,  they  were  now  reinforced  by 
Talleyrand,  who  took  up  that  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  by 
Berthier,  who  brought  his  powers  of  hard  work  to  that 
of  War,  until  he  was  succeeded  for  a  time  by  Carnot. 
Lucien  Bonaparte,  and  later  Chaptal,  became  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  Gaudin  controlled  Finance,  Forfait  the  Navy, 
and  Fouche  the  Police.  The  Council  of  State  was  organ- 
ized in  the  following  sections :  that  of  War,  which  was , 
presided  over  by  General  Brune  :  Marine,  by  Admiral 
Gantheaume :  Finance,  by  Defermon  :  Legislation,  by 
Boulay  de  la  Meurthe :  the  Interior,  by  Roederer. 

The  First  Consul  soon  showed  that  he  intended  to  adopt 
a  non-partisan  and  thoroughly  national  policy.  That  had 
been,  it  is  true,  the  aim  of  the  Directors  in  their  policy  of 
balance  and  repression  of  extreme  parties  on  both  sides. 
For  the  reasons  above  indicated,  they  had  failed :  but  now 
a  stronger  and  more  tactful  grasp  was  to  succeed  in  a  feat 
which  naturally  became  easier  every  year  that  removed 
the  passions  of  the  revolutionary  epoch  further  into  the 
distance.  Men  cannot  for  ever  perorate,  and  agitate  and 
plot.  A  time  infallibly  comes  when  an  able  leader  can 
successfully  appeal  to  their  saner  instincts :  and  that  hour 
had  now  struck.  Bonaparte's  appeal  was  made  to  the 
many,  who  cared  not  for  politics,  provided  that  they  them- 
selves were  left  in  security  and  comfort :  it  was  urged 
quietly,  persistently,  and  with  the  reserve  power  of  a 
mighty   prestige   and    of    overwhelming    military    force. 


216  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  1  chap 

Throughout  the  whole  of  the  Consulate,  a  policy  of  mod- 
eration, which  is  too  often  taken  for  weakness,  was 
strenuously  carried  through  by  the  strongest  man  and 
the  greatest  warrior  of  the  age. 

The  truly  national  character  of   his   rule  was   seen  in 
many  ways.     He  excluded  from  high  office  men  who  were 
notorious  regicides,  excepting   a  few  who,   like    Fouche, 
were  too  clever  to  be  dispensed  with.    The  constitutionals 
of  1791  and  even  declared  royalists  were  welcomed  back 
to   France,    and    many   of    the   Fructidorian   exiles   also 
returned.1     The  list  of  Smigris  was  closed,  so  that  neither 
political  hatred  nor  private  greed   could   misrepresent   a 
journey  as  an  act  of  political  emigration.     Equally  gener- 
ous and  prudent  was  the  treatment  of  Roman  Catholics. 
Toleration  was  now  extended  to  orthodox  or  non-juring 
priests,  who  were  required   merely  to  promise  allegiance 
to  the  new  constitution.     By  this  act  of  timely  clemency, 
orthodox  priests  were  allowed  to  return  to   France,  and 
they  were  even   suffered   to  officiate  in  places  where  no 
opposition  was  thereby  aroused. 

While  thus  removing  one  of  the  chief  grievances  of  the 
Norman,  Breton,  and  Vendean  peasants,  who  had  risen  as 
much  for  their  religion  as  for  their  king,  he  determined  to 
crush  their  revolts.  The  north-west,  and  indeed  parts  of 
the  south  of  France,  were  still  simmering  with  rebellions 
and  brigandage.  In  Normandy  a  daring  and  able  leader 
named  Frotte  headed  a  considerable  band  of  malcontents, 
and  still  more  formidable  were  the  Breton  "Chouans' 
that  followed  the  peasant  leader  Georges  Cadoudal.  This 
man  was  a  born  leader.  Though  but  thirty  years  of  age, 
his  fierce  courage  had  long  marked  him  out  as  the  first 
fighter  of  his  race  and  creed.  His  features  bespoke  a  bold, 
hearty  spirit,  and  his  massive  frame  defied  fatigue  and 
hardship.  He  struggled  on  ;  and  in  the  autumn  of  17  J9 
fortune  seemed  about  to  favor  the  "  whites "  :  the  revolt 
was  spreading  ;  and  had  a  Bourbon  prince  landed  in  Brit- 
tany before  Bonaparte  returned  from  Egypt,  the  royalists 
might  quite  possibly  have  overthrown  the  Directory.    But 

i  See  the  "Souvenirs"  of  Mathieu  Dumas  for  the  skilful  manner  in 
which  Bonaparte  gained  over  the  services  of  this  constitutional  royalist 
and  employed  him  to  raise  a  body  of  volunteer  horse. 


X  BRUMAIRE  217 

Bonaparte's  daring  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs. 
The  news  of  the  stroke  of  Brumaire  gave  the  royalists 
pause.  At  first  they  believed  that  the  First  Consul  would 
soon  call  back  the  king,  and  Bonaparte  skilfully  favoured 
this  notion  :  he  offered  a  pacification,  of  which  some  of 
the  harassed  peasants  availed  themselves.  Georges  him- 
self for  a  time  advised  a  reconciliation,  and  a  meeting  of 
the  royalist  leaders  voted  to  a  man  that  they  desired  "  to 
have  the  king  and  you"  (Bonaparte).  One  of  them, 
Hyde  de  Neuville,  had  an  interview  with  the  First  Consul 
at  Paris,  and  has  left  on  record  his  surprise  at  seeing  the 
slight  form  of  the  man  whose  name  was  ringing  through 
France.  At  the  first  glance  he  took  him  for  a  rather 
poorly  dressed  lackey  ;  but  when  the  general  raised  his 
eyes  and  searched  him  through  and  through  with  their 
eager  fire,  the  royalist  saw  his  error  and  fell  under  the 
spell  of  a  gaze  which  few  could  endure  unmoved.  The 
interview  brought  no  definite  result. 

Other  overtures  made  by  Bonaparte  were  more  effec- 
tive. True  to  his  plan  of  dividing  his  enemies,  he  ap- 
pealed to  the  clergy  to  end  the  civil  strife.  The  appeal 
struck  home  to  the  heart  or  the  ambitions  of  a  cleric 
named  Bernier.  This  man  was  but  a  village  priest  of  La 
Vendee  :  yet  his  natural  abilities  gained  him  an  ascendancy 
in  the  councils  of  the  insurgents,  which  the  First  Consul 
was  now  victoriously  to  exploit.  Whatever  may  have 
been  Bernier's  motives,  he  certainly  acted  with  some 
duplicity.  Without  forewarning  Cadoudal,  Bourmont, 
Frotte,  and  other  royalist  leaders,  he  secretly  persuaded 
the  less  combative  leaders  to  accept  the  First  Consul's 
terms  :  and  a  pacification  was  arranged  (January  18th). 
In  vain  did  Cadoudal  rage  against  this  treachery  :  in  vain 
did  he  strive  to  break  the  armistice.  Frotte  in  Normandy 
was  the  last  to  capitulate  and  the  first  to  feel  Bonaparte's 
vengeance  :  on  a  trumped-up  charge  of  treachery  he  was 
hurried  before  a  court-martial  and  shot.  An  order  was 
sent  from  Paris  for  his  pardon  ;  but  a  letter  which  Bona- 
parte wrote  to  Brune  on  the  day  of  the  execution  contains 
the  ominous  phrase  :  By  this  time  FrottS  ought  to  be  shot ; 
and  a  recently  published  letter  to  Hedouville  expresses 
the  belief   that  the  punishment  of  that   desperate   leader 


218  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

will  doubtless  contribute  to  the  complete  pacification  of  the 

West.  l 

In  the  hope  of  gaining  over  the  Chouans,  Bonaparte 
required  their  chiefs  to  come  to  Paris,  where  they  re- 
ceived the  greatest  consideration.  In  Bernier  the  priest, 
Bonaparte  discerned  diplomatic  gifts  of  a  high  order, 
which  were  soon  to  be  tested  in  a  far  more  important  ne- 
gotiation. The  nobles,  too,  received  flattering  attentions 
which  touched  their  pride  and  assured  their  future  insig- 
nificance. Among  them  was  Count  Bourmont,  the  Judas 
of  the  Waterloo  campaign. 

In  contrast  with  the  priest  and  the  nobles,  Georges 
Cadoudal  stood  firm  as  a  rock.  That  suave  tongue  spoke 
to  him  of  glory,  honour,  and  the  fatherland  :  he  heeded 
it  not,  for  he  knew  it  had  ordered  the  death  of  Frotte. 
There  stood  these  fighters  alone,  face  to  face,  types  of  the 
north  and  south,  of  past  and  present,  fiercest  and  toughest 
of  living  men,  their  stern  wills  racked  in  wrestle  for  two 
hours.  But  southern  craft  was  foiled  by  Breton  stead- 
fastness, and  Georges  went  his  way  unshained.  Once 
outside  the  palace,  his  only  words  to  his  friend,  Hyde  de 
Neuville,  were  :  "  What  a  mind  I  had  to  strangle  him  in 
these  arms  !  "  Shadowed  by  Bonaparte's  spies,  and  hear- 
ing that  he  was  to  be  arrested,  he  fled  to  England  ;  and 
Normandy  and  Brittany  enjoyed  the  semblance  of  peace. 

Thus  ended  the  civil  war  which  for  nearly  seven  years 
had  rent  France  in  twain.  Whatever  may  be  said  about 
the  details  of  Bonaparte's  action,  few  will  deny  its  benefi- 
cent results  on  French  life.  Harsh  and  remorseless  as 
Nature  herself  towards  individuals,  he  certainly,  at  this 
part  of  his  career,  promoted  the  peace  and  prosperity  oi 
the  masses.  And  what  more  can  be  said  on  behalf  ot  a 
ruler  at  the  end  of  a  bloody  revolution  ? 

Meanwhile  the  First  Consul  had  continued  to  develop 
Sieyes'  constitution  in  the  direction  of  autocracy,  lhe 
Council  of  State,  which  was  little  more  than  an  enlarged 
Ministry,  had  been  charged  with  the  vague  and  danger- 

i  «  Lettres  incites  de  Napoleon,"  February  21st,  1800  ;  «  Memoires  du 
General  d'Andigne\"  ch.  xv. ;  Madelin's  "  Fouche,  "p. 30 6. 

*  "  Georges  Cadoudal,"  par  son  neveu,  G.  de  Cadoudal ,  Hyde  ae 
Neuville,  vol.  i.,  p.  305. 


x  BRUMAIRE  218 

ous  function  of  "  developing  the  sense  of  laws  "  on  the 
demand  of  the  Consuls  ;  and  it  was  soon  seen  that  this 
Council  was  merely  a  convenient  screen  to  hide  the  opera- 
tions of  Bonaparte's  will.  On  the  other  hand,  a  blow  was 
struck  at  the  Tribunate,  the  only  public  body  which  had 
the  right  of  debate  and  criticism.  It  was  now  proposed 
(January,  1800)  that  the  time  allowed  for  debate  should 
be  strictly  limited.  This  restriction  to  the  right  of  free 
discussion  met  with  little  opposition.  One  of  the  most 
gifted  of  the  new  tribunes,  Benjamin  Constant,  the  friend 
of  Madame  de  Stael,  eloquently  pleaded  against  this  policy 
of  distrust  which  would  reduce  the  Tribunate  to  a  silence 
that  would  be  heard  by  Europe.  It  was  in  vain.  The 
rapid  rhetoric  of  the  past  had  infected  France  with  a  fool- 
ish fear  of  all  free  debate.  The  Tribunate  signed  its  own 
death  warrant ;  and  the  sole  result  of  its  feeble  attempt  at 
opposition  was  that  Madame  de  StaeTs  salon  was  forthwith 
deserted  by  the  Liberals  who  had  there  found  inspiration  ; 
while  the  gifted  authoress  herself  was  officially  requested 
to  retire  into  the  country. 

The  next  act  of  the  central  power  struck  at  freedom  of 
the  press.  As  a  few  journals  ventured  on  witticisms  at 
the  expense  of  the  new  Government,  the  Consuls  or- 
dered the  suppression  of  all  the  political  journals  of 
Paris  except  thirteen  ;  and  three  even  of  these  favoured 
papers  were  suppressed  on  April  7th.  The  reason  given 
for  this  despotic  action  was  the  need  of  guiding  public 
opinion  wisely  during  the  war,  and  of  preventing  any  arti- 
cles "  contrary  to  the  respect  due  to  the  social  compact, 
to  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  to  the  glory  of  the 
armies."  By  a  finely  ironical  touch  Rousseau's  doctrine 
of  the  popular  sovereignty  was  thus  invoked  to  sanction 
its  violation.  The  incident  is  characteristic  of  the  whole 
tendency  of  events,  which  showed  that  the  dawn  of  per- 
sonal rule  was  at  hand.  In  fact,  Bonaparte  had  already 
taken  the  bold  step  of  removing  to  the  Tuileries,  and  that 
too,  on  the  very  clay  when  he  ordered  public  mourning  for 
the  death  of  Washington  (February  7th).  No  one  but 
the  great  Corsican  would  have  dared  to  brave  the  com- 
ments which  this  coincidence  provoked.  But  he  was 
necessary  to  France,  and  all  men  knew  it.     At  the  first 


220  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  x 

sitting  of  the  provisional  Consuls,  Ducos  had  said  to  him : 
"  It  is  useless  to  vote  about  the  presidence  ;  it  belongs  to 
you  of  right ;  "  and,  despite  the  wry  face  pulled  by  Sieyes, 
the  general  at  once  took  the  chair.  Scarcely  less  remark- 
able than  the  lack  of  energy  in  statesmen  was  the  confu- 
sion of  thought  in  the  populace.  Mine.  Reinhard  tells  us 
that  after  the  coup  d'etat  people  believed  they  had  returned 
to  the  first  days  of  liberty.  What  wonder,  then,  that  the 
one  able  and  strong-willed  man  led  the  helpless  many  and 
re-moulded  Sieyes'  constitution  in  a  fashion  that  was  thus 
happily  parodied  :  — 

"  J'ai,  pour  les  f ous,  d'un  Tribunat 

Conserve  la  figure ; 
Pour  les  sots  je  laisse  un  Senat, 

Mais  ce  n'est  qu'en  peinture; 
A  ce  stupide  magistrat 

Ma  volonte  preside ; 
Et  tout  le  Conseil  d'Etat 

Dans  mon  sabre  reside." 


CHAPTER  XI 

MARENGO  :   LUNEVILLE 

Reserving  for  the  next  chapter  a  description  of  the 
new  civil  institutions  of  France,  it  will  be  convenient 
now  to  turn  to  foreign  affairs.  Having  arranged  the 
most  urgent  of  domestic  questions,  the  First  Consul  was 
ready  to  encounter  the  forces  of  the  Second  Coalition. 
He  had  already  won  golden  opinions  in  France  by  en- 
deavouring peacefully  to  dissolve  it.  On  the  25th  of 
December,  1799,  he  sent  two  courteous  letters,  one  to 
George  III.,  the  other  to  the  Emperor  Francis,  proposing 
an  immediate  end  to  the  war.  The  close  of  the  letter  to 
George  III.  has  been  deservedly  admired :  "  France  and 
England  by  the  abuse  of  their  strength  may,  for  the  mis- 
fortune of  all  nations,  be  long  in  exhausting  it :  but  I 
venture  to  declare  that  the  fate  of  all  civilized  nations  is 
concerned  in  the  termination  of  a  war  which  kindles  a 
conflagration  over  the  whole  world."  This  noble  senti- 
ment touched  the  imagination  of  France  and  of  friends 
of  peace  everywhere. 

And  yet,  if  the  circumstances  of  the  time  be  considered, 
the  first  agreeable  impressions  aroused  by  the  perusal  of 
this  letter  must  be  clouded  over  by  doubts.  The  First 
Consul  had  just  seized  on  power  by  illegal  and  forcible 
means,  and  there  was  as  yet  little  to  convince  foreign 
States  that  he  would  hold  it  longer  than  the  men  whom 
he  had  displaced.  Moreover,  France  was  in  a  difficult 
position.  Her  treasury  was  empty ;  her  army  in  Italy 
was  being  edged  into  the  narrow  coast-line  near  Genoa ; 
and  her  oriental  forces  were  shut  up  in  their  new  conquest. 
Were  not  the  appeals  to  Austria  and  England  merely  a 
skilful  device  to  gain  time?  Did  his  past  career  in  Italy 
and  Egypt  warrant  the  belief  that  he  would  abandon  the 
peninsula  and  the  new  colony  ?     Could  the  man  who  had 

221 


222 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


bartered  away  Venetia  and  seized  Malta  and  Egypt  be 
fitly  looked  upon  as  the  world's  peacemaker?  In  diplo- 
macy men's  words  are  interpreted  by  their  past  conduct 
and  present  circumstances,  neither  of  which  tended  to 
produce  confidence  in  Bonaparte's  pacific  overtures ;  and 
neither  Francis  nor  George  III.  looked  on  the  present 
attempt  as  anything  but  a  skilful  means  of   weakening 

the  Coalition.  ..  ,        ,. 

Indeed,  that  league  was,  for  various  reasons,  all  but  dis- 
solved by  internal  dissensions.     Austria  was  resolved  to 
keep  all  the  eastern  part  of  Piedmont  and  the  greater  part 
of  the  Genoese  Republic.     While  welcoming  the  latter  halt 
of  this  demand,  George  III.'s  Ministers  protested  against 
the  absorption  of  so  great  a  part  of  Piedmont  as  an  act 
of  cruel  injustice  to  the  King  of  Sardinia.     Austria  was 
annoyed  at  the  British  remonstrances  and  was  indignant 
at  the  designs  of  the  Czar  on  Corsica.     Accordingly  no 
time  could  have  been  better  chosen  by  Bonaparte  for  seek- 
ing to  dissolve  the  Coalition,  as  he  certainly  hoped  to  do 
by  these  two  letters.     Only  the  staunch  support  of  legiti- 
mist claims  by  England  then  prevented  the  Coalition  from 
degenerating  into  a  scramble  for  Italian  territories.1     And, 
if  we  may  trust  the  verdict  of  contemporaries  and  his  own 
confession  at  St.  Helena,  Bonaparte  never  expected  any 
other  result  from  these  letters  than  an  increase  ot  his  popu- 
larity in  France.     This  was  enhanced  by  the  British  reply, 
which  declared  that  His  Majesty  could  not  place  his  re- 
liance on  "general  professions  of   pacific  dispositions     : 
France  had  waged  aggressive  war,  levied  exactions,  and 
overthrown  institutions  in  neighbouring  States;  and  the 
British  Government  could  not  as  yet  discern  any  abandon- 
ment of  this  system  :  something  more  was  required  tor  a 
durable  peace  :  "  The  best  and  most  natural  pledge  ot  its 
reality  and  permanence  would  be  the  restoration  of  that 
line  of  princes  which  for  so  many  centuries  maintained 
the  French  nation  in  prosperity  at  home  and  in  considera- 
tion and  respect  abroad."     This  answer  has  been  sharply 
criticised,  and  justly  so,  if  its  influence  on  public  opinion 

i  «F  0.,"  Austria,  No.  58;  « Caattereaj?h'a  Despatches,"  v.  adinit. 
Bowman,  in  his  excellent  monograph,  "  Preliminary  Stages  of  the  Peace 
of  Amiens  "  (Toronto,  1899),  has  not  noted  this. 


xi  MARENGO:   LUNETILLE  22S 

be  alone  considered.  But  a  perusal  of  the  British  Foreign 
Office  Records  reveals  the  reason  for  the  use  of  these  stiffly 
legitimist  claims.  Legitimacy  alone  promised  to  stop  the 
endless  shiftings  of  the  political  kaleidoscope,  whether  by 
France,  Austria,  or  Russia.  Our  ambassador  at  Vienna 
was  requested  to  inform  the  Government  of  Vienna  of  the 
exact  wording  of  the  British  reply : 

"As  a  proof  of  the  zeal  and  steadiness  with  which  His  Majesty 
adheres  to  the  principles  of  the  Confederacy,  and  as  a  testimony  of 
the  confidence  with  which  he  anticipates  a  similar  answer  from  His 
Imperial  Majesty,  to  whom  an  overture  of  a  similar  nature  has  with- 
out doubt  been  made." 

But  this  correct  conduct,  while  admirably  adapted  to 
prop  up  the  tottering  Coalition,  was  equally  favourable 
to  the  consolidation  of  Bonaparte's  power.  It  helped  to 
band  together  the  French  people  to  resist  the  imposition 
of  their  exiled  royal  house  by  external  force.  Even 
George  III.  thought  it  "much  too  strong,"  though  he 
suggested  no  alteration.  At  once  Bonaparte  retorted  in 
a  masterly  note ;  he  ironically  presumed  that  His  Britan- 
nic Majesty  admitted  the  right  of  nations  to  choose  their 
form  of  government,  since  only  by  that  right  did  he  wear 
the  British  crown;  and  he  invited  him  not  to  apply  to 
other  peoples  a  principle  which  would  recall  the  Stuarts 
to  the  throne  of  Great  Britain. 

Bonaparte's  diplomatic  game  was  completely  won  dur- 
ing the  debates  on  the  King's  speech  at  Westminster  at  the 
close  of  January,  1800.  Lord  Grenville  laboriously  proved 
that  peace  was  impossible  with  a  nation  whose  war  was 
against  all  order,  religion,  and  morality ;  and  he  cited  ex- 
amples of  French  lawlessness  from  Holland  and  Switzer- 
land to  Malta  and  Egypt.  Pitt  declared  that  the  French 
Revolution  was  the  severest  trial  which  Providence  had 
ever  yet  inflicted  on  the  nations  of  the  earth ;  and,  claim- 
ing that  there  was  no  security  in  negotiating  with  France, 
owing  to  her  instability,  he  summed  up  his  case  in  the 
Ciceronian  phrase :  Paeem  nolo  quia  infida.  Ministers 
carried  the  day  by  260  votes  to  64 ;  but  they  ranged  nearly 
the  whole  of  France  on  the  side  of  the  First  Consul.  No 
triumph  in  the  field  was  worth  more  to  him  than  these 


224  '      THE  LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Philippics,  which  seemed  to  challenge  France  to  build  up 
a  s  ^Government  in  order  that  the  Conrt  of  St.  James 
^„  ght  Ld  some  firm  foundation  ^^ future  negotn.tmn. 

Far   more   dextrous   was  the  conduct  of  the  Austrian 
diplomatists      Affecting  to  believe  in  the  sincerity  of  the 
^"l'sproposalfor  peace,  they  so  worded  their 
n  te  as  to  drawVom  bim  a  reply  that  he  ™W^ 
to  discuss  terms  of  peace  on  the  basis  of  the   lreaty  ot 
Campo  Formio.i     As  Austria  had   since  then  conquered 
theTeater  part  of  Italy,  Bonaparte's  reply  immediately 
Celled  lnsPdeterminatLn  to  reassert  ^^^7i   ' 
in  Italv  and  the  Rhineland.     The  action  of  the  Courts  ot 
Vienimand  London  was  not  unlike  that  of  the  sun  and 
the   whid    in  the  proverbial  saw.     Viennese  suavity  in- 
duced    Bonaparte  to  take  off  his  coat  and  show  himself 
1   he   reallyP  was :    while    the    conscientious    bluster   of 
Grenville  and  Pitt  made  the  First  Consul  button  up  his 
coat  and  pose  as  the  buffeted  peacemaker. 
C°The  a¥es  had  good  grounds^ for  confidence.     Though 
Russia  had   withdrawn   from  the  Second  Coalit  on,   yet 
SieTustrlans  continued  their  victoriou^ ^g^^ 
Tn   April,   1800,  they    severed    the    trench    forces   near 
Savona  driving  back  Suchet's  corps  towards  Nice  while 
tWher  was  gradually  hemmed  in  behind  the  redoubts 
of   Genoa       There   the  Imperialist  advance  was  stoutly 
staved      Massena,  ably  seconded  by  Oudinot  and  Sou  t 
who  now  gained  their  W  laurels  as  fS^™^£ 
a   most   obstinate    resistance,  defying   alike   the  assaults 
of   the   white-coats,    the   bombs   hurled  FJh*J*$™ 
^nuadron    and   the    deadlier  inroads  of  famine  and  sick 
Zt       The    garrison    dwindled  by  degrees  to  less  than 
00  Iffectfves,  but    they  kept  double   the   number  of 
Austrian*  there,  while  Bonaparte ^was  *^^™** 

To  hold  olrat  Genoa  to  the  last  extremity,  and  nobly  was 

"ft  —hile  defended  the  line  of  the  River  Var 

agahist  Meks      In  Germany,  Moreau  with  his  larger  forces 

i«Nap.  Correspond.,"  Febn^ry  27th   1800 ;  Thugut,  "Briefe,"  vol. 

ii.,  pp.  444-446  ;  Oncken,  "Zeitalter,"  vol.  ii.,  P-  45. 


xi  MARENGO:    LUNEVILLE  226 

slowly  edged  back  the  chief  Austrian  army,  that  of 
General  Kray,  from  the  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest,  com- 
pelling it  to  fall  back  on  the  intrenched  camp  at  Ulm. 

On  their  side,  the  Austrians  strove  to  compel  Massena 
to  a  speedy  surrender,  and  then  with  a  large  force  to 
press  on  into  Nice,  Provence,  and  possibly  Savoy,  sur- 
rounding Suchet's  force,  and  rousing  the  French  royalists 
of  the  south  to  a  general  insurrection.  They  also  had 
the  promise  of  the  help  of  a  British  force,  which  was  to 
be  landed  at  some  point  on  the  coast  and  take  Suchet  in 
the  flank  or  rear.1  Such  was  the  plan,  daring  in  outline 
and  promising  great  things,  provided  that  everything 
went  well.  If  Massena  surrendered,  if  the  British  War 
Office  and  Admiralty  worked  up  to  time,  if  the  winds 
were  favourable,  and  if  the  French  royalists  again  ven- 
tured on  a  revolt,  then  France  would  be  crippled,  perhaps 
conquered.  As  for  the  French  occupation  of  Switzer- 
land and  Moreau's  advance  into  Swabia,  that  was  not  to 
prevent  the  prosecution  of  the  original  Austrian  plan 
of  advancing  against  Provence  and  wresting  Nice  and 
Savoy  from  the  French  grasp.  This  scheme  has  been 
criticised  as  if  it  were  based  solely  on  military  considera- 
tions ;  but  it  was  rather  dictated  by  schemes  of  political 
aggrandizement.  The  conquest  of  Nice  and  Savoy  was 
necessary  to  complete  the  ambitious  schemes  of  the 
Hapsburgs,  who  sought  to  gain  a  large  part  of  Piedmont 
at  the  expense  of  the  King  of  Sardinia,  and  after  conquer- 
ing Savoy  and  Nice,  to  thrust  that  unfortunate  king  to 
the  utmost  verge  of  the  peninsula,  which  the  prowess  of 
his  descendants  has  ultimately  united  under  the  Italian 
tricolour. 

The  allied  plan  sinned  against  one  of  the  elementary 
rules  of  strategy  ;  it  exposed  a  large  force  to  a  blow  from 
the  rear,  namely,  from  Switzerland.     The  importance  of 

1  A  Foreign  Office  despatch,  dated  Downing  Street,  February  8th,  1800, 
to  Vienna,  promised  a  loan  and  that  15,000  or  20,000  British  troops  should 
be  employed  in  the  Mediterranean  to  act  in  concert  with  the  Austrians 
there,  and  to  give  "support  to  the  royalist  insurrections  in  the  south- 
ern provinces  of  France."  No  differences  of  opinion  respecting  Piedmont 
can  be  held  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  failure  of  the  British  Government 
to  fulfil  this  promise  —  a  failure  which  contributed  to  the  disaster  at 
Marengo. 


226 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  1  chap. 


this   immensely    strong   central   position  early   attracted 
Bonaparte's  attention.     On  the  17th  of  March  he  called 
his  secretary,  Bourrienne  (so  the  latter  states),  and   lay 
down  with  him  on    a   map   of    Piedmont  :  then,  placing 
pins  tipped,  some  with  red,  others  with  black  wax,  so  as 
to  denote  the  positions  of  the  troops,  he  asked   him   to 
guess  where  the  French  would  beat  their  foes : 
'  "How  the  devil  should  I  know?"  said  Bourrienne      "Why,  look 
here,  you  fool,"  said  the  First  Consul :  «  Melas  is  at  Alessandria  with 
his  headquarters.     There  he  will  remain  until  Genoa  surrenders.     He 
has  at  Alessandria  Ins  magazines,  his  hospitals  his .artillery  his  re- 
serves     Crossing  the  Alps  here  (at  the  Great  St.  Bernard),  I  shall 
fall  upon  Melas,  cut  off  his  communications  with  Austria,  and  meet 
him  here  in  the  plains  of  the  River  Scrivia  at  ban  Gmliauo. 

I   quote   this    passage   as   showing    how   readily   such 
stories   of   ready-made  plans   gain   credence,  until    they 
come  to  be  tested  by  Napoleon's  correspondence.      Ihere 
we  find  no  strategic  soothsaying,  but  only  a  close  watch- 
ing of  events  as  they  develop  day  by  day.     In  March  and 
April  he  kept  urging  on  Moreau  the  need  of   an   early 
advance,  while  he  considered  the  advantages  ottered   by 
the  St.  Gotthard,  Simplon,  and  Great  St.  Bernard  passes 
for  his  own  army.     On  April  27th  he  decided  against  the 
first  (except  for  a  detachment),  because  Moreau  s  advance 
was  too  slow  to  safeguard  his  rear  on  that  route.     He  now 
preferred  the  Great  St.  Bernard,  but  still  doubted  whether 
after  crossing,  he  should  make   for   Milan,  or   strike   at 
Massena's  besiegers,  in  case  that  general  should  be  very 
hard  pressed.     Like  all  great  commanders,  he  started  with 
a  general  plan,  but  he  arranged  the  details  as  the  situation 
required.     In  his  letter  of  May  19th,  he  poured  scorn  on 
Parisian  editors  who  said  he  prophesied  that  in  a  month 
he  would  be  at  Milan.     "  That  is  not  in  my  character. 
Very  often  I  do  not  say  what  I  know  ;  but  never  do  1  say 

what  will  be."  „    . 

The  better  to  hide  his  purpose,  he  chose  as  his  hrst 
base  of  operations  the  city  of  Dijon,  whence  he  seemed  to 
threaten  either  the  Swabian  or  the  Italian  army  ol  his 
foes.  But  this  was  not  enough.  At  the  old  Burgundian 
capital  he  assembled  his  staff  and  a  few  regiments  of  con- 
scripts in  order   to   mislead   the   English   and   Austrian 


xi  MARENGO:  LUNEVILLE  227 

spies  ;  while  the  fighting  battalions  were  drafted  by  di- 
verse routes  to  Geneva  or  Lausanne.  So  skilful  were 
these  preparations  that,  in  the  early  days  of  May,  the 
greater  part  of  his  men  and  stores  were  near  the  lake  of 
Geneva,  whence  they  were  easily  transferred  to  the  upper 
valley  of  the  Rhone.  In  order  that  he  might  have  a 
methodical,  hard-working  coadjutor,  he  sent  Berthier 
from  the  office  of  the  Ministry  of  War,  where  he  had  dis- 
played less  ability  than  Bernadotte,  to  be  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  "army  of  reserve."  In  reality  Berthier  was, 
as  before  in  Italy  and  Egypt,  chief  of  the  staff;  but  he 
had  the  titular  dignity  of  commander  which  the  constitu- 
tion of  1800  forbade  the  First  Consul  to  assume. 

On  May  6th  Bonaparte  left  Paris  for  Geneva,  where 
he  felt  the  pulse  of  every  movement  in  both  campaigns. 
At  that  city,  on  hearing  the  report  of  his  general  of 
engineers,  he  decided  to  take  the  Great  St.  Bernard  route 
into  Italy,  as  against  the  Simplon.  With  redoubled 
energy,  he  now  supervised  the  thousands  of  details  that 
were  needed  to  insure  success  :  for,  while  prone  to  in- 
dulging in  grandiose  schemes,  he  revelled  in  the  work 
which  alone  could  bring  them  within  his  grasp  :  or,  as 
Wellington  once  remarked,  "  Nothing  was  too  great  or 
too  small  for  his  proboscis."  The  difficulties  of  sending 
a  large  army  over  the  Great  St.  Bernard  were  indeed 
immense.  That  pass  was  chosen  because  it  presented 
only  five  leagues  of  ground  impracticable  for  carriages. 
But  those  five  leagues  tested  the  utmost  powers  of  the 
army  and  of  its  chiefs.  Marmont,  who  commanded  the 
artillery,  had  devised  the  ingenious  plan  of  taking  the  can- 
non from  their  damages  and  placing  them  in  the  hollowed- 
out  trunks  of  pine,  so  that  the  trunnions  fitting  into  large 
notches  kept  them  steady  during  the  ascent  over  the  snow 
and  the  still  more  difficult  descent. 2  The  labour  of  dragging 
the  guns  wore  out  the  peasants  :  then  the  troops  were  in- 
vited—  a  hundred  at  a  time — to  take  a  turn  at  the  ropes, 
and  were  exhilarated  by  martial  airs  played  by  the  bands, 
or  by  bugles  and  drums  sounding  the  charge  at  the  worst 
places  of  the  ascent. 

1  Thiers  attributes  this  device  to  Bonaparte  ;  but  the  First  Consul's 
bulletin  of  May  24th  ascribes  it  to  Marmont  and  Gassendi. 


228 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


The  track  sometimes  ran  along  narrow  ledges  where  a 
false  step  meant  death,  or  where  avalanches  were  to  be 
eared.     The  elements,  however,  were  propitious,  and  the 
osses  insignificant.     This  was  due  to  many  causes :  the 
ardour  of  the  troops  in  an  enterprise  which  appealed    o 
French  imagination  and    roused  all  their  activities  ;  the 
SSZg«f   the    mountaineers ;    «*J^*^ 
nowers  of  Bonaparte  and  of  his  staff ;  all  these  may  oc 
citT as  elements   of   success.      They  present  a  striking 
onfrast  to  the  march  of  Hannibal's  ^7°™™*- the 
western  passes  of  the  Alps.     His  motley  host  struggled 
Tver  a  long  stretch  of  mountains  in  the  short  days  of  Oc- 
tober over  unknown  paths,  in  one  part  swept  away  by  a 
fall   of   the  cliff,  and  ever  and  anon  beset  by  clouds  of 
reacherous  Gauis.     Seeing  that  the  gi :ea gagman  - 
difficulties  began  long  before  he  reached  the  Alps,  tnat  ne 
was  encumbe?ed  by  elephants,  and  that  his  army  was  com- 
Tsed  of  diverse  races  held  together  only  by  trust  in  the 
Prowess  of  Iheir  chief,  his  exploit  was  far  more  wonderful 
than  that  of  Bonaparte,  which,  indeed,  more  nearly  resem- 
lt  the  crossing  of  the  St   Bernard  by  *»^  "^ 
The  difference  between  the  conditions  of  Hannibal  s  and 
Bonaparte's  enterprises   may  partly  be  measured  by  the 
time  which  they  occupied.       Whereas  Hannibal  s  marcn 
across  the  Alps7  lasted  fifteen  days,  three  of  which  were 
spent  in  the  miseries  of  a  forced  halt  amidst  the  snow     he 
J  First  Consul's  forces  took  but  seven  days.     Whereas  the 
Carthaginian  army  was  weakened  by  hunger,  the  French 
carried  their  full  rations  of  biscuit  ;  and  at  the  head  of  the 
Cpass  the  monks  of  the  Hospice  of  St.  Bernard ^ served out 
the  rations  of  bread,  cheese,  and  wine  which  the  First  Con 
sul  had  forwarded,  and  which  their  own  generosity  now 
doubled.    The  hospitable  fathers  themselves  served  at  the 
tables  set  up  in  front  of  the  Hospice. 

After  insuring  the  regular  succession  of  troops  and 
stores  Bonaparte  himself  began  the  ascent  on  May  20th. 
He wore  the  gray  overcoat  which  had  already  become  fa- 
mouT  and  his  features  were  fixed  in  that  expression  of 
cX  seH-possession  which  he  ever  maintained  in  face  of 
difficulty.  The  melodramatic  attitudes  of  horse  and  rider, 
which  David  has  immortalized  in  his  great  painting,  are,  of 


xi  MARENGO:    LUNEVILLE  229 

course,  merely  symbolical  of  the  genius  of  militant  democ- 
racy prancing  over  natural  obstacles  and  wafted  onwards 
and  upwards  by  the  breath  of  victory.  The  living  figure 
was  remarkable  only  for  stern  self-restraint  and  suppressed 
excitement ;  instead  of  the  prancing  war-horse  limned  by 
David,  his  beast  of  burden  was  a  mule,  led  by  a  peasant ; 
and,  in  place  of  victory,  he  had  heard  that  Lannes  with 
the  vanguard  had  found  an  unexpected  obstacle  to  his  de- 
scent into  Italy.  The  narrow  valley  of  the  Dora  Baltea, 
by  which  alone  they  could  advance,  was  wellnigh  blocked 
by  the  fort  of  Bard,  which  was  firmly  held  by  a  small  Aus- 
trian garrison  and  defied  all  the  efforts  of  Lannes  and 
Berthier.  This  was  the  news  that  met  the  First  Consul 
during  his  ascent,  and  again  at  the  Hospice.  After  accept- 
ing the  hospitality  of  the  monks,  and  spending  a  short  time 
in  the  library  and  chapel,  he  resumed  his  journey ;  and 
on  the  southern  slopes  he  and  his  staff  now  and  again 
amused  themselves  by  sliding  down  the  tracks  which  the 
passage  of  thousands  of  men  had  rendered  slippery.  After 
halting  at  Aosta,  he  proceeded  down  the  valley  to  the  fort 
of  Bard. 

Meanwhile  some  of  his  foot-soldiers  had  worked  their 
way  round  this  obstacle  by  a  goat-track  among  the  hills 
and  had  already  reached  Ivrea  lower  down  the  valley. 
Still  the  fort  held  out  against  the  cannonade  of  the 
French.  Its  commanding  position  seemed  to  preclude  all 
hope  of  getting  the  artillery  past  it ;  and  without  artil- 
lery the  First  Consul  could  not  hope  for  success  in  the 
plains  of  Piedmont.  Unable  to  capture  the  fort,  he  be- 
thought him  of  hurrying  by  night  the  now  remounted 
guns  under  the  cover  of  the  houses  of  the  village.  For 
this  purpose  he  caused  the  main  street  to  be  strewn  with 
straw  and  dung,  while  the  wheels  of  the  cannon  were  cov- 
ered over  so  as  to  make  little  noise.  They  were  then 
dragged  quietly  through  the  village  almost  within  pistol 
shot  of*  the  garrison  :  nevertheless,  the  defenders  took 
alarm,  and,  firing  with  musketry  and  grenades,  exploded 
some  ammunition  wagons  and  inflicted  other  losses  ;  yet 
40  guns  and  100  wagons  were  got  past  the  fort. 

How  this  unfailing  resource  contrasts  with  the  heed- 
less behaviour  of  the  enemy  !     Had  they  speedily  rein- 


230 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


forced  their  detachment  at  Bard,  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  Bonaparte's  movements  could  have  been  seriously 
hampered.  But,  up  to  May  21st,  Melas  was  ignorant 
that  his  distant  rear  was  being  assailed,  and  the  d,uuu 
Austrians  who  guarded  the  vale  of  the  Dora  Baltea  were 
divided,  part  being  at  Bard  and  others  at  Ivrea.  Ihe 
latter  place  was  taken  by  a  rush  of  Lannes'  troops  on 
May  22nd,  and  Bard  was  blockaded  by  part  ot  the 
French  rearguard.  . 

Bonaparte's  army,  if  the  rearguard  be  included,  num- 
bered  41,000   men.     Meanwhile,  farther  east,  a  trench 
force  of  15,000  men,  drawn  partly  from  Moreau's  army 
and  led  by  Moncey,  was  crossing  the  St.  Gotthard  pass 
and  began  to  drive  back   the  Austrian  outposts  in  the 
upper  ?alley'  of   the  Ticino  ;  and  5,000  men,  marching 
over   the  Mont   Cenis  pass,  threatened   Turin  from  the 
west      The  First  Consul's  aim  now  was  to  unite  the  two 
chief  forces,  seize  the  enemy's  magazines,  and  compel  him 
to  a  complete  surrender.     This  daring  resolve  took  shape 
at  Aosta  on  the  24th,  when  he  heard  that  Melas  was,  on 
the  19th,  still  at   Nice,  unconscious   of   his  doom,     Ihe 
chance  of   ending  the  war  at  one  blow  was  not  to   be 
missed,  even  if  Massena  had  to  shift  for  himself. 

But  already   Melas'   dream  of  triumph  had  vanished. 
On  the  21st,  hearing  the  astonishing  news ^  that  a  large 
force  had  crossed  the  St.  Bernard,  he  left  18  000  men  to 
oppose  Suchet  on  the  Var,   and  hurried  back  with  the 
remainder   to   Turin.      At   the   Piedmontese   capital   he 
heard  that  he  had  to  deal  with  the  First  Consul ;  but  not 
until  the  last  day  of  May  did  he  know  that  Moncey  was 
forcing  the  St.  Gotthard  and  threatening  Milan.      Ihen, 
realizing  the  full  extent  of  his  danger,  he  hastily  called  in 
all  the  available  troops  in  order  to  fight  his  way  through 
to  Mantua.     He  even  sent  an  express  to  the  besiegers  ot 
Genoa   to   retire  on   Alessandria  ;   but   negotiations  had 
been    opened  with   Massena   for   the   surrender  tf    that 
stronghold,  and  the  opinion  of  Lord  Keith    the  English 
admiral,  decided  the  Austrian  commander  there  to  press 
the  siege  to  the  very  end.     The  city  was  m  the  direst 
straits.     Horses,  dogs,  cats,  and  rats  were  at  last  eagerly 
sought  as  food  :  and  at  every  sortie  crowds  of  the  starv- 


xi  MARENGO:   LUNEVILLE  231 

ing  inhabitants  followed  the  French  in  order  to  cut  down 
grass,  nettles,  and  leaves,  which  they  then  boiled  with 
salt.1  A  revolt  threatened  by  the  wretched  townsfolk 
was  averted  by  Massena  ordering  his  troops  to  fire  on 
every  gathering  of  more  than  four  men.  At  last,  on 
June  4th,  with  8,000  half-starved  soldiers  he  marched 
through  the  Austrian  posts  with  the  honours  of  war. 
The  stern  warrior  would  not  hear  of  the  word  surrender 
or  capitulation.  He  merely  stated  to  the  allied  com- 
manders that  on  June  4th  his  troops  would  evacuate 
Genoa  or  clear  their  path  by  the  bayonet. 

Bonaparte  has  been  reproached  for  not  marching  at 
once  to  succour  Massena  :  the  charge  of  desertion  was 
brought  by  Massena  and  Thiebault,  and  has  been  driven 
home  by  Lanfrey  with  his  usual  skill.  It  will,  however, 
scarcely  bear  a  close  examination.  The  Austrians,  at  the 
first  trustworthy  news  of  the  French  inroads  into  Pied- 
mont and  Lombardy,  were  certain  to  concentrate  either  at 
Turin  or  Alessandria.  Indeed,  Melas  was  already  near 
Turin,  and  would  have  fallen  on  the  First  Consul's  flank 
had  the  latter  marched  due  south  towards  Genoa.2  Such 
a  march,  with  only  40,000  men,  would  have  been  perilous  : 
and  it  could  at  most  only  have  rescued  a  now  reduced  and 
almost  famishing  garrison.  Besides,  he  very  naturally 
expected  the  besiegers  of  Genoa  to  retreat  now  that  their 
rear  was  threatened. 

Sound  policy  and  a  desire  to  deal  a  dramatic  stroke 
spurred  on  the  First  Consul  to  a  more  daring  and  effec- 
tive plan  ;  to  clear  Lombardy  of  the  Imperialists  and  seize 
their  stores  ;  then,  after  uniting  with  Moncey's  15,000 
troops,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  all  the  Austrian  forces 
west  of  Milan. 

On  entering  Milan  he  was  greeted  with  wild  acclaim 
by  the  partisans  of  France  (June  2nd)  ;  they  extolled  the 
energy  and  foresight  that  brought  two  armies,  as  it  were 

1  Marbot,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  ix.;  Allardyce,  "Memoir  of  Lord  Keith," 
ch.  xiii.;  ThiGbault's  "Journal  of  the  Blockade  of  Genoa." 

2  That  Melas  expected  such  a  march  is  clear  from  a  letter  of  his  of  May 
23rd,  dated  from  Savillan,  to  Lord  Keith,  which  I  have  found  in  the 
"Brit.  Admiralty  Records"  (Mediterranean,  No.  22),  where  he  says: 
"  L'ennemi  a  cerne"  le  fort  de  Bard  et  s'est  avance"  jusque  sous  le  chateau 
d'lvr^e.     II  est  clair  que  son  but  est  de  dSlivrer  Massena." 


232  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

down   from    the   clouds,   to   confound    their   oppressors 
NuTbersTf  men  connected  with  the  Cisa  pine  Republic 
had   been    Proscribed,    banished,   or   imprisoned   by     he 
Austrian*  ■    and   their    friends    now   hailed   him   as   the 
fel  er  of'  their  republic.     The^First  Consul  spent  seven 
davs  hi  selecting  the  men  who  were  to  rebuild  the  Cisal- 
•  £  St.tV  in  beating  back  the  eastern  forces  of  Austria 
beyond  the  &ve    A&a,  and  in  organizing  his  troops  and 
those  of  Moncey  for  the  final  blow.      The  military  prob- 
lems   indeed,  demanded  great  care  and  judgment      His 
portion  was  'curiously  the  reverse  of  that  winch  he  had 

h^dv^  J^  ~W^  ba°cna;  AAeu, 

E^to"t Jt  L'of  MantL.     Now  the  Imperialists 
holdTng  nearly  the  same  positions,  were  striving  to  break 
through  the  French  lines  which  cut  them  off  from  that 
nUv   of   refuse  •  and   Bonaparte,   having  forces   slightly 
in/erior  to  hifopponents,  feft  the  difficulty  of  frustrating 

thThreeaiPoeutes  were  open  to  Melas.     The  most  direct  was 
bv  waTof  Tortona  and  Piacenza  along  the  southern  bank 
cl  tTe  Po  through  the  difficult  defile  of  Stradella  :  or  he 
mignt  retie  towards  Genoa,  across  the  Apennines,  and 
r^ain   Mantua  by  a  dash   across   the   Modenese  :  or  he 
mflt  cross  the  Po  at  Valenza  and  the  Ticino  near  Pavia. 
A  llttes roads  had  to  be  watched  by  the  French  as  they 
cautiously  drew  towards  their  quarry.     Bonaparte  s  first 
move  was  to  send   Murat    with   a   consider^  body  of 
Troops  to  seize  Piacenza  and  to  occupy  the  defile ,  of  Stia- 
della      These   important   posts   were   wrested  from    the 
Austrian  vanguard  ;  and   this   success   was   crowned  on 
June  9th  by  Genera    Lannes'  brilliant  victory  at  Monte- 

magazines  of  the  enemy  at  Cremona.  TnftVpment8 

After  gaining  precious  news  as  to    Melas    movements 

from ^ rter^ted  despatch    Bonaparte  left  Milan  on 

Innpflth  and  proceeded  to  Stradella.      I  here  ne  wane. 

for  news'of  SuLet  and  Mantua  from  the  ode  of  Savona 


xi  MARENGO:   LUNEVILLE  233 

and  Ceva  ;  for  their  forces,  if  united,  might  complete  the 
circle  which  he  was  drawing  around  the  Imperialists.1 
He  hoped  that  Massena  would  have  joined  Suchet  near 
Savona  ;  but  owing  to  various  circumstances,  for  which 
Massena  was  in  no  wise  to  blame,  their  junction  was 
delayed  ;  and  Suchet,  though  pressing  on  towards  Acqui, 
was  unable  to  cut  off  the  Austrian  retreat  on  Genoa. 
Yet  he  so  harassed  the  corps  opposed  to  him  in  its  retreat 
from  Nice  that  only  about  8,000  Austrians  joined  Melas 
from  that  quarter.2 

Doubtless,  Melas'  best  course  would  still  have  been  to 
make  a  dash  for  Genoa  and  trust  to  the  English  ships. 
But  this  plan  galled  the  pride  of  the  general,  who  had 
culled  plenteous  laurels  in  Italy  until  the  approach  of 
Bonaparte  threatened  to  snatch  the  whole  chaplet  from 
his  brow.  He  and  his  staff  sought  to  restore  their  droop- 
ing fortunes  by  a  bold  rush  against  the  ring  of  foes  that 
were  closing  around.  Never  has  an  effort  of  this  kind 
so  nearly  succeeded  and  yet  so  wholly  failed. 

The  First  Consul,  believing  that  the  Austrians  were 
bent  solely  on  flight,  advanced  from  Stradella,  where  suc- 
cess would  have  been  certain,  into  the  plains  of  Tortona, 
whence  he  could  check  any  move  of  theirs  southwards  on 
Genoa.  But  now  the  space  which  he  occupied  was  so 
great  as  to  weaken  his  line  at  any  one  point ;  while  his 
foes  had  the  advantage  of  the  central  position.  Bona- 
parte was  also  forced  to  those  enveloping  tactics  which 
had  so  often  proved  fatal  to  the  Austrians  four  years 
previously ;  and  this  curious  reversal  of  his  usual  tactics 

1  Bonaparte  did  not  leave  Milan  till  June  9th  :  see  "  Correspondance  " 
and  the  bulletin  of  June  10th.  Jomini  places  his  departure  for  the  7th, 
and  thereby  confuses  his  description  for  these  two  days.  Thiers  dates  it 
on  June  8th. 

2  Lord  W.  Bentinck  reported  to  the  Brit.  Admiralty  ("Records," 
Meditn.,  No.  22),  from  Alessandria,  on  June  15th  :  "  I  am  sorry  to  say 
that  General  Elsnitz's  corps,  which  was  composed  of  the  grenadiers  of  the 
finest  regiments  in  the  (Austrian)  army,  arrived  here  in  the  most  deplor- 
able condition.  His  men  had  already  suffered  much  from  want  of  provi- 
sions and  other  hardships.  He  was  pursued  in  his  retreat  by  Genl.  Suchet, 
who  had  with  him  about  7,000  men.  There  was  an  action  at  Ponte  di 
Nava,  in  which  the  French  failed ;  and  it  will  appear  scarcely  credible, 
when  I  tell  your  Lordship,  that  the  Austrians  lost  in  this  retreat,  from 
fatigue  only,  near  5,000  men  ;  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  Genl.  Suchet  will 
notify  this  to  the  world  as  a  great  victory." 


234  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xi 

may  account  for  the  anxiety  which  he  betrayed  as  he 
moved   towards   Marengo.     He   had,   however,   recently 
been  encouraged   by  the   arrival  of   Desaix   from   Pans 
after  his  return  from  Egypt.     This  dashing  officer  and 
noble  man  inspired  him  with  a  sincere  affection,  as  was 
seen  by  the  three  hours  of  eager  converse  which  he  held 
with  him  on  his  arrival,  as  also  by  his  words  to  Bour- 
rienne  :  "  He  is  quite  an  antique  character."    Desaix  with 
5,300  troops  was  now  despatched  on  the  night  of  June  13th 
towards  Genoa  to  stop  the  escape  of  the  Austnans  in  that 
direction.     This  eccentric  move  has  been  severely  criti- 
cised :  but  the  facts,  as  then  known  by  Bonaparte,  seemed 
to  show  that  Melas  was  about  to  march  on  Genoa.     The 
French  vanguard  under  Gardane  had  in  the  afternoon 
easily  driven  the  enemy's  front  from  the  village  of  Ma- 
rengo ;   and  Gardane  had  even  reported  that  there  was 
no  bridge  over  the  River  Bormida  by  which  the  enemy 
could  debouch   into   the   plain   of   Marengo.     Marmont, 
pushing  on  later  in  the  evening,  had  discovered  that  there 
was  at  least  one  well-defended  bridge  ;  and  when  early 
next  morning  Gardane's  error  was  known,  the  First  Con- 
sul, with  a  blaze  of  passion  against  the  offender,  sent  a 
courier  in  hot  haste  to  recall  Desaix.     Long  before  he 
could  arrive,  the  battle  of  Marengo  had  begun  :  and  tor 
the  greater  part  of  that  eventful  day,  June  the  14th,  the 
French  had  only  18,000  men  wherewith  to  oppose  the 
onset  of  31,000  Austrians.1 

As  will  be  seen  by  the  accompanying  map,  the  village 
of  Marengo  lies  in  the  plain  that  stretches  eastwards  from 
the  banks  of  the  River  Bormida  towards  the  hilly  country 
of  Stradella.  The  village  lies  on  the  high-road  leading 
eastwards  from  the  fortress  of  Alessandria,  the  chief 
stronghold  of  north-western  Italy.  The  plain  is  cut  up 
by  numerous  obstacles.  Through  Marengo  runs  a  stream 
called  the  Fontanone.  The  deep  curves  of  the  Bormida, 
the  steep  banks  of  the  Fontanone,  along  with  the  villages, 

i  The  inaccuracy  of  Marbot's  »  Memoires"  is  nowhere  more  glaring 
than  in  his  statement  that  Marengo  must  have  gone  against  the  French 
if  Ott's  25,000  Austrians  from  Genoa  had  joined  their  comrades.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Ott,  with  16,000  men,  had  already  fought  with  Lannes  at 
Montebello,  and  played  a  great  part  in  the  battle  of  Marengo. 


236  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

farmsteads,  and  vineyards  scattered  over  the  plain,  all 
helped  to  render  an  advance  exceedingly  difficult  in  face 
of  a  determined  enemy  ;  and  these  natural  features  had 
no  small  share  in  deciding  the  fortunes  of  the  day. 

Shortly  after  dawn  Melas  began  to  pour  his  troops 
across  the  Bormida,  and  drove  in  the  French  outposts  on 
Marengo :  but  there  they  met  with  a  tough  resistance 
from  the  soldiers  of  Victor's  division,  while  Kellermann, 
the  son  of  the  hero  of  Valmy,  performed  his  first  great 
exploit  by  hurling  back  some  venturesome  Austrian  horse- 
men into  the  deep  bed  of  the  Fontanone.  This  gave  time 
to  Lannes  to  bring  up  his  division,  5,000  strong,  into  line 
between  Marengo  and  Castel  Ceriolo.  But  when  the  full 
force  of  the  Austrian  attack  was  developed  about  10  a.m., 
the  Imperialists  not  only  gained  Marengo,  but  threw  a 
heavy  column,  led  by  General  Ott,  against  Lannes,  who 
was  constrained  to  retire,  contesting  every  inch  of  the 
ground.  Thus,  when,  an  hour  later,  Bonaparte  rode  up 
from  the  distant  rear,  hurrying  along  his  Consular  Guard, 
his  eye  fell  upon  his  battalions  overpowered  in  front  and 
outflanked  on  both  wings.  At  once  he  launched  his  Con- 
sular Guard,  1,000  strong,  against  Ott's  triumphant  ranks. 
Drawn  up  in  square  near  Castel  Ceriolo,  it  checked  them 
for  a  brief  space,  until,  plied  by  cannon  and  charged  by 
the  enemy's  horse,  these  chosen  troops  also  began  to  give 
ground.  But  at  this  crisis  Monnier's  division  of  3,600 
men  arrived,  threw  itself  into  the  fight,  held  up  the  flood 
of  white-coats  around  the  hamlet  of  Li  Poggi,  while  Carra 
St.  Cyr  fastened  his  grip  on  Castel  Ceriolo.  Under  cover 
of  this  welcome  screen,  Victor  and  Lannes  restored  some 
order  to  their  divisions  and  checked  for  a  time  the  onsets 
of  the  enemy.  Slowly  but  surely,  however,  the  impact  of 
the  Austrian  main  column,  advancing  along  the  high-road, 
made  them  draw  back  on  San  Giuliano. 

By  2  p.m.  the  battle  seemed  to  be  lost  for  the  French  : 
except  on  the  north  of  their  line  they  were  in  full  retreat, 
and  all  but  five  of  their  cannon  were  silenced.  Melas, 
oppressed  by  his  weight  of  years,  by  the  terrific  heat,  and 
by  two  slight  wounds,  retired  to  Alessandria,  leaving  his 
chief  of  the  staff,  Zach,  to  direct  the  pursuit.  But,  un- 
fortunately, Melas  had  sent  back  2,200  horsemen  to  watch 


xi  MARENGO:  LUNEVILLE  237 

the  district  between  Alessandria  and  Acqui,  to  which  lat- 
ter place  Suchet's  force  was  advancing.  To  guard  against 
this  remoter  danger,  he  weakened  his  attacking  force  at 
the  critical  time  and  place  ;  and  now,  when  the  Austrians 
approached  the  hill  of  San  Giuliano  with  bands  playing 
and  colours  flying,  their  horse  was  not  strong  enough  to 
complete  the  French  defeat.  Still,  such  was  the  strength 
of  their  onset  that  all  resistance  seemed  unavailing,  until 
about  5  p.m.  the  approach  of  Desaix  breathed  new  life 
and  hope  into  the  defence.  At  once  he  rode  up  to  the 
First  Consul ;  and  if  vague  rumours  may  be  credited,  he 
was  met  by  the  eager  question  :  "  Well,  what  do  you 
think  of  it  ?  "  To  which  he  replied  :  "The  battle  is  lost, 
but  there  is  time  to  gain  another."  Marmont,  who  heard 
the  conversation,  denies  that  these  words  were  uttered  ; 
and  they  presume  a  boldness  of  which  even  Desaix  would 
scarcely  have  been  guilty  to  his  chief.  What  he  unques- 
tionably did  urge  was  the  immediate  use  of  artillery  to 
check  the  Austrian  advance  :  and  Marmont,  hastily  rein- 
forcing his  own  five  guns  with  thirteen  others,  took  a 
strong  position  and  riddled  the  serried  ranks  of  the 
enemy  as,  swathed  in  clouds  of  smoke  and  dust,  they 
pressed  blindly  forward.  The  First  Consul  disposed  the 
troops  of  Desaix  behind  the  village  and  a  neighbouring 
hill ;  while  at  a  little  distance  on  the  French  left,  Keller- 
mann  was  ready  to  charge  with  his  heavy  cavalry  as  op- 
portunity offered. 

It  came  quickly.  Marmont's  guns  unsteadied  Zach's 
grenadiers :  Desaix's  men  plied  them  with  musketry ; 
and  while  they  were  preparing  for  a  last  effort,  Keller- 
mann's  heavy  cavalry  charged  full  on  their  flank.  Never 
was  surprise  more  complete.  The  column  was  cut  in 
twain  by  this  onset ;  and  veterans,  who  but  now  seemed 
about  to  overbear  all  obstacles,  were  lying  mangled  by 
grapeshot,  hacked  by  sabres,  flying  helplessly  amidst  the 
vineyards,  or  surrendering  by  hundreds.  A  panic  spread 
to  their  comrades  ;  and  they  gave  way  on  all  sides  before 
the  fiercely  rallying  French.  The  retreat  became  a  rout 
as  the  recoiling  columns  neared  the  bridges  of  the  Bor- 
mida  :  and  night  closed  over  a  scene  of  wild  confusion,  as 
the  defeated  army,  thrust  out  from  the  shelter  of  Marengo, 


238 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


flung  itself  over  the  river  into  the  stronghold  of  Ales- 
sandria. _  ,      , 

Such   was    the    victory   of    Marengo.     It  was   dearly 
bought  ;  for,  apart  from  the  heavy  losses,  amounting  on 
either  side  to  about  one-third  of  the  number  engaged,  the 
victors   sustained   an   irreparable   loss  in    the    death   of 
Desaix,  who  fell  in  the  moment  when  his  skill  and  vigour 
snatched  victory  from  defeat.     The  victory  was  immedi- 
ately  due   to   Kellermann's  brilliant  charge;  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  in  spite  of  Savary's  statements,  that  this 
voung  officer  made  the  charge  on  his  own  initiative.     Yet 
his  onset  could  have  had  little  effect,  had  not   Desaix 
shaken  the  enemy  and  left  him  liable  to  a  panic  like  that 
which    brought  disaster  to   the    Imperialists   at   Rivoli. 
Bonaparte's  dispositions  at  the  crisis  were  undoubtedly 
skilful  ;  but  in  the  first  part  of  the  fight  his  conduct  was 
below  his  reputation.     We  do  not  hear  of  him  electrify- 
ing his  disordered  troops  by  any  deed  comparable  with 
that  of   Csesar,  when,  shield  in  hand,  he  flung   himself 
among  the  legionaries  to  stem  the  torrent  of  the  Nervn. 
At  the  climax  of  the  fight  he  uttered  the  words  "Sol- 
diers, remember  it  is  my  custom  to  bivouac  on  the  held 
of  battle"— tame  and  egotistical  words  considering  the 

gravity  of  the  crisis. 

On  the  evening  of  the  great  day,  while  paying  an  exag- 
gerated compliment  to  Bessieres  and  the  cavalry  of  the 
Consular   Guard,  he   merely   remarked   to   Kellermann : 
"You  made  a  very  good  charge;"  to  which  that  officer 
is  said  to  have  replied :  "lam  glad  you  are  satisfied,  gen- 
eral :  for  it  has  placed  the  crown  on  your  head.       Such 
pettiness  was  unworthy  of  the  great  captain  who  could 
design   and  carry   through  the  memorable  campaign  ot 
Marengo.     If  the  climax  was  not  worthy  of  the  incep- 
tion, yet  the  campaign  as  a  whole  must  be  pronounced  a 
masterpiece.     Since  the  days  of  Hannibal  no  design  so 
daring   and   original   had    startled   the  world.     A  great 
Austrian  army  Was  stopped  in  its  victorious  career,  was 
compelled  to  turn  on  its  shattered  communications,  and 
to  fight  for  its  existence  some  120  miles  to  the  rear  of  the 
territory  which  it  seemed  to  have  conquered.     In  tact, 
the  allied  victories  of  the  past  year  were  effaced  by  this 


xi  MARENGO:   LUNEVILLE  239 

march  of  Bonaparte's  army,  which,  in  less  than  a  month 
after  the  ascent  of  the  Alps,  regained  Nice,  Piedmont,  and 
Lonibardy,  and  reduced  the  Imperialists  to  the  direst  straits. 

Staggered  by  this  terrific  blow,  Melas  and  his  staff  were 
ready  to  accept  any  terms  that  were  not  deeply  humiliat- 
ing ;  and  Bonaparte  on  his  side  was  not  loth  to  end  the 
campaign  in  a  blaze  of  glory.  He  consented  that  the 
Imperial  troops  should  retire  to  the  east  of  the  Mincio, 
except  at  Peschiera  and  Mantua,  which  they  were  still  to 
occupy.  These  terms  have  been  variously  criticised  : 
Melas  has  been  blamed  for  cowardice  in  surrendering  the 
many  strongholds,  including  Genoa,  which  his  men  firmly 
held.  Yet  it  must  be  remembered  that  he  now  had  at 
Alessandria  less  than  20,000  effectives,  and  that  30,000 
Austrians  in  isolated  bodies  were  practically  at  the  mercy 
of  the  French  between  Savona  and  Brescia,.  One  and  all 
they  could  now  retire  to  the  Mincio  and  there  resume  the 
defence  of  the  Imperial  territories.  The  political  designs 
of  the  Court  of  Vienna  on  Piedmont  were  of  course  shat- 
tered ;  but  it  now  recovered  the  army  which  it  had  heed- 
lessly sacrificed  to  territorial  greed.  Bonaparte  has  also 
been  blamed  for  the  lenience  of  his  terms.  Severer  condi- 
tions could  doubtless  have  been  extorted  ;  but  he  now 
merged  the  soldier  in  the  statesman.  He  desired  peace 
for  the  sake  of  France  and  for  his  own  sake.  After  this 
brilliant  stroke  peace  would  be  doubly  grateful  to  a  people 
that  longed  for  glory  but  also  yearned  to  heal  the  wounds 
of  eight  years'  warfare.  His  own  position  as  First  Consul 
was  as  yet  ill-established  ;  and  he  desired  to  be  back  at 
Paris  so  as  to  curb  the  restive  Tribunate,  overawe  Jacobins 
and  royalists,  and  rebuild  the  institutions  of  France. 

Impelled  by  these  motives,  he  penned  to  the  Emperor 
Francis  an  elegant  appeal  for  peace,  renewing  his  offer  of 
treating  with  Austria  on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio.1  But  Austria  was  not  as  yet  so  far  humbled  as 
to  accept  such  terms  ;  and  it  needed  the  master-stroke  of 
Moreau  at  the  great  battle  of  Hohenlinden  (December 
2nd,    1800),   and    the   turning   of   her   fortresses  on   the 

1  "  Corresp.,"  vol.  vi.,  p.  365.  Fournier,  "Hist.  Studien  und  Skiz- 
zen,"  p.  189,  argues  that  the  letter  was  written  from  Milan,  and  dated 
from  Marengo  for  effect. 


240  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Mincio  by  the  brilliant  passage  of  the  Spliigen  in  the 
depths  of  winter  by  Macdonald  —  a  feat  far  transcending 
that  of  Bonaparte  at  the  St.  Bernard  — to  compel  her  to  a 
peace.  A  description  of  these  events  would  be  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  work  ;  and  we  now  return  to  consider  the 
career  of  Bonaparte  as  a  statesman. 

After  a  brief  stay  at  Milan  and  Turin,  where  he  was 
received  as  the  liberator  of  Italy,  the  First  Consul  crossed 
the  Alps  by  the  Mont  Cenis  pass  and  was  received  with 
rapturous  acclaim  at  Lyons  and  Paris.  He  had  been  ab- 
sent from  the  capital  less  than  two  calendar  months. 

He  now  sent  a  letter  to  the  Czar  Paul,  offering  that,  if 
the  French  garrison  of  Malta  were  compelled  by  famine 
to  evacuate  that  island,  he  would  place  it  in  the  hands  of 
the  Czar,  as  Grand  Master  of  the  Knights  of  St.  John. 
Rarely  has  a  "  Greek  gift "  been  more  skilfully  tendered. 
In  the  first  place,  Valetta  was  so  closely  blockaded  by 
Nelson's   cruisers   and   invested    by   the   native   Maltese 
that  its  surrender  might  be  expected  in  a  few  weeks  ;  and 
the  First  Consul  was  well  aware  how  anxiously  the  Czar 
had  been  seeking  to  gain  a  foothold -at  Malta  whence  he 
could  menace  Turkey  from  the  south-east.     In  his  wish 
completely  to  gain  over  Russia,  Bonaparte  also  sent  back, 
well-clad  and  well-armed,  the  prisoners  taken   from  the 
Russian  armies  in  1799,  a  step  which  was  doubly  appre- 
ciated at  Petersburg  because  the    Russian   troops  which 
had  campaigned  with  the  Duke  of  York  in  Holland  were 
somewhat  shabbily  treated  by  the  British  Government  in 
the  Channel   Islands,  where   they  took   up   their  winter 
quarters.     Accordingly  the   Czar   now  sent  Kalicheff  to 
Paris,  for  the  formation  of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance.    He 
was  warmly  received.      Bonaparte   promised   in   general 
terms  to  restore  the  King  of  Sardinia  to  his  former  realm 
and  the  Pope  to  his  States.     On  his  side,  the  Czar  sent 
the  alluring  advice  to  Bonaparte  to  found  a  dynasty  and 
thereby  put  an  end  to  the  revolutionary  principles  which 
had  armed  Europe  against  France.     He   also  offered  to 
recognize  the  natural  frontiers  of  France,  the  Rhine  and 
the    Maritime   Alps,    and    claimed    that    German   affairs 
should  be  regulated   under   his   own   mediation.     When 
both   parties  were  so  complaisant,  a  bargain  was   easily 


xi  MARENGO:    LUNEVILLE  241 

arranged.  France  and  Russia  accordingly  joined  hands 
in  order  to  secure  predominance  in  the  affairs  of  Central 
and  Southern  Europe,  and  to  counterbalance  England's 
supremacy  at  sea.    • 

For  it  was  not  enough  to  break  up  the  Second  Coali- 
tion and  recover  Northern  Italy.  Bonaparte's  policy  was 
more  than  European  ;  it  was  oceanic.  England  must  be 
beaten  on  her  own  element :  then  and  then  only  could 
the  young  warrior  secure  his  grasp  on  Egypt  and  return 
to  his  oriental  schemes.  His  correspondence  before  and 
after  the  Marengo  campaign  reveals  his  eagerness  for  a 
peace  with  Austria  and  an  alliance  with  Russia.  His 
thoughts  constantly  turn  to  Egypt.  He  bargains  with 
Britain  that  his  army  there  may  be  revictualled,  and  so 
words  his  claim  that  troops  can  easily  be  sent  also.  Lord 
Grenville  refuses  (September  10th)  ;  whereupon  Bona- 
parte throws  himself  eagerly  into  further  plans  for  the 
destruction  of  the  islanders.  He  seeks  to  inflame  the 
Czar's  wrath  against  the  English  maritime  code.  His 
success  for  the  time  is  complete.  At  the  close  of  1800 
the  Russian  Emperor  marshals  the  Baltic  Powers  for  the 
overthrow  of  England's  navy,  and  outstrips  Bonaparte's 
wildest  hopes  by  proposing  a  Franco-Russian  invasion  of 
India  with  a  view  to  "dealing  his  enemy  a  mortal  blow." 
This  plan,  as  drawn  up  at  the  close  of  1800,  arranged  for 
the  mustering  of  35,000  Russians  at  Astrakan ;  while  as 
many  French  were  to  fight  their  way  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Danube,  set  sail  on  Russian  ships  for  the  Sea  of  Azov, 
join  their  allies  on  the  Caspian  Sea,  sail  to  its  southern 
extremity,  and,  rousing  the  Persians  and  Afghans  by  the 
hope  of  plunder,  sweep  the  British  from  India.  The 
scheme  received  from  Bonaparte  a  courteous  perusal ;  but 
he  subjected  it  to  several  criticisms,  which  led  to  less 
patient  rejoinders  from  the  irascible  potentate.  Never- 
theless, Paul  began  to  march  his  troops  towards  the  lower 
Volga,  and  several  polks  of  Cossacks  had  crossed  that 
river  on  the  ice,  when  the  news  of  his  assassination  cut 
short  the  scheme.1 

1  See  Czartoryski's  "Memoirs,"  ch.  xi.,  and  Driault's  "La  Question 
d'Orient,"  ch.  iii.  The  British  Foreign  Office  was  informed  of  the  plan. 
In  its  records  (No.  G14)  is  a  memoir  (pencilled  on  the  back  January  31st, 


242  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

The  grandiose  schemes  of  Paul  vanished  with  their  fan- 
tastic contriver ;  but  the  rapprochement  of  Russia  to  revo- 
lutionary France  was  ultimately  to  prove  an  event  of 
far-reaching  importance ;  for  the  eastern  power  thereby 
began  to  exert  on  the  democracy  of  western  Europe  that 
subtle,  semi-Asiatic  influence  which  has  so  powerfully 
warped  its  original  character. 

The  dawn  of  the  nineteenth  century  witnessed  some 
startling  rearrangements  on  the  political  chess-board. 
While  Bonaparte  brought  Russia  and  France  to  sudden 
amity,  the  unbending  maritime  policy  of  Great  Britain 
leagued  the  Baltic  Powers  against  the  mistress  of  the  seas. 
In  the  autumn  of  1800  the  Czar  Paul,  after  hearing  of  our 
capture  of  Malta,  forthwith  revived  the  Armed  Neutrality 
League  of  1780  and  opposed  the  forces  of  Russia,  Prussia, 
Sweden,  and  Denmark  to  the  might  of  England's  navy. 
But  Nelson's  brilliant  success  at  Copenhagen  and  the 
murder  of  the  Czar  by  a  palace  conspiracy  shattered  this 
league  only  four  months  after  its  formation,  and  the  new 
Czar,  Alexander,  reverted  for  a  time  to  friendship  with 
England.1  This  sudden  ending  to  the  first  Franco-Russian 
alliance  so  enraged  Bonaparte  that  he  caused  a  paragraph 
to  be  inserted  in  the  official  "  Moniteur,"  charging  the 
British  Government  with  procuring  the  assassination  of 
Paul,  an  insinuation  that  only  proclaimed  his  rage  at  this 
sudden  rebuff  to  his  hitherto  successful  diplomacy.  Though 
foiled  for  a  time,  he  never  lost  sight  of  the  hoped-for  alli- 
ance, which,  with  a  deft  commixture  of  force  and  persua- 
sion, he  gained  seven  years  later,  after  the  crushing  blow 
of  Friedland. 

Dread  of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance  undoubtedly  helped 
to  compel  Austria  to  a  peace.  Humbled  by  Moreau  at  the 
great  battle  of  Hohenlinden,  the  Emperor  Francis  opened 

1801)  from  a  M.  Leclerc  to  Mr.  Flint,  referring  the  present  proposal  back 
to  that  offered  by  M.  de  St.  G£nie  to  Catherine  II.,  and  proposing  that  the 
first  French  step  should  be  the  seizure  of  Socotra  and  Perim. 

1  Garden,  " Trails,"  vol.  vi.,  ch.  xxx.  ;  Captain  Mahan's  "Life  of 
Nelson,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xvi.  ;  Thiers,  "Consulate,"  bk.  ix.  For  the  assas- 
sination of  the  Czar  Paul  see  "Kaiser  Paul's  Ende,"  von  R.  R.  (Stutt- 
gart, 1897) ;  also  Czartoryski's  "  Memoirs,"  chs.  xiii.-xiv.  For  Bonaparte's 
offer  of  a  naval  truce  to  us  and  his  overture. of  December,  1800,  see  Bow- 
man, op.  cit. 


XI.  MARENGO:  LUNEVILLE  243 

negotiations  at  Luneville  in  Lorraine.  The  subtle  obsti- 
nacy of  Cobenzl  there  found  its  match  in  the  firm  yet  suave 
diplomacy  of  Joseph  Bonaparte,  who  wearied  out  Cobenzl 
himself,  until  the  march  of  Moreau  towards  Vienna  com- 
pelled Francis  to  accept  the  River  Adige  as  his  boundary 
in  Italy.  The  other  terms  of  the  treaty  (February  9th, 
1801)  were  practically  the  same  as  those  of  the  treaty  of 
Campo  Formio,  save  that  the  Hapsburg  Grand  Duke  of 
Tuscany  was  compelled  to  surrender  his  State  to  a  son 
of  the  Bourbon  Duke  of  Parma.  He  himself  was  to 
receive  "  compensation  "  in  Germany,  where  also  the  un- 
fortunate Duke  of  Modena  was  to  find  consolation  in  the 
district  of  the  Breisgau  on  the  Upper  Rhine.  The  help- 
lessness of  the  old  Holy  Roman  Empire  was,  indeed, 
glaringly  displaj^ed ;  for  Francis  now  admitted  the  right 
of  the  French  to  interfere  in  the  rearrangement  of  that 
medley  of  States.  He  also  recognized  the  Cisalpine, 
Ligurian,  Helvetic,  and  Batavian  Republics,  as  at  present 
constituted ;  but  their  independence,  and  the  liberty  of 
their  peoples  to  choose  what  form  of  government  they 
thought  fit,  were  expressly  stipulated. 

The  Court  of  Naples  also  made  peace  with  France  by 
the  treaty  of  Florence  (March,  1801),  whereby  it  with- 
drew its  troops  from  the  States  of  the  Church,  and  closed 
its  ports  to  British  and  Turkish  ships ;  it  also  renounced 
in  favour  of  the  French  Republic  all  its  claims  over  a 
maritime  district  of  Tuscany  known  as  the  Presidii,  the 
little  principality  of  Piombino,  and  a  port  in  the  Isle  of 
Elba.  These  cessions  fitted  in  well  with  Napoleon's 
schemes  for  the  proposed  elevation  of  the  heir  of  the 
Duchy  of  Parma  to  the  rank  of  King  of  Tuscany  or 
Etruria.  The  King  of  Naples  also  pledged  himself-  to 
admit  and  support  a  French  corps  in  his  dominions." 
Soult  with  10,000  troops  thereupon  occupied  Otranto, 
Taranto,  and  Brindisi,  in  order  to  hold  the  Neapolitan 
Government  to  its  engagements,  and  to  facilitate  French 
intercourse  with  Egypt. 

In  his  relations  with  the  New  World  Bonaparte  had 
also  prospered.  Certain  disputes  between  France  and 
the  United  States  had  led  to  hostilities  in  the  year  1798. 
Negotiations  for  peace  were  opened  in  March,  1800,  and 


244  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xi 

led  to  the  treaty  of  Morfontaine,  which  enabled  Bona* 
parte  to  press  on  the  Court  of  Madrid  the  scheme  of  the 
Parma-Louisiana  exchange,  that  promised  him  a  mag- 
nificent empire  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi. 

These  and  other  grandiose  designs  were  confided  only 
to  Talleyrand  and  other  intimate  counsellors.  But,  even 
to  the  mass  of  mankind,  the  transformation  scene  ushered 
in  by  the  nineteenth  century  was  one  of  bewildering 
brilliance.  Italy  from  the  Alps  to  her  heel  controlled  by 
the  French ;  Austria  compelled  to  forego  all  her  Italian 
plans ;  Switzerland  and  Holland  dominated  by  the  First 
Consul's  influence ;  Spain  following  submissively  his  im- 
perious lead ;  England,  despite  all  her  naval  triumphs, 
helpless  on  land;  and  France  rapidly  regaining  more 
than  all  her  old  prestige  and  stability  under  the  new  in- 
stitutions which  form  the  most  enduring  tribute  to  the 
First  Consul's  glory. 


i 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  NEW   INSTITUTIONS  OF  FRANCE 

"  We  have  done  with  the  romance  of  the  Revolution  : 
we  must  now  commence  its  history.  We  must  have  eyes 
only  for  what  is  real  and  practicable  in  the  application  of 
principles,  and  not  for  the  speculative  and  hypothetical." 
Such  were  the  memorable  words  of  Bonaparte  to  his 
Council  of  State  at  one  of  its  earty  meetings.  They  strike 
the  kej*note  of  the  era  of  the  Consulate.  It  was  a  period 
of  intensely  practical  activity  that  absorbed  all  the  ener- 
gies of  France  and  caused  the  earlier  events  of  the  Revo- 
lution to  fade  away  into  a  seemingly  remote  past.  The 
failures  of  the  civilian  rulers  and  the  military  triumphs  of 
Bonaparte  had  exerted  a  curious  influence  on  the  French 
character,  which  was  in  a  mood  of  expectant  receptivity. 
In  1800  everything  was  in  the  transitional  state  that 
favours  the  efforts  of  a  master  builder  ;  and  one  was  now 
at  hand  whose  constructive  ability  in  civil  affairs  equalled 
his  transcendent  genius  for  war. 

I  propose  here  briefly  to  review  the  most  important 
works  of  reconstruction  which  render  the  Consulate  and 
the  early  part  of  the  Empire  for  ever  famous.  So  vast 
and  complex  were  Bonaparte's  efforts  in  this  field  that 
they  will  be  described,  not  chronologically,  but  subject 
by  subject.  The  reader  will,  however,  remember  that  for 
the  most  part  they  went  on  side  by  side,  even  amidst  the 
distractions  caused  by  war,  diplomacy,  colonial  enter- 
prises, and  the  myriad  details  of  a  vast  administration. 
What  here  appears  as  a  series  of  canals  was  in  reality  a 
mighty  river  of  enterprise  rolling  in  undivided  volume 
and  fed  by  the  superhuman  vitality  of  the  First  Consul. 
It  was  his  inexhaustible  curiosity  which  compelled  func- 
tionaries to  reveal  the  secrets  of  their  office  :  it  was  his 
intelligence    that   seized    on  the  salient   points  of  every 

245 


246 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  1  chap 


problem  and  saw  the  solution  :  it  was  his  ardour  and 
mental  tenacity  which  kept  his  Ministers  and  committees 
hard  at  work,  and  by  toil  of  sometimes  twenty  hours  a 
day  supervised  the  results  :  it  was,  in  fine,  his  passion  for 
thoroughness,  his  ambition  for  France,  that  nerved  every 
official  with  something  of  his  own  contempt  of  difficulties, 
until!  arone  of  them  said,  «  the  gigantic  entered  into  our 

^M*^^*   political   reconstruction   which 
urgently  claimed  attention  was  that  of  local  government 
On  the  very  day  when  it  was  certain  that  the  nation  had 
accepted  the  new  constitution,  the  First  Consul  presented 
to  I    Legislature  a  draft  of   a  law  for   regulating  the 
affairs  of  &the   Departments.     It  must  be  admitted  that 
local  self-government,  as  instituted  by  the  men  of  1789 
n  thefr  Departmental  System,  had  proved  a  failure      In 
that  time   of   buoyant   hope,  when  every    difficulty  and 
abuse   seemed  about  to  be  charmed  away  by  the  magic  of 
universal   suffrage,  local  self-government   of  a  most   ad- 
vancedtype    had    been   intrusted    to   an   inexperienced 
nonSace       There   were   elections   for   the    commune   or 
Kb Tactions  for  the  canton,  elections  for  the  district 
elections    for    the    Department,    and    elections    for    the 
National   Assembly,  until   the  rustic  brain,  after  reeling 
with  excitement,  speedily  fell  back  into  muddled  apathy 
and  left  affairs  generally  to  the  wire-pullers  of  the  nearest 
Tacobin  club.     A  time  of  great  contusion  ensued.     Law 
wen aTordiug  to  local  opinton,  and  the  national  taxes  were 
Sen  left  unpaid.     In  the  Reign  of  Terror  this  lax  system 
was  replaced  by  the  despotism  of  the  secret  committees 
ami  the  way  was  thus  paved  for  a  return  to  organized 
central  control,  such  as  was  exercised  by  the  Djre^y. 

The  First  Consul,  as  successor  to  the  Directory,  there- 
fore found  matters  ready  to  his  hand  for  a  drastic  meas- 
ure of  centralization,  and  it  is  curious  to  notice  that 
the  men  of  1789  had  unwittingly  cleared  the  ground  for 

mmmMmmm 

Minister." 


xii  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  247 

him.  To  make  way  for  the  "  supremacy  of  the  general 
will,"  they  abolished  the  Parlements,  which  had  main- 
tained the  old  laws,  customs,  and  privileges  of  their 
several  provinces,  and  had  frequently  interfered  in  purely 
political  matters.  The  abolition  of  these  and  other 
privileged  corporations  in  1789  unified  France  and  left 
not  a  single  barrier  to  withstand  either  the  flood  of 
democracy  or  the  backwash  of  reaction.  Everything 
therefore  favoured  the  action  of  the  First  Consul  in  draw- 
ing all  local  powers  under  his  own  control.  France 
was  for  the  moment  weary  of  elective  bodies,  that  did 
little  except  waste  the  nation's  taxes  ;  and  though  there 
was  some  opposition  to  the  new  proposal,  it  passed  on 
February  16th,  1800  (28  Pluviose,  An  VIII.). 

It  substituted  local  government  by  the  central  power 
for  local  self-government.  The  local  divisions  remained 
the  same,  except  that  the  "districts,"  abolished  by  the 
Convention,  were  now  reconstituted  on  a  somewhat  larger 
scale,  and  were  termed  arrondissements,  while  the  smaller 
communes,  which  had  been  merged  in  the  cantons  since 
1795,  were  also  revived.  It  is  noteworthy  that,  of  all 
the  areas  mapped  out  by  the  Constituent  Assembly  in 
1789-90,  only  the  Department  and  canton  have  had  a 
continuous  existence  —  a  fact  which  seems  to  show  the 
peril  of  tampering  with  well-established  boundaries,  and 
of  carving  out  a  large  number  of  artificial  districts,  which 
speedil}'  become  the  corpus  vile  of  other  experimenters. 
Indeed,  so  little  was  there  of  effective  self-government 
that  France  seems  to  have  sighed  with  relief  when  order 
was  imposed  by  Bonaparte  in  the  person  of  a  Prefect. 
This  important  official,  a  miniature  First  Consul,  was  to 
administer  the  affairs  of  the  Department,  while  sub-pre- 
fects were  similarly  placed  over  the  new  arrondissements, 
and  mayors  over  the  communes.  The  mayors  were  ap- 
pointed by  the  First  Consul  in  communes  of  more  than 
5,000  souls  :  by  the  prefects  in  the  smaller  communes  : 
all  were  alike  responsible  to  the  central  power. 

The  rebound  from  the  former  electoral  system,  which 
placed  all  local  authority  ultimately  in  the  hands  of  the 
voters,  was  emphasized  by  article  75  of  the  constitution, 
which   virtually   raised   officials  beyond    reach  of   prose- 


248  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

cution.     It  ran  thus:    "The  agents  of  the  Government, 
other  than  the  Ministers,  cannot  be  prosecuted  for  facts 
relating  to  their  duties  except  by  a  decision  of  the  Council 
of  State  :  in  that  case  the  prosecution  takes  place  before 
the  ordinary  tribunals."      Now,  as  this   decision   rested 
with  a  body  composed  almost  entirely  of  the  higher  offi- 
cials, it  will  be  seen  that  the  chance  of  a  public  prosecu- 
tion of  an  official  became  extremely  small.     France  was 
therefore  in  the  first  months  of   1800  handed  over  to  a 
hierarchy  of  officials  closely  bound  together  by  interest 
and  esprit  de  corps;   and  local  administration,  after  ten 
years  of  democratic  experiments,  practically  reverted  to 
what  it  had  been  under  the  old  monarchy.     In  fact,  the 
powers  of  the  Prefects  were,  on  the  whole,  much  greater 
than  those  of  the  royal  Intendants  :  for  while  the  latter 
were  hampered  by  the  provincial  Parlements,  the  nominees 
of  the  First  Consul  had  to  deal  with  councils  that  retained 
scarce  the  shadow  of  power.     The  real  authority  in  local 
matters  rested  with  the  Prefects.     The  old  elective  bodies 
survived,  it  is  true,  but  their  functions  were  now  mainly 
advisory  ;    and,  lest  their  advice  should  be  too  copious, 
the  sessions  of  the  first  two  bodies  were  limited  to  a  fort- 
night a  year.     Except  for  a  share  in  the  assessment   of 
taxation,  their  existence  was  merely  a  screen  to  hide  the 
reality  of  the  new  central  despotism.1     Beneficent  it  may 
have  been  ;  and  the  choice  of  Prefects  was  certainly  a 
proof  of  Bonaparte's   discernment   of  real  merit   among 
men  of  all  shades  of  opinion  ;  but  for  all  that,  it  was  a 
despotism,  and  one  that  has  inextricably  entwined  itself 
with  the  whole  life  of  France.2 

It  seems  strange  that  this  law  should  not  have  aroused 
fierce  opposition  ;  for  it  practically  gagged  democracy  in 
its  most  appropriate  and  successful  sphere  of  action,  local 
self-government,  and  made  popular  election  a  mere  shadow, 

1  Lack  of  space  prevents  any  account  of  French  finances  and  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  Bank  of  France.  But  we  may  note  here  that  the  col- 
lection of  the  national  taxes  was  now  carried  out  by  a  State-appointed 
director  and  his  subordinates  in  every  Department —  a  plan  which  yielded 
better  results  than  former  slipshod  methods.  The  conseil  general  of  the 
Department  assessed  the  direct  taxes  among  the  smaller  areas.  "  M6ms." 
de  Gaudin,  Due  de  Gaete. 

2  Edmund  Blanc,  "  Napoleon  I. ;  ses  Institutions,"  p.  27. 


xii  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  249 

except  in  the  single  act  of  the  choice  of  the  local  juges  de 
paix.  This  was  foreseen  by  the  Liberals  in  the  Tribunate  : 
but  their  power  was  small  since  the  regulations  passed  in 
January :  and  though  Daunou,  as  "  reporter,"  sharply 
criticised  this  measure,  yet  he  lamely  concluded  with  the 
advice  that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  reject  it.  The  Tri- 
bunes therefore  passed  the  proposal  by  71  votes  to  25:  and 
the  Corps  Legislatif  by  217  to  68. 

The  results  of  this  new  local  government  have  often 
been  considered  so  favourable  as  to  prove  that  the  genius 
of  the  French  people  requires  central  control  rather  than 
self-government.  But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  condi- 
tions of  France  from  1790  to  1800  were  altogether  hostile 
to  the  development  of  free  institutions.  The  fierce  feuds 
at  home,  the  greed  and  the  class  jealousies  awakened  by 
confiscation,  the  blasts  of  war  and  the  blight  of  bankruptcy, 
would  have  severely  tested  the  firmest  of  local  institutions  ; 
they  were  certain  to  wither  so  delicate  an  organism  as  an 
absolute  democracy,  which  requires  peace,  prosperity,  and 
infinite  patience  for  its  development.  Because  France  then 
came  to  despair  of  her  local  self-government,  it  did  not 
follow  that  she  would  fail  after  Bonaparte's  return  had 
restored  her  prestige  and  prosperity.  But  the  national 
elan  forbade  any  postponement  or  compromise  ;  and  France 
forthwith  accepted  the  rule  of  an  able  official  hierarchy 
as  a  welcome  alternative  to  the  haphazard  acts  of  local 
busybodies.  By  many  able  men  the  change  has  been 
hailed  as  a  proof  of  Bonaparte's  marvellous  discernment 
of  the  national  character,  which,  as  they  aver,  longs  for 
brilliance,  order,  and  strong  government,  rather  than  for 
the  steep  and  thorny  paths  of  liberty.  Certainly  there 
is  much  in  the  modern  history  of  France  which  supports 
this  opinion.  Yet  perhaps  these  characteristics  are  due 
very  largely  to  the  master  craftsman  who  fashioned  France 
anew  when  in  a  state  of  receptivity,  and  thus  was  able  to 
subject  democracy  to  that  force  which  alone  has  been  able 
to  tame  it  —  the  mighty  force  of  militarism. 

The  return  to  a  monarchical  policy  was  nowhere  more 
evident  than  in  the  very  important  negotiations  which 
regulated  the  relations  of  Church  and  State  and  produced 


250 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 


the  Concordat  or  treaty  of  peace  with  the  Roman  Catho- 
lic Church.  But  we  must  first  look  back  at  the  events 
which  had  reduced  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  France 
to  its  pitiable  condition. 

The  conduct  of  the  revolutionists  towards  the  Church 
of  France  was  actuated  partly  by  the  urgent  needs  of  the 
national  exchequer,  partly  by  hatred  and  fear  of  so  pow- 
erful a  religious  corporation.     Idealists  of  the  new  school 
of  thought,  and  practical  men  who  dreaded  bankruptcy, 
accordingly  joined  in  the  assault  on  its  property  and  privi- 
leges •  its  tithes  were  confiscated,  the  religious  houses  and 
their  property  were  likewise  absorbed,  and  its  lands  were 
declared  to  be  the  lands  of  the  nation.     A  budget  of  pub- 
lic worship  was,  it  is  true,  designed  to  support  the  bishops 
and   priests  ;     but   this  solemn   obligation  was   soon  re- 
nounced by  the  fiercer  revolutionists.     Yet  robbery  was 
not  their  worst  offence.    In  July,  1790,  they  passed  a  law 
called  the  Civil  Constitution  of  the  Clergy,  which  aimed 
at   subjecting  the   Church  to  the   State.      It  compelled 
bishops  and  priests  to  seek  election  by  the  adult  males  ot 
their  several  Departments  and  parishes,  and  forced  them 
to  take  a  stringent  oath  of  obedience  to  the  new  order  ot 
things      All  the  bishops  but  four  refused  to  take  an  oath 
which  set  at  naught  the  authority  of  the  Pope  :  more  than 
50  000   priests   likewise   refused,  and  were  ejected  from 
their  livings  :  the  recusants  were  termed  orthodox  or  non- 
juring  priests,  and  by  the  law  of  August,  1792,  they  were 
exiled  from  France,  while  their  more  pliable  or  time-serv- 
ing brethren  who  accepted  the  new  decree  were  known  as 
constitutionals.     About  12,000  of  the  constitutionals  mar- 
ried, while  some  of  them  applauded  the  extreme  Jacobini- 
cal  measures  of  the  Terror.     One  of  them  shocked  the 
faithful  by  celebrating  the  mysteries,  having  a  bonnet  rouge 
on  his  head,  holding  a  pike  in  his  hand,  while  his  wife  was 
installed  near  the  altar.1     Outrages  like  these  were  rare  ; 
but  they  served  to  discredit  the  constitutional  Church  and 
to  throw  up  in  sharper  relief  the  courage  with  which  the 
orthodox  clergy  met  exile  and  death  for  conscience  sake. 
Moreover,  the  time-serving  of  the  constitutionals  was  to 
avail  them  little  :  during  the  Terror  their  stipends  were 
i  Theiner,  "  Hist,  des  deux  Concordats,"  vol.  i.,  p.  21. 


xii  THE   CONCORDAT  261 

unpaid,  and  the  churches  were  for  the  most  part  closed. 
After  a  partial  respite  in  1795-6,  the  coup  d'etat  of  Fruc- 
tidor  (1797)  again  ushered  in  two  years  of  petty  persecu- 
tions ;  but  in  the  early  summer  of  1799  constitutionals 
were  once  more  allowed  to  observe  the  Christian  Sunday, 
and  at  the  time  of  Bonaparte's  return  from  Egypt  their 
services  were  more  frequented  than  those  of  the  Theophi- 
lanthropists  on  the  decadis.  It  was  evident,  then,  that 
the  anti-religious  furor  had  burnt  itself  out,  and  that 
France  was  turning  back  to  her  old  faith.  Indeed,  out- 
side Paris  and  a  few  other  large  towns,  public  opinion 
mocked  at  the  new  cults,  and  in  the  country  districts  the 
peasantry  clung  with  deep  affection  to  their  old  orthodox 
priests,  often  following  them  into  the  forest  to  receive 
their  services  and  forsaking  those  of  their  supplanters. 

Such,  then,  was  the  religious  state  of  France  in  1799  : 
her  clergy  were  rent  by  a  formidable  schism  ;  the  ortho- 
dox priests  clung  where  possible  to  their  parishioners, 
or  lived  in  destitution  abroad ;  the  constitutional  priests, 
though  still  frowned  on  by  the  Directory,  were  gaining 
ground  at  the  expense  of  the  Theophilanthropists,  whose 
expiring  efforts  excited  ridicule,  —  in  fine,  a  nation  weary 
of  religious  experiments  and  groping  about  for  some  firm 
anchorage  in  the  midst  of  the  turbid  ebb-tide  and  its 
numerous  backwaters.1 

Despite  the  absence  of  any  deep  religious  belief,  Bona- 
parte felt  the  need  of  religion  as  the  bulwark  of  morality 
and  the  cement  of  society.  During  his  youth  he  had 
experienced  the  strength  of  Romanism  in  Corsica,  and 
during  his  campaigns  in  Italy  he  saw  with  admiration 
the  zeal  of  the  French  orthodox  priests  who  had  accepted 
exile  and  poverty  for  conscience'  sake.  To  these  outcasts 
he  extended  more  protection  than  was  deemed  compatible 
with  correct  republicanism;  and  he  received  their  grateful 
thanks.  After  Brumaire  he  suppressed  the  oath  previously 
exacted  from  the  clergy,  and  replaced  it  by  a  promise  of 
fidelity    to  the    constitution.      Many    reasons   have    been 

1  Thibaudeau  estimated  that  of  the  population  of  35,000,000  the  follow- 
ing assortment  might  be  made:  Protestants,  .Tews,  and  Theophilanthropists, 
3,000,000  ;  Catholics,  15,000,000,  equally  divided  between  orthodox  and 
constitutionals ;  and  as  many  as  17,000,000  professing  no  belief  whatever. 


252 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


assigned  for  this  conduct,  but  doubtless  his  imagination 
was  touched  by  the   sight   of  the   majestic  hierarchy  of 
Rome,  whose  spiritual  powers  still  prevailed,  even  amidst 
the  ruin  of   its  temporal  authority,  and  were  slowly  but 
surely  winning  back  the  ground  lost  in  the  Revolution 
An  influence  so  impalpable  yet  irresistible,  that  inherited 
from  the  Rome  of  the  Ceesars  the  gift  of  organization  and 
the  power  of  maintaining  discipline,  in  which  the  Revolu- 
tion  was  so  signally  lacking,  might  well  be  the  ally  of  the 
man  who  now  dominated  the  Latin  peoples.     The  pupil 
of  Caesar  could  certainly  not  neglect  the  aid  of  the  spiritual 
hierarchy,  which  was  all  that  remained  of  the  old  Roman 

gF  Added  to  this  was  his  keen  instinct  for  reality,  which 
led  him  to  scorn  such  whipped-up  creeds  as  Robespierre  s 
Supreme  Being  and  that  amazing  hybrid,  Theophilan- 
thiopy,  offspring  of  the  Goddess  of  Reason  and  La 
ReveUliere-Lepeaux.  Having  watched  their  manufac- 
ture, rise,  and  fall,  he  felt  the  more  regard  for  the  taith 
of  his  youth,  which  satisfied  one  of  the  most  imperious 
needs  of  his  nature,  a  craving  for  certainty.  Witness  this 
crushing  retort  to  M.  Mathieu  :  "  What  is  vour  Theophi- 
lanthropy  ?  Oh,  don't  talk  to  me  of  a  religion  which  only 
takes  me  for  this  life,  without  telling  me  whence  I  come 
or  whither  I  go."  Of  course,  this  does  not  prove  the  re- 
ality of  Napoleon's  religion  ;  but  it  shows  that  he  was  not 
devoid  of  the  religious  instinct. 

The  victory  of  Marengo  enabled  Bonaparte  to  proceed 
with  his  plans  for  an  accommodation  with  the  V  atican  ; 
and  he  informed  one  of  the  Lombard  bishops  that  he 
desired  to  open  friendly  relations  with  Pope  Pius  VII., 
who  was  then  about  to  make  his  entry  into  Rome.  I  here 
he  received  the  protection  of  the  First  Consul,  and  soon 
recovered  his  sovereignty  over  his  States,  excepting  the 

LT ^negotiations  between  Paris  and  the  Vatican  were 
transacted  chiefly  by  a  very  able  priest  Bernier  by  name 
who  had  gained  the  First  Consul's  confidence  during  the 
pacification  of  Brittany,  and  now  urged  on  the  envoys  of 
Rome  the  need  of  deferring  to  all  that  was  reasonable  in 
the    French  demands.     The  negotiators  for  the  Vatican 


xii  THE   CONCORDAT  253 

were  Cardinals  Consalvi  and  Caprara,  and  Monseigneur 
Spina  —  able  ecclesiastics,  who  were  fitted  to  maintain 
clerical  claims  with  that  mixture  of  suppleness  and  firm- 
ness which  had  so  often  baffled  the  force  and  craft  of 
mighty  potentates.  The  first  difficulty  arose  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  resignation  of  bishops  of  the  Gallican  Church  : 
Bonaparte  demanded  that,  whether  orthodox  or  constitu- 
tionals, they  must  resign  their  sees  into  the  Pope's  hands ; 
failing  that,  they  must  be  deposed  by  the  papal  authority. 
Sweeping  as  this  proposal  seemed,  Bonaparte  claimed  that 
bishops  of  both  sides  must  resign,  in  order  that  a  satisfac- 
tory selection  might  be  made.  Still  more  imperious  was 
the  need  that  the  Church  should  renounce  all  claim  to  her 
confiscated  domains.  All  classes  of  the  community,  so 
urged  Bonaparte,  had  made  immense  sacrifices  during  the 
Revolution  ;  and  now  that  peasants  were  settled  on  these 
once  clerical  lands,  the  foundations  of  society  would  be 
broken  up  by  any  attempt  to  dispossess  them. 

To  both  of  these  proposals  the  Court  of  Rome  offered  a 
tenacious  resistance.  The  idea  of  compelling  long-perse- 
cuted bishops  to  resign  their  sees  was  no  less  distasteful 
than  the  latter  proposal,  which  involved  acquiescence  in 
sacrilegious  robbery.  At  least,  pleaded  Mgr.  Spina,  let 
tithes  be  re-established.  To  this  request  the  First  Consul 
deigned  no  reply.  None,  indeed,  was  possible  except  a 
curt  refusal.  Few  imposts  had  been  so  detested  as  the 
tithe  ;  and  its  reimposition  would  have  wounded  the 
peasant  class,  on  which  the  First  Consul  based  his  author- 
ity. So  long  as  he  had  their  support  he  could  treat  with 
disdain  the  scoffs  of  the  philosophers  and  even  the  opposi- 
tion of  his  officers  ;  but  to  have  wavered  on  the  subject  of 
tithe  and  of  the  Church  lands  might  have  been  fatal  even 
to  the  victor  of  Marengo.1 

In  fact,  the  difficulty  of  effecting  any  compromise  was 
enormous.  In  seeking  to  reconcile  the  France  of  Rousseau 
and  Robespierre  to  the  unchanging  policy  of  the  Vatican, 
the  "  heir  to  the  Revolution  "  was  essaying  a  harder  task 
than  any  military  enterprise.     To  slay  men  has  ever  been 

JSee  Roederer,  "CEuvres,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  475.  On  the  discontent  of 
the  officers,  see  Pasquier's  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  vii. ;  also  Marmont's 
"  Mems.,"  bk.  vi. 


254 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


easier  than  to  mould  their  thoughts  anew .  and  Bonaparte 
was  now  striving  not  only  to  remould  trench  thought  but 
also  to  fashion  anew  the  ideas  of  the  Eternal  City.     He 
soon  perceived  that  this  latter  enterprise  was  more  diffi- 
cult than  the  former.     The  Pope  and  his  councillors  re- 
ioiced  at  the  signs  of  his  repentance,  but  required  to  see 
the   fruits  thereof.     Instead  of  first-fruits  they  received 
unheard-of  demands  — the  surrender  of  the  three  Lega- 
tions of  Bologna,  Ferrara,and  Romagna,  the  renunciation 
of  all  tithes  and  Church  lands  in  France,  and  the  accept- 
ance of  a  compromise  with  schismatics.     What  wonder 
that  the  replies  from  Rome  were  couched  in  the  non  pos- 
sumus  terms  which  form  the  last  refuge  of  the  Vatican. 
Finding  that  negotiations  made  no  progress,  Bonaparte 
intrusted  Berthier  and  Murat  to  pay  a  visit  to  Rome  and 
exercise  a  discreet  but  burdensome  pressure  in  the  form  ot 
requisitions  for  the  French  troops  in  the  Papal  States. 
'    The   ratification   of   peace   with  Austria  gave  greater 
weight  to  his  representations  at   Rome,  and  he  endeav- 
oured to  press  on  the  signature  of  the  Concordat,  so  as  to 
startle  the  world  by  the  simultaneous  announcement  ot 
the  pacification  of  the  Continent  and  of  the  healing  of  the 
great  religious  schism  in  France.     But  the  clerical  ma- 
chinery worked  too  slowly  to  admit  of  this projected  coup 
de  th/dtre.     In  Bonaparte's  proposals  of  February  25th, 
1801  there  were  several  demands  already  found  to  be  in- 
admissible at  the  Vatican  ; l  and  matters  came  to  a  dead- 
lock until  the  Pope  invested  Spina  with  larger  powers  for 
negotiating  at  Paris.     Consalvi  also  proceeded  to  Paris, 
where  he  was  received  in  state  with  other  ambassadors  at 
the  Tuileries,  the  sight  of  a  cardinal's  robe  causing  no 
little  sensation.     The  First  Consul  granted  him  a  long 
interview,  speaking  at  first  somewhat  seriously,  but  grad- 
ually becoming  more  affable  and  gracious.      Yet  as  his 
behaviour  softened  his  demands  stiffened ;  and  at  the  close 
of  the  audience  he  pressed  Consalvi  to  sign  a  somewhat 
unfavourable  version  of   the  compact  within  five   days, 
otherwise  the  negotiations  would  be  at  an  end  and  a  na- 
tional religion  would  be  adopted  — an  enterprise  for  which 
i  See  the  drafts  in  Count  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe's  «  Negociation  du  Con- 
cordat,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  58  and  268. 


xn  THE   CONCORDAT  255 

the  auguries  promised  complete  success.  At  a  later  inter- 
view he  expressed  the  same  resolution  in  homely  phrase  : 
when  Consalvi  pressed  him  to  take  a  firm  stand  against 
the  "  constitutional  "  intruders,  he  laughingly  remarked 
that  he  could  do  no  more  until  he  knew  how  he  stood  with 
Rome  ;  for  "  you  know  that  when  one  cannot  arrange 
matters  with  God,  one  comes  to  terms  with  the  devil."1 

This  dalliance  with  the  "constitutionals"  might  have 
been  more  than  an  astute  ruse,  and  Consalvi  knew  it.  In 
framing  a  national  Church  the  First  Consul  would  have 
appealed  not  only  to  the  old  Gallican  feeling,  still  strong 
among  the  clerics  and  laity,  but  also  to  the  potent  force  of 
French  nationality.  The  experiment  might  have  been  man- 
aged so  as  to  offend  none  but  the  strictest  Catholics,  who 
were  less  to  be  feared  than  the  free-thinkers.  Consalvi  was 
not  far  wrong  when,  writing  of  the  official  world  at  Paris, 
he  said  that  only  Bonaparte  really  desired  a  Concordat. 

The  First  Consul's  motives  in  seeking  the  alliance  of 
Rome  have,  very  naturally,  been  subjected  to  searching 
criticism  ;  and  in  forcing  the  Concordat  on  France,  and 
also  on  Rome,  he  was  certainly  undertaking  the  most 
difficult  negotiation  of  his  life.2  But  his  preference  for 
the  Roman  connection  was  an  act  of  far-reaching  state- 
craft. He  saw  that  a  national  Church,  unrecognized  by 
Rome,  was  a  mere  half-way  house  between  Romanism  and 
Protestantism  ;  and  he  disliked  the  latter  creed  because  of 
its  tendency  to  beget  sects  and  to  impair  the  validity  of 
the  general  will.  He  still  retained  enough  of  Rousseau's 
doctrine  to  desire  that  the  general  will  should  be  uniform, 
provided  that  it  could  be  controlled  by  his  own  will.  Such 
uniformity  in  the  sphere  of  religion  was  impossible  unless 
he  had  the  support  of  the  Papacy.  Only  by  a  bargain 
with  Rome  could  he  gain  the  support  of  a  solid  ecclesias- 
tical phalanx.  Finally,  by  erecting  a  French  national 
Church,  he  would  not  only  have  perpetuated  schism  at 
home,  but  would  have  disqualified  himself  for  acting  the 
part  of  Charlemagne  over  Central  and  Southern  Europe. 
To  re-fashion  Europe  in  a  cosmopolitan  mould  he  needed 
a  clerical  police  that  was  more  than  merely  French.     To 


iTheiner,  vol.  i.,  pp.  193  and  196. 
2M6neval,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  p.  81. 


256  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

achieve  those  grander  designs  the  successor  of  Caesar  would 
need  the  aid  of  the  successor  of  Peter  ;  and  this  aid  would 
be  granted  only  to  the  restorer  of  Roman  Catholicism  in 
France,  never  to  the  perpetuator  of  schism. 

These  would  seem  to  be  the  chief  reasons  why  he  braved 
public  opinion  in  Paris  and  clung  to  the  Roman  connec- 
tion, bringing  forward  his  plan  of  a  Gallican  Church  only 
as  a  threatening  move  against  the  clerical  flank.  When 
the  Vatican  was  obdurate  he  coquetted  with  the  "  consti- 
tutional" bishops,  allowing  them  every  facility  for  free 
speech  in  a  council  which  they  held  at  Paris  at  the  close  of 
June,  1801.  He  summoned  to  the  Tuileries  their  president, 
the  famous  Gregoire,  and  showed  him  signal  marks  of 
esteem.  "  Put  not  your  trust  in  princes  "  must  soon  have 
been  the  thought  of  Gregoire  and  his  colleagues  :  for  a 
fortnight  later  Bonaparte  carried  through  his  treaty  with 
Rome  and  shelved  alike  the  congress  and  the  church  of 
the  "constitutionals." 

It  would  be  tedious  to  detail  all  the  steps  in  this  com- 
plex negotiation,  but  the  final  proceedings  call  for  some 
notice.  When  the  treaty  was  assuming  its  final  form, 
Talleyrand,  the  polite  scoffer,  the  bitter  foe  of  all  clerical 
claims,  found  it  desirable  to  take  the  baths  at  a  distant 
place,  and  left  the  threads  of  the  negotiation  in  the  hands 
of  two  men  who  were  equally  determined  to  prevent  its 
signature,  Maret,  Secretary  of  State,  and  Hauterive,  who 
afterwards  became  the  official  archivist  of  France.  These 
men  determined  to  submit  to  Consalvi  a  draft  of  the  treaty 
differing  widely  from  that  which  had  been  agreed  upon  ; 
and  that,  too,  when  the  official  announcement  had  been 
made  that  the  treaty  was  to  be  signed  immediately.  In 
the  last  hours  the  cardinal  found  himself  confronted  with 
unexpected  conditions,  many  of  which  he  had  successfully 
repelled.  Though  staggered  by  this  trickery,  which  com- 
pelled him  to  sign  a  surrender  or  to  accept  an  open  rupture, 
Consalvi  fought  the  question  over  again  in  a  conference 
that  lasted  twenty-four  hours  ;  he  even  appeared  at  the 
State  dinner  given  on  July  14th  by  the  First  Consul,  who 
informed  him  before  the  other  guests  that  it  was  a  question 
of  "  my  draft  of  the  treaty  or  none  at  all."  Nothing  baffled 
the  patience  and  tenacity  of  the  Cardinal  ;  and  finally,  by 


xii  THE   CONCORDAT  257 

the  good  offices  of  Joseph  Bonaparte,  the  objectionable 
demands  thrust  forward  at  the  eleventh  hour  were  removed 
or  altered. 

The  question  has  been  discussed  whether  the  First  Con- 
sul was  a  party  to  this  device.  Theiner  asserts  that  he 
knew  nothing  of  it  :  that  it  was  an  official  intrigue  got  up 
at  the  last  moment  by  the  anti-clericals  so  as  to  precipitate 
a  rupture.  In  support  of  this  view,  he  cites  letters  of 
Maret  and  Hauterive  as  inculpating  these  men  and  tend- 
ing to  free  Bonaparte  from  suspicion  of  complicity.  But 
the  letters  cannot  be  said  to  dissipate  all  suspicion.  The 
First  Consul  had  made  this  negotiation  peculiarly  his  own  : 
no  officials  assuredly  would  have  dared  secretly  to  foist 
their  own  version  of  an  important  treaty  ;  or,  if  they  did, 
this  act  would  have  been  the  last  of  their  career.  But 
Bonaparte  did  not  disgrace  them  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  con- 
tinued to  honour  them  with  his  confidence.  Moreover,  the 
First  Consul  flew  into  a  passion  with  his  brother  Joseph 
when  he  reported  that  Consalvi  could  not  sign  the  docu- 
ment now  offered  to  him,  and  tore  in  pieces  the  articles 
finally  arranged  with  the  Cardinal.  On  the  return  of  his 
usually  calm  intelligence,  he  at  last  allowed  the  concessions 
to  stand,  with  the  exception  of  two  ;  but  in  a  scrutiny  of 
motives  we  must  assign  most  importance,  not  to  second 
and  more  prudent  thoughts,  but  to  the  first  ebullition  of 
feelings,  which  seem  unmistakably  to  prove  his  knowledge 
and  approval  of  Hauterive's  device.  We  must  therefore 
conclude  that  he  allowed  the  antagonists  of  the  Concordat 
to  make  this  treacherous  onset,  with  the  intention  of  ex- 
torting every  possible  demand  from  the  dazed  and  bewil- 
dered Cardinal.1 

After    further    delays   the    Concordat   was   ratified   at 

1  Thiers  omits  any  notice  of  this  strange  transaction.  Lanfrey  describes 
it,  but  unfortunately  relies  on  the  melodramatic  version  given  in  Consalvi's 
"Memoirs,"  which  were  written  many  years  later  and  are  far  less  trust- 
worthy than  the  Cardinal's  letters  written  at  the  time.  In  his  careful 
review  of  all  the  documentary  evidence,  Count  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe  (vol. 
iii.,  p.  201  note)  concludes  that  the  new  project  of  the  Concordat  (No. 
VIII.)  was  drawn  up  by  Hauterive,  was  "submitted  immediately  to  the 
approbation  of  the  First  Consul,"  and  thereupon  formed  the  basis  of  the 
long  and  heated  discussion  of  July  14th  between  the  Papal  and  French 
plenipotentiaries.  A  facsimile  of  this  interesting  document,  with  all  the 
erasures,  is  appended  at  the  end  of  his  volume. 


258 


THE   LITE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


Eastertide,  1802.     It  may  be  briefly  described  as  follows  : 
The   French   Government   recognized   that  the  Oattioiic 
apostolic  and  Roman  religion  was  the  religion  of  the  great 
majority  of  the  French  people,  "  especially  of  the  Consuls    ; 
but  it  refused  to  declare  it  to  be  the  religion  of  France,  as 
was  the  case  under  the  ancien  rtgime.     It  was  to  be  freely 
and  publicly  practised  in  France,  subject  to  the  police 
regulations  that- the  Government  judged  necessary  for  the 
public  tranquillity.     In  return  for  these  great  advantages, 
many  concessions  were  expected  from  the  Church.      Ine 
present  bishops,  both  orthodox  and  constitutional,  were  at 
the  Pope's  invitation,  to  resign  their  sees  ;  or,  failing  that, 
new  appointments  were  to  be  made,  as  if  the  sees  were 
vacant.      The   last   proviso   was   necessary;    for   ot   the 
eighty-one  surviving  bishops  affected  by  this  decision  as 
man/  as   thirteen   orthodox   and   two  "  constitutionals 
offered    persistent   but   unavailing    protests    against  the 
action  of  the  Pope  and  First  Consul.  _ 

A  new  division  of  archbishoprics  and  bishoprics  was  now 
made,  which  gave  in  all  sixty  sees  to  France.     The  *irst 
Consul  enjoyed  the  right  of  nomination  to  them  where- 
upon the  Pope  bestowed  canonical  investiture.     The  arch- 
bishops and  bishops  were  all  to  take  an  oath  of  fidelity  to 
the  constitution.     The  bishops  nominated  the  lower  clerics 
provided  that  they  were  acceptable  to  the  Government : 
all  alike  bound  themselves  to  watch  over  governmental 
interests.     The  stability  of  France  was  further  assured  by 
a  clause  granting  complete  and  permanent  security  to  the 
holders  of  the  confiscated  Church  lands  — a  healing  and 
salutary  compromise  which  restored  peace  to  every  village 
and  soothed  the  qualms  of  many  a  troubled  conscience. 
On  its  side,  the  State  undertook  to  furnish  suitable  sti- 
pends to  the  clergy,  a  promise  which  was  fulfilled  in i  a 
rather  niggardly  spirit.     For  the  rest,  the  First  Consul 
enjoyed  the  same  consideration  as  the  Kings  of  France  in 
all  matters  ecclesiastical ;  and  a  clause  was  added,  though 
Bonaparte  declared  it  needless,  that  if  any  succeeding  *  irst 
Consul  were  not  a  Roman   Catholic,  his  prerogatives  in 
religious  matters  should  be  revised  by  a  Convention.     A 
similar  Concordat  was  passed  a  little  later  for  the  pacifi- 
cation of  the  Cisalpine  Republic. 


xii  THE  CONCORDAT  259 

The  Concordat  was  bitterly  assailed  by  the  Jacobins, 
especially  by  the  military  chiefs,  and  had  not  the  infidel 
generals  been  for  the*  most  part  sundered  by  mutual  jeal- 
ousies they  might  perhaps  have  overthrown  Bonaparte. 
But  their  obvious  incapacity  for  civil  affairs  enabled  them 
to  venture  on  nothing  more  than  a  few  coarse  jests  and 
clumsy  demonstrations.  At  the  Easter  celebration  at 
Notre  Dame  in  honour  of  the  ratification  of  the  Con- 
cordat, one  of  them,  Delmas  by  name,  ventured  on  the 
only  protest  barbed  with  telling  satire  :  "  Yes,  a  fine 
piece  of  monkery  this,  indeed.  It  only  lacked  the  mill- 
ion men  who  got  killed  to  destroy  what  you  are  striving 
to  bring  back."  But  to  all  protests  Bonaparte  opposed  a 
calm  behaviour  that  veiled  a  rigid  determination,  before 
which  priests  and  soldiers  were  alike  helpless. 

In  subsequent  articles  styled  "  organic,"  Bonaparte, 
without  consulting  the  Pope,  made  several  laws  that 
galled  the  orthodox  clergy.  Under  the  plea  of  legislating 
for  the  police  of  public  worship,  he  reaffirmed  some  of  the 
principles  which  he  had  been  unable  to  incorporate  in  the 
Concordat  itself.  The  organic  articles  asserted  the  old 
claims  of  the  Gallican  Church,  which  forbade  the  appli- 
cation of  Papal  Bulls,  or  of  the  decrees  of  "  foreign " 
synods,  to  France  :  they  further  forbade  the  French 
bishops  to  assemble  in  council  or  synod  without  the  per- 
mission of  the  Government  ;  and  this  was  also  required 
for  a  bishop  to  leave  his  diocese,  even  if  he  were  sum- 
moned to  Rome.  Such  were  the  chief  of  the  organic 
articles.  Passed  under  the  plea  of  securing  public  tran- 
quillity, they  proved  a  fruitful  source  of  discord,  which 
during  the  Empire  became  so  acute  as  to  weaken  Napo- 
leon's authority.  In  matters  religious  as  well  as  political, 
he  early  revealed  his  chief  moral  and  mental  defect,  a 
determination  to  carry  his  point  by  whatever  means  and 
to  require  the  utmost  in  every  bargain.  While  refusing 
fully  to  establish  Roman  Catholicism  as  the  religion  of 
the  State,  he  compelled  the  Church  to  surrender  its  tem- 
poralities, to  accept  the  regulations  of  the  State,  and  to 
protect  its  interests.  Truly  if,  in  Chateaubriand's  famous 
phrase,  he  was  the  "  restorer  of  the  altars,"  he  exacted  the 
uttermost  farthing  for  that  restoration. 


260 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


In   one  matter  his   clear   intelligence  stands  forth  in 
marked  contrast  to  the   narrow  pedantry  of  the  Roman 
Cardinals.     At  a  time  of  reconciliation  between  orthodox 
and   "  constitutionals,"  they  required  from  the  latter  a 
complete  and  public  retractation  of  their  recent  errors.  At 
once  Bonaparte  intervened  with  telling  effect.     So  con- 
dign a  humiliation,  he  argued,  would  altogether  mar  the 
harmony  newly  re-established.     "  The  past  is  past :  and 
the  bishops  and  prefects  ought  to  require  from  the  priests 
only  the  declaration  of  adhesion  to  the  Concordat,  and  ot 
obedience  to  the  bishop  nominated  by  the  First  Consul 
and  instituted  by  the  Pope."     This  enlightened   advice, 
backed  up  by  irresistible   power,    carried   the   day,  and 
some   ten   thousand   constitutional    priests   were   quietly 
received  back  into  the  Roman  communion,  those  who  had 
contracted  marriages  being  compelled  to  put  away  their 
wives.     Bonaparte  took  a  deep  interest  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  dioceses,  in  the  naming  of  churches,  and  similar 
details,  doubtless  with  the    full   consciousness   that  the 
revival  of  the  Roman  religious  discipline  in  France  was  a 
more  important  service  than  any  feat  of  arms. 

He  was  right :  in  healing  a  great  schism  in  France  he 
was  dealing  a  deadly  blow  at  the  revolutionary  feeling  ot 
which  it  was  a  prominent  manifestation.  In  the  words 
of  one  of  his  Ministers,  "  The  Concordat  was  the  most 
brilliant  triumph  over  the  genius  of  Revolution,  and  all 
the  following  successes  have  without  exception  resulted 
from  it  "  1  After  this  testimony  it  is  needless  to  ask  why 
Bonaparte  did  not  take  up  with  Protestantism.  At  St. 
Helena,  it  is  true,  he  asserted  that  the  choice  of  Catholi- 
cism or  Protestantism  was  entirely  open  to  him  m  1SU1, 
and  that  the  nation  would  have  followed  him  in  either 

i  Pasauier  »  Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  vii.  Two  of  the  organic  articles  por- 
tende?Xe  Iboimon  of'the  revolutionary  calendar  The  first  restored  the 
old  names  of  the  days  of  the  week ;  the  second  ordered  that  Sunday 
shou"d  be  the  day  of  rest  for  all  public  functionaries.  The  observance  of 
S "then^oih  ceased  ;  but  the  months  of  the  ^cjagon^^ndw 
were  observed  until  the  close  of  the  year  1805.  Theopl hi  la"™°W  ™J 
similarly  treated:  when  its  votaries  applied  for  a  building,  their  request 
wS  refused  on  the  ground  that  their  cult  came  within  the  domain  of  phi- 
^Sphy  not  of  any  actual  religion  I  A  small  number  of  priests  and  of 
their  parishioners  refused  to  recognize  the  Concordat ;  and  even  to-day 
there  are  a  few  of  these  anti-concordataires. 


XII 


THE   CONCORDAT  261 


direction :  but  his  religious  policy,  if  carefully  examined, 
shows  no  sign  of  wavering  on  this  subject,  though  he 
once  or  twice  made  a  strategic  diversion  towards  Geneva, 
when  Rome  showed  too  firm  a  front.  Is  it  conceivable 
that  a  man  who,  as  he  informed  Joseph,  was  systemati- 
cally working  to  found  a  dynasty,  should  hesitate  in  the 
choice  of  a  governmental  creed  ?  Is  it  possible  to  think 
of  the  great  champion  of  external  control  and  State  disci- 
pline as  a  defender  of  liberty  of  conscience  and  the  right 
of  private  judgment  ? 

The  regulation  of  the  Protestant  cult  in  France  was  a 
far  less  arduous  task.  But  as  Bonaparte's  aim  was  to 
attach  all  cults  to  the  State,  he  decided  to  recognize  the 
two  chief  Protestant  bodies  in  France,  Calvinists  and 
Lutherans,  allowing  them  to  choose  their  own  pastors 
and  to  regulate  their  affairs  in  consistories.  The  pastors 
were  to  be  salaried  by  the  State,  but  in  return  the  Govern- 
ment not  only  reserved  its  approval  of  every  appoint- 
ment, but  required  the  Protestant  bodies  to  have  no 
relations  whatever  with  any  foreign  Power  or  authority. 
The  organic  articles  of  1802,  which  defined  the  position 
of  the  Protestant  bodies,  form  a  very  important  landmark 
in  the  history  of  the  followers  of  Luther  and  Calvin. 
Persecuted  by  Louis  XIV.  and  XV.,  they  were  tolerated 
by  Louis  XVI.  ;  they  gained  complete  religious  equality 
in  1789,  and  after  a  few  years  of  anarchy  in  matters  of 
faith,  they  found  themselves  suddenly  and  stringently 
bound  to  the  State  by  the  organizing  genius  of  Bonaparte. 

In  the  years  1806-1808  the  position  of  the  Jews  was 
likewise  defined,  at  least  for  all  those  who  recognized 
France  as  their  country,  performed  all  civic  duties,  and 
recognized  all  the  laws  of  the  State.  In  consideration 
of  their  paying  full  taxes  and  performing  military  service, 
they  received  official  protection  and  their  rabbis  govern- 
mental support. 

Such  was  Bonaparte's  policy  on  religious  subjects. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  its  motive  was,  in  the 
main,  political.  This  methodizing  .genius,  who  looked 
on  the  beliefs  and  passions,  the  desires  and  ambitions  of 
mankind,  as  so  many  forces  which  were  to  aid  him  in  his 
ascent,  had  already  satisfied  the  desires  for  military  glory 


THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

and  material  prosperity;  and  in  his  bargain  with  Rome 
he  now  won  the  support  of  an  organized  priesthood, 
besides  that  of  the  smaller  Protestant  and  Jewish  com- 
munions. That  he  gained  also  peace  and  quietness  for 
France  may  be  granted,  though  it  was  at  the  expense  of 
that  mental  alertness  and  independence  which  had  been 
her  chief  intellectual  glory ;  but  none  of  his  intimate 
acquaintances  ever  doubted  that  his  religion  was  only  a 
vague  sentiment,  and  his  attendance  at  mass  merely  a 
compliment  to  his  "sacred  gendarmerie."1 

Having  dared  and  achieved  the  exploit  of  organizing 
religion  in  a  half-infidel  society,  the  First  Consul  was 
ready  to  undertake  the  almost  equally  hazardous  task  of 
establishing  an  order  of  social  distinction,  and  that  too  in 
the  very  land  where  less  than  eight  years  previously 
every  title  qualified  its  holder  for  the  guillotine.  For  his 
new  experiment,  the  Legion  of  Honour,  he  could  adduce 
only  one  precedent  in  the  acts  of  the  last  twelve  years. 
The  whole  tendency  had  been  towards  levelling  all  in- 
equalities. In  1790  all  titles  of  nobility  were  swept  away; 
and  though  the  Convention  decreed  "  arms  of  honour  "  to 
brave  soldiers,  yet  its  generosity  to  the  deserving  proved 
to  be  less  remarkable  than  its  activity  in  guillotining  the 
unsuccessful.  Bonaparte,  however,  adduced  its  custom 
of  granting  occasional  modest  rewards  as  a  precedent  for 
his  own  design,  which  was  to  be  far  more  extended  and 
ambitious. 

In  May,  1802,  he  proposed  the  formation  of  a  Legion 
of  Honour,  organized  in  fifteen  cohorts,  with  grand  officers, 
commanders,  officers,  and  legionaries.  Its  affairs  were  to 
be  regulated  by  a  council  presided  over  by  Bonaparte 
himself.  Each  cohort  received  "  national  domains  "  with 
200,000  francs  annual  rental,  and  these  funds  were  dis- 
bursed to  the  members  on  a  scale  proportionate  to  their 
rank.  The  men  who  had  received  "  arms  of  honour  "  were, 
ipso  facto,  to  be  legionaries  ;  soldiers  "who  had  rendered 
considerable  services  to  the  State  in  the  war  of  liberty," 

1  Chaptal,  "Souvenirs,"  pp.  237-239.  Lucien  Bonaparte,  "Mems.," 
vol.  ii.,  p.  201,  quotes  his  brother  Joseph's  opinion  of  the  Concordat: 
"  Un  pas  retrograde  et  irr£fl£chi  de  la  nation  qui  s'y  soumettait." 


xii  THE  LEGION  OF   HONOUR  263 

and  civilians  "  who  by  their  learning,  talents,  and  virtues 
contributed  to  establish  or  to  defend  the  principles  of  the 
Republic,"  might  hope  for  the  honour  and  reward  now  held 
out.  The  idea  of  rewarding  merit  in  a  civilian,  as  well  as 
among  the  military  caste  which  had  hitherto  almost  entirely 
absorbed  such  honours,  was  certainly  enlightened;  and  the 
names  of  the  famous  savants  Laplace,  Monge,  Berthollet, 
Lagrange,  Chaptal,  and  of  jurists  such  as  Treilhard  and 
Tronchet,  imparted  lustre  to  what  would  otherwise  have 
been  a  very  commonplace  institution.  Bonaparte  desired 
to  call  out  all  the  faculties  of  the  nation  ;  and  when  Dumas 
proposed  that  the  order  should  be  limited  to  soldiers, 
the  First  Consul  replied  in  a  brilliant  and  convincing 
harangue  : 

"  To  do  great  things  nowadays  it  is  not  enough  to  be  a  man  of  five 
feet  ten  inches.  If  strength  and  bravery  made  the  general,  every 
soldier  might  claim  the  command.  The  general  who  does  great 
things  is  he  who  also  possesses  civil  qualities.  The  soldier  knows  no  law 
but  force,  sees  nothing  but  it,  and  measures  everything  by  it.  The 
civilian,  on  the  other  hand,  only  looks  to  the  general  welfare.  The 
characteristic  of  the  soldier  is  to  wish  to  do  everything  despotically  : 
that  of  the  civilian  is  to  submit  everything  to  discussion,  truth,  and 
reason.     The  superiority  thus  unquestionably  belongs  to  the  civilian." 

In  these  noble  words  we  can  discern  the  secret  of  Bona- 
parte's supremacy  both  in  politics  and  in  warfare.  Unit- 
ing in  his  own  person  the  ablest  qualities  of  the  statesman 
and  the  warrior,  he  naturally  desired  that  his,  new  order 
of  merit  should  quicken  the  vitality  of  France  in  every 
direction,  knowing  full  well  that  the  results  would  speedily 
be  felt  in  the  army  itself.  When  admitted  to  its  ranks, 
the  new  member  swore  : 

"  To  devote  himself  to  the  service  of  the  Republic,  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  integrity  of  its  territory,  the  defence  of  its  government, 
laws,  and  of  the  property  which  they  have  consecrated ;  to  fight  by 
all  methods  authorized  by  justice,  reason,  and  law,  against  every 
attempt  to  re-establish  the  feudal  regime,  or  to  reproduce  the  titles  anil 
qualities  thereto  belonging;  and  finally  to  strive  to  the  uttermost  to 
maintain  liberty  and  equality." 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  Tribunate,  despite  the 
recent  purging  of  its  most  independent  members,  judged 
liberty  and  equality  to  be  endangered  by  the  method  of 


264  THE  LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

defence  now  proposed.  The  members  bitterly  criticised 
the  scheme  as  a  device  of  the  counter-revolution  ;  but, 
with  the  timid  inconsequence  which  was  already  sapping 
their  virility,  they  proceeded  to  pass  by  fifty-six  votes  to 
thirty-eight  a  measure  of  which  they  had  so  accurately 
gauged  the  results.  The  new  institution  was,  indeed,  admi- 
rably suited  to  consolidate  Bonaparte's  power.  Resting  on 
the  financial  basis  of  the  confiscated  lands,  it  offered  some 
guarantee  against  the  restoration  of  the  old  monarchy  and 
feudal  nobility  ;  while,  by  stimulating  that  love  of  distinc- 
tion and  brilliance  which  is  inherent  in  every  gifted 
people,  it  quietly  began  to  graduate  society  and  to  group 
it  around  the  Paladins  of  a  new  Gaulish  chivalry.  The 
people  had  recently  cast  off  the  overlordship  of  the  old 
Frankish  nobles,  but  admiration  of  merit  (the  ultimate 
source  of  all  titles  of  distinction)  was  only  dormant  even 
in  the  days  of  Robespierre ;  and  its  insane  repression 
during  the  Terror  now  begat  a  corresponding  enthusiasm 
for  all  commanding  gifts.  Of  this  inevitable  reaction 
Bonaparte  now  made  skilful  use.  When  Berlier,  one  of 
the  leading  jurists  of  France,  objected  to  the  new  order  as 
leading  France  back  to  aristocracy,  and  contemptuously 
said  that  crosses  and  ribbons  were  the  toys  of  monarchy, 
Bonaparte  replied  : 

"  Well :  men  are  led  by  toys.  I  would  not  say  that  in  a  rostrum, 
but  in  a  council  of  wise  men  and  statesmen  one  ought  to  speak  one's 
mind.  I  don't  think  that  the  French  love  liberty  and  equality :  the 
French  are  not  at  all  changed  by  ten  years  of  revolution :  they  are 
what  the  Gauls  were,  fierce  and  fickle.  They  have  one  feeling  — 
honour.  We  must  nourish  that  feeling:  they  must  have  distinctions. 
See  how  they  bow  down  before  the  stars  of  strangers."  1 

After  so  frank  an  exposition  of  motives  to  his  own  Coun- 
cil of  State,  little  more  need  be  said.  We  need  not  credit 
Bonaparte  or  the  orators  of  the  Tribunate  with  any  super- 
human sagacity  when  he  and  they  foresaw  that  such  an 
order  would  prepare  the  way  for  more  resplendent  titles. 
The  Legion  of  Honour,  at  least  in  its  highest  grades,  was 
the  chrysalis  stage  of  the  Imperial  noblesse.  After  all, 
the  new  Charlemagne  might  plead  that  his  new  creation 

1  Thibaudeau,  "Consulat,"  ch.  xxvi. 


xn  THE   CODE   NAPOLEON  265 

satisfied  an  innate  craving  of  the  race,  and  that  its  dura- 
bility was  the  best  answer  to  hostile  critics.  Even  when, 
in  1814,  his  Senators  were  offering  the  crown  of  France 
to  the  heir  of  the  Bourbons,  they  expressly  stipulated  that 
the  Legion  of  Honour  should  not  be  abolished  :  it  has  sur- 
vived all  the  shocks  of  French  history,  even  the  vulgariz- 
ing associations  of  the  Second  Empire. 

The  same  quality  of  almost  pyramidal  solidity  charac- 
terizes another  great  enterprise  of  the  Napoleonic  period, 
the  codification  of  French  law. 

The  difficulties  of  this  undertaking  consisted  mainly 
in  the  enormous  mass  of  decrees  emanating  from  the 
National  Assemblies,  relative  to  political,  civil,  and 
criminal  affairs.  Many  of  those  decrees,  the  offspring  of 
a  momentary  enthusiasm,  had  found  a  place  in  the  codes 
of  laws  which  were  then  compiled  ;  and  yet  sagacious 
observers  knew  that  several  of  them  warred  against  the 
instincts  of  the  Gallic  race.  This  conviction  was  summed 
up  in  the  trenchant  statement  of  the  compilers  of  the  new 
code,  in  which  they  appealed  from  the  ideas  of  Rousseau 
to  the  customs  of  the  past :  "  New  theories  are  but  the 
maxims  of  certain  individuals :  the  old  maxims  represent 
the  sense  of  centuries."  There  was  much  force  in  this 
dictum.  The  overthrow  of  Feudalism  and  the  old  mon- 
archy had  not  permanently  altered  the  French  nature. 
They  were  still  the  same  joyous,  artistic,  clan-loving  peo- 
ple whom  the  Latin  historians  described  :  and  pride  in  the 
nation  or  the  family  was  as  closely  linked  with  respect  for 
a  doughty  champion  of  national  and  family  interests  as  in 
the  days  of  Csesar.  Of  this  Roman  or  quasi-Gallic  reac- 
tion Napoleon  was  to  be  the  regulator  ;  and  no  sphere  of 
his  activities  bespeaks  his  unerring  political  sagacity  more 
than  his  sifting  of  the  old  and  the  new  in  the  great  code 
which  was  afterwards  to  bear  his  name. 

Old  French  law  had  been  an  inextricable  labyrinth  of 
laws  and  customs,  mainly  Roman  and  Frankish  in  origin, 
hopelessly  tangled  by  feudal  customs,  provincial  privileges, 
ecclesiastical  rights,  and  the  later  undergrowth  of  royal 
decrees  ;  and  no  part  of  the  legislation  of  the  revolu- 
tionists met  with  so  little  resistance    as    their    root    and 


266 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


branch  destruction  of  this  exasperating  jungle.      Their 
difficulties  only  began  when  they  endeavoured  to  apply  the 
mSples  of  the  Rights  of  Man  to  political,   civil,  and 
cm'nal  affairs.     The  chief  of  these  principles  relating  to 
criminal  law  were  that  law  can  only  forbid  actions  that 
areTarmfuT  to  society,  and  must  only  impose  penalties 
?hat  are  strictly  necessary      To ^  these  epoch-making  £  - 
nouncements  the  Assembly  added,   ml  90,  that   crimes 
should  be  visited  only  on  the  guilty  individual,  not  on    he 
Wlv-  and  that  penalties   must  be  proportioned  to  the 
offence's      The  last  two  of  these  principles  had  of  late  been 
nSrantiy  violated ;  but  the  general  pacification  of  France 
now  permilted  a  calm  consideration  of  the  whole  question 
of  crS  law,  and    of  its   application   to   normal  con- 

time  the  Convener '  d»»£«d »    e  *7rTn  up  at  the 

W^  t0^TThTDi^to^  hut  neither  gave  satisfaction, 
orders  6t   the  uirecioiv,  "  First  Consul  to  achieve 

years'  toil  had  prepared.  «»onnd  Consul, 

y  He  had  many  other  advantages.     The  becona  ^on 
Cambaceres,  was  at  his  side,  wit ,  st .res  of  jegjl  cxpe^ 
e„ee  and  hahits  of  comph^ m^hat  were,*  t^  J 

I„tal-equahl  t^er'e*  ieldPingg?ound  before  the  more  auto- 


xii  THE   CODE   NAPOLEON  267 

cratic  maxims  of  Roman  law.  The  view  of  life  now 
dominant  was  that  of  the  warrior,  not  of  the  philosopher. 
Bonaparte  named  Tronchet,  Bigot  de  Preameneu,  and  the 
eloquent  and  learned  Portalis  for  the  redaction  of  the 
code.  By  ceaseless  toil  they  completed  their  first  draft 
in  four  months.  Then,  after  receiving  the  criticisms  of  the 
Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Tribunals  of  Appeal,  it  came 
before  the  Council  of  State  for  the  decision  of  its  special 
committee  on  legislation.  There  it  was  subjected  to  the 
scrutiny  of  several  experts,  but,  above  all,  to  Bonaparte 
himself.  He  presided  at  more  than  half  of  the  102  sit- 
tings devoted  to  this  criticism  ;  and  sittings  of  eight  or 
nine  hours  were  scarcely  long  enough  to  satisfy  his  eager 
curiosity,  his  relentless  activity,  and  his  determined 
practicality. 

From  the  notes  of  Thibaudeau,  one  of  the  members  of 
this  revising  committee,  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  part 
there  played  by  the  First  Consul.  We  see  him  listening 
intently  to  the  discussions  of  the  jurists,  taking  up  and 
sorting  the  threads  of  thought  when  a  tangle  seemed 
imminent,  and  presenting  the  result  in  some  striking  pat- 
tern. We  watch  his  methodizing  spirit  at  work  on  the 
cumbrous  legal  phraseology,  hammering  it  out  into  clear, 
ductile  French.  We  feel  the  unerring  sagacity,  which 
acted  as  a  political  and  social  touchstone,  testing,  approv- 
ing, or  rejecting  multifarious  details  drawn  from  old 
French  law  or  from  the  customs  of  the  Revolution  ;  and 
finally  we  wonder  at  the  architectural  skill  which  worked 
the  2,281  articles  of  the  Code  into  an  almost  unassailable 
pile.  To  the  skill  and  patience  of  the  three  chief  redac- 
tors that  result  is,  of  course,  very  largely  due  :  yet,  in  its 
mingling  of  strength,  simplicity,  and  symmetry,  we  may 
discern  the  projection  of  Napoleon's  genius  over  what  had 
hitherto  been  a  legal  chaos. 

Some  blocks  of  the  pyramid  were  almost  entirely  his 
own.  He  widened  the  area  of  French  citizenship  ;  above 
all,  he  strengthened  the  structure  of  the  family  by  enhanc- 
ing the  father's  authority.  Herein  his  Corsican  instincts 
and  the  requirements  of  statecraft  led  him  to  undo  much 
of  the  legislation  of  the  revolutionists.  Their  ideal  was 
individual  liberty :  his  aim  was  to  establish  public  order 


268  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  1  chap. 

by  autocratic  methods.     They  had  sought  to  make  of  the 
family  a  little  republic,  founded  on  the  principles  of  lib- 
erty and  equality  ,  but  in  the  new  Code  the  paternal  author- 
itfreappeired  no   less  strict,  albeit  less  severe  in  some 
deytails,Pthan  that  of  the  ancien  rSgime.     The   amdy  wa 
thenceforth  modelled  on  the  idea  dominant  in  the  btate  that 
author^  and  responsible  action  pertained  to  a  single  ind  v 
vidual      The  father  controlled  the  conduct  of   his  chil- 
dren   his  consent  was  necessary  for  the  marriage  of  sons 
ud  to  their  twenty-fifth  year,  for  that  of  daughters  up  to 
Z  twenty-first  year ;  and  other  regulations  were  framed 
in  the  lame  spirit5     Thus  there  was  rebuilt  in  trance  the 
SBtiSitioTofthe  family  on  an  almost  Roman  basis;  and 
hese  customs,  contrasting  sharply  with  the  domes^ tic  an- 
archy of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  have  had  a  mighty  influ- 
encein  fashioning  the  character  of  the  French,  as  of  the 
other  Latin  peoples,  to  a  ductility  that  yields  a  ready  obe- 
dience to  loPcal  officials,  drill-sergeants,  and  the  central 

G7neontheernr;spects  Bonaparte's  influence  on  the  code  was 
eaually  potent       He   raised   the  age  at  which  marriage 
could  Legally  contracted  to  that  of  eighteen  for  men 
and  fifteen  for  women,  and   he  prescribed  a  formula   o 
obedience  to  be  repeated  by  the  bride  to  her  husband; 
whU     the  latter  Z  bound  to  protect  and   support   the 


wife.2 


And  yet,  on  the  question  of  divorce,  Bonaparte^  action 
wat  sufficiently  ambiguous  to  reawaken  Josephine's  fears ; 
Ti   he  detractors  of  the  great  man  have ;--e  ground  fo 
declaring  that  his  action  herein  was  dictated  by  personal 

we  have  his  ideas  on  a  sound,  useful  education  ^  gwta .         •  rf 

begin  with  religion  in  all  its  seventy.     D ^,n^dmlt  any  mo 
this.     Religion  is  very  important  ma  girls  public  school  «  nQt 

guarantee  for  mothers  and  husbands  7..^  the  unsteadiness  of  their 
feasoners.  The  weakness  of  JJ*^""*  n^Vof  con  tant  resigna- 
ideas,  their  function  in  the  social  order, their  neea  oi  attained 

tion  and  of  a  kind  of  indulgent  and  easy  oh anty  -  all  car ^  no 

bv  religion."     They  were  to  learn  a  little  geograpny  ami  mot    j, 
foyrefgng language  ;  above  all,  to  do  plenty  of  needlework. 


xn  THE  CODE   NAPOLEON  269 

considerations.  Others  again  may  point  to  the  declara- 
tions of  the  French  National  Assemblies  that  the  law 
regarded  marriage  merely  as  a  civil  contract,  and  that 
divorce  was  to  be  a  logical  sequel  of  individual  liberty, 
"  which  an  indissoluble  tie  would  annul."  It  is  indisputa- 
ble that  extremely  lax  customs  had  been  the  result  of  the 
law  of  1792,  divorce  being  allowed  on  a  mere  declaration 
of  incompatibility  of  temper.1  Against  these  scandals 
Bonaparte  firmly  set  his  face.  But  he  disagreed  with  the 
framers  of  the  new  Code  when  they  proposed  altogether 
to  prohibit  divorce,  though  such  a  proposition  might  well 
have  seemed  consonant  with  his  zeal  for  Roman  Catholi- 
cism. After  long  debates  it  was  decided  to  reduce  the 
causes  which  could  render  divorce  possible  from  nine  to 
four  —  adultery,  cruelty,  condemnation  to  a  degrading 
penalty,  and  mutual  consent  —  provided  that  this  last 
demand  should  be  persistently  urged  after  not  less  than 
two  years  of  marriage,  and  in  no  case  was  it  to  be  valid 
after  twenty  years  of  marriage.2 

We  may  also  notice  here  that  Bonaparte  sought  to  sur- 
round the  act  of  adoption  with  much  solemnity,  declaring 
it  to  be  one  of  the  grandest  acts  imaginable.  Yet,  lest 
marriage  should  thereby  be  discouraged,  celibates  were 
expressly  debarred  from  the  privileges  of  adopting  heirs. 
The  precaution  shows  how  keenly  this  able  ruler  peered 
into  the  future.  Doubtless,  he  surmised  that  in  the  future 
the  population  of  France  could  cease  to  expand  at  the  nor- 
mal rate,  owing  to  the  working  of  the  law  compelling  the 
equal  division  of  property  among  all  the  children  of  a 
family.  To  this  law  he  was  certainly  opposed.  Equality 
in  regard  to  the  bequest  of  propert}^  was  one  of  the  sacred 
maxims  of  revolutionary  jurists,  who  had  limited  the  right 
of  free  disposal  by  bequest  to  one-tenth  of  each  estate : 
nine-tenths  being  of  necessity  divided  equally  among  the 
direct  heirs.  Yet  so  strong  was  the  reaction  in  favour  of 
the  Roman  principle  of  paternal  authority,  that  Bonaparte 
and  a  majority  of  the  drafters  of  the  new  Code  scrupled 
not  to  assail  that  maxim,  and  to  claim  for  the  father  larger 
discretionary  powers  over   the  disposal  of   his   property. 


1  Sagnac,  "  Legislation  civile  de  la  Re>.  Fr.,"  p.  293. 

2  Divorce  was  suppressed  in  1816,  but  was  re-established  in  1884. 


270  THE  LIFE  OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

They  demanded  that  the  disposable  share  should  vary 
according  to  the  wealth  of  the  testator  — a  remarkable 
proposal,  which  proves  him  to  be  anything  but  the  un- 
flinching champion  of  revolutionary  legal  ideas  which 
popular  French  histories  have  generally  depicted  him. 

This   proposal   would    have    re-established    liberty   of 
bequest  in  its  most  pernicious  form,  granting  almost  limit- 
less discretionary  power  to  the  wealthy,  while  restricting 
or  denying  it  to  the  poor.1     Fortunately  for  his  reputation 
in  France,  the  suggestion  was  rejected ;    and  the  law,  as 
finally  adopted,  fixed  the  disposable  share  as  one-fourth 
of  the  property  :  it  was  never  to  be  more  than  one-fourth, 
and  it   might   be   less   if    there   were   more   than  three 
children,  diminishing  as  the  size  of  the  family  increased. 
This  sliding  scale,  varying  inversely  with  the  size  of  the 
family,   is   open   to    an    obvious    objection:    it    granted 
liberty  of  bequest  only  in   cases  where   the   family  was 
small,  but   practically  lapsed   when  the   family  attained 
to  patriarchal  dimensions.     The  natural  result  has  been 
that  the  birth-rate  has  suffered  a  serious  and  prolonged 
check  in  France.     It  seems  certain  that  the  First  Consul 
foresaw  this  result.     His  experience  of  peasant  life  must 
have  warned   him   that   the  law,  even  as  now  amended, 
would   stunt   the   population   of   France   and   ultimately 
bring  about  that  okiyavdptoiria  which  saps  all  great  mili- 
tary enterprises.     The  great  captain  did  all  in  his  power 
to  prevent  the  French  settling  down  in  a  self-contained 
national   life;    he  strove  to  stir  them  up  to  world-wide 
undertakings,  and  for  the  success  of  his  future  imperial 
schemes  a  redundant  population  was  an  absolute  necessity. 
The  Civil  Code  became  law  in  1804 :  after  undergoing 
some  slight  modifications  and  additions,  it  was,  in  1807, 
renamed  the  Code  Napoleon.     Its  provisions  had  already, 
in  1806,  been  adopted  in  Italy.     In  1810  Holland,  and  the 
newly-annexed    coast-line    of    the   North   Sea   as   far   as 
Hamburg,  and  even  Liibeck  on  the  Baltic,  received  it  as 
the  basis  of  their  laws,  as  did  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Berg 
in   1811.      Indirectly   it    has   also   exerted   an   immense 
influence   on   the   legislation   of    Central    and    Southern 
Germany,  Prussia,  Switzerland,  and  Spain:   while  many 

1  Sagnac,  op.  crt.,  p.  362. 


XII 


EDUCATION  271 


of  the  Central  and  South  American  States  have  also 
borrowed  its  salient  features. 

A  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  was  promulgated  in  France 
in  1806,  one  of  Commerce  in  1807,  of  "  Criminal  Instruc- 
tion "  in  1808,  and  a  Penal  Code  in  1810.  Except  that 
they  were  more  reactionary  in  spirit  than  the  Civil  Code, 
there  is  little  that  calls  for  notice  here,  the  Penal  Code 
especially  showing  little  advance  in  intelligence  or 
clemency  on  the  older  laws  of  France.  Even  in  1802, 
officials  favoured  severity  after  the  disorders  of  the  pre- 
ceding years.  When  Fox  and  Romilly  paid  a  visit  to 
Talleyrand  at  Paris,  they  were  informed  by  his  secretary 
that: 

"  In  his  opinion  nothing  could  restore  good  morals  and  order  in  the 
country  but '  la  roue  et  la  religion  de  nos  ancetres.'  He  knew,  he  said, 
that  the  English  did  not  think  so,  but  we  knew  nothing  of  the  people. 
Fox  was  deeply  shocked  at  the  idea  of  restoring  the  wheel  as  a  punish- 
ment in  France."  * 

This  horrible  punishment  was  not  actually  restored  :  but 
this  extract  from  Romilly's  diary  shows  what  was  the 
state  of  feeling  in  official  circles  at  Paris,  and  how  strong 
was  the  reaction  towards  older  ideas.  The  reaction  was 
unquestionably  emphasized  by  Bonaparte's  influence,  and 
it  is  noteworthy  that  the  Penal  and  other  Codes,  passed 
during  the  Empire,  were  more  reactionary  than  the  laws 
of  the  Consulate.  Yet,  even  as  First  Consul,  he  exerted 
an  influence  that  began  to  banish  the  customs  and  tradi- 
tions of  the  Revolution,  except  in  the  single  sphere  of 
material  interests  ;  and  he  satisfied  the  peasants'  love  of 
land  and  money  in  order  that  he  might  the  more  securely 
triumph  over  revolutionary  ideals  and  draw  France  insen- 
sibly back  to  the  age  of  Louis  XIV. 

While  the  legislator  must  always  keep  in  reserve  punish- 
ment as  the  ultima  ratio  for  the  lawless,  he  will  turn  by 
preference  to  education  as  a  more  potent  moralizing  agency; 
and  certainly  education  urgently  needed  Bonaparte's  at- 
tention. The  work  of  carrying  into  practice  the  grand  edu- 
cational aims  of  Condorcet  and  his  coadjutors  in  the  French 
Convention  was  enough  to  tax  the  energies  of  a  Hercules. 

1  "The  Life  of  Sir  S.  Romilly,"  vol.  i.,  p.  408. 


272 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


Those  ardent   reformers  did   little  more  than   clear   the 
ground  for  future  action :  they  abolished  the  old  monastic 
Snd  clerical  training,  and  declared  for  a  generous  system 
of  national  education  in  primary,  secondary,  and  advanced 
schools.     But  amid  strifes  and  bankruptcy  their  aims  re- 
mained unfulfilled.     In  1799  there  were  only  twenty-four 
elementary  schools  open  in  Paris,  with  a  total  attendance 
of  less  than  1,000  pupils  ;  and  in  rural  districts  matters 
were  equally  bad.    '  Indeed,  Lucien  Bonaparte   asserted 
that  scarcely  any  education  was  to  be  found  in  France. 
Exaggerated  though  this  statement   was,  in   relation  to 
secondary  and  advanced   education,  it   was  proximately 
true  of  the  elementary  schools.     The  revolutionists  had 
merely   traced   the   outlines   of   a   scheme:    it   remained 
for  the  First  Consul  to  fill  in  the  details,  or  to  leave  it 

The  result  can  scarcely  be  cited  as  a  proof  of  his  educa- 
tional zeal.     Elementary  schools  were  left  to  the  control 
and  supervision  of  the  communes  and  of  the  sousprejets, 
and  naturally  made  little   advance   amidst   an  apathetic 
population  and  under  officials  who  cared  not  to  press  on 
an  expensive  enterprise.     The  law  of  April  30th,  180^ 
however,  aimed  at   improving   the   secondary  education, 
which  the  Convention  had  attempted  to  give  in  its  ecoles 
centrales.     These  were  now  reconstituted  either  as  Scoles 
secondares  or  as  lycSes.     The  former  were  local  or  even 
private  institutions  intended  for  the  most  promising  pupils 
of  the  commune  or  group  of  communes  ;  while  the  lycfes, 
far  fewer  in  number,  were  controlled  directly  by  the  Gov- 
ernment.    In  both  of  these  schools  great  prominence  was 
given  to  the  exact  and  applied  sciences.     The  aim  of  the 
instruction  was  not  to  awaken  thought  and  develop  the 
faculties,  but  rather  to  fashion  able  breadwinners,  obedient 
citizens,  and  enthusiastic  soldiers.     The  training  was  ot 
an  almost  military  type,  the  pupils  being  regularly  drilled, 
while  the  lessons  began  and  ended  with  the  roll  ot  drums. 
The  numbers  of  the  lycSes  and  of  their  pupils  rapidly  in- 
creased ;  but  the  progress  of  the  secondary  and  primary 
schools,  which  could  boast  no  such  attractions,  was  very 
slow      In  1806  only  25,000  children  were  attending  the 
public  primary  schools.     But  two  years  later  elementary 


xii  EDUCATION  273 

and  advanced  instruction  received  a  notable  impetus  from 
the  establishment  of  the  University  of  France. 

There  is  no  institution  which  better  reveals  the  char- 
acter of  the  French  Emperor,  with  its  singular  combina- 
tion of  greatness  and  littleness,  of  wide-sweeping  aims 
with  official  pedantry.  The  University,  as  it  existed 
during  the  First  Empire,  offers  a  striking  example  of  that 
mania  for  the  control  of  the  general  will  which  philoso- 
phers had  so  attractively  taught  and  Napoleon  so  profitably 
practised.  It  is  the  first  definite  outcome  of  a  desire  to 
subject  education  and  learning  to  wholesale  regimental 
methods,  and  to  break  up  the  old-world  bowers  of  culture 
by  State-worked  steam-ploughs.  His  aims  were  thus  set 
forth  : 

"  I  want  a  teaching  body,  because  such  a  body  never  dies,  but 
transmits  its  organization  and  spirit.  I  want  a  body  whose  teaching 
is  far  above  the  fads  of  the  moment,  goes  straight  on  even  when  the 
government  is  asleep,  and  whose  administration  and  statutes  be- 
come so  national  that  one  can  never  lightly  resolve  to  meddle  with 
them.  .  .  .  There  will  never  be  fixity  in  politics  if  there  is  not  a 
teaching  body  with  fixed  principles.  As  long  as  people  do  not  from 
their  infancy  learn  whether  they  ought  to  be  republicans  or  monarch- 
ists, Catholics  or  sceptics,  the  State  will  never  form  a  nation  :  it  will 
rest  on  unsafe  and  shifting  foundations,  always  exposed  to  changes 
and  disorders." 

Such  being  Napoleon's  designs,  the  new  University  of 
France  was  admirably  suited  to  his  purpose.  It  was  not 
a  local  university:  it  was  the  sum  total  of  all  the  public 
teaching  bodies  of  the  French  Empire,  arranged  and 
drilled  in  one  vast  instructional  array.  Elementary 
schools,  secondary  schools,  lycSes,  as  well  as  the  more 
advanced  colleges,  all  were  absorbed  in  and  controlled 
by  this  great  teaching  corporation,  which  was  to  incul- 
cate the  precepts  of  the  Catholic  religion,  fidelity  to  the 
Emperor  and  to  his  Government,  as  guarantees  for  the 
welfare  of  the  people  and  the  unity  of  France.  For 
educational  purposes,  France  was  now  divided  into  sev- 
enteen Academies,  which  formed  the  local  centres  of  the 
new  institution.  Thus,  from  Paris  and  sixteen  provin- 
cial Academies, .  instruction  was  strictly  organized  and 
controlled ;  and  within  a  short  time  of  its  institution 
(March,  1808),  instruction  of  all  kinds,  including  that  of 


274  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  elementary  schools,  showed  some  advance.     But  to 
aU  thosTwhoVok  on  the  unfolding  of  the  mental  and 
moral  faculties  as  the  chief  aim  of  true  education,  the 
homely Txpe iments  of  Pestalozzi  offer  a  far  more  sugges- 
tiv^  and  important  field  for  observation  than  the  barrack- 
k   method  of  the  French  Emperor.    The  Swiss  re  ormer 
sought  to  train  the  mind  to  observe,  reflect,  and  think  , 
to  aXist the  faculties  in  attaining  their  fullest  and  freest 
expre  sion ;  and  thus  to  add  to  the  richness  and  variety 
X^  though     The  French  imperial  system ^ough 
to  prune  away  all  mental  independence,  and  to  tiain  the 
voung  generation  in  neat  and  serviceable  espaher  meth- 
SeTXspixing  shoots,  especially  in  the  sphere  of  moral 
and   political   science,  were   sharply  cut   down.     Oon.e 
nuentlv    French    thought,    which    had    been    the    most 
■ffly  speculative   in   Europe,  speedily  became  vapid 

a^hTstmfremark  is  proximately  true  «**™W 
life  of  the  First  Empire.     It  soon  began  to  feel  the  rigm- 
ous  methods  of  the  femperor     Poetry  and  jU^  ™£ 
nf  expression  of  lofty  thought  and  rapt  feeling  require 
not  onlv  a  free  outlet  but  natural  and  unrestrained  sur- 
roLdinygsa     The  true  poet  is  at  home  in  the  forest ^ ^on 
the  mountain  rather  than  in  prim  parterres,      the  philos 
opLTseef  most  clearly  and  reasons  most  suggesUve y 
when  his  faculties  are  not  cramped  by  the  need L  of  observ 
ing  political  rules  and  police  regulations.     And  the  h* 
torian  when  he  is  tied  down  to  a  mere  investigation  and 
rec Sal  of  facts,  without  reference  to  their  meaning,  is  but 
a  sony  fowl  flapping  helplessly  with  ^™ftjXrat«re 
Yet  such  were  the  conditions  under  which  the  literature 
of  France  struggled  and  pined.     Her  poets,  a  band  sadly 
?hinned  alreadf by  the  guillotine,  sang  in £«£«£*£ 
low  strains  until  the  return  of  royalism  bega an  impenal 
ist  fervour  in  the  soul-stirring  lyrics  of  Beranger .    ner 
philosophy  was  dumb;    and   Napoleonic   history  limped 
Song  on  official  crutches,  until  Thiers,  a  generation  later 
essafed  his  monumental  work.     In  the  realm  of  exact  and 
applied  science,  as  might  be  expected  splendi ^  discov^- 
ies  adorned  the  Emperor's  reign;  but  if  we  are  to  nnu 
any  vSy  in  the  literature  of  that  period,  we  must  go 


in  THE   NEW   INSTITUTIONS   OF   FRANCE  275 

to  the  ranks,  not  of  the  panegyrists,  but  of  the  opposi- 
tion. There,  in  the  pages  of  Madame  de  Stael  and  Cha- 
teaubriand, we  feel  the  throb  of  life.  Genius  will  out, 
of  its  own  native  force :  but  it  cannot  be  pressed  out, 
even  at  a  Napoleon's  bidding.  In  vain  did  he  endeavour 
to  stimulate  literature  by  the  reorganization  of  the  Insti- 
tute, and  by  granting  decennial  prizes  for  the  chief  works 
and  discoveries  of  the  decade.  While  science  prospered, 
literature  languished :  and  one  of  his  own  remarks,  as  to 
the  desirability  of  a  public  and  semi-official  criticism  of 
some  great  literary  work,  seems  to  suggest  a  reason  for 
this  intellectual  malaise : 

"  The  public  will  take  interest  in  this  criticism ;  perhaps  it  will 
even  take  sides :  it  matters  not,  as  its  attention  will  be  fixed  on  these 
interesting  debates :  it  will  talk  about  grammar  and  poetry :  taste 
will  be  improved,  and  our  aim  will  be  fulfilled :  out  of  that  will  come 
poets  and  grammarians." 

And  so  it  came  to  pass  that,  while  he  was  rescuing  a 
nation  from  chaos  and  his  eagles  winged  their  flight  to 
Naples,  Lisbon,  and  Moscow,  he  found  no  original  thinker 
worthily  to  hymn  his  praises ;  and  the  chief  literary  tri- 
umphs of  his  reign  came  from  Chateaubriand,  whom  he 
impoverished,  and  Madame  de  Stael,  whom  he  drove  into 
exile. 

Such  are  the  chief  laws  and  customs  which  are  imperish- 
ably  associated  with  the  name  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  In 
some  respects  they  may  be  described  as  making  for  prog- 
ress. Their  establishment  gave  to  the  Revolution  that 
solidity  which  it  had  previously  lacked.  Among  so  "  in- 
flammable "  a  people  as  the  French  —  the  epithet  is  Ste. 
Beuve's  —  it  was  quite  possible  that  some  of  the  chief  civil 
conquests  of  the  last  decade  might  have  been  lost,  had  not 
the  First  Consul,  to  use  his  own  expressive  phrase,  "  thrown 
in  some  blocks  of  granite."  We  may  intensify  his  meta- 
phor and  assert  that  out  of  the  shifting  shingle  of  French 
life  he  constructed  a  concrete  breakwater,  in  which  his 
own  will  acted  as  the  binding  cement,  defying  the  storms 
of  revolutionary  or  royalist  passion  which  had  swept  the 
incoherent  atoms  to  and  fro,  and  had  carried  desolation 


276  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

far  inland.     Thenceforth  France  was  able  to  work  out  her 
future  under  the  shelter  of  institutions  which  ^question- 
ably possess  one  supreme  merit,  that  of  durabi l  ity.     But 
whilePthe  chief  civic  and  material  gains  of  the  Revolution 
were  thus  perpetuated,  the  very  spirit  and  life  of  that 
great  movement  were  benumbed  by  the  personality  and 
action  of   Napoleon.       The  burning  enthusiasm  for  the 
Rights  of  Man  was  quenched,  the  passion  for  civic  equality 
survived  only  as  the  gibbering  ghost  of  what  it  had  been  in 
1790  and  the  consolidation  of  revolutionary  France  was 
effected  by  a  process  nearly  akin  to  petrifaction. 

And  yetythisP  time  of  political  and  'intellectual  reaction 
in  France  was  marked  by  the  rise  of  the  greatest  of  her 
modern  institutions.     There  is  the  chief  paradox  of  that 
age.     While  barren  of  literary  activity  and  of  truly  civic 
developments,  yet  it  was  unequalled  in  the  growth  of  m- 
sSJns.     This  is  generally  the  characteristic  of  epochs 
when  the  human  faculties,  long  congealed  by  untowaid 
restraints,  suddenly  burst  their  barriers  and  run  not  m 
a  spring-tide  of  hope.     The  time  of  disillusionment  01 
despair  which  usually  supervenes  may,  as  a  rule,  be  com- 
pared with  the  numbing  torpor  of  winter,  necessary  doubt- 
Fess  in  our  human  economy,  but  poking,  the  charm  and 
vitality  of  the  expansive  phase.     Often,  indeed,  it  is  dis 
gracedV  the  characteristics  of  a  slavish  populace,  a  mean 
Slmes^,  a  mad  frivolity,  and  fawning ;  adula  ion  on  the 
ruler  who  dispenses  partem  et  cireenses.     Such  has  been  the 
course  of  many  a  political  reaction,  from  the  time  of  degen- 
erate Athens  and  imperial  Rome  down  to  the  dec «y  of 
Medicean  Florence  and  the  orgies  of  the  restored  Stuarts 
The  fruitfulness  of  the  time  of  monarchical  reaction  in 
France  may  be  chiefly  attributed  to  two  causes,  the  one 
general,  the  other  personal ;   the  one  connected  with  the 
French  Revolution,  the  other  with  the  exceptional  gifts  of 
Bonaparte.     In  their  efforts  to  create  durable  ^Ututions 
the  revolutionists  had    failed  :    they  had   attempted  too 
much  :  they  had  overthrown  the  old  order,  had  undertaken 
crusades  against  monarchical  Europe,  and  striven  tc .manu- 
facture constitutions  and  remodel  a  deeply  agitated  society. 
They   did  scarcely  more  than  trace  the  outlines ,  of  the 
future  social  structure.     The  edifice,  which  should  have 


xii  THE   NEW   INSTITUTIONS   OF  FRANCE  277 

been  reared  by  the  Directory,  was  scarcely  advanced  at  all, 
owing  to  the  singular  dulness  of  the  new  rulers  of  France. 
But  the  genius  was  at  hand.  He  restored  order,  he  rallied 
various  classes  to  his  side,  he  methodized  local  government, 
he  restored  finance  and  credit,  he  restored  religious  peace 
and  yet  secured  the  peasants  in  their  tenure  of  the  confis- 
cated lands,  he  rewarded  merit  with  social  honours,  and 
finally  he  solidified  his  polity  by  a  comprehensive  code  of 
laws  which  made  him  the  keystone  of  the  now  rounded  arch 
of  French  life. 

His  methods  in  this  immense  work  deserve  attention  : 
they  were  very  different  from  those  of  the  revolutionary 
parties  after  the  best  days  of  1789  were  past.  The  fol- 
lowers of  Rousseau  worked  on  rigorous  a  priori  methods. 
If  institutions  and  sentiments  did  not  square  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  their  master,  they  were  swept  away  or  were  forced 
into  conformity  with  the  new  evangel.  A  correct  know- 
ledge of  the  "  Contrat  Social "  and  keen  critical  powers 
were  the  prime  requisites  of  Jacobinical  statesmanship. 
Knowledge  of  the  history  of  France,  the  faculty  of  gauging 
the  real  strength  of  popular  feelings,  tact  in  conciliating 
important  interests,  all  were  alike  despised.  Institutions 
and  class  interests  were  as  nothing  in  comparison  with  that 
imposing  abstraction,  the  general  will.  For  this  alone 
could  philosophers  legislate  and  factions  conspire. 

From  these  lofty  aims  and  exasperating  methods  Bona- 
parte was  speedily  weaned.  If  victorious  analysis  led  to 
this  ;  if  it  could  only  pull  down,  not  reconstruct ;  if,  while 
legislating  for  the  general  will  Jacobins  harassed  one  class 
after  another  and  produced  civil  war,  then  away  with  their 
pedantries  in  favour  of  the  practical  statecraft  which 
attempted  one  task  at  a  time  and  aimed  at  winning  back 
in  turn  the  alienated  classes.  Then,  and  then  alone,  after 
civic  peace  had  been  re-established,  would  he  attempt  the 
reconstruction  of  the  civil  order  in  the  same  tentative 
manner,  taking  up  only  this  or  that  frayed  end  at  once, 
trusting  to  time,  skill,  and  patience  to  transform  the  tangle 
into  a  symmetrical  pattern.  And  thus,  where  Feuillants, 
Girondins,  and  Jacobins  had  produced  chaos,  the  practical 
man  and  his  able  helpers  succeeded  in  weaving  ineffaceable 
outlines.     As  to  the  time  when  the  change  took  place  in 


278  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xii 

Bonaparte's  brain  from  Jacobinism  to  aims  and  methods 
that  may  be  called  conservative,  we  are  strangely  ignorant. 
But  the  results  of  this  mental  change  will  stand  forth  clear 
and  solid  for  many  a  generation  in  the  customs,  laws,  and 
institutions  of  his  adopted  country.  If  the  Revolution, 
intellectually  considered,  began  and  ended  with  analysis, 
Napoleon's  faculties  supplied  the  needed  synthesis.  To- 
gether they  made  modern  France. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  CONSULATE  FOR  LIFE 

With  the  view  of  presenting  in  clear  outlines  the  chief 
institutions  of  Napoleonic  France,  they  have  been  described 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  detached  from  their  political 
setting.  We  now  return  to  consider  the  events  which 
favoured  the  consolidation  of  Bonaparte's  power. 

No  politician  inured  to  the  tricks  of  statecraft  could 
more  firmly  have  handled  public  affairs  than  the  man  who 
practically  began  his  political  apprenticeship  at  Brumaire. 
Without  apparent  effort  he  rose  to  the  height  whence  the 
five  Directors  had  so  ignominiously  fallen  ;  and  instinc- 
tively he  chose  at  once  the  policy  which  alone  could  have 
insured  rest  for  France,  that  of  balancing  interests  and 
parties.  His  own  political  views  being  as  yet  unknown, 
dark  with  the  excessive  brightness  of  his  encircling  glory, 
he  could  pose  as  the  conciliator  of  contending  factions. 
The  Jacobins  were  content  when  they  saw  the  regicide 
Cambaceres  become  Second  Consul ;  and  friends  of  con- 
stitutional monarchy  remembered  that  the  Third  Consul, 
Lebrun,  had  leanings  towards  the  Feuillants  of  1791. 
Fouche  at  the  inquisitorial  Ministry  of  Police,  and  Merlin, 
Berlier,  Real,  and  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe  in  the  Council  of 
State  seemed  a  barrier  to  all  monarchical  schemes  ;  and 
the  Jacobins  therefore  remained  quiet,  even  while  Catholic 
worship  was  again  publicly  celebrated,  while  Vendean 
rebels  were  pardoned,  and  plotting  Smigres  were  entering 
the  public  service. 

Many,  indeed,  of  the  prominent  terrorists  had  settled 
profitably  on  the  offices  which  Bonaparte  had  multiplied 
throughout  France,  and  were  therefore  dumb  :  but  some 
of  the  less  favoured  ones,  angered  by  the  stealthy  advance 
of  autocracy,  wove  a  plot  for  the  overthrow  of  the  First 
Consul.     Chief  among  them  were  a  braggart  named  De- 

279 


280 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chaj. 


merville,  a  painter,  Topino  Lebrun   a  sculptor   Ceracchi 
and  Arena,  brother  of  the  Corsican  deputy  who  had  shaken 
Bonaparte  by  the  collar  at  the  crisis  of  Brumaire.     These 
men  hit  upon  the  notion  that,  with  the  aid  of  one  man  of 
action,  they  could  make  away  with  the  new  despot.     Ihey 
opened  their  hearts  to  a  penniless  officer  named  Harel,  who 
had  been  dismissed  from  the  army  ;  and  he  straightway 
took  the  news  to  Bonaparte's  private  secretary,  Bourrienne. 
The  First  Consul,  on  hearing  of  the  matter,  at  once  charged 
Bourrienne  to  supply  Harel  with  money  to  buy  firearms, 
but  not  to  tell  the  secret  to  Fouche,  of  whose  double  deal- 
ings with  the  Jacobins  he  was  already  aware.     It  became 
neldful,  however,  to  inform  him  of  the  plot,  which  was 
now  carefully  nursed  by  the  authorities.     The  arrests  were 
planned  to  take  place  at  the  opera  on  October  10th.    About 
half  an  hour  after  the  play  had  begun,  Bonaparte  bade  his 
secretary  go  into  the  lobby  to  hear  the  news.     Bourrienne 
at  once  heard  the  noise  caused  by  a  number  of  arrests  :  he 
came  back,  reported  the  matter  to  his  master,  who  forth- 
with  returned  to  the  Tuileries.     The  plot  was  over. 

A  more  serious  attempt  was  to  follow.     On  the  drd  day 
of  Nivose  (December  24th,  1800),  as  the  Hirst  Consul  was 
driving  to  the  opera  to  hear  Haydn's  oratorio,  "The  Crea- 
tion," his  carriage  was  shaken  by  a  terrific  e^P1(lS1?^-     ,-f 
bomb  had  burst  between  his  carriage  and  that  ot  J  osepn- 
ine,  which  was  following.     Neither  was  injured,  though 
many  spectators  were  killed  or  wounded.     "Josephine, 
he  calmly  said,  as  she   entered  the  box,  "those   rascals 
wanted  to  blow  me  up  :  send  for  a  copy  of  the  music. 
But  under  this  cool  demeanour  he  nursed  a  determination 
of  vengeance  against  his  political  foes,  the  Jacobins.     On 

i  Madelin  in  his  «Fouch6,"  ch.  xi.,  shows  how  3°™^^™*? 

trous  literary  flatterer,  the  poet  Fontanes,  celebrated  the      discovery 
of  the  Arena  plot  by  publishing  anonymously  a  pamphlet  (    A  Parallel 
between  <£?a?  Cromwell,  Monk,  and  Bonaparte")  in  which  he  decided 
{K^one^'cSS  deserved  the  honour  of  a  comparison  with  Bona- 
Pane  an°S  thatertain  destinies  were  summoning  "m  to  ft  ye^^Uto 

L^hM^^^^ 

to  Madrid  as  a  punishment  for  his  ill-timed  suggestions. 


xni  THE   CONSULATE  FOR  LITE  281 

the  next  day  he  appeared  at  a  session  of  the  Council  of 
State  along  with  the  Ministers  of  Police  and  of  the  In- 
terior, Fouche  and  Chaptal.  The  Arena  plot  and  other 
recent  events  seemed  to  point  to  wild  Jacobins  and  anar- 
chists as  the  authors  of  this  outrage  :  but  Fouche  ventured 
to  impute  it  to  the  royalists  and  to  England. 

"  There  are  in  it,"  Bonaparte  at  once  remarked,  "  neither  nobles, 
nor  Chouans,  nor  priests.  They  are  men  of  September  (Septembri- 
seurs),  wretches  stained  with  blood,  ever  conspiring  in  solid  phalanx 
against  every  successive  government.  We  must  find  a  means  of 
prompt  redress." 

The  Councillors  at  once  adopted  this  opinion,  Roederer 
hotly  declaring  his  open  hostility  to  Fouche  for  his  re- 
puted complicity  with  the  terrorists  ;  and,  if  we  may 
credit  the  on  dit  of  Pasquier,  Talleyrand  urged  the  exe- 
cution of  Fouche  within  twenty-four  hours.  Bonaparte, 
however,  preferred  to  keep  the  two  cleverest  and  most 
questionable  schemers  of  the  age,  so  as  mutually  to  check 
each  other's  movements.  A  day  later,  when  the  Council 
was  about  to  institute  special  proceedings,  Bonaparte 
again  intervened  with  the  remark  that  the  action  of  the 
tribunal  would  be  too  slow,  too  restricted  :  a  signal  re- 
venge was  needed  for  so  foul  a  crime,  rapid  as  lightning : 

u  Blood  must  be  shed :  as  many  guilty  must  be  shot  as  the  inno- 
cent who  had  perished  —  some  fifteen  or  twenty  —  and  two  hundred 
banished,  so  that  the  Republic  might  profit  by  that  event  to  purge 
itself." 

This  was  the  policy  now  openly  followed.  In  vain  did 
some  members  of  the  usually  obsequious  Council  object 
to  this  summary  procedure.  Roederer,  Boulay,  even  the 
Second  Consul  himself,  now  perceived  how  trifling  was 
their  influence  when  they  attempted  to  modify  Bona- 
parte's plans,  and  two  sections  of  the  Council  speedily 
decided  that  there  should  be  a  military  commission  to 
judge  suspects  and  "deport"  dangerous  persons,  and 
that  the  Government  should  announce  this  to  the  Senate, 
Corps  Legislatif,  and  Tribunate.  Public  opinion,  mean- 
while, was  carefully  trained  by  the  official  "  Moniteur," 
which  described  in  detail  various  so-called  anarchist 
attempts ;  but   an   increasing   number   in   official   circles 


282  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

veered  round  to  Fouche's  belief  that  the  outrage  was  the 
work  of  the  royalists  abetted  by  England.  The  First 
Consul  himself,  six  days  after  the  event,  inclined  to  this 
version.  Nevertheless,  at  a  full  meeting  of  the  Council 
of  State,  on  the  tirst  day  of  the  year  1801,  he  brought 
up  a  list  of  "  130  villains  who  were  troubling  the  public 
peace,"  with  a  view  to  inflicting  summary  punishment  on 
them.  Thibaudeau,  Boulay,  and  Roederer  haltingly  ex- 
pressed their  fears  that  all  the  130  might  not  be  guilty 
of  the  recent  outrage,  and  that  the  Council  had  no 
powers  to  decide  on  the  proscription  of  individuals. 
Bonaparte  at  once  assured  them  that  he  was  not  consult- 
ing them  about  the  fate  of  individuals,  but  merely  to 
know  whether  they  thought  an  exceptional  measure 
necessary.     The  Government  had  only 

"Strong  presumptions,  not  proofs,  that  the  terrorists  were  the 
authors  of  this  attempt.  Chonannerie  and  emigration  are  surface  ills, 
terrorism  is  an  internal  disease.  The  measure  ought  to  be  taken  in- 
dependently of  the  event.  It  is  only  the  occasion  of  it.  We  banish 
them  (the  terrorists)  for  the  massacres  of  September  2nd,  May  31st, 
the  Babeuf  plot,  and  every  subsequent  attempt."1 

The  Council  thereupon  unanimously  affirmed  the  need  of 
an  exceptional  measure,  and  adopted  a  suggestion  of 
Talleyrand  (probably  emanating  from  Bonaparte)  that 
the  Senate  should  be  invited  to  declare  by  a  special  de- 
cision, called  a  senatus  consultum,  whether  such  an  act 
were  "preservative  of  the  constitution."  This  device, 
which  avoided  the  necessity  of  passing  a  law  through  two 
less  subservient  bodies,  the  Tribunate  and  Corps  Legis- 
latif,  was  forthwith  approved  by  the  guardians  of  the  con- 
stitution. It  had  far-reaching  results.  The  complaisant 
Senate  was  brought  down  from  its  constitutional  watch- 
tower  to  become  the  tool  of  the  Consuls  ;  and  an  easy 
way  for  further  innovations  was  thus  dextrously  opened 
up  through  the  very  portals  which  were  designed  to  bar 
them  out. 

The  immediate  results  of  the  device  were  startling.  By 
an  act  of  January  4th,  1801,  as  many  as  130  prominent 
Jacobins  were  "  placed  under  special  surveillance  outside 

1  Thibaudeau,  op.  efc'.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  55.     Miot  de  Melito,  ch.  xii. 


xiii  THE   CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  283 

the  European  territory  of  the  Republic"  —  a  specious 
phrase  for  denoting  a  living  death  amidst  the  wastes  of 
French  Guiana  or  the  Seychelles.  Some  of  the  threatened 
persons  escaped,  perhaps  owing  to  the  connivance  of 
Fouche  ;  some  were  sent  to  the  Isle  of  Oleron  ;  but  the 
others  were  forthwith  despatched  to  the  miseries  of  cap- 
tivity in  the  tropics.  Among  these  were  personages  so 
diverse  as  Rossignol,  once  the  scourge  of  France  with  his 
force  of  Parisian  cut-throats,  and  Dustrem,  whose  crime 
was  his  vehement  upbraiding  of  Bonaparte  at  St.  Cloud. 
After  this  measure  had  taken  effect,  it  was  discovered  by 
judicial  inquiry  that  the  Jacobins  had  no  connection  with 
the  outrage,  which  was  the  work  of  royalists  named 
Saint-Rejant  and  Carbon.  These  were  captured,  and  on 
January  31st,  1801,  were  executed ;  but  their  fate  had  no 
influence  whatever  on  the  sentence  of  the  transported 
Jacobins.  Of  those  who  were  sent  to  Guiana  and  the 
Seychelles,  scarce  twenty  saw  France  again.1 

Bonaparte's  conduct  with  respect  to  plots  deserves  close 
attention.  Never  since  the  age  of  the  Borgias  have  con- 
spiracies been  so  skilfully  exploited,  so  cunningly  counter- 
mined. Moreover,  his  conduct  with  respect  to  the  Arena 
and  Nivose  affairs  had  a  wider  significance  ;  for  he  now 
quietly  but  firmly  exchanged  the  policy  of  balancing 
parties  for  one  which  crushed  the  extreme  republicans, 
and  enhanced  the  importance  of  all  who  were  likely  to 
approve  or  condone  the  establishment  of  personal  rule. 

It  is  now  time  to  consider  the  effect  which  Bonaparte's 
foreign  policy  had  on  his  position  in  France.  Reserving 
for  a  later  chapter  an  examination  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens, 
we  may  here  notice  the  close  connection  between  Bonaparte's 
diplomatic  successes  and  the  perpetuation  of  his  Consulate. 


1  It  seems  clear,  from  the  evidence  so  frankly  given  by  Cadondal  in  his 
trial  in  1804,  as  well  as  from  his  expressions  when  he  heard  of  the  affair  of 
Niv6se,  that  the  hero  of  the  Chouans  had  no  part  in  the  bomb  affair.  He 
had  returned  to  France,  had  empowered  St.  Recant  to  buy  arms  and 
horses,  "  dont  je  me  servirai  plus  tard  "  ;  and  it  seems  certain  that  he  in- 
tended to  form  a  band  of  desperate  men  who  were  to  waylay,  kidnap,  or 
kill  the  First  Consul  in  open  fight.  This  plan  was  deferred  by  the  bomb 
explosion  for  three  years.     As  soon  as  he  heard  of  this  event,  he  exclaimed  : 

"I'll  bet  that  it  was  that St.  Recant,      lie  has  upset  all  my  plans." 

(See  "  Georges  Cadoudal,"  par  G.  de  Cadoudal.) 


284 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


All  thoughtful  students  of  history  must  have  observed 
the  warping  influence  which  war  and  diplomacy  have 
exerted  on  democratic  institutions.  The  age  of  Alcibia- 
des,  the  doom  of  the  Roman  Republic,  and  many  other 
examples  might  be  cited  to  show  that  free  institutions  can 
with  difficulty  survive  the  strain  of  a  vast  military  organ- 
ization or  the  insidious  results  of  an  exacting  diplomacy. 
But  never  has  the  gulf  between  democracy  and  personal 
rule  been  so  quickly  spanned  as  by  the  commanding  genius 
of  Bonaparte. 

The  events  which  disgusted  both  England  and  h  ranee 
with  war  have  been  described   above.     Each   antagonist 
had  parried  the  attacks  of  the  other.     The   blow  which 
Bonaparte  had  aimed  at  Britain's  commerce  by  his  eastern 
expedition  had  been   foiled;  and  a  considerable  trench 
force  was  shut  up  in  Egypt.     His  plan  of  relieving  his 
starving  garrison  in  Malta  by  concluding  a  maritime  truce 
had  been  seen  through  by  us  ;    and  after  a  blockade  of 
two  years,  Valetta   fell    (September,    1800).     But  while 
Great  Britain  regained  more  than  all  her  old  power  in  the 
Mediterranean,  she  failed  to  make  any  impression  on  the 
land-power  of  France.     The  First  Consul  in  the  year  1801 
compelled  Naples  and  Portugal  to  give  up  the   English 
alliance  and  to  exclude  our  vessels   and   goods.     In   the 
north  the  results  of  the  war  had  been   in  favour   ot  the 
islanders.     The  Union  Jack  again  waved  triumphant  on 
the  Baltic,  and  all  attempts  of  the  French  to  rouse   and 
support   an    Irish   revolt   had    signally  failed.     Yet  _  the 
French  preparations  for  an  invasion  of  England  strained 
the  resources  of  our  exchequer  and  the  patience  of  our 
people.     The  weary  struggle  was  evidently  about  to  close 

in  a  stalemate.  D 

For  political  and  financial  reasons  the  two  Fowers 
needed  repose.  Bonaparte's  authority  was  not  as  yet  so 
firmly  founded  that  he  could  afford  to  neglect  the  silent 
longings  of  France  for  peace  ;  his  institutions  had  not  as 
Vet  taken  root  ;  and  he  needed  money  for  public  works 
and  colonial  enterprises.  That  he  looked  on  peace  as  tar 
more  desirable  for  France  than  for  England  at  the  present 
time  is  clear  from  a  confidential  talk  which  he  had  with 
Roederer  at  the  close  of  1800.     This  bright  thinker,  to 


xni  THE   CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  285 

whom  he  often  unbosomed  himself,  took  exception  to  his 
remark  that  England  could  not  wish  for  peace  ;  where- 
upon the  First  Consul  uttered  these  memorable  words  : 

"  My  dear  fellow,  England  ought  not  to  wish  for  peace,  because  we 
are  masters  of  the  world.  Spain  is  ours.  We  have  a  foothold  in 
Italy.  In  Egypt  we  have  the  reversion  to  their  tenure.  Switzerland, 
Holland,  Belgium — that  is  a  matter  irrevocably  settled,  on  which  we 
have  declared  to  Prussia,  Russia,  and  the  Emperor  that  we  alone,  if  it 
were  necessary,  would  make  war  on  all,  namely,  that  there  shall  be  no 
Stadholder  in  Holland,  and  that  we  will  keep  Belgium  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine.  A  stadholder  in  Holland  would  be  as  bad  as  a 
Bourbon  in  the  St.  Antoine  suburb."  1 

The  passage  is  remarkable,  not  only  for  its  frank  state- 
ment of  the  terms  on  which  England  and  the  Continent 
might  have  peace,  but  also  because  it  discloses  the  rank 
undergrowth  of  pride  and  ambition  that  is  beginning  to 
overtop  his  reasoning  faculties.  Even  before  he  has 
heard  the  news  of  Moreau's  great  victory  of  Hohenlinden, 
he  equates  the  military  strength  of  France  with  that  of 
the  rest  of  Europe  :  nay,  he  claims  without  a  shadow  of 
doubt  the  mastery  of  the  world :  he  will  wage,  if  neces- 
sary, a  double  war,  against  England  for  a  colonial  empire, 
and  against  Europe  for  domination  in  Holland  and  the 
Rhineland.  It  is  naught  to  him  that  that  double  effort 
has  exhausted  France  in  the  reigns  of  Louis  XIV.  and 
Louis  XV.  Holland,  Switzerland,  Italy,  shall  be  French 
provinces,  Egypt  and  the  Indies  shall  be  her  satrapies, 
and  la  grande  nation  may  then  rest  on  her  glories. 

Had  these  aims  been  known  at  Westminster,  Ministers 
would  have  counted  peace  far  more  harmful  than  war. 
But,  while  ambition  reigned  at  Paris,  dull  common  sense 
dictated  the  policy  of  Britain.  In  truth,  our  people 
needed  rest :  we  were  in  the  first  stages  of  an  industrial 
revolution  :  our  cotton  and  woollen  industries  were  pass- 
ing from  the  cottage  to  the  factory ;  and  a  large  part  of 
our  folk  were  beginning  to  cluster  in  grimy,  ill-organized 
townships.  Population  and  wealth  advanced  by  leaps 
and  bounds  ;  but  with  them  came  the  nineteenth-century 
problems  of  widening  class  distinctions  and  uncertainty  of 

1  Roederer,  "  QSuvres,"  vol.  iii. ,  p.  352.  For  these  negotiations  see  Bow- 
man's "Preliminary  Stages  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  "  (Toronto,  1899). 


286 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


employment.  The  food-supply  was  often  inadequate,  and 
in  1801  the  price  of  wheat  in  the  London  market  ranged 
from  £6  to  X 8  the  quarter;  the  quartern  loaf  selling  at 
times  for  as  much  as  Is.  lO^d.1 

The  state  of  the  sister  island  was  even  worse,     lhe  dis- 
content of  Ireland  had  been  crushed  by  the  severe  repres- 
sion which  followed  the  rising  of  1798  ;    and  the  bonds 
connecting  the  two  countries  were  forcibly  tightened  by 
the  Act  of  Union  of  1800.       But  rest  and  reform  were 
urgently  needed  if  this  political  welding  was  to  acquire 
solid  strength,  and  rest  and  reform  were  alike  denied. 
The  position  of  the  Ministry  at  Westminster  was  also  pre- 
carious.    The  opposition  of  George  III.  to  the  proposals 
for  Catholic  Emancipation,  to  which  Pitt  believed  himself 
in  honour  bound,  led  to  the  resignation  in  February  1801, 
of  that  able  Minister.     In  the  following  month  Alding- 
ton, the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons,  with  the  com- 
placence born  of  bland  obtuseness,  undertook  to  till  his 
place.     At  first,  the  Ministry  was  treated  with  the  toler- 
ance due  to  the  new  Premier's  urbanity,  but  it  gradually 
faded  away  into  contempt  for  his  pitiful  weakness  in  face 
of  the  dangers  that  threatened  the  realm. 

Certain  unofficial  efforts  in  the  cause  of  peace  had  been 
made  during  the  year  1800,  by  a  Frenchman    M.  Otto 
who  had  been  charged  to  proceed  to  London  to  treat  with 
the  British  Government  for  the  exchange  of   prisoners. 
For  various  reasons  his  tentative  proposals  as  to  an  accom- 
modation between  the  belligerents  had  had  no  issue  :   but 
he  continued  to  reside  in  London,  and  quietly  sought  to 
bring  about  a  good  understanding.     The  accession  of  the 
Addington  Ministry  favoured  the  opening  of  negotiations, 
the  new  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Lord  Hawkesbury 
announcing  His  Majesty's  desire  for  peace      Indeed,  the 
one  hope  of  the  new  Ministry,  and  of  the  king  who  sup- 
ported it  as  the  only  alternative  to  Catholic  Emancipation, 
was  bound  up  with'  the  cause  of  peace.     In  the  next  chap- 
ter it  will  appear  how  disastrous  were  the  results  ot  that 
strange  political  situation,  when  a  morbidly  conscientious 
king  clung  to  the  weak  Addington,  and  jeopardized  the 

i  Porter,  "  Progress  of  the  Nation,"  ch.  xiv. 


xin  THE    CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  287 

interests  of  Britain,  rather  than  accept  a  strong  Minister 
and  a  measure  of  religious  equality. 

Napoleon  received  Hawkesbury's  first  overtures,  those 
of  March  21st,  1801,  with  thinly  veiled  scorn  ;  but  the 
news  of  Nelson's  victory  at  Copenhagen  and  of  the  assas- 
sination of  the  Czar  Paul,  the  latter  of  which  wrung  from 
him  a  cry  of  rage,  ended  his  hopes  of  crushing  us  ;  and 
negotiations  were  now  formally  begun.  On  the  14th  of 
April,  Great  Britain  demanded  that  the  French  should 
evacuate  Egypt,  while  she  herself  would  give  up  Minorca, 
but  retain  the  following  conquests  :  Malta,  Tobago,  Mar- 
tinique, Trinidad,  Essequibo,  Demerara,  Berbice,  Ceylon, 
and  (a  little  later)  Curacoa  ;  while,  if  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  were  restored  to  the  Dutch,  it  was  to  be  a  free  port : 
an  indemnity  was  also  to  be  found  for  the  Prince  of  Orange 
for  the  loss  of  his  Netherlands.  These  claims  were  de- 
clared by  Bonaparte  to  be  inadmissible.  He  on  his  side 
urged  the  far  more  impracticable  demand  of  the  status  quo 
ante  helium  in  the  East  and  West  Indies  and  in  the  Medi- 
terranean ;  which  would  imply  the  surrender,  not  only  of 
our  many  naval  conquests,  but  also  of  our  gains  in  Hindo- 
stan  at  the  expense  of  the  late  Tippoo  Sahib's  dominions. 
In  the  ensuing  five  months  the  British  Government 
gained  some  noteworthy  successes  in  diplomacy  and  war. 
It  settled  the  disputes  arising  out  of  the  Armed  Neutrality 
League  ;  there  was  every  prospect  of  our  troops  defeating 
those  of  France  in  Egypt ;  and  our  navy  captured  St. 
Eustace  and  Saba  in  the  West  Indies. 

As  a  set-off  to  our  efforts  by  sea,  Bonaparte  instigated 
a  war  between  Spain  and  Portugal,  in  order  that  the 
latter  Power  might  be  held  as  a  "  guarantee  for  the  gen- 
eral peace."  Spain,  however,  merely  waged  a  "  war  of 
oranges,"  and  came  to  terms  with  her  neighbour  in  the 
Treaty  of  Badajoz,  June  6th,  1801,  whereby  she  gained 
the  small  frontier  district  of  Olivenza.  This  fell  far 
short  of  the  First  Consul's  intentions.  Indeed,  such  was 
his  annoyance  at  the  conduct  of  the  Court  of  Madrid  and 
the  complaisance  of  his  brother  Lucien  Bonaparte,  who 
was  ambassador  there,  that  he  determined  to  make  Spain 
bear  a  heavy  share  of  the  English  demands.  On  June 
22nd,  1801,  he  wrote  to  his  brother  at  Madrid : 


288  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

"  I  have  already  caused  the  English  to  be  informed  that  I  will 
never  depart,  as  regards  Portugal,  from  the  ulthr.itum  addressed  to 
M.  d'Araujo,  and  that  the  status  quo  ante  helium  for  Portugal  must 
amount,  for  Spain,  to  the  restitution  of  Trinidad ;  for  France,  to  the 
restitution  of  Martinique  and  Tobago;  and  for  Batavia  [Holland],  to 
that  of  Curacoa  and  some  other  small  American  isles."1 

In  other  words,  if  Portugal  at  the  close  of  this  whipped- 
up  war  retained  her  present  possessions,  then  England 
must  renounce  her  claims  to  Trinidad,  Martinique,  To- 
bago, Curagoa,  etc.  :  and  he  summed  up  his  contention 
in  the  statement  that  "  in  signing  this  treaty  Charles  IV. 
has  consented  to  the  loss  of  Trinidad."  Further  pressure 
on  Portugal  compelled  her  to  cede  part  of  Northern  Brazil 
to  France  and  to  pay  her  20,000,000  francs. 

A  still  more  striking  light  is  thrown  on  Bonaparte's 
diplomatic  methods  by  the  following  question,  addressed 
to  Lord  Hawkesbury  on  June  15th  : 

"  If,  supposing  that  the  French  Government  should  accede  to  the 
arrangements  proposed  for  the  East  Indies  by  England,  and  should 
adopt  the  status  quo  ante  helium  for  Portugal,  the  King  of  England 
would  consent  to  the  re-establishment  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  in  America." 

The  British  Minister  in  his  reply  of  June  25th  explained 
what  the  phrase  status  quo  ante  helium  in  regard  to  the 
Mediterranean  would  really  imply.  It  would  necessitate, 
not  merely  the  evacuation  of  Egypt  by  the  French,  but 
also  that  of  the  Kingdom  of  Sardinia  (including  Nice), 
the  Duchy  of  Tuscany,  and  the  independence  of  the  rest 
of  the  peninsula.  He  had  already  offered  that  we  should 
evacuate  Minorca  ;  but  he  now  stated  that,  if  France  re- 
tained her  influence  over  Italy,  England  would  claim 
Malta  as  a  set-off  to  the  vast  extension  of  French  terri- 
torial influence,  and  in  order  to  protect  English  commerce 
in  those  seas  :  for  the  rest,  the  British  Government  could 
not  regard  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  Portugal 
as  an  equivalent  to  the  surrender  by  Great  Britain  of  her 
West  Indian  conquests,  especially  as  France  had  acquired 
further  portions  of  Saint  Domingo.  Nevertheless  he 
offered  to  restore  Trinidad  to  Spain,  if  she  would  reinstate 

1 "  New  Letters  of  Napoleon  I."     See  too  his  letter  of  June  17th. 


xin  THE   CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  289 

Portugal  in  the  frontier  strip  of  Olivenza  ;  and,  on 
August  5th,  he  told  Otto  that  we  would  give  up  Malta 
if  it  became  independent. 

Meanwhile  events  were,  on  the  whole,  favourable  to 
Great  Britain.  She  made  peace  with  Russia  on  favour- 
able terms  ;  and  in  the  Mediterranean,  despite  a  first  suc- 
cess gained  by  the  French  Admiral  Linois  at  Algesiras,  a 
second  battle  brought  back  victory  to  the  Union  Jack. 
An  attack  made  by  Nelson  on  the  flotilla  at  Boulogne 
was  a  failure  (August  15th).  But  at  the  close  of  August 
the  French  commander  in  Egypt,  General  Menou,  was 
constrained  to  agree  to  the  evacuation  of  Egypt  by  his 
troops,  which  were  to  be  sent  back  to  France  on  English 
vessels.  This  event  had  been  expected  by  Bonaparte, 
and  the  secret  instruction  which  he  forwarded  to  Otto  at 
London  shows  the  nicety  of  his  calculation  as  to  the  ad- 
vantages to  be  reaped  by  France  owing  to  her  receiving 
the  news  while  it  was  still  unknown  in  England.  He 
ordered  Otto  to  fix  October  the  2nd  for  the  close  of  the 
negotiations  : 

"  You  will  understand  the  importance  of  this  when  you  reflect  that 
Menou  may  possibly  not  be  able  to  hold  out  in  Alexandria  beyond 
the  first  of  Vendemiaire  (September  22nd)  ;  that,  at  this  season,  the 
winds  are  fair  to  come  from  Egypt,  and  ships  reach  Italy  and  Trieste 
in  very  few  days.  Thus  it  is  necessary  to  push  them  [the  negotia- 
tions] to  a  conclusion  before  Vendemiaire  10." 

The  advantages  of  an  irresponsible  autocrat  in  negotiat- 
ing with  a  Ministry  dependent  on  Parliament  have  rarely 
been  more  signally  shown.  Anxious  to  gain  popularity, 
and  unable  to  stem  the  popular  movement  for  peace,  Al- 
dington and  Hawkesbury  yielded  to  this  request  for  a 
fixed  limit  of  time  ;  and  the  preliminaries  of  peace  were 
signed  at  London  on  October  1st,  1801,  the  very  day 
before  the  news  arrived  there  that  one  of  our  demands 
was  rendered  useless  by  the  actual  surrender  of  the  French 
in  Egypt.1 

1  "  Cornwallis  Correspondence,"  vol.  hi.,  pp.  380-382.  Few  records 
exist  of  the  negotiations  between  Lord  Hawkesbury  and  M.  Otto  at  Lon- 
don. I  have  found  none  in  the  Foreign  Office  archives.  The  general 
facts  are  given  by  Garden,  "TraiteV  vol.  vii.,  ch.  xxxi.  ;  only  a  few  of 
the  discussions  were  reduced  to  writing.  This  seriously  prejudiced  our 
interests  at  Amiens. 


290 


THE  LIFE  OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


The  chief  conditions  of  the  preliminaries  were  as  fol- 
lows :  Great  Britain  restored  to  France,  Spain,  and  the 
Batavian  Republic  all  their  possessions  and  colonies  re- 
cently conquered  by  her   except   Trinidad  and   Ceylon. 
The  Cape  of  Good  Hope  was  given  back  to  the  Dutch, 
but   remained   open   to   British    and   French   commerce. 
Malta  was  to  be  restored  to  the  Order  of  St.  John,  and 
placed   under   the   guarantee  and   protection  of   a  third 
Power  to  be  agreed  on  in  the  definitive  treaty.     Egypt 
returned  to  the  control  of  the  Sublime  Porte.     The  exist- 
ing possessions  of  Portugal  (that  is,  exclusive  of  Olivenza) 
were  preserved  intact.     The  French  agreed  to  loose  their 
hold  on  the  Kingdom  of  Naples  and  the  Roman  Territory  ; 
while  the  British  were   also  to   evacuate   Porto   Eerrajo 
(Elba)  and  the  other  ports  and  islands  which  they  held 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  Adriatic.     The  young  Republic 
of  the  Seven  Islands  (Ionian  Islands)  was  recognized  by 
France  :  and  the  fisheries  on  the  coasts  of  Newfoundland 
and  the  adjacent  isles  were  placed  on  their  former  footing, 
subject  to  "such  arrangements  as  shall  appear  just  and 
reciprocally  useful." 

It  was  remarked  as  significant  of  the  new  docility  ot 
George  III.,  that  the  empty  title  of  "King  of  France, 
which  he  and  his  predecessors  had  affected,  was  now  for- 
mally resigned,  and  theirs  de  ly%  ceased  to  appear  on  the 

royal  arms.  .     . 

Thus,  with  three  exceptions,  Great  Britain  had  given 
way  on  every  point  of  importance  since  the  first  declara- 
tion of  her  claims  ;  the  three  exceptions  were  Trinidad 
and  Ceylon,  which  she  gained  from  the  allies  of  trance  ; 
and  Egypt,  the  recovery  of  which  from  the  French  was 
already  achieved,  though  it  was  unknown  at  London. 
On  every  detail  but  these  Bonaparte  had  gained  a  signal 
diplomatic  success.  His  skill  and  tenacity  bade  fair  to 
recover  for  France,  Martinique,  Tobago,  and  Santa  Lucia, 
then  in  British  hands,  as  well  as  the  French  stations  in 
India.  The  only  British  gains,  after  nine  years  of  war- 
fare, fruitful  in  naval  triumphs,  but  entailing  an  addition 
of  £  290,000,000  to  the  National  Debt,  were  the  islands 
of  Trinidad  and  the  Dutch  possessions  in  Ceylon.  And 
yet  in  the  six  months  spent  in  negotiations  the  general 


xin  THE   CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  291 

course  of  events  had  been  favourable  to  the  northern 
Power.  What  then  had  been  lacking?  Certainly  not 
valour  to  her  warriors,  nor  good  fortune  to  her  flag  ;  but 
merely  brain  power  to  her  rulers.  They  had  little  of 
that  foresight,  skill,  and  intellectual  courage,  without 
which  even  the  exploits  of  a  Nelson  are  of  little  permanent 
effect. 

Reserving  for  treatment  in  the  next  chapter  the  ques- 
tions arising  from  these  preliminaries  and  the  resulting 
Peace  of  Amiens,  we  turn  now  to  consider  their  bearing 
on  Bonaparte's  position  as  First  Consul.  The  return  of 
peace  after  an  exhausting  war  is  always  welcome  ;  yet 
the  patriotic  Briton  who  saw  the  National  Debt  more  than 
doubled,  with  no  adequate  gain  in  land  or  influence,  could 
not  but  contrast  the  difference  in  the  fortunes  of  France. 
That  Power  had  now  gained  the  Rhine  boundary  ;  her 
troops  garrisoned  the  fortresses  of  Holland  and  Northern 
Italy ;  her  chief  dictated  his  will  to  German  princelings 
and  to  the  once  free  Switzers  ;  while  the  Court  of  Madrid, 
nay,  the  Eternal  City  herself,  obeyed  his  behests.  And 
all  this  prodigious  expansion  had  been  accomplished  at 
little  apparent  cost  to  France  herself  ;  for-  the  victors' 
bill  had  been  very  largely  met  out  of  the  resources  of  the 
conquered  territories.  It  is  true  that  her  nobles  and 
clergy  had  suffered  fearful  losses  in  lands  and  treasure, 
while  her  trading  classes  had  cruelly  felt  the  headlong 
fall  in  value  of  her  paper  notes  :  but  in  a  land  endowed 
with  a  bounteous  soil  and  climate  such  losses  are  soon 
repaired,  and  the  signature  of  the  peace  with  England  left 
France  comparatively  prosperous.  In  October  the  First 
Consul  also  concluded  peace  with  Russia,  and  came  to  a 
friendly  understanding  with  the  Czar  on  Italian  affairs  and 
the  question  of  indemnities  for  the  dispossessed  German 
Princes.1 

Bonaparte  now  strove  to  extend  the  colonies  and  com- 
merce of  France,  a  topic  to  which  we  shall  return  later 
on,  and  to  develop  her  internal  resources.  The  chief  roads 
were  repaired,  and  ceased  to  be  in  the  miserable  condition  in 
which  the  abolition  of  the  corvSes  in  1789  had  left  them  : 
canals  were  dug  to  connect  the  chief  river  systems  of  France. 

1  Lefebvre,  "  Cabinets  de  l'Europe,"  ch.  iv. 


292 


THE   LIFE   OF.  NAPOLEON   I  CHAR 


or  were  greatly  improved ;  and  Paris  soon  benefited  from 
the Construction  of   the  Scheldt   and   Owe  canal    which 
brought  the  resources  of  Belgium  within  easy  reach  of  the 
centre  of  France.     Ports  were  deepened  and  extended; 
and  Marseilles  entered  on  golden  vistas ^of  prosperity ^soon 
to  be  closed  by  the  renewal  of  war  with  England.     Com- 
municatTons  wfth  Italy  were  facilitated  by  the  improvement 
of  the  road  between  Marseilles  and  Genoa,  as  also  of  the 
tracks  leading  over  the  Simplon,  Mont  Gems,  and  Mont 
G^vre  pa  segs  :  the  roads  leading  to  the  Rhine  and  along 
Ss  left  bank  also  attested  the  First  Consul's  desire,  not 
only  to  extend  commerce,  but  to  protect  his  natural  boun- 
darv  on  the  east.     The  results  of  this  road-making  were 
to  L'een  in  the  campaign  of  Ulm    when,  ^*™f 
forces  marched   from  Boulogne  to  the  Black   Forest   at 

^S in' ptL^afkt  his  renovating  hand.  With  the 
abrupt  determined  tones  which  he  assumed  more  and  more 
on  Eg  absolute  power,  he  one  day  said  to  Chaptal  at 
Malmaison : 

» I  intend  to  make  Paris  the  most  beautiful  capital  oi !  the  jwU: 

But,     replied  ms  mi i  scarcely  support  one  million  ; 

population;  ...  as  it  is,  rans  woTj  ,  .        *te^  «  What  are  your 

Srtsrft  a£?  sir «  ?£?dred  men  to 

set  to  work  to-morrow  at  La  Villette  to  d.g  the  eanal. 
Such  was  the  inception  of  a  great  public  work  which  cost 
more  than    half    a  million   sterling.       lne    piovisioning 
of  Paris  also  received  careful  attention,  a  large  reserve  of 
wh!at  being  always  kept  on  hand  for  the  sat faction  <* 
"  a  populac?  which  is  only  dangerous  when  it  'B  Imngry- 
Ronanarte  therefore  insisted  on  corn  being  stored   ana 
solTintrge  quantities  and I  at  *  very  low g^taS 
considerable  loss  was  thereby  entailed.     ^ BuV b^s  sup 
plying  *«»«..•»  also  provided -«   °  » ^i  d»™ 
^y^t  &£&£.  where   Bonaparte 
i  Chaptal,  "  Mes  Souvenirs,"  pp.  287,  291,  and  359. 


xin  THE   CONSULATE   FOK   LIFE  293 

himself  was  a  frequent  attendant,  and  a  willing  captive 
to  the  charms  of  the  actress  Mile.  Georges. 

The  beautifying  of  Paris  was,  however,  the  chief  means 
employed  by  Bonaparte  for  weaning  its  populace  from 
politics  ;  and  his  efforts  to  this  end  were  soon  crowned 
with  complete  success.  Here  again  the  events  of  the 
Revolution  had  left  the  field  clear  for  vast  works  of  re- 
construction such  as  would  have  been  impossible  but  for 
the  abolition  of  the  many  monastic  institutions  of  old 
Paris.  On  or  near  the  sites  of  the  famous  Feuillants 
and  Jacobins  he  now  laid  down  splendid  thoroughfares  ; 
and  where  the  constitutionals  or  reds  a  decade  previously 
had  perorated  and  fought,  the  fashionable  world  of  Paris 
now  rolled  in  gilded  cabriolets  along  streets  whose  names 
recalled  the  Italian  and  Egyptian  triumphs  of  the  First 
Consul.  Art  and  culture  bowed  down  to  the  ruler  who 
ordered  the  renovation  of  the  Louvre,  which  now  became 
the  treasure-house  of  painting  and  sculpture,  enriched  by 
masterpieces  taken  from  many  an  Italian  gallery.  No 
enterprise  has  more  conspicuously  helped  to  assure  the 
position  of  Paris  as  the  capital  of  the  world's  culture 
than  Bonaparte's  grouping  of  the  nation's  art  treasures 
in  a  central  and  magnificent  building.  In  the  first  year 
of  his  Empire  Napoleon  gave  orders  for  the  construction 
of  vast  galleries  which  were  to  connect  the  northern 
pavilion  of  the  Tuileries  with  the  Louvre  and  form  a 
splendid  facade  to  the  new  Rue  de  Rivoli.  Despite  the 
expense,  the  work  was  pushed  on  until  it  was  suddenly 
arrested  by  the  downfall  of  the  Empire,  and  was  left  to 
the  great  man's  nephew  to  complete.  Though  it  is  pos- 
sible, as  Chaptal  avers,  that  the  original  design  aimed 
at  the  formation  of  a  central  fortress,  yet  to  all  lovers  of 
art,  above  all  to  the  hero-worshipping  Heine,  the  new 
Louvre  was  a  sure  pledge  of  Napoleon's  immortality. 

Other  works  which  combined  beauty  with  utility  were 
the  prolongation  of  the  quays  along  the  left  bank  of  the 
Seine,  the  building  of  three  bridges  over  that  river,  the 
improvement  of  the  Jardin  des  Plantes,  together  with 
that  of  other  parks  and  open  spaces,  and  the  completion 
of  the  Conservatoire  of  Arts  and  Trades.  At  a  later 
date,  the  military  spirit  of   the    Empire  received   signal 


294  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

illustration  in  the  erection  of  the  Vend ome  column,  the  Arc 
de  Triomphe,  and  the  consecration,  or  desecration,  of  the 
Madeleine  as  a  temple  of  glory. 

Many  of  these  works  were  subsequent  to  the  period 
which  we  are  considering  ;  but  the  enterprises  of  the 
Emperor  represent  the  designs  of  the  First  Consul ;  and 
the  plans  for  the  improvement  of  Paris  formed  during  the 
Consulate  were  sufficient  to  inspire  the  Parisians  with 
lively  gratitude  and  to  turn  them  from  political  specula- 
tions to  scenes  of  splendour  and  gaiety  that  recalled  the 
days  of  Louis  XIV.  If  we  may  believe  the  testimony  of 
Romilly,  who  visited  Paris  in  1802,  the  new  policy  had 
even  then  attained  its  end. 

u  The  quiet  despotism,  which  leaves  everybody  who  does  not  wish 
to  meddle  with  politics  (and  few  at  present  have  any  such  wish)  in  the 
full  and  secure  enjoyment  of  their  property  and  of  their  pleasures,  is 
a  sort  of  paradise,  compared  with  the  agitation,  the  perpetual  alarms, 
the  scenes  of  infamy,  of  bloodshed,  which  accompanied  the  pretended 
liberties  of  France." 

But  while  acknowledging  the  material  benefits  of  Bona- 
parte's rule,  the  same  friend  of  liberty  notes  with  con- 
cern : 

"  That  he  [Bonaparte]  meditates  the  gaining  fresh  laurels  in  war 
can  hardly  be  doubted,  if  the  accounts  which  one  hears  of  his  restless 
and  impatient  disposition  be  true." 

However  much  the  populace  delighted  in  this  new 
regime,  the  many  ardent  souls  who  had  dared  and  achieved 
so  much  in  the  sacred  quest  of  liberty  could  not  refrain 
from  protesting  against  the  innovations  which  were  re- 
storing personal  rule.  Though  the  Press  was  gagged, 
though  as  many  as  thirty -two  Departments  were  subjected 
to  the  scrutiny  of  special  tribunals,  which,  under  the 
guise  of  stamping  out  brigandage,  frequently  punished 
opponents  of  the  Government,  yet  the  voice  of  criticism 
was  not  wholly  silenced.  The  project  of  the  Concordat 
was  sharply  opposed  in  the  Tribunate,  which  also  ventured 
to  declare  that  the  first  sections  of  the  Civil  Code  were 
not  conformable  to  the  principles  of  1789  and  to  the  first 
draft  of  a  code  presented  to  the  Convention.     The  Gov* 


xiii  THE   CONSULATE  FOR   LIFE  295 

ernment  thereupon  refused  to  send  to  the  Tribunate  any 
important  measures,  but  merely  flung  them  a  mass  of 
petty  details  to  discuss,  as  "  bones  to  gnaw"  until  the  time 
for  the  renewal  by  lot  of  a  fifth  of  its  members  should 
come  round.  During  a  discussion  at  the  Council  of  State, 
the  First  Consul  hinted  with  much  frankness  at  the 
methods  which  ought  to  be  adopted  to  quell  the  factious 
opposition  of  the  Tribunate  : 

"  One  cannot  work  with  an  institution  so  productive  of  disorder. 
The  constitution  has  created  a  legislative  power  composed  of  three 
bodies.  None  of  these  branches  has  any  right  to  organize  itself :  that 
must  be  done  by  the  law.  Therefore  we  must  make  a  body  which  shall 
organize  the  manner  of  deliberations  of  these  three  branches.  The 
Tribunate  ought  to  be  divided  into  five  sections.  The  discussion  of 
laws  will  take  place  secretly  in  each  section  :  one  might  even  introduce 
a  discussion  between  these  sections  and  those  of  the  Council  of  State. 
Only  the  reporter  will  speak  publicly.  Then  things  will  go  on 
reasonably." 

Having  delivered  this  opinion,  ex  cathedra,  he  departed 
(January  7th,  1802)  for  Lyons,  there  to  be  invested  with 
supreme  authority  in  the  reconstituted  Cisalpine,  or  as  it 
was  now  termed,  Italian  Republic.1  Returning  at  the 
close  of  the  month,  radiant  with  the  lustre  of  this  new 
dignity,  he  was  able  to  bend  the  Tribunate  and  the 
Corps  Legislatif  to  his  will.  The  renewal  of  their  mem- 
bership by  one-fifth  served  as  the  opportunity  for  subject- 
ing them  to  the  more  pliable  Senate.  This  august  body 
of  highly-paid  members  holding  office  for  life  had  the  right 
of  nominating  the  new  members  ;  but  hitherto  the  retiring 
members  had  been  singled  out  by  lot.  Roederer,  acting 
on  a  hint  of  the  time-serving  Second  Consul,  now  proposed 
in  the  Council  of  State  that  the  retiring  members  of 
those  Chambers  should  thenceforth  be  appointed  by  the 
Senate,  and  not  by  lot ;  for  the  principle  of  the  lot,  he 
quaintly  urged,  was  hostile  to  the  right  of  election 
which  belonged  to  the  Senate.  Against  such  conscious 
sophistry  all  the  bolts  of  logic  were  harmless.  The  ques- 
tion was  left  undecided,  in  order  that  the  Senate  might 
forthwith  declare  in  favour  of  its  own  right  to  determine 
every  year  not  only  the  elections  to,  but  the  exclusions 

i  See  Chapter  XIV.  of  this  work. 


296  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

from,  the  Tribunate  and  the  Corps  Legislatif.  A  senatus 
consultum  of  March  legalized  this  monstrous  innovation, 
which  led  to  the  exclusion  from  the  Tribunate  of  zealous 
republicans  like  Benjamin  Constant,  Isnard,  Ganilh, 
Daunou,  and  Chenier.  The  infusion  of  the  senatorial 
nominees  served  to  complete  the  nullity  of  these  bodies ; 
and  the  Tribunate,  the  lineal  descendant  of  the  terrible 
Convention,  was  gagged  and  bound  within  eight  years 
of  the  stilling  of  Danton's  mighty  voice. 

In  days  when  civic  zeal  was  the  strength  of  the  French 
Republic,  the  mere  suggestion  of  such  a  violation  of 
liberty  would  have  cost  the  speaker  his  life.  But  since 
the  rise  of  Bonaparte,  civic  sentiments  had  yielded  place 
to  the  military  spirit  and  to  boundless  pride  in  the  nation's 
glory.  Whenever  republican  feelings  were  outraged, 
there  were  sufficient  distractions  to  dissipate  any  of  the 
sombre  broodings  which  Bonaparte  so  heartily  disliked  ; 
and  an  event  of  international  importance  now  came  to  still 
the  voice  of  political  criticism. 

The  signature  of  the  definitive  treaty  of  peace  with 
Great  Britain  (March  27th,  1802)  sufficed  to  drown  the 
muttered  discontent  of  the  old  republican  party  under 
the  paeans  of  a  nation's  joy.  The  jubilation  was  natural. 
While  Londoners  were  grumbling  at  the  sacrifices  which 
Addington's  timidity  had  entailed,  all  France  rang  with 
praises  of  the  diplomatic  skill  which  could  rescue  several 
islands  from  England's  grip  and  yet  assure  French  suprem- 
acy on  the  Continent.  The  event  seemed  to  call  for  some 
sign  of  the  nation's  thankfulness  to  the  restorer  of  peace 
and  prosperity.  The  hint  having  been  given  by  the  tact- 
ful Cambaceres  to  some  of  the  members  of  the  Tribunate, 
this  now  docile  body  expressed  a  wish  that  there  should 
be  a  striking  token  of  the  national  gratitude ;  and  a 
motion  to  that  effect  was  made  by  the  Senate  to  the  Corps 
Legislatif  and  to  the  Government  itself. 

The  form  which  the  national  memorial  should  take  was 
left  entirely  vague.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  the 
outcome  would  have  been  a  column  or  a  statue  :  to  a 
Napoleon  it  was  monarchy. 

The  Senate  was  in  much  doubt  as  to  the  fit  course  of 
action.     The  majority  desired  to  extend  the  Consulate 


xm  THE   CONSULATE    FOR   LIFE  297 

for  a  second  term  of  ten  years,  and  a  formal  motion  to 
that  effect  was  made  on  May  7th.  It  was  opposed  by  a 
few,  some  of  whom  demanded  the  prolongation  for  life. 
The  president,  Tronehet,  prompted  by  Fouche  and  other 
republicans,  held  that  only  the  question  of  prolonging  the 
Consulate  for  another  term  of  ten  years  was  before  the 
Senate  :  and  the  motion  was  carried  by  sixty  votes  against 
one :  the  dissentient  voice  was  that  of  the  Girondin  Lan- 
juinais.  The  report  of  this  vote  disconcerted  the  First 
Consul,  but  he  replied  with  some  constraint  that  as  the 
people  had  invested  him  with  the  supreme  magistrature, 
he  would  not  feel  assured  of  its  confidence  unless  the 
present  proposal  were  also  sanctioned  by  its  vote  :  "  You 
judge  that  I  owe  the  people  another  sacrifice :  I  will  give 
it  if  the  people's  voice  orders  what  your  vote  now  author- 
izes." But  before  the  mass  vote  of  the  people  was  taken, 
an  important  change  had  been  made  in  the  proposal  itself. 
It  was  well  known  that  Bonaparte  was  dissatisfied  with 
the  senatorial  offer :  and  at  a  special  session  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  State,  at  which  Ministers  were  present,  the  Second 
Consul  urged  that  they  must  now  decide  how,  when,  and 
on  what  question  the  people  were  to  be  consulted.  The 
whole  question  recently  settled  by  the  Senate  was  thus 
reopened  in  a  way  that  illustrated  the  advantage  of  multi- 
plying councils  and  of  keeping  them  under  official  tute- 
lage. The  Ministers  present  asserted  that  the  people 
disapproved  of  the  limitations  of  time  imposed  by  the 
Senate ;  and  after  some  discussion  Cambaceres  procured 
the  decision  that  the  consultation  of  the  people  should  be 
on  the  questions  whether  the  First  Consul  should  hold 
his  power  for  life,  and  whether  he  should  nominate  his 
successor. 

To  the  latter  part  of  this  proposal  the  First  Consul 
offered  a  well-judged  refusal.  To  consult  the  people  on 
the  restoration  of  monarchy  would,  as  yet,  have  been  as 
inopportune  as  it  was  superfluous.  After  gaining  com- 
plete power,  Bonaparte  could  be  well  assured  as  to  the 
establishment  of  an  hereditary  claim.  The  former  and 
less  offensive  part  of  the  proposal  was  therefore  sub- 
mitted to  the  people  ;  and  to  it  there  could  be  only  one 
issue  amidst  the  prosperity  brought  by  the  peace,  and  the 


298  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

surveillance  exercised  by  the  prefects  and  the  grateful 
clergy  now  brought  back  by  the  Concordat.  The  Con- 
sulate for  Life  was  voted  by  the  enormous  majority  of 
more  than  3,500,000  affirmative  votes  against  8374  nega- 
tives. But  among  these  dissentients  were  many  hon- 
oured names:  among  military  men  Carnot,  Drouot, 
Mouton,  and  Bernard  opposed  the  innovation  ;  and  La- 
fayette made  the  public  statement  that  he  could  not  vote 
for  such  a  magistracy  unless  political  liberty  were  guar- 
anteed. A  senatus  consultum  of  August  1st  forthwith 
proclaimed  Napoleon  Bonaparte  Consul  for  Life  and 
ordered  the  erection  of  a  Statue  of  Peace  holding  in 
one  hand  the  victor's  laurel  and  in  the  other  the  senato- 
rial decree. 

On  the  following  day  Napoleon  —  for  henceforth  he 
generally  used  his  Christian  name  like  other  monarchs  — 
presented  to  the  Council  of  State  a  project  of  an  organic 
law,  which  virtually  amounted  to  a  new  constitution. 
The  mere  fact  of  its  presentation  at  so  early  a  date  suf- 
fices to  prove  how  completely  he  had  prepared  for  the 
recent  change  and  how  thoroughly  assured  he  was  of  suc- 
cess. This  important  measure  was  hurried  through  the 
Senate,  and,  without  being  submitted  to  the  Tribunate 
or  Corps  Legislatif,  still  less  to  the  people,  for  whose 
sanction  he  had  recently  affected  so  much  concern  —  was 
declared  to  be  the  fundamental  law  of  the  State. 

The  fifth  constitution  of  revolutionary  France  may  be 
thus  described.  It  began  by  altering  the  methods  of  elec- 
tion. In  place  of  Sieyes'  lists  of  notabilities,  Bonaparte 
proposed  a  simpler  plan.  The  adult  citizens  of  each  can- 
ton were  thenceforth  to  meet,  for  electoral  purposes,  in 
primary  assemblies,  to  name  two  candidates  for  the  office 
oijuge  de  paix  (i.e.,  magistrate)  and  town  councillor,  and 
to  choose  the  members  of  the  "  electoral  colleges  "  for  the 
arrondissement  and  for  the  Department.  In  the  latter  case 
only  the  600  most  wealthy  men  of  the  Department  were 
eligible.  An  official  or  aristocratic  tinge  was  to  be  im- 
parted to  these  electoral  colleges  by  the  infusion  of  mem- 
bers selected  by  the  First  Consul  from  the  members  of  the 
Legion  of  Honour.  Fixity  of  opinion  was  also  assured  by 
members  holding  office  for  life;  and,  as  they  were  elected 


xm  THE   CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  299 

in  the  midst  of  the  enthusiasm  aroused  by  the  Peace  of 
Amiens,  they  were  decidedly  Bonapartist. 

The  electoral  colleges  had  the  following  powers  :  they 
nominated  two  candidates  for  each  place  vacant  in  the 
merely  consultative  councils  of  their  respective  areas,  and 
had  the  equally  barren  honour  of  presenting  two  candi- 
dates for  the  Tribunate  —  the  final  act  of  selection  being 
decided  by  the  executive,  that  is,  by  the  First  Consul. 
Corresponding  privileges  were  accorded  to  the  electoral 
colleges  of  the  Department,  save  that  these  plutocratic 
bodies  had  the  right  of  presenting  candidates  for  admis- 
sion to  the  Senate.  The  lists  of  candidates  for  the  Corps 
LSgislatif  were  to  be  formed  by  the  joint  action  of  the 
electoral  colleges,  namely,  those  of  the  Departments  and 
those  of  the  arrondissements.  But  as  the  resulting  coun- 
cils and  parliamentary  bodies  had  only  the  shadow  of 
power,  the  whole  apparatus  was  but  an  imposing  machine 
for  winnowing  the  air  and  threshing  chaff. 

The  First  Consul  secured  few  additional  rights  or  at- 
tributes, except  the  exercise  of  the  royal  prerogative  of 
granting  pardon.  But,  in  truth,  his  own  powers  were 
already  so  large  that  they  were  scarcely  susceptible  of  ex- 
tension. The  three  Consuls  held  office  for  life,  and  were 
ex  officio  members  of  the  Senate.  The  second  and  third 
Consuls  were  nominated  by  the  Senate  on  the  presentation 
of  the  First  Consul :  the  Senate  might  reject  two  names 
proposed  by  him  for  either  office,  but  they  must  accept  his 
third  nominee.  The  First  Consul  might  deposit  in  the 
State  archives  his  proposal  as  to  his  successor  :  if  the  Sen- 
ate rejected  this  proposal,  the  second  and  third  Consuls 
made  a  suggestion  ;  and  if  it  were  rejected,  one  of  the 
two  whom  they  thereupon  named  must  be  elected  by  the 
Senate.  The  three  legislative  bodies  lost  practically  all 
their  powers,  those  of  the  Corps  Legislatif  going  to  the 
Senate,  those  of  the  Council  of  State  to  an  official  Cabal 
formed  out  of  it ;  while  the  Tribunate  was  forced  to  de- 
bate secretly  in  jive  sections,  where,  as  Bonaparte  observed, 
they  might  jabber  as  they  liked. 

■  On  the  other  hand,  the  attributes  of  the  Senate  were 
signally  enhanced.  It  was  thenceforth  charged,  not  only 
with  the  preservation  of  the  republican  constitution,  but 


300 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


with  its  interpretation  in  disputed  points,  and  its  comple- 
tion wherever  it  should  be  found  wanting.     Furthermore, 
by  means  of  organic  senatus  consulta  it  was  empowered  to 
make  constitutions  for  the  French  colonies,  or  to  suspend 
trial  by  iury  for  five  years  in  any  Department,  or  even  to 
declare  it  outside  the  limits  of  the  constitution.     It  now 
gained  the  right  of  being  consulted  in  regard  to  the  rati- 
fication of  treaties,  previously  enjoyed  by  the  Corps  Legis- 
latif      Finally,  it  could  dissolve  the  Corps  Legislatif  and 
the  Tribunate.     But  this  formidable  machinery  was  kept 
under  the  strict  control  of  the  chief  engineer :    all  these 
powers  were  set  in  motion  on  the  initiative  of  the  Govern- 
ment :  and  the  proposals  for  its  laws,  or  senatus  consults 
were  discussed  in  the  Cabal  of  the  Council  of  State  named 
by  the  First  Consul.     This  precaution  might  have  been 
deemed  superfluous  by  a  ruler  less  careful  about  details 
than  Napoleon  ;  the  composition  of  the  Senate  was  such 
as  to  assure  its  pliability  ;   for  though  it  continued  to 
renew  its  ranks  by  co-optation,  yet  that  privilege  was  re- 
stricted in  the  following  way  :  from  the  lists  of  candidates 
for  the  Senate  sent  up  by  the    electoral  colleges  of  the 
Departments,  Napoleon    selected  three  for  each  seat  va- 
cant ;  one  of  those  three   must  be  chosen  by  the  Senate. 
Moreover,  the  First  Consul  was  to  be  allowed  directly  to 
nominate  forty  members  in  addition   to  the  eighty  pre- 
scribed by  the  constitution  of  1799.     Thus,  by  direct  or 
indirect  means,  the  Senate  soon  became  a  strict  Napoleonic 
preserve,  to  which  only  the  most  devoted  adherents  could 
aspire.     And  yet,  such  is  the  vanity  of  human  efforts,  it 
was  this  very  body  which  twelve  years  later  was  to  vote 

his  deposition.1  • 

The  victory  of  action  over  talk,  of  the  executive  over 
the  legislature,  of  the  one  supremely  able  man  over  the 
discordant  and  helpless  many,  was  now  complete,  lhe 
process  was  startlingly  swift  ;  yet  its  chief  stages  are  not 
difficult  to  trace.  The  orators  of  the  first  two  National 
Assemblies  of  France,  after  wrecking  the  old  royal  au- 
thority, were  constrained  by  the  pressure  of  events  to 
intrust  the  supervision  of  the  executive  powers  to  im- 
portant committees,  whose  functions  grew  with  the  in- 
iThibaudeau,  op.  tit.,  ch.  xxvi. ;  Lavisse,  "Napolfeon,"  ch.  i. 


xin  THE  CONSULATE  FOR  LIFE  301 

tensity  of  the  national  danger.  Amidst  the  agonies  of 
1793,  when  France  was  menaced  by  the  First  Coalition, 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  leaped  forth  as  the  en- 
sanguined champion  of  democracy  ;  and,  as  the  crisis 
developed  in  intensity,  this  terrible  body  and  the  Com- 
mittee of  General  Security  virtually  governed  France. 

After  the  repulse  of  the  invaders  and  the  fall  of  Robes- 
pierre, the  return  to  ordinary  methods  was  marked  by  the 
institution  of  the  Directory,  when  five  men,  chosen  by 
the  legislature,  controlled  the  executive  powers  and  the 
general  policy  of  the  Republic  :  that  compromise  was 
forcibly  ended  by  the  stroke  of  Brumaire.  Three  Con- 
suls then  seized  the  reins,  and  two  years  later  a  single 
charioteer  gripped  the  destinies  of  France.  His  powers 
were,  in  fact,  ultimately  derived  from  those  of  the  secret 
committees  of  the  terrorists.  But,  unlike  the  supremacy 
of  Robespierre,  that  of  Napoleon  could  not  be  disputed  ; 
for  the  general,  while  guarding  all  the  material  boons 
which  the  Revolution  had  conferred,  conciliated  the  inter- 
ests aud  classes  whereon  the  civilian  had  so  brutally 
trampled.  The  new  autocracy  therefore  possessed  a 
solid  strength  which  that  of  the  terrorists  could  never 
possess.  Indeed,  it  was  more  absolute  than  the  dicta- 
torial power  that  Rousseau  had  outlined.  The  philos- 
opher had  asserted  that,  while  silencing  the  legislative 
power,  the  dictator  really  made  it  vocal,  and  that  he 
could  do  everything  but  make  laws.  But  Napoleon,  after 
1802,  did  far  more  :  he  suppressed  debates  and  yet  drew 
laws  from  his  subservient  legislature.  Whether,  then,  we 
regard  its  practical  importance  for  France  and  Europe, 
or  limit  our  view  to  the  mental  sagacity  and  indomitable 
will-power  required  for  its  accomplishment,  the  triumph 
of  Napoleon  in  the  three  years  subsequent  to  his  return 
from  Egypt  is  the  most  stupendous  recorded  in  the  his- 
tory of  civilized  peoples. 

The  populace  consoled  itself  for  the  loss  of  political 
liberty  by  the  splendour  of  the  fete  which  heralded  the 
title  of  First  Consul  for  Life,  proclaimed  on  August  15th  : 
that  day  was  also  memorable  as  being  the  First  Consul's 
thirty-third  birthday,  the  festival  of  the  Assumption,  and 
the  anniversary  of  the  ratification  of  the  Concordat.     The 


302 


THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  char 


decorations  and  fireworks  were  worthy  of  so  remarkable 
a  confluence  of  solemnities.     High  on  one  of  the  towers 
of   Notre   Dame   glittered  an   enormous   star,  and  at  its 
centre  there  shone  the  sign  of  the  Zodiac  which  had  shed 
its  influence  over  his  first  hours  of  life.     The  myriads  of 
spectators  who  gazed  at  that  natal  emblem  might  well 
have  thought  that  his  life's  star  was  now  at  its  zenith. 
Few  could  have  dared  to  think  that  it  was  to  mount  far 
higher  into  unknown  depths  of  space,  blazing  as  a  baleful 
portent  to  kings  and   peoples  ;    still  less  was  there  any 
Cassandra  shriek  of  doom  as  to  its  final  headlong  fall  into 
the  wastes  of  ocean.     All  was  joy  and  jubilation  oyer  a 
career  that  had  even  now  surpassed  the  records  of  antique 
heroism,  that   blended   the   romance  of  oriental  prowess 
with  the  beneficent  toils  of  the  legislator,  and  prospered 
alike  in  war  and  peace.  , 

And  yet  black  care  cast  one  shadow  over  that  jubilant 
festival.      There   was   a  void  in  the  First  Consul  s  life 
such  as  saddened  but  few  of  the  millions  of  peasants  who 
looked  up  to  him  as  their  saviour.     His  wife  had  borne 
him  no  heir  :  and  there  seemed  no  prospect  that  a  child 
of  his  own  would  ever  succeed  to  his  glorious  heritage. 
Family  ioys,  it  seemed,   were   not   for  him.     Suspicions 
and  bickerings  were  his  lot.     His  brothers,  in  their  fever- 
ish desire  for  the  establishment  of  a  Bonapartist  dynasty, 
ceaselessly  urged  that  he  should  take  means  to  provide 
himself   with   a  legitimate    heir,   in    the   last   resort   by 
divorcing  Josephine.     With  a  consideration  for  her  feel- 
ings which  does  him  credit,  Napoleon  refused  to  counte- 
nance such  proceedings.     Yet  it  is  certain  that  from  this 
time  onwards  he  kept  in  view  the  desirability,  on  political 
grounds,  of  divorcing  her,  and  made  this  the  excuse  for 
indulgence  in  amours  against  which  Josephine  s  tears  and 
reproaches  were  all  in  vain. 

The  consolidation  of  personal  rule,  the  institution  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour,  and  the  return  of  very  many  of 
the  emigrant  nobles  under  the  terms  of  the  recent  am- 
nesty, favoured  the  growth  of  luxury  in  the  capital  and 
of  Court  etiquette  at  the  Tuileries  and  St.  Cloud.  At 
these  palaces  the  pomp  of  the  ancien  rSgime  was  labori- 
ously copied.     General  Duroc,  stiff  republican  though  lie 


xin  THE  CONSULATE  FOR  LIFE  303 

was,  received  the  appointment  of  Governor  ot  the  Palace ; 
under  him  were  chamberlains  and  prefects  of  the  palace, 
who  enforced  a  ceremonial  that  struggled  to  be  monarch- 
ical. The  gorgeous  liveries  and  sumptuous  garments  of 
the  reign  of  Louis  XV.  speedily  replaced  the  military- 
dress  which  even  civilians  had  worn  under  the  warlike 
Republic.  High  boots,  sabres,  and  regimental  headgear 
gave  way  to  buckled  shoes,  silk  stockings,  Court  rapiers, 
and  light  hats,  the  last  generally  held  under  the  arm.  Tri- 
colour cockades  were  discarded,  along  with  the  revolu- 
tionary jargon  which  thoud  and  citizen  d  everyone  ;  and 
men  began  to  purge  their  speech  of  some  .of  the  obscene 
terms  which  had  haunted  clubs  and  camps. 

It  was  remarked,  however,  that  the  First  Consul  still 
clung  to  the  use  of  the  term  citizen,  and  that  amidst  the 
surprising  combinations  of  colours  that  flecked  his  Court, 
he  generally  wore  only  the  uniform  of  a  colonel  of  grena- 
diers or  of  the  light  infantry  of  the  Consular  Guard.  This 
conduct  resulted  partly  from  his  earty  dislike  of  luxury, 
but  partly,  doubtless,  from  a  conviction  that  republicans 
will  forgive  much  in  a  man  who,  like  Vespasian,  discards 
the  grandeur  which  his  prowess  has  won,  and  shines  by 
his  very  plainness.  To  trifling  matters  such  as  these 
Napoleon  always  attached  great  importance  ;  for,  as  he 
said  to  Admiral  Malcolm  at  St.  Helena  :  "  In  France 
trifles  are  great  things :  reason  is  nothing." l  Besides, 
genius  so  commanding  as  his  little  needed  the  external 
trappings  wherewith  ordinary  mortals  hide  their  nullity. 
If  his  attire  was  simple,  it  but  set  off  the  better  the  play 
of  his  mobile  features,  and  the  rich,  unfailing  flow  of  his 
conversation.  Perhaps  no  clearer  and  more  pleasing 
account  of  his  appearance  and  his  conduct  at  a  reception 
has  ever  been  given  to  the  world  than  this  sketch  of  the 
great  man  in  one  of  his  gentler  moods  by  John  Leslie 
Foster,  who  visited  Paris  shortly  after  the  Peace  of 
Amiens  : 

"  He  is  about  five  feet  seven  inches  high,  delicately  and  gracefully 
made ;  his  hair  a  dark  brown  crop,  thin  and  lank  ;  his  complexion 
smooth,  pale,  and  sallow  ;  his  eyes  gray,  but  very  animated ;  his  eye* 

1 "  A  Diary  of  St.  Helena,"  by  Lady  Malcolm,  p.  97. 


304  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

brows  light  brown,  thin  and  projecting.  All  his  features,  particu* 
larly  his  mouth  and  nose,  fine,  sharp,  defined,  and  expressive  beyond 
description;  expressive  of  what?  Not  of  anything perce  as  the  prints 
expressed  him,  still  less  of  anything  mtchant;  nor  has  he  anything 
of  that  eye  whose  bend  doth  awe  the  world.  The  true  expression  6t 
his  countenance  is  a  pleasing  melancholy,  which,  whenever  he  speaks, 
relaxes  into  the  most  agreeable  and  gracious  smile  you  can  conceive. 
To  this  you  must  add  the  appearance  of  deep  and  intense  thought,  but 
above  all  the  predominating  expression  a  look  of  calm  and  tranquil 
resolution  and  intrepidity  which  nothing  human  could  discompose. 
His  address  is  the  finest  1  have  ever  seen,  and  said  by  those  who  have 
travelled  to  exceed  not  only  every  Prince  and  Potentate  now  in  being, 
but  even  all  those  whose  memory  has  come  down  to  us.  He  has 
more  unaffected  dignity  than  I  could  conceive  in  man.  His  address 
is  the  gentlest  and  most  prepossessing  you  can  conceive,  which  is  sec- 
onded by  the  greatest  fund  of  levee  conversation  that  I  suppose  any 
person  ever  possessed.  He  speaks  deliberately,  but  very  fluently, 
with  particular  emphasis,  and  in  a  rather  low  tone  of  voice.  While 
he  speaks,  his  features  are  still  more  expressive  than  his  words."  2 

In  contrast  with  this  intellectual  power  and  becoming 
simplicity  of  attire,  how  stupid  and  tawdry  were  the 
bevies  of  soulless  women  and  the  dumb  groups  of  half- 
tamed  soldiers !  How  vapid  also  the  rules  of  etiquette 
and  precedence  which  starched  the  men  and  agitated  the 
minds  of  their  consorts  !  Yet,  while  soaring  above  these 
rules  with  easy  grace,  the  First  Consul  imposed  them  rigidly 
on  the  crowd  of  eager  courtiers.  On  these  burning  ques- 
tions he  generally  took  the  advice  of  M.  de  Remusat,  whose 
tact  and  acquaintance  with  Court  customs  were  now  of 
much  service,  while  the  sprightly  wit  of  his  young  wife 
attracted  Josephine,  as  it  has  all  readers  of  her  piquant 
but  rather  spiteful  memoirs.  In  her  pages  we  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  life  of  that  singular  Court ;  the  attempts 
at  aping  the  inimitable  manners  of  the  ancien  riyime  ;  the 
pompous  nullity  of  the  second  and  third  Consuls;  the 
tawdry  magnificence  of  the  costumes  ;  the  studied  avoid- 
ance of  any  word  that  implied  even  a  modicum  of  learn- 
ing or  a  distant  acquaintance  with  politics ;  the  nervous 
pre-occupation  about  Napoleon's  moods  and  whims  ;  the 
graceful  manners  of  Josephine  that  rarely  failed  to  charm 

1  "  The  Two  Duchesses.'"  edited  by  Vere  Foster,  p.  172.  Lord 
Malmesbury  ("  Diaries,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  257)  is  less  favourable  :  "When  B. 
is  out  of  his  ceremonious  habits,  his  language  is  often  coarse  and  vulgar." 


nil  THE   CONSULATE   FOR   LIFE  305 

away  his  humours,  except  when  she  herself  had  been  out- 
rageously slighted  for  some  passing  favourite ;  above  all, 
the  leaden  dulness  of  conversation,  which  drew  from 
Chaptal  the  confession  that  life  there  was  the  life  of  a 
galley  slave.  And  if  we  seek  for  the  hidden  reason  why 
&  ruler  eminently  endowed  with  mental  force  and  fresh- 
ness should  have  endured  so  laboured  a  masquerade,  we 
find  it  in  his  strikingly  frank  confession  to  Madame  de 
Remusat :  It  is  fortunate  that  the  French  are  to  be  ruled 
through  their  vanity. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS 

The  previous  chapter  dealt  in  the  main  with  the 
internal  affairs  of  France  and  the  completion  of  Napoleon's 
power:  it  touched  on  foreign  affairs  only  so  far  as  to 
exhibit  the  close  connection  between  the  First  Consul's 
diplomatic  victory  over  England  and  his  triumph  over 
the  republican  constitution  in  his  adopted  country.  But 
it  is  time  now  to  review  the  course  of  the  negotiations  which 
led  up  to  the  Treaty  of  Amiens. 

In  order  to  realize  the  advantages  which  France  then 
had  over  England,  it  will  be  well  briefly  to  review  the 
condition  of  our  land  at  that  time.  Our  population  was 
far  smaller  than  that  of  the  French  Republic.  France, 
with  her  recent  acquisitions  in  Belgium,  the  Rhineland, 
Savoy,  Nice,  and  Piedmont,  numbered  nearly  40,000,000 
inhabitants :  but  the  census  returns  of  Great  Britain  for 
1801  showed  only  a  total  of  10,942,000  souls,  while  the 
numbers  for  Ireland,  arguing  from  the  rather  untrust- 
worthy return  of  1813,  may  be  reckoned  at  about  six 
and  a  half  millions.  The  prodigious  growth  of  the 
English-speaking  people  had  not  as  yet  fully  com- 
menced either  in  the  motherland,  the  United  States,  or 
in  the  small  and  struggling  settlements  of  Canada  and 
Australia.  Its  future  expansion  was  to  be  assured  by 
industrial  and  social  causes,  and  by  the  events  con- 
sidered in  this  and  in  subsequent  chapters.  It  was  a 
small  people  that  had  for  several  months  faced  with 
undaunted  front  the  gigantic  power  of  Bonaparte  and,, 
that  of  the  Armed  Neutrals. 

This  population  of  less  than  18,000,000  souls,  of  which 
nearly  one-third  openly  resented  the  Act  of  Union 
recently  imposed  on  Ireland,  was  burdened  by  a  National 
Debt  which    amounted   to  £ 537,000,000,  and   entailed  a 

306 


chap,  xit  THE  PEACE  OF  AMIENS  307 

yearly  charge  of  more  than  £20,000,000  sterling.  In 
the  years  of  war  with  revolutionary  France  the  annual 
expenditure  had  risen  from  £19,859,000  (for  1792)  to 
the  total  of  <£ 61,329,000,  which  necessitated  an  income 
tax  of  10  per  cent,  on  all  incomes  of  ,£200  and  upwards. 
Yet,  despite  party  feuds,  the  nation  was  never  stronger, 
and  its  fleets  had  never  won  more  brilliant  and  solid 
triumphs.  The  chief  naval  historian  of  France  admits 
that  we  had  captured  no  fewer  than  50  ships  of  the  line, 
and  had  lost  to  our  enemies  only  five,  thereby  raising  the 
strength  of  our  fighting  line  to  189,  while  that  of  France 
had  sunk  to  47. 1  The  prowess  of  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley 
was  also  beginning  to  revive  in  India  the  ancient  lustre 
of  the  British  arms;  but  the  events  of  1802-3  were  to 
show  that  our  industrial  enterprise,  and  the  exploits  of 
our  sailors  and  soldiers,  were  by  themselves  of  little  avail 
when  matched  in  a  diplomatic  contest  against  the  vast 
resources  of  France  and  the  embodied  might  of  a 
Napoleon. 

Men  and  institutions  were  everywhere  receiving  the 
imprint  of  his  will.  France  was  as  wax  under  his  genius. 
The  sovereigns  of  Spain,  Italy,  and  Germany  obeyed  his 
fiat.  Even  the  stubborn  Dutch  bent  before  him.  On 
the  plea  of  defeating  Orange  intrigues,  he  imposed  a  new 
constitution  on  the  Batavian  Republic  whose  indepen- 
dence he  had  agreed  to  respect.  Its  Directory  was  now 
replaced  by  a  Regency  which  relieved  the  deputies  of 
the  people  of  all  responsibility.  A  plebiscite  showed 
52,000  votes  against,  and  16,000  for,  the  new  regime;  but, 
as  350,000  had  not  voted,  their  silence  was  taken  for 
consent,  and  Bonaparte's  will  became  law  (September, 
1801). 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  appreciate  the  position  of 
France  and  Great  Britain.  Before  the  signature  of  the 
preliminaries  of  peace  at  London  on  October  1st,  1801, 
our  Government  had  given  up  its  claims  to  the  Cape, 
Malta,  Tobago,  Martinique,  Essequibo,  Demerara,  Ber- 
bice,  and  Curagoa,  retaining  of  its  conquests  only  Trini- 
dad and  Ceylon. 

A   belated   attempt  had,  indeed,  been  made  to  retain 
1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  "  Guerres  Maritimes,"  vol.  ii.,  chap.  vii. 


308  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Tobago.  The  Premier  and  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord 
Hawkesbury,  were  led  by  the  French  political  agent  in 
London,  M.  Otto,  to  believe  that,  in  the  ensuing  negotia- 
tions at  Amiens,  every  facility  would  be  given  by  the 
French  Government  towards  its  retrocession  to  us,  and 
that  this  act  would  be  regarded  as  the  means  of  indemni- 
fying Great  Britain  for  the  heavy  expense  of  supporting 
many  thousands  of  French  and  Dutch  prisoners.  The 
Cabinet,  relying  on  this  promise  as  binding  between  hon- 
ourable men,  thereupon  endeavoured  to  obtain  the  assent 
of  George  III.  to  the  preliminaries  in  their  ultimate  form, 
and  only  the  prospect  of  regaining  Tobago  by  this  com- 
promise induced  the  King  to  give  it.  When  it  was  too 
late,  King  and  Ministers  realized  their  mistake  in  relying 
on  verbal  promises  and  in  failing  to  procure  a  written 
statement.1 

The  abandonment  by  Ministers  of  their  former  claim 
to  Malta  is  equally  strange.  Nelson,  though  he  held 
Malta  to  be  useless  as  a  base  for  the  British  fleet  watching 
Toulon,  made  the  memorable  statement :  "  I  consider 
Malta  as  a  most  important  outwork  to  India."  But  a 
despatch  from  St.  Petersburg,  stating  that  the  new  Czar 
had  concluded  a  formal  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  Order 
of  St.  John  settled  in  Russia,  may  have  convinced  Adding- 
ton  and  his  colleagues  that  it  would  be  better  to  forego  all 
claim  to  Malta  in  order  to  cement  the  newly  won  friend- 
ship of  Russia.  Whatever  may  have  been  their  motive, 
British  Ministers  consented  to  cede  the  island  to  the 
Knights  of  St.  John,  under  the  protection  of  some  third 
Power. 

The  preliminaries  of  peace  were  further  remarkable  for 
three  strange  omissions.  They  did  not  provide  for  the 
renewal  of  previous  treaties  of  peace  between  the  late 
combatants.  War  is  held  to  break  all  previous  treaties  ; 
and  by  failing  to  require  the  renewal  of  the  treaties  of 
1713,  1763,  and  1783,  it  was  now  open  to  Spain  and  France 
to  cement,  albeit  in  a  new  form,  that  Family  Compact 
which  it  had  long  been  the  aim  of  British  diplomacy  to 

1  These  facts  were  fully  acknowledged  later  by  Otto  :  see  his  despatch 
of  January  6th,  1802,  to  Talleyrand,  published  by  Du  Casse  in  his  "  Nego- 
ciations  relatives  au  Traite"  d' Amiens,"  vol.  iii. 


xiv  THE  PEACE   OF  AMIENS  309 

dissolve  :  the  failure  to  renew  those  earlier  treaties  ren- 
dered it  possible  for  the  Court  of  Madrid  to  alienate  any 
of  its  colonies  to  France,  as  at  that  very  time  was  being 
arranged  with  respect  to  Louisiana. 

The  second  omission  was  equally  remarkable.  No 
mention  was  made  of  any  renewal  of  commercial  inter- 
course between  England  and  France.  Doubtless  a  com- 
plete settlement  of  this  question  would  have  been  difficult. 
British  merchants  would  have  looked  for  a  renewal  of  that 
enlightened  treaty  of  commerce  of  1786-7,  which  had 
aroused  the  bitter  opposition  of  French  manufacturers. 
But  the  question  might  have  been  broached  at  London, 
and  its  omission  from  the  preliminaries  served  as  a  reason 
for  shelving  it  in  the  definitive  treaty  —  a  piece  of  folly 
which  at  once  provoked  the  severest  censure  from  British 
manufacturers,  who  thereby  lost  the  markets  of  France 
and  her  subject  States,  Holland,  Spain,  Switzerland, 
Genoa,  and  Etruria. 

And,  finally,  the  terms  of  peace  provided  no  compensa- 
tion either  for  the  French  royal  House  or  for  the  dis- 
possessed House  of  Orange.  Here  again,  it  would  have 
been  very  difficult  to  find  a  recompense  such  as  the  Bour- 
bons could  with  dignity  have  accepted  ;  and  the  sug- 
gestion made  by  one  of  the  royalist  exiles  to  Lord 
Hawkesbury,  that  Great  Britain  should  seize  Crete  and 
hand  it  over  to  them,  will  show  how  desperate  was  their 
sase.1  Nevertheless  some  effort  should  have  been  made 
by  a  Government  which  had  so  often  proclaimed  its  cham- 
pionship of  the  legitimist  cause.  Still  more  glaring  was 
the  omission  of  any  stipulation  for  an  indemnity  for  the 
House  of  Orange,  now  exiled  from  the  Batavian  Republic. 
That  claim,  though  urged  at  the  outset,  found  no  place  in 
the  preliminaries  ;  and  the  mingled  surprise  and  contempt 
felt  in  the  saloris  of  Paris  at  the  conduct  of  the  British 
Government  is  shown  in  a  semi-official  report  sent  thence 
by  one  of  its  secret  agents  : 

"  I  cannot  get  it  into  my  head  that  the  British  Ministry  has  acted 
in  good  faith  in  subscribing  to  preliminaries  of  peace,  which,  con- 
iidering  the  respective  positions  of  the  parties,  would  be  harmful  to 

1  "  F.  O.,"  France,  No.  59.     The  memoir  is  dated  October  19th,  1801. 


310  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  cha* 

the  English  people.  .  .  .  People  are  persuaded  in  France  that  the 
moderation  of  England  is  only  a  snare  put  in  Bonaparte's  way,  and  it 
is  mainly  in  order  to  dispel  it  that  our  journals  have  received  the 
order  to  make  much  of  the  advantages  which  must  accrue  to  England 
from  the  conquests  retained  by  her :  but  the  journalists  have  con- 
vinced nobody,  and  it  is  said  openly  that  if  our  European  conquests 
are  consolidated  by  a  general  peace,  France  will,  within  ten  years, 
subjugate  all  Europe,  Great  Britain  included,  despite  all  her  vast 
dominions  in  India.  Only  within  the  last  few  days  have  people  here 
believed  in  the  sincerity  of  the  English  preliminaries  of  peace,  and 
they  say  everywhere  that,  after  having  gloriously  sailed  past  the  rocks 
that  Bonaparte's  cunning  had  placed  in  its  track,  the  British  Ministry 
has  completely  foundered  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  People 
blame  the  whole  structure  of  the  peace  as  betraying  marks  of  feeble- 
ness in  all  that  concerns  the  dignity  and  the  interests  of  the  King ; 
.  .  .  and  we  cannot  excuse  its  neglect  of  the  royalists,  whose  interests 
are  entirely  set  aside  in  the  preliminaries.  Men  are  especially  aston- 
ished at  England's  retrocession  of  Martinique  without  a  single  stipu- 
lation for  the  colonists  there,  who  are  at  the  mercy  of  a  government 
as  rapacious  as  it  is  fickle.  All  the  owners  of  colonial  property  are 
very  uneasy,  and  do  not  hide  their  annoyance  against  England  on 
this  score." x 


This  interesting  report  gives  a  glimpse  into  the  real 
thought  of  Paris  such  as  is  rarely  afforded  by  the  tamed 
or  venal  Press.  As  Bonaparte's  spies  enabled  him  to  feel 
every  throb  of  the  French  pulse,  he  must  at  once  have 
seen  how  great  was  the  prestige  which  he  gained  by  these 
first  diplomatic  successes,  and  how  precarious  was  the 
foothold  of  the  English  Ministers  on  the  slippery  grade  of 
concession  to  which  they  had  been  lured.  Addington 
surely  should  have  remembered  that  only  the  strong  man 
can  with  safety  recede  at  the  outset,  and  that  an  act  of 
concession  which,  coming  from  a  master  mind,  is  inter- 
preted as  one  of  noble  magnanimity,  will  be  scornfully 
snatched  from  a  nerveless  hand  as  a  sign  of  timorous  com- 
plaisance. But  the  public  statements  and  the  secret 
avowals  of  our  leaders  show  that  they  wished  "  to  try 
the  experiment  of  peace,"  now  that  France  had  returned 
to  ordinary  political  conditions  and  Jacobinism  was  curbed 
by  Bonaparte.  "  Perhaps,"  wrote  Castlereagh,  "  France, 
satisfied  with  her  recent  acquisitions,  will  find  her  interest 
in  that  system  of  internal  improvement  which  is  neces- 

1  "  F.  O.,"  France,  No.  59. 


xiv  THE  PEACE   OF  AMIENS  311 

sarily  connected  with  peace."1  There  is  no  reason  for 
doubting  the  sincerity  of  this  statement.  Our  policy  was 
distinctly  and  continuously  complaisant :  France  regained 
her  colonies  :  she  was  not  required  to  withdraw  from 
Switzerland  and  Holland.  Who  could  expect,  from  what 
was  then  known  of  Bonaparte's  character,  that  a  peace  so 
fraught  with  glory  and  profit  would  not  satisfy  French 
honour  and  his  own  ambition  ? 

Peace,  then,  was  an  "  experiment."  The  British  Govern- 
ment wished  to  see  whether  France  would  turn  from  revo- 
lution and  war  to  agriculture  and  commerce,  whether  her 
young  ruler  would  be  satisfied  with  a  position  of  grandeur 
and  solid  power  such  as  Louis  XIV.  had  rarely  enjoyed. 
Alas  !  the  failure  of  the  experiment  was  patent  to  all  save 
the  blandest  optimists  long  before  the  Preliminaries  of 
London  took  form  in  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Amiens. 
Bonaparte's  aim  now  was  to  keep  our  Government  strictly 
to  the  provisional  terms  of  peace  which  it  had  imprudently 
signed.  Even  before  the  negotiations  were  opened  at 
Amiens,  he  ordered  Joseph  Bonaparte  to  listen  to  no 
proposal  concerning  the  King  of  Sardinia  and  the  ex- 
Stadholder  of  Holland,  and  asserted  that  the  "  internal 
affairs  of  the  Batavian  Republic,  of  Germany,  of  Helvetia, 
and  of  the  Italian  Republics  "  were  "  absolutely  alien  to 
the  discussions  with  England."  This  implied  that  Eng- 
land was  to  be  shut  out  from  Continental  politics,  and 
that  France  was  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  Central  and 
Southern  Europe.  This  observance  of  the  letter  was, 
however,  less  rigid  where  French  colonial  and  maritime 
interests  were  at  stake.  Dextrous  feelers  were  put  forth 
seawards,  and  it  was  only  when  these  were  repulsed  that 
the  French  negotiators  encased  themselves  in  their  pre- 
liminaries. 

The  task  of  reducing  those  articles  to  a  definitive  treaty 
devolved,  on  the  British  side,  on  the  Marquis  Cornwallis, 
a  gouty,  world-weary  old  soldier,  chiefly  remembered  for 
the  surrender  which  ended  the  American  War.  Never- 
theless, he  had  everywhere  won  respect  for  his  personal 
probity  in  the  administration  of  Indian  affairs,  and  there 

1  Oastlereagh,  "Letters  and  Despatches,"  Second  Series,  vol.  i.,  p.  62, 
and  the  speeches  of  Ministers  on  November  3rd,  1801. 


312  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

must  also  have  been  some  convincing  qualities  in  a  per- 
sonality which  drew  from  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena  the 
remark  :  "  I  do  not  believe  that  Cornwallis  was  a  man  of 
first-rate  abilities:  but  he  had  talent,  great  probity,  sin- 
cerity, and  never  broke  his  word.  .  .  .  He  was  a  man  of 
honour  —  a  true  Englishman." 

Against  Lord  Cornwallis,  and  his  far  abler  secretary, 
Mr.  Merry,  were  pitted  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  his  secreta- 
ries. The  abilities  of  the  eldest  of  the  Bonapartes  have 
been  much  underrated.  Though  he  lacked  the  masterful 
force  and  wide  powers  of  his  second  brother,  yet  at 
Luneville  Joseph  proved  himself  to  be  an  able  diplo- 
matist, and  later  on  in  his  tenure  of  power  at  Naples 
and  Madrid  he  displayed  no  small  administrative  gifts. 
Moreover,  his  tact  and  kindliness  kindled  in  all  who 
knew  him  a  warmth  of  friendship  such  as  Napoleon's 
sterner  qualities  rarely  inspired.  The  one  was  loved  as 
a  man  :  for  the  other,  even  his  earlier  acquaintances 
felt  admiration  and  devotion,  but  always  mingled  with 
a  certain  fear  of  the  demigod  that  would  at  times  blaze 
forth.  This  was  the  dread  personality  that  urged  Talley- 
rand and  Joseph  Bonaparte  to  their  utmost  endeavours 
and  steeled  them  against  any  untoward  complaisance  at 
Amiens. 

The  selection  of  so  honourable  a  man  as  Cornwallis 
afforded  no  slight  guarantee  for  the  sincerity  of  our 
Government,  and  its  sincerity  will  stand  the  test  of  a 
perusal  of  its  despatches.  Having  examined  all  those 
that  deal  with  these  negotiations,  the  present  writer  can 
affirm  that  the  official  instructions  were  in  no  respect 
modified  by  the  secret  injunctions :  these  referred  merely 
to  such  delicate  and  personal  topics  as  the  evacuation  of 
Hanover  by  Prussian  troops  and  the  indemnities  to  be 
sought  for  the  House  of  Orange  and  the  House  of  Savoy. 
The  circumstances  of  these  two  dispossessed  dynasties 
were  explained  so  as  to  show  that  the  former  Dutch 
Stadholder  had  a  very  strong  claim  on  us,  as  well  as  on 
France  and  the  Batavian  Republic  ;  while  the  champion- 
ship of  the  House  of  Savoy  by  the  Czar  rendered  the 
claims  of  that  ancient  family  on  the  intervention  of 
George   III.  less  direct  and  personal  than  those  of  the 


xit  THE   PEACE   OF   AMIENS  313 

Prince  of  Orange.  Indeed,  England  would  have  insisted 
on  the  insertion  of  a  clause  to  this  effect  in  the  prelimi- 
naries, had  not  other  arrangements  been  on  foot  at  Berlin 
which  promised  to  yield  due  compensation  to  this  unfor- 
tunate prince.  Doubtless  the  motives  of  the  British 
Ministers  were  good,  but  their  failure  to  insert  such  a 
clause  fatally  prejudiced  their  case  all  through  the  negoti- 
ations at  Amiens. 

The  British  official  declaration  respecting  Malta  was 
clear  and  practical.  The  island  was  to  be  restored  to 
the  Knights  of  the  Order  of  St.  John  and  placed  under 
the  protection  of  a  third  Power  other  than  France  and 
England.  But  the  reconstitution  of  the  Order  was  no 
less  difficult  than  the  choice  of  a  strong  and  disinterested 
protecting  Power.  Lord  Hawkesbury  proposed  that  Russia 
be  the  guaranteeing  Power.  No  proposal  could  have  been 
more  reasonable.  The  claims  of  the  Czar  to  the  protec- 
torate of  the  Order  had  been  so  recently  asserted  by  a 
treaty  with  the  knights  that  no  other  conclusion  seemed 
feasible.  And,  in  order  to  assuage  the  grievances  of  the 
islanders  and  strengthen  the  rule  of  the  knights,  the 
British  Ministry  desired  that  the  natives  of  Malta  should 
gain  a  foothold  in  the  new  constitution.  The  lack  of 
civil  and  political  rights  had  contributed  so  materially  to 
the  overthrow  of  the  Order  that  no  reconstruction  of  that 
shattered  body  could  be  deemed  intelligent,  or  even 
honest,  which  did  not  cement  its  interests  with  those  of 
the  native  Maltese.  The  First  Consul,  however,  at  once 
demurred  to  both  these  proposals.  In  the  course  of  a 
long  interview  with  Cornwallis  at  Paris,1  he  adverted  to 
the  danger  of  bringing  Russia's  maritime  pressure  to 
bear  on  Mediterranean  questions,  especially  as  her  sover- 
eigns "  had  of  late  shown  themselves  to  be  such  unsteady 
politicians."  This  of  course  referred  to  the  English  pro- 
clivities of  Alexander  I.,  and  it  is  clear  that  Bonaparte's 


1  Cornwallis,  "  Correspondence,"  vol.  iii.,  despatch  of  December  3rd, 
1801.  The  feelings  of  the  native  Maltese  were  strongly  for  annexation  to 
Britain,  and  against  the  return  of  the  Order  at  all.  They  sent  a  deputa- 
tion to  London  (February,  1802),  which  was  shabbily  treated  by  our 
Government  so  as  to  avoid  offending  Bonaparte.  (See  "  Correspondence 
of  W.  A.  Miles,"  vol.  ii..  pp.  323-321),  who  drew  up  their  memorial.) 


314  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

annoyance  with  Alexander  was  the  first  unsettling  influ 
ence  which  prevented  the  solution  of  the  Maltese  question. 
The  First  Consul  also  admitted  to  Cornwallis  that  the 
King  of  Naples,  despite  his  ancient  claims  of  suzerainty 
over  Malta,  could  not  be  considered  a  satisfactory  guaran- 
tor, as  between  two  Great  Powers  ;  and  he  then  proposed 
that  the  tangle  should  be  cut  by  blowing  up  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Valetta. 

The  mere  suggestion  of  such  an  act  affords  eloquent 
proof  of  the  difficulties  besetting  the  whole  question.  To 
destroy  works  of  vast  extent,  which  were  the  bulwark 
of  Christendom  against  the  Barbary  pirates,  would  prac- 
tically have  involved  the  handing  over  of  Valetta  to 
those  pests  of  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  from  Malta  as 
a  new  base  of  operations  they  could  have  spread  devas- 
tation along  the  coasts  of  Sicily  and  Italy.  This  was 
the  objection  which  Cornwallis  at  once  offered  to  an 
otherwise  specious  proposal  :  he  had  recently  received 
papers  from  Major-General  Pigot  at  Malta,  in  which  the 
same  solution  of  the  question  was  examined  in  detail. 
The  British  officer  pointed  out  that  the  complete  dis- 
mantling of  the  fortifications  would  expose  the  island, 
and  therefore  the  coasts  of  Italy,  to  the  rovers  ;  yet  he 
suggested  a  partial  demolition,  which  seems  to  prove 
that  the  British  officers  in  command  at  Malta  did  not 
contemplate  the  retention  of  the  island  and  the  infrac- 
tion of  the  peace. 

Our  Government,  however,  disapproved  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  fortifications  of  Valetta  as  wounding  the  sus- 
ceptibilities of  the  Czar,  and  as  in  no  wise  rendering 
impossible  the  seizure  of  the  island  and  the  reconstruction 
of  those  works  by  some  future  invader.  In  tact,  as  the 
British  Ministry  now  aimed  above  all  at  maintaining  good 
relations  with  the  Czar,  Bonaparte's  proposal  could  only  be 
regarded  as  an  ingenious  device  for  sundering  the  Anglo- 
Russian  understanding.  The  French  Minister  at  St. 
Petersburg  was  doing  his  utmost  to  prevent  the  rapproche- 
ment of  the  Czar  to  the  Court  of  St.  James,  and  was  striv- 
ing to  revive  the  moribund  league  of  the  Armed  Neutrals. 
That  last  offer  had  "been  rejected  in  the  most  peremptory 
manner  and  in  terms  almost  bordering   upon   derision. 


xiv  THE  PEACE   0*'   AMIENS  31» 

Still  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  the  former  Anglo- 
Russian  disputes  about  Malta  might  be  so  far  renewed  as 
to  bring  Bonaparte  and  Alexander  to  an  understanding. 
The  sentimental  Liberalism  of  the  young  Czar  predisposed 
him  towards  a  French  alliance,  and  his  whole  disposition 
inclined  him  towards  the  brilliant  opportunism  of  Paris 
rather  than  the  frigid  legitimacy  of  the  Court  of  St.  James. 
The  Maltese  affair  and  the  possibility  of  reopening  the 
Eastern  Question  were  the  two  sources  of  hope  to  the  pro- 
moters of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance  ;  for  both  these  ques- 
tions appealed  to  the  chivalrous  love  of  adventure  and  to 
the  calculating  ambition  so  curiously  blent  in  Alexander's 
nature.  Such,  then,  was  the  motive  which  doubtless 
prompted  Bonaparte's  proposal  concerning  Valetta;  such 
also  were  the  reasons  which  certainly  dictated  its  rejection 
by  Great  Britain. 

In  his  interview  with  the  First  Consul  at  Paris,  and  in 
the  subsequent  negotiations  at  Amiens  with  Joseph  Bona- 
parte, the  question  of  Tobago  and  England's  money  claim 
for  the  support  of  French  prisoners  was  found  to  be  no 
less  thorny  than  that  of  Malta.  The  Bonapartes  firmly 
rejected  the  proposal  for  the  retention  of  Tobago  by  Eng- 
land in  lieu  of  her  pecuniary  demand.  A  Government 
Which  neglected  to  procure  the  insertion  of  its  claim  to 
Tobago  among  the  Preliminaries  of  London  could  cer- 
tainly not  hope  to  regain  that  island  in  exchange  for  a 
concession  to  France  that  was  in  any  degree  disputable. 
But  the  two  Bonapartes  and  Talleyrand  now  took  their 
stand  solely  on  the  preliminaries,  and  politely  waved  on 
one  side  the  earlier  promises  of  M.  Otto  as  unauthorized 
and  invalid.  They  also  closely  scrutinized  the  British 
claim  to  an  indemnity  for  the  support  of  French  prisoners. 
Though  theoretically  correct,  it  was  open  to  an  objection, 
which  was  urged  by  Bonaparte  and  Talleyrand  with  suave 
yet  incisive  irony.  They  suggested  that  the  claim  must 
be  considered  in  relation  to  a  counter-claim,  soon  to  be 
sent  from  Paris,  for  the  maintenance  of  all  prisoners  taken 
by  the  French  from  the  various  forces  sudsidized  by  Great 
Britain,  a  charge  which  "would  probably  not  leave  a 
balance  so  much  in  favour  of  1 1  is  [Britannic]  Majesty  as 
His   Government  may  have   looked    forward   to."     This 


316  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chae 

retort  was  not  so  terrible  as  it  appeared ;  for  most  of  the 
papers  necessary  for  the  making  up  of  the  French  counter- 
claim had  been  lost  or  destroyed  during  the  Revolution. 
Yet  the  threat  told  with  full  effect  on  Cornwallis,  who 
thereafter  referred  to  the  British  claim  as  a  "hopeless 
debt."1  The  officials  of  Downing  Street  drew  a  distinc- 
tion between  prisoners  from  armies  merely  subsidized  by 
us  and  those  taken  from  foreign  forces  actually  under  our 
control ;  but  it  is  clear  that  Cornwallis  ceased  to  press 
the  claim.  In  fact,  the  British  case  was  mismanaged 
from  beginning  to  end :  the  accounts  for  the  maintenance 
of  French  and  Dutch  prisoners  were,  in  the  first  instance, 
wrongly  drawn  up;  and  there  seems  to  have  been  little 
or  no  notion  of  the  seriousness  of  the  counter-claim,  which 
came  with  all  the  effect  of  a  volley  from  a  masked  battery, 
destructive  alike  to  our  diplomatic  reputation  and  to  our 
hope  of  retaining  Tobago. 

It  is  impossible  to  refer  here  to  all  the  topics  discussed 
at  Amiens.  The  determination  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  adopt  a  forward  colonial  and  oceanic  policy  is 
clearly  seen  in  its  proposals  made  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1801.  They  were  :  (1)  the  abolition  of  salutes  to  the 
British  flag  on  the  high  seas ;  (2)  an  absolute  ownership 
of  the  eastern  and  western  coasts  of  Newfoundland  in 
return  for  a  proposed  cession  of  the  isles  of  St.  Pierre 
and  Miquelon  to  us  —  which  would  have  practically  ceded 
to  France  in  full  sovereignty  all  the  best  fishing  coasts  of 
that  land,  with  every  prospect  of  settling  the  interior,  in 
exchange  for  two  islets  devastated  by  war  and  then  in 
British  hands ;  (3)  the  right  of  the  French  to  a  share 
in  the  whale  fishery  in  those  seas ;  (4)  the  establishment 
of  a  French  fishing  station  in  the  Falkland  Isles ;  and 
(5)  the  extension  of  the  French  districts  around  the 
towns  of  Yanaon  and  Mahe  in  India.2  To  all  these 
demands  Lord  Cornwallis  opposed  an  unbending  oppo- 
sition. Weak  as  our  policy  had  been  on  other  affairs, 
it  was  firm  as  a  rock  on  all  maritime  and  Indian  ques- 
tions.    In  fact,  the  events  to  be  described  in  the  next 

1  Cornwallis's  despatches  of  January  10th  and  23rd,  1802. 

2  Project  of  a  treaty  forwarded  by  Cornwallis  to  London  on  December 
27th,  1801,  in  the  Public  Record  Office,  No.  615. 


xiv  THE   PEACE   OF   AMIENS  317 

chapter,  which  led  to  the  consolidation  of  British  power 
in  Hindostan,  would  in  all  probability  never  have  oc- 
curred but  for  the  apprehensions  excited  by  these  French 
demands  ;  and  our  masterful  proconsul  in  Bengal,  the 
Marquis  Wellesley,  could  not  have  pursued  his  daring 
and  expensive  schemes  of  conquest,  annexation,  and 
forced  alliances,  had  not  the  schemes  of  the  First  Consul 
played  into  the  hands  of  the  soldiers  at  Calcutta  and 
weakened  the  protests  of  the  dividend  hunters  of  Lead- 
enhall  Street. 

The  persistence  of  French  demands  for  an  increase 
of  influence  in  Newfoundland  and  the  West  and  East 
Indies,  the  vastness  of  her  expedition  to  Saint  Domingo 
and  the  thinly-veiled  designs  of  her  Australian  expedi- 
tion (which  we  shall  notice  in  the  next  chapter),  all 
served  to  awaken  the  suspicions  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment. The  negotiations  consequently  progressed  but 
slowly.  From  the  outset  they  were  clogged  by  the  sus- 
picion of  bad  faith.  Spain  and  Holland,  smarting  under 
the  conditions  of  a  peace  which  gave  to  France  all  the 
glory  and  to  her  allies  all  the  loss,  delayed  sending  their 
respective  envoys  to  the  conferences  at  Amiens,  and  finally 
avowed  their  determination  to  resist  the  surrender  of  Trini- 
dad and  Ceylon.  In  fact,  pressure  had  to  be  exerted  from 
Paris  and  London  before  they  yielded  to  the  inevitable. 
This  difficulty  was  only  one  of  several :  there  then  re- 
mained the  questions  whether  Portugal  and  Turkey  should 
be  admitted  to  share  in  the  treaty,  as  England  demanded ; 
or  whether  they  should  sign  a  separate  peace  with  France. 
The  First  Consul  strenuously  insisted  on  the  exclusion  of 
those  States,  though  their  interests  were  vitally  affected 
by  the  present  negotiations.  He  saw  that  a  separate  treaty 
with  the  Sublime  Porte  would  enable  him,  not  only  to  ex- 
tract valuable  trading  concessions  in  the  Black  Sea  trade, 
but  also  to  cement  a  good  understanding  with  Russia  on 
the  Eastern  Question,  which  was  now  being  adroitly  re- 
opened by  French  diplomacy.  Against  the  exclusion  of 
Turkey  from  the  negotiations  at  Amiens,  Great  Britain 
firmly  but  vainly  protested.  In  fact,  Talleyrand  had 
bound  the  Porte  to  a  separate  agreement  which  promised 
everything  for  France  and  nothing  for  Turkey,  and  seemed 


318  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

to  doom  the  Sublime  Porte  to  certain  humiliation  and 
probable  partition.1 

Then  there  were  the  vexed  questions  of  the  indemnities 
claimed  by  George  III.  for  the  Houses  of  Orange  and  of 
Savoy.  In  his  interview  with  Cornwallis,  Bonaparte 
had  effusively  promised  to  do  his  utmost  for  the  ex-Stad- 
holder,  though  he  refused  to  consider  the  case  of  the  King 
of  Sardinia,  who,  he  averred,  had  offended  him  by  appeal- 
ing to  the  Czar.  The  territorial  interests  of  France  in 
Italy  doubtless  offered  a  more  potent  argument  to"  the 
First  Consul  :  after  practically  annexing  Piedmont  and 
dominating  the  peninsula,  he  could  ill  brook  the  presence 
on  the  mainland  of  a  king  whom  he  had  already  sacrificed 
to  his  astute  and  masterful  policy.  The  case  of  the 
Prince  of  Orange  was  different.  He  was  a  victim  to  the 
triumph  of  French  and  democratic  influence  in  the  Dutch 
Netherlands.  George  III.  felt  a  deep  interest  in  this 
unfortunate  prince  and  made  a  strong  appeal  to  the  better 
instincts  of  Bonaparte  on  his  behalf.  Indeed,  it  is  prob- 
able that  England  had  acquiesced  in  the  consolidation  of 
French  influence  at  the  Hague,  in  the  hope  that  her  com- 
plaisance would  lead  the  First  Consul  to  assure  him  some 
position  worthy  of  so  ancient  a  House.  But  though 
Cornwallis  pressed  the  Batavian  Republic  on  behalf  of  its 
exiled  chief,  yet  the  question  was  finally  adjourned  by 
the  XVIIIth  clause  of  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Amiens  ; 
and  the  scion  of  that  famous  House  had  to  take  his  share 
in  the  forthcoming  scramble  for  the  clerical  domains  of 
Germany.2 

For  the  still  more  difficult  cause  of  the  House  of  Savoy 
the  British  Government  made  honest  but  unavailing 
efforts,  firmly  refusing  to  recognize  the  newest  creations 

1  See  the  "  Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.  France  gained  the  right  of  admis- 
sion to  the  Black  Sea  :  the  despatches  of  Mr.  Merry  from  Paris  in  May, 
1802,  show  that  France  and  Russia  were  planning  schemes  of  partition  of 
Turkey.     ("F.  0.,"  France,  No.  62.) 

2  The  despatches  of  March  14th  and  22nd,  1802,  show  how  strong  was 
the  repugnance  of  our  Government  to  this  shabby  treatment  of  the  Prince 
of  Orange  ;  and  it  is  clear  that  Cornwallis  exceeded  his  instructions 
in  signing  peace  on  those  terms.  (See  Garden,  vol.  vii.,  p.  142.)  By  a 
secret  treaty  with  Prussia  (May,  1802),  France  procured  Fulda  for  the 
House  of  Orange. 


xiv  THE   PEACE   OF   AMIENS  319 

of  Bonaparte  in  Ital}r,  namely,  the  Kingdom  of  Etruria 
and  the  Ligurian  Republic,  until  he  indemnified  the 
House  of  Savoy.  Our  recognition  was  withheld  for  the 
reasons  that  prompt  every  bargainer  to  refuse  satisfaction 
to  his  antagonist  until  an  equal  concession  is  accorded. 
This  game  was  played  by  both  Powers  at  Amiens,  and 
with  little  other  result  than  mutual  exasperation.  Yet 
here,  too,  the  balance  of  gain  naturally  accrued  to  Bona- 
parte ;  for  he  required  the  British  Ministry  to  recognize 
existing  facts  in  Etruria  and  Liguria,  while  Cornwallis 
had  to  champion  the  cause  of  exiles  and  of  an  order  that 
seemed  for  ever  to  have  vanished.  To  pit  the  non-ex- 
istent against  the  actual  was  a  task  far  above  the  powers 
of  British  statesmanship  ;  yet  that  was  to  be  its  task  for 
the  next  decade,  while  the  forces  of  the  living  present 
were  to  be  wielded  by  its  mighty  antagonist.  Herein 
lay  the  secret  of  British  failures  and  of  Napoleon's  ex- 
traordinary triumphs. 

Leaving,  for  a  space,  the  negotiations  at  Amiens,  we 
turn  to  consider  the  events  which  transpired  at  Lyons  in 
the  early  weeks  of  1802,  events  which  influenced  not  only 
the  future  of  Italy,  but  the  fortunes  of  Bonaparte. 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  after  the  French  victories 
of  Marengo  and  Hohenlinden,  Austria  agreed  to  terms 
of  peace  whereby  the  Cisalpine,  Ligurian,  Helvetic,  and 
Batavian  Republics  were  formally  recognized  by  her, 
though  a  clause  expressly  stipulated  that  they  were  to 
be  independent  of  France.  A  vain  hope  !  They  con- 
tinued to  be  under  French  tutelage,  and  their  strong- 
holds in  the  possession  of  French  troops. 

It  now  remained  to  legalize  French  supremacy  in  the 
Cisalpine  Republic,  which  comprised  the  land  between 
the  Ticino  and  the  Adige,  and  the  Alps  and  the  Rubicon. 
The  new  State  received  a  provisional  form  of  government 
after  Marengo,  a  small  council  being  appointed  to  super- 
vise civil  affairs  at  the  capital,  Milan.  With  it  and  with 
Marescalchi,  the  Cisalpine  envoy  at  Paris,  Bonaparte  had 
concerted  a  constitution,  or  rather  he  had  used  these 
men  as  a  convenient  screen  to  hide  its  purely  personal 
origin.  Having,  for  form's  sake,  consulted  the  men  whom 
he   had   himself   appointed,   he    now   suggested  that  the 


320  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

chief  citizens  of  that  republic  should  confer  with  him 
respecting  their  new  institutions.  His  Minister  at  Milan 
thereupon  proposed  that  they  should  cross  the  Alps  for 
that  purpose,  assembling,  not  at  Paris,  where  their  de- 
pendence on  the  First  Consul's  will  might  provoke  too 
much  comment,  but  at  Lyons.  To  that  city,  accordingly, 
there  repaired  some  450  of  the  chief  men  of  Northern 
Italy,  who  braved  the  snows  of  a  most  rigorous  December, 
in  the  hope  of  consolidating  the  liberties  of  their  long- 
distracted  country.  And  thus  was  seen  the  strange 
spectacle  of  the  organization  of  Lombardy,  Modena,  and 
the  Legations  being  effected  in  one  provincial  centre  of 
France,  while  at  another  of  her  cities  the  peace  of  Europe 
and  the  fortunes  of  two  colonial  empires  were  likewise  at 
stake.  Such  a  conjunction  of  events  might  well  impress 
the  imagination  of  men,  bending  the  stubborn  will  of  the 
northern  islanders,  and  moulding  the  Italian  notables  to 
complete  complaisance.  And  yet,  such  power  was  there 
in  the  nascent  idea  of  Italian  nationality,  that  Bonaparte's 
proposals,  which,  in  his  absence,  were  skilfully  set  forth 
by  Talleyrand,  met  with  more  than  one  rebuff  from  the 
Consulta  at  Lyons. 

Bitterly  it  opposed  the  declaration  that  the  Roman 
Catholic  religion  was  the  religion  of  the  Cisalpine  Re- 
public and  must  be  maintained  by  a  State  budget.  Only 
the  first  part  of  this  proposal  could  be  carried :  so  keen 
was  the  opposition  to  the  second  part  that,  as  a  preferable 
plan,  property  was  set  apart  for  the  support  of  the 
clergy  ;  and  clerical  discipline  was  subjected  to  the  State, 
on  terms  somewhat  similar  •  to  those  of  the  French 
Concordat.1 

Secular  affairs  gave  less  trouble.  The  apparent  suc- 
cess of  the  French  constitution  furnished  a  strong  motive 
for  adopting  one  of  a  similar  character  for  the  Italian 
State  ;  and  as  the  proposed  institutions  had  been  ap- 
proved at  Milan,  their  acceptance  by  a  large  and  miscel- 
laneous body  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  Talleyrand  also 
took  the  most  unscrupulous  care  that  the  affair  of  the 
Presidency  should  be  judiciously  settled.  On  December 
31st,  1801,  he  writes  to  Bonaparte  from  Lyons  : 

1  Pasolini,  "Memorie,"  ad  init. 


THE   PEACE   OF   AMIENS  321 

"  The  opinion  of  the  Cisalpines  seems  not  at  all  decided  as  to  the 
choice  to  be  made :  they  will  gladly  receive  the  man  whom  you 
nominate :  a  President  in  France  and  a  Vice-President  at  Milan 
would  suit  a  large  number  of  them." 

Four  days  later  he  confidently  assures  the  First  Consul : 

"  They  will  do  what  you  want  without  your  needing  even  to  show 
your  desire.  What  they  think  you  desire  will  immediately  become 
law."  1 

The  ground  having  been  thus  thoroughly  worked, 
Bonaparte  and  Josephine,  accompanied  by  a  brilliant  suite, 
arrived  at  Lyons  on  January  11th,  and  met  with  an  enthu- 
siastic reception.  Despite  the  intense  cold,  followed  by  a 
sudden  thaw,  a  brilliant  series  of  fetes,  parades,  and  recep- 
tions took  place  ;  and  several  battalions  of  the  French 
Army  of  Egypt,  which  had  recently  been  conveyed  home 
on  English  ships,  now  passed  in  review  before  their  chief. 
The  impressionable  Italians  could  not  mistake  the  aim  of 
these  demonstrations  ;  and,  after  general  matters  had  been 
arranged  by  the  notables,  the  final  measures  were  relegated 
to  a  committee  of  thirty.  The  desirability  of  this  step 
was  obvious,  for  urgent  protests  had  already  been  raised 
in  the  Consulta  against  the  appointment  of  a  foreigner  as 
President  of  the  new  State.  When  a  hubbub  arose  on 
this  burning  topic  — 

"  Some  officers  of  the  regiments  in  garrison  at  Lyons  appeared  in 
the  hall  and  imposed  silence  upon  all  parties.  Notwithstanding  this, 
Count  Melzi  was  actually  chosen  President  by  the  majority  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Thirty;  but  he  declined  the  honour,  and  suggested  in  signifi- 
cant terms  that,  to  enable  him  to  render  any  service  to  the  country, 
the  committee  had  better  fix  upon  General  Bonaparte  as  their  Chief 
Magistrate.  This  being  done,  Bonaparte  immediately  appointed 
Count  Melzi  Vice-President."  2 

Bonaparte's  determination  to  fill  this  important  position 
is  clearly  seen  in  his  correspondence.     On  the  2nd  and 

1 "  Lettres  in6dites  de  Talleyrand  a  Napoleon  "  (Paris,  1889). 

2  Mr.  Jackson's  despatch  of  February  17th,  1802,  from  Paris.  According 
to  Miot  de  Melito  ("  Mems.,1'  ch.  xiv.),  Bonaparte  had  offered  the  post  of 
President  to  his  brother  Joseph,  but  fettered  by  so  many  restrictions  that 
Joseph  declined  the  honour. 


322  THE  LIFE  OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

4th  of  Pluviose  (January  22nd  and  24th),  he  writes  from 

Lyons : 

"  All  the  principal  affairs  of  the  Consulta  are  settled.  I  Gount  on 
being  back  at  Paris  in  the  course  of  the  decade." 

"  To-morrow  I  shall  review  the  troops  from  Egypt.  On  the  6th  [of 
Pluviose]  all  the  business  of  the  Consulta  will  be  finished,  and  I  shall 
probably  set  out  on  my  journey  on  the  7th." 

The  next  day,  5th  Pluviose,  sees  the  accomplishment  of 
his  desires  : 

"  To-day  I  have  reviewed  the  troops  on  the  Place  Bellecour ;  the 
sun  shone  as  it  does  in  Floreal.  The  Consulta  has  named  a  commit- 
tee of  thirty  individuals,  which  has  reported  to  it  that,  considering  the 
domestic  and  foreign  affairs  of  the  Cisalpine,  it  was  indispensable  to 
let  me  discharge  the  first  magistracy,  until  circumstances  permit  and 
I  judge  it  suitable  to  appoint  a  successor." 

These  extracts  prove  that  the  acts  of  the  Consulta  could 
be  planned  beforehand  no  less  precisely  than  the  move- 
ments of  the  soldiery,  and  that  even  so  complex  a  matter 
as  the  voting  of  a  constitution  and  the  choice  of  its  chief 
had  to  fall  in  with  the  arrangements  of  this  methodizing 
genius.  Certainly  civilization  had  progressed  since  the 
weary  years  when  the  French  people  groped  through 
mists  and  waded  in  blood  in  order  to  gain  a  perfect  pol- 
ity :  that  precious  boon  was  now  conferred  on  a  neigh- 
bouring people  in  so  sure  a  way  that  the  plans  of  their, 
benefactor  could  be  infallibly  fixed  and  his  return  to  Paris 
calculated  to  the  hour. 

The  final  address  uttered  by  Bonaparte  to  the  Italian 
notables  is  remarkable  ior  the  short,  sharp  sentences, 
which  recall  the  tones  of  the  parade  ground.  Passing  re- 
cent events  in  rapid  review,  he  said,  speaking  in  his  mother 
tongue  : 

"...  Every  effort  had  been  made  to  dismember  you  :  the  protec- 
tion of  France  won  the  day  :  you  have  been  recognized  at  Luneville. 
One-fifth  larger  than  before,  you  are  now  more  powerful,  more  consoli- 
dated, and  have  wider  hopes.  Composed  of  six  different  nations,  you 
will  be  now  united  under  a  constitution  the  best  possible  for  your  so- 
cial and  material  condition.  .  .  .  The  selections  T  have  made  for  your 
chief  offices  have  been  made  independently  of  all  idea  of  party  or  feel- 
ing of  locality.  As  for  that  of  President,  I  have  found  no  one  among 
you  with  sufficient  claims  on  public  opinion,  sufficiently  free  from  local 


xiv  THE   TEACE   OF   AMIENS  323 

feelings,  and  who  had  rendered  great  enough  services  to  his  country, 
to  intrust  it  to  him.  .  .  .  Your  people  has  only  local  feelings :  it  must 
now  rise  to  national  feelings." 

In  accordance  with  this  last  grand  and  prophetic  remark, 
the  name  Italian  was  substituted  for  that  of  Cisalpine  : 
and  thus,  for  the  first  time  since  the  Middle  Ages,  there 
reappeared  on  the  map  of  Europe  that  name,  which  was 
to  evoke  the  sneers  of  diplomatists  and  the  most  exalted 
patriotism  of  the  century.  If  Bonaparte  had  done  naught 
else,  he  would  deserve  immortal  glory  for  training  the 
divided  peoples  of  the  peninsula  for  a  life  of  united 
activity. 

The  new  constitution  was  modelled  on  that  of  France  ; 
but  the  pretence  of  a  democratic  suffrage  was  abandoned. 
The  right  of  voting  was  accorded  to  three  classes,  the  great 
proprietors,  the  clerics  and  learned  men,  and  the  merchants. 
These,  meeting  in  their  several  "Electoral  Colleges,"  voted 
for  the  members  of  the  legislative  bodies  ;  a  Tribunal 
was  also  charged  with  the  maintenance  of  the  constitution. 
By  these  means  Bonaparte  endeavoured  to  fetter  the  power 
of  the  reactionaries  no  less  than  the  anti-clerical  fervour 
of  the  Italian  Jacobins.  The  blending  of  the  new  and 
the  old  which  then  began  shows  the  hand  of  the  master- 
builder,  who  neither  sweeps  away  materials  merely  because 
they  are  old,  nor  rejects  the  strength  that  comes  from  im- 
proved methods  of  construction  :  and,  however  much  we 
may  question  the  disinterestedness  of  his  motives  in  this 
great  enterprise,  there  can  be  but  one  opinion  as  to  the 
skill  of  the  methods  and  the  beneficence  of  the  results  in 
Italy.1 

The  first  step  in  the  process  of  Italian  unification  had 
now  been  taken  at  Lyons.  A  second  soon  followed.  The 
affairs  of  the  Ligurian  Republic  were  in  some  confusion  ; 
and  an  address  came  from  Genoa  begging  that  their  dif- 
ferences might  be  composed  by  the  First  Consul.     The 

1  Roederer  tells  us  ("CEuvres,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  428)  that  he  had  drawn  up 
two  plans  of  a  constitution  for  the  Cisalpine  ;  the  one  very  short  and 
leaving  much  to  the  President,  the  other  precise  and  detailed.  He  told 
Talleyrand  to  advise  Bonaparte  to  adopt  the  former  as  it  was  "  short  and  " 
—  he  was  about  to  add  "clear"  when  the  diplomatist  cut  him  short  with 
the  words,  "Yes:  short  and  obscure!'1'1 


324  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

spontaneity  of  this  offer  may  well  be  questioned,  seeing 
that  Bonaparte  found  it  desirable,  in  his  letter  of  February 
18th,  1802,  to  assure  the  Ligurian  authorities  that  they 
need  feel  no  disquietude  as  to  the  independence  of  their 
republic.  Bonaparte  undertook  to  alter  their  constitution 
and  nominate  their  Doge. 

That  the  news  of  the  events  at  Lyons  excited  the  live- 
liest indignation  in  London  is  evident  from  Hawkesbury's 
despatch  of  February  12th,  1802,  to  Cornwallis  : 

"  The  proceedings  at  Lyons  have  created  the  greatest  alarm  in  this 
country,  and  there  are  many  persons  who  were  pacifically  disposed, 
who  since  this  event  are  desirous  of  renewing  the  war.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  be  surprised  at  this  feeling  when  we  consider  the  inordinate 
ambition,  the  gross  breach  of  faith,  and  the  inclination  to  insult  Eu- 
rope manifested  by  the  First  Consul  on  this  occasion.  The  Govern- 
ment here  are  desirous  of  avoiding  to  take  notice  of  these  proceedings, 
and  are  sincerely  desirous  to  conclude  the  peace,  if  it  can  be  obtained 
on  terms  consistent  with  our  honour." 

Why  the  Government  should  have  lagged  behind  the  far 
surer  instincts  of  English  public  opinion  it  is  difficult  to 
say.  Hawkesbury's  despatch  of  four  days  later  supplies 
an  excuse  for  his  contemptible  device  of  pretending  not 
to  see  this  glaring  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville. 
Referring  to  the  events  at  Lyons,  he  writes  : 

"  Extravagant  and  unjustifiable  as  they  are  in  themselves,  [they] 
must  have  led  us  to  believe  that  the  First  Consul  would  have  been 
more  anxious  than  ever  to  have  closed  his  account  with  this  country." 

Doubtless  that  was  the  case,  but  only  on  condition  that 
England  remained  passive  while  French  domination  was 
extended  over  all  neighbouring  lands.  If  our  Ministers 
believed  that  Bonaparte  feared  the  displeasure  of  Austria, 
they  were  completely  in  error.  Thanks  to  the  utter  weak- 
ness of  the  European  system,  and  the  rivalry  of  Austria 
and  Prussia,  he  was  now  able  to  concentrate  his  ever-in- 
creasing power  and  prestige  on  the  negotiations  at  Amiens, 
which  once  more  claim  our  attention. 

Far  from  being  sated  by  the  prestige  gained  at  Lyons, 
he  seemed  to  grow  more  exacting  with  victory.  Moreover, 
he  had  been  cut  to  the  quick  by  some  foolish  articles  of  a 
French  SmigrS  named  Peltier,  in  a  paper  published  at  Lon- 


xiv  THE  PEACE   OF  AMIENS  325 

don  :  instead  of  treating  them  with  the  contempt  they 
deserved,  he  magnified  these  ravings  of  a  disappointed 
exile  into  an  event  of  high  policy,  and  fulminated  against 
the  Government  which  allowed  them.  In  vain  did  Corn- 
wallis  object  that  the  Addington  Cabinet  could  not  ven- 
ture on  the  unpopular  act  of  curbing  freedom  of  the  Press 
in  Great  Britain.  The  First  Consul,  who  had  experienced 
no  such  difficulty  in  France,  persisted  now,  as  a  year  later, 
in  considering  every  uncomplimentary  reference  to  himself 
as  an  indirect  and  semi-official  attack. 

To  these  causes  we  may  attribute  the  French  demands 
of  February  4th  :  contradicting  his  earlier  proposal  for  a 
temporary  Neapolitan  garrison  of  Malta,  Bonaparte  now 
absolutely  refused  either  to  grant  that  necessary  protec- 
tion to  the  weak  Order  of  St.  John,  or  to  join  Great  Brit- 
ain in  an  equal  share  of  the  expenses  —  £20,000  a  year  — 
which  such  a  garrison  would  entail.  The  astonishment 
and  indignation  aroused  at  Downing  Street  nearly  led  to 
an  immediate  rupture  of  the  negotiations  ;  and  it  needed 
all  the  patience  of  Cornwallis  and  the  suavity  of  Joseph 
Bonaparte  to  smooth  away  the  asperities  caused  by  Napo- 
leon's direct  intervention.  It  needs  only  a  slight  acquaint- 
ance with  the  First  Consul's  methods  of  thought  and 
expression  to  recognize  in  the  Protocol  of  February  4th 
the  incisive  speech  of  an  autocrat  confident  in  his  newly- 
consolidated  powers  and  irritated  by  the  gibes  of  Peltier.1 

The  good  sense  of  the  two  plenipotentiaries  at  Amiens 
before  long  effected  a  reconciliation.  Hawkesbury,  writ- 
ing from  Downing  Street,  warned  Cornwallis  that  if 
a  rupture  were  to  take  place  it  must  not  be  owing  to  "  any 
impatience  on  our  part "  :  and  he,  in  his  turn,  affably 
inquired  from  Joseph  Bonaparte  whether  he  had  any  more 
practicable  plan  than  that  of  a  Neapolitan  garrison,  which 
he  had  himself  proposed.  No  plan  was  forthcoming  other 
than  that  of  a  garrison  of  1,000  Swiss  mercenaries  ;  and 
as  this  was  open  to  grave  objections,  the  original  proposal 
was  finally  restored.  On  its  side,  the  Court  of  St.  James 
still  refused  to  blow  up  the  fortifications  at  Valetta  ;  and 
rather  than   destroy  those  works,  England   had   already 

1  Napoleon's  letter  of  February  2nd,  1802,  to  Joseph  Bonaparte  ;  see 
too  Cornwallis's  memorandum  of  February  18th. 


326  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

offered  that  the  independence  of  Malta  should  be  guaran- 
teed by  the  Great  Powers  —  Great  Britain,  France,  Aus- 
tria, Russia,  Spain,  and  Prussia  :  to  this  arrangement 
France  soon  assented.  Later  on  we  demanded  that  the 
Neapolitan  garrison  should  remain  in  Malta  for  three  years 
after  the  evacuation  of  the  island  by  the  British  troops ; 
whereas  France  desired  to  limit  the  period  to  one  year. 
To  this  Cornwallis  finally  assented,  with  the  proviso  that, 
"  if  the  Order  of  St.  John  shall  not  have  raised  a  sufficient 
number  of  men,  the  Neapolitan  troops  shall  remain  until 
they  shall  be  relieved  by  an  adequate  force,  to  be  agreed 
upon  by  the  guaranteeing  Powers."  The  question  of  the 
garrison  having  been  arranged,  other  details  gave  less 
trouble,  and  the  Maltese  question  was  settled  in  the  thir- 
teen conditions  added  to  Clause  X.  of  the  definitive  treaty. 

Though  this  complex  question  was  thus  adjusted  by 
March  17th,  other  matters  delayed  a  settlement.  Hawkes- 
bury  still  demanded  a  definite  indemnity  for  the  Prince 
of  Orange,  but  Cornwallis  finally  assented  to  Article 
XVIII.  of  the  treaty,  which  vaguely  promised  "an  ade- 
quate compensation."  Cornwallis  also  persuaded  his 
chief  to  waive  his  claims  for  the  direct  participation  of 
Turkey  in  the  treaty.  The  British  demand  for  an  indem- 
nity for  the  expense  of  supporting  French  prisoners  was 
to  be  relegated  to  commissioners  —  who  never  met. 
Indeed,  this  was  the  only  polite  way  of  escaping  from  the 
untenable  position  which  our  Government  had  heedlessly 
taken  upon  this  topic. 

It  is  clear  from  the  concluding  despatches  of  Corn- 
wallis that  he  was  wheedled  by  Joseph  Bonaparte  into 
conceding  more  than  the  British  Government  had  em- 
powered him  to  do  :  and,  though  the  "  secret  and  most 
confidential"  despatch  of  March  22nd  cautioned  him 
against  narrowing  too  much  the  ground  of  a  rupture,  if 
a  rupture  should  still  occur,  yet  three  days  later,  and 
after  the  receipt  of  this  despatch,  he  signed  the  terms  of 
peace  with  Joseph  Bonaparte,  and  two  days  later  with 
the  other  signatory  Powers.1      It   may  well  be  doubted 

1  It  is  only  fair  to  Cornwallis  to  quote  the  letter,  marked  "  Private," 
which  he  received  from  Hawkesbury  at  the  same  time  that  he  was  bidden 
to  stand  firm :  — 


xiv  THE   PEACE   OF  AMIENS  327 

whether  peace  would  ever  have  been  signed  but  for  the 
skill  of  Joseph  Bonaparte  in  polite  cajolery  and  the  de- 
termination of  Cornwallis  to  arrive  at  an  understanding. 
In  any  case  the  final  act  of  signature  was  distinctly  the 
act,  not  of  the  British  Government,  but  of  its  plenipo- 
tentiary. That  fact  is  confirmed  by  his  admission,  on 
March  28th,  that  he  had  yielded  where  he  was  ordered 
to  remain  inflexible.  At  St.  Helena,  Napoleon  also 
averred  that  after  Cornwallis  had  definitely  pledged  him- 
self to  sign  the  treaty  as  it  stood  on  the  night  of  March 
24th,  he  received  instructions  in  a  contrary  sense  from 
Downing  Street;  that  nevertheless  he  held  himself  bound 
by  his  promise  and  signed  the  treaty  on  the  following  day, 
observing  that  his  Government,  if  dissatisfied,  might  refuse 
to  ratify  it,  but  that,  having  pledged  his  word,  he  felt 
bound  to  abide  by  it.  This  story  seems  consonant  with 
the  whole  behaviour  of  Cornwallis,  so  creditable  to  him  as 
a  man,  so  damaging  to  him  as  a  diplomatist.  The  later 
events  of  the  negotiation  aroused  much  annoyance  at 
Downing  Street,  and  the  conduct  of  Cornwallis  met  with 
chilling  disapproval. 

The  First  Consul,  on  the  other  hand,  showed  his  appre- 
ciation of  his  brother's  skill  with  unusual  warmth  ;  for 
when  they  appeared  together  at  the  opera  in  Paris,  he 
affectionately  thrust  his  elder  brother  to  the  front  of  the 
State  box  to  receive  the  plaudits  of  the  audience  at  the 
advent  of  a  definite  peace.  That  was  surely  the  purest 
and  noblest  joy  which  the  brothers  ever  tasted. 

With  what  feelings  of  pride,  not  unmixed  with  awe, 
must  the  brothers  have  surveyed  their  career.  Less  than 
nine  years  had  elapsed  since  their  family  fled  from  Corsica 
and  landed  on  the  coast  of  Provence,  apparently  as  bank- 

"  Downing  Street,  March  22nd,  1802. 

"I  think  it  right  to  inform  you  that  I  have  had  a  confidential  com- 
munication with  Otto,  who  will  use  his  utmost  endeavours  to  induce  his 
Government  to  agree  to  the  articles  respecting  the  Prince  of  Orange  and 
the  prisoners  in  the  shape  in  which  they  are  now  proposed.  I  have  very 
little  doubt  of  his  success,  and  I  should  hope  therefore  that  you  will  soon 
be  released.  I  need  not  remind  you  of  the  importance  of  sending  your 
most  expeditious  messenger  the  moment  our  fate  is  determined.  The 
Treasury  is  almost  exhausted,  and  Mr.  Addington  cannot  well  make  his 
loan  in  the  present  state  of  uncertainty." 


328  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xiv 

rupt  in  their  political  hopes  as  in  their  material  fortunes. 
Thrice  did  the  fickle  goddess  cast  Napoleon  to  the  ground 
in  the  first  two  years  of  his  new  life,  only  that  his  won- 
drous gifts  and  sublime  self-confidence  might  tower  aloft 
the  more  conspicuously,  bewildering  alike  the  malcontents 
of  Paris,  the  generals  of  the  old  Empire,  the  peoples  of 
the  Levant,  and  the  statesmen  of  Britain.  Of  all  these 
triumphs  assuredly  the  last  was  not  the  least.  The  Peace 
of  Amiens  left  France  the  arbitress  of  Europe,  and,  by 
restoring  to  her  all  her  lost  colonies,  it  promised  to  place 
her  in  the  van  of  the  oceanic  and  colonizing  peoples. 


CHAPTER   XV 

A  FRENCH  COLONIAL  EMPIRE 

ST.    DOMINGO  —  LOUISIANA INDIA AUSTRALIA 

"  I]  n'y  a  rien  dans  l'histoire  du  monde  de  comparable  aux  forces 
navales  de  l'Angleterre,  a  l'etendue  et  a  la  richesse  de  son  commerce, 
a  la  masse  de  ses  dettes,  de  ses  defenses,  de  ses  moyens,  et  a  la  fragi- 
lite  des  bases  sur  lesquelles  repose  l'edifice  immense  de  sa  fortune." 
—  Baron  Malouet,  Considerations  hisloriques  sur  I' Empire  de  la  Mer. 

There  are  abundant  reasons  for  thinking  that  Napo- 
leon valued  the  Peace  of  Amiens  as  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary to  the  restoration  of  the  French  Colonial  Empire.  A 
comparison  of  the  dates  at  which  he  set  on  foot  his 
oceanic  schemes  will  show  that  they  nearly  all  had  their 
inception  in  the  closing  months  of  1801  and  in  the  course 
of  the  following  year.  The  sole  important  exceptions 
were  the  politico-scientific  expedition  to  Australia,  the 
ostensible  purpose  of  which  insured  immunity  from  the 
attacks  of  English  cruisers  even  in  the  year  1800,  and 
the  plans  for  securing  French  supremacy  in  Egypt,  which 
had  been  frustrated  in  1801  and  were,  to  all  appearance, 
abandoned  by  the  First  Consul  according  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens.  The  question  whether  he 
really  relinquished  his  designs  on  Egypt  is  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  that 
it  will  be  more  fitly  considered  in  the  following  chapter. 
It  may  not,  however,  be  out  of  place  to  offer  some  proofs 
as  to  the  value  which  Bonaparte  set  on  the  valley  of  the 
Nile  and  the  Isthmus  of  Suez.  A  letter  from  a  spy  at 
Paris,  preserved  in  the  archives  of  our  Foreign  Office,  and 
dated  July  10th,  1801,  contains  the  following  significant 
statement  with  reference  to  Bonaparte  :  "  Egypt,  which 
is  considered  here  as  lost  to  France,  is  the  only  object 
which  interests  his  personal  ambition  and  excites  his 
revenge."     Even  at  the  end  of  his  days,  he  thought  long- 

329 


330 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 


infflv  of  the  land  of  the  Pharaohs.  In  his  first  interview 
with  the  governor  of  St.  Helena,  the  illustrious  exile  said 
emphatically  :  "  Egypt  is  the  most  important  country  m 
the  world."  The  words  reveal  a  keen  perception  ot  all 
the  influences  conducive  to  commercial  prosperity  and 
imperial  greatness.  Egypt,  in  fact,  with  the  Suez  Canal, 
which  his  imagination  always  pictured  as  a  necessary 
adjunct,  was  to  be  the  keystone  of  that  arch  of  empire 
which  was  to  span  the  oceans  and  link  the  prairies  ot  the 
far  west  to  the  teeming  plains  of  India  and  the  far  Austral 

Isles. 

The   motives   which  impelled  Napoleon  to  the  enter- 
prises now  to  be  considered  were  as  many-sided  as  the 
maritime   ventures    themselves.      Ultimately,   doubtless, 
they  arose  out  of  a  love  of  vast  undertakings  that  minis- 
tered at  once  to  an  expanding  ambition  and  to  that  need 
of  arduous  administrative  toils  for  which  his  mind  ever 
craved  in  the  heyday  of  its  activity.     And,  while  satiat- 
ing the  grinding  powers  of  his  otherwise  morbidly  rest- 
less spirit,  these  enterprises  also  fed  and  soothed  those 
imperious,  if  unconscious,  instincts  which  prompt  every 
able  man  of  inquiring   mind  to  reclaim  all  possible  do- 
mains from  the  unknown  or  the  chaotic.     As  Egypt  had, 
for   the  present  at  least,   been   reft   from  his   grasp,   he 
turned  naturally  to  all  other  lands  that  could  be  forced 
to  yield  their  secrets  to  the  inquirer,  or  their  comforts  to 
the  benefactors  of  mankind.     Only  a  dull  cynicism  can 
deny  this  motive  to  the  man  who  first  unlocked  the  doors 
of  Egyptian  civilization  ;  and  it  would  be  equally  futile  to 
deny  to  him  the  same  beneficent  aims  with  regard  to  the 
settlement  of  the  plains  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  coasts 
of  New  Holland. 

The  peculiarities  of  the  condition  of  t  ranee  furnished 
another  powerful  impulse  towards  colonization.  In  the 
last  decade  her  people  had  suffered  from  an  excess  of 
mental  activity  and  nervous  excitement.  From  philo- 
sophical and  political  speculation  they  must  be  brought 
back  to  the  practical  and  prosaic;  and  what  influence 
could  be  so  healthy  as  the  turning  up  of  new  soil  and 
other  processes  that  satisfy  the  primitive  instincts  ?  Some 
of  these,  it  was  true,  were  being  met  by  the  increasing 


Xv  A   FRENCH   COLONIAL    EMPIRE  331 

peasant  proprietary  in  France  herself.  But  this  internal 
development,  salutary  as  it  was,  could  not  appease  the 
restless  spirits  of  the  towns  or  the  ambition  of  the  sol- 
diery. Foreign  adventures  and  oceanic  commerce  alone 
could  satisfy  the  Parisians  and  open  up  new  careers  for 
the  Praetorian  chiefs,  whom  the  First  Consul  alone  really 
feared. 

Nor  were  these  sentiments  felt  by  him  alone.  In  a 
paper  which  Talleyrand  read  to  the  Institute  of  France 
in  July,  1797,  that  far-seeing  statesman  had  dwelt  upon 
the  pacifying  influences  exerted  by  foreign  commerce 
and  colonial  settlements  on  a  too  introspective  nation. 
His  words  bear  witness  to  the  keenness  of  his  insight 
into  the  maladies  of  his  own  people  and  the  sources  of 
social  and  political  strength  enjoyed  by  the  United 
States,  where  he  had  recently  sojourned.  Referring  to 
their  speedy  recovery  from  the  tumults  of  their  revolu- 
tion he  said :  "  The  true  Lethe  after  passing  through  a 
revolution  is  to  be  found  in  the  opening  out  to  men  of 
every  avenue  of  hope.  —  Revolutions  leave  behind  them 
a  general  restlessness  of  mind,  a  need  of  movement." 
That  need  was  met  in  America  by  man's  warfare  against 
the  forest,  the  flood,  and  prairie.  France  must  there- 
fore possess  colonies  as  intellectual  and  political  safety- 
valves  ;  and  in  his  graceful,  airy  style  he  touched  on  the 
advantages  offered  by  Egypt,  Louisiana,  and  West  Africa, 
both  for  their  intrinsic  value  and  as  opening  the  door  of 
work  and  of  hope  to  a  brain-sick  generation. 

Following  up  this  clue,  Bonaparte,  at  a  somewhat 
later  date,  remarked  the  tendency  of  the  French  people, 
now  that  the  revolutionary  strifes  were  past,  to  settle 
down  contentedly  on  their  own  little  plots ;  and  lie 
emphasized  the  need  of  a  colonial  policy  such  as  would 
widen  the  national  life.  The  remark  has  been  largely 
justified  by  events ;  and  doubtless  he  discerned  in  the 
agrarian  reforms  of  the  Revolution  an  influence  un- 
favourable to  that  racial  dispersion  which,  under  wise 
guidance,  builds  up  an  oceanic  empire.  The  grievances 
of  the  ancien  rSgime  had  helped  to  scatter  on  the  shores 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  the  seeds  of  a  possible  New  France. 
Primogeniture  was  ever  driving  from  England  her  younger 


332  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

sons  to  found  New  Englands  and  expand  the  commerce 
of  the  motherland.  Let  not  France  now  rest  at  home, 
content  with  her  perfect  laws  and  with  the  conquest  of 
her  "natural  frontiers."  Let  her  rather  strive  to  regain 
the  first  place  in  colonial  activity  which  the  follies  of 
Louis  XV.  and  the  secular  jealousy  of  Albion  had  filched 
from  her.  In  the  effort  she  would  extend  the  bounds 
of  civilization,  lay  the  ghost  of  Jacobinism,  satisfy  mili- 
tary and  naval  adventures,  and  unconsciously  revert  to 
the  ideas  and  governmental  methods  of  the  age  of  le 
grand  monarque. 

The  French  possessions  beyond  the  seas  had  never 
shrunk  to  a  smaller  area  than  in  the  closing  years  of  the 
late  war  with  England.  The  fact  was  confessed  by' the 
First  Consul  in  his  letter  of  October  7th,  1801,  to  Decres, 
the  Minister  for  the  Navy  and  the  Colonies :  "  Our  pos- 
sessions beyond  the  sea,  which  are  now  in  our  power, 
are  limited  to  Saint  Domingo,  Guadeloupe,  the  Isle  of 
France  (Mauritius),  the  Isle  of  Bourbon,  Senegal,  and 
Guiana."  After  rendering  this  involuntary  homage  to 
the  prowess  of  the  British  navy,  Bonaparte  proceeded  to 
describe  the  first  measures  for  the  organization  of  these 
colonies  :  for  not  until  March  25th,  1802,  when  the  de- 
finitive treaty  of  peace  was  signed,  could  the  others  be 
regained  by  France. 

First  in  importance  came  the  re-establishment  of  French 
authority  in  the  large  and  fertile  island  of  Hayti,  or  St. 
Domingo.  It  needs  an  effort  of  the  imagination  for  the 
modern  reader  to  realize  the  immense  importance  of  the 
West  Indian  islands  at  the  beginning  of  the  century 
whose  close  found  them  depressed  and  half  bankrupt. 
At  the  earlier  date,  when  the  name  Australia  was  unknown 
and  the  half-starved  settlement  in  and  around  Sydney 
represented  the  sole  wealth  of  that  isle  of  continent ;  when 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  was  looked  on  only  as  a  port  of 
call ;  when  the  United  States  numbered  less  than  five  and 
a  half  million  souls,  and  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi 
rolled  in  unsullied  majesty  past  a  few  petty  Spanish 
stations  —  the  plantations  of  the  West  Indies  seemed  the 
unfailing  mine  of  colonial  industry  and  commerce.     Under 


tv  ST.    DOMINGO  333 

the  ancien  rSgime,  the  trade  of  the  French  portion  of  St. 
Domingo  is  reported  to  have  represented  more  than  half 
of  her  oceanic  commerce.  But  during  the  Revolution  the 
prosperity  of  that  colony  reeled  under  a  terrible  blow. 

The  hasty  proclamation  of  equality  between  whites  and 
blacks  by  the  French  revolutionists,  and  the  refusal  of  the 
planters  to  recognize  that  decree  as  binding,  led  to  a  terri- 
ble servile  revolt,  which  desolated  the  whole  of  the  colony. 
Those  merciless  strifes  had,  however,  somewhat  abated 
under  the  organizing  power  of  a  man  in  whom  the  black 
race  seem  to  have  vindicated  its  claims  to  political  capacity. 
Toussaint  l'Ouverture  had  come  to  the  front  by  sheer 
sagacity  and  force  of  character.  By  a  deft  mixture  of 
force,  and  clemency,  he  imposed  order  on  the  vapouring 
crowds  of  negroes  :  he  restored  the  French  part  of  the 
island  to  comparative  order  and  prosperity  :  and  with  an 
army  of  20,000  men  he  occupied  the  Spanish  portion.  In 
this,  as  in  other  matters,  he  appeared  to  act  as  the  manda- 
tory of  France  ;  but  he  looked  to  the  time  when  France, 
beset  by  European  wars,  would  tacitly  acknowledge  his 
independence.  In  May,  1801,  he  made  a  constitution  for 
the  island,  and  declared  himself  governor  for  life,  with 
power  to  appoint  his  successor.  This  mimicry  of  the  con- 
sular office,  and  the  open  vaunt  that  he  was  the  "  Bonaparte 
of  the  Antilles,"  incensed  Bonaparte  ;  and  the  haste  with 
which,  on  the  day  after  the  Preliminaries  of  London,  he 
prepared  to  overthrow  this  contemptible  rival,  tells  its  own 
tale. 

Yet  Corsican  hatred  was  tempered  with  Corsican  guile. 
Toussaint  had  requested  that  the  Haytians  should  be  under 
the  protection  of  their  former  mistress.  Protection  was 
the  last  thing  that  Bonaparte  desired  ;  but  he  deemed  it 
politic  to  flatter  the  black  chieftain  with  assurances  of  his 
personal  esteem  and  gratitude  for  the  "  great  services  which 
you  have  rendered  to  the  French  people.  If  its  flag  floats 
over  St.  Domingo  it  is  due  to  you  and  your  brave  blacks  " 
—  a  reference  to  Toussaint's  successful  resistance  to  English 
attempts  at  landing.  There  were,  it  is  true,  some  points  in 
the  new  Haytian  constitution  which  contravened  the  sov- 
ereign rights  of  France,  but  these  were  pardonable  in  the 
difficult  circumstances  which  had  pressed  on  Toussaint : 


334 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 


he  was  now,  however,  invited  to  amend  them  so  as  to  recog- 
nize the  complete  sovereignty  of  the  motherland  and  the 
authority  of  General  Leclerc,  whom  Bonaparte  sent  out  as 
captain-general  of  the  island.     To  this  officer,  the  husband 
of  Pauline  Bonaparte,  the  First  Consul  wrote  on  the  same 
day  that  there  was  reported  to  be  much  ferment  in  the 
island  against  Toussaint,  that  the  obstacles  to  be  overcome 
would  therefore  be  much  less  formidable  than  had  been 
feared,  provided  that  activity  and  firmness  were  used.     In 
his  references  to  the  burning  topic  of  slavery,  the  Sirst 
Consul  showed  a  similar  reserve.     The  French  Republic 
having  abolished  it,  he  could  not,  as  yet,  openly  restore  an 
institution  flagrantly  opposed  to  the  Rights  of  Man.     Os- 
tensibly therefore  he  figured  as  the  champion  of  emancipa- 
tion, assuring  the  Haytians  in  his  proclamation  of  November 
8th,  1801,  that  they  were  all  free  and  all  equal  in  the  sight 
of  God  and  of  the  French  Republic  :    "  If  you  are  told, 
*  These  forces  are  destined  to  snatch  your  liberty  from  you, 
reply,  '  The  Republic  has  given  us  our  liberty  :  it  will  not 
allow  it  to  be  taken  from  us.'  "     Of  a  similar  tenor  was 
his  public  declaration  a  fortnight  later,  that  at  fet.  Do- 
mingo and  Guadeloupe  everybody  was  free  and  would 
remain  free.     Very  different  were  his  private  instructions. 
On  the  last  day  of  October  he  ordered  Talleyrand  to  write 
to  the  British  Government,  asking  for  their  help  in  supply- 
ing provisions  from  Jamaica  to  this  expedition  destined  to 
"destroy  the  new  Algiers  being  organized  in  American 
waters"  ;  and  a  fortnight  later  he  charged  him  to  state 
his  resolve  to  destroy  the  government  of  the  blacks  at  bt. 
Domingo ;  that  if  he  had  to  postpone  the  expedition  tor  a 
vear,  he  would  be  "  obliged  to  constitute  the  blacks  as 
French"  ;   and  that  "the  liberty  of  the  blacks,  if  recog- 
nized by  the  Government,  would  always  be  a  support  tor 
the  Republic  in  the  New  World."     As  he  was  striving  to 
caiole  our  Government  into  supporting  his  expedition,  it 
is  clear  that  in  the  last  enigmatic  phrase  he  was  bidding 
for  that  support  by  the  hint  of  a  prospective  restoration 
of  slavery  at  St.  Domingo.     A  comparison  of  his  public 
and   private   statements   must   have  produced  a  curious 
effect  on  the  British  Ministers,  and  many  of  the  difficul- 
ties during  the  negotiations  at  Amiens  doubtless  sprang 


XV 


ST.    DOMINGO  335 


out  of  their  knowledge  of  his  double-dealing  in  the  West 
Indies. 

The  means  at  the  First  Consul's  disposal  might  have 
been  considered  sufficient  to  dispense  with  these  paltry- 
devices  ;  for  when  the  squadrons  of  Brest,  Lorient,  Roche- 
fort,  and  Toulon  had  joined  their  forces,  they  mustered 
thirty-two  ships  of  the  line  and  thirty-one  frigates,  with 
more  than  20,000  troops  on  board.  So  great,  indeed,  was 
the  force  as  to  occasion  strong  remonstrances  from  the 
British  Government,  and  a  warning  that  a  proportionately 
strong  fleet  would  be  sent  to  watch  over  the  safety  of  our 
West  Indies.1  The  size  of  the  French  armada  and  the 
warnings  which  Toussaint  received  from  Europe  induced 
that  wily  dictator  to  adopt  stringent  precautionary 
measures.  He  persuaded  the  blacks  that  the  French  were 
about  to  enslave  them  once  more,  and,  raising  the  spectre 
of  bondage,  he  quelled  sedition,  ravaged  the  maritime 
towns,  and  awaited  the  French  in  the  interior,  in  confident 
expectation  that  yellow  fever  would  winnow  their  ranks 
and  reduce  them  to  a  level  with  his  own  strength. 

His  hopes  were  ultimately  realized,  but  not  until  he  him- 
self succumbed  to  the  hardihood  of  the  French  attack. 
Leclerc's  army  swept  across  the  desolated  belt  with  an 
ardour  that  was  redoubled  by  the  sight  of  the  mangled 
remains  of  white  people  strewn  amidst  the  negro  encamp- 
ments, and  stormed  Toussaint's  chief  stronghold  at  Crete- 
a-Pierrot.  The  dictator  and  his  factious  lieutenants 
thereupon  surrendered  (May  8th,  1802),  on  condition  of 
their  official  rank  being  respected  —  a  stipulation  which 
both  sides  must  have  regarded  as  unreal  and  impossible. 
The  French  then  pressed  on  to  secure  the  subjection  of 
the  whole  island  before  the  advent  of  the  unhealthy  sea- 
son which  Toussaint  eagerly  awaited.  It  now  set  in  with 
unusual  virulence  ;  and  in  a  few  days  the  conquerors 
found  their  force  reduced  to  12,000  effectives.  Suspect- 
ing  Toussaint's    designs,    Leclerc   seized   him.     He    was 

aSee  the  British  notes  of  November  6th-16th,  1801,  in  the  "  Cornwallis 
Correspondence,"  vol.  iii.  In  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Lords,  May 
13th,  1802,  Lord  Grenville  complained  that  we  had  had  to  send  to  the 
West  Indies  in  time  of  peace  a  fleet  double  as  large  as  that  kept  there 
during  the  late  war. 


336  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

empowered  to  do  so  by  Bonaparte's  orders  of  March  16th, 

1802  : 

"  Follow  your  instructions  exactly,  and  as  soon  as  you  have  done 
with  Toussaint,  Christopher,  Dessalines,  and  the  chief  brigands,  and 
the  masses  of  the  blacks  are  disarmed,  send  to  the  continent  all  the 
blacks  and  the  half-castes  who  have  taken  part  in  the  civil  troubles." 

Toussaint  was  hurried  off  to  France,  where  he  died  a  year 
later  from  the  hardships  to  which  he  was  exposed  at  the 
fort  of  Joux  among  the  Juras. 

Long  before  the  cold  of  a  French  winter  claimed  the 
life  of  Toussaint,  his  antagonist  fell  a  victim  to  the 
sweltering  heats  of  the  tropics.  On  November  2nd,  1802, 
Leclerc  succumbed  to  the  unhealthy  climate  and  to  his 
ceaseless  anxieties.  In  the  Notes,  dictated  at  St.  Helena, 
Napoleon  submitted  Leclerc's  memory  to  some  strictures 
for  his  indiscretion  in  regard  to  the  proposed  restoration 
of  slavery.  The  official  letters  of  that  officer  expose  the 
injustice  of  the  charge.  The  facts  are  these.  After  the 
seeming  submission  of  St.  Domingo,  the  First  Consul 
caused  a  decree  to  be  secretly  passed  at  Paris  (May  20th, 
1802),  which  prepared  to  re-establish  slavery  in  the  West 
Indies  ;  but  Decres  warned  Leclerc  that  it  was  not  for 
the  present  to  be  applied  to  St.  Domingo  unless  it  seemed 
to  be  opportune.  Knowing  how  fatal  any  such  proclama- 
tion would  be,  Leclerc  suppressed  the  decree  ;  but  Gen- 
eral Richepanse,  who  was  now  governor  of  the  island  of 
Guadeloupe,  not  only  issued  the  decree,  but  proceeded  to 
enforce  it  with  rigour.  It  was  this  which  caused  the  last 
and  most  desperate  revolts  of  the  blacks,  fatal  alike  to 
French  domination  and  to  Leclerc's  life.  His  successor, 
Rochambeau,  in  spite  of  strong  reinforcements  of  troops 
from  France  and  a  policy  of  the  utmost  rigour,  succeeded 
no  better.  In  the  island  of  Guadeloupe  the  rebels  openly 
defied  the  authority  of  France  ;  and,  on  the  renewal  of 
war  between  England  and  France,  the  remains  of  the 
expedition  were  for  the  most  part  constrained  to  sur- 
render to  the  British  flag  or  to  the  insurgent  blacks. 
The  island  recovered  its  so-called  independence  ;  and  the 
sole  result  of  Napoleon's  efforts  in  this  sphere  was  the 
loss  of  more  than  twenty  generals  and  some  30,000  troops. 


xv  LOUISIANA  337 

The  assertion  has  been  made  by  Lanfrey  that  the  First 
Consul  told  off  for  this  service  the  troops  of  the  Army 
of  the  Rhine,  with  the  aim  of  exposing  to  the  risks  of 
tropical  life  the  most  republican  part  of  the  French  forces. 
That  these  furnished  a  large  part  of  the  expeditionary 
force  cannot  be  denied  ;  but  if  his  design  was  to  rid  him- 
self of  political  foes,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  he  should 
not  have  selected  Moreau,  Massena,  or  Augereau,  rather 
than  Leclerc.  The  fact  that  his  brother-in-law  was 
accompanied  by  his  wife,  Pauline  Bonaparte,  for  whom 
venomous  tongues  asserted  that  Napoleon  cherished  a 
more  than  brotherly  affection,  will  suffice  to  refute  the 
slander.  Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  Bonaparte 
had  not  hesitated  to  subject  the  choicest  part  of  his  Army 
of  Italy  and  his  own  special  friends  to  similar  risks  in 
Egypt  and  Syria.  He  never  hesitated  to  sacrifice  thou- 
sands of  lives  when  a  great  object  was  at  stake  ;  and  the 
restoration  of  the  French  West  Indian  Colonies  might 
well  seem  worth  an  army,  especially  as  St.  Domingo  was 
not  only  of  immense  intrinsic  value  to  France  in  days 
when  beetroot  sugar  was  unknown,  but  was  of  strategic 
importance  as  a  base  of  operations  for  the  vast  colonial 
empire  which  the  First  Consul  proposed  to  rebuild  in  the 
basin  of  the  Mississippi. 

The  history  of  the  French  possessions  on  the  North 
American  continent  could  scarcely  be  recalled  by  ardent 
patriots  without  pangs  of  remorse.  The  name  Louisiana, 
applied  to  a  vast  territory  stretching  up  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Missouri,  recalled  the  glorious  days  of 
Louis  XIV.,  when  the  French  flag  was  borne  by  stout 
voyageurs  up  the  foaming  rivers  of  Canada  and  the  placid 
reaches  of  the  father  of  rivers.  It  had  been  the  ambition 
of  Montcalm  to  connect  the  French  stations  on  Lake  Erie 
with  the  forts  of  Louisiana ;  but  that  warrior-statesman 
in  the  West,  as  his  kindred  spirit,  Dupleix,  in  the  East, 
had  fallen  on  the  evil  days  of  Louis  XV.,  when  valour 
and  merit  in  the  French  colonies  "were  sacrificed  to  the 
pleasures  and  parasites  of  Versailles.  The  natural  result 
followed.  Louisiana  was  yielded  up  to  Spain  in  1763,  in 
order  to  reconcile  the  Court  of  Madrid  to  cessions  required 


338  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

by  that  same  Peace  of  Paris.  Twenty  years  later  Spain 
recovered  from  England  the  provinces  of  eastern  and 
western  Florida  ;  and  thus,  at  the  dawn  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  red  and  yellow  flag  waved  over  all  the  lands 
between  California,  New  Orleans,  and  the  southern  tip  of 
Florida.1 

Many  efforts  were  made  by  France  to  regain  her  old 
Mississippi  province  ;  and  in  1795,  at  the  break  up  of 
the  First  Coalition,  the  victorious  Republic  pressed  Spain 
to  yield  up  this  territory,  where  the  settlers  were  still 
French  at  heart.  Doubtless  the  weak  King  of  Spain 
would  have  yielded ;  but  his  chief  Minister,  Godoy,  clung 
tenaciously  to  Louisiana,  and  consented  to  cede  only 
the  Spanish  part  of  St.  Domingo  —  a  diplomatic  success 
which  helped  to  earn  him  the  title  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace.  So  matters  remained  until  Talleyrand,  as  Foreign 
Minister,  sought  to  gain  Louisiana  from  Spain  before  it 
slipped  into  the  horny  fists  of  the  Anglo-Saxons. 

That  there  was  every  prospect  of  this  last  event  was  the 
conviction  not  only  of  the  politicians  at  Washington,  but 
also  of  every  iron-worker  on  the  Ohio  and  of  every  planter 
on  the  Tennessee.  Those  young  but  growing  settlements 
chafed  against  the  restraints  imposed  by  Spain  on  the 
river  trade  of  the  lower  Mississippi  —  the  sole  means 
available  for  their  exports  in  times  when  the  Alleghanies 
were  crossed  by  only  two  tracks  worthy  the  name  of 
roads.  In  1795  they  gained  free  egress  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  and  the  right  of  bonding  their  merchandise  in 
a  special  warehouse  at  New  Orleans.  Thereafter  the 
United  States  calmly  awaited  the  time  when  racial 
vigour  and  the  exigencies  of  commerce  should  yield  to 
them   the   possession   of    the   western   prairies   and    the 

1  For  these  and  the  following  negotiations  see  Lucien  Bonaparte's 
"  Mfimoires,"  vol.  ii.,  and  Garden's  "Traites  de  Paix,"  vol.  hi.,  ch. 
xxxiv.  The  Hon.  H.  Taylor,  in  "  The  North  American  Review  "  of  No- 
vember, 1898,  has  computed  that  the  New  World  was  thus  divided  in 
1801: 

Spain 7,028,000  square  miles. 

Great  Britain 3,719,000      "        " 

Portugal 3,209,000 


it        (i 


United  States 827,000      "        " 

Russia 577,000      "        » 

France 29,000      "        " 


xv  LOUISIANA  339 

little  townships  of  Arkansas  and  New  Orleans.  They 
reckoned  without  taking  count  of  the  eager  longing  of  the 
French  for  their  former  colony  and  the  determination  of 
Napoleon  to  give  effect  to  this  honourable  sentiment. 

In  July,  1800,  when  his  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  were  in  good  train,  the  First  Consul  sent  to 
Madrid  instructions  empowering  the  French  Minister 
there  to  arrange  a  treaty  whereby  France  should  re- 
ceive Louisiana  in  return  for  the  cession  of  Tuscany  to 
the  heir  of  the  Duke  of  Parma.  This  young  man  had 
married  the  daughter  of  Charles  IV.  of  Spain  ;  and,  for 
the  aggrandizement  of  his  son-in-law,  that  roi  faineant, 
was  ready,  nay  eager,  to  bargain  away  a  quarter  of  a 
continent  ;  and  he  did  so  by  a  secret  convention  signed 
at  St.  Ildefonso  on  October  7th,  1800. 

But  though  Charles  rejoiced  over  this  exchange, 
Godoy,  who  was  gifted  with  some  insight  into  the  fu- 
ture, was  determined  to  frustrate  it.  Various  events 
occurred  which  enabled  this  wily  Minister,  first  to  delay, 
and  then  almost  to  prevent,  the  odious  surrender. 
Chief  among  these  was  the  certainty  that  the  transfer 
from  weak  hands  to  strong  hands  would  be  passionately 
resented  by  the  United  States  ;  and  until  peace  with 
England  was  fully  assured,  and  the  power  of  Toussaint 
broken,  it  would  be  folly  for  the  First  Consul  to  risk  a 
conflict  with  the  United  States.  That  they  would  fight 
rather  than  see  the  western  prairies  pass  into  the  First 
Consul's  hands  was  abundantly  manifest.  It  is  proved 
by  many  patriotic  pamphlets.  The  most  important  of 
these  —  "An  Address  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  on  the  Cession  of  Louisiana  to  the  French,"  pub- 
lished at  Philadelphia  in  1802  —  quoted  largely  from  a 
French  brochure  by  a  French  Councillor  of  State.  The 
French  writer  had  stated  that  along  the  Mississippi  his 
countrymen  would  find  boundless  fertile  prairies,  and  as 
for  the  opposition  of  the  United  States — "a  nation  of 
pedlars  and  shopkeepers"  —  that  could  be  crushed  by  a 
French  alliance  with  the  Indian  tribes.  The  American 
writer  thereupon  passionately  called  on  his  fellow-citizens 
to  prevent  this  transfer  :  "  France  is  to  be  dreaded  only, 
or   chiefly,   on   the    Mississippi.       The    government    must 


340  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

take  Louisiana  before  it  passes  into  her  hands.  The 
iron  is  now  hot  ;  command  us  to  rise  as  one  man  and 
strike."  These  and  other  like  protests  at  last  stirred 
the  placid  Government  at  Washington  ;  and  it  bade  the 
American  Minister  at  Paris  to  make  urgent  remon- 
strances, the  sole  effect  of  which  was  to  draw  from 
Talleyrand  the  bland  assurance  that  the  transfer  had 
not  been  seriously  contemplated.1 

By  the  month  of  June,  1802,  all  circumstances  seemed 
to  smile  on  Napoleon's  enterprise :  England  had  ratified 
the  Peace  of  Amiens,  Toussaint  had  delivered  himself 
up  to  Leclerc  :  France  had  her  troops  strongly  posted  in 
Tuscany  and  Parma,  and  could,  if  necessary,  forcibly  end 
the  remaining  scruples  felt  at  Madrid  :  while  the  United 
States,  with  a  feeble  army  and  a  rotting  navy,  were  con- 
trolled by  the  most  peaceable  and  Franco-phil  of  their 
presidents,  Thomas  Jefferson.  The  First  Consul  accord- 
ingly ordered  an  expedition  to  be  prepared,  as  if  for  the 
reinforcement  of  Leclerc  in  St.  Domingo,  though  it  was 
really  destined  for  New  Orleans ;  and  he  instructed  Tal- 
leyrand to  soothe  or  coerce  the  Court  of  Madrid  into  the 
final  act  of  transfer.  The  offer  was  therefore  made  by 
the  latter  (June  19th)  in  the  name  of  the  First  Consul 
that  in  no  case  would  Louisiana  ever  be  alienated  to  a  Third 
Poiver.  When  further  delays  supervened,  Bonaparte,  true 
to  his  policy  of  continually  raising  his  demands,  required 
that  Eastern  and  Western  Florida  should  also  be  ceded  to 
him  by  Spain,  on  condition  that  the  young  King  of  Etru- 
ria  (for  so  Tuscany  was  now  to  be  styled)  should  regain 
his  father's  duchy  of  Parma.2 

A  word  of  explanation  must  here  find  place  as  to  this 
singular  proposal.  Parma  had  long  been  under  French 
control;  and,  in  March,  1801,  by  the  secret  Treaty  of 
Madrid,  the  ruler  of  that  duchy,  whose  death  seemed  im- 
minent, was  to  resign  his  claims  thereto,  provided  that 
his  son  should  gain  Etruria  —  as  had  been  already  pro- 
vided for  at  St.  Ildefonso  and  Luneville.  The  duke  was, 
however,  allowed  to  keep  his  duchy  until  his  death,  which 

1  "  History  of  the  United  States,  1801-1813,"  by  H.  Adams,  vol.  i., 
p.  409. 

2  Napoleon's  letter  of  November  2nd,  1802. 


tv 


LOUISIANA  341 


occurred  on  October  9th,  1802  ;  and  it  is  stated  by  our 
gnvoy  in  Paris  to  have  been  hastened  by  news  of  that 
odious  bargain.1  His  death  now  furnished  Bonaparte 
with  a  good  occasion  for  seeking  to  win  an  immense  area 
in  the  New  World  at  the  expense  of  a  small  Italian  duchy, 
which  his  troops  could  at  any  time  easily  overrun.  This 
consideration  seems  to  have  occurred  even  to  Charles  IV. ; 
he  refused  to  barter  the  Floridas  against  Parma.  The  re- 
establishment  of  his  son-in-law  in  his  paternal  domains 
was  doubtless  desirable,  but  not  at  the  cost  of  so  exact- 
ing a  heriot  as  East  and  West  Florida. 

From  out  this  maze  of  sordid  intrigues  two  or  three 
facts  challenge  our  attention.  Both  Bonaparte  and 
Charles  IV.  regarded  the  most  fertile  waste  lands  then 
calling  for  the  plough  as  fairly  exchanged  against  half 
a  million  of  Tuscans ;  but  the  former  feared  the  resent- 
ment of  the  United  States,  and  sought  to  postpone  a  rup- 
ture until  he  could  coerce  them  by  overwhelming  force. 
It  is  equally  clear  that,  had  he  succeeded  in  this  enter- 
prise, France  might  have  gained  a  great  colonial  empire 
in  North  America  protected  from  St.  Domingo  as  a  naval 
and  military  base,  while  that  island  would  have  doubly 
prospered  from  the  vast  supplies  poured  down  the  Missis- 
sippi ;  but  this  success  he  would  have  bought  at  the  ex- 
pense of  a  rapprochement  between  the  United  States  and 
their  motherland,  such  as  a  bitter  destiny  was  to  postpone 
to  the  end  of  the  century. 

The  prospect  of  an  Anglo-American  alliance  might  well 
give  pause  even  to  Napoleon.  Nevertheless,  he  resolved 
to  complete  this  vast  enterprise,  which,  if  successful,  would 
have  profoundly  affected  the  New  World  and  the  relative 
importance  of  the  French  and  English  peoples.  The  Span- 
ish officials  at  New  Orleans,  in  pursuance  of  orders  from 
Madrid,  now  closed  the  lower  Mississippi  to  vessels  of  the 
United  States  (October,  1802).  At  once  a  furious  out- 
cry arose  in  the  States  against  an  act  which  not  only  vio- 
lated their  treaty  rights,  but  foreshadowed  the  coming 
grip  of  the  First  Consul.  For  this  outburst  he  was  pre- 
pared :  General  Victor  was  at  Dunkirk,  with  five  battal- 
ions and  sixteen  field-pieces,  ready  to  cross  the  Atlantic, 

1  Merry's  despatch  of  October  21st,  1802. 


342  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

ostensibly  for  the  relief  of  Leclerc,  but  really  in  order  to 
take  possession  of  New  Orleans.1  But  his  plan  was  foiled 
by  the  sure  instincts  of  the  American  people,  by  the  dis- 
asters of  the  St.  Domingo  expedition,  and  by  the  restless- 
ness of  England  under  his  various  provocations.  Jefferson, 
despite  his  predilections  for  France,  was  compelled  to  for- 
bid the  occupation  of  Louisiana  :  he  accordingly  sent  Mon- 
roe to  Paris  with  instructions  to  effect  a  compromise,  or 
even  to  buy  outright  the  French  claims  on  that  land. 
Various  circumstances  favoured  this  mission.  In  the 
first  week  of  the  year  1803  Napoleon  received  the  news 
of  Leclerc's  death  and  the  miserable  state  of  the  French 
in  St.  Domingo ;  and  as  the  tidings  that  he  now  received 
from  Egypt,  Syria,  Corfu,  and  the  East  generally,  were 
of  the  most  alluring  kind,  he  tacitly  abandoned  his  Mis- 
sissippi enterprise  in  favour  of  the  oriental  schemes  which 
were  closer  to  his  heart.  In  that  month  of  January  he 
seems  to  have  turned  his  gaze  from  the  western  hemi- 
sphere towards  Turkey,  Egypt,  and  India.  True,  he 
still  seemed  to  be  doing  his  utmost  for  the  occupation  of 
Louisiana,  but  only  as  a  device  for  sustaining  the  selling 
price  of  the  western  prairies. 

When  the  news  of  this  change  of  policy  reached  the 
ears  of  Joseph  and  Lucien  Bonaparte,  it  aroused  their 
bitterest  opposition.  Lucien  plumed  himself  on  having 
struck  the  bargain  with  Spain  which  had  secured  that 
vast  province  at  the  expense  of  an  Austrian  archduke's 
crown  ;  and  Joseph  knew  only  too  well  that  Napoleon 
was  freeing  himself  in  the  West  in  order  to  be  free  to 
strike  hard  in  Europe  and  the  East.  The  imminent 
rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  touched  him  keenly  :  for 
that  peace  was  his  proudest  achievement.  If  coloniitl 
adventures  must  be  sought,  let  them  be  sought  in  the 
New  World,  where  Spain  and  the  United   States   could 

1  The  instructions  which  he  sent  to  Victor  supply  an  interesting  com- 
mentary on  French  colonial  policy  :  "The  system  of  this,  as  of  all  our 
other  colonies,  should  be  to  concentrate  its  commerce  in  the  national  com- 
merce :  it  should  especially  aim  at  establishing  its  relations  with  our  An- 
tilles, so  as  to  take  the  place  in  those  colonies  of  the  American  commerce. 
.  .  .  The  captain-general  should  abstain  from  every  innovation  favour- 
able to  strangers,  who  should  be  restricted  to  such/xmimunieations  as  are 
absolutely  indispensable  to  the  prosperity  of  Louisiana. 


xv  LOUISIANA  343 

offer  only  a  feeble  resistance,  rather  than  in  Europe  and 
Asia,  where  unending  war  must  be  the  result  of  an  aggres- 
sive policy. 

At  once  the  brothers  sought  an  interview  with  Napoleon. 
He  chanced  to  be  in  his  bath,  a  warm  bath  perfumed  with 
scents,  where  he  believed  that  tired  nature  most  readily 
found  recovery.  He  ordered  them  to  be  admitted,  and 
an  interesting  family  discussion  was  the  result.  On  his 
mentioning  the  proposed  sale,  Lucien  at  once  retorted 
that  the  Legislature  would  never  consent  to  this  sacrifice : 
He  there  touched  the  wrong  chord  in  Napoleon's  nature  : 
had  he  appealed  to  the  memories  of  le  grand  monarque  and 
of  Montcalm,  possibly  he  might  have  bent  that  iron  will; 
but  the  mention  of  the  consent  of  the  French  deputies 
roused  the  spleen  of  the  autocrat,  who,  from  amidst 
the  scented  water,  mockingly  bade  his  brother  go  into 
mourning  for  the  affair,  which  he,  and  he  alone,  intended 
to  carry  out.  This  gibe  led  Joseph  to  threaten  that  he 
would  mount  the  tribune  in  the  Chambers  and  head  the 
opposition  to  this  unpatriotic  surrender.  Defiance  flashed 
forth  once  more  from  the  bath  ;  and  the  First  Consul 
finally  ended  their  bitter  retorts  by  spasmodically  rising, 
as  suddenly  falling  backwards,  and  drenching  Joseph  to 
the  skin.  His  peals  of  scornful  laughter,  and  the  swoon- 
ing of  the  valet,  who  was  not  yet  fully  inured  to  these 
family  scenes,  interrupted  the  argument  6f  the  piece  ; 
but,  when  resumed  a  little  later,  a  sec,  Lucien  wound  up 
by  declaring  that,  if  he  were  not  his  brother,  he  would  be 
his  enemy.  "  My  enemy  !  That  is  rather  strong,"  ex- 
claimed Napoleon.  "  You  my  enemy  !  I  would  break 
you,  see,  like  this  box" — and  he  dashed  his  snuff-box  on 
the  carpet.  It  did  not  break  :  but  the  portrait  of  Josephine 
was  detached  and  broken.  Whereupon  Lucien  picked  up 
the  pieces  and  handed  them  to  his  brother,  remarking  : 
"  It  is  a  pity  :  meanwhile,  until  you  can  break  me,  it  is 
your  wife's  portrait  that  you  have  broken."  1 

To  Talleyrand,  Napoleon  was  equally  unbending  :  sum- 
moning him  on  April  11th,  he  said  : 

1  Lucien  Bonaparte,  "Me^noires,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  ix.  He  describes  Jose- 
phine's alarm  at  this  ill  omen  at  a  time  when  rumours  of  a  divorce  were 
rife. 


344  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

"  Irresolution  and  deliberation  are  no  longer  in  season.  I  renounce 
Louisiana.  It  is  not  only  New  Orleans  that  I  cede  :  it  is  the  whole 
colony,  without  reserve  ;  I  know  the  price  of  what  I  abandon.  I  have 
proved  the  importance  I  attach  to  this  province,  since  my  first  diplo- 
matic act  with  Spain  had  the  object  of  recovering  it.  I  renounce  it 
with  the  greatest  regret :  to  attempt  obstinately  to  retain  it  would  be 
folly.    I  direct  you  to  negotiate  the  affair." 1 

After  some  haggling  with  Monroe,  the  price  agreed  on 
for  this  territory  was  60,000,000  francs,  the  United  States 
also  covenanting  to  satisfy  the  claims  which  many  of 
their  citizens  had  on  the  French  treasury.  For  this  paltry 
sum  the  United  States  gained  a  peaceful  title  to  the  debat- 
able lands  west  of  Lake  Erie  and  to  the  vast  tracts  west 
of  the  Mississippi.  The  First  Consul  carried  out  his 
threat  of  denying  to  the  deputies  of  France  any  voice  in 
this  barter.  The  war  with  England  sufficed  to  distract 
their  attention  ;  and  France  turned  sadly  away  from  the 
western  prairies,  which  her  hardy  sons  had  first  opened 
up,  to  fix  her  gaze,  first  on  the  Orient,  and  thereafter  on 
European  conquests.  No  more  was  heard  of  Louisiana, 
and  few  references  were  permitted  to  the  disasters  in  St. 
Domingo ;  for  Napoleon  abhorred  any  mention  of  a  coup 
manque*,  and  strove  to  banish  from  the  imagination  of 
France  those  dreams  of  a  trans-Atlantic  Empire  which 
had  drawn  him,  as  they  were  destined  sixty  years  later  to 
draw  his  nephew,  to  the  verge  of  war  with  the  rising 
republic  of  the  New  World.  In  one  respect,  the  uncle 
was  more  fortunate  than  the  nephew.  In  signing  the 
treaty  with  the  United  States,  the  First  Consul  could 
represent  his  conduct,  not  as  a  dextrous  retreat  from  an 
impossible  situation,  but  as  an  act  of  grace  to  the  Ameri- 
cans and  a  blow  to  England.  "  This  accession  of  terri- 
tory," he  said,  "  strengthens  for  ever  the  power  of  the 
United  States,  and  I  have  just  given  to  England  a  mari- 
time rival  that  sooner  or  later  will  humble  her  pride."2 

In  the  East  there  seemed  to  be  scarcely  the  same  field 
for  expansion  as  in  the  western  hemisphere.     Yet,  as  the 

1  Barb6-Marbois,  "  Hist,  de  Louisiana,"  quoted  by  H.  Adams,  op.  cit., 
vol.  ii.,  p.  27  ;  Roloff,  "  Napoleon's  Colonial  Politik." 

2  Garden,  "  Traites,"  vol.  viii.,  cb.  xxxiv.  See  too  Roederer,  "  QSuvres," 


xv  INDIA  345 

Orient  had  ever  fired  the  imagination  of  Napoleon,  he 
was  eager  to  expand  the  possessions  of  France  in  the 
Indian  Ocean.  In  October,  1801,  these  amounted  to  the 
Isle  of  Bourbon  and  the  Isle  of  France  ;  for  the  former 
French  possessions  in  India,  namely,  Pondicherry,  Mahe, 
Karikal,  Chandernagore,  along  with  their  factories  at 
Yanaon,  Surat,  and  two  smaller  places,  had  been  seized 
by  the  British,  and  were  not  to  be  given  back  to  Fiance 
until  six  months  after  the  definitive  treaty  of  peace  was 
signed.  From  these  scanty  relics  it  seemed  impossible 
to  rear  a  stable  fabric  :  yet  the  First  Consul  grappled 
with  the  task.  After  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  he 
ordered  Admiral  Gantheaume  with  four  ships  of  war  to 
show  the  French  flag  in  those  seas,  and  to  be  ready  in 
due  course  to  take  over  the  French  settlements  in  India. 
Meanwhile  he  used  his  utmost  endeavours  in  the  negotia- 
tions at  Amiens  to  gain  an  accession  of  land  for  Pondi- 
cherry, such  as  would  make  it  a  possible  base  for  military 
enterprise.  Even  before  those  negotiations  began  he  ex- 
pressed to  Lord  Cornwallis  his  desire  for  such  an  exten- 
sion ;  and  when  the  British  plenipotentiary  urged  the 
cession  of  Tobago  to  Great  Britain,  he  offered  to  exchange 
it  for  an  establishment  or  territory  in  India.1  Herein  the 
First  Consul  committed  a  serious  tactical  blunder  ;  for  his 
insistence  on  this  topic  and  his  avowed  desire  to  negotiate 
direct  with  the  Nabob  undoubtedly  aroused  the  suspicions 
of  our  Government. 

Still  greater  must  have  been  their  "concern  when  they 
learnt  that  General  Decaen  was  commissioned  to  receive 
back  the  French  possessions  in  India  ;  for  that  general  in 
1800  had  expressed  to  Bonaparte  his  hatred  of  the  English, 
and  had  begged,  even  if  he  had  to  wait  ten  years,  that  he 
might  be  sent  where  he  could  fight  them,  especially  in 
India.  As  was  his  wont,  Bonaparte  said  little  at  the  time  ; 
but  after  testing  Decaen's  military  capacity,  he  called  him 
to  his  side  at  midsummer,  1802,  and  suddenly  asked  him 
if  he  still  thought  about  India.     On  receiving  an  eager 

vol.  iii.,  p.  461,  for  Napoleon's  expressions  after  dinner  on  January  11th, 
1803  :  "  Maudit  sucre,  maudit  caf6,  maudites  colonies." 

1  Cornwallis,  "Correspondence,"  vol.  iii.,  despatch  of  December  3rd, 
1801. 


346  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

affirmative,  he  said,  "Well,  you  "will  go."  "In  what 
capacity  ?  "  "  As  captain-general :  go  to  the  Minister  of 
Marine  and  of  the  Colonies  and  ask  him  to  communicate 
to  you  the  documents  relating  to  this  expedition."  By 
such  means  did  Bonaparte  secure  devoted  servants.  It  is 
scarcely  needful  to  add  that  the  choice  of  such  a  man  only 
three  months  after  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens 
proves  that  the  First  Consul  only  intended  to  keep  that  peace 
as  long  as  his  forward  colonial  policy  rendered  it  desirable.1 

Meanwhile  our  Governor-General,  Marquis  Wellesley, 
was  displaying  an  activity  which  might  seem  to  be  dic- 
tated by  knowledge  of  Bonaparte's  designs.  There  was, 
indeed,  every  need  of  vigour.  Nowhere  had  French  and 
British  interests  been  so  constantly  in  collision  as  in  India. 
In  1798  France  had  intrigued  with  Tippoo  Sahib  at  Ser- 
ingapatam,  and  arranged  a  treaty  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
pelling the  British  nation  from  India.  When  in  1799 
French  hopes  were  dashed  by  Arthur  Wellesley's  capture 
of  that  city  and  the  death  of  Tippoo,  there  still  remained 
some  prospect  of  overthrowing  British  supremacy  by  unit- 
ing the  restless  Mahratta  rulers  of  the  north  and  centre, 
especially  Scindiah  and  Holkar,  in  a  powerful  confederacy. 
For  some  years  their  armies,  numbering  some  60,000  men, 
had  been  drilled  and  equipped  by  French  adventurers, 
the  ablest  and  most  powerful  of  whom  was  M.  Perron. 
Doubtless  it  was  with  the  hope  of  gaining  their  support 
that  the  Czar  Paul  and  Bonaparte  had  in  1800  formed  the 
project  of  invading  India  by  way  of  Persia.  And  after 
the  dissipation  of  that  dream,  there  still  remained  the 
chance  of  strengthening  the  Mahratta  princes  so  as  to  con- 
test British  claims  with  every  hope  of  success.  Forewarned 
by  the  home  Government  of  Bonaparte's  eastern  designs, 
our  able  and  ambitious  Governor-General  now  prepared  to 
isolate  the  Mahratta  chieftains,  to  cut  them  off  from  all 
contact  with  France,  and,  if  necessary,  to  shatter  Scindiah's 
army,  the  only  formidable  native  force  drilled  by  European 
methods. 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs  when  General  Decaen 
undertook  the  enterprise  of  revivifying  French  influences 

1  See  the  valuable  articles  on  General  Decaen's  papers  in  the  "  Revue 
historique"  of  1879  and  of  1881. 


XV 


INDIA  347 


in  India.  The  secret  instructions  which  he  received  from 
the  First  Consul,  dated  January  loth,  1803,  were  the  fol- 
lowing : 

"  To  communicate  with  the  peoples  or  princes  who  are  most  impa- 
tient under  the  yoke  of  the  English  Company.  ...  To  send  home  a 
report,  six  months  after  his  arrival  in  India,  concerning  all  information 
that  he  shall  have  collected,  on  the  strength,  the  position,  and  the  feel- 
ing of  the  different  peoples  of  India,  as  well  as  on  the  strength  and 
position  of  the  different  English  establishments ;  .  .  .  his  views,  and 
hopes  that  he  might  have  of  finding  support,  in  case  of  war,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  maintain  himself  in  the  Peninsula.  .  .  .  Finally,  as  one 
must  reason  on  the  hypothesis  that  we  should  not  be  masters  of  the 
sea  and  could  hope  for  slight  succour," 

Decaen  is  to  seek  among  the  French  possessions  or  else- 
where a  place  serving  as  a  point  oVappui,  where  in  the  last 
resort  he  could  capitulate  and  thus  gain  the  means  of  being 
transported  to  France  with  arms  and  baggage.  Of  this 
point  d'appui  he  will 

"strive  to  take  possession  after  the  first  months  .  .  .  whatever  be 
the  nation  to  which  it  belongs,  Portuguese,  Dutch,  or  English.  .  .  . 
If  war  should  break  out  between  England  and  France  before  the  1st 
of  Vendemiaire,  Year  XIII.  (September  22nd,  1804),  and  the  captain- 
general  is  warned  of  it  before  receiving  the  orders  of  the  Government, 
he  has  carte  blanche  to  fall  back  on  the  lie  de  France  and  the  Cape,  or 
to  remain  in  India.  ...  It  is  now  considered  impossible  that  we 
should  have  war  with  England  without  dragging  in  Holland.  One  of 
the  first  cares  of  the  captain-general  will  be  to  gain  control  over  the 
Dutch,  Portuguese,  and  Spanish  establishments,  and  of  their  resources. 
The  captain-general's  mission  is  at  first  one  of  observation,  on  political 
and  military  topics,  with  the  small  forces  that  he  takes  out,  and  an 
occupation  of  comptolrs  for  our  commerce  :  but  the  First  Consul,  if  well 
informed  by  him,  will  perhaps  be  able  some  day  to  put  him  in  a  posi- 
tion to  acquire  that  great  glory,  which  hands  down  the  memory  of  men 
beyond  the  lapse  of  centuries."  1 

Had  these  instructions  been  known  to  English  states- 
men, they  would  certainly  have  ended  the  peace  which 
was  being  thus  perfidiously  used  by  the  First  Consul  for 
the  destruction  of  our  Indian  Empire.  But  though  their 
suspicions  were  aroused  by  the  departure  of  Decaen's  ex- 
pedition and  by  the  activity  of  French  agents  in  India, 

1  Dumas'  "Precis  des  Evenements  Militaires,"  vol.  xi.,  p.  189.  The 
version  of  these  instructions  presented  by  Thiers,  book  xvi.,  is  utterly  mis- 
leading. 


348  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

yet  the  truth  remained  half  hidden,  until,  at  a  later  date, 
the  publication  of  General  Decaen's  papers  shed  a  flood  of 
light  on  Napoleon's  policy. 

Owing  to  various  causes,  the  expedition  did  not  set  sail 
from  Brest  until  the  beginning  of  March,  1803.  The  date 
should  be  noticed.  It  proves  that  at  this  time  Napoleon 
judged  that  a  rupture  of  peace  was  not  imminent ;  and 
when  he  saw  his  miscalculation,  he  sought  to  delay  the 
war  with  England  as  long  as  possible  in  order  to  allow 
time  for  Decaen's  force  at  least  to  reach  the  Cape,  then 
in  the  hands  of  the  Dutch.  The  French  squadron  was  too 
weak  to  risk  a  fight  with  an  English  fleet ;  it  comprised 
only  four  ships  of  war,  two  transports,  and  a  few  smaller 
vessels,  carrying  about  1,800  troops.1  The  ships  were  un- 
der the  command  of  Admiral  Linois,  who  was  destined  to 
be  the  terror  of  our  merchantmen  in  eastern  seas.  De- 
caen's first  halt  was  at  the  Cape,  which  had  been  given 
back  by  us  to  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  on  Febru- 
ary 21st,  1803.  The  French  general  found  the  Dutch 
officials  in  their  usual  state  of  lethargy  :  the  fortifications 
had  not  been  repaired,  and  many  of  the  inhabitants,  and 
even  of  the  officials  themselves,  says  Decaen,  were  devoted 
to  the  English.  After  surveying  the  place,  doubtless  with 
a  view  to  its  occupation  as  the  point  oVappui  hinted  at  in 
his  instructions,  he  set  sail  on  the  27th  of  May,  and  arrived 
before  Pondicherry  on  the  11th  of  July.2 

In  the  meantime  important  events  had  transpired  which 
served  to  wreck  not  only  Decaen's  enterprise,  but  the 
French  influence  in  India.  In  Europe  the  flames  of  war 
had  burst  forth,  a  fact  of  which  both  Decaen  and  the  Brit- 
ish officials  were  ignorant ;  but  the  Governor  of  Fort  St. 
George  (Madras),  having,  before  the  15th  of  June,  "re- 
ceived intelligence  which  appeared  to  indicate  the  cer- 

1  Lord  Whitworth,  our  ambassador  in  Paris,  stated  (despatch  of  March 
24th,  1803)  that  Decaen  was  to  be  quietly  reinforced  by  troops  in  French 
pay  sent  out  by  every  French,  Spanish,  or  Dutch  ship  going  to  India,  so 
as  to  avoid  attracting  notice.  ("England  and  Napoleon,"  edited  by 
Oscar  Browning,  p.  137.) 

2  See  my  article,  "  The  French  East  India  Expedition  at  the  Cape,"  and 
unpublished  documents  in  the  "  Eng.  Hist.  Rev."  of  January,  1900. 
French  designs  on  the  Cape  strengthened  our  resolve  to  acquire  it,  as  we 
prepared  to  do  in  the  summer  of  1805. 


XV 


INDIA  349 


tainty  of  an  early  renewal  of  hostilities  between  His 
Majesty  and  France,"  announced  that  he  must  postpone 
the  restitution  of  Pondicherry  to  the  French,  until  he 
should  have  the  authority  of  the  Governor-General  for 
such  action.1 

The  Marquis  Wellesley  was  still  less  disposed  to  any 
such  restitution.  French  intervention  in  the  affairs  of 
Switzerland,  which  will  be  described  later  on,  had  so 
embittered  Anglo-French  relations  that  on  October  the 
17th,  1802,  Lord  Hobart,  our  Minister  of  War  and  for  the 
Colonies,  despatched  a  "  most  secret  "  despatch,  stating 
that  recent  events  rendered  it  necessary  to  postpone  this 
retrocession.  At  a  later  period  Wellesley  received  contrary 
orders,  instructing  him  to  restore  French  and  Dutch  terri- 
tories ;  but  he  judged  that  step  to  be  inopportune  consider- 
ing the  gravity  of  events  in  the  north  of  India.  So  active 
was  the  French  propaganda  at  the  Mahratta  Courts,  and 
so  threatening  were  their  armed  preparations,  that  he 
redoubled  his  efforts  for  the  consolidation  of  British 
supremacy.  He  resolved  to  strike  at  Scindiah,  unless  he 
withdrew  his  southern  army  into  his  own  territories  ;  and, 
on  receiving  an  evasive  answer  from  that  prince,  who 
hoped  b}'  temporizing  to  gain  armed  succours  from  France, 
he  launched  the  British  forces  against  him.  Now  was  the 
opportunity  for  Arthur  Wellesley  to  display  his  prowess 
against  the  finest  forces  of  the  East ;  and  brilliantly  did 
the  young  warrior  display  it.  The  victories  of  Assaye  in 
September,  and  of  Argaum  in  November,  scattered  the 
southern  Mahratta  force,  but  only  after  desperate  conflicts 
that  suggested  how  easily  a  couple  of  Decaen's  battalions 
might  have  turned  the  scales  of  war. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  north,  General  Lake  stormed  Ali- 
garh,  and  drove  Scindiah's  troops  back  to  Delhi.  Dis- 
gusted at  the  incapacity  and  perfidy  that  surrounded  him, 
Perron  threw  up  his  command ;  and  another  conflict  near 

1  Wellesley,  "  Despatches,"  vol.  iii.,  Appendix,  despatch  of  August  1st, 
1803.  See  too  Castlereagh's  "Letters  and  Despatches,"  Second  Series, 
vol.  i.,  pp.  166-176,  for  Lord  Elgin's  papers  and  others,  all  of  1802,  de- 
scribing the  utter  weakness  of  Turkey,  the  probability  of  Egypt  falling  to 
any  invader,  of  Caucasia  and  Persia  being  menaced  by  Russia,  and  the 
need  of  occupying  Aden  as  a  check  to  any  French  designs  on  India  from 
Suez. 


350  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Delhi  yielded  that  ancient  seat  of  Empire  to  our  trading 
company.  In  three  months  the  results  of  the  toil  of 
Scindiah,  the  restless  ambition  of  Holkar,  the  training  of 
European  officers,  and  the  secret  intrigues  of  Napoleon, 
were  all  swept  to  the  winds.  Wellesley  now  annexed  the 
land  around  Delhi  and  Agra,  besides  certain  coast  districts 
which  cut  off  the  Mahrattas  from  the  sea,  also  stipulating 
for  the  complete  exclusion  of  French  agents  from  their 
States.  Perron  was  allowed  to  return  to  France  ;  and  the 
brusque  reception  accorded  him  from  Bonaparte  may  serve 
to  measure  the  height  of  the  First  Consul's  hopes,  the 
depth  of  his  disappointment,  and  his  resentment  against 
a  man  who  was  daunted  by  a  single  disaster.1* 

Meanwhile  it  was  the  lot  of  Decaen  to  witness,  in 
inglorious  inactivity,  the  overthrow  of  all  his  hopes. 
Indeed,  he  barely  escaped  the  capture  which  Wellesley 
designed  for  his  whole  force,  as  soon  as  he  should  hear  of 
the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe ;  but  by  secret  and  skilful 
measures  all  the  French  ships,  except  one  transport, 
escaped  to  their  appointed  rendezvous,  the  He  dc  France. 
Enraged  by  these  events,  Decaen  and  Linois  determined 
to  inflict  every  possible  injury  on  their  foes.  The  latter 
soon  swept  from  the  eastern  seas  British  merchantmen 
valued  at  a  million  sterling,  while  the  general  ceased  not 
to  send  emissaries  into  India  to  encourage  the  millions  of 
natives  to  shake  off  the  joke  of  "  a  few  thousand  English." 

These  officers  effected  little,  and  some  of  them  were 
handed  over  to  the  English  authorities  by  the  now  obse- 
quious potentates.  Decaen  also  endeavoured  to  carry  out 
the  First  Consul's  design  of  occupying  strategic  points  in 
the  Indian  Ocean.  In  the  autumn  of  1803  he  sent  a  fine 
cruiser  to  the  Imaum  of  Muscat,  to  induce  him  to  cede 
a  station  for  commercial  purposes  at  that  port.  But 
Wellesley,  forewarned  by  our  agent  at  Bagdad,  had  made 
a  firm  alliance  with  the  Imaum,  who  accordingly  refused 

1  Wellesley's  despatch  of  July  13th,  1804 :  with  It  he  inclosed  an 
intercepted  despatch,  dated  Fondicherry,  August  6th,  1803,  a  "  Memoire 
sur  I' Importance  actuelle  de  l'lnde  et  les  nioyens  leg  plus  efficaces  <  1 1  y 
r<£tablir  la.  Nation  Franchise  dans  son  aneienne  splendeur."  The  writer. 
Lieutenant  Lefebvre,  set,  forth  the  unpopularity  of  the  British  in  India 
and  the  immense  wealth  which  France  could  gain  from  its  conquest. 


tv  AUSTRALIA  35i 

:he  request  of  the  French  captain.  The  incident,  however, 
mpplies  another  link  in  the  chain  of  evidence  as  to  the 
completeness  of  Napoleon's  oriental  policy,  and  yields 
mother  proof  of  the  vigour  of  our  great  proconsul  at  Cal- 
cutta, by  whose  foresight  our  Indian  Empire  was  preserved 
md  strengthened.1 

Bonaparte's  enterprises  were  by  no  means  limited  to 
well-known  lands.  The  unknown  continent  of  the  South- 
ern Seas  appealed  to  his  imagination,  which  pictured  its 
solitudes  transformed  by  French  energy  into  a  second 
fatherland.  Australia,  or  New  Holland,  as  it  was  then 
called,  had  long  attracted  the  notice  of  French  explorers, 
but  the  English  penal  settlements  at  and  near  Sydney 
formed  the  only  European  establishment  on  the  great 
southern  island  at  the  dawn  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Bonaparte  early  turned  his  eyes  towards  that  land. 
On  his  voyage  to  Egypt  he  took  with  him  the  volumes 
in  which  Captain  Cook  described  his  famous  discoveries  ; 
ind  no  sooner  was  he  firmly  installed  as  First  Consul  than 
he  planned  with  the  Institute  of  France  a  great  French 
expedition  to  New  Holland.  The  full  text  of  the  plan 
has  never  been  published  :  probably  it  was  suppressed 
or  destroyed  ;  and  the  sole  public  record  relating  to  it 
is  contained  in  the  official  account  of  the  expedition 
published  at  the  French  Imperial  Press  in  1807. 2  Ac- 
cording to  this  description,  the  aim  was  solely  geographi- 
cal and  scientific.  The  First  Consul  and  the  Institute  of 
France  desired  that  the  ships  should  proceed  to  Van 
Diemen's  Land,  explore  its  rivers,  and  then  complete 
the  survey  of  the  south  coast  of  the  continent,  so  as  to 
see  whether  behind  the  islands  of  the  Nuyts  Archipelago 
there  might  be  a  channel  connecting  with  the  Gulf  of 
Carpentaria,  and  so  cutting  New  Holland  in  half.  They 
were  then  to  sail  west  to  "Terre  Leeuwin,"  ascend  the 
Swan    River,    complete    the   exploration   of  Shark's   Bay 

1  The  report  of  the  Imaum  is  given  in  Castlereagh's  "  Letters,"  Second 
Series,  vol.  i.,  p.  203. 

2  "  Voyage  de  D^couverte  aux  Terres  Australes  sur  les  Corvettes,  le 
G^ographe  et  le  Naturaliste,"  redigG  par  M.  F.  Pe>on  (Paris,  1807-15). 
From  the  Atlas  the  accompanying  map  has  been  copied. 


352  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

and  the  north-western  coasts,  and  winter  in  Timor  or 
Amboyne.  Finally,  they  were  to  coast  along  New  Guinea 
and  the  Gulf  of  Carpentaria,  and  return  to  France  in  1803. 

In  September,  1800,  the  ships,  having  on  board  twenty- 
three  scientific  men,  set  sail  from  Havre  under  the 
command  of  Commodore  Baudin.  They  received  no 
molestation  from  English  cruisers,  it  being  a  rule  of 
honour  to  give  Admiralty  permits  to  all  members  of  genu- 
inely scientific  and  geographical  parties.  Nevertheless, 
even  on  its  scientific  side,  this  splendidly-equipped  expe- 
dition produced  no  results  comparable  with  those  achieved 
by  Lieutenant  Bass  or  by  Captain  Flinders.  The  French 
ships  touched  at  the  He  de  France,  and  sailed  thence  for 
Van  Diemen's  Land.  After  spending  a  long  time  in  the 
exploration  of  its  coasts  and  in  collecting  scientific  infor- 
mation, they  made  for  Sydney  in  order  to  repair  their  ships 
and  gain  relief  for  their  many  invalids.  Thence,  after 
incidents  which  will  be  noticed  presently,  they  set  sail  in 
November,  1802,  for  Bass  Strait  and  the  coast  beyond. 
They  seem  to  have  overlooked  the  entrance  to  Port 
Phillip — a  discovery  effected  by  Murray  in  1801,  but  not 
made  public  till  three  years  later  —  and  failed  to  notice 
the  outlet  of  the  chief  Australian  river,  which  is  obscured 
by  a  shallow  lake. 

There  they  were  met  by  Captain  Flinders,  who,  on 
H.M.S.  "Investigator,"  had  been  exploring  the  coast 
between  Cape  Leeuwin  and  the  great  gulfs  which  he 
named  after  Lords  St.  Vincent  and  Spencer.  Flinders 
was  returning  towards  Sydney,  when,  in  the  long  desolate 
curve  of  the  bay  which  he  named  from  the  incident 
Encounter  Bay,  he  saw  the  French  ships.  After  brief 
and  guarded  intercourse  the  explorers  separated,  the 
French  proceeding  to  survey  the  gulfs  whence  the  "  In- 
vestigator" had  just  sailed  ;  while  Flinders,  after  a  short 
stay  at  Sydney  and  the  exploration  of  the  northern  coast 
and  Torres  Strait,  set  out  for  Europe.1 

1  His  later  mishaps  may  here  be  briefly  recounted.  Being  compelled 
to  touch  at  the  He  de  France  for  repairs  to  his  ship,  he  was  there  seized 
and  detained  as  a  spy  by  General  Decaen,  until  the  chivalrous  interces- 
sion of  the  French  explorer,  Bougainville,  finally  availed  to  procure  his 
release  in  the  year  1810.     The  conduct  of  Decaen  was  the  more  odious, 


xv  AUSTRALIA  353 

Apart  from  the  compilation  of  the  most  accurate  map 
of  Australia  which  had  then  appeared,  and  the  naming  of 
several  features  on  its  coasts  —  e.g.,  Capes  Berrouilli  and 
Gantheaume,  the  Bays  of  Rivoli  and  of  Lacepede,  and 
the  Freycinet  Peninsula,  which  are  still  retained — the 
French  expedition  achieved  no  geographical  results  of  the 
first  importance. 

Its  political  aims  now  claim  attention.  A  glance  at 
the  accompanying  map  will  show  that,  under  the  guise  of 
being  an  emissary  of  civilization,  Commodore  Baudin  was 
prepared  to  claim  half  the  continent  for  France.  Indeed, 
his  final  inquiry  at  Sydney  about  the  extent  of  the  British 
claims  on  the  Pacific  coast  was  so  significant  as  to  elicit 
from  Governor  King  the  reply  that  the  whole  of  Van 
Diemen's  Land  and  of  the  coast  from  Cape  Howe  on  the 
south  of  the  mainland  to  Cape  York  on  the  north  was 
British  territory.  King  also  notified  the  suspicious  action 
of  the  French  Commander  to  the  Home  Government ; 
and  when  the  French  sailed  away  to  explore  the  coast  of 
Southern  and  Central  Australia,  he  sent  a  ship  to  watch 
their  proceedings.  When,  therefore,  Commodore  Baudin 
effected  a  landing  on  King  Island,  the  Union  Jack  was 
speedily  hoisted  and  saluted  by  the  blue-jackets  of  the 
British  vessel  ;  for  it  was  rumoured  that  French  officers 
had  said  that  King  Island  would  afford  a  good  station 
for  the  command  of  Bass  Strait  and  the  seizure  of  British 
ships.  This  -was  probably  mere  gossip.  Baudin  in  his 
interviews  with  Governor  King  at  Sydney  disclaimed  any 

as  the  French  crews  during  their  stay  at  Sydney  in  the  autumn  of  1802, 
when  the  news  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  was  as  yet  unknown,  had  received 
not  only  much  help  in  the  repair  of  their  ships,  but  most  generous  per- 
sonal attentions,  officials  and  private  persons  at  Sydney  agreeing  to  put 
themselves  on  short  rations  in  that  season  of  dearth  in  order  that  the 
explorers  might  have  food.  Though  this  fact  was  brought  to  Decaen's 
knowledge  by  the  brother  of  Commodore  Baudin,  he  none  the  less  re- 
fused to  acknowledge  the  validity  of  the  passport  which  Flinders,  as  a 
geographical  explorer,  had  received  from  the  French  authorities,  but  de- 
tained him  in  captivity  for  seven  years.  For  the  details  see  "  A  Voyage 
of  Discovery  to  the  Australian  Isles,"  by  Captain  Flinders  (London, 
1814),  vol.  ii.,  chs.  vii.-ix.  The  names  given  by  Flinders  on  the  coasts 
of  VVestern  and  South  Australia  have  been  retained  owing  to  tin- 
priority  of  his  investigation  :  but  the  French  names  have  been  kept  on 
the  coast  between  the  mouth  of  the  Murray  and  Bass  Strait  for  the  same 
reason. 

2a 


354  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

intention  of  seizing  Van  Diemen's  Land  ;  but  he  after- 
wards stated  that  he  did  not  know  what  were  the  plans  of 
the  French  Government  with  regard  to  that  island.1 

Long  before  this  dark  saying  could  be  known  at  West- 
minster, the  suspicions  of  our  Government  had  been 
aroused  ;  and,  on  Februar}'  13th,  1803,  Lord  Hobart  penned 
a  despatch  to  Governor  King  bidding  him  to  take  every 
precaution  against  French  annexations,  and  to  form  settle- 
ments in  Van  Diemen's  Land  and  at  Port  Phillip.  The 
station  of  Risden  was  accordingly  planted  on  the  estuary 
of  the  Derwent,  a  little  above  the  present  town  of  Hobart ; 
while  on  the  shores  of  Port  Phillip  another  expedition  sent 
out  from  the  mother  country  sought,  but  for  the  present 
in  vain,  to  find  a  suitable  site.  The  French  cruise  there- 
fore exerted  on  the  fortunes  of  the  English  and  French 
peoples  an  influence  such  as  has  frequently  accrued  from 
their  colonial  rivalry  :  it  spurred  on  the  island  Power  to 
more  vigorous  efforts  than  she  would  otherwise  have  put^ 
forth,  and  led  to  the  discomfiture  of  her  continental  rival. 
The  plans  of  Napoleon  for  the  acquisition  of  Van  Diemen's 
Land  and  the  middle  of  Australia  had  an  effect  like  that 
which  the  ambition  of  Montcalm,  Dupleix,  Lally,  and 
Perron  has  exerted  on  the  ultimate  destiny  of  many  a 
vast  and  fertile  territory. 

Still,  in  spite  of  the  destruction  of  his  fleet  at  Trafal- 
gar, Napoleon  held  to  his  Australian  plans.  No  fact,  per- 
haps, is  more  suggestive  of  the  dogged  tenacity  of  his 
will  than  his  order  to  Peron  and  Freycinet  to  publish 
through  the  Imperial  Press  at  Paris  an  exhaustive  account 
of  their  Australian  voyage,  accompanied  by  maps  which 
claimed  half  of  that  continent  for  the  tricolour  flag.  It 
appeared  in  1807,  the  year  of  Tilsit  and  of  the  plans  for 
the  partition  of  Portugal  and  her  colonies  between  France 
and  Spain.  The  hour  seemed  at  last  to  have  struck  for 
the  assertion  of  French  supremacy  in  other  continents, 
now  that  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  had  durably  consoli- 
dated it  in  Europe.     And  who  shall  say  that,  but  for  the 

1  See  Baudin's  letter  to  King  of  December  23rd,  1803,  in  vol.  v. 
(Appendix)  of  "  Historical  Records  of  New  South  Wales,"  and  the  other 
important  letters  and  despatches  contained  there,  as  also  ibid.,  pp.  133 
and  376. 


xv  A  FRENCH  COLONIAL   EMPIRE  355 

Spanish  Rising  and  the  genius  of  Wellington,  a  vast 
colonial  empire  might  not  have  been  won  for  France,  had 
Napoleon  been  free  to  divert  his  energies  away  from  this 
"  old  Europe  "  of  which  he  professed  to  be  utterly  weary  ? 

His  whole  attitude  towards  European  and  colonial  poli- 
tics revealed  a  statesmanlike  appreciation  of  the  forces 
that  were  to  mould  the  fortunes  of  nations  in  the  nine- 
teenth century.  He  saw  that  no  rearrangement  of  the 
European  peoples  could  be  permanent.  They  were  too 
stubborn,  too  solidly  nationalized,  to  bear  the  yoke  of  the 
new  Charlemagne.  "  I  am  come  too  late,"  he  once 
exclaimed  to  Marmont  ;  "  men  are  too  enlightened,  there 
is  nothing  great  left  to  be  done."  These  words  reveal  his 
sense  of  the  artificiality  of  his  European  conquests.  His 
imperial  instincts  could  find  complete  satisfaction  only 
among  the  docile  fate-ridden  peoples  of  Asia,  where 
he  might  unite  the  functions  of  an  Alexander  and  a 
Mahomet :  or,  failing  that,  he  would  carve  out  an  empire 
from  the  vast  southern  lands,  organizing  them  by  his 
unresting  powers  and  ruling  them  as  cekist  and  as  despot. 
This  task  would  possess  a  permanence  such  as  man's  con- 
quests over  Nature  may  always  enjoy,  and  his  triumphs 
over  his  fellows  seldom  or  never.  The  political  recon- 
struction of  Europe  was  at  best  one  of  an  infinite  number 
of  such  changes,  always  progressing  and  never  completed  ; 
while  the  peopling  of  new  lands  and  the  founding  of  States 
belonged  to  that  highest  plane  of  political  achievement 
wherein  schemes  of  social  beneficence  and  the  dictates  of 
a  boundless  ambition  could  maintain  an  eager  and  unend- 
ing rivalry.  While  a  strictly  European  policy  could  effect 
little  more  than  a  raking  over  of  long-cultivated  parterres, 
the  foundation  of  a  new  colonial  empire  would  be  the  turn- 
ing up  of  the  virgin  soil  of  the  limitless  prairie. 

If  we  inquire  by  the  light  of  history  why  these  grand 
designs  failed,  the  answer  must  be  that  they  were  too  vast 
fitly  to  consort  with  an  ambitious  European  policy.  His 
ablest  adviser  noted  this  fundamental  defect  as  rapidly 
developing  after  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  when  "he  began  to 
sow  the  seeds  of  new  wars  which,  after  overwhelming 
Europe  and  France,  were  to  lead  him  to  his  ruin."  This 
criticism  of  Talleyrand  on  a  man  far  greater  than  himself, 


356  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xv 

but  who  lacked  that  saving  grace  of  moderation  in  which 
the  diplomatist  excelled,  is  consonant  with  all  the  teach- 
ings of  history.  The  fortunes  of  the  colonial  empires  of 
Athens  and  Carthage  in  the  ancient  world,  of  the  Italian 
maritime  republics,  of  Portugal  and  Spain,  and,  above  all, 
the  failure  of  the  projects  of  Louis  XIV.  and  Louis  XV., 
serve  to  prove  that  only  as  the  motherland  enjoys  a  suffi- 
ciency of  peace  at  home  and  on  her  borders  can  she  send 
forth  in  ceaseless  flow  those  supplies  of  men  and  treasure 
which  are  the  very  life-blood  of  a  new  organism.  That 
beneficent  stream  might  have  poured  into  Napoleon's 
Colonial  Empire,  had  not  other  claims  diverted  it  into  the 
barren  channels  of  European  warfare.  The  same  result 
followed  as  at  the  time  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  when 
the  double  effort  to  wage  great  campaigns  in  Germany  and 
across  the  oceans  sapped  the  strength  of  France,  and  the 
additions  won  by  Dupleix  and  Montcalm  fell  away  from 
her  flaccid  frame. 

Did  Napoleon  foresee  a  similar  result  ?  His  conduct  in 
regard  to  Louisiana  and  in  reference  to  Decaen's  expedi- 
tion proves  that  he  did,  but  only  when  it  was  too  late. 
As  soon  as  he  saw  that  his  policy  was  about  to  provoke 
another  war  with  Britain  long  before  he  was  ready  for  it, 
he  decided  to  forego  his  oceanic  schemes  and  to  concen- 
trate his  forces  on  his  European  frontiers.  The  decision 
was  dictated  by  a  true  sense  of  imperial  strategy.  But 
what  shall  we  say  of  his  sense  of  imperial  diplomacy? 
The  foregoing  narrative  and  the  events  to  be  described  in 
the  next  chapters  prove  that  his  mistake  lay  in  that  over- 
weening belief  in  his  own  powers  and  in  the  pliability  of 
his  enemies  which  was  the  cause  of  his  grandest  triumphs 
and  of  his  unexampled  overthrow. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

NAPOLEON'S   INTERVENTIONS 

War,  said  St.  Augustine,  is  but  the  transition  from  a 
lower  to  a  higher  state  of  peace.  The  saying  is  certainly 
true  for  those  wars  that  are  waged  in  defence  of  some 
great  principle  or  righteous  cause.  It  may  perhaps  be 
applied  with  justice  to  the  early  struggles  of  the  French 
revolutionists  to  secure  their  democratic  Government 
against  the  threatened  intervention  of  monarchical  States. 
But  the  danger  of  vindicating  the  cause  of  freedom  by 
armed  force  has  never  been  more  glaringly  shown  than 
in  the  struggles  of  that  volcanic  age.  When  democracy 
had  gained  a  sure  foothold  in  the  European  system, 
the  war  was  still  pushed  on  by  the  triumphant  repub- 
licans at  the  expense  of  neighbouring  States,  so  that,  even 
before  the  advent  of  Bonaparte,  their  polity  was  being 
strangely  warped  by  the  influence  of  military  methods 
of  rule.  The  brilliance  of  the  triumphs  won  by  that 
young  warrior  speedily  became  the  greatest  danger  of 
republican  France  ;  and  as  the  extraordinary  energy 
developed  in  her  people  by  recent  events  cast  her  feeble 
neighbours  to  the  ground,  Europe  cowered  away  before 
the  ever-increasing  bulk  of  France.  In  their  struggles 
after  democracy  the  French  finally  reverted  to  the  military 
type  of  Government,  which  accords  with  many  of  the 
cherished  instincts  of  their  race :  and  the  military-demo- 
cratic compromise  embodied  in  Napoleon  endowed  that 
people  with  the  twofold  force  of  national  pride  and  of 
conscious  strength  springing  from  their  new  institutions. 

With  this  was  mingled  contempt  for  neighbouring 
peoples  who  either  could  not  or  would  not  gain  a  similar 
independence  and  prestige.  Everything  helped  to  feed 
this  self-confidence  and  contempt  for  others.  The  vener- 
able fabric  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  was  rocking  to 

357 


358  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

and  fro  amidst  the  spoliations  of  its  ecclesiastical  lands 
by  lay  princes,  in  which  its  former  champions,  the  Houses 
of  Hapsburg  and  Hohenzollern,  were  the  most  exacting 
of  the  claimants.     The  Czar,  in  October,  1801,  had  come 
to  a  profitable  understanding  with  France  concerning  these 
"  secularizations."     A  little  later  France  and  Russia  be- 
gan to  draw  together  on  the  Eastern  Question  in  a  way 
threatening  to  Turkey  and  to  British  influence   in  the 
Levant.1     In  fact,  French  diplomacy  used   the  partition 
of    the    German   ecclesiastical  lands  and  the   threatened 
collapse   of  the    Ottoman   power  as  a   potent    means  of 
busying  the  Continental  States  and  leaving  Great  Britain 
isolated.     Moreover,  the  great  island  State  was  passing 
through  ministerial  and  financial  difficulties  which  robbed 
her  of  all  the  fruits  of  her  naval  triumphs  and  made  her 
diplomacy  at   Amiens  the  laughing-stock   of  the  world. 
When   monarchical   ideas   were   thus  discredited,  it  was 
idle  to  expect  peace.     The  struggling  upwards  towards  a 
higher  plane  had  indeed  begun  ;  democracy  had  effected 
a  lodgment  in  Western  Europe  ;  but  the  old  order  in  its 
bewildered   gropings  after   some  sure  basis  had   not  yet 
touched  bottom  on  that  rock  of  nationality  which  was  to 
yield  a  new  foundation  for  monarchy  amidst  the  strifes 
of   the   nineteenth   century.      Only  when   the  monarchs 
received    the   support    of    their   French-hating    subjects 
could   an  equilibrium  of  force  and  of  enthusiasms  yield 
the  long-sought  opportunity  for  a  durable  peace.2 

ljlr.  Merry's  ciphered  despatch  from  Paris,  May  7th,  1802. 

2  It  is  impossible  to  enter  into  the  complicated  question  of  the  recon- 
struction of  Germany  effected  in  1802-3.  A  general  agreement  had  been 
made  at  Rastadt  that,  as  an  indemnity  for  the  losses  of  German  btates  in 
the  conquest  of  the  Rhineland  by  France,  they  should  receive  the  eccle- 
siastical lands  of  the  old  Empire.  The  Imperial  Diet  appointed  a  delega- 
tion to  consider  the  whole  question  ;  but  before  this  body  assembled  (on 
August  24th,  1802),  a  number  of  treaties  had  been  secretly  made  at  Paris, 
with  the  approval  of  Russia,  which  favoured  Prussia  and  depressed  Aus- 
tria. Austria  received  the  archbishoprics  of  Trent  and  Bnxen :  while  her 
Archdukes  (formerly  of  Tuscany  and  Modena)  were  installed  in  fealz- 
burg  and  Breisgau.  Prussia,  as  the  protege  of  France,  gained  Hildesheim, 
Paderborn,  Erfurt,  the  city  of  Munster,  etc.  Bavaria  received  Wurzburg, 
Bamberg,  Augsburg,  Passau,  etc.  See  Garden  «  Traitfis,"  vol •  v"m  <jh. 
xxxii.;  "Annual  Register"  of  1802,  pp.  648-665  ;  Oncken,  "Consulat 
und  Kaiserthum,"  vol.  ii. ;  and  Beer's  "Zehn  Jahre  Oesterreichischer 
Politik." 


xvi  NAPOLEON'S   INTERVENTIONS  359 

The  negotiations  at  Amiens  had  amply  shown  the  great 
difficulty  of  the  readjustment  of  European  affairs.  If  our 
Ministers  had  manifested  their  real  feelings  about  Napo- 
leon's presidency  of  the  Italian  Republic,  war  would  cer- 
tainly have  broken  forth.  But,  as  has  been  seen,  they 
preferred  to  assume  the  attitude  of  the  ostrich,  the  worst 
possible  device  both  for  the  welfare  of  Europe  and  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  ;  for  it  convinced  Napoleon 
that  he  could  safely  venture  on  other  interventions  ;  and 
this  he  proceeded  to  do  in  the  affairs  of  Italy,  Holland, 
and  Switzerland. 

On  September  21st,  1802,  appeared  a  senatus  consultum 
ordering  the  incorporation  of  Piedmont  in  France.  This 
important  territory,  lessened  by  the  annexation  of  its 
eastern  parts  to  the  Italian  Republic,  had  for  five  months 
been  provisionally  administered  by  a  French  general  as  a 
military  district  of  France.  Its  definite  incorporation  in 
the  great  Republic  now  put  an  end  to  all  hopes  of  restora- 
tion of  the  House  of  Savoy.  For  the  King  of  Sardinia, 
now  an  exile  in  his  island,  the  British  Ministry  had  made 
some  efforts  at  Amiens  ;  but,  as  it  knew  that  the  Czar  and 
the  First  Consul  had  agreed  on  offering  him  some  suitable 
indemnity,  the  hope  was  cherished  that  the  new  sovereign, 
Victor  Emmanuel  I.,  would  be  restored  to  his  mainland 
possessions.  That  hope  was  now  at  an  end.  In  vain  did 
Lord  Whitworth,  our  ambassador  at  Paris,  seek  to  help  the 
Russian  envoy  to  gain  a  fit  indemnity.  Sienna  and  its 
lands  were  named,  as  if  in  derision  ;  and  though  George 
III.  and  the  Czar  ceased  not  to  press  the  claims  of  the 
House  of  Savoy,  yet  no  more  tempting  offer  came  from 
Paris,  except  a  hint  that  some  part  of  European  Turkey 
might  be  found  for  him ;  and  the  young  ruler  nobly  re- 
fused to  barter  for  the  petty  Siennese,  or  for  some  Turkish 
pachalic,  his  birthright  to  the  lands  which,  under  a  happier 
Victor  Emmanuel,  were  to  form  the  nucleus  of  a  United 
Italy.1  A  month  after  the  absorption  of  Piedmont  came 
the  annexation  of  Parma.  The  heir  to  that  duchy,  who 
was  son-in-law  to  the  King  of  Spain,  had  been  raised  to 
the  dignity  of  King  of  Etruria  ;  and  in   return   for  this 

JThe  British  notes  of  April  28th  and  May  8th,  1803,  again  demanded 
a  suitable  indemnity  for  the  King  of  Sardinia. 


360  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

aggrandizement  in  Europe,  Charles  IV.  bartered  away 
to  France  the  whole  of  Louisiana.  Nevertheless,  the 
First  Consul  kept  his  troops  in  Parma,  and  on  the  death 
of  the  old  duke  in  October,  1802,  Parma  and  its  depen- 
dencies were  incorporated  in  the  French  Republic. 

The  naval  supremacy  of  France  in  the  Mediterranean 
was  also  secured  by  the  annexation  of  the  Isle  of  Elba 
with  its  excellent  harbour  of  Porto  Ferrajo.  Three 
deputies  from  Elba  came  to  Paris  to  pay  their  respects 
to  their  new  ruler.  The  Minister  of  War  was  thereupon 
charged  to  treat  them  with  every  courtesy,  to  entertain 
them  at  dinner,  to  give  them  3,000  francs  apiece,  and 
to  hint  that  on  their  presentation  to  Bonaparte  they 
might  make  a  short  speech  expressing  the  pleasure  of 
their  people  at  being  united  with  France.  By  such  deft 
rehearsals  did  this  master  in  the  art  of  scenic  displays 
weld  Elba  on  to  France  and  France  to  himself. 

Even  more  important  was  Bonaparte's  intervention  in 
Switzerland.  The  condition  of  that  land  calls  for  some 
explanation.  For  wellnigh  three  centuries  the  Switzers 
had  been  grouped  in  thirteen  cantons,  which  differed 
widely  in  character  and  constitution.  The  Central  or 
Forest  Cantons  still  retained  the  old  Teutonic  custom  of 
regulating  their  affairs  in  their  several  folk-moots,  at 
which  every  householder  appeared  fully  armed.  Else- 
where the  confederation  had  developed  less  admirable 
customs,  and  the  richer  lowlands  especially  were  under 
the  hereditary  control  of  rich  burgher  families.  There 
was  no  constitution  binding  these  States  in  any  effective 
union.  Each  of  the  cantons  claimed  a  governmental 
sovereignty  that  was  scarcely  impaired  by  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  Federal  Diet.  Besides  these  sovereign 
States  were  others  that  held  an  ill-defined  position  as 
allies  ;  among  these  were  Geneva,  Basel,  Bienne,  Saint 
Gall,  the  old  imperial  city  of  Muhlhausen  in  Alsace, 
the  three  Grisons,  the  principality  of  Neufchatel,  and 
Valais  on  the  Upper  Rhone.  Last  came  the  subject- 
lands,  Aargau,  Thurgau,  Ticino,  Vaud,  and  others,  which 
were  governed  in  various  degrees  of  strictness  by  their 
cantonal  overlords.  Such  was  the  old  Swiss  Confeder- 
acy :    it    somewhat   resembled    that  chaotic    Macedonian 


xvi  NAPOLEON'S   INTERVENTIONS  361 

league  of  mountain  clans,  plain-dwellers,  and  cities,  which 
was  so  profoundly  influenced  by  the  infiltration  of  Greek 
ideas  and  by  the  masterful  genius  of  Philip.  Switzerland 
was  likewise  to  be  shaken  by  a  new  political  influence, 
and  thereafter  to  be  controlled  by  the  greatest  statesman 
of  the  age. 

On  this  motley  group  of  cantons  and  districts  the 
French  Revolution  exerted  a  powerful  influence  ;  and 
when,  in  1798,  the  people  of  Vaud  strove  to  throw  off 
the  yoke  of  Berne,  French  troops,  on  the  invitation  of 
the  insurgents,  invaded  Switzerland,  quelled  the  brave 
resistance  of  the  central  cantons,  and  ransacked  the  chief 
of  the  Swiss  treasuries.  After  the  plunderers  came  the 
constitution-mongers,  who  forthwith  forced  on  Switzer- 
land democracy  of  the  most  French  and  geometrical  type  : 
all  differences  between  the  sovereign  cantons,  allies, 
and  subject-lands  were  swept  away,  and  Helvetia  was 
constituted  as  an  indivisible  republic — except  Valais, 
which  was  to  be  independent,  and  Geneva  and  Miihl- 
hausen,  which  were  absorbed  by  France.  The  subject 
districts  and  non-privileged  classes  benefited  considerably 
by  the  social  reforms  introduced  under  French  influence  ; 
but  a  constitution  recklessly  transferred  from  Paris  to 
Berne  could  only  provoke  loathing  among  a  people  that 
never  before  had  submitted  to  foreign  dictation.  More- 
over, the  new  order  of  things  violated  the  most  elementary 
needs  of  the  Swiss,  whose  racial  and  religious  instincts 
claimed  freedom  of  action  for  each  district  or  canton. 

Of  these  deep-seated  feelings  the  oligarchs  of  the  plains, 
no  less  than  the  democrats  of  the  Forest  Cantons,  were 
now  the  champions ;  while  the  partisans  of  the  new- 
fangled democracy  were  held  up  to  scorn  as  the  sup- 
porters of  a  cast-iron  centralization.  It  soon  became 
clear  that  the  constitution  of  1798  could  be  perpetuated 
only  by  the  support  of  the  French  troops  quartered  on 
that  unhappy  land  ;  for  throughout  the  years  1800  and 
1801  the  political  see-saw  tilted  every  few  months,  first 
in  favour  of  the  oligarchic  or  federal  party,  then  again 
towards  their  unionist  opponents.  After  the  Peace  of 
Luneville,  which  recognized  the  right  of  the  Swiss  to 
adopt  what  form  of  government  they  thought  fit,  some 


362  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

of  their  deputies  travelled  to  Paris  with  the  draft  of  a 
constitution  lately  drawn  up  by  the  Chamber  at  Berne, 
in  the  hope  of  gaining  the  assent  of  the  First  Consul  to 
its  provisions  and  the  withdrawal  of  French  troops.  They 
had  every  reason  for  hope :  the  party  then  in  power  at 
Berne  was  that  which  favoured  a  centralized  democracy, 
and  their  plenipotentiary  in  Paris,  a  thorough  republican 
named  Stapfer,  had  been  led  to  hope  that  Switzerland 
would  now  be  allowed  to  carve  out  its  own  destiny. 
What,  then,  was  his  surprise  to  find  the  First  Consul 
increasingly  enamoured  of  federalism.  The  letters  writ- 
ten by  Stapfer  to  the  Swiss  Government  at  this  time  are 
highly  instructive.1 

On  March  10th,  1801,  he  wrote  : 

"  What  torments  us  most  is  the  cruel  uncertainty  as  to  the  real 
aims  of  the  French  Government.  Does  it  want  to  federalize  us  in 
order  to  weaken  us  and  to  rule  more  surely  by  our  divisions :  or  does 
it  really  desire  our  independence  and  welfare,  and  is  its  delay  only 
the  result  of  its  doubts  as  to  the  true  wishes  of  the  Helvetic  nation?" 

Stapfer  soon  found  that  the  real  cause  of  delay  was  the 
non-completion  of  the  cession  of  Valais,  which  Bonaparte 
urgently  desired  for  the  construction  of  a  military  road 
across  the  Simplon  Pass ;  and  as  the  Swiss  refused  this 
demand,  matters  remained  at  a  standstill.  "The  whole 
of  Europe  would  not  make  him  give  up  a  favourite 
scheme,"  wrote  Stapfer  on  April  10th  ;  "  the  possession 
of  Valais  is  one  of  the  matters  closest  to  his  heart." 

The  protracted  pressure  of  a  French  army  of  occupa- 
tion on  that  already  impoverished  land  proved  irresisti- 
ble ;  and  some  important  modifications  of  the  Swiss  project 
of  a  constitution,  on  which  the  First  Consul  insisted,  were 
inserted  in  the  new  federal  compact  of  May,  1801.  Swit- 
zerland was  now  divided  into  seventeen  cantons ;  and  de- 
spite the  wish  of  the  official  Swiss  envoys  for  a  strongly 
centralized  government,  Bonaparte  gave  large  powers  to 
the  cantonal  authorities.  His  motives  in  this  course  of 
action  have   been  variously  judged.     In  giving   greater 

1See  his  letters  of  January  28th,  1801,  February  27th,  March  10th, 
March  25th,  April  10th,  and  May  16th,  published  in  a  work,  "  Bonaparte, 
Talleyrand  et  Stapfer  "  (Zurich,  1869). 


xvi  NAPOLEON'S   INTERVENTIONS  303 

freedom  of  movement  to  the  several  cantons,  he  certainly 
adopted  the  only  statesmanlike  course :  but  his  conduct 
during  the  negotiation,  his  retention  of  Valais,  and  the 
continued  occupation  of  Switzerland  by  his  troops,  albeit 
in  reduced  numbers,  caused  many  doubts  as  to  the  sincer- 
ity of  his  desire  for  a  final  settlement. 

The  unionist  majority  at  Berne  soon  proceeded  to 
modify  his  proposals,  which  they  condemned  as  full  of 
defects  and  contradictions ;  while  the  federals  strove  to 
keep  matters  as  they  were.  In  the  month  of  October 
their  efforts  succeeded,  thanks  to  the  support  of  the 
French  ambassador  and  soldiery ;  they  dissolved  the 
Assembly,  annulled  its  recent  amendments  ;  and  their 
influence  procured  for  Reding,  the  head  of  the  oligarchic 
party,  the  office  of  Landamman,  or  supreme  magistrate. 
So  reactionary,  however,  were  their  proceedings,  that  the 
First  Consul  recalled  the  French  general  as  a  sign  of  his 
displeasure  at  his  help  recently  offered  to  the  federals. 
Their  triumph  was  brief :  while  their  chiefs  were  away  at 
Easter,  1802,  the  democratic  unionists  effected  another 
coup  detat —  it  was  the  fourth  —  and  promulgated  one 
more  constitution.  This  change  seems  also  to  have  been 
brought  about  with  the  connivance  of  the  French  authori- 
ties : l  their  refusal  to  listen  to  Stapfer's  claims  for  a 
definite  settlement,  as  well  as  their  persistent  hints  that 
the  Swiss  could  not  by  themselves  arrange  their  own 
affairs,  argued  a  desire  to  continue  the  epoch  of  quar- 
terly coups  d'etat. 

The  victory  of  the  so-called  democrats  at  Berne  now 
brought  the  whole  matter  to  the  touch.  They  appealed 
to  the  people  in  the  first  Swiss  plebiscite,  the  precursor  of 
the  famous  referendum.  It  could  now  be  decided  without 
the  interference  of  French  troops  ;  for  the  First  Consul  had 
privately  declared  to  the  new  Landamman,  Bolder,  that  he 
left  it  to  his  Government  to  decide  whether  the  foreign 
soldiery  should  remain  as  a  support  or  should  evacuate 

1  Daendliker,  "  Geschichte  der  Schweiz,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  418;  Muralt's 
"Reinhard,"  p.  5-r) ;  and  Stapfer's  letter  of  April  28th:  "  Malgre"  cette 
apparente  neutrality  que  le  gouvernement  francos  declare  vouloir  observer 
pour  le  moment,  difKrentes  circonstances  me  persuadent  qu'il  a  vu  avec 
plaisir  passer  la  direction  des  affaires  des  mains  de  la  majority  du  S^nat 
[helvelique]  dans  celles  de  la  minorite*  du  Petit  Conseil." 


364  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Switzerland.1  After  many  searchings  of  heart,  the  new 
authorities  decided  to  try  their  fortunes  alone  —  a  response 
which  must  have  been  expected  at  Paris,  where  Stapfer  had 
for  months  been  urging  the  removal  of  the  French  forces. 
For  the  first  time  since  the  year  1798  Switzerland  was 
therefore  free  to  declare  her  will.  The  result  of  the  plebis- 
cite was  decisive  enough,  72,453  votes  being  cast  in  favour 
of  the  latest  constitution,  and  92,423  against  it.  Nothing 
daunted  by  this  rebuff,  and,  adopting  a  device  which  the 
First  Consul  had  invented  for  the  benefit  of  Dutch  liberty, 
the  Bernese  leaders  declared  that  the  167,172  adult  voters 
who  had  not  voted  at  all  must  reckon  as  approving  the 
new  order  of  things.  The  flimsiness  of  this  pretext  was 
soon  disclosed.  The  Swiss  had  had  enough  of  electioneer- 
ing tricks,  hole-and-corner  revolutions,  and  paper  compacts. 
They  rushed  to  arms  ;  and  if  ever  Carlyle's  appeal  away 
from  ballot-boxes  and  parliamentary  tongue-fencers  to  the 
primaeval  mights  of  man  can  be  justified,  it  was  in  the  sharp 
and  decisive  conflicts  of  the  early  autumn  of  1802  in  Swit- 
zerland. The  troops  of  the  central  authorities,  marching 
forth  from  Berne  to  quell  the  rising  ferment,  sustained  a 
repulse  at  the  foot  of  Mont  Pilatus,  as  also  before  the  walls 
of  Zurich  ;  and,  the  revolt  of  the  federals  ever  gathering 
force,  the  Helvetic  authorities  were  driven  from  Berne  to 
Lausanne.  There  they  were  planning  flight  across  the 
Lake  of  Geneva  to  Savoy,  when,  on  October  15th,  the 
arrival  of  Napoleon's  aide-de-camp,  General  Rapp,  with  an 
imperious  proclamation  dismayed  the  federals  and  promised 
to  the  discomfited  unionists  the  mediation  of  the  First  Con- 
sul for  which  they  had  humbly  pleaded.2 

Napoleon  had  apparently  viewed  the  late  proceedings  in 
Switzerland  with  mingled  feelings  of  irritation  and  amused 

1  Garden,  "  Traitds,"  vol.  viii.,  p.  10.  Mr.  Merry,  our  charge  d'affaires 
at  Paris,  reported  July  21st :  "  M.  Stapfer  makes  a  boast  of  having  ob- 
tained the  First  Consul's  consent  to  withdraw  the  French  troops  entirely 
from  Switzerland.  I  learn  from  some  well-disposed  Swiss  who  are  here 
that  such  a  consent  has  been  given  ;  but  they  consider  it  only  as  a  measure 
calculated  to  increase  the  disturbances  in  their  country  and  to  furnish  a 
pretext  for  the  French  to  enter  it  again." 

2  Reding,  in  a  pamphlet  published  shortly  after  this  time,  gave  full  par- 
ticulars of  his  interviews  with  Bonaparte  at  Paris,  and  stated  that  he  had 
fully  approved  of  his  (Reding's)  federal  plans.  Neither  Bonaparte  not 
Talleyrand  ever  denied  this. 


xvi  NAPOLEON'S   INTERVENTIONS  365 

contempt.  "  Well,  there  you  are  once  more  in  a  revolu- 
tion "  was  his  hasty  comment  to  Stapfer  at  a  diplomatic 
reception  shortly  after  Easter  ;  "  try  and  get  tired  of  all 
that."  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  believe  that  so  keen- 
sighted  a  statesman  could  look  forward  to  anything  but 
commotions  for  a  land  that  was  being  saddled  with  an  im- 
practicable constitution,  and  whence  the  controlling  French 
forces  were  withdrawn  at  that  very  crisis.  He  was  cer- 
tainly prepared  for  the  events  of  September  :  many  times 
he  had  quizzingly  asked  Stapfer  how  the  constitution  was 
faring,  and  he  must  have  received  with  quiet  amusement 
the  solemn  reply  that  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  its 
brilliant  success.  When  the  truth  flashed  on  Stapfer  he 
was  dumfounded,  especially  as  Talleyrand  at  first  mock- 
ingly repulsed  any  suggestion  of  the  need  of  French  medi- 
ation, and  went  on  to  assure  him  that  his  master  had 
neither  counselled  nor  approved  the  last  constitution,  the 
unfitness  of  which  was  now  shown  by  the  widespread  in- 
surrection. Two  days  later,  however,  Napoleon  altered 
his  tone  and  directed  Talleyrand  vigorously  to  protest 
against  the  acts  and  proclamations  of  the  victorious  feder- 
als as  "the  most  violent  outrage  to  French  honour."  On 
the  last  day  of  September  he  issued  a  proclamation  to  the 
Swiss  declaring  that  he  now  revoked  his  decision  not  to 
mingle  in  Swiss  politics,  and  ordered  the  federal  authori- 
ties and  troops  to  disperse,  and  the  cantons  to  send  depu- 
ties to  Paris  for  the  regulation  of  their  affairs  under  his 
mediation.  Meanwhile  he  bade  the  Swiss  live  once  more 
in  hope  :  their  land  was  on  the  brink  of  a  precipice,  but  it 
would  soon  be  saved  !  Rapp  carried  analogous  orders  to 
Lausanne  and  Berne,  while  Ney  marched  in  with  a  large 
force  of  French  troops  that  had  been  assembled  near  the 
Swiss  frontiers. 

So  glaring  a  violation  of  Swiss  independence  and  of  the 
guaranteeing  Treaty  of  Luneville  aroused  indignation 
throughout  Europe.  But  Austria  was  too  alarmed  at 
Prussian  aggrandizement  in  Germany  to  offer  any  protest ; 
and,  indeed,  procured  some  trifling  gains  by  giving  France 
a  free  hand  in  Switzerland.1     The  Court  of  Berlin,  then 

^ee  "Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  despatches  of  October  29th,  1802,  and 
January  28th,  1803. 


366  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

content  to  play  the  jackal  to  the  French  lion,  revealed  to 
the  First  Consul  the  appeals  for  help  privately  made  to 
Prussia  by  the  Swiss  federals  :x  the  Czar,  influenced 
doubtless  by  his  compact  with  France  concerning  German 
affairs,  and  by  the  advice  of  his  former  tutor,  the  Swiss 
Laharpe,  offered  no  encouragement ;  and  it  was  left  to 
Great  Britain  to  make  the  sole  effort  then  attempted  for 
the  cause  of  Swiss  independence.  For  some  time  past  the 
cantons  had  made  appeals  to  the  British  Government, 
which  now,  in  response,'' sent  an  English  agent,  Moore,  to 
confer  with  their  chiefs,  and  to  advance  money  and  promise 
active  support  if  he  judged  that  a  successful  resistance 
could  be  attempted.2  The  British  Ministry  undoubtedly 
prepared  for  an  open  rupture  with'  France  on  this  ques- 
tion. Orders  were  immediately  sent  from  London  that 
no  more  French  or  Dutch  colonies  were  to  be  handed 
back  ;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and 
the  French  settlements  in  India  were  refused  to  the 
Dutch  and  French  officers  who  claimed  their  surrender. 

Hostilities,  however,  were  for  the  present  avoided.  In 
face  of  the  overwhelming  force  which  Ney  had  close  at 
hand,  the  chiefs  of  the  central  cantons  shrank  from  any 
active  opposition  ;  and  Moore,  finding  on  his  arrival  at 
Constance  that  they  had  decided  to  submit,  speedily 
returned  to  England.  Ministers  beheld  with  anger  and 
dismay  the  perpetuation  of  French  supremacy  in  that 
land  ;  but  they  lacked  the  courage  openly  to  oppose  the 
First  Consul's  action,  and  gave  orders  that  the  stipulated 
cessions  of  French  and  Dutch  colonies  should  take  effect. 

The  submission  of  the  Swiss  and  the  weakness  of  all 
the  Powers  encouraged  the  First  Consul  to  impose  his 
will  on  the  deputies  from  the  cantons,  who  assembled  at 
Paris  at  the  close  of  the  year  1802.  He  first  caused  their 
aims  and  the  capacity  of  their  leaders  to  be  sounded  in  a 
Franco-Swiss  Commission,  and  thereafter  assembled  them 

1  Napoleon  avowed  this  in  his  speech  to  the  Swiss  deputies  at  St.  Cloud, 
December  12th,  1802. 

2  Lord  Hawkesbury's  note  of  October  10th,  1802,  the  appeal  of  the 
Swiss,  and  the  reply  of  Mr.  Moore  from  Constance,  are  printed  in  full 
in  the  papers  presented  to  Parliament,  May  18th,  1803. 

The  Duke  of  Orleans  wrote  from  Twickenham  a  remarkable  letter  to 
Pitt,  dated  October  18th,  1802,  offering  to  go  as  leader  to  the  Swiss  in  the 


xvi   •  NAPOLEON'S  INTERVENTIONS  367 

at  St.  Cloud  on  Sunday,  December  12th.  He  harangued 
them  at  great  length,  hinting  very  clearly  that  the  Swiss 
must  now  take  a  far  lower  place  in  the  scale  of  peoples 
than  in  the  days  when  France  was  divided  into  sixty  fiefs, 
and  that  union  with  her  could  alone  enable  them  to  play 
a  great  part  in  the  world's  affairs :  nevertheless,  as  they 
clung  to  independence,  he  would  undertake  in  his  quality 
of  mediator  to  end  their  troubles,  and  yet  leave  them  free. 
That  they  could  attain  unity  was  a  mere  dream  of  their 
metaphysicians :  they  must  rely  on  the  cantonal  organiza- 
tion, always  provided  that  the  French  and  Italian  districts 
of  Vaud  and  the  upper  Ticino  were  not  subject  to  the 
central  or  German  cantons  :  to  prevent  such  a  dishonour 
he  would  shed  the  blood  of  50,000  Frenchmen  :  Berne 
must  also  open  its  golden  book  of  the  privileged  families 
to  include  four  times  their  number.  For  the  rest,  the 
Continental  Powers  could  not  help  them,  and  England 
had  "  no  right  to  meddle  in  Swiss  affairs."  The  same 
menace  was  repeated  in  more  strident  tones  on  January 
29th  : 

"  I  tell  you  that  I  would  sacrifice  100,000  men  rather  than  allow 
England  to  meddle  in  your  affairs :  if  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James  uttered 
a  single  word  for  you,  it  would  be  all  up  with  you,  I  would  unite  you 
to  France :  if  that  Court  made  the  least  insinuation  of  its  fears  that  I 
would  be  your  Landamman,  I  would  make  myself  your  Landamman." 

There  spake  forth  the  inner  mind  of  the  man  who, 
whether  as  child,  youth,  lieutenant,  general,  Consul,  or 
Emperor,  loved  to  bear  down  opposition.1 

In  those  days  of  superhuman  activity,  when  he  was 
carving  out  one  colonial  Empire  in  the  New  World  and 
preparing  to  found  another  in  India,  when  he  was  out- 
cause  of  Swiss  and  of  European  independence  :  "I  am  a  natural  enemy 
to  Bonaparte  and  to  all  similar  Governments.  .  .  .  England  and  Austria 
can  find  in  me  all  the  advantages  of  my  being  a  French  prince.  Dispose 
of  me,  Sir,  and  show  me  the  way.  I  will  follow  it."  See  Stanhope's 
"  Life  of  Pitt,"  vol.  iii.,  ch.  xxxiii. 

1  See  Roederer,  "CEuvres,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  454,  for  the  curious  changes 
which  Napoleon  prescribed  in  the  published  reports  of  these  speeches  ; 
also  Stapfer's  despatch  of  February  3rd,  1803,  which  is  more  trustworthy 
than  the  official  version  in  Napoleon's  "  Correspondance."  This,  however, 
contains  the  menacing  sentence  :  "  It  is  recognized  by  Europe  that  Italy 
and  Holland,  as  well  as  Switzerland,  are  at  the  disposition  of  France." 


368  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

witting  the  Cardinals,  rearranging  the  map  of  Germany, 
breathing  new  life  into  French  commerce  and  striving 
to  shackle  that  of  Britain,  he  yet  found  time  to  utter 
some  of  the  sagest  maxims  as  to  the  widely  different 
needs  of  the  Swiss  cantons.  He  assured  the  deputies 
that  he  spoke  as  a  Corsican  and  a  mountaineer,  who 
knew  and  loved  the  clan  system.  His  words  proved  it. 
With  sure  touch  he  sketched  the  characteristics  of  the 
French  and  Swiss  people.  Switzerland  needed  the  local 
freedom  imparted  by  her  cantons :  while  France  re- 
quired unity,  Switzerland  needed  federalism  :  the  French 
rejected  this  last  as  damaging  their  power  and  glory ; 
but  the  Swiss  did  not  ask  for  glory ;  they  needed  "  po- 
litical tranquillity  and  obscurity " :  moreover,  a  simple 
pastoral  people  must  have  extensive  local  rights,  which 
formed  their  chief  distraction  from  the  monotony  of  life : 
democracy  was  a  necessity  for  the  forest  cantons ;  but 
let  not  the  aristocrats  of  the  towns  fear  that  a  wider 
franchise  would  end  their  influence,  for  a  people  depend- 
ent on  pastoral  pursuits  would  always  cling  to  great 
families  rather  than  to  electoral  assemblies :  let  these  be 
elected  on  a  fairly  wide  basis.  Then  again,  what  ready 
wit  flashed  forth  in  his  retort  to  a  deputy  who  objected 
to  the  Bernese  Oberland  forming  part  of  the  Canton  of 
Berne :  "  Where  do  you  take  your  cattle  and  your 
cheese?"  —  "To  Berne."  —  "  Whence  do  you  get  your 
grain,  cloth,  and  iron  ? "  —  "  From  Berne."  —  "  Very  well : 
'To  Berne,  from  Berne'  —  you  consequently  belong  to 
Berne."  The  reply  is  a  good  instance  of  that  canny 
materialism  which  he  so  victoriously  opposed  to  feudal 
chaos  and  monarchical  ineptitude. 

Indeed,  in  matters  great  as  well  as  small  his  genius 
pierced  to  the  heart  of  a  problem  :  he  saw  that  the  demo- 
cratic unionists  had  failed  from  the  rigidity  of  their 
centralization,  while  the  federals  had  given  offence  by 
insufficiently  recognizing  the  new  passion  for  social 
equality.1  He  now  prepared  to  federalize  Switzerland 
on  a  moderately  democratic  basis ;  for  a  policy  of  balance, 

1  It  is  only  fair  to  say  that  they  had  recognized  their  mistake  and  had 
recently  promised  equality  of  rights  to  the  formerly  subject  districts  and 
to  all  classes.     See  Muralt's  "  Reinhard,"  p.  113. 


xvi  NAPOLEON'S   INTERVENTIONS  369 

he  himself  being  at  the  middle  of  the  see-saw,  was  obvi- 
ously required  by  good  sense  as  well  as  by  self-interest. 
Witness  his  words  to  Roederer  on  this  subject : 

"  While  satisfying  the  generality,  I  cause  the  patricians  to  tremble. 
In  giving  to  these  last  the  appearance  of  power,  I  oblige  them  to  take 
refuge  at  my  side  in  order  to  find  protection.  I  let  the  people  threaten 
the  aristocrats,  so  that  these  may  have  need  of  me.  I  will  give  them 
places  and  distinctions,  but  they  will  hold  them  from  me.  This  sys- 
tem of  mine  has  succeeded  in  France.  See  the  clergy.  Every  day 
they  will  become,  in  spite  of  themselves,  more  devoted  to  my  govern- 
ment than  they  had  foreseen." 

How  simple  and  yet  how  subtle  is  this  statecraft ;  sim- 
plicity of  aim,  with  subtlety  in  the  choice  of  means  :  this 
is  the  secret  of  his  success. 

After  much  preliminary  work  done  by  French  com- 
missioners and  the  Swiss  deputies  in  committee,  the  First 
Consul  summed  up  the  results  of  their  labours  in  the  Act 
of  Mediation  of  February  19th,  1803,  which  constituted 
the  Confederation  in  nineteen  cantons,  the  formerly  sub- 
ject districts  now  attaining  cantonal  dignity  and  privi- 
leges. The  forest  cantons  kept  their  ancient  folk-moots, 
while  the  town  cantons  such  as  Berne,  Zurich,  and  Basel 
were  suffered  to  blend  their  old  institutions  with  demo- 
cratic customs,  greatly  to  the  chagrin  of  the  unionists, 
at  whose  invitation  Bonaparte  had  taken  up  the  work  of 
mediation. 

The  federal  compact  was  also  a  compromise  between  the 
old  and  the  new.  The  nineteen  cantons  were  to  enjoy  sov- 
ereign powers  under  the  shelter  of  the  old  federal  pact. 
Bonaparte  saw  that  the  fussy  imposition  of  French  govern- 
mental forms  in  1798  had  wrought  infinite  harm,  and  he 
now  granted  to  the  federal  authorities  merely  the  powers 
necessary  for  self-defence :  the  federal  forces  were  to  con- 
sist of  15,200  men  —  a  number  less  than  that  which  by 
old  treaty  Switzerland  had  to  furnish  to  France.  The 
central  power  was  vested  in  a  Landamman  and  other  offi- 
cers appointed  yearly  by  one  of  the  six  chief  cantons  taken 
in  rotation  ;  and  a  Federal  Diet,  consisting  of  twenty-five 
deputies  —  one  from  each  of  the  small  cantons,  and  two 
from  each  of  the  six  larger  cantons  — met  to  discuss  mat- 
ters of  general  import,  but  the  balance  of  power  rested 
2b 


370  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xvi 

with  the  cantons :  further  articles  regulated  the  Helvetic 
debt  and  declared  the  independence  of  Switzerland  —  as 
if  a  land  could  be  independent  which  furnished  more 
troops  to  the  foreigner  than  it  was  allowed  to  maintain 
for  its  own  defence.  Furthermore,  the  Act  breathed  not 
a  word  about  religious  liberty,  freedom  of  the  Press,  or 
the  right  of  petition  :  and,  viewing  it  as  a  whole,  the 
friends  of  freedom  had  cause  to  echo  the  complaint  of 
Stapfer  that  "  the  First  Consul's  aim  was  to  annul  Switzer- 
land politically,  but  to  assure  to  the  Swiss  the  greatest 
possible  domestic  happiness." 

I  have  judged  it  advisable  to  give  an  account  of  Franco- 
Swiss  relations  on  a  scale  proportionate  to  their  interest 
and  importance ;  they  exhibit,  not  only  the  meanness  and 
folly  of  the  French  Directory,  but  the  genius  of  the  great 
Corsican  in  skilfully  blending  the  new  and  the  old,  and 
in  his  rejection  of  the  fussy  pedantry  of  French  theorists 
and  the  worst  prejudices  of  the  Swiss  oligarchs.  Had  not 
his  sage  designs  been  intertwined  with  subtle  intrigues 
which  assured  his  own  unquestioned  supremacy  in  that 
land,  the  Act  of  Mediation  might  be  reckoned  among  the 
grandest  and  most  beneficent  achievements.  As  it  is,  it 
must  be  regarded  as  a  masterpiece  of  able  but  selfish  state- 
craft, which  contrasts  unfavourably  with  the  disinterested 
arrangements  sanctioned  by  the  allies  for  Switzerland  in 
1815. 


CHAPTER   XVII 

THE   RENEWAL   OF   WAR 

The  re-occupation  of  Switzerland  by  the  French  in  Oc- 
tober, 1802,  was  soon  followed  by  other  serious  events, 
which  convinced  the  British  Ministry  that  war  was  hardly 
to  be  avoided.  Indeed,  before  the  treaty  was  ratified, 
ominous  complaints  had  begun  to  pass  between  Paris  and 
London. 

Some  of  these  were  trivial,  others  were  highly  impor- 
tant. Among  the  latter  was  the  question  of  commercial 
intercourse.  The  British  Ministry  had  neglected  to  obtain 
any  written  assurance  that  trade  relations  should  be  re- 
sumed between  the  two  countries  ;  and  the  First  Consul, 
either  prompted  by  the  protectionist  theories  of  the  Jaco- 
bins, or  because  he  wished  to  exert  pressure  upon  England 
in  order  to  extort  further  concessions,  determined  to  re- 
strict trade  with  us  to  the  smallest  possible  dimensions. 
This  treatment  of  England  was  wholly  exceptional,  for  in 
his  treaties  concluded  with  Russia,  Portugal,  and  the 
Porte,  Napoleon  had  procured  the  insertion  of  clauses 
which  directly  fostered  French  trade  with  those  lands. 
Remonstrances  soon  came  from  the  British  Government 
that  "  strict  prohibitions  were  being  enforced  to  the  admis- 
sion of  British  commodities  and  manufactures  into  France, 
and  very  vigorous  restrictions  were  imposed  on  British 
vessels  entering  French  ports  ";  but,  in  spite  of  all  repre- 
sentations, we  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  the  hardware 
of  Birmingham,  and  the  ever-increasing  stores  of  cotton 
and  woollen  goods,  shut  out  from  France  and  her  subject- 
lands,  as  well  as  from  the  French  colonies  which  we  had 
just  handed  back. 

In  this  policy  of  commercial  prohibition  Napoleon  was 
confirmed  by  our  refusal  to  expel  the  Bourbon  princes. 
He  declined  to  accept  our  explanation  that  they  were  not 

371 


372  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

officially  recognized,  and  could  not  be  expelled  from  Eng- 
land without  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  hospitality;  and 
he  bitterly  complained  of  the  personal  attacks  made  upon 
him  in  journals  published  in  London  by  the  French 
Smigres.  Of  these  the  most  acrid,  namely,  those  of 
Peltier's  paper,  "L'Ambigu,"  had  already  received  the 
reprobation  of  the  British  Ministry  ;  but,  as  had  been  pre- 
viously explained  at  Amiens,  the  Addington  Cabinet  de- 
cided that  it  could  not  venture  to  curtail  the  liberty  of  the 
Press,  least  of  all  at  the  dictation  of  the  very  man  who  was 
answering  the  pop-guns  of  our  unofficial  journals  by  double- 
shotted  retorts  in  the  official  "Moniteur."  Of  these  last 
His  Majesty  did  not  deign  to  make  any  formal  com- 
plaint ;  but  he  suggested  that  their  insertion  in  the  organ 
of  the  French  Government  should  have  prevented  Napo- 
leon from  preferring  the  present  protests. 

This  wordy  war  proceeded  with  unabated  vigour  on 
both  sides  of  the  Channel,  the  British  journals  complain- 
ing of  the  Napoleonic  dictatorship  in  Continental  affairs 
while  the  "  Moniteur  "  bristled  with  articles  whose  short, 
sharp  sentences  could  come  only  from  the  First  Consul. 
The  official  Press  hitherto  had  been  characterized  by  dull 
decorum,  and  great  was  the  surprise  of  the  older  Courts 
when  the  French  official  journals  compared  the  policy  of 
the  Court  of  St.  James  with  the  methods  of  the  Barbary 
rovers  and  the  designs  of  the  Miltonic  Satan.1  Neverthe- 
less, our  Ministry  prosecuted  and  convicted  Peltier  for 
libel,  an  act  which,  at  the  time,  produced  an  excellent 
impression  at  Paris.2 

But  more  serious  matters  were  now  at  hand.  News- 
paper articles  and  commercial  restrictions  were  not  the 
cause  of  war,  however  much  they  irritated  the  two  peo- 
ples. 

The  general  position  of  Anglo-French  affairs  in  the 
autumn  of  1802  is  well  described  in  the  official  instruc- 
tions given  to  Lord  Whitworth  when  he  was  about  to 
proceed  as  ambassador  to  Paris.     For  this  difficult  duty 

1  See,  inter  alia,  the  "  Moniteur"  of  August  8th,  October  9th,  Novem- 
ber 6th,  1802  ;  of  January  1st  and  9th,  February  19th,  1803. 

2  Lord  "Whitworth's  despatches  of  February  28th  and  March  3rd,  1803, 
in  Browning's  "  England  and  Napoleon." 


xvii  THE   RENEWAL   OF   WAR  373 

he  had  several  good  qualifications.  During  his  embassy 
at  St.  Petersburg  he  had  shown  a  combination  of  tact  and 
firmness  which  imposed  respect,  and  doubtless  his  com- 
posure under  the  violent  outbreaks  of  the  Czar  Paul  fur- 
nished a  recommendation  for  the  equally  trying  post  at 
Paris,  which  he  filled  with  a  sang  froid  that  has  become 
historic.  Possibly  a  more  genial  personality  might  have 
smoothed  over  some  difficulties  at  the  Tuileries :  but  the 
Addington  Ministry,  having  tried  geniality  in  the  person 
of  Cornwallis,  naturally  selected  a  man  who  was  remark- 
able for  his  powers  of  quiet  yet  firm  resistance. 

His  first  instructions  of  September  10th,  1802,  are  such 
as  might  be  drawn  up  between  any  two  Powers  entering 
on  a  long  term  of  peace.  But  the  series  of  untoward 
events  noticed  above  overclouded  the  political  horizon  ; 
and  the  change  finds  significant  expression  in  the  secret 
instructions  of  November  14th.  He  is  now  charged  to 
state  George  III.'s  determination  "never  to  forego  his 
right  of  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  the  Continent  on  any 
occasion  in  which  the  interests  of  his  own  dominions  or 
those  of  Europe  in  general  may  appear  to  him  to  require 
it."  A  French  despatch  is  then  quoted,  as  admitting 
that,  for  every  considerable  gain  of  France  on  the  Conti- 
nent, Great  Britain  had  some  claim  to  compensation :  and 
such  a  claim,  it  was  hinted,  might  now  be  proffered  after 
the  annexation  of  Piedmont  and  Parma.  Against  the  con- 
tinued occupation  of  Holland  by  French  troops  and  their 
invasion  of  Switzerland,  Whitworth  was  to  make  moder- 
ate but  firm  remonstrances,  but  in  such  a  way  as  not  to 
commit  us  finally.  He  was  to  employ  an  equal  discretion 
with  regard  to  Malta.  As  Russia  and  Prussia  had  as  yet 
declined  to  guarantee  the  arrangements  for  that  island's 
independence,  it  was  evident  that  the  British  troops  could 
not  yet  be  withdrawn. 

"His  Majesty  would  certainly  be  justified  in  claiming  the  posses- 
sion of  Malta,  as  some  counterpoise  to  the  acquisitions  of  France,  since 
the  conclusion  of  the  definitive  treaty :  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  de- 
cide now  whether  His  Majesty  will' be  disposed  to  avail  himself  of 
his  pretensions  in  this  respect." 

Thus  between  September  10th  and  November  14th  we 
passed  from  a  distinctly  pacific  to  a  bellicose  attitude,  and 


374  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

all  but  formed  the  decision  to  demand  Malta  as  a  com- 
pensation for  the  recent  aggrandizements  of  France.  To 
have  declared  war  at  once  on  these  grounds  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  more  dignified.  But,  as  our  Ministry 
had  already  given  way  on  many  topics,  a  sudden  decla- 
ration of  war  on  Swiss  and  Italian  affairs  would  have 
stultified  its  complaisant  conduct  on  weightier  subjects. 
Moreover,  the  whole  drift  of  eighteenth-century  diplo- 
macy, no  less  than  Bonaparte's  own  admission,  warranted 
the  hope  of  securing  Malta  by  way  of  "  compensation." 
The  adroit  bargainer,  who  was  putting  up  German  Church 
lands  for  sale,  who  had  gained  Louisiana  by  the  Parma- 
Tuscany  exchange,  and  still  professed  to  the  Czar  his 
good  intentions  as  to  an  "  indemnity "  for  the  King  of 
Sardinia,  might  well  be  expected  to  admit  the  principle 
of  compensation  in  Anglo-French  relations  when  these 
were  being  jeopardized  by  French  aggrandizement ;  and, 
as  will  shortly  appear,  the  First  Consul,  while  professing 
to  champion  international  law  against  perfidious  Albion, 
privately  admitted  her  right  to  compensation,  and  only 
demurred  to  its  practical  application  when  his  oriental 
designs  were  thereby  compromised. 

Before  Whitworth  proceeded  to  Paris,  sharp  remon- 
strances had  been  exchanged  between  the  French  and 
British  Governments.  To  our  protests  against  Napo- 
leon's interventions  in  neighbouring  States,  he  retorted  by 
demanding  "  the  whole  Treaty  of  Amiens  and  nothing  but 
that  treaty."  Whereupon  Hawkesbury  answered:  "The 
state  of  the  Continent  at  the  period  of  the  Treaty  of 
Amiens,  and  nothing  but  that  state."  In  reply  Napoleon 
sent  off  a  counterblast,  alleging  that  French  troops  had 
evacuated  Taranto,  that  Switzerland  had  requested  his  me- 
diation, that  German  affairs  possessed  no  novelty,  and  that 
England,  having  six  months  previously  waived  her  interest 
in  continental  affairs,  could  not  resume  it  at  will.  The 
retort,  which  has  called  forth  the  admiration  of  M.  Thiers, 
is  more  specious  than  convincing.  Hawkesbury's  appeal 
was,  not  to  the  sword,  but  to  law ;  not  to  French  influence 
gained  by  military  occupations  that  contravened  the  Treaty 
of  Luneville,  but  to  international  equity. 

Certainly,  the  Addington  Cabinet  committed  a  grievous 


xvn  THE   RENEWAL   OF   WAR  375 

blunder  in  not  inserting  in  the  Treaty  of  Amiens  a  clause 
stipulating  the  independence  of  the  Batavian  and  Helvetic 
Republics.  Doubtless  it  relied  on  the  Treaty  of  Luneville, 
and  on  a  Franco-Dutch  convention  of  August,  1801,  which 
specified  that  French  troops  were  to  remain  in  the  Batavian 
Republic  only  up  to  the  time  of  the  general  peace.  But 
it  is  one  thing  to  rely  on  international  law,  and  quite  an- 
other thing,  in  an  age  of  violence  and  chicanery,  to  hazard 
the  gravest  material  interests  on  its  observance.  Yet  this 
was  what  the  Addington  Ministry  had  done:  "  His  Majesty 
consented  to  make  numerous  and  most  important  restitu- 
tions to  the  Batavian  Government  on  the  consideration  of 
that  Government  being  independent  and  not  being  subject 
to  any  foreign  control."1  Truly  the  restoration  of  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  of  other  colonies  to  the  Dutch 
solely  in  reliance  on  the  observance  of  international  law 
by  Napoleon  and  Talleyrand,  was,  as  the  event  proved,  an 
act  of  singular  credulity.  But,  looking  at  this  matter  fairly 
and  squarely,  it  must  be  allowed  that  Napoleon's  reply 
evaded  the  essence  of  the  British  complaint;  it  was  merely 
an  argumentum  ad  hominem  ;  it  convicted  the  Addington 
Cabinet  of  weakness  and  improvidence ;  but  in  equity  it 
was  null  and  void,  and  in  practical  politics  it  betokened 
war. 

As  Napoleon  refused  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  Hol- 
land, and  continued  to  dominate  that  unhappy  realm,  it  was 
clear  that  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  would  speedily  be  closed 
to  our  ships  —  a  prospect  which  immensely  enhanced  the 
value  of  the  overland  route  to  India,  and  of  those  portals 
of  the  Orient,  Malta  and  Egypt.  To  the  Maltese  Question 
we  now  turn,  as  also,  later  on,  to  the  Eastern  Question, 
with  which  it  was  then  closely  connected. 

Many  causes  excited  the  uneasiness  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment about  the  fate  of  Malta.  In  spite  of  our  effort 
not  to  wound  the  susceptibilities  of  the  Czar,  who  was  pro- 
tector of  the  Order  of  St.  John,  that  sensitive  young  ruler 
had  taken  umbrage  at  the  article  relating  to  that  island. 
He  now  appeared  merely  as  one  of  the  six  Powers  guar- 
anteeing its  independence,  not  as  the  sole  patron  and 
guarantor,  and  he  was  piqued  at  his  name  appearing  after 

1  Secret  instructions  to  Lord  Whitworth,  November  14th,  1802. 


376  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

that  of  the  Emperor  Francis  ! 1  For  the  present  arrange- 
ment the  First  Consul  was  chiefly  to  blame  ;  but  the  Czar 
vented  his  displeasure  on  England.  On  April  28th,  1802, 
our  envoy  at  Paris,  Mr.  Merry,  reported  as  follows  : 

"  Either  the  Russian  Government  itself,  or  Count  Markoff  alone 
personally,  is  so  completely  out  of  humour  with  us  for  not  having 
acted  in  strict  concert  with  them,  or  him,  or  in  conformity  to  their 
ideas  in  negotiating  the  definitive  treaty  [of  Amiens],  that  I  find  he 
takes  pains  to  turn  it  into  ridicule,  and  particularly  to  represent  the 
arrangement  we  have  made  for  Malta  as  impracticable  and  conse- 
quently as  completely  null." 

The  despatches  of  our  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
Lord  St.  Helens,  and  of  his  successor,  Admiral  Warren, 
are  of  the  same  tenor.  They  report  the  Czar's  annoy- 
ance with  England  over  the  Maltese  affair,  and  his  re- 
fusal to  listen  even  to  the  joint  Anglo-French  request 
of  November  18th,  1802,  for  his  guarantee  of  the  Amiens 
arrangements.2  A  week  later  Alexander  announced  that 
he  would  guarantee  the  independence  of  Malta,  provided 
that  the  complete  sovereignty  of  the  Knights  of  St.  John 
was  recognized  —  that  is,  without  any  participation  of  the 
native  Maltese  in  the  affairs  of  that  Order  —  and  that  the 
island  should  be  garrisoned  by  Neapolitan  troops,  paid 
by  France  and  England,  until  the  Knights  should  be  able 
to  maintain  their  independence.  This  reopening  of  the 
question  discussed,  ad  nauseam,  at  Amiens  proved  that  the 
Maltese  Question  would  long  continue  to  perplex  the  world. 
The  matter  was  still  further  complicated  by  the  abo- 
lition of  the  Priories,  Commanderies,  and  property 
of  the  Order  of  St.  John  by  the  French  Government  in 
the  spring  of  1802  —  an  example  which  was  imitated  by 
the  Court  of  Madrid  in  the  following  autumn  ;  and  as  the 
property  of  the  Knights  in  the  French  part  of  Italy  had 
also  lapsed,  it  was  difficult  to  see  how  the  scattered  and 

1 "  Foreign_Office  Records,"  Russia,  No.  50. 

2  In  his  usually  accurate  "  Manuel  historique  de  Politique  Etrangere" 
(vol.  ii.,  p.  238),  M.  Bourgeois  states  that  in  May,  1802,  Lord  St.  Helens 
succeeded  in  persuading  the  Czar  not  to  give  his  guarantee  to  the  clause 
respecting  Malta.  Every  despatch  that  I  have  read  runs  exactly  counter 
to  this  statement :  the  fact  is  that  the  Czar  took  umbrage  at  the  treaty 
and  refused  to  listen  to  our  repeated  requests  for  his  guarantee.  Thiers 
rightly  states  that  the  British  Ministry  pressed  the  Czar  to  give  his  guar- 
antee, but  that  France  long  neglected  to  send  her  application.  Why  this 
neglect  if  she  wished  to  settle  matters  ? 


cvu  THE   RENEWAL   OF   WAR  377 

impoverished  Knights  could  form  a  stable  government, 
especially  if  the  native  Maltese  were  not  to  be  admitted 
;o  a  share  in  public  affairs.  This  action  of  France,  Spain, 
ind  Russia  fully  warranted  the  British  Government  in 
lot  admitting  into  the  fortress  the  2,000  Neapolitan  troops 
;hat  arrived  in  the  autumn  of  1802.  Our  evacuation  of 
Malta  was  conditioned  by  several  stipulations,  five  of 
which  had  not  been  fulfilled.1  But  the  difficulties1  arising 
Hit  of  the  reconstruction  of  this  moribund  Order  were  as 
nothing  when  compared  with  those  resulting  from  the 
reopening  of  a  far  vaster  and  more  complex  question  —  the 
'eternal"  Eastern  Question. 

Rarely  has  the  mouldering  away  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
g^one  on  so  rapidly  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
3entury.  Corruption  and  favouritism  paralyzed  the  Gov- 
ernment at  Constantinople  ;  masterful  pachas,  aping  the 
tactics  of  Ali  Pacha,  the  virtual  ruler  of  Albania,  were 
beginning  to  carve  out  satrapies  in  Syria,  Asia  Minor, 
Wallachia,  and  even  in  Roumelia  itself.  Such  was  the 
state  of  Turkey  when  the  Sultan  and  his  advisers  heard 
with  deep  concern,  in  October,  1801,  that  the  only  Power 
on  whose  friendship  they  could  firmly  rely  was  about  to 
relinquish  Malta.  At  once  he  sent  an  earnest  appeal  to 
George  III.  begging  him  not  to  evacuate  the  island. 
This  despatch  is  not  in  the  archives  of  our  Foreign  Office; 
but  the  letter  written  from  Malta  by  Lord  Elgin,  our  am- 
bassador at  Constantinople,  on  his  return  home,  sufficiently 
shows  that  the  Sultan  was  conscious  of  his  own  weakness 
and  of  the  schemes  of  partition  which  were  being  concocted 
at  Paris.  Bonaparte  had  already  begun  to  sound  both 
Austria  and  Russia  on  this  subject,  deftly  hinting  that  the 
Power  which  did  not  early  join  in  the  enterprise  would 
come  poorly  off.  For  the  present  both  the  rulers  rejected 
his  overtures ;  but  he  ceased  not  to  hope  that  the  anarchy 
in  Turkey,  and  the  jealousy  which  partition  scheme:} 
always  arouse  among  neighbours,  would  draw  first  one 
and  then  the  other  into  his  enterprise.2 

1  Castlereagh's  "  Letters  and  Despatches,"  Second  Series,  vol.  i.,  pp.  56 
and  69  ;  Dumas'  "  Ev6nements,"  ix.,  91. 

2  Meinoire  of  Francis  II.  to  Cobenzl  (March  31st,  1801),  in  Beer, 
"Die  Orientalische  Politik  Oesterreiclis,"  Appendix. 


378  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

The  young  Czar's  disposition  was  at  that  period  restless 
and  unstable,  free  from  the  passionate  caprices  of  his  ill-fated 
father,  and  attuned  by  the  fond  efforts  of  the  Swiss  demo- 
crat Laharpe  to  the  loftiest  aspirations  of  the  France  of 
1789.  Yet  the  son  of  Paul  I.  could  hardly  free  himself 
from  the  instincts  of  a  line  of  conquering  Czars;  his  frank 
blue  eyes,  his  graceful  yet  commanding  figure,  his  high 
broad  forehead  and  close-shut  mouth  gave  promise  of 
mental  energy;  and  his  splendid  physique  and  love  of  mar- 
tial display  seemed  to  invite  him  to  complete  the  campaigns 
of  Catherine  II.  against  the  Turks,  and  to  wash  out  in  the 
waves  of  the  Danube  the  remorse  which  he  still  felt  at  his 
unwitting  complicity  in  a  parricidal  plot.  Between  his  love 
of  liberty  and  of  foreign  conquest  he  for  the  present  wa- 
vered, with  a  strange  constitutional  indecision  that  marred 
a  noble  character  and  that  yielded  him  a  prey  more  than 
once  to  a  masterful  will  or  to  seductive  projects.  He  is 
the  Janus  of  Russian  history.  On  the  one  side  he  faces 
the  enormous  problems  of  social  and  political  reform,  and 
yet  he  steals  many  a  longing  glance  towards  the  dome  of 
St.  Sophia.  This  instability  in  his  nature  has  been  thus 
pointedly  criticised  by  his  friend  Prince  Czartoryski:1 

"  Grand  ideas  of  the  general  good,  generous  sentiments,  and  the 
desire  to  sacrifice  to  them  a  part  of  the  imperial  authority,  had  really 
occupied  the  Emperor's  mind,  but  they  were  rather  a  young  man's 
fancies  than  a  grown  man's  decided  will.  The  Emperor  liked  forms 
of  liberty,  as  he  liked  the  theatre :  it  gave  him  pleasure  and  flattered 
his  vanity  to  see  the  appearances  of  free  government  in  his  Empire: 
but  all  he  wanted  in  this  respect  was  forms  and  appearances :  he  did 
not  expect  them  to  become  realities.  He  would  willingly  have  agreed 
that  every  man  should  be  free,  on  the  condition  that  he  should  volun- 
tarily do  only  what  the  Emperor  wished." 

This  later  judgment  of  the  well-known  Polish  nation- 
alist is  probably  embittered  by  the  disappointments  which 
he  experienced  at  the  Czar's  hands ;  but  it  expresses  the 
feeling  of  most  observers  of  Alexander's  early  career,  and 
it  corresponds  with  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  Napoleon's 
favourite  aide-de-camp,  Duroc,  who  went  to  congratulate 
the  young  Czar  on  his  accession  and  to  entice  him  into 
oriental  schemes  —  that  there  was  nothing  to  hope  and 

1  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xiii. 


xvn  THE   RENEWAL   OF    WAR  379 

nothing  to  fear  from  the  Czar.  The  mot  was  deeply- 
true.1 

From  these  oriental  schemes  the  young  Czar  was,  for 
the  time,  drawn  aside  towards  the  nobler  path  of  social 
reform.  The  saving  influence  on  this  occasion  was  exerted 
by  his  old  tutor,  Laharpe.  The  ex-Director  of  Switzer- 
land readily  persuaded  the  Czar  that  Russia  sorely  needed 
political  and  social  reform.  His  influence  was  powerfully 
aided  by  a  brilliant  group  of  young  men,  the  Vorontzoffs, 
the  Strogonoffs,  Novossiltzoff,  and  Czartoryski,  whose  ad- 
miration for  western  ideas  and  institutions,  especially 
those  of  Britain,  helped  to  impel  Alexander  on  the  path 
of  progress.  Thus,  when  Napoleon  was  plying  the  Czar 
with  notes  respecting  Turkey,  that  young  ruler  was  com- 
mencing to  bestow  system  on  his  administration,  privileges 
on  the  serfs,  and  the  feeble  beginnings  of  education  on 
the  people. 

While  immersed  in  these  beneficent  designs,  Alexander 
heard  with  deep  chagrin  of  the  annexation  of  Piedmont 
and  Parma,  and  that  Napoleon  refused  to  the  King  of 
Sardinia  any  larger  territory  than  the  Siennese.  This 
breach  of  good  faith  cut  the  Czar  to  the  quick.  It  was  in 
vain  that  Napoleon  now  sought  to  lure  him  into  Turkish 
adventures  by  representing  that  France  should  secure  the 
Morea  for  herself,  that  other  parts  of  European  Turkey 
might  be  apportioned  to  Victor  Emmanuel  I.  and  the 
French  Bourbons.  This  cold-blooded  proposal,  that  an- 
cient dynasties  should  be  thrust  from  the  homes  of  their 
birth  into  alien  Greek  or  Moslem  lands,  wounded  the 
Czar's  monarchical  sentiments.  He  would  none  of  it  ; 
nor  did  he  relish  the  prospect  of  seeing  the  French  in  the 
Morea,  whence  they  could  complete  the  disorder  of  Turkey 
and  seize  on  Constantinople.  He  saw  whither  Napoleon 
was  leading  him.  He  drew  back  abruptly,  and  even  noti- 
fied to  our  ambassador,  Admiral  Warren,  that  England 
had  better  keep  Malta.2 

1  Ulmann's  "  Russisch-Preussische  Politik,  1801-1806,"  pp.  10-12. 

2  Warren  reported  (December  10th,  1802)  that  Vorontzoff  warned  him 
to  he  very  careful  as  to  the  giving  up  of  Malta;  and,  on  January  19th, 
Czartoryski  told  him  that  l>  the  Emperor  wished  the  English  to  keep 
Malta.''  Bonaparte  hud  put  in  a  claim  for  the  Morea  to  indemnify  the 
Bourbons  and  the  House  of  Savoy.     ("F.  <>.,"  Russia,  No.  51. ^ 


380  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Alexander  also,  on  January  19th,  1803  (O.  S.),  charged 
his  ambassador  at  Paris  to  declare  that  the  existing  sys- 
tem of  Europe  must  not  be  further  disturbed,  that  each 
Government  should  strive  for  peace  and  the  welfare  of  its 
own  people  ;  that  the  frequent  references  of  Napoleon  to 
the  approaching  dissolution  of  Turkey  were  ill-received  at 
St.  Petersburg,  where  they  were  considered  the  chief  cause 
of  England's  anxiety  and  refusal  to  disarm.  He  also  sug- 
gested that  the  First  Consul  by  some  public  utterance 
should  dispel  the  fears  of  England  as  to  a  partition  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  thus  assure  the  peace  of  the  world.1 

Before  this  excellent  advice  was  received,  Napoleon 
astonished  the  world  by  a  daring  stroke.  On  the  30th  of 
January  the  "  Moniteur "  printed  in  full  the  bellicose 
report  of  Colonel  Sebastiani  on  his  mission  to  Algiers, 
Egypt,  Syria,  and  the  Ionian  Isles.  As  that  mission  was 
afterwards  to  be  passed  off  as  merely  of  a  commercial 
character,  it  will  be  well  to  quote  typical  passages  from 
the  secret  instructions  which  the  First  Consul  gave  to  his 
envoy  on  September  5th,  1802  : 

"  He  will  proceed  to  Alexandria :  he  will  take  note  of  what  is  in 
the  harbour,  the  ships,  the  forces  which  the  British  as  well  as  the 
Turks  have  there,  the  state  of  the  fortifications,  the  state  of  the  towers, 
the  account  of  all  that  has  passed  since  our  departure  both  at  Alexan- 
dria and  in  the  whole  of  Egypt :  finally,  the  present  state  of  the  Egyp- 
tians. .  .  .  He  will  proceed  to  St.  Jean  d'Acre,  will  recommend  the 
convent  of  Nazareth  to  Djezzar  :  will  inform  him  that  the  agent  of 
the  [French]  Republic  is  to  appear  at  Acre :  will  find  out  about  the 
fortifications  he  has  had  made :  will  walk  along  them  himself,  if  there 
be  no  danger." 

Fortifications,  troops,  ships  of  war,  the  feelings  of  the 
natives,  and  the  protection  of  the  Christians  —  these  sub- 
jects were  to  be  Sebastiani's  sole  care.  Commerce  was 
not  once  named.  The  departure  of  this  officer  had 
already  alarmed  our  Government.  Mr.  Merry,  our  chargS 
d'affaires  in  Paris,  had  warned  it  as  to  the  real  aims  in 
view,  in  the  following  "  secret "  despatch  : 

"Paris,  September  25th,  1802. 

"...  I  have  learnt  from  good  authority  that  he  [Sebastiani]  was 
accompanied  by  a  person  of  the  name  of  Jaubert  (who  was  General 

1  Browning's  "  England  and  Napoleon,"  pp.  88-91. 


xvn  THE   RENEWAL   OF   WAR  381 

Bonaparte's  interpreter  and  confidential  agent  with  the  natives  during 
the  time  he  commanded  in  Egypt),  who  has  carried  with  him  regular 
powers  and  instructions,  prepared  by  M.  Talleyrand,  to  treat  with 
Ibrahim-Bey  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  fresh  and  successful  revolt  in 
Egypt  against  the  power  of  the  Porte,  and  of  placing  that  country  again 
under  the  direct  or  indirect  dependence  of  France,  to  which  end  he 
has  been  authorized  to  offer  assistance  from  hence  in  men  and  money. 
The  person  who  has  confided  to  me  this  information  understands  that 
the  mission  to  Ibrahim-Bey  is  confided  solely  to  M.  Jaubert,  and  that  his 
being  sent  with  Colonel  Sebastiani  has  been  in  order  to  conceal  the  real 
object  of  it,  and  to  afford  him  a  safe  conveyance  to  Egypt,  as  well  as 
for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  Colonel  in  his  transactions  with  the 
Regencies  of  Algiers,  Tunis,  and  Tripoli." 1 

Merry's  information  was  correct  :  it  tallied  with  the 
secret  instructions  given  by  Napoleon  to  Sebastiani :  and 
our  Government,  thus  forewarned,  at  once  adopted  a  stiffer 
tone  on  all  Mediterranean  and  oriental  questions.  Sebas- 
tiani was  very  coldly  received  by  our  officer  commanding 
in  Egypt,  General  Stuart,  who  informed  him  that  no 
orders  had  as  yet  come  from  London  for  our  evacuation  of 
that  land.  Proceeding  to  Cairo,  the  commercial  emissary 
proposed  to  mediate  between  the  Turkish  Pacha  and  the 
rebellious  Mamelukes,  an  offer  which  was  firmly  declined.2 
In  vain  did  Sebastiani  bluster  and  cajole  by  turns.  The 
Pacha  refused  to  allow  him  to  go  on  to  Assouan,  the  head- 
quarters of  the  insurgent  Bey,  and  the  discomfited  envoy 
made  his  way  back  to  the  coast  and  took  ship  for  Acre. 
Thence  he  set  sail  for  Corfu,  where  he  assured  the  people 
of  Napoleon's  wish  that  there  should  be  an  end  to  their 
civil  discords.  Returning  to  Genoa,  and  posting  with  all 
speed  to  Paris,  he  arrived  there  on  January  25th,  1803. 
Five  days  later  that  gay  capital  was  startled  by  the  report 
of  his  mission,  which  was  printed  in  full  in  the  "Moniteur." 
It  described  the  wretched  state  of  the  Turks  in  Egypt  — 
the  Pacha  of  Cairo  practically  powerless,  and  on  bad  terms 
with  General  Stuart,  the  fortifications  everywhere  in  a 
ruinous  state,  the  4,430  British  troops  cantoned  in  and 
near  Alexandria,  the  Turkish  forces  beneath  contempt. 

ll'F.  0.,"  France,  No.  72. 

2  We  were  undertaking  that  mediation.  Lord  Elgin's  despatch  from 
Constantinople,  January  loth,  1803,  states  that  he  had  induced  the  Porte 
to  allow  the  Mamelukes  to  hold  the  province  of  Assouan.  (Turkey, 
No.  38.) 


382  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

"  Six  thousand  French  would  at  present  be  enough  to  con- 
quer Egypt."  And  as  to  the  Ionian  Islands,  u  I  do  not 
stray  from  the  truth  in  assuring  you  that  these  islands 
will  declare  themselves  French  as  soon  as  an  opportunity 
shall  offer  itself."1 

Such  were  the  chief  items  of  this  report.  Various 
motives  have  been  assigned  for  its  publication.  Some 
writers  have  seen  in  it  a  crushing  retort  to  English  news- 
paper articles.  Others  there  are,  as  M.  Thiers,  who  waver 
between  the  opinion  that  the  publication  of  this  report  was 
either  a  "  sudden  unfortunate  incident,"  or  a  protest  against 
the  "latitude"  which  England  allowed  herself  in  the  exe- 
cution of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens. 

A  consideration  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs  at  the  end 
of  January,  1803,  will  perhaps  guide  us  to  an  explanation 
which  is  more  consonant  with  the  grandeur  of  Napoleon's 
designs.  At  that'  time  he  was  all-powerful  in  the  Old 
World.  As  First  Consul  for  Life  he  was  master  of  forty 
millions  of  men  :  he  was  President  of  the  Italian  Repub- 
lic :  to  the  Switzers,  as  to  the  Dutch,  his  word  was  law. 
Against  the  infractions  of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville,  Austria 
dared  make  no  protest.  The  Czar  was  occupied  with  do- 
mestic affairs,  and  his  rebuff  to  Napoleon's  oriental  schemes 
had  not  yet  reached  Paris.  As  for  the  British  Ministry, 
it  was  trembling  from  the  attacks  of  the  Grenvilles  and 
Windhams  on  the  one  side,  and  from  the  equally  vigorous 
onslaughts  of  Fox,  who,  when  the  Government  proposed 
an  addition  to  the  armed  forces,  brought  forward  the  stale 
platitude  that  a  large  standing  army  ^'was  a  dangerous 

1  Papers  presented  to  Parliament  on  May  18th,  1803.  I  pass  over  the 
insults  to  General  Stuart,  as  Sebastiani  on  February  2nd  recanted  to  Lord 
Whitworth  everything  he  had  said,  or  had  been  made  to  say,  on  that  topic, 
and  mentioned  Stuart  "  in  terms  of  great  esteem."  According  to  Medieval 
("Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  iii.),  Jaubert,  who  had  been  with  Sebastiani,  saw 
a  proof  of  the  report,  as  printed  for  the  "  Moniteur,"  and  advised  the 
omission  of  the  most  irritating  passages  ;  but  Maret  dared  not  take  the 
responsibility  for  making  such  omissions.  Lucien  Bonaparte  ("  Meins.," 
vol.  ii.,  ch.  ix.)  has  another  version  —  less  credible,  I  think  —  that  Napo- 
leon himself  dictated  the  final  draft  of  the  report  to  Sebastiani ;  and  when 
the  latter  showed  some  hesitation,  the  First  Consul  muttered,  as  the  most 
irritating  passages  were  read  out,  "Parbleu,  nous  verrons  si  ceci  — si  cela 
—  ne  d^cidera  pas  John  Bull  a  guerroyer."  Joseph  was  much  distressed 
about  it,  and  exclaimed  :  "  Ah,  mon  pauvre  traits  d'Amiens  !  II  ne  tient 
plus  qu'a  un  fil." 


xvn  THE    RENEWAL   OF    WAR  383 

instrument  of  influence  in  the  hands  of  the  Crown." 
When  England's  greatest  orator  thus  impaired  the  unity 
of  national  feeling,  and  her  only  statesman,  Pitt,  remained 
in  studied  seclusion,  the  First  Consul  might  well  feel 
assured  of  the  impotence  of  the  Island  Power,  and  view 
the  bickering  of  her  politicians  with  the  same  quiet  con- 
tempt that  Philip  felt  for  the  Athens  of  Demosthenes. 

But  while  his  prospects  in  Europe  and  the  East  were 
roseate,  the  western  horizon  bulked  threateningly  with 
clouds.  The  news  of  the  disasters  in  St.  Domingo  reached 
Paris  in  the  first  week  of  the  year  1803,  and  shortly  after- 
wards came  tidings  of  the  ferment  in  the  United  States 
and  the  determination  of  their  people  to  resist  the  acqui- 
sition of  Louisiana  by  France.  If  he  persevered  with  this 
last  scheme,  he  would  provoke  war  with  that  republic  and 
drive  it  into  the  arms  of  England.  From  that  blunder  his 
statecraft  instinctively  saved  him,  and  he  determined  to 
sell  Louisiana  to  the  United  States. 

So  unheroic  a  retreat  from  the  prairies  of  the  New  World 
must  be  covered  by  a  demonstration  towards  the  banks  of 
the  Nile  and  of  the  Indus.  It  was  ever  his  plan  to  cover 
retreat  in  one  direction  by  brilliant  diversions  in  another  : 
only  so  could  he  enthrall  the  imagination  of  FYance,  and 
keep  his  hold  on  her  restless  capital.  And  the  publication 
of  Sebastiani's  report,  with  its  glowing  description  of  the 
fondness  cherished  for  France  alike  by  Moslems,  Syrian 
Christians,  and  the  Greeks  of  Corfu ;  its  declamation 
against  the  perfidy  of  General  Stuart ;  and  its  incitation 
to  the  conquest  of  the  Levant,  furnished  him  with  the 
motive  power  for  effecting  a  telling  transformation  scene 
and  banishing  all  thoughts  of  losses  in  the  West.1 

The  official  publication  of  this  report  created  a  sensation 
even  in  France,  and  was  not  the  bagatelle  which  M.  Thiers 
has  endeavoured  to  represent  it.2     But  far  greater  was  the 

*So  Adams's  "  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  12-21. 

2  Miot  de  Melito,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xv.,  quotes  the  words  of  Joseph 
Bonaparte  to  him  :  "  Let  him  [Napoleon]  once  more  drench  Europe  with 
blood  in  a  war  that  he  could  have  avoided,  and  which,  but  for  the  outra- 
geous mission  on  which  he  senthis  Sebastiani,  would  never  have  occurred." 

Talleyrand  laboured  hard  to  persuade  Lord  Whitworth  that  Sebastiani's 
mission  was  "solely  commercial":  Napoleon,  in  his  long  conversation 
with  our  ambassador,  "  did  not  affect  to  attribute  it  to  commercial  motives 


384  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

astonishment  at  Downing  Street,  not  at  the  facts  disclosed 
by  the  report  —  for  Merry's  note  had  prepared  our  Minis- 
ters for  them  —  but  rather  at  the  official  avowal  of  hostile 
designs.  At  once  our  Government  warned  Whitworth  that 
he  must  insist  on  our  retaining  Malta.  He  was  also  to 
protest  against  the  publication  of  such  a  document,  and  to 
declare  that  George  III.  could  not  "enter  into  any  further 
discussion  relative  to  Malta  until  he  received  a  satisfactory 
explanation."  Far  from  offering  it,  Napoleon  at  once  com- 
plained of  our  non-evacuation  of  Alexandria  and  Malta. 

"  Instead  of  that  garrison  [of  Alexandria]  being  a  means  of  pro- 
tecting Egypt,  it  was  only  furnishing  him  with  a  pretence  for  in- 
vading it.  This  he  should  not  do,  whatever  might  be  his  desire  to 
have  it  as  a  colony,  because  he  did  not  think  it  worth  the  risk  of  a  war, 
in  which  he  might  perhaps  be  considered  the  aggressor,  and  by  which 
he  should  lose  more  than  he  could  gain,  since  sooner  or  later  Egypt 
would  belong  to  France,  either  by  the  falling  to  pieces  of  the  Turkish 
Empire,  or  by  some  arrangement  with  the  Porte.  .  .  .  Finally,"  he 
asked,  "  why  should  not  the  mistress  of  the  seas  and  the  mistress  of 
the  land  come  to  an  arrangement  and  govern  the  world?" 

A  subtler  diplomatist  than  Whitworth  would  probably 
have  taken  the  hint  for  a  Franco-British  partition  of  the 
world  :  but  the  Englishman,  unable  at  that  moment  to 
utter  a  word  amidst  the  torrent  of  argument  and  invective, 
used  the  first  opportunity  merely  to  assure  Napoleon  of 
the  alarm  caused  in  England  by  Sebastiani's  utterance 
concerning  Egypt.  This  touched  the  First  Consul  at  the 
wrong  point,  and  he  insisted  that  on  the  evacuation  of 
Malta  the  question  of  peace  or  war  must  depend.  In  vain 
did  the  English  ambassador  refer  to  the  extension  of  French 
power  on  the  Continent.  Napoleon  cut  him  short  :  "  I 
suppose  you  mean  Piedmont  and  Switzerland  :   ce  sont  des 

:   vous  n'avez  pas  le  droit  d'en  parler  a  cette  heure." 

Seeing  that  he  was  losing  his  temper,  Lord  Whitworth 
then  diverted  the  conversation.1 

only,"  but  represented  it  as  necessitated  by  our  infraction  of  the  Treaty 
of  Amiens.  This  excuse  is  as  insincere  as  the  former.  The  instructions 
to  Sebastiani  were  drawn  up  on  September  5th,  1802,  when  the  British 
Ministry  was  about  to  fulfil  the  terms  of  the  treaty  relative  to  Malta  and 
was  vainly  pressing  Russia  and  Prussia  for  the  guarantee  of  its  indepen- 
dence. 

1  Despatch  of  February  21st. 


xvii  THE   RENEWAL   OF    WAR  385 

This  long  tirade  shows  clearly  what  were  the  aims  of 
the  First  Consul.  He  desired  peace  until  his  eastern  plans 
were  fully  matured.  And  what  ruler  would  not  desire  to 
maintain  a  peace  so  fruitful  in  conquests  —  that  perpetu- 
ated French  influence  in  Italy,  Switzerland,  and  Holland, 
that  enabled  France  to  prepare  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  and  to  intrigue  with  the  Mahrattas? 
Those  were  the  conditions  on  which  England  could  enjoy 
peace  :  she  must  recognize  the  arbitrament  of  France  in 
the  affairs  of  all  neighbouring  States,  she  must  make  no 
claim  for  compensation  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  she  must 
endure  to  be  officially  informed  that  she  alone  could  not 
maintain  a  struggle  against  France.1 

But  George  III.  was  not  minded  to  sink  to  the  level  of 
a  Charles  II.  Whatever  were  the  failings  of  our  "  farmer 
king "  he  was  keenly  alive  to  national  honour  and  in- 
terests. These  had  been  deeply  wounded,  even  in  the 
United  Kingdom  itself.  Napoleon  had  been  active  in 
sending  "commercial  commissioners"  into  our  land. 
Many  of  them  were  proved  to  be  soldiers  :  and  the  secret 
instructions  sent  by  Talleyrand  to  one  of  them  at  Dublin, 
which  chanced  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  our  Government, 
showed  that  they  were  charged  to  make  plans  of  the  har- 
bours, and  of  the  soundings  and  moorings.2 

Then  again,  the  French  were  almost  certainly  helping 
Irish  conspirators.  One  of  these,  Emmett,  already  sus- 
pected of  complicity  in  the  Despard  conspiracy  which 
aimed  at  the  King's  life,  had,  after  its  failure,  sought 
shelter  in  France.  At  the  close  of  1802  he  returned  to 
his  native  land  and  began  to  store  arms  in  a  house  near 
Rathfarnham.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  authorities 
were  aware  of  his  plans,  or,  as  is  more  probable,  let  the 
plot  come  to  a  head.  The  outbreak  did  not  take  place 
till  the  following  July  (after  the  renewal  of  war),  when 
Emmett  and  some  of  his  accomplices,  along  with  Russell, 
who  stirred  up  sedition  in  Ulster,  paid  for  their  folly 
with  their  lives.     They  disavowed  any  connection   with 

1  "  View  of  the  State  of  the  Republic,"  read  to  the  Corps  Legislatif  on 
February  21st,  1803. 

2  Papers  presented  to  Parliament  May  18th,  1803.  See  too  Pitt's 
speech,  May  23rd,  1803. 

2c 


386  THE   LIFE   OF   NAFOLEON    I  chap. 

France,  but  they  must  have  based  their  hope  of  success 
on  a  promised  French  invasion  of  our  coasts.1 

The  dealings  of  the  French  commercial  commissioners 
and  the  beginnings  of  the  Emmett  plot  increased  tl\e 
tension  caused  by  Napoleon's  masterful  foreign  policy  ; 
and  the  result  was  seen  in  the  King's  message  to  Par- 
liament on  March  8th,  1803.  In  view  of  the  military  prep- 
arations and  of  the  wanton  defiance  of  the  First  Consul's 
recent  message  to  the  Corps  Legislatif,  Ministers  asked 
for  the  embodiment  of  the  militia  and  the  addition  of 
10,000  seamen  to  the  navy.  After  Napoleon's  declaration 
to  our  ambassador  that  France  was  bringing  her  forces  on 
active  service  up  to  480,000  men,  the  above-named  in- 
crease of  the  British  forces  might  well  seem  a  reasonable 
measure  of  defence.  Yet  it  so  aroused  the  spleen  of  the 
First  Consul  that,  at  a  public  reception  of  ambassadors 
on  March  13th,  he  thus  accosted  Lord  Whitworth  : 

"'So  you  are  determined  to  goto  war.'  'No,  First  Consul,'!  re- 
plied, '  we  are  too  sensible  of  the  advantage  of  peace.'  '  Why,  then, 
these  armaments?  Against  whom  these  measures  of  precaution? 
I  have  not  a  single  ship  of  the  line  in  the  French  ports,  but  if  you 
wish  to  arm  I  will  arm  also :  if  you  wish  to  fight,  I  will  fight  also. 
You  may  perhaps  kill  France,  but  will  never  intimidate  her.'  '  We  wish,' 
said  I,  '  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  We  wish  to  live  on  good  terms 
with  her.'  '  You  must  respect  treaties  then,'  replied  he  ;  '  woe  to  those 
who  do  not  respect  treaties.  They  shall  answer  for  it  to  all  Europe.' 
He  was  too  agitated  to  make  it  advisable  to  prolong  the  conversation : 
I  therefore  made  no  answer,  and  he  retired  to  his  apartment,  repeating 
the  last  phrase."  2 

This  curious  scene  shows  Napoleon  in  one  of  his 
weaker  petulant  moods  :  it  left  on  the  embarrassed  spec- 
tators no  impression  of  outraged  dignity,  but  rather  of 
the  overweening  self-assertion  of  an  autocrat  who  could 
push  on  hostile  preparations,  and  yet  flout  the  ambassador 
of  the  Power  that  took  reasonable  precautions  in  return. 
The  slight  offered  to  our  ambassador,  though  hotly  re- 

1  See  Russell's  proclamation  of  July  22nd  to  the  men  of  Antrim  that 
"he  doubted  not  but  the  French  were  then  fighting  in  Scotland." 
("Ann.  Reg.,"  1803,  p.  246.)  This  document  is  ignored  by  Plowden 
("  Hist,  of  Ireland,  1801-1810.") 

2  Despatch  of  March  14th,  1803.  Compare  it  with  the  very  mild  ver- 
sion in  Napoleon's  "  Corresp.,"  No.  6636. 


xvn  THE    RENEWAL   OF   WAR  387 

sented  in  Britain,  had  no  direct  effect  on  the  negotiations, 
as  the  First  Consul  soon  took  the  opportunity  of  tacitly 
apologizing  for  the  occurrence  ;  but  indirectly  the  matter 
was  infinitely  important.  By  that  utterance  he  nailed  his 
colours  to  the  mast  with  respect  to  the  British  evacuation 
of  Malta.  With  his  keen  insight  into  the  French  nature, 
he  knew  that  "  honour  "  was  its  mainspring,  and  that  his 
political  fortunes  rested  on  the  satisfaction  of  that  instinct. 
He  could  not  now  draw  back  without  affronting  the  pres- 
tige of  France  and  undermining  his  own  position.  In 
vain  did  our  Government  remind  him  of  his  admission 
that  "  His  Majesty  should  keep  a  compensation  out  of  his 
conquests  for  the  important  acquisitions  of  territory  made 
by  France  upon  the  Continent." 1  That  promise,  although 
official,  was  secret.  Its  violation  would,  at  the  worst, 
only  offend  the  officials  of  Whitehall.  Whereas,  if  he 
now  acceded  to  their  demand  that  Malta  should  be  the 
compensation,  he  at  once  committed  that  worst  of  all 
crimes  in  a  French  statesman,  of  rendering  himself  ludi- 
crous. In  this  respect,  then,  the  scene  of  March  13th  at 
the  Tuileries  was  indirectly  the  cause  of  the  bloodiest  war 
that  has  desolated  Europe. 

Napoleon  now  regarded  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  as 
probable,  if  not  certain.  Facts  are  often  more  eloquent 
than  diplomatic  assurances,  and  such  facts  are  not  wanting. 
On  March  6th  Decaen's  expedition  had  set  sail  from  Brest 
for  the  East  Indies  with  no  anticipation  of  immediate  war. 
On  March  16th  a  fast  brig  was  sent  after  him  with  orders 
that  he  should  return  with  all  speed  from  Pondicherry  to 
the  Mauritius.  Napoleon's  correspondence  also  shows 
that,  as  early  as  March  11th,  that  is,  after  hearing  of 
George  III.'s  message  to  Parliament,  he  expected  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  :  on  that  day  he  ordered  the  formation 
of  flotillas  at  Dunkirk  and  Cherbourg,  and  sent  urgent 
messages  to  the  sovereigns  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Spain, 
inveighing  against  England's  perfidy.  The  envoy  de- 
spatched to  St.  Petersburg  was  specially  charged  to  talk 
to  the  Czar  on  philosophic  questions,  and  to  urge  him  to 
free  the  seas  from  England's  tyranny. 

Much  as  Addington  and  his  colleagues  loved  peace,  they 

1  Lord  Hawkesbury  to  General  Andreossy,  March  10th. 


388  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

were  now  convinced  that  it  was  more  hazardous  than  opeD 
war.  Malta  was  the  only  effectual  bar  to  a  French  seizure 
of  Egypt  or  an  invasion  of  Turkey  from  the  side  of  Corfu. 
With  Turkey  partitioned  and  Egypt  in  French  hands, 
there  would  be  no  security  against  Napoleon's  designs  on 
India.  The  British  forces  evacuated  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  on  February  21st,  1803;  they  set  sail  from  Alex- 
andria on  the  17th  of  the  following  month.  By  the  former 
act  we  yielded  up  to  France  the  sea  route  to  India  —  for 
the  Dutch  at  the  Cape  were  but  the  tools  of  the  First 
Consul :  by  the  latter  we  left  Malta  as  the  sole  barrier 
against  a  renewed  land  attack  on  our  Eastern  possessions. 
The  safety  of  our  East  Indian  possessions  was  really  at 
stake,  and  yet  Europe  was  asked  to  believe  that  the  ques- 
tion was  whether  England  would  or  would  not  evacuate 
Malta.  This  was  the  French  statement  of  the  case :  it 
was  met  by  the  British  plea  that  France,  having  declared 
her  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  compensation  for  us, 
had  no  cause  for  objecting  to  the  retention  of  an  island  so 
vital  to  our  interests. 

Yet,  while  convinced  of  the  immense  importance  of 
Malta,  the  Addington  Cabinet  did  not  insist  on  retaining 
it,  if  the  French  Government  would  "  suggest  some  other 
equivalent  security  by  which  His  Majesty's  object  in  claim- 
ing the  permanent  possession  of  Malta  may  be  accomplished 
and  the  independence  of  the  island  secured  conformably 
to  the  spirit  of  the  10th  Article  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens." 1 
To  the  First  Consul  was  therefore  left  the  initiative  in 
proposing  some  other  plan  which  would  safeguard  British 
interests  in  the  Levant;  and,  with  this  qualifying  expla- 
nation, the  British  ambassador  was  charged  to  present  to 
him  the  following  proposals  for  a  new  treaty :  Malta  to 
remain  in  British  hands,  the  Knights  to  be  indemnified  for 
any  losses  of  property  which  they  may  thereby  sustain : 
Holland  and  Switzerland  to  be  evacuated  by  French  troops : 
the  island  of  Elba  to  be  confirmed  to  France,  and  the  King 
of  Etruria  to  be  acknowledged  by  Great  Britain :  the 
Italian  and  Ligurian  Republics  also  to  be  acknowledged, 
if  "  an  arrangement  is  made  in  Italy  for  the  King  of  Sar- 
dinia, which  shall  be  satisfactory  to  him." 

1  Lord  Hawkesbury  to  Lord  Whitworth,  April  4th,  1803. 


xvn  THE   RENEWAL   OF    WAR  .  389 

Lord  Whitworth  judged  it  better  not  to  present  these 
demands  point  blank,  but  gradually  to  reveal  their  sub- 
stance. This  course,  he  judged,  would  be  less  damaging 
to  the  friends  of  peace  at  the  Tuileries,  and  less  likely  to 
affront  Napoleon.  But  it  was  all  one  and  the  same.  The 
First  Consul,  in  his  present  state  of  highly  wrought  ten- 
sion, practically  ignored  the  suggestion  of  an  equivalent 
security,  and  declaimed  against  the  perfidy  of  England  for 
daring  to  infringe  the  treaty,  though  he  had  offered  no 
opposition  to  the  Czar's  proposals  respecting  Malta,  which 
weakened  the  stability  of  the  Order  and  sensibly  modified 
that  same  treaty. 

Talleyrand  was  more  conciliatory  ;  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that,  had  the  First  Consul  allowed  his  brother 
Joseph  and  his  Foreign  Minister  wider  powers,  the  crisis 
might  have  been  peaceably  passed.  Joseph  Bonaparte 
urgently  pressed  Whitworth  to  be  satisfied  with  Corfu  or 
Crete  in  place  of  Malta ;  but  he  confessed  that  the  sug- 
gestion was  quite  unauthorized,  and  that  the  First  Consul 
was  so  enraged  on  the  Maltese  Question  that  he  dared  not 
broach  it  to  him.1  Indeed,  all  through  these  critical 
weeks  Napoleon's  relations '  to  his  brothers  were  very 
strained,  they  desiring  peace  in  Europe  so  that  Louisiana 
might  even  now  be  saved  to  France,  while  the  First  Con- 
sul persisted  in  his  oriental  schemes.  He  seems  now  to 
have  concentrated  his  energies  on  the  task  of  postponing 
the  rupture  to  a  convenient  date  and  of  casting  on  his  foes 
the  odium  of  the  approaching  war.  He  made  no  proposal 
that  could  reassure  Britain  as  to  the  security  of  the  over- 
land routes  ;  and  he  named  no  other  island  which  could 
be  considered  as  an  equivalent  to  Malta. 

To  many  persons  his  position  has  seemed  logically  un- 
assailable ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  view  can  be 
held.  The  Treaty  of  Amiens  had  twice  over  been  ren- 
dered, in  a  technical  sense,  null  and  void  by  the  action  of 
Continental  Powers.  Russia  and  Prussia  had  not  guaran- 
teed the  state  of  things  arranged  for  Malta  by  that  treaty  ; 
and  the  action  of  France  and  Spain  in  confiscating  the 
property  of  the  Knights  in  their  respective  lands  had  so 
far  sapped  the  strength  of  the  Order  that  it  could  never 

1  Despatches  of  April  11th  and  18th,  1803. 


390  •  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

again  support  the  expense  of  the  large  garrison  which  the 
lines  around  Valetta  required. 

In  a  military  sense,  this  was  the  crux  of  the  problem  ; 
for  no  one  affected  to  believe  that  Malta  was  rendered 
secure  by  the  presence  at  Valetta  of  2,000  troops  of  the 
King  of  Naples,  whose  realm  could  within  a  week  be  over- 
run by  Murat's  division.  This  obvious  difficulty  led  Lord 
Hawkesbury  to  urge,  in  his  notes  of  April  13th  and  later, 
that  British  troops  should  garrison  the  chief  fortifications 
of  Valetta  and  leave  the  civil  power  to  the  Knights  :  or, 
if  that  were  found  objectionable,  that  we  should  retain 
complete  possession  of  the  island  for  ten  years,  provided 
that  we  were  left  free  to  negotiate  with  the  King  of 
Naples  for  the  cession  of  Lampedusa,  an  islet  to  the  west 
of  Malta.  To  this  last  proposal  the  First  Consul  offered 
no  objection  ;  but  he  still  inflexibly  opposed  any  reten- 
tion of  Malta,  even  for  ten  years,  and  sought  to  make  the 
barren  islet  of  Lampedusa  appear  an  equivalent  to  Malta. 
This  absurd  contention  had,  however,  been  exploded  by 
Talleyrand's  indiscreet  confession  "  that  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  Order  of  St.  John  was  not  so  much  the  point 
to  be  discussed  as  that  of  suffering  Great  Britain  to  acquire 
a,  possession  in  the  Mediterranean."1 

This,  indeed,  was  the  pith  and  marrow  of  the  whole 
question,  whether  Great  Britain  was  to  be  excluded  from 
that  great  sea  —  save  at  Gibraltar  and  Lampedusa — look- 
ing on  idly  at  its  transformation  into  a  French  lake  by 
the  seizure  of  Corfu,  the  Morea,  Egypt,  and  Malta  itself  ; 
or  whether  she  should  retain  some  hold  on  the  overland 
route  to  the  East.  The  difficulty  was  frankly  pointed 
out  by  Lord  Whitworth ;  it  was  as  frankly  admitted  by 
Joseph  Bonaparte;  it  was  recognized  by  Talleyrand; 
and  Napoleon's  desire  for  a  durable  peace  must  have  been 
slight  when  he  refused  to  admit  England's  claim  effectively 
to  safeguard  her  interests  in  the  Levant,  and  ever  fell  back 
on  the  literal  fulfilment  of  a  treaty  which  had  been  in- 
validated by  his  own  deliberate  actions. 

Affairs  now  rapidly  came  to  a  climax.  On  April  23rd 
the  British  Government  notified  its  ambassador  that,  if  the 
present  terms  were  not  granted  within  seven  days  of  his 

1  Whitworth  to  Hawkesbury,  April  23rd. 


xvn  THE   RENEWAL  OF    WAR  391 

receiving  them,  he  was  to  leave  Paris.  Napoleon  was  no 
less  angered  than,  surprised  bjr  the  recent  turn  of  events. 
In  place  of  timid  complaisance  which  he  had  expected  from 
Addington,  he  was  met  with  open  defiance  ;  but  he  now 
proposed  that  the  Czar  should  offer  his  intervention  be- 
tween the  disputants.  The  suggestion  was  infinitely 
skilful.  It  flattered  the  pride  of  the  young  autocrat  and 
promised  to  yield  gains  as  substantial  as  those  which  Rus- 
sian mediation  had  a  year  before  procured  for  France  from 
the  intimidated  Sultan ;  it  would  help  to  check  the  plans 
for  an  Anglo-Russian  alliance  then  being  mooted  at  St. 
Petersburg,  and,  above  all,  it  served  to  gain  time. 

All  these  advantages  were  to  a  large  extent  realized. 
Though  the  Czar  had  been  the  first  to  suggest  our  reten- 
tion of  Malta,  he  now  began  to  waver.  The  clearness 
and  precision  of  Talleyrand's  notes,  and  the  telling  charge 
of  perfidy  against  England,  made  an  impression  which  the 
cumbrous  retorts  of  Lord  Hawkesbury  and  the  sailor-like 
diplomacy  of  Admiral  Warren  failed  to  efface.1  And  the 
Russian  Chancellor,  Vorontzoff,  though  friendly  to  Eng- 
land, and  desirous  of  seeing  her  firmly  established  at  Malta, 
now  began  to  complain  of  the  want  of  clearness  in  her 
policy.  The  Czar  emphasized  this  complaint,  and  sug- 
gested that,  as  Malta  could  not  be  the  real  cause  of  dis- 
pute, the  British  Government  should  formulate  distinctly 
its  grievances  and  so  set  the  matter  in  train  for  a  settle- 
ment. The  suggestion  was' not  complied  with.  To  draw 
up  a  long  list  of  complaints,  some  drawn'from  secret  sources 
and  exposing  the  First  Consul's  schemes,  would  have  exas- 
perated his  already  ruffled  temper  ;  and  the  proposal  can 
only  be  regarded  as  an  adroit  means  of  justifying  Alexan- 
der's sudden  change  of  front. 

Meanwhile  events  had  proceeded  apace  at  Paris.  On 
April  26th  Joseph  Bonaparte  made  a  last  effort  to  bend 
his  brother's  will,  but  only  gained  the  grudging  concession 
that  Napoleon  would  never  consent  to  the  British  retention 

1  Czartoryski  ("Meras.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xiii.)  calls  him  "an  excellent 
admiral  but  an  indifferent  diplomatist  —  a  perfect  representative  of  the 
nullity  and  incapacity  of  the  Addington  Ministry  which  had  appointed 
him.  The  English  Government  was  seldom  happy  in  its  ambassadors." 
So  Earl  Minto's  "  Letters,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  279. 


392  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  Malta  for  a  longer  time  than  three  or  four  years.  As 
this  would  have  enabled  him  to  postpone  the  rupture  long 
enough  to  mature  his  oriental  plans,  it  was  rejected  by  Lord 
Whitworth,  who  insisted  on  ten  years  as  the  minimum. 
The  evident  determination  of  the  British  Government 
speedily  to  terminate  the  affair,  one  way  or  the  other,  threw 
Napoleon  into  a  paroxysm  of  passion  ;  and  at  the  diplo- 
matic reception  of  May  1st,  from  which  Lord  Whitworth 
discreetly  absented  himself,  he  vehemently  inveighed 
against  its  conduct.  Fretted  by  the  absence  of  our  am- 
bassador, for  whom  this  sally  had  been  intended,  he  re- 
turned to  St.  Cloud,  and  there  dictated  this  curious  epistle 
to  Talleyrand  : 

"  I  desire  that  your  conference  [with  Lord  Whitworth]  shall  not 
degenerate  into  a  conversation.  Show  yourself  cold,  reserved,  and 
even  somewhat  proud.  If  the  [British]  note  contains  the  word  ulti- 
matum make  him  feel  that  this  word  implies  war ;  if  it  does  not  con- 
tain this  word,  make  him  insert  it,  remarking  to  him  that  we  must 
know  where  we  are,  that  we  are  tired  of  this  state  of  anxiety.  .  .  . 
Soften  down  a  little  at  the  end  of  the  conference,  and  invite  him  to 
return  before  writing  to  his  Court." 

But  this  careful  rehearsal  was  to  avail  nothing  ;  our 
stolid  ambassador  was  not  to  be  cajoled,  and  on  May  2nd, 
that  is,  seven  days  after  his  presenting  our  ultimatum,  he 
sent  for  his  passports.  He  did  not,  however,  set  out  im- 
mediately. Yielding  to  an  urgent  request,  he  delayed  his 
departure  in  order  to  hear  the  French  reply  to  the  British 
ultimatum.1  It  notified  sarcastically  that  Lampedusa  was 
not  in  the  First  Consul's  power  to  bestow,  that  any  change 
with  reference  to  Malta  must  be  referred  by  Great  Britain 
to  the  Great  Powers  for  their  concurrence,  and  that  Hol- 
land would  be  evacuated  as  soon  as  the  terms  of  the  Treaty 
of  Amiens  were  complied  with.  Another  proposal  was 
that  Malta  should  be  transferred  to  Russia  —  the  very  step 
which  was  proposed  at  Amiens  and  was  rejected  by  the 
Czar  :  on  that  account  Lord  Whitworth  now  refused  it  as 
being  merely  a  device  to  gain  time.  The  sending  of  his 
passports  having  been  delayed,  he  received  one  more 
despatch  from  Downing  Street,  which  allowed  that  our 

1See  Lord  Malmesbury's  "Diaries"  (vol.  iv.,  p.  263)  as  to  the  bad 
results  of  Whitworth's  delay. 


xvn  THE   RENEWAL   OF   WAR  393 

retention  of  Malta  for  ten  years  should  form  a  secret 
article — a  device  which  would  spare  the  First  Consul's 
susceptibilities  on  the  point  of  honour.  Even  so,  however, 
Napoleon  refused  to  consider  a  longer  tenure  than  two  or 
three  years.  And  in  this  he  was  undoubtedly  encouraged 
by  the  recent  despatch  from  St.  Petersburg,  wherein  the 
Czar  promised  his  mediation  in  a  sense  favourable  to 
France.  This  unfortunate  occurrence  completed  the  dis- 
comfiture of  the  peace  party  at  the  Consular  Court,  and  in 
a  long  and  heated  discussion  in  a  council  held  at  St.  Cloud 
on  May  11th  all  but  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  Talleyrand 
voted  for  the  rejection  of  the  British  demands. 

On  the  next  day  Lord  Whit  worth  left  Paris.  During 
his  journey  to  Calais  he  received  one  more  proposal,  that 
France  should  hold  the  peninsula  of  Otranto  for  ten 
years  if  Great  Britain  retained  Malta  for  that  period  ; 
but  if  this  suggestion  was  made  in  good  faith,  which  is 
doubtful,  its  effect  was  destroyed  by  a  rambling  diatribe 
which  Talleyrand,  at  his  master's  orders,  sent  shortly 
afterwards.1  In  any  case  it  was  looked  upon  by  our 
ambassador  as  a  last  attempt  to  gain  time  for  the  con- 
centration of  the  French  naval  forces.  He  crossed  the 
Straits  of  Dover  on  May  17th,  the  day  after  the  British 
declaration  of  war  was  issued. 

On  May  22nd,  1803,  appeared  at  Paris  the  startling 
order  that,  as  British  frigates  had  captured  two  French 
merchantmen  on  the  Breton  coast,  all  Englishmen  between 
eighteen  and  sixty  years  of  age  who  were  in  France 
should  be  detained  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  pretext  for 
this  unheard-of  action,  which  condemned  some  10,000 
Britons  to  prolonged  detention,  was  that  the  two  French 
ships  were  seized  prior  to  the  declaration  of  war.  This 
is  false :  they  were  seized  on  May  20th,  that  is,  four  days 
after  the  British  Government  had  declared  war,  three 
days  after  an  embargo  had  been  laid  on  British  vessels  in 
French  ports,  and  seven  days  after  the  First  Consul  had 
directed  his  envoy  at  Florence  to  lay  an  embargo  on  Eng- 
lish ships  in  the  ports  of  Tuscan}.2  It  is  therefore 
obvious  that  Napoleon's  barbarous  decree  merely  marked 

^ote  of  May  12th,  1803  :  see  "  England  and  Napoleon,"  p.  249. 
2  "  Corresp.,"  vol.  viii.,  No.  0743. 


394  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

his  disappointment  at  the  failure  of  his  efforts  to  gain 
time  and  to  deal  the  first  stroke.  How  sorely  his  temper 
was  tried  by  the  late  events  is  clear  from  the  recital  of  the 
Duchesse  d'Abrantes,  who  relates  that  her  husband,  when 
ordered  to  seize  English  residents,  found  the  First  Consul 
in  a  fury,  his  eyes  flashing  fire  ;  and  when  Junot  expressed 
his  reluctance  to  carry  out  this  decree,  Napoleon  passion- 
ately exclaimed:  "  Do  not  trust  too  far  to  my  friendship: 
as  soon  as  I  conceive  doubt  as  to  yours,  mine  is  gone." 

Few  persons  in  England  now  cherished  any  doubts  as 
to  the  First  Consul's  hatred  of  the  nation  which  stood 
between  him  and  his  oriental  designs.  Ministers  alone 
knew  the  extent  of  those  plans  :  but  every  ploughboy 
could  feel  the  malice  of  an  act  which  cooped  up  innocent 
travellers  on  the  flimsiest  of  pretexts.  National  ardour, 
and,  alas,  national  hatred  were  deeply  stirred.1  The 
Whigs,  who  had  paraded  the  clemency  of  Napoleon,  were 
at  once  helpless,  and  found  themselves  reduced  to  impo- 
tence for  wellnigh  a  generation  ;  and  the  Tories,  who 
seemed  the  exponents  of  a  national  policy,  were  left  in 
power  until  the  stream  of  democracy,  dammed  up  by  war 
in  1793  and  again  in  1803,  asserted  its  full  force  in  the 
later  movement  for  reform. 

Yet  the  opinion  often  expressed  by  pamphleteers,  that 
the  war  of  1803  was  undertaken  to  compel  France  to 
abandon  her  republican  principles,  is  devoid  of  a  shred  of 
evidence  in  its  favour.  After  1802  there  were  no  French 
republican  principles  to  be  combated  ;  they  had  already 
been  jettisoned  ;  and,  since  Bonaparte  had  crushed  the 
Jacobins,  his  personal  claims  were  favourably  regarded  at 
Whitehall,  Addington  even  assuring  the  French  envoy 
that  he  would  welcome  the  establishment  of  hereditary 
succession  in  the  First  Consul's  family.2  But  while  Bona- 
parte's own  conduct  served  to  refute  the  notion  that  the 

1  See  Romilly's  letter  to  Dumont,  May  31st,  1803  ("  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.). 

2  "  Lettres  incites  de  Talleyrand,"  November  3rd,  1802.  In  his  letter 
of  May  3rd,  1803,  to  Lord  Whitworth,  M.  Huber  reports  Fouch^'s  out- 
spoken warning  in  the  Senate  to  Bonaparte  :  "  Vous  §tes  vous-menie, 
ainsi  que  nous,  un  r^sultat  de  la  revolution,  et  la  guerre  remet  tout  en 
probl£me.  On  vous  flatte  en  vous  faisant  compter  sur  les  principes  r£vo- 
lutionnaires  des  autres  nations:  le  resultat  de  notre  revolution  les  a 
aneantis  partout." 


xvii  THE   RENEWAL   OF    WAR  396 

war  of  1803  was  a  war  of  principles,  his  masterful  policy 
in  Europe  and  the  Levant  convinced  every  well-informed 
man  that  peace  was  impossible  ;  and  the  rupture  was 
accompanied  by  acts  and  insults  to  the  "  nation  of  shop- 
keepers "  that  could  be  avenged  only  by  torrents  of  blood. 
Diatribes  against  perfidious  Albion  rilled  the  French  Press 
and  overflowed  into  splenetic  pamphlets,  one  of  which 
bade  odious  England  tremble  under  the  consciousness  of 
her  bad  faith  and  the  expectation  of  swift  and  condign 
chastisement.  Such  was  the  spirit  in  which  these  nations 
rushed  to  arms  ;  and  the  conflict  was  scarcely  to  cease 
until  Napoleon  was  flung  out  into  the  solitudes  of  the 
southern  Atlantic. 

The  importance  of  the  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens 
will  be  realized  if  we  briefly  survey  Bonaparte's  position 
after  that  treaty  was  signed.  He  had  regained  for  his 
adopted  country  a  colonial  empire,  and  had  given  away 
not  a  single  French  island.  France  was  raised  to  a  posi- 
tion of  assured  strength  far  preferable  to  the  perilous 
heights  attained  later  on  at  Tilsit.  In  Australia  there 
was  a  prospect  that  the  tricolour  would  wave  over  areas 
as  great  and  settlements  as  prosperous  as  those  of  New 
South  Wales  and  the  infant  town  of  Sydney.  From  the 
lie  de  France  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  as  convenient 
bases  of  operations,  British  India  could  easily  be  assailed  ; 
and  a  Franco-Mahratta  alliance  promised  to  yield  a  victory 
over  the  troops  of  the  East  India  Company.  In  Europe 
the  imminent  collapse  of  the  Turkish  Empire  invited  a 
partition,  whence  France  might  hope  to  gain  Egypt  and 
the  Morea.  ■  The  Ionian  Isles  were  ready  to  accept  French 
annexation ;  and,  if  England  withdrew  her  troops  from 
Malta,  the  fate  of  the  weak  Order  of  St.  John  could 
scarcely  be  a  matter  of  doubt. 

For  the  fulfilment  of  these  bright  hopes  one  thing  alone 
was  needed,  a  policy  of  peace  and  naval  preparation.  As 
yet  Napoleon's  navy  was  comparatively  weak.  In  March, 
1803,  he  had  only  forty-three  line-of-battle  ships,  ten  of 
which  were  on  distant  stations  ;  but  he  had  ordered 
twenty -three  more  to  be  built  —  ten  of  them  in  Holland  ; 
and,  with  the  harbours  of  France,  Holland,  Flanders,  and 
Northern  Italy  at  his  disposal,  he  might  hope,  at  the  close 


39G  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xvii 

of  1804,  to  confront  the  flag  of  St.  George  with  a  superi- 
ority of  force.  That  was  the  time  which  his  secret  in- 
structions to  Decaen  marked  out  for  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  that  would  yield  to  the  tricolour  a  world-wide 
supremacy. 

These  schemes  miscarried  owing  to  the  impetuosity  of 
their  contriver.  Hustled  out  of  the  arena  of  European 
politics,  and  threatened  with  French  supremacy  in  the 
other  Continents,  England  forthwith  drew  the  sword  ; 
and  her  action,  cutting  athwart  the  far-reaching  web  of 
the  Napoleonic  intrigues,  forced  France  to  forego  her 
oceanic  plans,  to  muster  her  forces  on  the  Straits  of  Dover, 
and  thereby  to  yield  to  the  English  race  the  supremacy  in 
Louisiana,  India,  and  Australia,  leaving  also  the  destinies 
of  Egypt  to  be  decided  in  a  later  age.  Viewed  from  the 
standpoint  of  racial  expansion,  the  renewal  of  war  in  1803 
is  the  greatest  event  of  the  century. 

[Since  this  chapter  was  printed,  articles  on  the  same  subject  have 
appeared  in  the  "  Revue  Historique "  (March-June,  1901)  by  M. 
Philippson,  which  take  almost  the  same  view  as  that  here  presented. 
I  cannot,  however,  agree  with  the  learned  writer  that  Napoleon 
wanted  war.  I  think  he  did  not,  until  his  navy  was  ready ;  but  it  was 
not  in  him  to  give  way.] 


CHAPTER   XVIII 
EUROPE   AND   THE  BONAPARTES 

The  disappointment  felt  by  Napoleon  at  England's 
interruption  of  his  designs  may  be  measured,  first  by  his 
efforts  to  postpone  the  rupture,  and  thereafter  by  the 
fierce  energy  which  he  threw  into  the  war.  As  has  been 
previously  noted,  the  Czar  had  responded  to  the  First 
Consul's  appeal  for  mediation  in  notes  which  seemed  to 
the  British  Cabinet  unjustly  favourable  to  the  French 
case.  Napoleon  now  offered  to  recognize  the  arbitration 
of  the  Czar  on  the  questions  in  dispute,  and  suggested 
that  meanwhile  Malta  should  be  handed  over  to  Russia 
to  be  held  in  pledge  :  he  on  his  part  offered  to  evacuate 
Hanover,  Switzerland,  and  Holland,  if  the  British  would 
suspend  hostilities,  to  grant  an  indemnity  to  the  King  of 
Sardinia,  to  allow  Britain  to  occupy  Lampedusa,  and  fully 
to  assure  "the  independence  of  Europe,"  if  France  re- 
tained her  present  frontiers.  But  when  the  Russian 
envoy,  Markoff,  urged  him  to  crown  these  proposals  by 
allowing  Britain  to  hold  Malta  for  a  certain  time,  there- 
after to  be  agreed  upon,  he  firmly  refused  to  do  so  on  his 
own  initiative,  for  that  would  soil  his  honour  :  but  he 
would  view  with  resignation  its  cession  to  Britain  if  that 
proved  to  be  the  award  of  Alexander.  Accordingly 
Markoff  wrote  to  his  colleague  at  London,  assuring  him 
that  the  peace  of  the  world  was  now  once  again  assured 
by  the  noble  action  of  the  First  Consul.1 

Were  these  proposals  prompted  by  a  sincere  desire  to 
assure  a  lasting  peace,  or  were  they  put  forward  as  a 
device  to  gain  time  for  the  completion  of  the  French 
naval  preparations  ?  Evidently  they  were  completely 
distrusted  by  the    British    Government,  and    with   some 

1  A  copy  of  this  letter,  with  the  detailed  proposals,  is  in  our  Foreign 
Office  archives  (Russia,  No.  52). 

397 


398  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

reason.  They  were  nearly  identical  with  the  terms 
formulated  in  the  British  ultimatum,  which  Napoleon 
had  rejected.  Moreover,  our  Foreign  Office  had  by  this 
time  come  to  suspect  Alexander.  On  June  23rd  Lord 
Hawkesbury  wrote  that  it  might  be  most  damaging  to 
British  interests  to  place  Malta  "at  the  hazard  of  the 
Czar's  arbitration "  ;  and  he  informed  the  Russian  am- 
bassador, Count  Vorontzoff,  that  the  aim  of  the  French 
had  obviously  been  merely  to  gain  time,  that  their  explana- 
tions were  loose  and  unsatisfactory,  and  their  demands 
inadmissible,  and  that  Great  Britain  could  not  acknow- 
ledge the  present  territories  of  the  French  Republic  as 
permanent  while  Malta  was  placed  in  arbitration.  In 
fact,  our  Government  feared  that,  when  Malta  had  been 
placed  in  Alexander's  hands,  Napoleon  would  lure  him 
into  oriental  adventures  and  renew  the  plans  of  an  ad- 
vance on  India.     Their  fears  were  well  founded. 

Napoleon's  preoccupation  was  always  for  the  East :  on 
February  21st,  1803,  he  had  charged  his  Minister  of  Marine 
to  send  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  Suliotes  and  Maniotes 
then  revolting  against  the  Sultan  ;  and  at  midsummer 
French  agents  were  at  Ragusa  to  prepare  for  a  landing  at 
the  mouth  of  the  River  Cattaro.1  With  Turkey  rent  by 
revolt,  Malta  placed  as  a  pledge  in  Russian  keeping,  and 
Alexander  drawn  into  the  current  of  Napoleon's  designs, 
what  might  not  be  accomplished  ?  Evidently  the  First 
Consul  could  expect  more  from  this  course  of  events  than 
from  barren  strifes  with  Nelson's  ships  in  the  Straits  of 
Dover.  For  ws,  such  a  peace  was  far  more  risky  than  war. 
And  yet,  if  the  Czar's  offer  were  too  stiffly  repelled,  public 
opinion  would  everywhere  be  alienated,  and  in  that  has 
always  lain  half  the  strength  of  England's  policy.2  Min- 
isters therefore  declared  that,  while  they  could  not  accept 
Russia's  arbitration  without  appeal,  they  would  accede 
to  her  mediation  if  it  concerned  all  the  causes  of  the  pres- 
ent war.  This  reasonable  proposal  was  accepted  by  the 
Czar,  but  received  from  Napoleon  a  firm  refusal.     He  at 

1  Bourgeois,  "  Manuel  de  Politique  Etrangere,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  243. 

2  See  Castlereagh's  "Letters  and  Despatches,"  Second  Series,  vol.  i., 
pp.  75-82,  as  to  the  need  of  conciliating  public  opinion,  even  by  accepting 
Corfu  as  a  set-off  for  Malta,  provided  a  durable  peace  could  thus  be  secured. 


i 


xvin  EUROPE   AND   THE   BONAPARTES  399 

once  wrote  to  Talleyrand,  August  23rd,  1803,  directing 
that  the  Russian  proposals  should  be  made  known  to 
Haugwitz,  the  Prussian  Foreign  Minister : 

"  Make  him  see  all  the  absurdity  of  it :  tell  him  that  England  will 
never  get  from  me  any  other  treaty  than  that  of  Amiens :  that  /  will 
never  suffer  her  to  have  anything  in  the  Mediterranean;  that  I  will  not 
treat  with  her  about  the  Continent ;  that  I  am  resolved  to  evacuate 
Holland  and  Switzerland ;  but  that  I  will  neVer  stipulate  this  in  an 
article." 

As  for  Russia,  he  continued,  she  talked  much  about  the 
integrity  of  Turkey,  but  was  violating  it  by  the  occupation 
of  the  Ionian  Isles  and  her  constant  intrigues  in  Wallachia. 
These  facts  were  correct :  but  the  manner  in  which  he 
stated  them  clearly  revealed  his  annoyance  that  the  Czar 
would  not  wholly  espouse  the  French  cause.  Talleyrand's 
views  on  this  question  may  be  seen  in  his  letter  to  Bona- 
parte, when  he  assures  his  chief  that  he  has  now  reaped 
from  his  noble  advance  to  the  Russian  Emperor  the  sole 
possible  advantage  — "  that  of  proving  to  Europe  by  a 
grand  act  of  frankness  your  love  of  peace  and  to  throw 
upon  England  the  whole  blame  for  the  war."  It  is  not 
often  that  a  diplomatist  so  clearly  reveals  the  secrets  of 
his  chief's  policy.1 

The  motives  of  Alexander  were  less  questionable.  His 
chief  desire  at  that  time  was  to  improve  the  lot  of  his 
people.  War  would  disarrange  these  noble  designs : 
France  would  inevitably  overrun  fche  weaker  Continental 
States  :  England  would  retaliate  by  enforcing  her  severe 
maritime  code ;  and  the  whole  world  would  be  rent  in 
twain  by  this  strife  of  the  elements. 

These  gloomy  forebodings  were  soon  to  be  realized. 
Holland  was  the  first  to  suffer.  And  yet  one  effort  was 
made  to  spare  her  the  horrors  of  war.  Filled  with  com- 
miseration for  her  past  sufferings,  the  British  Government 
at  once  offered  to  respect  her  neutrality,  provided  that  the 
French  troops  would  evacuate  her  fortresses  and  exact  no 
succour  either  in  ships,  men,  or  money.2  But  such  for- 
jbearance  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  from  Napoleon,  who 

1  "Lettres  incites  de  Talleyrand,"  August  21st,  1803. 

2  Garden,  "Traites,"  vol.  v'iii.,  p.  191. 


400  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

not  only  had  a  French  division  in  that  land,  supported  at 
its  expense,  but  also  relied  on  its  maritime  resources.1  The 
proposal  was  at  once  set  aside  at  Paris.  Napoleon's  deci- 
sion to  drag  the  Batavian  Republic  into  the  war  arose, 
however,  from  no  spasm  of  the  war  fever ;  it  was  calmly- 
stated  in  the  secret  instructions  issued  to  General  Decaen 
in  the  preceding  January.  "  It  is  now  considered  impos- 
sible that  we  could  have  war  with  England,  without  drag- 
ging Holland  into  it."  Holland  was  accordingly  once 
more  ground  between  the  upper  and  the  nether  millstone, 
between  the  Sea  Power  and  the  Land  Power,  pouring  out 
for  Napoleon  its  resources  in  men  and  money,  and  losing 
to  the  masters  of  the  sea  its  ships,  foreign  commerce,  and 
colonies. 

Equally  hard  was  the  treatment  of  Naples.  In  spite  of 
the  Czar's  plea  that  its  neutrality  might  be  respected,  this 
kingdom  was  at  once  occupied  by  St.  Cyr  with  troops  that 
held  the  chief  positions  on  the  "  heel "  of  Italy.  This 
infraction  of  the  Treaty  of  Florence  was  to  be  justified  by 
a  proclamation  asserting  that,  as  England  had  retained 
Malta,  the  balance  of  power  required  that  France  should 
hold  these  positions  as  long  as  England  held  Malta.2  This 
action  punished  the  King  and  Queen  of  Naples  for  their 
supposed  subservience  to  English  policy ;  and,  while 
•lightening  the  burdens  of  the  French  exchequer,  it  com- 
pelled England  to  keep  a  large  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean 
for  the  protection  of  Egypt,  and  thereby  weakened  her 
defensive  powers  in  th$  Straits  of  Dover.  To  distract  his 
foes,  and  compel  them  to  extend  their  lines,  was  ever 
Napoleon's  aim  both  in  military  and  naval  strategy  ;  and 
the  occupation  of  Taranto,  together  with  the  naval  activity 
at  Toulon  and  Genoa,  left  it  doubtful  whether  the  great 
captain  determined  to  strike  at  London  or  to  resume  his 
eastern  adventures.  His  previous  moves  all  seemed  to 
point  towards  Egypt  and  India  ;  and  the  Admiralty  in- 
structions of  May  18th,  1803,  to  Nelson,  reveal  the  expec- 
tation of  our  Government  that  the  real  blow  would  fall 
on  the  Morea  and  Egypt.     Six  weeks  later  our  admiral 

1  Holland  was  required  to  furnish  16,000  troops  and  maintain  18,000 
French,  to  provide  10  ships  of  war  and  350  gunboats. 
2"Corresn.."  Mnv  23rd.  1803 


Corresp.,"  May  23rd,  1803. 


§ 


BANTA 

xvin  EUROPE  AND  THE  B0jiA£AKT-fi6—  401 

reported  the  activity  of  French  intrigues  in  the  Morea, 
which  was  doubtless  intended  to  be  their  halfway  house  to 
Egypt  —  "  when  sooner  or  later,  farewell  India."  2  Proofs 
of  Napoleon's  designs  on  the  Morea  were  found  by  Cap- 
tain Keats  of  H.M.S.  "Superb"  on  a  French  vessel  that 
he  captured,  a  French  corporal  having  on  him  a  secret 
letter  from  an  agent  at  Corfu,  dated.  May  23rd,  1803.  It 
ended  thus : 

"  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  we  shall  soon  have  a  revolu- 
tion in  the  Morea,  as  we  desire.     I  have  close  relations  with  Crepacchi, 
and  we  are  in  daily  correspondence  with  all  the  chiefs  of  the  Morea : 
we  have  even  provided  them  with  munitions  of  war."  2 

On  the  whole,  however,  it  seems  probable  that  Napoleon's 
chief  aim  now  was  London  and  not  Egypt  ;  but  his  dem- 
onstrations eastwards  were  so  skilfully  maintained  as  to 
convince  both  the  English  Government  and  Nelson  that 
his  real  aim  was  Egypt  or  Malta.  For  this  project  the 
French  corps  d'armee  in  the  "  heel "  of  Italy  held  a  com- 
manding position.  Ships  alone  were  wanting  ;  and  these 
he  sought  to  compel  the  King  of  Naples  to  furnish.  As 
early  as  April  20th,  1803,  our  charge  d'affaires  at  Naples, 
Mr.  a  Court,  reported  that  Napoleon  was  pressing  on  that 
Government  a  French  alliance,  on  the  ground  that  — 

"  The  interests  of  the  two  countries  are  the  same :  it  is  the  inten- 
tion of  France  to  shut  every  port  to  the  English,  from  Holland  to 
the  Turkish  dominions,  to  prevent  the  exportation  of  her  merchan- 
dise, and  to  give  a  mortal  blow  to  her  commerce,  for  there  she  is  most 
vulnerable.  Our  joint  forces  may  wrest  from  her  hands  the  island  of 
Malta.  The  Sicilian  navy  may  convoy  and  protect  the  French  troops 
in  the  prosecution  of  such  a  plan,  and  the  most  happy  result  may  be 
augured  to  their  united  exertions." 

Possibly  the  King  and  his  spirited  but  whimsical  con- 
sort, Queen  Charlotte,  might  have  bent  before  the  threats 
which  accompanied  this  alluring  offer  ;  but  at  the  head 
of  the  Neapolitan  administration  was  an  Englishman,  Gen- 
eral Acton,  whose  talents  and  force  of  will  commanded 

1  Nelson's  letters  of  July  2nd.  See  too  Mahan's  "  Life  of  Nelson," 
vol.  ii.,  pp.  180-188,  and  Napoleon's  letters  of  November  24th,  1803,  en- 
couraging the  Mamelukes  to  look  to  France. 

2  "Foreign  Office  Records,"  Sicily  and  Naples,  No.  55,  July  25th. 

2d 


402  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

their  respect  and  confidence.  To  the  threats  of  the  French 
ambassador  he  answered  that  France  was  strong  and  Naples 
was  weak  ;  force  might  overthrow  the  dynasty  ;  but  nothing 
would  induce  it  to  violate  its  neutrality  towards  England. 
So  unwonted  a  defiance  aroused  Napoleon  to  a  character- 
istic revenge.  When  his  troops  were  quartered  on  South- 
ern Italy,  and  were  draining  the  Neapolitan  resources,  the 
Queen  wrote  appealing  to  his  clemency  on  behalf  of  her 
much  burdened  people.  In  reply  he  assured  her  of  his 
desire  to  be  agreeable  to  her  :  but  how  could  he  look  on 
Naples  as  a  neutral  State,  when  its  chief  Minister  was  an 
Englishman  ?  This  was  "  the  real  reason  that  justified 
all  the  measures  taken  towards  Naples."1  The  brutality 
and  falseness  of  this  reply  had  no  other  effect  than  to 
embitter  Queen  Charlotte's  hatred  against  the  arbiter  of 
the  world's  destinies,  before  whom  she  and  her  consort 
refused  to  bow,  even  when,  three  years  later,  they  were 
forced  to  seek  shelter  behind  the  girdle  of  the  inviolate 
sea. 

Hanover  also  fell  into  Napoleon's  hands.  Mortier  with 
25,000  French  troops  speedily  overran  that  land  and  com- 
pelled the  Duke  of  Cambridge  to  a  capitulation.  The 
occupation  of  the  Electorate  not  only  relieved  the  French 
exchequer  of  the  support  of  a  considerable  corps  ;  it  also 
served  to  hold  in  check  the  Prussian  Court,  always  pre- 
occupied about  Hanover ;  and  it  barred  the  entrance  of 
the  Elbe  and  Weser  to  British  ships,  an  aim  long  cherished 
by  Napoleon.  To  this  we  retorted  by  blockading  the 
mouths  of  those  rivers,  an  act  which  must  have  been  ex- 
pected by  Napoleon,  and  which  enabled  him  to  declaim 
against  British  maritime  tyranny.  In  truth,  the  beginnings 
of  the  Continental  System  were  now  clearly  discernible. 
The  shores  of  the  Continent  from  the  south  of  Italy  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  were  practically  closed  to  English 
ships,  while  by  a  decree  of  July  15th,  any  vessel  whatsoever 
that  had  cleared  from  a  British  port  was  to  be  excluded 
from  all  harbours  of  the  French  Republic.  Thus  all  com- 
mercial nations  were  compelled,  slowly  but  inevitably,  to 
side  with  the  master  of  the  land  or  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  i 

In  vain  did  the  King  of  Prussia  represent  to  Napoleon 

1  Letter  of  July  28th,  1803. 


xvm  EUROPE    AND   THE   BONAPARTES  403 

that  Hanover  was  not  British  territory,  and  that  the 
neutrality  of  Germany  was  infringed  and  its  interests 
damaged  by  the  French  occupation  of  Hanover  and 
Cuxhaven.  His  protest  was  met  by  an  offer  from  Napo- 
leon to  evacuate  Hanover,  Taranto,  and  Otranto,  only  at 
the  time  when  England  should  "  evacuate  Malta  and  the 
Mediterranean  "  ;  and  though  the  special  Prussian  envoy, 
Lombard,  reported  to  his  master  that  Napoleon  was 
"truth,  loyalty,  and  friendship  personified,"  yet  he  received 
not  a  word  that  betokened  real  regard  for  the  suscepti- 
bilities of  Frederick  William  III.  or  the  commerce  of  his 
people.1  For  the  present,  neither  King  nor  Czar  ventured 
on  further  remonstrances  ;  but  the  First  Consul  had  sown 
seeds  of  discord  which  were  to  bear  fruit  in  the  Third 
Coalition. 

Having  quartered  60,000  French  troops  on  Naples  and 
Hanover,  Napoleon  could  face  with  equanimity  the  costs 
of  the  Avar.  Gigantic  as  they  were,  they  could  be  met 
from  the  purchase  money  of  Louisiana,  the  taxation  and 
voluntary  gifts  of  the  French  dominions,  the  subsidies  of 
the  Italian  and  Ligurian  republics,  and  a  contribution 
which  he  now  exacted  from  Spain. 

Even  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  he  had  signifi- 
cantly reminded  Charles  IV.  that  the  Spanish  marine  was 
deteriorating,  and  her  arsenals  and  dockyards  were  idle  : 
"  But  England  is  not  asleep  ;  she  is  ever  on  the  watch 
and  will  never  rest  until  she  has  seized  on  the  colonies 
and  commerce  of  the  world."2  For  the  present,  however, 
the  loss  of  Trinidad  and  the  sale  of  Louisiana  rankled  too 
deeply  to  admit  of  Spain  entering  into  another  conflict, 
whence,  as  before,  Napoleon  would  doubtless  gain  the 
glory  and  leave  to  her  the  burden  of  territorial  sacrifices. 
In  spite  of  his  shameless  relations  to  the  Queen  of  Spain, 
Godoy,  the  Spanish  Minister,  was  not  devoid  of  patriotism  ; 
and  he  strove  to  evade  the  obligations  which  the  treaty  of 
1796  imposed  on  Spain  in  case  of  an  Anglo-French  con- 
flict. He  embodied  the  militia  of  the  north  of  Spain  and 
doubtless  would  have  defied  Bonaparte's  demands,  had 
Russia  and  Prussia  shown  any  disposition  to  resist  French 

1 "  Nap.  Corresp.,"  August  23rd,  1803,  and  Oncken,  ch.  v. 
2  "Corresp.,"  vol.  viii.,  No.  6627. 


404  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

aggressions.  But  those  Powers  were  as  yet  wholly  de- 
voted to  private  interests  ;  and  when  Napoleon  threatened 
Charles  IV.  and  Godoy  with  an  inroad  of  80,000  French 
troops  unless  the  Spanish  militia  were  dissolved  and 
72,000,000  francs  were  paid  every  year  into  the  French 
exchequer,  the  Court  of  Madrid  speedily  gave  way.  Its 
surrender  was  further  assured  by  the  thinly  veiled  threat 
that  further  resistance  would  lead  to  the  exposure  of  the 
liaison  between  Godoy  and  the  Queen.  Spain  therefore 
engaged  to  pay  the  required  sum  —  more  than  double  the 
amount  stipulated  in  1796  —  to  further  the  interests  of 
French  commerce  and  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Portu- 
gal. At  the  close  of  the  year  the  Court  of  Lisbon,  yielding 
to  the  threats  of  France  and  Spain,  consented  to  purchase 
its  neutrality  by  the  payment  of  a  million  francs  a  month 
to  the  master  of  the  Continent.1 

Meanwhile  the  First  Consul  was  throwing  his  untiring 
energies  into  the  enterprise  of  crushing  his  redoubtable 
foe.  He  pushed  on  the  naval  preparations  at  all  the  dock- 
yards of  France,  Holland,  and  North  Italy  ;  the  great 
mole  that  was  to  shelter  the  roadstead  at  Cherbourg  was 
hurried  forward,  and  the  coast  from  the  Seine  to  the 
Rhine  became  "a  coast  of  iron  and  bronze  " — to  use  Mar- 
mont's  picturesque  phrase  —  while  every  harbour  swarmed 
with  small  craft  destined  for  an  invasion.  Troops  were 
withdrawn  from  the  Rhenish  frontiers  and  encamped 
along  the  shores  of  Picardy  ;  others  were  stationed  in  re- 
serve at  St.  Omer,  Montreuil,  Bruges,  and  Utrecht ;  while 
smaller  camps  were  formed  at  Ghent,  Compiegne,  and  St. 
Malo.  The  banks  of  the  Elbe,  Weser,  Scheldt,  Somme, 
and  Seine  —  even  as  far  up  as  Paris  itself — rang  with  the 
blows  of  shipwrights  labouring  to  strengthen  the  flotilla 
of  flat-bottomed  vessels  designed  for  the  invasion  of  Eng- 
land. Troops,  to  the  number  of  50,000  at  Boulogne  under 
Soult,  30,000  at  Etaples,  and  as  many  at  Bruges,  com- 
manded by  Ney  and  Davoust  respectively,  were  organized 
anew,  and  by  constant  drill  and  exposure  to  the  elements 
formed  the  tough  nucleus  of  the  future  Grand  Army, 
before  which  the  choicest  troops  of  Czar  and  Kaiser  were 

1  Lefebvre,  "Cabinets  de  l'Europe,"  ch.  viii.  ;  "Nap.  Corresp.,"  vol. 
viii.,  Nos.6979,  6985,  7007,  7098,  7113. 


xvm  EUROPE  AND  THE  BONAPARTES  405 

to  be  scattered  in  headlong  rout.  To  all  these  many-sided 
exertions  of  organization  and  drill,  of  improving  harbours 
and  coast  fortifications,  of  ship-building,  testing,  embark- 
ing, and  disembarking,  the  First  Consul  now  and  again 
applied  the  spur  of  his  personal  supervision;  for  while  the 
warlike  enthusiasm  which  he  had  aroused  against  perfidi- 
ous Albion  of  itself  achieved  wonders,  yet  work  was  never 
so  strenuous  and  exploits  so  daring  as  under  the  eyes  of 
the  great  captain  himself.  He  therefore  paid  frequent 
visits  to  the  north  coast,  surveying  with  critical  eyes  the 
works  at  Boulogne,  Calais,  Dunkirk,  Ostend,  and  Ant- 
werp. The  last-named  port  engaged  his  special  attention. 
Its  position  at  the  head  of  the  navigable  estuary  of  the 
Scheldt,  exactly  opposite  the  Thames,  marked  it  out  as 
the  natural  rival  of  London  ;  he  now  encouraged  its  com- 
merce and  ordered  the  construction  of  a  dockyard  fitted 
to  contain  twenty-five  battleships  and  a  proportionate 
number  of  frigates  and  sloops.  Antwerp  was  to  become 
the  great  commercial  and  naval  emporium  of  the  North 
Sea.  The  time  seemed  to  favour  the  design ;  Hamburg 
and  Bremen  were  blockaded,  and  London  for  a  space  was 
menaced  by  the  growing  power  of  the  First  Consul,  who 
seemed  destined  to  restore  to  the  Flemish  port  the  pros- 
perity which  the  savagery  of  Alva  had  swept  away  with 
such  profit  to  Elizabethan  London.  But  grand  as  were 
Napoleon's  enterprises  at  Antwerp,  they  fell  far  short  of 
his  ulterior  designs.  He  told  Las  Cases  at  St.  Helena 
that  the  dockyard  and  magazines  were  to  have  been  pro- 
tected by  a  gigantic  fortress  built  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  River  Scheldt,  and  that  Antwerp  was  to  have  been  "a 
loaded  pistol  held  at  the  head  of  England." 

In  both  lands  warlike  ardour  rose  to  the  highest  pitch. 
French  towns  and  Departments  freely  offered  gifts  of  gun- 
boats and  battleships.  And  in  England  public  men  vied 
with  one  another  in  their  eagerness  to  equip  and  maintain 
volunteer  regiments.  Wordsworth,  who  had  formerly 
sung  the  praises  of  the  French  Revolution,  thus  voiced 
the  national  defiance  : 

"  No  parleying  now  !  In  Britain  is  one  breath; 
We  all  are  with  you  now  from  shore  to  shore ; 
Ye  men  of  Kent,  'tis  victory  or  death." 


106  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

In  one  respect  England  enjoyed  a  notable  advantage. 
Having  declared  war  before  Napoleon's  plans  were  ma- 
tured, she  held  the  command  of  the  seas,  even  against  the 
naval  resources  of  France,  Holland,  and  North  Italy.  The 
first  months  of  the  war  witnessed  the  surrender  of  St.  Lucia 
and  Tobago  to  our  fleets  ;  and  before  the  close  of  the  year 
Berbice,  Demerara,  Essequibo,  together  with  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  French  St.  Domingo  force,  had  capitulated 
to  the  Union  Jack.  Our  naval  supremacy  in  the  Channel 
now  told  with  full  effect.  Frigates  were  ever  on  the 
watch  in  the  Straits  to  chase  any  French  vessels  that  left 
port.  But  our  chief  efforts  were  to  blockade  the  enemy's 
ships.  Despite  constant  ill-health  and  frequent  gales, 
Nelson  clung  to  Toulon.  Admiral  Cornwallis  cruised  off 
Brest  with  a  fleet  generally  exceeding  fifteen  sail  of  the 
line  and  several  smaller  vessels  :  six  frigates  and  smaller 
craft  protected  the  coast  of  Ireland  ;  six  line-of-battle 
ships  and  twenty-three  lesser  vessels  were  kept  in  the 
Downs  under  Lord  Keith  as  a  central  reserve  force,  to 
which  the  news  of  all  events  transpiring  on  the  enemy's 
coast  was  speedily  conveyed  by  despatch  boats  ;  the  newly 
invented  semaphore  telegraphs  were  also  systematically 
used  between  the  Isle  of  Wight  and  Deal  to  convey  news 
along  the  coast  and  to  London.  Martello  towers  were 
erected  along  the  coast  from  Harwich  to  Pevensey  Bay, 
at  the  points  where  a  landing  was  easy.  Numerous  inven- 
tors also  came  forward  with  plans  for  destroying  the  French 
flotilla,  but  none  was  found  to  be  serviceable  except  the 
rockets  of  Colonel  Congreve,  which  inflicted  some  damage 
at  Boulogne  and  elsewhere.  Such  were  the  dispositions 
of  our  chief  naval  forces :  they  comprised  469  ships  of  war, 
and  over  700  armed  boats,  of  all  sizes.1 

Our  regular  troops  and  militia  mustered  180,000  strong ; 
while  the  volunteers,  including  120,000  men  armed  with 
pikes  or  similar  weapons,  numbered  410,000.  Of  course 
little  could  be  hoped  from  these  last  in  a  conflict  with 
French  veterans  ;  and  even  the  regulars,  in  the  absence 
of  any  great  generals  —  for  Wellesley  was  then  in  India  — 

1  The  French  and  Dutch  ships  in  commission  were :  ships  of  the  line, 
48  ;  frigates,  37  ;  corvettes,  22  ;  gun-brigs,  etc.,  124  ;  flotilla,  2,115.  (See 
"  Mems.  of  the  Earl  of  St.  Vincent,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  218.) 


xvm        EUROPE  AND  THE  BONAPARTES         407 

might  have  offered  but  a  poor  resistance  to  Napoleon's 
military  machine.  Preparations  were,  however,  made  for 
a  desperate  resistance.  Plans  were  quietly  framed  for  the 
transfer  of  the  Queen  and  the  ro}ral  family  to  Worcester, 
along  with  the  public  treasure,  which  was  to  be  lodged  in 
the  cathedral;  while  the  artillery  and  stores  from  Wool- 
wich arsenal  were  to  be  conveyed  into  the  Midlands  by  the 
Grand  Junction  Canal.1 

The  scheme  of  coast-defence  which  General  Dundas 
had  drawn  up  in  1796  was  now  again  set  in  action.  It  in- 
cluded, not  only  the  disposition  of  the  armed  forces,  but 
plans  for  the  systematic  removal  of  all  provisions,  stores, 
animals,  and  fodder  from  the  districts  threatened  by  the 
invader  ;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  country  was  far  better 
prepared  than  French  writers  have  been  willing  to  admit. 
Indeed,  so  great  was  the  expense  of  these  defensive  prep- 
arations that,  when  Nelson's  return  from  the  West  Indies 
disconcerted  the  enemy's  plans,  Fox  merged  the  statesman 
in  the  partisan  by  the  curious  assertion  that  the  invasion 
scare  had  been  got  up  by  the  Pitt  Ministry  for  party  pur- 
poses.2 Few  persons  shared  that  opinion.  The  nation 
was  animated  by  a  patriotism  such  as  had  never  yet  stirred 
the  sluggish  veins  of  Georgian  England.  The  Jacobinism, 
which  Dundas  in  1796  had  lamented  as  paralyzing  the 
nation's  energy,  had  wholly  vanished  ;  and  the  fatality 
which  dogged  the  steps  of  Napoleon  was  already  discerni- 
ble. The  mingled  hatred  and  fear  which  he  inspired 
outside  France  was  beginning  to  solidify  the  national 
resistance  :  after  uniting  rich  and  poor,  English  and  Scots 
in  a  firm  phalanx  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  national 
principle  was  in  turn  to  vivify  Spain,  Russia,  and  Ger- 
many, and  thus  to  assure  his  overthrow. 

Reserving  for  consideration  in  another  chapter  the  later 
developments  of  the  naval  war,  it.  will  be  convenient  now 
to  turn  to  important  events  in  the  history  of  the  Bona- 
parte family. 

The  loves  and  intrigues  of  the  Bonapartes  have  fur- 
nished material  enough  to  fill  several  volumes  devoted  to 
light  gossip,  and  naturally  so.     Given  an  ambitious  family, 

1  Pellew's  "Life  of  Lord  Sidmouth,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  239. 

2  Stanhope's  "Life  of  Pitt,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  213. 


408  THE   LITE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

styled  parvenus  by  the  ungenerous,  shooting  aloft  swiftly 
as  the  flames  of  Vesuvius,  ardent  as  its  inner  fires,  and 
stubborn  as  its  hardened  lava  —  given  also  an  imperious 
brother  determined  to  marry  his  younger  brothers  and 
sisters,  not  as  they  willed,  but  as  he  willed  —  and  it  is 
clear  that  materials  are  at  hand  sufficient  to  make  the 
fortunes  of  a  dozen  comediettas. 

To  the  marriage  of  Pauline  Bonaparte  only  the  briefest 
reference  need  here  be  made.  The  wild  humour  of  her 
blood  showed  itself  before  her  first  marriage  ;  and  after 
the  death  of  her  husband,  General  Leclerc,  in  San  Do- 
mingo, she  privately  espoused  Prince  Borghese  before  the 
legal  time  of  mourning  had  expired,  an  indiscretion  which 
much  annoyed  Napoleon  (August,  1803).  Ultimately 
this  brilliant,  frivolous  creature  resided  in  the  splendid 
mansion  which  now  forms  the  British  embassy  in  Paris. 
The  case  of  Louis  Bonaparte  was  somewhat  different. 
Nurtured  as  he  had  been  in  his  early  years  by  Napoleon, 
he  had  rewarded  him  by  contracting  a  dutiful  match  with 
Hortense  Beauharnais  (January,  1802)  ;  but  that  union 
was  to  be  marred  by  a  grotesquely  horrible  jealousy 
which  the  young  husband  soon  conceived  for  his  powerful 
brother. 

For  the  present,  however,  the  chief  trouble  was  caused 
by  Lucien,  whose  address  had  saved  matters  at  the  few 
critical  minutes  of  Brumaire.  Gifted  with  a  strong  vein 
of  literary  feeling  and  oratorical  fire,  he  united  in  his 
person  the  obstinacy  of  a  Bonaparte,  the  headstrong  feel- 
ings of  a  poet,  and  the  dogmatism  of  a  Corsican  republi- 
can. His  presumptuous  conduct  had  already  embroiled 
him  with  the  First  Consul,  who  deprived  him  of  his 
Ministry  and  sent  him  as  ambassador  to  Madrid.1  He 
further  sinned,  first  by  hurrying  on  peace  with  Portugal 
—  it  is  said  for  a  handsome  present  from  Lisbon  —  and 
later  by  refusing  to  marry  the  widow  of  the  King  of 
Etruria.  In  this  he  persisted,  despite  the  urgent  repre- 
sentations of  Napoleon  and  Joseph  :  "  You  know  very  well 
that  I  am  a  republican,  and  that  a  queen  is  not  what  suits 
me,  an  ugly  queen  too  ! "  — "What  a  pity  your  answer  was 
not  cut  short,  it  would  have  been  quite  Roman,"  sneered 

1  Roederer,  "QSuvres,"  vol.  Hi.,  p.  348  ;  M&ieval,  vol.  i.,  ch.  iv. 


xvm         EUROPE  AND  THE  BONAPARTES  409 

Joseph  at  his  younger  brother,  once  the  Brutus  of  the 
Jacobin  clubs.  But  Lucien  was  proof  against  all  the 
splendours  of  the  royal  match  ;  he  was  madly  in  love 
with  a  Madame  Jouberthon,  the  deserted  wife  of  a  Paris 
stockbroker  ;  and  in  order  to  checkmate  all  Napoleon's 
attempts  to  force  on  a  hated  union,  he  had  secretly  mar- 
ried the  lady  of  his  choice  at  the  village  of  Plessis- 
Chamant,  hard  by  his  country  house  (October  26th,  1803). 

The  letter  which  divulged  the  news  of  this  affair  reached 
the  First  Consul  at  St.  Cloud  on  an  interesting  occasion.1 
It  was  during  a  so-called  family  concert,  to  which  only 
the  choicest  spirits  had  been  invited,  whence  also,  to 
Josephine's  chagrin,  Napoleon  had  excluded  Madame 
Tallien  and  several  other  old  friends,  whose  reputation 
would  have  tainted  the  air  of  religion  and  morality  now 
pervading  the  Consular  Court.  While  this  select  com- 
pany was  enjoying  the  strains  of  the  chamber  music,  and 
Napoleon  alone  was  dozing,  Lucien's  missive  was  handed 
in  by  the  faithful  if  indiscreet  Duroc.  A  change  came 
over  the  scene.  At  once  Napoleon  started  up,  called  out 
"  Stop  the  music  :  stop,"  and  began  with  nervous  strides 
and  agitated  gestures  to  pace  the  hall,  exclaiming  "  Trea- 
son !  it  is  treason  !  "  Round-eyed,  open-mouthed  wonder 
seized  on  the  disconcerted  musicians,  the  company  rose  in 
confusion,  and  Josephine,  following  her  spouse,  besought 
him  to  say  what  had  happened.  "  What  has  happened  — 
why  —  Lucien  has  married  his  —  mistress."  2 

The  secret  cause  for  this  climax  of  fashionable  comedy 
is  to  be  sought  in  reasons  of  state.  The  establishment  of 
hereditary  power  was  then  being  secretly  and  anxiously 
discussed.  Napoleon  had  no  heirs :  Joseph's  children 
were  girls  :  Lucien's  first  marriage  also  had  naught  but 
female  issue  :  the  succession  must  therefore  devolve  on 
Lucien's  children  by  a  second  marriage.  But  a  natural 
son  had  already  been  born  to  him  by  Madame  Jouberthon  ; 
and  his  marriage  now  promised  to  make  this  bastard  the 

1  Lucien  ("  Mems.,"  vol.  iii.,  pp.  315-320)  says  at  Malmaison  ;  but  Na- 
poleon's "  Correspondance "  shows  that  it  was  at  St.  Cloud.  Masson 
("Nap-  et  sa  Famille,"  ch.  xii.)  throws  doubt  on  the  story. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  318.  The  scene  was  described  by  Murat  :  the  real  phrase 
was  coquine,  but  it  was  softened  down  by  Murat  to  maitresse. 


410  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

heir  to  the  future  French  imperial  throne.  That  was 
the  reason  why  Napoleon  paced  the  hall  at  St.  Cloud, 
"  waving  his  arm  like  a  semaphore,"  and  exclaiming 
"  treason !  "  Failing  the  birth  of  sons  to  the  two  elder 
brothers,  Lucien's  marriage  seriously  endangered  the 
foundation  of  a  Napoleonic  dynasty;  besides,  the  whole 
affair  would  yield  excellent  sport  to  the  royalists  of 
the  Boulevard  St.  Germain,  the  snarling  Jacobins  of 
the  back  streets,  and  the  newspaper  writers  of  hated 
Albion. 

In  vain  were  negotiations  set  on  foot  to  make  Lucien 
divorce  his  wife.  The  attempt  only  produced  exaspera- 
tion, Joseph  himself  finally  accusing  Napoleon  of  bad 
faith  in  the  course  of  this  affair.  In  the  following 
springtime  Lucien  shook  off  the  dust  of  France  from 
his  feet,  and  declared  in  a  last  letter  to  Joseph  that  he 
departed,  hating  Napoleon.  The  moral  to  this  curious 
story  was  well  pointed  by  Joseph  Bonaparte  :  "  Des- 
tiny seems  to  blind  us,  and  intends,  by  means  of  our 
own  faults,  to  restore  France  some  day  to  her  former 
rulers."1 

At  the  very  time  of  the  scene  at  St.  Cloud,  fortune 
was  preparing  for  the  First  Consul  another  matrimonial 
trouble.  His  youngest  brother,  Jerome,  then  aged  nine- 
teen years,  had  shown  much  aptitude  for  the  French  navy, 
and  was  serving  on  the  American  station,  when  a  quarrel 
with  the  admiral  sent  him  flying  in  disgust  to  the  shore. 
There,  at  Baltimore,  he  fell  in  love  with  Miss  Paterson, 
the  daughter  of  a  well-to-do  merchant,  and  sought  her 
hand  in  marriage.  In  vain  did  the  French  consul  remind 
him  that,  were  he  five  years  older,  he  would  still  need  the 
consent  of  his  mother.  The  headstrong  nature  of  his 
race  brooked  no  opposition,  and  he  secretly  espoused  the 
young  lady  at  her  father's  residence.  Napoleon's  ire  fell 
like  a  blasting  wind  on  the  young  couple  ;  but  after  wait- 
ing some  time,  in  hopes  that  the  storm  would  blow  over, 
they  ventured  to  come  to  Europe.  Thereupon  Napoleon 
wrote  to  Madame  Mere  in  these  terms  : 

1  Miot  de  Melito,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xv.  Lucien  settled  in  the 
Papal  States,  where  he,  the  quondam  Jacobin  and  proven  libertine,  later 
on  received  from  the  Pope  the  title  of  Prince  de  Canino. 


xvin  EUROPE   AND   THE   BONAPARTES  411 

"Jerome  lias  arrived  at  Lisbon  with  the  woman  with  whom  he 
lives.  ...  I  have  given  orders  that  Miss  Paterson  is  to  be  sent  back 
to  America.  ...  If  he  shows  no  inclination  to  wash  away  the  dis- 
honour with  which  he  has  stained  my  name,  by  forsaking  his  country's 
flag  on  land  and  sea  for  the  sake  of  a  wretched  woman,  I  will  cast  him 
off  for  ever."  x 

The  sequel  will  show  that  Jerome  was  made  of  softer 
stuff  than  Lucien  ;  and,  strange  to  say,  his  compliance 
with  Napoleon's  dynastic  designs  provided  that  family 
with  the  only  legitimate  male  heirs  that  were  destined  to 
sustain  its  wavering  hopes  to  the  end  of  the  century. 

1  "Lettres  incites  de  Napoleon,"  April  22nd,  1806. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE   KOYALIST  PLOT 

From  domestic  comedy,  France  turned  rapidly  in  the 
early  months  of  1804  to  a  sombre  tragedy  —  the  tragedy 
of  the  Georges  Cadoudal  plot  and  the  execution  of  the 
Due  d'Enghien. 

There  were  varied  reasons  why  the  exiled  French  Bour- 
bons should  compass  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon.  Every 
month  that  they  delayed  action  lessened  their  chances  of 
success.  They  had  long  clung  to  the  hope  that  his  Con- 
cordat with  the  Pope  and  other  anti-revolutionary  meas- 
ures betokened  his  intention  to  recall  their  dynasty.  But 
in  February,  1803,  the  Comte  de  Provence  received  over- 
tures which  showed  that  Bonaparte  had  never  thought  of 
playing  the  part  of  General  Monk.  The  exiled  prince, 
then  residing  at  Warsaw,  was  courteously  but  most  firmly 
urged  by  the  First  Consul  to  renounce  both  for  himself 
and  for  the  other  members  of  his  House  all  claims  to  the 
throne  of  France,  in  return  for  which  he  would  receive  a 
pension  of  two  million  francs  a  year.  The  notion  of  sink- 
ing to  the  level  of  a  pensionary  of  the  French  Republic 
touched  Bourbon  pride  to  the  quick  and  provoked  this 
spirited  reply  : 

"  As  a  descendant  of  St.  Louis,  I  shall  endeavour  to  imitate  his  ex- 
ample by  respecting  myself  even  in  captivity.  As  successor  to  Francis 
I.,  I  shall  at  least  aspire  to  say  with  him  :  '  We  have  lost  everything 
but  our  honour.' " 

To  this  declaration  the  Comte  d'Artois,  his  son,  the  Due 
de  Berri,  Louis  Philippe  of  Orleans,  his  two  sons,  and  the 
two  Condes  gave  their  ardent  assent ;  and  the  same  royal 
response  came  from  the  young  Conde,  the  Due  d'Enghien, 
dated  Ettenheim,  March  22nd,  1803.  Little  did  men 
think  when  they  read  this  last  defiance  to  Napoleon  that 

412 


chap,  xix  THE   ROYALIST  PLOT  413 

within  a  year  its  author  would  be  flung  into  a  grave  in 
the  moat  of  the  Castle  of  Vincennes. 

Scarcely  had  the  echoes  of  the  Bourbon  retorts  died 
away  than  the  outbreak  of  war  between  England  and 
France  raised  the  hopes  of  the  French  royalist  exiles  in 
London  ;  and  their  nimble  fancy  pictured  the  French 
army  and  nation  as  ready  to  fling  themselves  at  the  feet 
of  Louis  XVIII.  The  future  monarch  did  not  share  these 
illusions.  In  the  chilly  solitudes  of  Warsaw  he  discerned 
matters  in  their  true  light,  and  prepared  to  wait  until  the 
vaulting  ambition  of  Napoleon  should  league  Europe 
against  him.  Indeed,  when  the  plans  of  the  forward 
wing  in  London  were  explained  to  him,  with  a  view  of 
enlisting  his  support,  he  deftly  waved  aside  the  embar- 
rassing overtures  by  quoting  the  lines  : 

"  Et  pour  etre  approuves 
De  semblables  projets  veulent  etre  acheves," 

a  cautious  reply  which  led  his  brother,  then  at  Edinburgh, 
scornfully  to  contemn  his  feebleness  as  unworthy  of  any 
further  confidences.1  In  truth,  the  Comte  d'Artois,  des- 
tined one  day  to  be  Charles  X.  of  France,  was  not 
fashioned  by  nature  for  a  Fabian  policy  of  delay  :  not 
even  the  misfortunes  of  exile  could  instil  into  the  water- 
tight compartments  of  his  brain  the  most  elementary 
notions  of  prudence.  Daring,  however,  attracts  daring  ; 
and  this  prince  had  gathered  around  him  in  our  land  the 
[most  desperate  of  the  French  royalists,  whose  hopes, 
i  hatreds,  schemes,  and  unending  requests  for  British  money 
i  may  be  scanned  by  the  curious  in  some  thirty  large  vol- 
umes of  letters  bequeathed  by  their  factotum,  the  Comte 
de  Puisaye,  to  the  British  Museum.  Unfortunately  this 
[correspondence  throws  little  light  on  the  details  of  the 
iplot  which  is  fitly  called  by  the  name  of  Georges 
jCadoudal. 

This  daring  Breton  was,  in  fact,  the  only  man  of  action 
n  whom  the  Bourbon  princes  could  firmly  rely  for   an 

1Pasquier,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  p.  167,  and  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  "  Les 

jlernieres  Annees  du  due  d'Enghien,"  p.  299.     An  intriguing  royalist  of 

Neufchatel,  Fauche-Borel,  had  been  to  England  in  1802  to  get  the  help 

?f  the  Addington  Ministry,  but  failed.     See  Caudrillier's  articles  in  the 

'Revue  Historique,"  Nov.,  1900-March,  1901. 


414  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

enterprise  that  demanded  a  cool  head,  cunning  in  the 
choice  of  means,  and  a  remorseless  hand.  Pichegru,  it  is 
true,  lived  near  London,  but  saw  little  of  the  SrnigrSs,  ex- 
cept the  venerable  Conde.  Dumouriez  also  was  in  the 
great  city,  but  his  name  was  too  generally  scorned  in 
France  for  his  treachery  in  1793  to  warrant  his  being 
used.  But  there  were  plenty  of  swashbucklers  who 
could  prepare  the  ground  in  France,  or,  if  fortune 
favoured,  might  strike  the  blow  themselves  ;  and  a  small 
committee  of  French  royalists,  which  had  the  support  of 
that  furious  royalist,  Mr.  Windham,  M.P.,  began  even 
before  the  close  of  1802  to  discuss  plans  for  the  "re- 
moval "  of  Bonaparte.  Two  of  their  tools,  Picot  and  Le 
Bourgeois  by  name,  plunged  blindly  into  a  plot,  and  were 
arrested  soon  after  they  set  foot  in  France.  Their  boyish 
credulity  seems  to  have  suggested  to  the  French  authori- 
ties the  sending  of  an  agent  so  as  to  entrap  not  only 
French  emigres,  but  also  English  officials  and  Jacobinical 
generals. 

The  agent  provocateur  has  at  all  times  been  a  favourite 
tool  of  continental  Governments  :  but  rarely  has  a  more 
finished  specimen  of  the  class  been  seen  than  Mehee  de 
la  Touche.  After  plying  the  trade  of  an  assassin  in  the 
September  massacres  of  1792,  and  of  a  Jacobin  spy  during 
the  Terror,  he  had  been  included  by  Bonaparte  among 
the  Jacobin  scapegoats  who  expiated  the  Chouan  outrage 
of  Nivose.  Pining  in  the  weariness  of  exile,  he  heard 
from  his  wife  that  he  might  be  pardoned  if  he  would  per- 
form some  service  for  the  Consular  Government.  At 
once  he  consented,  and  it  was  agreed  that  he  should  feign 
royalism,  should  worm  himself  into  the  secrets  of  the 
emigre's  at  London,  and  act  as  intermediary  between  them 
and  the  discontented  republicans  of  Paris. 

The  man  who  seems  to  have  planned  this  scheme  was 
the  ex-Minister  of  Police.  Fouche  had  lately  been  de- 
prived by  Bonaparte  of  the  inquisitorial  powers  which  he 
so  unscrupulously  used.  His  duties  were  divided  between 
Regnier,  the  Grand  Judge  and  Minister  of  Justice,  and 
Real,  a  Councillor  of  State,  who  watched  over  the  inter- 
nal security  of  France.  These  men  had  none  of  the 
ability  of  Fouche,  nor  did  they  know  at  the  outset  what 


xix  THE    ROYALIST   PLOT  415 

Mehee  was  doing  in  London.  It  may,  therefore,  be 
assumed  that  Mehee  was  one  of  Fouche's  creatures,  whom 
he  used  to  discredit  his  successor,  and  that  Bonaparte 
welcomed  this  means  of  quickening  the  zeal  of  the  official 
police,  while  he  also  wove  his  meshes  round  plotting 
Emigres,  English  officials,  and  French  generals.1 

Among  these  last  there  was  almost  chronic  discontent, 
and  Bonaparte  claimed  to  have  found  out  a  plot  whereby 
twelve  of  them  should  divide  France  into  as  many  por- 
tions, leaving  to  him  only  Paris  and  its  environs.  If  so, 
he  never  made  any  use  of  his  discovery.  In  fact,  out  of 
this  group  of  malcontents,  Moreau,  Bernadotte,  Augereau, 
Macdonald,  and  others,  he  feared  only  the  hostility  of  the 
first.  The  victor  of  Hohenlinden  lived  in  sullen  privacy 
near  to  Paris,  refusing  to  present  himself  at  the  Consular 
Court,  and  showing  his  contempt  for  those  who  donned  a 
courtier's  uniform.  He  openly  mocked  at  the  Concordat; 
and  when  the  Legion  of  Honour  was  instituted,  he  be- 
stowed a  collar  of  honour  upon  his  dog.  So  keen  was 
Napoleon's  resentment  at  this  raillery  that  he  even  pro- 
posed to  send  him  a  challenge  to  a  duel  in  the  Bois  de 
Boulogne.2  The  challenge,  of  course,  was  not  sent ;  a 
show  of  reconciliation  was  assumed  between  the  two  war- 
riors ;  but  Napoleon  retained  a  covert  dislike  of  the  man 
whose  brusque  republicanism  was  applauded  by  a  large 
portion  of  the  army  and  by  the  frondeurs  of  Paris. 

The  ruin  of  Moreau,  and  the  confusion  alike  of  French 
royalists  and  of  the  British  Ministry,  could  now  be  assured 
by  the  encouragement  of  a  Jacobin-Royalist  conspiracy, 
in  which  English  officials  should  be  implicated.  Moreau 
was  notoriously  incapable  in  the  sphere  of  political  in- 
trigue :  the  royalist  coteries  in  London  presented  just  the 
material  on  which  the  agent  provocateur  delights  to  work ; 
and  some  British  officials  could,  doubtless,  with  equal  ease 
|be  drawn  into  the  toils.  Mehee  de  la  Touche  has  left  a 
highly  spiced  account  of  his  adventures ;  but  it  must,  of 
course,  be  received  with  distrust.3 

Proceeding  first  to  Guernsey,  he  gained  the  confidence 

1  Madelin's  "FoucheV  vol.  i.,  p.  368,  minimizes  Fouche's  role  here. 

2  Desmarest,  "T^moignages  historiques,"  pp.  78-82. 

8  "  Alliance  des  Jacobins  de  France  avec  le  Ministere  Anglais." 


416  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

of  the  Governor,  General  Doyle  ;  and,  fortified  by  recom- 
mendations from  him,  he  presented  himself  to  the  SmiyrSs 
at  London,  and  had  an  interview  with  Lord  Hawkesbury 
and  the  Under-Secretaries  of  State,  Messrs.  Hammond  and 
Yorke.  He  found  it  easy  to  inflame  the  imagination  of 
the  French  exiles,  who  clutched  at  the  proposed  union 
between  the  irreconcilables,  the  extreme  royalists,  and  the 
extreme  republicans ;  and  it  was  forthwith  arranged  that 
Napoleon's  power,  which  rested  on  the  support  of  the  peas- 
ants, in  fact  of  the  body  of  France,  should  be  crushed  by 
an  enveloping  move  of  the  tips  of  the  wings. 

Mehee's  narrative  contains  few  details  and  dates,  such 
as  enable  one  to  test  his  assertions.  But  I  have  examined 
the  Puisaye  Papers,1  and  also  the  Foreign  and  Home  Office 
archives,  and  have  found  proofs  of  the  complicity  of  our 
Government,  which  it  will  be  well  to  present  here  con- 
nectedly. Taken  singly  they  are  inconclusive,  but  col- 
lectively their  importance  is  considerable.  In  our  Foreign 
Office  Records  (France,  No.  70)  there  is  a  letter,  dated 
London,  August  30th,  1803,  from  the  Baron  de  Roll,  the 
factotum  of  the  exiled  Bourbons,  to  Mr.  Hammond,  our 
Permanent  Under-Secretary  at  the  Foreign  Office,  asking 
him  to  call  on  the  Comte  d'Artois  at  his  residence,  No.  46, 
Baker  Street.  That  the  deliberations  at  that  house  were 
not  wholly  peaceful  appears  from  a  long  secret  memoran- 
dum of  October  24th,  1803,  in  which  the  Comte  d'Artois 
reviews  the  career  of  "that  miserable  adventurer''''  (Bona- 
parte), so  as  to  prove  that  his  present  position  is  precarious 
and  tottering.  He  concludes  by  naming  those  who  desired 
his  overthrow  —  Moreau,  Reynier,  Bernadotte,  Simon, 
Massena,  Lannes,  and  Ferino  :  Sieyes,  Carnot,  Chenier, 
Fouche,  Barras,  Tallien,  Rewbell,  Lamarque,  and  Jean  de 
Bry.  Others  would  not  attack  him  "corps  a  corps,"  but 
disliked  his  supremacy.  These  two  papers  prove  that  our 
Government  was  aware  of  the  Bourbon  plot.  Another 
document,  dated  London,  November  18th,  1803,  proves  its 
active  complicity.  It  is  a  list  of  the  French  royalist 
officers  "  who  had  set  out  or  were  ready  to  set  out."  All 
were  in  our  pay,  two  at  six  shillings,  five  at  four  shillings, 
and  nine  at  two  shillings  a  day.     It  would  be  indelicate  to 

1  Brit.  Mus.,  "Add.  MSS.,"  Nos.  7976  et  seq. 


xix  THE   ROYALIST   PLOT  417 

reveal  the  names,  but  among  them  occurs  that  of  Joachim 
P.  J.  Cadoudal.  The  list  is  drawn  up  and  signed  by 
Frieding  —  a  name  that  was  frequently  used  by  Pichegru 
as  an  alias.  In  his  handwriting  also  is  a  list  of  "  royalist 
officers  for  whom  I  demand  a  year's  pay  in  advance  "  — 
five  generals,  thirteen  chefs  de  legion,  seventeen  chefs  de 
bataillon,  and  nineteen  captains.  The  pay  claimed  amounts 
to  <£  3,110  15s.1  That  some,  at  least,  of  our  Admiralty 
officials  also  aided  Cadoudal  is  proved  by  a  "  most  secret " 
letter,  dated  Admiralty  Office,  July  31st,  1803,  from 
E.  N[epean]  to  Admiral  Montagu  in  the  Downs,  charging 
him  to  help  the  bearer,  Captain  Wright,  in  the  execution 
of  "  a  very  important  service,"  and  to  provide  for  him 
"  one  of  the  best  of  the  hired  cutters  or  luggers  under 
your  orders."  Another  "  most  secret  "  Admiralty  letter, 
of  January  9th,  1804,  orders  a  frigate  or  large  sloop  to  be 
got  ready  to  convey  secretly  "  an  officer  of  rank  and  con- 
sideration "  (probably  Pichegru)  to  the  French  coast. 
Wright  carried  over  the  conspirators  in  several  parties, 
until  chance  threw  him  into  J^apoleon's  power  and  con- 
signed him  to  an  ignominious  death,  probably  suicide. 

Finally,  there  is  the  letter  of  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  Parlia- 
mentary Secretary  at  the  Foreign  Office  (dated  March 
12th,  1804),  to  Sir  Arthur  Paget,  in  which  he  refers  to 
the  "sad  result  of  all  our  fine  projects  for  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  Bourbons  :  ...  we  are,  of  course,  greatly 
apprehensive  for  poor  Moreau's  safety."2 

In  face  of  this  damning  evidence  the  ministerial  denials 
of  complicity  must  be  swept  aside.3  It  is  possible,  how- 
ever, that  the  plot  was  connived  at,  not  by  the  more  re- 
spectable chiefs,  but  by  young  and  hot-headed  officials. 
Even  in  the  summer  of  1803  that  Cabinet  was  already 
tottering  under  the  attacks  of  the  Whigs  and  the  followers 
of  Pitt.     The  blandly  respectable  Addington  and  Hawkes- 


1  In  our  Records  (France,  No.  71)  is  a  letter  of  Count  Descars,  dated 
London,  March  25th,  1805,  to  Lord  Mulgrave,  Minister  for  War,  render- 
ing an  account  for  various  sums  advanced  by  our  Government  for  the 
royalist  "army." 

2"  Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  96. 

•"Pari.  Debates,"  April,  1804  (esp.  April  16th).  The  official  denial 
|s,  of  course,  accepted  by  Alison,  ch.  xxxviii. 

2b 


418  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

bury  with  his  "vacant  grin"1  were  evidently  no  match 
for  Napoleon  ;  and  Arbuthnot  himself  dubs  Addington 
"  a  poor  wretch  universally  despised  and  laught  at,"  and 
pronounces  the  Cabinet  "the  most  inefficient  that  ever 
curst  a  country."  I  judge,  therefore,  that  our  official  aid 
to  the  conspirators  was  limited  to  the  Under-Secretaries 
of  the  Foreign,  War,  and  Admiralty  Offices.  Moreover, 
the  royalist  plans,  as  revealed  to  our  officials,  mainly  con- 
cerned a  rising  in  Normandy  and  Brittany.  Our  Govern- 
ment would  not  have  paid  the  salaries  of  fifty-four  royalist 
officers  —  many  of  them  of  good  old  French  families  —  if 
it  had  been  only  a  question  of  stabbing  Napoleon.  The 
lists  of  those  officers  were  drawn  up  here  in  November, 
1803,  that  is,  three  months  after  Georges  Cadoudal  had 
set  out  for  Normandy  and  Paris  to  collect  his  desperadoes  ; 
and  it  seems  most  probable  that  the  officers  of  the  "  royal 
army  "  were  expected  merely  to  clinch  Cadoudal's  enter- 
prise by  rekindling  the  flame  of  revolt  in  the  north  and 
west.  French  agents  were  trying  to  do  the  same  in  Ire- 
land, and  a  plot  for  the  murder  of  George  III.  was  thought 
to  have  been  connived  at  by  the  French  authorities.  But, 
when  all  is  said,  the  British  Government  must  stand  ac- 
cused of  one  of  the  most  heinous  of  crimes.  The  whole 
truth  was  not  known  at  Paris  ;  but  it  was  surmised  ;  and 
the  surmise  was  sufficient  to  envenom  the  whole  course  of 
the  struggle  between  England  and  Napoleon. 

Having  now  established  the  responsibility  of  British 
officials  in  this,  the  most  famous  plot  of  the  century,  we 
return  to  describe  the  progress  of  the  conspiracy  and  the 
arts  employed  by  Napoleon  to  defeat  it.  His  tool,  Mehee 
de  la  Touche,  after  entrapping  French  royalists  and  some 
of  our  own  officials  in  London,  proceeded  to  the  Continent 
in  order  to  inveigle  some  of  our  envoys.  He  achieved  a 
brilliant  success.  He  called  at  Munich,  in  order,  as  he 
speciousl}'  alleged,  to  arrange  with  our  ambassador  there 

1  The  expression  is  that  of  George  III.,  who  further  remarked  that  all 
the  ambassadors  despised  Hawkesbury.  (Rose,  "  Diaries,"  vol.  ii.,  p. 
157.)  Windham's  letter,  dated  Eeaconsfield,  August  10th,  1803,  in  the 
Puisaye  Papers,  warned  the  French  emigres  that  they  must  not  count  on 
any  aid  from  Ministers,  who  had  "at  all  times  shown  such  feebleness  of 
spirit,  that  they  can  scarcely  dare  to  lift  their  eyes  to  such  aims  as  you 
indicate.     ("  Add.  MSS.,"  No.  7970.) 


xix  THE   ROYALIST   PLOT  419 

the  preparations  for  the  royalist  plot.  The  British  envoy, 
who  bore  the  honoured  name  of  Francis  Drake,  was  a  zeal- 
ous intriguer  closely  in  touch  with  the  Smigres:  he  was 
completely  won  over  by  the  arts  of  Mehee  :  he  gave  the 
spy  money,  supplied  him  with  a  code  of  false  names,  and 
even  intrusted  him  with  a  recipe  for  sympathetic  ink. 
Thus  furnished,  Mehee  proceeded  to  Paris,  sent  his  briber 
a  few  harmless  bulletins,  took  his  information  to  the  police, 
and,  at  Napoleon  s  dictation,  gave  him  news  that  seriously 
misled  our- Government  and  Nelson.1 

The  same  trick  was  tried  on  Stuart,  our  ambassador  at 
Vienna,  who  had  a  tempting  offer  from  a  French  agent  to 
furnish  news  from  every  French  despatch  to  or  from  Vienna. 
Stuart  had  closed  with  the  offer,  when  suddenly  the  man 
was  seized  at  the  instance  of  the  French  ambassador,  and  his 
papers  were  searched.2  In  this  case  there  were  none  that 
compromised  Stuart,  and  his  career  was  not  cut  short  in 
the  ignominious  manner  that  befell  Drake,  over  whom  there 
may  be  inscribed  as  epitaph  the  warning  which  Talleyrand 
gave  to  young  aspirants  —  "et  surtout  pas  trop  de  zele." 

Thus,  while  the  royalists  were  conspiring  the  overthrow 
of  Napoleon,  he  through  his  agents  was  countermining 
their  clumsy  approach  to  his  citadel,  and  prepared  to  blow 
them  sky  high  when  their  mines  were  crowded  for  the 
final  rush.  The  royalist  plans  matured  slowly  owing  to 
changes  which  need  not  be  noticed.  Georges  Cadoudal 
quitted  London,  and  landed  at  Biville,  a  smuggler's  haunt 
inot  far  from  Dieppe,  on  August  23rd,  1803.  Thence  he 
1  made  his  way  to  Paris,  and  spent  some  months  in  striving 
to  enlist  trusty  recruits.  It  has  been  stated  that  the  plot 
never  aimed  at  assassination,  but  at  the  overpowering  of 
'the  First  Consul's  escort,  and  the  seizure  of  his  person, 
during  one  of  his  journeys.  Then  he  was  to  be  forcibly 
transferred  to  the  northern  coast  on  relays  of  horses,  and 
hurried  over  to  England.3     But,  though  the  plotters  threw 

1  See  in  chapter  xxi.,  p.  488.  Our  envoy,  Spencer  Smith,  at  Stuttgart, 
kas  also  taken  in  by  a  French  spy,  Captain  Rosey,  whose  actions  were 
directed  by  Napoleon.     See  his  letter  (No.  76G0). 

2  "F.  O.,"  Austria,  No.  68  (October  31st,  1803). 

8  Lavalette,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xxiii. ;  "  Georges  Cadoudal,"  by  Georges  de 
Cadoudal  (Paris,  1887). 


420  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

the  veil  of  decency  over  their  enterprise  by  calling  it 
kidnapping,  they  undoubtedly  meant  murder.  Among 
Drake's  papers  there,  is  a  hint  that  the  royalist  emissaries 
were  at  first  to  speak  only  of  the  seizure  and  deportation 
of  the  First  Consul. 

Whatever  may  have  been  their  precise  aims,  they  were 
certainly  known  to  Napoleon  and  his  police.  On  Novem- 
ber 1st,  1803,  he  wrote  to  Regnier  : 

"  You  must  not  be  in  a  hurry  about  the  arrests :  when  the  author 
[Mehee]  has  given  in  all  the  information,  we  will  draw  up  a  plan 
with  him,  and  will  see  what  is  to  be  done.  I  wish  him  to  write  to 
Drake,  and,  in  order  to  make  him  trustful,  inform  him  that,  before 
the  great  blow  can  be  dealt,  he  believes  he  [Mehee]  can  promise  to 
have  seized  on  the  table  of  the  First  Consul,  in  his  secret  room,  notes 
written  in  his  own  hand  relating  to  his  great  expedition,  and  every 
other  important  document." 

Napoleon  revelled  in  the  details  of  his  plan  for  hoisting 
the  engineers  with  their  own  petards.1  But  he  knew  full 
well  that  the  plot,  when  fully  ripe,  would  yield  far  more 
than  the  capture  of  a  few  Chouans.  He  must  wait  until 
Moreau  was  implicated.  The  man  selected  by  the  emigres 
to  sound  Moreau  was  Pichegru,  and  this  choice  was  the 
sole  instance  of  common  sense  displayed  by  them.  It  was 
Pichegru  who  had  marked  out  the  future  fortune  of  Moreau 
in  the  campaign  of  1793,  and  yet  he  had  seemed  to  be  the 
victim  of  that  general's  gross  ingratitude  at  Fructidor. 
Who  then  so  fitted  as  he  to  approach  the  victor  of  Hohen- 
linden  ?  Through  a  priest  named  David  and  General 
Lajolais,  an  interview  was  arranged  ;  and  shortly  after 
Pichegru's  arrival  in  France,  these  warriors  furtively 
clasped  hands  in  the  capital  which  had  so  often  resounded 
with  their  praises  (January,  1804).  They  met  three  or 
four  times,  and  cleared  away  some  of  the  misunderstand- 
ings of  the  past.  But  he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with 
Georges,  and  when  Pichegru  mooted  the  overthrow  of 
Bonaparte  and  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons,  he  firmly 
warned  him  :  "  Do  with  Bonaparte  what  you  will,  but  do 
not  ask  me  to  put  a  Bourbon  in  his  place." 

1  See  his  letter  of  January  24th,  1804,  to  Real,  instructing  him  to  tell 
Meliee  what  falsehoods  are  to  find  a  place  in  M6heVs  next  bulletin  to 
Drake  1     "Keep  on  continually  with  the  affair  of  my  portfolio." 


xix  THE  ROYALIST  PLOT  421 

From  this  resolve  Moreau  never  receded.  But  his  cal- 
culating reserve  did  not  save  him.  Already  several  sus- 
pects had  been  imprisoned  in  Normandy.  At  Napoleon's 
suggestion  five  of  them  were  condemned  to  death,  in  the 
hope  of  extorting  a  confession  ;  and  the  last,  a  man  named 
Querelle,  gratified  his  gaolers  by  revealing  (February  14th) 
not  only  the  lodging  of  Georges  in  Paris,  but  the  intention 
of  other  conspirators,  among  whom  was  a  French  prince, 
to  land  at  Biville.  The  plot  was  now  coming  to  a  head, 
and  so  was  the  counter-plot.  On  the  next  day  Moreau  was 
arrested  by  order  of  Napoleon,  who  feigned  the  utmost 
grief  and  surprise  at  seeing  the  victor  of  Hohenlinden 
mixed  up  with  royalist  assassins  in  the  pay  of  Eng- 
land.1 

Elated  by  this  success,  and  hoping  to  catch  the  Comte 
d'Artois  himself,  Napoleon  forthwith  despatched  to  that 
cliff  one  of  his  most  crafty  and  devoted  servants,  Savary, 
who  commanded  the  gendarmerie  d'elite.  Tricked  out  in 
suitable  disguises,  and  informed  by  a  smuggler  as  to  the 
royalist  signals,  Savary  eagerly  awaited  the  royal  quarry, 
and  when  Captain  Wright's  vessel  hove  in  sight,  he  used 
his  utmost  arts  to  imitate  the  signals  that  invited  a  land- 
ing. But  the  crew  were  not  to  be  lured  to  shore  ;  and 
after  fruitless  endeavours  he  returned  to  Paris  —  in  time 
to  take  part  in  the  murder  of  the  Due  d'Enghien. 

Meanwhile  the  police  were  on  the  tracks  of  Pichegru 
and  Georges.  On  the  last  day  of  February  the  general 
was  seized  in  bed  in  the  house  of  a  treacherous  friend  : 
but  not  until  the  gates  of  Paris  had  been  closed,  and 
domiciliary  visits  made,  was  Georges  taken,  and  then  only 
after  a  desperate  affray  (March  9th).  The  arrest  of  the  two 
Polignacs  and  the  Marquis  de  Riviere  speedily  followed. 

Hitherto  Napoleon  had  completely  outwitted  his  foes. 
He  knew  well  enough  that  he  was  in  no  danger. 

"  I  have  run  no  real  risks,"  he  wrote  to  Melzi,  "  for  the  police  had  its 
eyes  on  all  these  machinations,  and  I  have  the  consolation  of  not  find- 

JMiot  de  Melito,  vol.  i.,  ch.  xvi.  ;  Pasquier,  vol.  i.,  ch.  vii.  See  also 
Desraarest,  "  Quinze  ans  de  la  haute  police"  :  his  claim  that  the  police 
previously  knew  nothing  of  the  plot  is  refuted  by  Napoleon's  letters  {e.g., 
that  of  November  1st,  1803);  as  also  by  Guilhermy,  "Papiers  d'un 
Emigre,"  p.  122. 


! 


422  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ing  reason  to  complain  of  a  single  man  among  all  those  I  have  placed 
in  this  huge  administration.     Moreau  stands  alone."1 

But  now,  at  the  moment  of  victory,  when  France  was 
swelling  with  rage  against  royalist  assassins,  English 
gold,  and  Moreau's  treachery,  the  First  Consul  was 
hurried  into  an  enterprise  which  gained  him  an  imperial 
crown  and  flecked  the  purple  with  innocent  blood. 

There  was  living  at  Ettenheim,  in  Baden,  not  far  from 
the  Rhine,  a  young  prince  of  the  House  of  Conde,  the 
Due  d'Enghien.  Since  the  disbanding  of  the  corps  of 
Conde  he  had  been  tranquilly  enjoying  the  society  of 
the  Princess  Charlotte  de  Rohan,  to  whom  he  had  been 
secretly  married.  Her  charms,  the  attractions  of  the 
chase,  the  society  of  a  small  circle  of  French  Smigres, 
and  an  occasional  secret  visit  to  the  theatre  at  Strassburg, 
formed  the  chief  diversions  to  an  otherwise  monotonous 
life,  until  he  was  fired  with  the  hope  of  a  speedy  declara- 
tion of  war  by  Austria  and  Russia  against  Napoleon. 
Report  accused  him  of  having  indiscreetly  ventured  in 
disguise  far  into  France  ;  but  he  indignantly  denied  it. 
His  other  letters  also  prove  that  he  was  not  an  accomplice 
of  the  Cadoudal-Pichegru  conspiracy.  But  Napoleon's 
spies  gave  information  which  seemed  to  implicate  him  in 
that  enterprise.  Chief  among  them  was  Mehee,  who,  at 
the  close  of  February,  hovered  about  Ettenheim  and 
heard  that  the  duke  was  often  absent  for  many  days 
at  a  time. 

Napoleon  received  this  news  on  March  1st,  and  ordered 
the  closest  investigation  to  be  made.  One  of  his  spies 
reported  that  the  young  duke  associated  with  General 
Dumouriez.  In  reality  the  general  was  in  London,  and 
the  spy  had  substituted  the  name  of  a  harmless  old  gen- 
tleman called  Thumery.  When  Napoleon  saw  the  name 
of  Dumouriez  with  that  of  the  young  duke  his  rage 
knew  no  bounds.  "  Am  I  a  dog  to  be  beaten  to  death 
in  the  street  ?  Why  was  1  not  warned  that  they  were 
assembling  at  Ettenheim  ?  Are  my  murderers  sacred 
beings  ?  They  attack  my  very  person.  I'll  give  them 
war   for   war."     And   he   overwhelmed   with   reproaches 

i  "Lettres  incites  de  Napoleon,"  letter  of  Feb.  20th,  1804. 


xix  THE   ROYALIST   PLOT  423 

both  Real  and  Talleyrand  for  neglecting  to  warn  him  of 
these  traitors  and  assassins  clustering  on  the  banks  of  the 
Rhine.  The  seizure  of  Georges  Cadoudal  and  the  exami- 
nation of  one  of  his  servants  helped  to  confirm  Napoleon's 
surmise  that  he  was  the  victim  of  a  plot  of  which  the 
duke  and  Dumouriez  were  the  real  contrivers,  while 
Georges  was  their  tool.  Cadoudal's  servant  stated  that 
there  often  came  to  his  master's  house  a  mysterious  man, 
at  whose  entry  not  only  Georges  but  also  the  Polignacs 
and  Riviere  always  arose.  This  convinced  Napoleon  that 
the  Due  d'Enghien  was  directing  the  plot,  and  he  deter- 
mined to  have  the  duke  and  Dumouriez  seized.  That 
they  were  on  German  soil  was  naught  to  him.  Talley- 
rand promised  that  he  could  soon  prevail  on  the  Elector 
to  overlook  this  violation  of  his  territory,  and  the  question 
was  then  discussed  in  an  informal  council.  Talleyrand, 
Real,  and  Fouche  advised  the  severest  measures.  Lebrun 
spoke  of  the  outcry  which  such  a  violation  of  neutral  ter- 
ritory would  arouse,  but  bent  before  the  determination  of 
the  First  Consul ;  and  the  regicide  Cambaceres  alone 
offered  a  firm  opposition  to  an  outrage  which  must  em- 
broil France  with  Germany  and  Russia.  Despite  this 
protest,  Napoleon  issued  his  orders  and  then  repaired  to 
the  pleasing  solitudes  of  La  Malmaison,  where  he  re- 
mained in  almost  complete  seclusion.  The  execution 
of  the  orders  was  now  left  to  Generals  Ordener  and 
Caulaincourt,  who  arranged  the  raid  into  Baden ;  to 
Murat,  who  was  now  Governor  of  Paris  ;  and  to  the 
devoted  and  unquestioning  Savary  and  Real. 

The  seizure  of  the  duke  was  craftily  effected.  Troops 
and  gendarmes  were  quietly  mustered  at  Strassburg  : 
spies  were  sent  forward  to  survey  the  ground  ;  and  as 
the  dawn  of  the  15th  of  March  was  lighting  up  the  east- 
ern sky,  thirty  Frenchmen  encircled  Enghien's  abode. 
His  hot  blood  prompted  him  to  fight,  but  on  the  advice 
of  a  friend  he  quietty  surrendered,  was  haled  away  to 
Strassburg  and  thence  to  the  castle  of  Vincennes  on 
the  southeast  of  Paris.  There  everything  was  ready  for 
his  reception  on  the  evening  of  March  20th.  The  pall 
of  secrecy  was  spread  over  the  preparations.  The 
name  of  Plessis  was  assigned  to  the  victim,  and    Harel, 


424  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  governor  of  the  castle,  was  left  ignorant  of  his 
rank.1 

Above  all,  he  was  to  be  tried  by  a  court-martial  of 
officers,  a  form  of  judgment  which  was  summary  and 
without  appeal ;  whereas  the  ordinary  courts  of  justice 
must  be  slow  and  open  to  the  public  gaze.  It  was  true 
that  the  Senate  had  just  suspended  trial  by  jury  in  the 
case  of  attempts  against  the  First  Consul's  life  —  a  device 
adopted  in  view  of  the  Moreau  prosecution.  But  the  cer- 
tainty of  a  conviction  was  not  enough  :  Napoleon  deter- 
mined to  strike  terror  into  his  enemies,  such  as  a  swift 
and  secret  blow  always  inspires.  He  had  resolved  on  a 
trial  by  court-martial  when  he  still  believed  Enghien  to 
be  an  accomplice  of  Dumouriez  ;  and  when,  late  on  Satur- 
day, March  17th,  that  mistake  was  explained,  his  purpose 
remained  unshaken  —  unshaken  too  by  the  high  mass  of 
Easter  Sunday,  March  18th,  which  he  heard  in  state  at 
the  Chapel  of  the  Tuileries.  On  the  return  journey  to 
Malmaison  Josephine  confessed  to  Madame  de  Remusat 
her  fears  that  Bonaparte's  will  was  unalterably  fixed  :  "  I 
have  done  what  I  could,  but  I  fear  his  mind  is  made  up." 
She  and  Joseph  approached  him  once  more  in  the  park 
while  Talleyrand  was  at  his  side.  "  I  fear  that  cripple," 
she  said,  as  they  came  near,  and  Joseph  drew  the  Minister 
aside.  All  was  in  vain.  "  Go  away  ;  you  are  a  child  ; 
you  don't  understand  public  duties."  This  was  Jose- 
phine's final  repulse. 

On  March  20th  Napoleon  drew  up  the  form  of  questions 
to  be  put  to  the  prisoner.  He  now  shifted  the  ground 
of  accusation.  Out  of  eleven  questions  only  the  last 
three  referred  to  the  duke's  connection  with  the  Cadoudal 
plot.2  For  in  the  meantime  he  had  found  in  the  duke's 
papers  proofs  of  his  having  offered  his  services  to  the 
British  Government  for  the  present  war,3  his  hopes  of 
participation  in  a  future  Continental  war,  but  nothing  that 
could  implicate  him  in  the  Cadoudal  plot.  The  papers 
were  certainly  disappointing  ;  and  that  is  doubtless  the 
reason    why,  after  examining   them   on    March    19th,  he 

1  Segur,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  x.     Bonaparte  to  Murat  and  Harel,  March  20th. 

2  Letter  to  Real,  ••  Corresp.,"  No.  7639. 

8  The  original  is  in  "F.  O."  (Austria,  No.  68). 


xix  THE   ROYALIST   PLOT  425 

charged  Real  "  to  take  secret  cognizance  of  these  papers 
along  with  Desmarest.  One  must  prevent  any  talk  on 
the  more  or  less  of  charges  contained  in  these  papers." 
The  same  fact  doubtless  led  to  their  abstraction  along 
with  the  dossier  of  the  proceedings  of  the  court-martial.1 

The  task  of  summoning  the  officers  who  were  to  form 
the  court-martial  was  imposed  on  Murat.  But  when 
this  bluff,  hearty  soldier  received  this  order,  he  exclaimed : 
"  What  !  are  they  trying  to  soil  my  uniform  !  I  will  not 
allow  it  !  Let  him  appoint  them  himself  if  he  wants  to." 
But  a  second  and  more  imperious  mandate  compelled 
him  to  perform  this  hateful  duty.  The  seven  senior 
officers  of  the  garrison  of  Paris  now  summoned  were 
ordered  not  to  separate  until  judgment  was  passed.2  At 
their  head  was  General  Hulin,  who  had  shown  such 
daring  in  the  assault  on  the  Bastille  ;  and  thus  one  of 
the  early  heroes  of  the  Revolution  had  the  evening  of 
his  days  shrouded  over  with  the  horrors  of  a  midnight 
murder.  Finally,  the  First  Consul  charged  Savary,  who 
had  just  returned  to  Paris  from  Biville,  furious  at  being 
baulked  of  his  prey,  to  proceed  to  Vincennes  with  a  band 
of  his  gendarmes  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  sentence. 

The  seven  officers  as  yet  knew  nothing  of  the  nature 
of  their  mission,  or  of  martial  law.  "  We  had  not,"  wrote 
Hulin  long  afterwards,  "  the  least  idea  about  trials  ;  and 
worst  of  all,  the  reporter  and  clerk  had  scarcely  any  more 
experience."3  The  examination  of  the  prisoner  was  curt 
in  the  extreme.  He  was  asked  his  name,  date  and  place 
of  birth,  whether  he  had  borne  arms  against  France  and 
was  in  the  pay  of  England.  To  the  last  questions  he 
answered  decisively  in  the  affirmative,  adding  that  he 
wished  to  take  part  in  the  new  war  against  France. 

His  replies  were  the  same  as  he  made  in  his  preliminary 
examination,  which  he  closed  with  the  written  and  urgent 

1  Pasquier,  "MSmoires,"  vol.  i.,  p.  187. 

2  The  Comte  de  Mosbourg's  notes  in  Count  Murat's  "  Murat  "  (Paris, 
1897),  pp.  437-445,  prove  that  Savary  did  not  draw  his  instructions  for 
the  execution  of  the  duke  merely  from  Murat,  but  from  Bonaparte  him- 
self, who  must  therefore  be  held  solely  responsible  for  the  composition 
and  conduct  of  that  court.  Masson's  attempt  ("Nap.  et  sa  Famille," 
ch.  xiv.)  to  inculpate  Murat  is  very  weak. 

3  Hulin  in  "  Catastrophe  du  due  d'Enghien,"  p.  118. 


426  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

request  for  a  personal  interview  with  Napoleon.  To  this 
request  the  court  proposed  to  accede  ;  but  Savary,  who 
had  posted  himself  behind  Hulin's  chair,  at  once  declared 
this  step  to  be  inopportune.  The  judges  had  only  one 
chance  of  escape  from  their  predicament,  namely,  to  induce 
the  duke  to  invalidate  his  evidence  :  this  he  firmly  refused 
to  do,  and  when  Hulin  warned  him  of  the  danger  of  his 
position,  he  replied  that  he  knew  it,  and  wished  to  have 
an  interview  with  the  First  Consul. 

The  court  then  passed  sentence,  and,  "in  accordance 
with  article  (blank)  of  the  law  (blank)  to  the  following 
effect  (blank)  condemned  him  to  suffer  death."  Ashamed, 
as  it  would  seem,  of  this  clumsy  condemnation,  Hulin  was 
writing  to  Bonaparte  to  request  for  the  condemned  man 
the  personal  interview  which  he  craved,  when  Savary  took 
the  pen  from  his  hands,  with  the  words  :  "  Your  work  is 
done  :  the  rest  is  my  business."  l  The  duke  was  forth- 
with led  out  into  the  moat  of  the  castle,  where  a  few 
torches  shed  their  light  on  the  final  scene  of  this  sombre 
tragedy :  he  asked  for  a  priest,  but  this  was  denied  him  : 
he  then  bowed  his  head  in  prayer,  lifted  those  noble 
features  towards  the  soldiers,  begged  them  not  to  miss 
their  aim,  and  fell,  shot  through  the  heart.  Hard  by  was 
a  grave,  which,  in  accordance  with  orders  received  on  the 
previous  day,  the  governor  had  caused  to  be  made  ready  ; 
into  this  the  body  was  thrown  pell-mell,  and  the  earth 
closed  over  the  remains  of  the  last  scion  of  the  warlike 
House  of  Conde. 

Twelve  years  later  loving  hands  disinterred  the  bones 
and  placed  them  in  the  chapel  of  the  castle.  But  even 
then  the  world  knew  not  all  the  enormity  of  the  crime. 
It  was  reserved  for  clumsy  apologists  like  Savary  to  pro- 
voke replies  and  further  investigations.  The  various 
excuses  which  throw  the  blame  on  Talleyrand,  and  on 
everyone  but  the  chief  actor,  are  sufficiently  disposed  of 
by  the  ex-Emperor's  will.  In  that  document  Napoleon 
brushed  away  the  excuses  which  had  previously  been 
offered  to  the  credulity  or  malice  of  his  courtiers,  and  took 
on  himself  the  responsibility  for  the  execution  : 

1  Dupin  in  "  Catastrophe  du  due  d'Enghien,"  pp.  101,  123. 


xix  THE  ROYALIST  PLOT  427 

"I  caused  the  Due  d'Enghien  to  be  arrested  and  judged,  because  it 
was  necessary  for  the  safety,  the  interest,  and  the  honour  of  the 
French  people  when  the  Comte  d'Artois,  by  his  own  confession,  was 
supporting  sixty  assassins  at  Paris.  In  similar  circumstances  I  would 
act  in  the  same  way  again." x 

The  execution  of  the  Due  d'Enghien  is  one  of  the  most 
important  incidents  of  this  period,  so  crowded  with  mo- 
mentous events.  The  sensation  of  horror  which  it  caused 
can  be  gauged  by  the  mental  agony  of  Madame  de  Remusat 
and  of  others  who  had  hitherto  looked  on  Bonaparte  as  the 
hero  of  the  age  and  the  saviour  of  the  country.  His  mother 
hotly  upbraided  him,  saying  it  was  an  atrocious  act,  the 
stain  of  which  could  never  be  wiped  out,  and  that  he  had 
yielded  to  the  advice  of  enemies  eager  to  tarnish  his  fame.2 
Napoleon  said  nothing,  but  shut  himself  up  in  his  cabinet, 

1  The  only  excuse  which  calls  for  notice  here  is  that  Napoleon  at  the 
last  moment,  when  urged  by  Joseph  to  be  merciful,  gave  way,  and  de- 
spatched orders  late  at  night  to  R6al  to  repair  to  Vincennes.  R6al 
received  some  order,  the  exact  purport  of  which  is  unknown  :  it  was  late 
at  night  and  he  postponed  going  till  the  morrow.  On  his  way  he  met 
Savary,  who  came  towards  Paris  bringing  the  news  of  the  duke's  execution. 
Real's  first  words,  on  hearing  this  unexpected  news,  were  :  "  How  is  that 
possible  ?  I  had  so  many  questions  to  put  to  the  duke :  his  examination 
plight  disclose  so  much.  Another  thing  gone  wrong  ;  the  First  Consul  will 
be  furious."  These  words  were  afterwards  repeated  to  Pasquier  both  by 
Savary  and  by  Real :  and,  unless  Pasquier  lied,  the  belated  order  sent  to 
R6al  was  not  a  pardon  (and  Napoleon  on  his  last  voyage  said  to  Cockburn 
it  was  not) ,  but  merely  an  order  to  extract  such  information  from  the  duke  as 
would  compromise  other  Frenchmen.  Besides,  if  Napoleon  had  despatched 
an  order  for  the  duke's  pardon,  why  was  not  that  order  produced  as  a 
sign  of  his  innocence  and  Real's  blundering?  Why  did  he  shut  himself 
up  in  Ins  private  room  on  March  20th,  so  that  even  Josephine  had  difficulty 
in  gaining  entrance  ?  And  if  he  really  desired  to  pardon  the  duke,  how 
came  it  that  when,  at  noon  of  March  21st,  Re"al  explained  that  he  arrived 
at  Vincennes  too  late,  the  only  words  that  escaped  Napoleon's  lips  were 
"  C'est  bien  "  ?  (See  Meneval,  vol.  i.,  p.  296.)  Why  also  was  his  counte- 
nance the  only  one  that  afterwards  showed  no  remorse  or  grief  ?  Caulain- 
court,  when  he  heard  the  results  of  his  raid  into  Baden,  fainted  with  horror, 
and  when  brought  to  by  Bonaparte,  overwhelmed  him  with  reproaches. 
Why  also  had  the  grave  been  dug  beforehand  ?  Why,  finally,  were  Savary 
and  Heal  not  disgraced?  No  satisfactory  answer  to  these  questions  has 
ever  been  given.  The  "  Catastrophe  du  due  d'Enghien  "  and  Count  Boulay 
de  la  Meurthe's  "  Les  dernieres  Anne'es  du  due  d'Enghien"  and  Napo- 
leon's "  Correspondance "  give  all  the  documents  needed  for  forming  a 
judgment  on  this  case.  The  evidence  is  examined  by  Mr.  Fay  in  "The 
American  Hist.  Rev.,"  July  and  Oct.,  1898.  For  the  rewards  to  the  mur- 
derers see  Masson,  "  Nap.  et  sa  Famille,"  chap.  xiii. 

aDucasse,  "Les  Rois  Freres  de  Nap.,"  p.  9. 


428  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xix 

revolving  these  terrible  words,  which  doubtless  bore  fruit 
in  the  bitter  reproaches  later  to  be  heaped  upon  Talleyrand 
for  his  share  in  the  tragedy.  Many  royalists  who  had  be- 
gan to  rally  to  his  side  now  showed  their  indignation  at 
the  deed.  Chateaubriand,  who  was  about  to  proceed  as 
the  envoy  of  France  to  the  Republic  of  Valais,  at  once 
offered  his  resignation  and  assumed  an  attitude  of  covert 
defiance.  And  that  was  the  conduct  of  all  royalists  who 
were  not  dazzled  by  the  glamour  of  success  or  cajoled  by 
Napoleon's  favours.  Many  of  his  friends  ventured  co  show 
their  horror  of  this  Corsican  vendetta ;  and  a  mot  which 
was  plausibly,  but  it  seems  wrongly,  attributed  to  Fouche, 
well  sums  up  the  general  opinion  of  that  callous  society: 
"  It  was  worse  than  a  crime  —  it  was  a  blunder." 

Scarcely  had  Paris  recovered  from  this  sensation  when, 
on  April  6th,  Pichegru  was  found  strangled  in  prison  ;  and 
men  silently  but  almost  unanimously  hailed  it  as  the  work 
of  Napoleon's  Mamelukes.  This  judgment,  however  natu- 
ral after  the  Enghien  affair,  seems  to  be  incorrect.  It  is 
true  the  corpse  bore  marks  which  scarcely  tallied  with 
suicide  :  but  Georges  Cadoudal,  whose  cell  was  hard  by, 
heard  no  sound  of  a  scuffle ;  and  it  is  unlikely  that  so 
strong  a  man  as  Pichegru  would  easily  have  succumbed  to 
assailants.  It  is  therefore  more  probable  that  the  conqueror 
of  Holland,  shattered  by  his  misfortunes  and  too  proud  to 
undergo  a  public  trial,  cut  short  a  life  which  already  was 
doomed.  Never  have  plotters  failed  more  ignominiously 
and  played  more  completely  into  the  hands  of  their  enemy. 
A  mot  of  the  Boulevards  wittily  sums  up  the  results  of 
their  puny  efforts  :  "  They  came  to  France  to  give  her  a 
king,  and  they  gave  her  an  Emperor." 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE   DAWN  OF  THE  EMPIRE 

For  some  time  the  question  of  a  Napoleonic  dynasty  had 
been  freely  discussed;  and  the  First  Consul  himself  had 
latterly  confessed  his  intentions  to  Joseph  in  words  that 
reveal  his  superhuman  confidence  and  his  caution :  "  I 
always  intended  to  end  the  Revolution  by  the  establish- 
ment of  heredity  :  but  I  thought  that  such  a  step  could  not 
be  taken  before  the  lapse  of  five  or  six  years."  Events, 
however,  bore  him  along  on  a  favouring  tide.  Hatred  of 
England,  fear  of  Jacobin  excesses,  indignation  at  the  royal- 
ist schemes  against  his  life,  and  finally  even  the  execution 
of  Enghien,  helped  on  the  establishment  of  the  Empire. 
Though  moderate  men  of  all  parties  condemned  the  mur- 
der, the  remnants  of  the  Jacobin. party  hailed  it  with  joy. 
Up  to  this  time  they  had  a  lingering  fear  that  the  First 
Consul  was  about  to  play  the  part  of  Monk.  The  pomp 
of  the  Tuileries  and  the  hated  Concordat  seemed  to  their 
crooked  minds  but  the  prelude  to  a  recall  of  the  Bourbons, 
whereupon  priestcraft,  tithes,  and  feudalism  would  be  the 
order  of  the  day.  Now  at  last  the  tragedy  of  Vincennes 
threw  a  lurid  light  into  the  recesses  of  Napoleon's  ambi- 
tion; and  they  exclaimed,  "He  is  one  of  us."  It  must 
thenceforth  be  war  to  the  knife  between  the  Bourbons  and 
Bonaparte  ;  and  his  rule  would  therefore  be  the  best  guar- 
antee for  the  perpetual  ownership  of  the  lands  confiscated 
during  the  Revolution.1 

To  a  materialized  society  that  great  event  had  come  to 
be  little  more  than  a  big  land  investment  syndicate,  of 
which  Bonaparte  was  now  to  be  the  sole  and  perpetual 
director.  This  is  the  inner  meaning  of  the  references  to 
the  Social  Contract  which  figure  so  oddly  among  the  peti- 
tions  for   hereditary  rule.     The  Jacobins,  except  a  few 

JMiot  de  Melito,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  i. ,-  Pasquier,  vol.  i.,  ch.  ix. 

429 


430  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

conscientious  stalwarts,  were  especially  alert  in  the  feat  of 
making  extremes  meet.  Fouche,  who  now  wriggled  back 
into  favour  and  office,  appealed  to  the  Senate,  only  seven 
days  after  the  execution,  to  establish  hereditary  power  as 
the  only  means  of  ending  the  plots  against  Napoleon's  life  ; 
for,  as  the  opportunist  Jacobins  argued,  if  the  hereditary 
system  were  adopted,  conspiracies  to  murder  would  be 
meaningless,  when,  even  if  they  struck  down  one  man, 
they  must  fail  to  shatter  the  system  that  guaranteed  the 
Revolution. 

The  cue  having  been  thus  dextrously  given,  appeals  and 
petitions  for  hereditary  rule  began  to  pour  in  from  all 
parts  of  France.  The  grand  work  of  the  reorganization  of 
France  certainly  furnished  a  solid  claim  on  the  nation's 
gratitude.  The  recent  promulgation  of  the  Civil  Code 
and  the  revival  of  material  prosperity  redounded  to  Napo- 
leon's glory  ;  and  with  equal  truth  and  wit  he  could  claim 
the  diadem  as  a  fit  reward  for  having  revived  many  interests 
while  none  had  been  displaced.  Such  a  remark  and  such 
an  exploit  proclaim  the  born  ruler  of  men.  But  the 
Senate  overstepped  all  bounds  of  decency  when  it  thus 
addressed  him:  "You  are  founding  a  new  era:  but  you 
ought  to  make  it  last  for  ever  :  splendour  is  nothing  with- 
out duration. "  The  Greeks  who  fawned  on  Persian  satraps 
did  not  more  unman  themselves  than  these  pensioned  syco- 
phants, who  had  lived  through  the  days  of  1789  but  knew 
them  not.  This  fulsome  adulation  would  be  unworthy  of 
notice  did  it  not  convey  the  most  signal  proof  of  the  dan- 
ger which  republics  incur  when  men  lose  sight  of  the 
higher  aims  of  life  and  wallow  among  its  sordid  interests.1 

After  the  severe  drilling  of  the  last  four  years,  the 
Chambers  voted  nearly  unanimously  in  favour  of  a  Napo- 
leonic dynasty.  The  Corps  LSgislatif  was  not  in  session, 
and  it  was  not  convoked.  The  Senate,  after  hearing 
Fouche*'s  unmistakable  hints,  named  a  commission  of  its 


1I  cannot  agree  with  M.  Lanfrey,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xi.,  that  the  Empire  was 
not  desired  by  the  nation.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  writer  here  attributes 
to  the  apathetic  masses  his  own  unrivalled  acuteness  of  vision  and  enthu- 
siasm for  democracy.  Lafayette  well  sums  up  the  situation  in  the  remark 
that  he  was  more  shocked  at  the  submission  of  all  than  at  the  usurpation 
of  one  man  ("  Mems.,"  vol.  v.,  p.  239). 


xx  THE   DAWN  OF  THE   EMPIRE  481 

members  to  report  on  hereditary  rule,  and  then  waited  on 
events.  These  were  decided  mainly  in  private  meetings 
of  the  Council  of  State,  where  the  proposal  met  with  some 
opposition  from  Cambaceres,  Merlin,  and  Thibaudeau. 
But  of  what  avail  are  private  remonstrances  when  in  open 
session  opponents  are  dumb  and  supporters  vie  in  adula- 
tion? In  the  Tribunate,  on  April  23rd,  an  obscure  mem- 
ber named  Curee  proposed  the  adoption  of  the  hereditary 
principle.  One  man  alone  dared  openly  to  combat  the 
proposal,  the  great  Carnot ;  and  the  opposition  of  Curee 
to  Carnot  might  have  recalled  to  the  minds  of  those  abject 
champions  of  popular  liberty  the  verse  that  glitters  amidst 
the  literary  rubbish  of  the  Roman  Empire : 

"  Victrix  causa  deis  placuit,  sed  victa  Catoni." 

The  Tribunate  named  a  commission  to  report ;  it  was 
favourable  to  the  Bonapartes.  The  Senate  voted  in  the 
same  sense,  three  Senators  alone,  among  them  Gregoire, 
Bishop  of  Blois,  voting  against  it.  Sieyes  and  Lanjuinais 
were  absent ;  but  the  well-salaried  lord  of  the  manor  of 
Crosne  must  have  read  with  amused  contempt  the  resolu- 
tion of  this  body,  which  he  had  designed  to  be  the  guardian 
of  the  republican  constitution  : 

"  The  French  have  conquered  liberty  :  they  wish  to  preserve  their 
conquest :  they  wish  for  repose  after  victory.  They  will  owe  this 
glorious  repose  to  the  hereditary  rule  of  a  single  man,  who,  raised 
above  all,  is  to  defend  public  liberty,  maintain  equality,  and  lower 
his  fasces  before  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  that  proclaims  him." 

In  this  way  did  France  reduce  to  practice  the  dogma  of 
Rousseau  with  regard  to  the  occasional  and  temporary 
need  of  a  dictator.1 

When  the  commonalty  are  so  obsequious,  any  title  can 
be  taken  by  the  one  necessary  man.  Napoleon  at  first 
affected  to  doubt  whether  the  title  of  Stadholder  would 
not  be  more  seemly  than  that  of  Emperor  ;  and  in  one  of 
the  many  conferences  held  on  this  topic,  Miot  de  Melito 
advocated  the  retention  of  the  term  Consul  for  its  grand 
republican  simplicity.  But  it  was  soon  seen  that  the 
term  Emperor  was  the  only  one  which  satisfied  Napoleon's 

1  See  Aulard,  "  R£v.  Francaise,"  p.  772,  for  the  opposition. 


432  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ambition  and  French  love  of  splendour.  Accordingly  a 
senatus  consultum  of  May  18th,  1804,  formally  decreed  to 
him  the  title  of  Emperor  of  the  French.  As  for  his  former 
colleagues,  Cambaceres  and  Lebrun,  they  were  stultified 
with  the  titles  of  Arch-chancellor  and  Arch-treasurer  of 
the  Empire  :  his  brother  Joseph  received  the  title  of  Grand 
Elector,  borrowed  from  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  oddly 
applied  to  an  hereditary  empire  where  the  chief  had  been 
appointed  :  Louis  was  dubbed  Constable ;  two  other  grand 
dignities,  those  of  Arch-chancellor  of  State  and  High 
Admiral,  were  not  as  yet  filled,  but  were  reserved  for 
Napoleon's  relatives  by  marriage,  Eugene  Beauharnais  and 
Murat.  These  six  grand  dignitaries  of  the  new  Empire 
were  to  be  irresponsible  and  irremovable,  and,  along  with  the 
Emperor,  they  formed  the  Grand  Council  of  the  Empire. 

On  lesser  individuals  the  rays  of  the  imperial  diadem 
cast  a  fainter  glow.  Napoleon's  uncle,  Cardinal  Fesch, 
became  Grand  Almoner ;  Berthier,  Grand  Master  of  the 
Hounds  ;  Talleyrand,  Grand  Chamberlain ;  Duroc,  Grand 
Marshal  of  the  Palace ;  and  Caulaincourt,  Master  of  the 
Horse,  the  acceptance  of  which  title  seemed  to  the  world 
to  convict  him  of  full  complicity  in  the  schemes  for  the 
murder  of  the  Due  d'Enghien.  For  the  rest,  the  Em- 
peror's mother  was  to  be  styled  Madame  Mere;  his  sisters 
became  Imperial  Highnesses,  with  their  several  establish- 
ments of  ladies-in-waiting ;  and  Paris  fluttered  with  excite- 
ment at  each  successive  step  upwards  of  expectant  nobles, 
regicides,  generals,  and  stockjobbers  towards  the  central 
galaxy  of  the  Corsican  family,  which,  ten  years  before,  had 
subsisted  on  the  alms  of  the  Republic  one  and  indivisible. 

It  remained  to  gain  over  the  army.  The  means  used 
were  profuse,  in  proportion  as  the  task  was  arduous.  The 
following  generals  were  distinguished  as  Marshals  of  the 
Empire  (May  19th)  :  Berthier,  Murat,  Massena,  Augereau, 
Lannes,  Jourdan,  Ney,  Soult,  Brune,  Davoust,  BessiSres, 
Moncey,  Mortier,  and  Bernadotte ;  two  marshal's  batons 
were  held  in  reserve  as  a  reward  for  future  service,  and 
four  aged  generals  Lefebvre,  Serrurier,  Perignon,  and 
Keller  man  (the  hero  of  Valmy),  received  the  title  of 
honorary  marshals.  In  one  of  his  conversations  with 
Roederer,  the   Emperor  frankly  avowed  his  reasons  for 


xx  THE   DAWN   OF   THE   EMPIRE  433 

showering  these  honours  on  his  military  chiefs;  it  was 
in  order  to  assure  the  imperial  dignity  to  himself ;  for 
how  could  they  object  to  this,  when  they  themselves 
received  honours  so  lofty  ? 1  The  confession  affords  a 
curious  instance  of  Napoleon's  unbounded  trust  in  the 
most  elementary,  not  to  say  the  meanest,  motives  of 
human  conduct.  Suitable  rewards  were  bestowed  on 
officers  of  the  second  rank.  But  it  was  at  once  remarked 
that  determined  and  outspoken  republicans  like  Suchet, 
Gouvion  St.  Cyr,  and  Macdonald,  whose  talents  and  ex- 
ploits far  outstripped  those  of  many  of  the  marshals,  were 
excluded  from  their  ranks.  St.  Cyr  was  at  Taranto,  and 
Macdonald,  after  an  enforced  diplomatic  mission  to  Copen- 
hagen, was  received  on  his  recall  with  much  coolness.2 
Other  generals  who  had  given  umbrage  at  the  Tuileries 
were  more  effectively  broken  in  by  a  term  of  diplomatic 
banishment.  Lannes  at  Lisbon  and  Brune  at  Constanti- 
nople learnt  a  little  diplomacy  and  some  complaisance  to 
the  head  of  the  State,  and  were  taken  back  to  Napoleon's 
favour.  Bernadotte,  though  ever  suspected  of  Jacobinism 
and  feared  for  the  forceful  ambition  that  sprang  from  the 
blending  of  Gascon  and  Moorish  blood  in  his  veins,  was 
now  also  treated  with  the  consideration  due  to  one  who 
had  married  Joseph  Bonaparte's  sister-in-law:  he  received 
at  Napoleon's  hands  the  house  in  Paris  which  had  formerly 
belonged  to  Moreau :  the  exile's  estate  of  Grosbois,  near 
Paris,  went  to  reward  the  ever  faithful  Berthier.  Auge- 
reau,  half  cured  of  his  Jacobinism  by  the  disfavour  of  the 
Directory,  was  now  drilling  a  small  French  force  and  Irish 
volunteers  at  Brest.  But  the  Grand  Army,  which  com- 
prised the  pick  of  the  French  forces,  was  intrusted  to  the 
command  of  men  on  whom  Napoleon  could  absolutely 
rely,  Davoust,  Soult,  and  Ney  ;  and,  in  that  splendid  force, 
hatred  of  England  and  pride  in  Napoleon's  prowess  now 
overwhelmed  all  political  considerations. 

1  Roederer,  "CEuvres,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  513. 

2  Macdonald,  "Souvenirs,"  ch.  xii. ;  Segur,  "Mems.,1'  ch.  vii.  When 
Thi^bault  congratulated  Mass^na  on  his  new  title,  the  veteran  scoffingly 
replied :  "Oh,  there  are  fourteen  of  us."  (Thie"bault,  " Mems.,"  ch.  vii., 
Eng.  edit.)  See  too  Mannont  ("Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  227)  on  his  own 
exclusion  and  the  inclusion  of  Bessieres. 

2f 


434  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

These  arrangements  attest  the  marvellous  foresight  and 
care  which  Napoleon  brought  to  bear  on  all  affairs  :  even  if 
the  discontented  generals  and  troops  had  protested  against 
the  adoption  of  the  Empire  and  the  prosecution  of  Moreau, 
they  must  have  been  easily  overpowered.  In  some  places, 
as  at  Metz,  the  troops  and  populace  fretted  against  the 
Empire  and  its  pretentious  pomp  ;  but  the  action  of  the 
commanders  soon  restored  order.  And  thus  it  came  to 
pass  that  even  the  soldiery  that  still  cherished  the  Republic 
raised  not  a  musket  while  the  Empire  was  founded  and 
Moreau  was  accused  of  high  treason. 

The  record  of  the  French  revolutionary  generals  is  in 
the  main  a  gloomy  one.  If  in  1795  it  had  been  prophesied 
that  all  those  generals  who  bore  the  tricolour  to  victory 
would  vanish  or  bow  their  heads  before  a  Corsican,  the 
prophet  would  speedily  have  closed  his  croakings  for  ever. 
Yet  the  reality  was  even  worse.  Marceau  and  Hoche  died 
in  the  Rhineland  :  Kleber  and  Desaix  fell  on  the  same  day, 
by  assassination  and  in  battle  :  Richepanse,  Leclerc,  and 
many  other  brave  officers  rotted  away  in  San  Domingo  : 
Pichegru  died  a  violent  death  in  prison  :  Carnot  was  re- 
tiring into  voluntary  exile  :  Massena  and  Macdonald  were 
vegetating  in  inglorious  ease  :  others  were  fast  descending 
to  the  rank  of  flunkeys  ;  and  Moreau  was  on  his  trial  for 
high  treason. 

Even  the  populace,  dazzled  with  glitter  and  drunk  with 
sensations,  suffered  some  qualms  at  seeing  the  victor  of 
Hohenlinden  placed  in  the  dock  ;  and  the  grief  of  the 
scanty  survivors  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  portended 
trouble  if  the  forms  of  justice  were  too  much  strained. 
Trial  by  jury  had  been  recently  dispensed  with  in  cases 
that  concerned  the  life  of  Napoleon.  Consequently  the 
prisoner,  along  with  Georges  and  his  confederates,  could 
be  safely  arraigned  before  judges  in  open  court ;  and  in 
that  respect  the  trial  contrasted  with  the  midnight  court- 
martial  of  Vincennes.  Yet  in  no  State  trial  have  judges 
been  subjected  to  more  official  pressure  for  the  purpose  of 
assuring  a  conviction.1    The  cross-examination  of  numerous  j 

1  Chaptal,  "Souvenirs,"  p.  262.  For  Moreau' s  popularity  see  Made- 
lines "FoucheY'  vol.  i.,  p.  422. 


xx  THE    DAWN   OF   THE   EMPIRE  435 

witnesses  proved  that  Moreau  had  persistently  refused  his 
help  to  the  plot  ;  and  the  utmost  that  could  be  urged 
against  him  was  that  he  desired  Napoleon's  overthrow, 
had  three  interviews  with  Pichegru,  and  did  not  reveal 
the  plot  to  the  authorities.  That  is  to  say,  he  was  guilty 
of  passively  conniving  at  the  success  of  a  plot  which  a 
"  good  citizen  "  ought  to  have  denounced. 

For  these  reasons  the  judges  sentenced  him  to  two 
years'  imprisonment.  This  judgment  excessively  annoyed 
Napoleon,  who  desired  to  use  his  imperial  prerogative  of 
pardon  on  Moreau's  life,  not  on  a  mere  term  of  imprison- 
ment ;  and  with  a  show  of  clemency  that  veiled  a  hidden 
irritation,  he  now  released  him  provided  that  he  retired  to 
the  United  States.1  To  that  land  of  free  men  the  victor 
of  Hohenlinden  retired  with  a  dignity  which  almost  threw 
a  veil  over  his  past  incapacity  and  folly  ;  and,  for  the 
present  at  least,  men  could  say  that  the  end  of  his  politi- 
cal career  was  nobler  than  Pompey's,  while  Napoleon's 
conduct  towards  his  rival  lacked  the  clemency  which 
graced  the  triumph  of  Caesar. 

As  for  the  actual  conspirators,  twenty  of  them  were 
sentenced  to  death  on  June  10th,  among  them  being  the 
elder  of  the  two  Polignacs,  the  Marquis  de  Riviere,  and 
Georges  Cadoudal.  Urgent  efforts  were  made  on  behalf 
of  the  nobles  by  Josephine  and  "  Madame  Mere  "  ;  and 
Napoleon  grudgingly  commuted  their  sentence  to  impris- 
onment. But  the  plebeian,  Georges  Cadoudal,  suffered 
death  for  the  cause  that  had  enlisted  all  the  fierce  ener- 
gies of  his  youth  and  manhood.  With  him  perished  the 
bravest  of  Bretons  and  the  last  man  of  action  of  the 
royalists.  Thenceforth  Napoleon  was  not  troubled  by 
Bourbon  plotters  ;  and  doubtless  the  skill  with  which  his 
agents  had  nursed  this  silly  plot  and  sought  to  entangle 
all  waverers  did  far  more  than  the  strokes  of  the  guil- 
lotine to  procure  his  future  immunity.  Men  trembled 
before  a  union  of  immeasurable  power  with  unfathom- 

1  At  the  next  public  audience  Napoleon  upbraided  one  of  the  judges, 
Lecourbe,  who  had  maintained  that  Moreau  was  innocent,  and  thereafter 
deprived  him  of  his  judgeship.  He  also  disgraced  his  brother,  General 
Lecourbe,  and  forbade  his  coming  within  forty  leagues  of  Paris.  ("  Let- 
.tres  incites  de  Napoleon,"  August  22nd  and  29th,  1805.) 


436  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

able  craft  such  as  recalled  the  days  of  the  Emperor 
Tiberius. 

Indeed,  Napoleon  might  now  almost  say  that  his  chief 
foes  were  the  members  of  his  own  household.  The  ques- 
tion of  hereditary  succession  had  already  reawakened  and 
intensified  all  the  fierce  passions  of  the  Emperor's  rela- 
tives. Josephine  saw  in  it  the  fatal  eclipse  of  a  divorce 
sweeping  towards  the  dazzling  field  of  her  new  life,  and 
Napoleon  is  known  to  have  thrice  almost  decided  on  this 
step.  She  no  longer  had  any  hopes  of  bearing  a  child ; 
and  she  is  reported  by  the  compiler  of  the  Fouche  "  Me- 
moirs "  to  have  clutched  at  that  absurd  device,  a  supposi- 
titious child,  which  Fouche  had  taken  care  to  ridicule  in 
advance.  Whatever  be  the  truth  of  this  rumour,  she  cer- 
tainly used  all  her  powers  over  Napoleon  and  over  her 
daughter  Hortense,  the  spouse  of  Louis  Bonaparte,  to  have 
their  son  recognized  as  first  in  the  line  of  direct  succession. 
But  this  proposal,  which  shelved  both  Joseph  and  Louis,  was 
not  only  hotly  resented  by  the  eldest  brother,  who  claimed 
to  be  successor  designate,  it  also  aroused  the  flames  of 
jealousy  in  Louis  himself.  It  was  notorious  that  he  sus- 
pected Napoleon  of  an  incestuous  passion  for  Hortense,  of 
which  his  fondness  for  the  little  Charles  Napoleon  was 
maliciously  urged  as  proof  ;  and  the  proposal,  when  made 
with  trembling  eagerness  by  Josephine,  was  hurled  back 
by  Louis  with  brutal  violence.  To  the  clamour  of  Louis 
and  Joseph  the  Emperor  and  Josephine  seemed  reluctantly 
to  yield. 

New  arrangements  were  accordingly  proposed.  Lucien 
and  Jerome  having,  for  the  present  at  least,  put  them- 
selves out  of  court  by  their  unsatisfactory  marriages, 
Napoleon  appeared  to  accept  a  reconciliation  with  Joseph 
and  Louis,  and  to  place  them  in  the  order  of  succession, 
as  the  Senate  recommended.  But  he  still  reserved  the 
right  of  adopting  the  son  of  Louis  and  of  thus  favouring 
his  chances  of  priority.  Indeed,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  Emperor  at  this  difficult  crisis  showed  conjugal  tact 
and  affection,  for  which  he  has  received  scant  justice  at 
the  hands  of  Josephine's  champions.  "  How  could  I  di- 
vorce this  good  wife,"  he  said  to  Roederer,  "  because  I  am 
t  becoming  great  ?  "    But  fate  seemed  to  decree  the  divorce, 


xx  THE   DAWN   OF   THE    EMPIRE  437 

which,  despite  the  reasonings  of  his  brothers,  he  resolutely 
thrust  aside ;  for  the  little  boy  on  whose  life  the  Empress 
built  so  many  fond  hopes  was  to  be  cut  off  by  an  early 
death  in  the  year  1807. 

Then  there  were  frequent  disputes  between  Napoleon 
and  Joseph.  Both  of  them  had  the  Corsican's  instinct  in 
favour  of  primogeniture ;  and  hitherto  Napoleon  had  in 
many  ways  deferred  to  his  elder  brother.  Now,  however, 
he  showed  clearly  that  he  would  brook  not  the  slightest 
interference  in  affairs  of  State.  And  truly,  if  we  except 
Joseph's  diplomatic  services,  he  showed  no  commanding- 
gifts  such  as  could  raise  him  aloft  along  with  the  bewilder- 
ing rush  of  Napoleon's  fortunes.  The  one  was  an  irre- 
pressible genius,  the  other  was  a  man  of  culture  and  talent, 
whose  chief  bent  was  towards  literature,  amours,  and  the 
art  of  dolce  far  niente,  except  when  his  pride  was  touched  : 
then  he  was  capable  of  bursts  of  passion  which  seemed  to 
impose  even  on  his  masterful  second  brother.  Lucien, 
Louis,  and  even  the  youthful  Jerome,  had  the  same  in- 
tractable pride  which  rose  defiant  even  against  Napoleon. 
He  was  determined  that  his  brothers  should  now  take  a 
subordinate  rank,  while  they  regarded  the  dynasty  as 
largely  due  to  their  exertions  at  or  after  Brumaire,  and 
claimed  a  proportionate  reward.  Napoleon,  however,  saw 
that  a  dynasty  could  not  thus  be  founded.  As  he  frankly 
said  to  Roederer,  a  dynasty  could  only  take  firm  root  in 
France  among  heirs  brought  up  in  a  palace  :  "  I  have 
never  looked  on  my  brothers  as  the  natural  heirs  to  power  : 
I  only  consider  them  as  men  fit  to  ward  off  the  evils  of  a 
minority." 

Joseph  deeply  resented  this  conduct.  He  was  a  Prince 
of  the  Empire,  and  a  Grand  Elector  ;  but  he  speedily 
found  out  that  this  meant  nothing  more  than  occasionally 
presiding  at  the  Senate,  and  accordingly  indulged  in  little 
acts  of  opposition  that  enraged  the  autocrat.  In  his 
desire  to  get  his  brother  away  from  Paris,  the  Emperor 
had  already  recommended  him  to  take  up  the  profession 
of  arms  ;  for  he  could  not  include  him  in  the  succession, 
and  place  famous  marshals  under  him  if  he  knew  nothing 
of  an  army.  Joseph  perforce  accepted  the  command  of  a 
regiment,  and  at  thirty-six  years  of  age  began  to  learn 


438  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

drill  near  Boulogne.1  This  piece  of  burlesque  was  one 
day  to  prove  infinitely  regrettable.  After  the  disaster  of 
Vittoria,  Napoleon  doubtless  wished  that  Joseph  had  for 
ever  had  free  play  in  the  tribune  of  the  Senate  rather  than 
have  dabbled  in  military  affairs.  But  in  the  spring  and 
summer  of  1804  the  Emperor  noted  his  every  word  ;  so 
that,  when  he  ventured  to  suggest  that  Josephine  should 
not  be  crowned  at  the  coming  coronation,  Napoleon's 
wrath  blazed  forth.  Why  should  Joseph  speak  of  his 
rights  and  his  interests  ?  Who  had  won  power  ?  Who 
deserved  to  enjoy  power  ?  Power  was  his  (Napoleon's) 
mistress,  and  he  dared  Joseph  to  touch  her.  The  Senate 
or  Council  of  State  might  oppose  him  for  ten  years,  with- 
out his  becoming  a  tyrant  :  "  To  make  me  a  tyrant  one 
thing  alone  is  necessary — a  movement  of  my  family."2 

The  family,  however,  did  not  move.  As  happened  with 
all  the  brothers  except  Lucien,  Joseph  gave  way  at  the 
critical  moment.  After  threatening  at  the  Council  of 
State  to  resign  his  Grand  Electorate  and  retire  to  Germany 
if  his  wife  were  compelled  to  bear  Josephine's  train  at  the 
coronation,  he  was  informed  by  the  Emperor  that  either  he 
must  conduct  himself  dutifully  as  the  first  subject  of  the 
realm,  or  retire  into  private  life,  or  oppose  —  and  be 
crushed.  The  argument  was  unanswerable,  and  Joseph 
yielded.  To  save  his  own  and  his  wife's  feelings,  the 
wording  of  the  official  programme  was  altered  :  she  wasfo 
support  Josephine  s  mantle,  not  to  bear  her  train. 

In  things  great  and  small  Napoleon  carried  his  point. 
Although  Roederer  pleaded  long  and  earnestly  that  Joseph 
and  Louis  should  come  next  to  the  Emperor  in  the  suc- 
cession, and  inserted  a  clause  in  the  report  which  he  was 
intrusted  to  draw  up,  yet  by  some  skilful  artifice  this 
clause  was  withdrawn  from  the  constitutional  act  on  which 
the  nation  was  invited  to  express  its  opinion  :  and  France 
assented  to  a  plebiscite  for  the  establishment  of  the  Empire 
in  Napoleon's  family,  which  passed  over  Joseph  and  Louis, 
as  well  as  Lucien  and  Jerome,  and  vested  the  succession 
in  the  natural  or  adopted  son  of  Napoleon,  and  in  the  heirs 


1  Miot  de  Melito,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  i. 

2  Napoleon  to  Roederer,  "(Euvres,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  514. 


xx  THE   DAWN   OF   THE   EMPIRE  43D 

male  of  Joseph  or  Louis.  Consequently  these  princes  had 
no  place  in  the  succession,  except  by  virtue  of  the  senatus 
consultum  of  May  18th,  which  gave  them  a  legal  right,  it 
is  true,  but  without  the  added  sanction  of  the  popular 
vote.  More  than  three  and  a  half  million  votes  were  cast 
for  the  new  arrangement,  a  number  which  exceeded  those 
given  for  the  Consulate  and  the  Consulate  for  Life.  As 
usual,  France  accepted  accomplished  facts. 

Matters  legal  and  ceremonial  were  now  approaching 
completion  for  the  coronation.  Negotiations  had  been 
proceeding  between  the  Tuileries  and  the  Vatican,  Napo- 
leon begging  and  indeed  requiring  the  presence  of  the 
Pope  on  that  occasion.  Pius  VII.  was  troubled  at  the 
thought  of  crowning  the  murderer  of  the  Due  d'Enghien  ; 
but  he  was  scarcely  his  own  master,  and  the  dextrous 
hints  of  Napoleon  that  religion  would  benefit  if  he  were 
present  at  Notre  Dame  seem  to  have  overcome  his  first 
scruples,  besides  quickening  the  hope  of  recovering  the 
north  of  his  States.  He  was  to  be  disappointed  in  more 
ways  than  one.  Religion  was  to  benefit  only  from  the 
enhanced  prestige  given  to  her  rites  in  the  coming  cere- 
mony, not  in  the  practical  way  that  the  Pope  desired. 
And  yet  it  was  of  the  first  importance  for  Napoleon  to 
receive  the  holy  oil  and  the  papal  blessing,  for  only  so 
could  he  hope  to  wean  the  affections  of  royalists  from  their 
uncrowned  and  exiled  king.  Doubtless  this  was  one  of  the 
chief  reasons  for  the  restoration  of  religion  by  the  Con- 
cordat, as  was  shrewdly  seen  at  the  time  by  Lafayette, 
who  laughingly  exclaimed  :  "  Confess,  general,  that  your 
chief  wish  is  for  the  little  phial."  1  The  sally  drew  from 
the  First  Consul  an  obscene  disclaimer  worthy  of  a  drunken 
ostler.     Nevertheless,  the  little  phial  was  now  on  its  way. 

In  order  to  divest  the  meeting  of  Pope  and  Emperor  of 
any  awkward  ceremony,  Napoleon  arranged  that  it  should 
take  place  on  the  road  between  Fontainebleau  and  Ne- 
mours, as  a  chance  incident  in  the  middle  of  a  day's  hunting. 
The  benevolent  old  pontiff  was  reclining  in  his  carriage, 
weary  with  the  long  journey  through  the  cold  of  an  early 
winter,  when  he  was  startled  to  see  the  retinue  of  li is  host. 
The  contrast  in  every  way  was  striking.     The  figure  of 

Lafayette,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  v.,  p.  182. 


440  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  Emperor  had  now  attained  the  fulness  which  betokens 
abounding  health  and  strength  :  his  face  was  slightly 
flushed  with  the  hunt  and  the  consciousness  that  he  was 
master  of  the  situation,  and  his  form  on  horseback  gained 
a  dignity  from  which  the  shortness  of  his  legs  somewhat 
detracted  when  on  foot.  As  he  rode  up  attired  in  full 
hunting  costume,  he  might  have  seemed  the  embodiment 
of  triumphant  strength.  The  Pope,  on  the  other  hand, 
clad  in  white  garments  and  with  white  silk  shoes,  gave  an 
impression  of  peaceful  benevolence,  had  not  his  intellectual 
features  borne  signs  of  the  protracted  anxieties  of  his 
pontificate.  The  Emperor  threw  himself  from  his  horse 
and  advanced  to  meet  his  guest,  who  on  his  side  alighted, 
rather  unwillingly,  in  the  mud  to  give  and  receive  the  em- 
brace of  welcome.  Meanwhile  Napoleon's  carriage  had 
been  driven  up  :  footmen  were  holding  open  both  doors, 
and  an  officer  of  the  Court  politely  handed  Pius  VII.  to 
the  left  door,  while  the  Emperor,  entering  by  the  right, 
took  the  seat  of  honour,  and  thus  settled  once  for  all  the 
vexed  question  of  social  precedence.1 

During  the  Pope's  sojourn  at  Fontainebleau,  Josephine 
breathed  to  him  her  anxiety  as  to  her  marriage  ;  it  hav- 
ing been  only  a  civil  contract,  she  feared  its  dissolution, 
and  saw  in  the  Pope's  intervention  a  chance  of  a  firmer 
union  with  her  consort.  The  pontiff  comforted  her  and 
required  from  Napoleon  the  due  solemnization  of  his  mar- 
riage ;  it  was  therefore  secretly  performed  by  Napoleon's 
uncle,  Cardinal  Fesch,  two  days  before  the  coronation.2 

It  was  not  enough,  however,  that  the  successor  of  St. 
Peter  should  grace  the  coronation  with  his  presence :  the 
Emperor  sought  to  touch  the  imagination  of  men  by  figur- 
ing as  the  successor  of  Charlemagne.     We  here  approach 

1 "  M&noires  de  Savary,  Due  de  Rovigo."  So  Bourrienne,  who  was 
informed  by  Rapp,  who  was  present  (vol.  ii.,  ch.  xxxiii.).  The  "  Moni- 
teur  "  (4th  Frimaire,  Year  XIII.)  asserted  that  the  Pope  took  the  right- 
hand  seat ;  but  I  distrust  its  version. 

2  Mine,  de  R&nusat,  vol.  i.,  ch.  x.  As  the  cure  of  the  parish  was  not 
present,  even  as  witness,  this  new  contract  was  held  by  the  Bonapartes  to 
lack  full  validity.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  Fesch  always  maintained 
that  the  marriage  could  only  be  annulled  by  an  act  of  arbitrary  authority. 
For  Napoleon's  refusal  to  receive  the  communion  on  the  morning  of  the 
coronation,  lest  he,  being  what  he  was,  should  be  guilty  of  sacrilege  and 
hypocrisy,  see  Segur. 


xx  THE   DAWN   OF   THE    EMPIRE  441 

one  of  the  most  interesting  experiments  of  the  modern 
world,  which,  if  successful,  would  profoundly  have  altered 
the  face  of  Europe  and  the  character  of  its  States.  Even 
in  its  failure  it  attests  Napoleon's  vivid  imagination  and 
boundless  mental  resources.  He  aspired  to  be  more  than 
Emperor  of  the  French:  he  wished  to  make  his  Empire 
a  cosmopolitan  realm,  whose  confines  might  rival  those  of 
the  Holy  Roman.  Empire  of  one  thousand  years  before, 
and  embrace  scores  of  peoples  in  a  grand,  well-ordered 
European  polity. 

Already  his  dominions  included  a  million  of  Germans 
in  the  Rhineland,  Italians  of  Piedmont,  Genoa,  and  Nice, 
besides  Savoyards,  Genevese,  and  Belgians.  How  potent 
would  be  his  influence  on  the  weltering  chaos  of  German 
and  Italian  States,  if  these  much-divided  peoples  learnt 
to  look  on  him  as  the  successor  to  the  gk»ries  of  Charle- 
magne !  And  this  honour  he  was  now  to  claim.  However 
delusive  was  the  parallel  between  the  old  semi-tribal  polity 
and  modern  States  where  the  peoples  were  awakening  to 
a  sense  of  their  nationality,  Napoleon  was  now  in  a  posi- 
tion to  clear  the  way  for  his  great  experiment.  He  had 
two  charms  wherewith  to  work,  material  prosperity  and 
his  gift  of  touching  the  popular  imagination.  The  former 
of  these  was  already  silently  working  in  his  favour :  the 
latter  was  first  essayed  at  the  coronation. 

Already,  after  a  sojourn  at  Boulogne,  he  had  visited 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  the  city  where  Charlemagne's  relics  are 
entombed,  and  where  Victor  Hugo  in  some  of  his  sublim- 
est  verse  has  pictured  Charles  V.  kneeling  in  prayer  to 
catch  the  spirit  of  the  mediaeval  hero.  Thither  went 
Napoleon,  but  in  no  suppliant  mood ;  for  when  Josephine 
was  offered  the  arm-bones  of  the  great  dead,  she  also 
proudly  replied  that  she  would  not  deprive  the  city  of 
that  precious  relic,  especially  as  she  had  the  support  of 
an  arm  as  great  as  that  of  Charlemagne.1  The  insignia 
and  the  sword  of  that  monarch  were  now  brought  to 
Paris,  and  shed  on  the  ceremony  of  coronation  that  his- 
toric gleam  which  was  needed  to  redeem  it  from  tawdry 
commonplace. 

All  that  money  and  art  could  do  to  invest  the  affair 

1  S£gur,  ch.  xi. 


442  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

with  pomp  and  circumstance  had  already  been  done. 
The  advice  of  the  new  Master  of  the  Ceremonies,  M.  de 
Segur,  and  the  hints  of  the  other  nobles  who  had  rallied 
to  the  new  Empire,  had  been  carefully  collated  by  the 
untiring  brain  that  now  watched  over  France.  The  sum 
of  1,123,000  francs  had  been  expended  on  the  coronation 
robes  of  Emperor  and  Empress,  and  far  more  on  crowns 
and  tiaras.  The  result  was  seen  in  costumes  of  match- 
less splendour ;  the  Emperor  wore  a  French  coat  of  red 
velvet  embroidered  in  gold,  a  short  cloak  adorned  with 
bees  and  the  collar  of  the  Legion  of  Honour  in  diamonds ; 
and  at  the  archbishop's  palace  he  assumed  the  long  purple 
robe  of  velvet  profusely  ornamented  with  ermine,  while 
his  brow  was  encircled  by  a  wreath  of  laurel,  meed  of 
mighty  conquerors.  In  the  pommel  of  his  sword  flashed 
the  famous  Pitt  diamond,  which,  after  swelling  the  family 
fortune  of  the  British  statesman,  fell  to  the  Regent  of 
France,  and  now  graced  the  coronation  of  her  Dictator. 
The  Empress,  radiant  with  joy  at  her  now  indissoluble 
union,  bore  her  splendours  with  an  easy  grace  that 
charmed  all  beholders  and  gave  her  an  almost  girlish 
air.  She  wore  a  robe  of  white  satin,  trimmed  with  silver 
and  gold  and  besprinkled  with  golden  bees :  her  waist 
and  shoulders  glittered  with  diamonds,  while  on  her 
brows  rested  a  diadem  of  the  finest  diamonds  and  pearls 
valued  at  more  than  a  million  francs.1  The  curious  might 
remember  that  for  a  necklace  of  less  than  twice  that  value 
the  fair  fame  of  Marie  Antoinette  had  been  clouded  over 
and  the  House  of  Bourbon  shaken  to  its  base. 

The  stately  procession  began  with  an  odd  incident: 
Napoleon  and  Josephine,  misled  apparently  by  the  all- 
pervading  splendour  of  the  new  state  carriage,  seated 
themselves  on  the  wrong  side,  that  is,  in  the  seats  des- 
tined for  Joseph  and  Louis :  the  mistake  was  at  once 
made  good,  with  some  merriment ;  but  the  superstitious 
saw  in  it  an  omen  of  evil.2  And  now,  amidst  much  en- 
thusiasm and  far  greater  curiosity,  the  procession  wound 

1  F.  Masson's  "Josephine,  Imp^ratrice  et  Reine,"  p.  229.  For  the 
Pitt  diamond,  see  Yule's  pamphlet  and  Sir  M.  Grant  Duff's  "  Diary," 
June  30,  1888. 

2  De  Bausset,  "  Court  de  Napoleon,"  ch.  ii. 


xx  THE   DAWN   OF  THE    EMPIRE  443 

along  through  the  Rue  Nicaise  and  the  Rue  St.  Honore — 
streets  where  Bonaparte  had  won  his  spurs  on  the  day 
of  Vendemiaire —  over  the  Pont-Neuf,  and  so  to  the  ven- 
erable cathedral,  where  the  Pope,  chilled  by  long  wait- 
ing, was  ready  to  grace  the  ceremony.  First  he  anointed 
Emperor  and  Empress  with  the  holy  oil;  then,  at  the 
suitable  place  in  the  Mass  he  blessed  their  crowns,  rings, 
and  mantles,  uttering  the  traditional  prayers  for  the  pos- 
session of  the  virtues  and  powers  which  each  might  seem 
to  typify.  But  when  he  was  about  to  crown  the  Emperor, 
he  was  gently  waved  aside,  and  Napoleon  with  his  own 
hands  crowned  himself.  A  thrill  ran  through  the  august 
assembly,  either  of  pity  for  the  feelings  of  the  aged  pon- 
tiff or  of  admiration  at  the  "  noble  and  legitimate  pride  " 
of  the  great  captain  who  claimed  as  wholly  his  own  the 
crown  which  his  own  right  arm  had  won.  Then  the 
cortege  slowly  returned  to  the  middle  of  the  nave,  where 
a  lofty  throne  had  been  reared. 

Another  omen  now  startled  those  who  laid  store  by 
trifles.  It  was  noticed  that  the  sovereigns  in  ascending 
the  steps  nearly  fell  backwards  under  the  weight  of  their 
robes  and  trains,  though  in  the  case  of  Josephine  the 
anxious  moment  may  have  been  due  to  the  carelessness, 
whether  accidental  or  studied,  of  her  "mantle-bearers." 
But  to  those  who  looked  beneath  the  surface  of  things 
was  not  this  an  all-absorbing  .portent,  that  all  this  reli- 
gious pomp  should  be  removed  by  scarcely  eleven  years 
from  the  time  when  this  same  nave  echoed  to  the  shouts 
and  gleamed  with  the  torches  of  the  worshippers  of  the 
newly  enthroned   Goddess  of  Reason  ? 

Revolutionary  feelings  were  not  wholly  dead,  but  they 
now  vented  themselves  merely  in  gibes.  On  the  night 
before  the  coronation  the  walls  of  Paris  were  adorned  with 
posters  announcing :  The  last  Representation  of  the  French 
Revolution — for  the  Benefit  of  a  poor  Corsiean  Family. 
And  after  the  event  there  were  inquiries  why  the  new 
throne  had  no  glands  cVor:  the  answer  suggested,  because 
it  was  sanglant.1  Beyond  these  quips  and  jests  the 
Jacobins  and  royalists  did  not  go.  When  the  phrase 
your  subjects  was  publicly  assigned   to  the    Corps  LSgis- 

1  "Foreign  Office  Records,"  Intelligences,  No.  42G. 


444 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I 


CHAP.   IX 


latif  by  its  courtier-like  president,  Fontanes,  there  was  a 
flutter  of  wrath  among  those  who  had  hoped  that  the 
new  Empire  was  to  be  republican.  But  it  quickly  passed 
away ;  and  no  Frenchman,  except  perhaps  Carnot,  made 
so  manly  a  protest  as  the  man  of  genius  at  Vienna,  who 
had  composed  the  "Sinfonia  Eroica,"  and  with  grand 
republican  simplicity  inscribed  it,  "  Beethoven  a  Bona- 
parte." When  the  master  heard  that  his  former  hero 
had  taken  the  imperial  crown,  he  tore  off  the  dedica- 
tion with  a  volley  of  curses  on  the  renegade  and  tyrant ; 
and  in  later  years  he  dedicated  the  immortal  work  to  the 
memory  of  a  great  man. 


CHAPTER   XXI 

THE  BOULOGNE  FLOTILLA 

The  establishment  of  the  Empire,  as  has  been  seen, 
provoked  few  signs  of  opposition  from  the  French  armies, 
once  renowned  for  their  Jacobinism ;  and  by  one  or  two 
instances  of  well-timed  clemency,  the  Emperor  gained  over 
even  staunch  republicans.  Notably  was  this  the  case  with 
a  brave  and  stalwart  colonel,  who,  enraged  at  the  first  vol- 
ley of  cheers  for  the  Empire,  boldly  ordered  "  Silence  in 
the  ranks."  At  once  Napoleon  made  him  general  and 
appointed  him  one  of  his  aides-de-camp ;  and  this  brave 
officer,  Mouton  by  name,  was  later  to  gain  glory  and  the 
title  of  Comte  de  Lobau  in  the  Wagrain  campaign.  These 
were  the  results  of  a  timely  act  of  generosity,  such  as 
touches  the  hearts  of  any  soldiery  and  leads  them  to  shed 
their  blood  like  water.  And  so  when  Napoleon,  after  the 
coronation,  distributed  to  the  garrison  of  Paris  their  stand- 
ards, topped  now  by  the  imperial  eagles,  the  great  Champ 
de  Mars  was  a  scene  of  wild  enthusiasm.  The  thunderous 
shouts  that  acclaimed  the  prowess  of  the  new  Prankish 
leader  were  as  warlike  as  those  which  ever  greeted  the 
hoisting  of  a  Carolingian  King  on  the  shields  of  his  lieges. 
Distant  nations  heard  the  threatening  din  and  hastened  to 
muster  their  forces  for  the  fray. 

As  yet  only  England  was  at  war  with  the  Emperor. 
Against  her  Napoleon  now  prepared  to  embattle  the  might 
of  his  vast  Empire.  The  preparations  on  the  northern 
coast  were  now  wellnigh  complete,  and  there  was  only  one 
question  to  be  solved  —  how  to  "leap  the  ditch."  It  seems 
istrange  to  us  now  that  no  attempt  was  made  to  utilize  the 
great  motive  force  of  the  nineteenth  century — steam 
power.       And     the     French     memoir-writers,     Marmont, 

fourrienne,  Pasquier,  and  Bausset,  have  expressed  their 
445 


446  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

surprise  that  so  able  a  chief  as  Napoleon  should  have 
neglected  this  potent  ally. 

Their  criticisms  seem  to  be  prompted  by  later  reflec- 
tions rather  than  based  on  an  accurate  statement  of  facts. 
In  truth,  the  nineteenth-century  Hercules  was  still  in  his 
cradle.  Henry  Bell  had  in  1800  experimented  with  a 
steamer  on  the  Clyde  ;  but  it  aroused  the  same  trembling 
curiosity  as  Trevithick's  first  locomotive,  or  as  Fulton's 
first  paddle-boat  built  on  the  Seine  in  1803.  In  fact,  this 
boat  of  the  great  American  inventor  was  so  weak  that, 
when  at  anchor,  it  broke  in  half  during  a  gale,  thus  rid- 
ding itself  of  the  weight  of  its  cumbrous  engine.  With 
his  usual  energy,  Fulton  built  a  larger  and  stronger  craft, 
which  not  only  carried  the  machinery,  but,  in  August, 
1803,  astonished  the  members  of  the  French  Institute  by 
moving,  though  with  much  circumspection. 

Fulton,  however,  was  disappointed,  and  if  we  may  judge 
from  the  scanty  records  of  his  life,  he  never  offered  this 
invention  to  Napoleon.1  He  felt  the  need  of  better  ma- 
chinery, and  as  this  could  only  be  procured  in  England, 
he  gave  the  order  to  a  Birmingham  firm,  which  engined 
his  first  successful  boat,  the  "  Clermont,"  launched  on  the 
Hudson  in  1807.  But  for  the  war,  perhaps,  Fulton  would 
have  continued  to  live  in  Paris  and  made  his  third  attempt 
there.  He  certainly  never  offered  his  imperfect  steamship 
to  the  First  Consul.  Probably  the  fact  that  his  first  boat 
foundered  when  at  anchor  in  the  Seine  would  have  pro- 
cured him  a  rough  reception,  if  he  had  offered  to  equip 
the  whole  of  the  Boulogne  flotilla  with  an  invention  which 
had  sunk  its  first  receptacle  and  propelled  the  second  boat 
at  a  snail's  pace. 

Besides,  he  had  already  met  with  one  repulse  from 
Napoleon.  He  had  offered,  first  to  the  Directory  and 
later  to  the  First  Consul,  a  boat  which  he  claimed  would 
"deliver  France  and  the  world  from  British  oppression." 
This  was  a  sailing  vessel,  which  could  sink  under  water 
and  then  discharge  under  a  hostile  ship  a  "carcass"  of 
gunpowder  or  torpedo  —  another  invention  of  his  fertile 
brain.  The  Directory  at  once  repulsed  him.  Bonaparte 
instructed  Monge,  Laplace,  and  Volney  to  report  on  this 

1  "Life  of  Fulton,"  by  Colden  (1817)  ;  also  one  by  Reigart  (1856). 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  447 

submarine  or  "plunging"  boat,  which  had  a  partial  suc- 
cess. It  succeeded  in  blowing  up  a  small  vessel  in  the 
harbour  at  Brest  in  July,  1801 ;  but  the  Commission 
seems  to  have  reported  unfavourably  on  its  utility  for 
offensive  purposes.  In  truth,  as  Fulton  had  not  then 
applied  motive  power  to  this  invention,  the  name  "  plung- 
ing boat "  conveyed  an  exaggerated  notion  of  its  functions, 
which  were  more  suited  to  a  life  of  ascetic  contemplation 
than  of  destructive  activity. 

It  appears  that  the  memoir-writers  named  above  have 
confused  the  two  distinct  in/entions  of  Fulton  just  re- 
ferred to.  In  the  latter  half  of  1803  he  repaired  to  Eng- 
land, and  later  on  to  the  United  States,  and  after  the  year 
1803  he  seems  to  have  had  neither  the  will  nor  the  oppor- 
tunity to  serve  Napoleon.  In  England  he  offered  his  tor- 
pedo patent  to  the  English  Admiralty,  expressing  his 
hatred  of  the  French  Emperor  as  a  "wild  beast  who  ought 
to  be  hunted  down."  Little  was  done  with  the  torpedo  in 
England,  except  to  blow  up  a  vessel  off  Walmer  as  a  proof 
of  what  it  could  do.  It  is  curious  also  that  when  Bell 
offered  his  paddle-boat  to  the  Admiralty  it  was  refused, 
though  Nelson  is  said  to  have  spoken  in  its  favour.  The 
official  mind  is  everywhere  hostile  to  new  inventions ;  and 
Marmont  suggestively  remarks  that  Bonaparte's  training 
as  an  artillerist,  and  his  experience  of  the  inconvenience 
and  expense  resulting  from  the  adoption  of  changes  in 
that  arm,  had  no  slight  influence  in  setting  him  against 
all  innovations. 

But,  to  resume  our  description  of  the  Boulogne  flotilla 
it  may  be  of  interest  to  give  some  hitherto  unpublished 
details  about  the  flat-bottomed  boats,  and  then  to  pass  in 
brief  review  Napoleon's  plans  for  assuring  a  temporary 
command  of  the  Channel. 

It  is  clear  that  he  at  first  relied  almost  solely  on  the  flo- 
tilla. After  one  of  his  visits  to  Boulogne,  he  wrote  on  No- 
vember 23rd,  1803,  to  Admiral  Gantheaume  that  he  would 
soon  have  on  the  northern  coast  1,300  flat-bottomed  boats 
able  to  carry  100,000  men,  while  the  Dutch  flotilla  would 
transport  60,000.  "Do  you  think  it  will  take  us  to  the 
English  coast?  Eight  hours  of  darkness  which  favour  us 
would  decide  the  fate  of  the  universe."     There  is  no  men- 


448  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

tion  of  any  convoying  fleet :  the  First  Consul  evidently 
believed  that  the  flotilla  could  beat  off  any  attack  at  sea. 
This  letter  offers  a  signal  proof  of  his  inability,  at  least  at 
that  time,  to  understand  the  risks  of  naval  warfare.  But 
though  his  precise  and  logical  mind  seems  then  to  have 
been  incapable  of  fully  realizing  the  conditions  of  war  on 
the  fickle,  troublous,  and  tide-swept  Channel,  his  admirals 
urgently  warned  him  against  trusting  to  shallow,  flat-bot- 
tomed boats  to  beat  the  enemy  out  at  sea ;  for  though  these 
praams  in  their  coasting  trips  repelled  the  attacks  of  Brit- 
ish cruisers,  which  dared  not  come  into  shallow  waters,  it 
did  not  follow  that  they  would  have  the  same  success  in 
mid-Channel,  far  away  from  coast  defences  and  amidst 
choppy  waves  that  must  render  the  guns  of  keelless  boats 
wellnigh  useless.1 

The  present  writer,  after  going  through  the  reports  of 
our  admiral  stationed  in  the  Downs,  is  convinced  that  our 
seamen  felt  a  supreme  contempt  for  the  flat-bottomed 
boats  when  at  sea.  After  the  capture  of  one  of  them,  by 
an  English  gun-brig,  Admiral  Montagu  reported,  Novem- 
ber 23rd,  1803  : 

"  It  is  impossible  to  suppose  for  an  instant  that  anything  effective 
can  be  produced  by  such  miserable  tools,  equally  ill-calculated  for  the 
grand  essentials  in  a  maritime  formation,  battle  and  speed  :  that 
floored  as  this  wretched  vessel  is,  she  cannot  hug  the  wind,  but  must 
drift  bodily  to  leeward,  which  indeed  was  the  cause  of  her  capture ; 
for,  having  got  a  little  to  leeward  of  Boulogne  Bay,  it  was  impossible 
to  get  back  and  she  was  necessitated  to  steer  large  for  Calais.  On 
the  score  of  battle,  she  has  one  long  18-pounder,  without  breeching  or 
tackle,  traversing  on  a  slide,  which  can  only  be  fired  stem  on.  The 
8-pounder  is  mounted  aft,  but  is  a  fixture  :  so  that  literally,  if  one  of 
our  small  boats  was  to  lay  alongside  there  would  be  nothing  but 
musketry  to  resist,  and  those  [sic]  placed  in  the  hands  of  poor 
wretches  weakened  by  the  effect  of  seasickness,  exemplified  when  this 
gun-boat  was  captured  —  the  soldiers  having  retreated  to  the  hold,  in- 
capable of  any  energy  or  manly  exertion.  ...  In  short,  Sir,  these 
vessels  in  my  mind  are  completely  contemptible  and  ridiculous,  and 
I  therefore  conclude  that  the  numbers  collected  at  Boulogne  are  to 

1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  "  Guerres  Maritimes,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  75;  Cheva- 
lier, "Hist,  de  la  Marine  Francaise,"  p.  105;  Capt.  Desbriere's  "Pro- 
jets  de  D^barquement  aux  lies  Britanniques,"  vol.  i.  The  accompanying 
engraving  shows  how  fantastic  were  some  of  the  earlier  French  schemes 
of  invasion. 


:xi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  449 

:eep  our  attention  on  the  qui  vive,  and  to  gloss  over  the  real  attack 
neditated  from  other  points." 

rhe  vessel  which  provoked  the  contempt  of  our  admiral 
vas  not  one  of  the  smallest  class  :  she  was  58^  ft.  long, 
14^  ft.  wide,  drew  8  ft.  forward  and  4  ft.  aft :  her  sides 
■ose  3  ft.  above  the  water,  and  her  capacity  was  35  tons, 
rhe  secret  intelligence  of  the  Admiralty  for  the  years 
L804  and  1805  also  shows  that  Dutch  sailors  were  equally 
jonvinced  of  the  unseaworthiness  of  these  craft  :  Admiral 
Verhuell  plainly  told  the  French  Emperor  that,  however 
latterers  might  try  to  persuade  him  of  the  feasibility  of 
;he  expedition,  "nothing  but  disgrace  could  be  expected." 
rhe  same  volume  (No.  426)  contains  a  report  of  the  cap- 
ture of  two  of  the  larger  class  of  French  chaloupes  off 
Cape  La  Hogue.  Among  the  prisoners  was  a  young 
French  royalist  named  La  Bourdonnais  :  when  forced  by 
bhe  conscription  to  enter  Napoleon's  service,  he  chose  to 
serve  with  the  chaloupes  "  because  of  his  conviction  that 
all  these  flotillas  were  nothing  but  bugbears  and  would 
never  attempt  the  invasion  so  much  talked  of  and  in 
which  so  few  persons  really  believe."  The  same  was  the 
opinion  of  the  veteran  General  Dumouriez,  who,  now  an 
exile  in  England,  drew  up  for  our  Government  a  long 
report  on  the  proposed  invasion  and  the  means  of  thwart- 
ing it.  The  reports  of  our  spies  also  prove  that  all  ex- 
perienced seamen  on  the  Continent  declared  Napoleon's 
project  to  be  either  a  ruse  or  a  foolhardy  venture. 

The  compiler  of  the  Ney  "  Memoirs,"  who  was  certainly 
well  acquainted  with  the  opinions  of  that  Marshal,  then 
commanding  the  troops  at  Boulogne,  also  believed  that  the 
flotilla  was  only  able  to  serve  as  a  gigantic  ferry.1  The 
French  admirals  were  still  better  aware  of  the  terrible 
risks  to  their  crowded  craft  in  a  fight  out  at  sea.  They 
also  pointed  out  that  the  difference  in  the  size,  draught, 
and  speed  of  the  boats  must  cause  the  dispersion  of  the 
flotilla,  when  its  parts  might  fall  a  prey  to  the  more  sea- 
tvorthy  vessels  of  the  enemy.  Indeed,  the  only  chance  of 
srossing  without  much  loss  seemed  to  be  offered  by  a  pro- 

1  "  M^moires  du  Marshal  Ney,"  bk.  vii.,  ch.  i.  ;  so  too  Marmont,  vol.  ii., 
>.  213  ;  Mahan,  "  Sea  Power,"  ch.  xv. 

26 


450  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

tracted  calm,  when  the  British  cruisers  would  be  helpless 
against  a  combined  attack  of  a  cloud  of  rowboats.  The 
risks  would  be  greater  during  a  fog,  when  the  crowd  of 
boats  must  be  liable  to  collision,  stranding  on  shoals,  and 
losing  their  way.  Even  the  departure  of  this  quaint 
armada  presented  grave  difficulties  :  it  was  found  that  the 
whole  force  could  not  clear  the  harbour  in  a  single  tide  ; 
and  a  part  of  the  flotilla  must  therefore  remain  exposed 
to  the  British  fire  before  the  whole  mass  could  get  under 
way.  For  all  these  reasons  Bruix,  the  commander  of  the 
flotilla,  and  Decres,  Minister  of  Marine,  dissuaded  Napo- 
leon from  attempting  the  descent  without  the  support  of 
a  powerful  covering  fleet. 

Napoleon's  correspondence  shows  that,  by  the  close  of 
the  year  1803,  he  had  abandoned  that  first  fatuous  scheme 
which  gained  him  from  the  wits  of  Paris  the  soubriquet 
of  "  Don  Quixote  de  la  Manche."  1  On  the  7th  of  Decem- 
ber he  wrote  to  Gantheaume,  maritime  prefect  at  Toulon, 
urging  him  to  press  on  the  completion  of  his  nine  ships  of 
the  line  and  five  frigates,  and  sketching  plans  of  a  naval 
combination  that  promised  to  insure  the  temporary  com- 
mand of  the  Channel.  Of  these  only  two  need  be  cited 
here  : 

1.  "  The  Toulon  squadron  will  set  out  on  20th  nivose  (January 
10th,  1804),  will  arrive  before  Cadiz  (or  Lisbon),  will  find  there  the 
Rochefort  squadron,  will  sail  on  without  making  land,  between  Brest 
and  the  Sorlingues,  will  touch  at  Cape  La  Hogue,  and  will  pass  in 
forty-eight  hours  before  Boulogne  :  thence  it  will  continue  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Scheldt  (there  procuring  masts,  cordage,  and  all  needful 
things)  — or  perhaps  to  Cherbourg. 

2.  "  The  Rochefort  squadron  will  set  out  on  20th  nivose,  will  reach 
Toulon  the  20th  plumose :  the  united  squadrons  will  set  sail  in  ventose, 
and  arrive  in  germinal  before  Boulogne  —  that  is  rather  late.  In  any 
case  the  Egyptian  Expedition  will  cover  the  departure  of  the  Toulon 
squadron  :  everything  will  be  managed  so  that  Nelson  will  first  sail  for 
Alexandria." 

These  schemes  reveal  the  strong  and  also  the  weak 
qualities  of  Napoleon.  He  perceived  the  strength  of  the 
central  position  which  France  enjoyed  on  her  four  coasts ; 
and  he  now  contrived  all  his  dispositions,  both  naval  and 
political,  so  as  to  tempt  Nelson  away  eastwards  from  Tou- 

1Roederer,  "(Euvres,"  vol.  Hi.,  p.  494. 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  451 

Ion  during  the  concentration  of  the  French  fleet  in  the 
Channel ;  and  for  this  purpose  he  informed  the  military 
officers  at  Toulon  that  their  destination  was  Taranto  and 
the  Morea.  It  was  to  these  points  that  he  wished  to  decoy 
Nelson  ;  for  this  end  had  he  sent  his  troops  to  Taranto, 
and  kept  up  French  intrigues  in  Corfu,  the  Morea,  and 
Egypt ;  it  was  for  this  purpose  that  he  charged  that  wily 
spy  Mehee  to  inform  Drake  that  the  Toulon  fleet  was  to 
take  40,000  French  troops  to  the  Morea,  and  that  the 
Brest  fleet,  with  200  highly  trained  Irish  officers,  was 
intended  solely  for  Ireland.  But,  while  displaying  con- 
summate guile,  he  failed  to  allow  for  the  uncertainties  of 
operations  conducted  by  sea.  Ignoring  the  patent  fact 
that  the  Toulon  fleet  was  blockaded  by  Nelson,  and  that 
of  Rochefort  by  Collingwood,  he  fixed  the  dates  of  their 
departure  and  junction  as  though  he  were  ordering  the 
movements  of  a  corps  oVarmee  in  Provence  ;  and  this  crav- 
ing for  certainty  was  to  mar  his  naval  plans  and  dog  his 
footsteps  with  the  shadow  of  disaster.1 

The  plan  of  using  the  Toulon  fleet  to  cover  an  inva- 
sion of  England  was  not  entirely  new.  As  far  back  as 
the  days  of  De  Tourville,  a  somewhat  similar  plan  had 
been  devised  :  the  French  Channel  and  Atlantic  fleets 
under  that  admiral  were  closely  to  engage  Russell  off 
the  Isle  of  Wight,  while  the  Toulon  squadron,  sailing 
northwards,  was  to  collect  the  French  transports  on  the 
coasts  of  Normandy  for  the  invasion  of  England.  Had 
Napoleon  carefully  studied  French  naval  history,  he 
would  have  seen  that  the  disaster  of  La  Hogue  was 
largely  caused  by  the  severe  weather  which  prevented 
the  rendezvous,  and  brought  about  a  hasty  and  ill- 
advised  alteration  in  the  original  scheme.  But  of  all 
subjects  on  which  he  spoke  as  an  authority,  there  was 
perhaps  not  one  that  he  had  so  inadequately  studied  as 
naval  strategy  :  yet  there  was  none  wherein  the  lessons  of 
experience  needed  so  carefully  to  be  laid  to  heart. 

1  Colonel  Campbell,  our  Commissioner  at  Elba,  noted  in  his  diary  (De- 
cember 5th,  1814)  :  "  As  I  have  perceived  in  many  conversations,  Napo- 
leon has  no  idea  of  the  difficulties  occasioned  by  winds  and  tides,  but 
judges  of  changes  of  position  in  the  case  of  ships  as  he  would  with  regard 
to  troops  on  land. " 


452  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Fortune  seemed  to  frown  on  Napoleon's  naval  schemes  : 
yet  she  was  perhaps  not  unkind  in  thwarting  them  in 
their  first  stages.  Events  occurred  which  early  sug- 
gested a  deviation  from  the  combinations  noticed  above. 
In  the  last  days  of  1803,  hearing  that  the  English  were 
about  to  attack  Martinique,  he  at  once  wrote  to  Gan- 
theaume,  urging  him  to  despatch  the  Toulon  squadron 
under  Admiral  Latouche-Treville  for  the  rescue  of  this 
important  island.  The  commander  of  the  troops,  Cervoni, 
was  to  be  told  that  the  expedition  aimed  at  the  Morea, 
so  that  spies  might  report  this  news  to  Nelson,  and  it  is 
clear  from  our  admiral's  despatches  that  the  ruse  half 
succeeded.  Distracted,  however,  by  the  thought  that 
the  French  might,  after  all,  aim  at  Ireland,  Nelson  clung 
to  the  vicinity  of  Toulon,  and  his  untiring  zeal  kept 
in  harbour  the  most  daring  admiral  in  the  French  navy, 
who,  despite  his  advanced  age,  excited  an  enthusiasm  that 
none  other  could  arouse.      , 

To  him,  in  spite  of  his  present  ill-fortune,  Napoleon 
intrusted  the  execution  of  a  scheme  bearing  date  July 
2nd,  1804.  Latouche  was  ordered  speedily  to  put  to  sea 
with  his  ten  ships  of  the  line  and  four  frigates,  to  rally 
a  French  warship  then  at  Cadiz,  release  the  five  ships 
of  the  line  and  four  frigates  blockaded  at  Rochefort  by 
Collingwood,  and  then  sweep  the  Channel  and  convoy 
the  flotilla  across  the  straits.  This  has  been  pronounced 
by  Jurien  de  la  Graviere  the  best  of  all  Napoleon's 
plans  :  it  exposed  ships  that  had  long  been  in  harbour 
only  to  a  short  ocean  voyage,  and  it  was  free  from  the 
complexity  of  the  later  and  more  grandiose  schemes. 

But  fate  interposed  and  carried  off  the  intrepid  com- 
mander by  that  worst  of  all  deaths  for  a  brave  seaman, 
death  by  disease  in  harbour,  where  he  was  shut  up  by 
his  country's  foes  (August  20th). 

Villeneuve  was  thereupon  appointed  to  succeed  him, 
while  Missiessy  held  command  at  Rochefort.  The  choice 
of  Villeneuve  has  always  been  considered  strange  ;  and 
the  riddle  is  not  solved  by  the  declaration  of  Napoleon 
that  he  considered  that  Villeneuve  at  the  Nile  showed 
his  good  fortune  in  escaping  with  the  only  French  ships 
which  survived  that  disaster.      A  strange   reason    this: 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  458 

to  appoint  an  admiral  commander  of  an  expedition  that 
was  to  change  the  face  of  the  world  because  his  good 
fortune  consisted  in  escaping  from  Nelson  !  * 

Napoleon  now  began  to  widen  his  plans.  According 
to  the  scheme  of  September  29th,  three  expeditions  were 
now  to  set  out  ;  the  first  was  to  assure  the  safety  of  the 
French  West  Indies  ;  the  second  was  to  recover  the 
Dutch  colonies  in  those  seas  and  reinforce  the  French 
troops  still  holding  out  in  part  of  St.  Domingo  ;  while 
the  third  had  as  its  objective  West  Africa  and  St.  Helena. 
The  Emperor  evidently  hoped  to  daze  us  by  simultaneous 
attacks  in  Africa,  America,  and  also  in  Asiatic  waters. 
After  these  fleets  had  set  sail  in  October  and  November, 
1804,  Ireland  was  to  be  attacked  by  the  Brest  fleet  now 
commanded  by  Gantheaume.  Slipping  away  from  the 
grip  of  Cornwallis,  he  was  to  pass  out  of  sight  of  land  and 
disembark  his  troops  in  Lough  Swilly.  These  troops, 
18,000  strong,  were  under  that  redoubtable  fighter,  Auge- 
reau  ;  and  had  they  been  landed,  the  history  of  the  world 
might  have  been  different.  Leaving  them  to  revolution- 
ize Ireland,  Gantheaume  was  to  make  for  the  English 
Channel,  touch  at  Cherbourg  for  further  orders,  and  pro- 
ceed to  Boulogne  to  convoy  the  flotilla  across  :  or,  if  the 
weather  prevented  this,  as  was  probable  in  January,  he 
was  to  pass  on  to  the  Texel,  rally  the  seven  Dutch  battle- 
ships and  the  transports  with  their  25,000  troops,  beat 
back  down  the  English  Channel  and  return  to  Ireland. 
Napoleon  counted  on  the  complete  success  of  one  or  other 
of  Gantheaume's  moves  :  "  Whether  I  have  30,000  or 
40,000  men  in  Ireland,  or  whether  I  am  both  in  England 
and  Ireland,  the  war  is  ours."2 

The  objections  to  the  September  combination  are  fairly 
obvious.  It  was  exceedingly  improbable  that  the  three 
fleets  could   escape  at  the  time  and  in  the   order  which 

1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  vol.  ii.,  p.  88,  who  says  :  "His  mild  and 
melancholy  disposition,  his  sad  and  modest  behaviour,  ill  suited  the 
Emperor's  ambitious  plans." 

2  l;Corresp.,"  No.  80C3.  See  too  No.  7996  for  Napoleon's  plan  of 
carrying  a  howitzer  in  the  bows  of  his  gun  vessels  so  that  his  projectiles 
might  btirst  in  the  wood.  Already  at  Boulogne  he  had  uttered  the  pro- 
phetic words :  "  We  must  have  shells  that  will  shiver  the  wooden  sides 
of  ships." 


454  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Napoleon  desired,  or  that  crews  enervated  by  long  captiv- 
ity in  port  would  succeed  in  difficult  operations  when 
thrust  out  into  the  wintry  gales  of  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Channel.  Besides,  success  could  only  be  won  after  a 
serious  dispersion  of  French  naval  resources  ;  and  the 
West  Indian  expeditions  must  be  regarded  as  prompted 
quite  as  much  by  a  colonial  policy  as  by  a  determination 
to  overrun  England  or  Ireland.1  At  any  rate,  if  the 
Emperor's  aim  was  merely  to  distract  us  by  widely  diverg- 
ing attacks,  that  could  surely  have  been  accomplished 
without  sending  twenty-six  sail  of  the  line  into  American 
and  African  waters,  and  leaving  to  Gantheaume  so  dis- 
proportionate an  amount  of  work  and  danger.  This  Sep- 
tember combination  may  therefore  be  judged  distinctly 
inferior  to  that  of  July,  which,  with  no  scattering  of  the 
French  forces,  promised  to  decoy  Nelson  away  to  the 
Morea  and  Egypt,  while  the  Toulon  and  Rochefort  squad- 
rons proceeded  to  Boulogne. 

The  September  schemes  hopelessly  miscarried.  Gan- 
theaume did  not  elude  Cornwallis,  and  remained  shut  up 
in  Brest.  Missiessy  escaped  from  Rochefort,  sailed  to  the 
West  Indies,  where  he  did  some  damage  and  then  sailed 
home  again.  "  He  had  taken  a  pawn  and  returned  to  his 
own  square."2  Villeneuve  slipped  out  from  Toulon 
(January  19th,  1805),  while  Nelson  was  sheltering  from 
westerly  gales  under  the  lee  of  Sardinia  ;  but  the  storm 
which  promised  to  renew  his  reputation  for  good  luck 
speedily  revealed  the  weakness  of  his  ships   and  crews. 

"My  fleet  looked  well  at  Toulon,"  he  wrote  to  Decres,  Minister  of 
Marine,  "  but  when  the  storm  came  on,  things  changed  at  once.  The 
sailors  were  not  used  to  storms  :  they  were  lost  among  the  mass  of 
soldiers  :  these  from  sea-sickness  lay  in  heaps  about  the  decks  :  it  was 
impossible  to  work  the  ships  :  hence  yard-arms  were  broken  and  sails 

1  James,  "Naval  History,"  vol.  Hi.,  p.  213,  and  Chevalier,  p.  115, 
imply  that  Villeneuve's  fleet  from  Toulon,  after  scouring  the  West  Indies, 
was  to  rally  the  Rochefort  force  and  cover  the  Boulogne  flotilla :  but  this 
finds  no  place  in  Napoleon's  September  plan,  which  required  Gantheaume 
first  to  land  troops  in  Ireland  and  then  convoy  the  flotilla  across  if  the 
weather  were  favourable,  or  if  it  were  stormy  to  beat  down  the  Channel 
with  the  troops  from  Holland.  See  O'Connor  Morris,  "Campaigns  of 
Nelson,"  p.  121. 

2  Colomb,  "  Naval  Warfare,"  p.  18. 


xsi  THE    BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  455 

were  carried  away :  our  losses  resulted  as  much  from  clumsiness  and 
inexperience  as  from  defects  in  the  materials  delivered  by  the  ar- 
senals." l 

Inexperience  and  sea-sickness  were  factors  that  found  no 
place  in  Napoleon's  calculations  ;  but  they  compelled  Ville- 
neuve  to  return  to  Toulon  to  refit ;  and  there  Nelson  closed 
on  him  once  more. 

Meanwhile  events  were  transpiring  which  seemed  to 
add  to  Napoleon's  naval  strength  and  to  the  difficulties 
of  his  foes.  On  January  4th,  1805,  he  concluded  with 
Spain  a  treaty  which  added  her  naval  resources  to  those 
of  France,  Holland,  and  Northern  Italy.  The  causes  that 
led  to  an  open  rupture  between  England  and  Spain  were 
these.  Spain  had  been  called  upon  by  Napoleon  secretly 
to  pay  him  the  stipulated  sum  of  72,000,000  francs  a  year 
(see  p.  437),  and  she  reluctantly  consented.  This  was, 
of  course,  a  covert  act  of  hostility  against  England  ;  and 
the  Spanish  Government  was  warned  at  the  close  of  1803 
that,  if  this  subsidy  continued  to  be  paid  to  France,  it 
would  constitute  "at  any  future  period,  when  circum- 
stances may  render  it  necessary,  a  just  cause  of  war" 
between  England  and  Spain.  Far  from  complying  with 
this  reasonable  remonstrance,  the  Spanish  Court  yielded 
to  Napoleon's  imperious  order  to  repair  five  French  war- 
ships that  had  taken  refuge  in  Ferrol  from  our  cruisers, 
and  in  July,  1804,  allowed  French  seamen  to  travel  thither 
overland  to  complete  the  crews  of  these  vessels.  Thus  for 
some  months  our  warships  had  to  observe  Ferrol,  as  if  it 
were  a  hostile  port. 

Clearly,  this  state  of  things  could  not  continue ;  and 
when  the  protests  of  our  ambassador  at  Madrid  were  per- 
sistently evaded  or  ignored,  he  was  ordered,  in  the  month 
of  September,  to  leave  that  capital  unless  he  received  sat- 
isfactory assurances.  He  did  not  leave  until  November 
10th,  and  before   that  time   a   sinister  event  had  taken 

1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  vol.  ii.,  p.  100.  Nelson  was  aware  of  the  fal- 
lacies that  crowded  Napoleon's  brain :  "  Bonaparte  has  often  made  his 
boast  that  our  fleet  would  be  worn  out  by  keeping  the  sea,  and  that  his 
was  kept  in  order  and  increasing  by  staying  in  port ;  but  he  now  finds, 
I  fancy,  if  emperors  hear  truth,  that  his  fleet  suffers  more  in  a  night  than 
ours  in  one  year."  —  Nelson  to  Collingwood,  March  13th,  1805. 


456  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

place.  The  British  Ministry  determined  that  Spanish 
treasure-ships  from  South  America  should  not  be  allowed 
to  land  at  Cadiz  the  sinews  of  war  for  France,  and  sent 
orders  to  our  squadrons  to  stop  those  ships.  Four  frig- 
ates were  told  off  for  that  purpose.  On  the  5th  of  Octo- 
ber they  sighted  the  four  rather  smaller  Spanish  frigates 
that  bore  the  ingots  of  Peru,  and  summoned  them  to  sur- 
render, thereafter  to  be  held  in  pledge.  The  Spaniards, 
nobly  resolving  to  yield  only  to  overwhelming  force,  re- 
fused ;  and  in  the  ensuing  fight  one  of  their  ships  blew 
up,  whereupon  the  others  hauled  down  their  flags  and 
were  taken  to  England.  Resenting  this  action,  Spain 
declared  war  on  December  12th,  1804. 

Stripped  of  all  the  rodomontade  with  which  French  his- 
torians have  enveloped  this  incident,  the  essential  facts 
are  as  follows.  Napoleon  compelled  Spain  by  the  threat 
of  invasion  to  pay  him  a  large  subsidy  :  England  declared 
this  payment,  and  accompanying  acts,  to  be  acts  of  war ; 
Spain  shuffled  uneasily  between  the  two  belligerents,  but 
continued  to  supply  funds  to  Napoleon  and  to  shelter  and 
repair  his  warships ;  thereupon  England  resolved  to  cut 
off  her  American  subsidies,  but  sent  a  force  too  small  to 
preclude,  the  possibility  of  a  sea-fight ;  the  fight  took 
place,  with  a  lamentable  result,  which  changed  the  covert 
hostility  of  Spain  into  active  hostility. 

Public  opinion  and  popular  narratives  are,  however, 
fashioned  by  sentiment  rather  than  founded  on  evidence  ; 
accordingly,  Britain's  prestige  suffered  from  this  event. 
The  facts,  as  currently  reported,  seemed  to  convict  her  of 
an  act  of  piracy ;  and  few  persons  on  the  Continent  or 
among  the  Whig  coteries  of  Westminster  troubled  to  find 
oat  whether  Spain  had  not  been  guilty  of  acts  of  hostility 
and  whether  the  French  Emperor  was  not  the  author  of 
the  new  war.  Undoubtedly,  it  was  his  threatening  press- 
ure on  Spain  that  had  compelled  her  to  her  recent  action  : 
but  that  pressure  had  been  for  the  most  part  veiled  by 
diplomacy,  while  Britain's  retort  was  patent  and  notori- 
ous. Consequently,  every  version  of  this  incident  that 
was  based  merely  on  newspaper  reports  condemned  her 
conduct  as  brutally  piratical ;  and  only  those  who  have 
delved  into  archives  have  discovered  the  real  facts  of  the 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  457 

case.1  Napoleon's  letter  to  the  King  of  Spain  quoted  on 
p.  437  shows  that  even  before  the  war  he  was  seeking  to 
drag  him  into  hostilities  with  England,  and  he  continued 
to  exert  a  remorseless  pressure  on  the  Court  of  Madrid ; 
it  left  two  alternatives  open  to  England,  either  to  see 
Napoleon  close  his  grip  on  Spain  and  wield  her  naval  re- 
sources when  she  was  fully  prepared  for  war,  or  to  pre- 
cipitate the  rupture.  It  was  the  alternative,  mutatis 
mutandis,  presented  to  George  III.  and  the  elder  Pitt  in 
1761,  when  the  King  was  for  delay  and  his  Minister  was 
for  war  at  once.  That  instance  had  proved  the  father's 
foresight ;  and  now  at  the  close  of  1804  the  younger  Pitt 
might  flatter  himself  that  open  war  was  better  than  a 
treacherous  peace. 

In  lieu  of  a  subsidy  Spain  now  promised  to  provide 
from  twenty-five  to  twenty-nine  sail  of  the  line,  and  to 
have  them  ready  by  the  close  of  March.  On  his  side, 
Napoleon  agreed  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the  Spanish 
dominions,  and  to  regain  Trinidad  for  her.  The  sequel 
will  show  how  his  word  was  kept. 

The  conclusion  of  this  alliance  placed  the  hostile  navies 
almost  on  an  equality,  at  least  on  paper.  But,  as  the 
equipment  of  the  Spanish  fleet  was  very  slow,  Napoleon 
for  the  present  adhered  to  his  plan  of  September,  1804, 
with  the  result  already  detailed.  Not  until  March  2nd, 
1805,  do  we  find  the  influence  of  the  Spanish  alliance 
observable  in  his  naval  schemes.  On  that  date  he  issued 
orders  to  Villeneuve  and  Gantheaume,  which  assigned  to 
the  latter  most  of  the  initiative,  as  also  the  chief  com- 
mand after  their  assumed  junction.  Gantheaume,  with 
the  Brest  fleet,  after  eluding  the  blockaders,  was  to  pro- 
ceed first  to  Ferrol,  capture  the  British  ships  off  that 
port,  and  reinforced  by  the    French   and   Spanish   ships 

1  Garden,  "Traites,"  vol.  viii.,  pp.  276-290  ;  also  Capt.  Mahan,  "In- 
fluence of  Sea  Power,  etc.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xv.  ad  fin.  He  quotes  the  opinion 
of  a  Spanish  historian,  Don  Jos6  de  Couto:  "  If  all  the  circumstances  are 
properly  weighed  ...  we  shall  see  that  all  the  charges  made  against  Eng- 
land for  the  seizure  of  the  frigates  may  be  reduced  to  want  of  proper  fore- 
sight in  the  strength  of  the  force  detailed  to  effect  it."  —  In  the  Admiralty 
secret  letters  (1804-16)  I  have  found  the  instructions  to  Sir  J.  Orde,  with 
the  Swiftsure,  Polyphemus,  Agamemnon,  Ruby,  Defence,  Lively,  and  two 
sloops,  to  seize  the  treasure-ships.     No  fight  seems  to  have  been  expected. 


458  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

there  at  anchor,  proceed  across  the  Atlantic  to  the  ap- 
pointed rendezvous  at  Martinique.  The  Toulon  squad- 
ron under  Villeneuve  was  at  the  same  time  to  make  for 
Cadiz,  and,  after  collecting  the  Spanish  ships,  set  sail  for 
the  West  Indies.  Then  the  armada  was  to  return  with 
all  speed  to  Boulogne,  where  Napoleon  expected  it  to 
arrive  between  June  10th  and  July  10th.1 

Diverse  judgments  have  been  passed  on  this,  the  last 
and  grandest  of  Napoleon's  naval  combinations.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  is  urged  that,  as  the  French  fleets  had  seen 
no  active  service,  a  long  voyage  was  necessary  to  impart 
experience  and  efficiency  before  matters  were  brought  to 
the  touch  in  the  Straits  of  Dover;  and  as  Britain  and 
France  both  regarded  their  West  Indian  islands  as  their 
most  valued  possessions,  a  voyage  thither  would  be  cer- 
tain to  draw  British  sails  in  eager  pursuit.  Finally,  those 
islands  dotted  over  a  thousand  miles  of  sea  presented  a 
labyrinth  wherein  it  would  be  easy  for  the  French  to  elude 
Nelson's  cruisers. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  urged  that  the  success  of 
the  plan  depended  on  too  many  if 8.  Assuming  that  the 
Toulon  and  Brest  squadrons  escaped  the  blockaders,  their 
subsequent  movements  would  most  probably  be  reported 
by  some  swift  frigate  off  Gibraltar  or  Ferrol.  The  chance 
of  our  divining  the  French  plans  was  surely  as  great  as 
that  Gantheaume  and.  Villeneuve  would  unite  in  the  West 
Indies,  ravage  the  British  possessions,  and  return  in  un- 
diminished force.  The  English  fleets,  after  weary  months 
of  blockade,  were  adepts  at  scouting  ;  their  wings  covered 
with  ease  a  vast  space,  their  frigates  rapidly  signalled 
news  to  the  flagship,  and  their  concentration  was  swift 
and  decisive.  Prompt  to  note  every  varying  puff  of  wind, 
they  bade  fair  to  overhaul  their  enemies  when  the  chase 
began  in  earnest,  and  when  once  the  battle  was  joined, 
numbers  counted  for  little :  the  English  crews,  inured  to 
fights  on  the  ocean,  might  be  trusted  to  overwhelm  the 
foe  by  their  superior  experience  and  discipline,  hampered 
as  the  French  now  were  by  the  lumbering  and  defective 
warships  of  Spain. 

Napoleon,    indeed,   amply   discounted   the    chances    of 

1  "  Corresp.,"  No.  8379  ;  Mahan,  ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  149. 


xxr  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  459 

failure  of  his  ultimate  design,  the  command  of  the  Chan- 
nel. The  ostensible  aims  of  the  expedition  were  colonial. 
The  French  fleets  were  to  take  on  board  11,908  soldiers, 
of  whom  three-fourths  were  destined  for  the  West  Indies  ; 
and,  in  case  Gantheaume  did  not  join  Villeneuve  at  Marti- 
nique, the  latter  was  ordered,  after  waiting  forty  days,  to 
set  sail  for  the  Canaries,  there  to  intercept  the  English 
convoys  bound  for  Brazil  and  the  East  Indies. 

In  the  spring  and  summer  of  1805  Napoleon's  correspond- 
ence supplies  copious  proof  of  the  ideas  and  plans  that  passed 
through  his  brain.  After  firmly  founding  the  new  Empire, 
he  journeyed  into  Piedmont,  thence  to  Milan  for  his  coro- 
nation as  King  of  Italy,  and  finally  to  Genoa.  In  this 
absence  of  three  months  from  Paris  (April-July)  many 
lengthy  letters  to  Decres  attest  the  alternations  of  his 
hopes  and  fears.  He  now  keeps  the  possibility  of  failure 
always  before  him  :  his  letters  no  longer  breathe  the  crude 
confidence  of  1803  :  and  while  facing  the  chances  of  fail- 
ure in  the  West  Indies,  his  thoughts  swing  back  to  the 
Orient  : 

"  According  to  all  the  news  that  I  receive,  five  or  six  thousand  men 
in  the  [East]  Indies  would  ruin  the  English  Company.  Supposing 
that  our  [West]  Indian  expedition  is  not  fully  successful,  and  I  can- 
not reach  the  grand  end  which  will  demolish  all  the  rest,  I  think  we 
must  arrange  the  [East]  Indian  expedition  for  September.  We  have 
now  greater  resources  for  it  than  some  time  ago." * 

How  tenacious  is  his  will  !  He  here  recurs  to  the  plan 
laid  down  before  Decaen  sailed  to  the  East  Indies  in 
March,  1803.  Even  the  prospects  of  a  continental  coali- 
tion fail  to  dispel  that  gorgeous  dream.  But  amid  much 
that  is  visionary  we  may  discern  this  element  of  practicality  : 
in  case  the  blow  against  England  misses  the  mark,  Napo- 
leon has  provided  himself  with  a  splendid  alternative  that 
will  banish  all  thought  of  failure. 

It  is  needless  to  recount  here  the  well-known  details  of 
Villeneuve's  voyage  and  Nelson's  pursuit.  The  Toulon 
and  Cadiz  fleets  got  clear  away  to  the  West  Indies,  and 
after  a  last  glance  towards  the  Orient,  Nelson  set  out  in 

1  Letter  of  April  29th,  1805.  I  cannot  agree  with  Mahan  (p.  155)  that 
this  was  intended  only  to  distract  us. 


460  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

pursuit.  On  the  4th  of  June  the  hostile  fleets  were  sepa- 
rated by  only  a  hundred  miles  of  sea ;  and  Villeneuve, 
when  off  Antigua,  hearing  that  Nelson  was  so  close,  de- 
cided forthwith  to  return  to  Europe.  After  disembarking 
most  of  his  troops  and  capturing  a  fleet  of  fourteen  British 
merchantmen,  he  sailed  for  Ferrol,  in  pursuance  of  orders 
just  received  from  Napoleon,  which  bade  him  rally  fifteen 
allied  ships  at  that  port,  and  push  on  to  Brest,  where  he 
must  release  Gantheaume. 

In  this  gigantic  war  game,  where  the  Atlantic  was  the 
chess-board,  and  the  prize  a  world-empire,  the  chances  were 
at  this  time  curiously  even.  Fortune  had  favoured  Ville- 
neuve but  checked  Gantheaume.  Villeneuve  successfully 
dodged  Nelson  in  the  West  Indies,  but  ultimately  the  pur- 
suer divined  the  enemy's  scheme  of  returning  to  Europe, 
and  sent  a  swift  brig  to  warn  the  Admiralty,  which  was 
thereby  informed  of  the  exact  position  of  affairs  on  July 
8th,  that  is,  twelve  days  before  Napoleon  himself  knew  of 
the  state  of  affairs.  On  July  20th,  the  French  Emperor 
heard,  through  English  newspapers,  that  his  fleet  was  on  its 
return  voyage  :  and  his  heart  beat  high  with  hope  that 
Villeneuve  would  now  gather  up  his  squadrons  in  the  Bay 
of  Biscay  and  appear  before  Boulogne  in  overwhelming 
force  ;  for  he  argued  that,  even  if  Villeneuve  should  keep 
right  away  from  Brest,  and  leave  blockaders  and  blockaded 
face  to  face,  he  would  still  be  at  least  sixteen  ships  stronger 
than  any  force  that  could  be  brought  against  him. 

But  Napoleon  was  now  committing  the  blunder  which 
he  so  often  censured  in  his  inferiors.  He  was  "  making 
pictures  "  to  himself,  pictures  in  which  the  gleams  of  for- 
tune were  reserved  for  the  tricolour  flag,  and  gloom  and 
disaster  shrouded  the  Union  Jack  ;  he  conceived  that  Nel- 
son had  made  for  Jamaica,  and  that  the  British  squadrons 
were  engaged  in  chasing  phantom  French  fleets  around 
Ireland  or  to  the  East  Indies.  "  We  have  not  to  do," 
he  said,  "with  a  far-seeing,  but  with  a  very  proud, 
Government." 

In  reality,  Nelson  was  nearing  the  coast  of  Portugal, 
Cornwallis  had  been  so  speedily  reinforced  as  to  marshal 
twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line  off  Brest,  while  Calder  wa 
waiting  for  Villeneuve  off  Cape  Finisterre  with  a  fleet 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  461 

fifteen  battleships.  Thus,  when  Villeneuve  neared  the 
north-west  of  Spain,  his  twenty  ships  of  the  line  were 
confronted  by  a  force  which  he  could  neither  overwhelm 
nor  shake  off.  The  combat  of  July  22nd,  fought  amidst 
a  dense  haze,  was  unfavourable  to  the  allies,  two  Spanish 
ships  of  the  line  striking  their  colours  to  Calder  before 
the  gathering  fog  and  gloom  of  night  separated  the  com- 
batants :  on  the  next  two  days  Villeneuve  strove  to 
come  to  close  quarters,  but  Calder  sheered  off  ;  there- 
upon the  French,  unable  then  to  make  Ferrol,  put  into 
Vigo,  while  Calder,  ignorant  of  their  position,  joined 
Cornwallis  off  Brest.  This  retreat  of  the  British  admiral 
subjected  him  to  a  court-martial,  and  consternation  reigned 
in  London  when  Villeneuve  was  known  to  be  on  the 
Spanish  coast  unguarded  ;  but  the  fear  was  needless  ; 
though  the  French  admiral  succeeded  in  rallying  the 
Ferrol  squadron,  yet,  as  he  was  ordered  to  avoid  Ferrol, 
he  put  into  Corunna,  and  on  August  15th  he  decided  to 
sail  for  Cadiz. 

To  realize  the  immense  importance  of  this  decision 
we  must  picture  to  ourselves  the  state  of  affairs  just 
before  this  time. 

Nelson,  delayed  by  contrary  winds  and  dogged  by 
temporary  ill-luck  had  made  for  Gibraltar,  whence,  find- 
ing that  no  French  ships  had  passed  the  straits,  he  doubled 
back  in  hot  haste  northwards,  and  there  is  clear  proof 
that  his  speedy  return  to  the  coast  of  Spain  spread 
dismay  in  official  circles  at  Paris.  "  This  unexpected 
union  of  forces  undoubtedly  renders  every  scheme  of  in- 
vasion impracticable  for  the  present,"  wrote  Talleyrand  to 
Napoleon  on  August  2nd,  1805. 1  Missing  Villeneuve  off 
Ferrol,  Nelson  joined  Cornwallis  off  Ushant  on  the  very 
day  when  the  French  admiral  decided  to  make  for  Cadiz. 
Passing  on  to  Portsmouth,  the  hero  now  enjoyed  a  few 
days  of  well-earned  repose,  until  the  nation  called  on  him 
for  his  final  effort. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  arrived  on  August  3rd  at 
Boulogne,  where  he  reviewed  a  line  of  soldiery  nine  miles 
long.  The  sight  might  well  arouse  his  hopes  of  assured 
victory.      He   had  ground   for   hoping   that   Villeneuve 

1  "  Lettres  in&lites  de  Talleyrand,"  p.  121. 


462  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

would  soon  be  in  the  Channel.  Not  until  August  8th 
did  he  receive  news  of  the  fight  with  Calder,  and  he  took 
pains  to  parade  it  as  an  English  defeat.  He  therefore 
trusted  that,  in  the  spirit  of  his  orders  to  Villeneuve 
dated  July  the  26th,  that  admiral  would  sail  to  Cadiz, 
gather  up  other  French  and  Spanish  ships,  and  return  to 
Ferrol  and  Brest  with  a  mighty  force  of  some  sixty  sail 
of  the  line  : 

"  I  count  on  your  zeal  for  my  service,  on  your  love  for  the  father- 
land, on  your  hatred  of  this  Power  which  for  forty  generations  has 
oppressed  us,  and  which  a  little  daring  and  perseverance  on  your  part 
will  for  ever  reduce  to  the  rank  of  the  small  Powers  :  150,000  soldiers 
.  .  .  and  the  crews  complete  are  embarked  on  2,000  craft  of  the 
flotilla,  which,  despite  the  English  cruisers,  forms  a  long  line  of 
broadsides  from  Etaples  to  Cape  Grisnez.  Your  voyage,  and  it  alone, 
makes  us  without  any  doubt  masters  of  England." 

Austria  and  Russia  were  already  marshalling  their 
forces  for  the  war  of  the  Third  Coalition.  Yet,  though 
menaced  by  those  Powers,  to  whom  he  had  recently 
offered  the  most  flagrant  provocations,  this  astonishing 
man  was  intent  only  on  the  ruin  of  England,  and  secretly 
derided  their  preparations.  "  You  need  not "  (so  he  wrote 
to  Eugene,  Viceroy  of  Italy)  "contradict  the  newspaper 
rumours  of  war,  but  make  fun  of  them.  .  .  .  Austria's 
actions  are  probably  the  result  of  fear."  —  Thus,  even 
when  the  eastern  horizon  lowered  threateningly  with 
clouds,  he  continued  to  pace  the  cliffs  of  Boulogne,  or 
gallop  restlessly  along  the  strand,  straining  his  gaze 
westward  to  catch  the  first  glimpse  of  his  armada.  That 
horizon  was  never  to  be  flecked  with  Villeneuve's  sails : 
they  were  at  this  time  furled  in  the  harbour  of  Cadiz. 

Unmeasured  abuse  has  been  showered  upon  Villeneuve 
for  his  retreat  to  that  harbour.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  in  both  of  Napoleon's  last  orders  to  him,  those 
of  July  16th  and  26th,  he  was  required  to  sail  to  Cadiz 
under  certain  conditions.  In  the  first  order  prescribing 
alternative  ways  of  gaining  the  mastery  of  the  Channel, 
that  step  was  recommended  solely  as  a  last  alternative  in 
case  of  misfortune  :  he  was  directed  not  to  enter  the  long 
and  difficult  inlet  of  Ferrol,  but,  after  collecting  the 
squadron  there,  to  cast  anchor  at  Cadiz.     In  the  order  of 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  463 

July  26th  he  was  charged  positively  to  repair  to  Cadiz  : 
"  My  intention  is  that  you  rally  at  Cadiz  the  Spanish  ships 
there,  disembark  your  sick,  and,  without  stopping  there 
more  than  four  days  at  most,  again  set  sail,  return  to  Fer- 
rol,  etc."  Villeneuve  seems  not  to  have  received  these 
last  orders,  but  he  alludes  to  those  of  July  16th.1 

These,  then,  were  probably  the  last  instructions  he  re- 
ceived from  Napoleon  before  setting  sail  from  the  roads  of 
Corunna  on  August  13th.  The  censures  passed  on  his 
retreat  to  Cadiz  are  therefore  based  on  the  supposition 
that  he  received  instructions  which  he  did  not  receive.2 
He  expressly  based  his  move  to  Cadiz  on  Napoleon's  orders 
of  July  16th.  The  mishaps  which  the  Emperor  then  con- 
templated as  necessitating  such  a  step  had,  in  Villeneuve's 
eyes,  actually  happened.  The  admiral  considered  the  fight 
of  July  22nd  la  malheureuse  affaire;  his  ships  were  en- 
cumbered with  sick ;  they  worked  badly ;  on  August  15th 
a  north-east  gale  carried  away  the  top-mast  of  a  Spanish 
ship ;  and  having  heard  from  a  Danish  merchantman  the 
news  — false  news,  as  it  afterwards  appeared  —  that  Corn- 
wallis  with  twenty-five  ships  was  to  the  north,  he  turned 
and  scudded  before  the  wind.  He  could  not  divine  the 
disastrous  influence  of  his  conduct  on  the  plan  of  invasion. 
He  did  not  know  that  his  master  was  even  then  beginning 
to  hesitate  between  a  dash  on  London  or  a  campaign  on 
the  Danube,  and  that  the  events  of  the  next  few  days  were 
destined  to  tilt  the  fortunes  of  the  world.  Doubtless  he 
ought  to  have  disregarded  the  Emperor's  words  about 
Cadiz  and  to  have  struggled  on  to  Brest,  as  his  earlier 
and  wider  orders  enjoined.  But  the  Emperor's  instruc- 
tions pointed  to  Cadiz  as  the  rendezvous  in  case  of  mis- 
fortune or  great  difficulty.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Napoleon 
on  July  26th  ordered  the  Rochefort  squadron  to  meet 
Villeneuve  at  Cadiz;  and  it  is  clear  that  by  that  date  Napo- 
leon had  decided  on  that  rendezvous,  apparently  because 
it  could  be  more  easily  entered  and  cleared  than  Ferrol, 
and  was  safer  from  attack.      But,  as  it  happened,  the 


1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  vol.  ii.,  p.  367. 

2  Thiers  writes,  most  disingenuously,  as  though  Napoleon's  letters  of 
August  13th  and  22nd  could  have  influenced  Villeneuve. 


464  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Rochefort  squadron  had  already  set  sail  and  failed  to  sight 
an  enemy  or  friend  for  several  weeks. 

Such  are  the  risks  of  naval  warfare,  in  which  even  the 
greatest  geniuses  at  times  groped  but  blindly.  Nelson 
was  not  afraid  to  confess  the  truth.  The  French  Emperor, 
however,  seems  never  to  have  made  an  admission  which 
would  mar  his  claim  to  strategic  infallibility.  Even  now, 
when  the  Spanish  ships  were  proved  to  clog  the  enterprise, 
he  persisted  in  merely  counting  numbers,  and  in  asserting 
that  Villeneuve  might  still  neutralize  the  force  of  Calder  and 
Cornwallis.  These  hopes  he  cherished  up  to  August  23rd, 
when,  as  the  next  chapter  will  show,  he  faced  right  about  to 
confront  Austria.  His  Minister  of  Marine,  who  had  more 
truly  gauged  the  difficulties  of  all  parts  of  the  naval  enter- 
prise, continued  earnestly  to  warn  him  of  the  terrible  risk 
of  burdening  Villeneuve's  ships  with  unseaworthy  craft  of 
Spain  and  of  trusting  to  this  ill-assorted  armada  to  cover 
the  invasion,  now  that  their  foes  had  divined  its  secret. 
The  Emperor  bitterly  upbraided  his  Minister  for  his 
timidity,  and  in  the  presence  of  Daru,  Intendant  General 
of  the  army,  indulged  in  a  dramatic  soliloquy  against 
Villeneuve  for  his  violation  of  orders :  "  What  a  navy  ! 
What  an  admiral  !  What  sacrifices  for  nothing  !  My 
hopes  are  frustrated  —  Daru,  sit  down  and  write "  — 
whereupon  it  is  said  that  he  traced  out  the  plans  of 
the  campaign  which  was  to  culminate  at  Ulm  and 
Austerlitz.1 

The  question  has  often  been  asked  whether  Napoleon 
seriously  intended  the  invasion  of  England.  Certainly 
the  experienced  seamen  of  England,  France,  and  Holland, 
with  few  exceptions,  declared  that  the  flat-bottomed  boats 
were  unseaworthy,  and  that  a  frightful  disaster  must  ensue 
if  they  were  met  out  at  sea  by  our  ships.  When  it  is 
further  remembered  that  our  coasts  were  defended  by 
batteries  and  martello  towers,  that  several  hundreds  of 

1  Dupin,  "  Voyages  dans  la  Grande  Bretagne  "  (tome  i.,  p.  244),  who 
had  the  facts  from  Daru.  But,  as  Medieval  sensibly  says  ("Mems.," 
vol.  i.,  ch.  v.),  it  was  not  Napoleon's  habit  dramatically  to  dictate  his 
plans  so  far  in  advance.  Certainly,  in  military  matters,  he  always  kept 
his  imagination  subservient  to  facts.  Not  until  September  22nd  did  he 
make  any  written  official  notes  on  the  final  moves  of  his  chief  corps; 
besides,  the  Austrians  did  not  cross  the  Inn  till  September  8th. 


xii  THE  BOULOGNE  FLOTILLA  465 

pinnaces  and  row-boats  were  ready  to  attack  the  flotilla 
before  it  could  attempt  the  disembarkation  of  horses, 
artillery,  and  stores,  and  that  180,000  regulars  and  militia, 
aided  by  400,000  volunteers,  were  ready  to  defend  our 
land,  the  difficulties  even  of  capturing  London  will  be 
obvious.  And  the  capture  of  the  capital  would  not  have 
decided  the  contest.  Napoleon  seems  to  have  thought  it 
would.  In  his  voyage  to  St.  Helena  he  said  :  "  I  put  all 
to  the  hazard  ;  I  entered  into  no  calculations  as  to  the 
manner  in  which  I  was  to  return  ;  I  trusted  all  to  the  im- 
pression the  occupation  of  the  capital  would  have  occa- 
sioned." 1  —  But,  as  has  been  shown  above  (p.  441),  plans 
had  been  secretly  drawn  up  for  the  removal  of  the  Court 
and  the  national  treasure  to  Worcester  ;  the  cannon  of 
Woolwich  were  to  be  despatched  into  the  Midlands  by 
canal  ;  and  our  military  authorities  reckoned  that  the 
systematic  removal  of  provisions  and  stores  from  all  the 
districts  threatened  by  the  enemy  would  exhaust  him  long 
before  he  overran  the  home  counties.  Besides,  the  inva- 
sion was  planned  when  Britain's  naval  power  had  been 
merely  evaded,  not  conquered.  Nelson  and  Cornwallis 
and  Calder  would  not  for  ever  be  chasing  phantom  fleets  ; 
they  would  certainly  return,  and  cut  Napoleon  from  his 
base,  the  sea. 

Again,  if  Napoleon  was  bent  solely  on  the  invasion  of 
England,  why  should  he,  in  June,  1805,  have  offered  to 
Russia  and  Austria  so  gratuitous  an  affront  as  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Ligurian  Republic  ?  He  must  have  known 
that  this  act  would  hurry  them  into  war.  Thiers  con- 
siders the  annexation  of  Genoa  a  "  grave  fault "  in  the 
Emperor's  policy  —  but  many  have  doubted  whether  Na- 
poleon did  not  intend  Genoa  to  be  the  gate  leading  to  a 
new  avenue  of  glory,  now  that  the  success  of  his  naval 
dispositions  was  doubtful.  Marbot  gives  the  general 
opinion  of  military  circles  when  he  says  that  the  Emperor 
wanted  to  provoke  a  continental  war  in  order  to  escape 
the  ridicule  which  the  failure  of  his  Boulogne  plans  would 
otherwise  have  aroused.     "  The  new  coalition  came  just  at 

1  Diary  of  General  Bingham,  in  "Blackwood's  Magazine,"  October, 
1896.     The  accompanying  medal,  on  the  reverse  of  winch  are  the  words 

I"frapp6e  a  Londres,  en  1804,"  affords  another  proof  of  his  intentions. 
2h 


466  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

the  right  moment  to  get  him  out  of  an  annoying  situation." 
The  compiler  of  the  Fouche  "  Memoirs,"  which,  though 
not  genuine,  may  be  accepted  as  generally  correct,  took 
the  same  view.  He  attributes  to  Napoleon  the  noteworthy 
words  :  "  I  may  fail  by  sea,  but  not  by  land  ;  besides,  I 
shall  be  able  to  strike  the'  blow  before  the  old  coalition 
machines  are  ready  :  the  kings  have  neither  activity  nor 
decision  of  character  :  I  do  not  fear  old  Europe."  The 
Emperor  also  remarked  to  the  Council  of  State  that  the 
expense  of  all  the  preparations  at  Boulogne  was  fully 
justified  by  the  fact  that  they  gave  him  "  fully  twenty 
days'  start  over  all  enemies.  ...  A  pretext  had  to  be 
found  for  raising  the  troops  and  bringing  them  together 
without  alarming  the  Continental  Powers  :  and  that 
pretext  was  afforded  me  by  the  projected  descent  upon 
England."1 

It  is  also  quite  possible  that  his  aim  was  Ireland  as 
much  as  England.  It  certainly  was  in  the  plan  of  Sep- 
tember, 1804 :  and  doubtless  it  still  held  a  prominent 
place  in  his  mind,  except  during  the  few  days  when  he 
pictured  Calder  vanquished  and  Nelson  scouring  the 
West  Indies.  Then  he  doubtless  fixed  his  gaze  solely 
upon  London.  But  there  is  much  indirect  evidence 
which  points  to  Ireland  as  forming  at  least  a  very  im- 
portant part  of  his  scheme.  Both  Nelson  and  Colling- 
wood  believed  him  to  be  aiming  at  Ireland.2 

But  indeed  Napoleon  is  often  unfathomable.  Herein 
lies  much  of  the  charm  of  Napoleonic  studies.  He  is 
at  once  the  Achilles,  the  Mercury,  and  the  Proteus  of 
the  modern  world.  The  ease  with  which  his  mind 
grasped  all  problems  and  suddenly  concentrated  its  force 
on  some  new  plan  may  well  perplex  posterity  as  it  dazed 
his  contemporaries.  If  we  were  dealing  with  any  other 
man  than  Napoleon,  we  might  safely  say  that  an  invasion  of 
England,  before  the  command  of  the  sea  had  been  secured, 
was  infinitely  less  likely  than  a  descent  on  Ireland.  The 
landing  of  a  corps  (VarmSe  there  would  have  provoked  a 

1  Marbot,  "Mems.,"  ch.  xix. ;  Fouchg,  "Mems.,"  part  1;  Miot  de 
Melito,  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  i. 

2  See  Nelson's  letters  of  August  25th,  1803,  and  May  1st,  1804  ; 
Collingwood's  of  July  21st,  1805. 


xxi  THE   BOULOGNE   FLOTILLA  467 

revolution;  and  British  ascendancy  would  have  vanished 
in  a  week.  Even  had  Nelson  returned  and  swept  the  seas, 
Ireland  would  have  been  lost  to  the  United  Kingdom ; 
and  Britain,  exhausted  also  by  the  expenses  which  the 
Boulogne  preparations  had  compelled  her  to  make  for  the 
defence  of  London,  must  have  succumbed. 

If  ever  Napoleon  intended  risking  all  his  fortunes  on 
the  conquest  of  England,  it  can  be  proved  that  his  mind 
was  gradually  cleared  of  illusions.  He  trusted  that  a 
popular  rising  would  overthrow  the  British  Government: 
people  and  rulers  showed  an  accord  that  had  never  been 
known  since  the  reign  of  Queen  Anne.  He  believed,  for 
a  short  space,  that  the  flotilla  could  fight  sea-going  ships 
out  at  sea  :  the  converse  was  proved  up  to  the  hilt. 
Finally,  he  trusted  that  Villeneuve,  when  burdened  with 
Spanish  ships,  would  outwit  and  out-manoeuvre  Nelson ! 

What  then  remained  after  these  and  many  other  dis- 
appointments? Surely  that  scheme  alone  was  practicable, 
in  which  the  command  of  the  sea  formed  only  an  unim- 
portant factor.  For  the  conquest  of  England  it  was  an 
essential  factor.  In  Ireland  alone  could  Napoleon  find 
the  conditions  on  which  he  counted  for  success  —  a  dis- 
contented populace  that  would  throng  to  the  French 
eagles,  and  a  field  of  warfare  where  the  mere  landing  of 
20,000  veterans  would  decide  the  campaign.1 

And  yet  it  is,  on  the  whole,  certain  that  his  expedition 
for  Ireland  was  meant  merely  to  distract  and  paralyze 
the  defenders  of  Great  Britain,  while  he  dealt  the  chief 
blow  at  London.  Instinct  and  conviction  alike  prompted 
him  to  make  imposing  feints  that  should  lead  his  enemy 
to  lay  bare  his  heart,  and  that  heart  was  our  great  capital. 
His  indomitable  will  scorned  the  word  impossible  —  "a 
word  found  only  in  the  dictionary  of  fools  "  ;  he  felt  Eng- 
land to  be  the  sole  barrier  to  his  ambitions  ;  and  to  crush 
her  power  he  was  ready  to  brave,  not  only  her  stoutest 
seamen,  but  also  her  guardian  angels,  the  winds  and 
storms.  Both  the  man  and  the  occasion  were  unique  in 
the  world's  history,  and  must  not  be  judged  according  to 

1  In  "  F.  0.,"  France,  No.  71,  is  a  report  of  a  spy  on  the  interview  of 
Napoleon  with  O'Connor,  whom  he  made  General  of  Division.  See 
Appendix,  p.  470. 


468  THE  LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xxi 

tame  probabilities.  For  his  honour  was  at  stake.  He 
was  so  deeply  pledged  to  make  use  of  the  vast  prepara- 
tions at  his  northern  ports  that,  had  all  his  complex  dis- 
positions worked  smoothly,  he  would  certainly  have 
attempted  a  dash  at  London ;  and  only  after  some  ade- 
quate excuse  could  he  consent  to  give  up  that  adventure. 
The  excuse  was  now  furnished  by  Villeneuve's  retreat 
to  Cadiz ;  and  public  opinion,  ignorant  of  Napoleon's 
latest  instructions  on  that  subject,  and  knowing  only 
the  salient  facts  of  the  case,  laid  on  that  luckless  admiral 
the  whole  burden  of  blame  for  the  failure  of  the  scheme 
of  invasion.  With  front  unabashed  and  a  mind  presag- 
ing certain  triumphs,  Napoleon  accordingly  wheeled  his 
legions  eastward  to  prosecute  that  alluring  alternative, 
the  conquest  of  England  through  the  Continent. 


APPENDIX 

[The  two  following  State  Papers  have  never  before  been 

published.] 

No.  I.  is  a  despatch  from  Mr.  Thornton,  our  charge"  d'affaires 
at  Washington,  relative  to  the  expected  transfer  of  the  vast 
region  of  Louisiana  from  Spain  to  France  (see  ch.  xv.  of  this 
vol.). 

[In  "F.  0.,"  America,  No.  35.] 

"  Washington, 

"  26  Jany.,  1802. 

"  My  Lord, 
"...  About  four  years  ago,  when  the  rumour  of  the  transfer  of 
Louisiana  to  France  was  first  circulated,  I  put  into  Mr.  Pickering's 
hands  for  his  perusal  a  despatch  written  by  Mr.  Fauchet  about  the 
year  1794,  which  with  many  others  was  intercepted  by  one  of  H.M. 
ships.  In  that  paper  the  French  Minister  urged  to  his  Government 
the  absolute  necessity  of  acquiring  Louisiana  or  some  territory  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  United  States  in  order  to  obtain  a  permanent  influence 
in  the  country,  and  he  alluded  to  a  memorial  written  some  years  before 
by  the  Count  du  Moutier  to  the  same  effect,  when  he  was  employed  as 
His  Most  Christian  Majesty's  Minister  to  the  United  States.  The 
project  seems  therefore  to  have  been  long  in  the  contemplation  of  the 
French  Government,  and  perhaps  no  period  is  more  favourable  than 
the  present  for  carrying  it  into  execution. 

"  When  I  paid  my  respects  to  the  Vice-President,  Mr.  Burr,  on  his 
arrival  at  this  place,  he,  of  his  own  accord,  directed  conversation  to 
this  topic.  He  owned  that  he  had  made  some  exertion  indirectly  to 
discover  the  truth  of  the  report,  and  thought  he  had  reason  to  believe 
it.  He  appeared  to  think  that  the  great  armament  destined  by  France 
to  St.  Domingo,  had  this  ulterior  object  in  view,  and  expressed  much 
apprehension  that  the  transfer  and  colonization  of  Louisiana  were 
meditated  by  her  with  the  concurrence  or  acquiescence  of  His  Maj'" 
Gov'.  It  was  impossible  for  me  to  give  any  opinion  on  this  part  of 
the  measure,  which,  whatever  may  be  its  ultimate  tendency,  presents 
at  first  view  nothing  but  danger  to  His  Maj'9  Trans-Atlantic  posses- 
sions. 

"Regarding  alone  the  aim  of  France  to  acquire  a  preponderating 
influence  in  the  councils  of  the  United  States,  it  may  be  very  well 
doubted  whether  the  possession  of  Louisiana,  and  th  means  which 
she  would  chuse  to  employ  are  calculated  to  secure  that  end.     Experi- 

469 


470  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I 

ence  seems  now  to  have  sanctioned  the  opinion  that  if  the  provinces 
of  Canada  had  been  restored  to  France  at  the  Peace  of  Paris,  and  if 
from  tha,t  quarter  she  had  been  left  to  press  upon  the  American  fron- 
tier, to  harass  the  exterior  settlements  and  to  mingle  in  the  feuds  of 
the  Indian  Tribes,  the  colonies  might  still  have  preserved  their  alle- 
giance to  the  parent  country  and  have  retained  their  just  jealousy  of 
that  system  of  encroachment  adopted  by  France  from  the  beginning 
of  the  last  century.  The  present  project  is  but  a  continuance  of  the 
same  system;  and  neither  her  power  nor  her  present  temper  leave 
room  for  expectation  that  she  will  pursue  it  with  less  eagerness  or 
greater  moderation  than  before.  Whether,  therefore,  she  attempt  to 
restrain  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  or  limit  the  freedom  of  the 
port  of  New  Orleans ;  whether  she  press  upon  the  Western  States  with 
any  view  to  conquest,  or  seduce  them  by  her  principles  of  fraternity 
(for  which  indeed  they  are  well  prepared)  she  must  infallibly  alienate 
the  Atlantic  States  and  force  them  into  a  straiter  connection  with 
Great  Britain. 

"  I  have  scarcely  met  with  a  person  under  whatever  party  he  may 
rank  himself,  who  does  not  dread  this  event,  and  who  would  not  pre- 
fer almost  any  neighbours  to  the  French  :  and  it  seems  perfect  infatu- 
ation in  the  Administration  of  this  country  that  they  chuse  the  present 
moment  for  leaving  that  frontier  almost  defenceless  by  the  reduction 
of  its  military  establishment. 

"  I  have,  etc., 

"  [Signed]  Edwd  Thornton." 

No.  II.  is  a  report  in  "F.  0.,"  France,  No.  71,  by  one  of  our 
spies  in  Paris  on  the  doings  of  the  Irish  exiles  there,  especially 
O'Connor,  whom  Napoleon  had  appointed  General  of  Division 
in  Marshal  Augereau's  army,  then  assembling  at  Brest  for  the 
expedition  to  Ireland.  After  stating  O'Connor's  appointment, 
the  report  continues  : 

u  About  eighty  Irishmen  were  sent  to  Morlaix  to  be  formed  into  a 
company  of  officers  and  taught  how  they  were  to  discipline  and 
instruct  their  countrymen  when  they  landed  in  Ireland.  McShee, 
General  de  Brigade,  commands  them.  He  and  Blackwell  are,  I  believe, 
the  only  persons  among  them  of  any  consequence,  who  have  seen 
actual  service.  Emmett's  brother  and  McDonald,  who  were  jealous  of 
the  attention  paid  to  O'Connor,  would  not  go  to  Morlaix.  They  were 
prevailed  on  to  go  to  Brest  towards  the  end  of  May,  and  there  to  join 
General  Humbert.  Commandant  Dalton,  a  young  man  of  Irish  ex- 
traction, and  lately  appointed  to  a  situation  in  the  Army  at  Boulogne, 
translated  everything  between  O'Connor  and  the  War  Department  at 
Paris.  There  is  no  Irish  Committee  at  Paris  as  is  reported.  O'Con- 
nor and  General  Hartry,  an  old  Irishman  who  has  been  long  in  the 
French  service,  are  the  only  persons  applied  to  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment, O'Connor  for  the  expedition,  and  Hartry  for  the  Police,  etc.,  of 
the  Irish  in  France. 


APPENDIX  471 

"  O'Connor,  though  he  had  long  tried  to  have  an  audience  of  Bona- 
parte, never  saw  him  till  the  20th  of  May  [1805],  when  he  was  pre- 
sented to  him  at  the  levee  by  Marshal  Augereau.  The  Emperor  and 
the  Empress  complimented  him  on  his  dress  and  military  appearance, 
and  Bonaparte  said  to  him  Venez  me  voir  en  particulier  demain  matin. 
O'Connor  went  and  was  alone  with  him  near  two  hours.  On  that 
day  Bonaparte  did  not  say  a  word  to  him  respecting  his  intention  on 
England ;  all  their  conversation  regarded  Ireland.  O'Connor  was 
with  him  again  on  the  Thursday  and  Friday  following.  Those  three 
audiences  are  all  that  O'Connor  ever  had  in  private  with  Bonaparte. 

"  He  told  me  on  the  Saturday  evening  that  he  should  go  to  Court 
the  next  morning  to  take  public  leave  of  the  Emperor,  and  leave  Paris 
as  soon  as  he  had  received  10,000  livres  which  Maret  was  to  give  him 
for  his  travelling  expenses,  etc.,  and  which  he  was  to  have  in  a  day 
or  two.  His  horses  and  all  his  servants  but  one  had  set  off  for  Brest 
some  time  before. 

"Bonaparte  told  O'Connor,  when  speaking  of  the  prospect  of  a 
continental  War,  'la  Russie  peut-etre  pourroit  envoyer  cette  annee 
100,000  hommes  contre  la  France,  mais  j'ai  pour  cela  assez  de  monde 
a  ma  disposition :  je  ferois  meme  marcher,  s'il  le  faut,  une  armee 
contre  la  Russie,  et  si  l'Empereur  d'Allemagne  refusoit  un  passage  a 
cette  armee  dans  son  pays,  je  la  ferois  passer  malgre  lui.'  He  after- 
wards said  — '  il  y  a  plusieurs  moyens  de  detruire  l'Angleterre,  mais 
celui  de  lui  oter  Irlande  est  bon.  Je  vous  donnerai  25,000  bonnes 
troupes  et  s'il  en  arrive  seulement  15,000,  ce  sera  assez.  Vous  aurez 
aussi  150,000  fusils  pour  armer  vos  compatriotes,  et  un  pare  d'artillerie 
legere,  des  pieces  de  4  et  de  6  livres,  et  toutes  les  provisions  de  guerre 
necessaires.' 

"O'Connor  endeavoured  to  persuade  Bonaparte  that  the  best  way  to 
conquer  England  was  first  to  go  to  Ireland,  and  thence  to  England 
with  200,000  Irishmen.  Bonaparte  said  he  did  not  think  that  would 
do;  d'ailleurs  he  added,  ce  seroit  trop  long.  They  agreed  that  all  the 
English  in  Ireland  should  be  exterminated  as  the  whites  had  been  in 
St.  Domingo.  Bonaparte  assured  him  that,  as  soon  as  he  had  formed 
an  Irish  army,  he  should  be  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  French  and 
Irish  forces.  Bonaparte  directed  O'Connor  to  try  to  gain  over  to  his 
interest  Laharpe,  the  Emperor  of  Russia's  tutor.  Laharpehad  applied 
for  a  passport  to  go  to  St.  Pdtersbourg.  He  says  he  will  do  everything 
in  his  power  to  engage  the  Emperor  to  go  to  war  with  Bonaparte. 
Laharpe  breathes  nothing  but  vengeance  against  Bonaparte,  who, 
besides  other  injuries,  turned  his  back  on  him  in  public  and  woidd 
not  speak  to  him.  Laharpe  was  warned  of  O'Connor's  intended  visit, 
and  went  to  the  country  to  avoid  seeing  him.  The  Senator  Garat  is 
1  to  go  to  Brest  with  O'Connor  to  write  a  constitution  for  Ireland. 
I  O'Connor  is  getting  out  of  favour  with  the  Irish  in  France;  they 
begin  to  suspect  his  ambitious  and  selfish  views.  There  was  a  cool- 
jness  between  Admiral  Truguet  and  him  for  some  time  previous  to 
iTruguet's  return  to  Brest.  Augereau  had  given  a  dinner  to  all  the 
jprincipal  officers  of  his  army  then  at  Paris.  Truguet  invited  all  of 
them  to  dine  with  him,  two  or  three  days  after,  except  O'Connor. 
O'Connor  told  me  he  would  never  forgive  him  for  it." 


The  Life  of  Napoleon  I 


INCLUDING   NEW    MATERIALS 
FROM    THE    BRITISH    OFFICIAL    RECORDS 


BY 
JOHN    HOLLAND    ROSE,    M.A. 

LATE  SCHOLAR  OF  CHRIST'S  COLLEGE,   CAMBRIDGE 


"  Let  my  son  often  read  and  reflect  on  history :   this  is  the  only 
true  philosophy." 

—  Napoleon's  last  Instructions  for  the  King  of  Rome. 


TWO  VOLUMES    IN   ONE 
VOL.  II 


Nefo  fforfc 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

1918 


All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1902, 
By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  December,  1901.     Reprinted 
September,  IQ02. 

New  edition,  two  volumes  in  one,  May,  1907  ;  August,  1910  . 
February,  1913;  December,  1916. 


Nortoooo  ^rtas 

J.  S.  Cushing  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXII.  Ulm  and  Trafalgar 1 

XXIII.  Austerlitz 26 

XXIV.  Prussia  and  the  New  Charlemagne        .        .  47 
XXV.  The  Fall  of  Prussia 73 

XXVI.  The  Continental  System  :  Friedland     .        .  95 

XXVII.  Tilsit 115 

XXVIII.  The  Spanish  Rising 146 

XXIX.  Erfurt 160 

XXX.  Napoleon  and  Austria 174 

XXXI.  The  Empire  at  its  Height         ....  192 

XXXII.  The  Russian  Campaign 213 

XXXIII.  The  First  Saxon  Campaign        .        .        .        .246 

XXXIV.  VlTTORIA    AND    THE    ARMISTICE        ....  276 

XXXV.  Dresden  and  Leipzig 303 

XXXVI.  From  the  Rhine  to  the  Seine  ....  339 

XXXVII.  The  First  Abdication 367 

XXXVIII.  Elba  and  Paris 400 

XXXIX.  LlGNY    AND    QUATRE   BRAS 417 

XL.  Waterloo 449 

XLI.  From  the  Elysee  to  St.  Helena      .        .        .  472 

XLII.  Closing  Years       . 497 


APPENDIX 

List  of  the  Chief  Appointments  and  Dignities  bestowed 

by  Napoleon 531 

Index 533 


MAPS   AND   PLANS 

PAGB 

Battle  of  Ulm 14 

Battle  of  Austerlitz        .........  35 

Battle  of  Jena 88 

Battle  of  Friedland         .                 112 

Battle  of  Wagram 181 

Central  Europe  after  1810 198 

Campaign  in  Russia       .                 228 

Battle  of  Vittoria 285 

The  Campaign  of  1813 309 

Battle  of  Dresden 316 

Battle  of  Leipzig 329 

The  Campaign  of  1814 to/ace  353 

Plan  of  the  Waterloo  Campaign 422 

Battle  of  Ligny 429 

St.  Helena 498 


THE    LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON   I 


\  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I 

CHAPTER   XXII 

ULM  AND  TRAFALGAR 

"Napoleon  is  the  only  man  in  Europe  that  knows  the  value  of 
time." —  Czartoryski. 

Before  describing  the  Continental  campaign  which 
shattered  the  old  European  system  to  its  base,  it  will  be 
well  to  take  a  brief  glance  at  the  events  which  precipi- 
tated the  war  of  the  Third  Coalition.  Even  at  the  time  of 
Napoleon's  rupture  with  England,  his  high-handed  conduct 
towards  the  Italian  Republic,  Holland,  Switzerland,  and 
in  regard  to  the  Secularizations  in  Germany,  had  exposed 
him  to  the  hostility  of  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Austria  ;  but 
as  yet  it  took  the  form  of  secret  resentment.  The  last- 
named  Power,  under  the  Ministry  of  Count  Cobenzl,  had 
relapsed  into  a  tame  and  undignified  policy,  which  the 
Swedish  Ambassador  at  Vienna  described  as  "one  of  fear 
and  hope  —  fear  of  the  power  of  France,  and  hope  to 
obtain  favours  from  her."1  At  Berlin,  Frederick  William 
clung  nervously  to  neutrality,  even  though  the  French 
occupation  of  Hanover  was  a  threat  to  Prussia's  influence 
in  North  Germany.  The  Czar  Alexander  was,  at  present, 
wrapt  up  in  home  affairs  ;  and  the  only  monarch  who  as 
yet  ventured  to  show  his  dislike  of  the  First  Consul  was 
the  King  of  Sweden.  In  the  autumn  of  1803  Gustavus 
IV.  defiantly  refused  Napoleon's  proposals  for  a  Franco- 
Swedish  alliance,  baited  though  they  were  with  the  offer 
of  Norway  as  an  eventual  prize  for  Sweden,  and  a  subsidy 
for  every  Swedish  warship  serving  against  England.  And 
it  was  not  the  dislike  of  a  proud  nature  to  receive  money 

1  Armfeldt  to  Drake,  December  24th,  1803  ("  F.  O.,"  Bavaria,  No.  27). 

VOL.  II  —  B  1 


2  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

which  prompted  his  refusal ;  for  Gustavus,  while  in  Ger- 
many, hinted  to  Drake  that  he  desired  to  have  pecuniary 
help  from  England  for  the  defence  of  his  province  of 
Pomerania.1 

But  a  doughtier  champion  of  European  independence 
was  soon  to  enter  the  field.    The  earlier  feelings  of  respect 
and    admiration    which    the    young    Czar   had    cherished 
towards   Napoleon  were  already  overclouded,   when  the 
news  of  the  execution  of  the  Due  d'Enghien  at  once  roused 
a  storm  of  passion  in  his  breast.  The  chivalrous  protection 
which  he  loved  to  extend  to  smaller  States,  the  guarantee 
of  the  Germanic  system  which   the   Treaty  of  Teschen 
had  vested  in  him,  above  all,  his  horror  at  the  crime,  led 
him  to  offer  an  emphatic  protest.     The  Russian  Court  at 
once  went  into  mourning,  and  Alexander  expressed  both 
to  the  German  Diet  and  to  the  French  Government  his 
indignation  at  the  outrage.     It  was  ever  Napoleon's  habit 
to  return  blow  with  blow ;  and  he  now  instructed  Talley- 
rand to  reply  that  in  the  D'Enghien  affair  he  had  acted  solely 
on  the  defensive,  and  that  Russia's  complaint  "  led  him 
to  ask  if,  at  the  time  when  England  was  compassing  the 
assassination  of  Paul  I.,  the  authors  of  the  plot  had  been 
known  to  be  one  league  beyond  the  [Russian]  frontiers, 
every  effort  would  not  have  been  made  to  have  them  seized  ?" 
Never  has  a  poisoned  dart  been  more  deftly  sped  at  the 
weak  spot  of  an  enemy's  armour.    The  Czar,  ever  haunted 
by  the  thought  of  his  complicity  in  a  parricidal  plot,  was 
deeply  wounded  by  this  malicious  taunt,  and  all  the  more 
so  because,  as  the  death  of  Paul  had  been  officially  ascribed 
to  a  fit,  the  insult  could  not  be  flung  back.2     The  only 
reply  was  to  break  off  all  diplomatic  relations  with  Napo- 
leon ;  and  this  took  place  in  the  summer  of  1804.8 

Yet  war  was  not  to  break  out  for  more  than  a  year. 
This  delay  was  due  to  several  causes.  Austria  could  not 
be  moved  from  her  posture  of  timid  neutrality.     In  fact, 

1  Drake's  despatch  of  December  15th,  1803,  ib. 

2  Czartoryski,  "Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  ii. 

8  The  Czar's  complaints  were  :  the  exile  of  the  King  of  Sardinia,  the 
reoccupation  of  S.  Italy  by  the  French,  the  changes  in  Italy,  the  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Baden,  the  occupation  of  Cuxhaven  by  the  French, 
and  the  levying  of  ransom  from  the  Hanse  Towns  to  escape  the  same  fate 
("F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  56). 


xxii  ULM   AND  TRAFALGAR  3 

Francis  II.  and  Cobenzl  saw  in  Napoleon's  need  of  a 
recognition  of  his  new  imperial  title  a  means  of  assuring 
a  corresponding  change  of  title  for  the  Hapsburg  Domin- 
ions. Francis  had  long  been  weary  of  the  hollow  dignity 
of  Elective  Emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  The 
faded  pageantry  of  Ratisbon  and  Frankfurt  was  all  that 
remained  of  the  glories  of  the  realm  of  Charlemagne :  the 
medley  of  States  which  owned  him  as  elected  lord  cared 
not  for  the  decrees  of  this  ghostly  realm  ;  and  Goethe 
might  well  place  in  the  mouth  of  his  jovial  toper,  in  the 
cellar  scene  of  "  Faust,"  the  words  : 

"  Dankt  Gott  mit  jedem  Morgen 
Dass  Ihr  nicht  braucht  fur's  Rom'sche  Reich  zu  sorgen  1 " 

In  that  bargaining  and  burglarious  age,  was  it  not 
better  to  build  a  more  lasting  habitation  than  this  vener- 
able ruin  ?  Would  not  the  hereditary  dominions  form  a 
more  lasting  shelter  from  the  storm  ?  Such  were  doubt- 
less the  thoughts  that  prompted  the  assumption  of  the 
title  of  Hereditary  Emperor  of  Austria  (August  11th, 
1804).  The  letter-patent,  in  which  this  change  was 
announced,  cited  as  parallels  "the  example  of  the  Im- 
perial Court  of  Russia  in  the  last  century  and  of  the  new 
sovereign  of  France."  Both  references  gave  umbrage  to 
Alexander,  who  saw  no  parallel  between  the  assumption 
of  the  title  of  Emperor  by  Peter  the  Great  and  the  game 
of  folio w-the-leader  played  by  Francis  to  Napoleon.1 

Prussian  complaisance  to  the  French  Emperor  was  at 
this  time  to  be  expected.  Frederick  William  III.  reigned 
over  10,000,000  subjects  ;  he  could  marshal  248,000  of  the 
best  trained  troops  in  Europe,  and  his  revenue  was  more 
fruitful  than  that  of  the  great  Frederick.  Yet  the  effec- 
tive power  of  Prussia  had  sadly  waned  ;  for  her  policy 
was  now  marked  by  an  enervating  indecision.  'In  the 
autumn  of  1804,  however,  the  Prussian  King  was  for  a 
time  spurred  into  action  by  the  news  that  Sir  George 
Rumbold,  British  envoy  at  Hamburg,  had  been  seized  on 
the  night  of  October  24th,  by  French  troops,  and  carried 
off  to  Paris.     This  aggression  upon  the  Circle  of  Lower 

1  Lord  Harrowby  to  Admiral  Warren  ("F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  56). 


4  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Saxony,  of  which  Frederick  William  was  Director,  aroused 
lively  indignation  at  Berlin  ;  and  the  King  at  once  wrote 
to  Napoleon  a  request  for  the  envoy's  liberation  as  a  proof 
of  his  "  friendship  and  high  consideration  ...  a  seal  on 
the  past  and  a  pledge  for  the  future." 

To  this  appeal  Napoleon  returned  a  soothing  answer 
that  Sir  George  would  at  once  be  released,  though  Eng- 
land was  ever  violating  the  rights  of  neutrals,  and  her 
agents  were  conspiring  against  his  life.1  The  Emperor, 
in  fact,  saw  that  he  had  taken  a  false  step,  which  might 
throw  Prussia  into  the  arms  of  England  and  Russia.  For 
this  latter  Power  had  already  (May,  1804)  offered  her 
armed  help  to  the  Court  of  Berlin  in  case  the  French 
should  violate  any  other  German  territory.2  But  the  King 
was  easily  soothed  ;  and  when,  in  the  following  spring, 
Napoleon  sent  seven  Golden  Eagles  of  the  Legion  of 
Honour  to  the  Court  of  Berlin,  seven  Black  Eagles  of  the 
renowned  Prussian  Order  were  sent  in  return  —  an  occur- 
rence which  led  Gustavus  IV.  to  return  his  Order  of  the 
Black  Eagle  with  the  remark  that  he  could  not  recognize 
"  Napoleon  and  his  like "  as  comrades  in  an  Order  of 
Chivalry  and  Religion.3  Napoleon's  aim  was  achieved  : 
Prussia  was  sundered  from  any  league  in  which  Gustavus 
IV.  was  a  prominent  member. 

Thus,  the  chief  steps  in  the  formation  of  the  Third 
Coalition  were  taken  by  Sweden,  England,  and  Russia. 
Early  in  1804  Gustavus  proposed  a  League  of  the  Powers; 
and,  on  the  advent  of  the  Pitt  Ministry  to  office,  overtures 
began  to  pass  between  St.  Petersburg  and  London  for  an 
alliance.  The  first  advances  were  made  by  Pitt  and  our 
Foreign  Minister,  the  Earl  of  Harrowby,  in  a  note  of 
June  26th,  1804,  in  which  hopes  were  expressed  that  Rus- 
sia, England,  Austria,  Sweden,  and  if  possible  Prussia, 
might  be  drawn  together.4  Alexander  and  Czartoryski 
were  already  debating  the  advantages  of  an  alliance  with 
England.     Their  aims  were  certainly  noble.    International 

1  Lord  Harrowby  to  Admiral  Warren  ("F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  56). 
3  Garden,  "  Traites,"  vol.  viii.,  p.  302  ;  Ulraann,  "  Russisch-Preussische 
Politik,"  p.  117. 

8  See  the  letter  in  the  "  Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  168. 
*  "  F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  177. 


xxii  ULM  AND   TRAFALGAR  5 

law  and  the  rights  of  the  weak  States  bordering  on  France 
were  to  be  championed,  and  it  was  suggested  by  Czartory- 
ski  that  disputes  should  be.  settled,  not  by  force  but  by 
arbitration.1 

The  statement  of  these  exalted  ideas  was  intrusted  to 
a  special  envoy  to  London,  M.  Novossiltzoff,  who  pro- 
pounded to  Pitt  the  scheme  of  a  European  polity  where 
the  States  should  be  independent  and  enjoy  institutions 
"founded  on  the  sacred  rights  of  humanity."  With  this 
aim  in  view,  the  Czar  desired  to  curb  the  power  of  Napo- 
leon, bring  back  France  to  her  old  limits,  and  assure  the 
peace  of  Europe  on  a  firm  basis,  namely  on  the  principle 
of  the  balance  of  power.  Pitt  and  Lord  Harrowby  having 
agreed  to  these  proposals,  details  were  discussed  at  the 
close  of  1804.  None  of  the  allies  were,  in  any  case,  to 
make  a  separate  peace  ;  and  England  (said  M.  Novossilt- 
zoff) must  not  only  use  her  own  troops,  but  grant  sub- 
sidies to  enable  the  Powers  to  set  on  foot  effective  forces. 

This  last  sentence  claims  special  notice,  as  it  disposes 
of  the  well-worn  phrase,  that  the  Third  Coalition  was 
built  up  by  Pitt's  gold.  On  the  contrary,  Russia  was  the 
first  to  set  forth  the  need  of  English  subsidies,  which  Pitt 
was  by  no  means  eager  to  supply.  The  phrase  used  by 
French  historians  is  doubtless  correct  in  so  far  as  English 
gold  enabled  our  allies  to  arm  efficiently  ;  but  it  is  wholly 
false  if  it  implies  that  the  Third  Coalition  was  merely 
trumped  up  by  our  money,  and  that  the  Russian,  Austrian, 
and  Swedish  Governments  were  so  many  automatic  ma- 
chines which,  if  jogged  with  coins,  would  instantly  supply 
armies  to  the  ready  money  purchaser.  This  is  practically 
the  notion  still  prevalent  on  the  Continent;  and  it  is 
clearly  traceable  to  the  endless  diatribes  against  Pitt's 
gold  with  which  Napoleon  seasoned  his  bulletins,  and  to 
the  caricatures  which  he  ordered  to  be  drawn.  The  follow- 
ing was  his  direction  to  his  Minister  of  Police,  Fouche  : 
'"Have  caricatures  made — an  Englishman  purse  in  hand, 
\entreating  the  various  Powers  to  take  his  money.  This  is 
the  real  direction  to  give  the  whole  business."  How  well  he 
knew  mankind :  he  rightly  counted  on  its  gullibility  where 
'pictures  were  concerned ;  and  the  direction  which  he  thus 

1  Czartoryski's  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  chs.  ii.-iv. 


<5  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

gave  to  public  opinion  bids  fair  to  persist,  in  spite  of  every 
exposure  of  the  trickery.1 

But,  to  return  to  the  plans  of  the  allies,  Holland,  Swit- 
zerland, and  Italy  were  to  be  liberated  from  their  "  en- 
slavement to  France,"  and  strengthened  so  as  to  provide 
barriers  to  future  aggressions  :  the  King  of  Sardinia  was 
to  be  restored  to  his  mainland  possessions,  and  receive  in 
addition  the  Ligurian,  or  Genoese,  Republic.2  On  all 
essential  topics  the  British  Government  was  in  full  accord 
with  the  views  of  the  Czar,  and  Pitt  insisted  on  the  need 
of  a  system  of  international  law  which  should  guarantee 
the  Continent  against  further  rapacious  acts.  But  Europe 
was  not  destined  to  find  peace  on  these  principles  until 
after  ten  years  of  desolating  war. 

Various  causes  hindered  the  formation  of  this  league. 
On  January  2nd,  1805,  Napoleon  sent  to  George  III.  an 
offer  of  peace ;  and  those  persons  who  did  not  see  that 
this  was  a  device  for  discovering  the  course  of  negotia- 
tions believed  that  he  ardently  desired  it.  We  now  know 
that  the  offer  was  despatched  a  week  after  he  had  ordered 
Missiessy  to  ravage  the  British  West  Indies.3  And,  doubt- 
less, his  object  was  attained  when  George  III.  replied  in 
the  speech  from  the  throne  (January  15th)  that  he  could 
not  entertain  the  proposal  without  reference  to  the  Powers 
with  whom  he  was  then  engaged  in  confidential  intercourse, 
and  especially  the  Emperor  of  Russia.     Yet  the  British 

1  "  Lettres  inedites  de  Napoleon  "  (May  30th,  1805). 

2  See  Novossiltzoff's  Report  in  Czartoryski's  "  Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  ch. 
iv.,  and  Pitt's  note  developing  the  Russian  proposals  in  Garden's  "  Traites," 
vol.  viii.,  pp.  817-323,  or  Alison,  App.  to  ch.  xxxix.  A  comparison  of  these 
two  memoranda  will  show  that  on  Continental  questions  there  was  no 
difference  such  as  Thiers  affected  to  see  between  the  generous  policy  of 
Russia  and  the  "cold  egotism"  of  Pitt.  As  Czartoryski  has  proved  in 
his  "  Memoirs  "  (vol.  ii.,  ch.  x.),  Thiers  has  erred  in  assigning  importance 
to  a  mere  first  draft  of  a  conversation  which  Czartoryski  had  with  that 
ingenious  schemer,  the  Abbe"  Piatoli.  The  official  proposals  sent  from 
St.  Petersburg  to  London  were  very  different ;  e.g.,  the  proposal  of  Alex- 
ander with  regard  to  the  French  frontiers  was  this  :  "  The  first  object  is 
to  bring  back  France  into  its  ancient  limits,  or  such  other  ones  as  might 
appear  most  suitable  to  the  general  tranquillity  of  Europe."  It  is,  there- 
fore, futile  to  state  that  this  was  solely  the  policy  of  Pitt  after  he  had 
"remodelled"  the  Russian  proposals. 

8  "Corresp. ,"  No.  8231.  See  too  Bourrienne,  Miot  de  Melito,  vol.  ii., 
ch.  iv.,  and  Thiers,  bk.  xxi. 


xxn  ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  7 

Government  discussed  with  the  Czar  the  basis  for  a  future 
pacification  of  Europe ;  and  the  mission  of  Novossiltzoff 
at  midsummer  to  Berlin,  on  his  way  to  Paris,  was  the 
answer,  albeit  a  belated  one,  to  Napoleon's  New  Year's  pa- 
cific appeal.  We  shall  now  see  why  this  delay  occurred, 
and  what  acts  of  the  French  Emperor  finally  dispelled  all 
hopes  of  peace. 

The  delay  was  due  to  differences  between  Russia  and 
England  respecting  Malta  and  our  maritime  code.  The 
Czar  insisted  on  our  relinquishing  Malta  and  relaxing  the 
rigours  of  the  right  of  search  for  deserters  from  our  navy. 
To  this  the  Pitt  Ministry  demurred,  seeing  that  Malta  was 
our  only  means  of  protecting  the  Mediterranean  States, 
and  our  only  security  against  French  aggressions  in  the 
Levant,  while  the  right  of  searching  neutral  vessels  was 
necessary  to  prevent  the  enfeebling  of  our  navy.1  Negoti- 
ations were  nearly  broken  off  even  after  a  treaty  between 
the  two  Powers  had  been  brought  to  the  final  stage  on 
April  11th,  1805 ;  but  in  July  (after  the  Czar  had  re- 
corded his  solemn  protest  against  our  keeping  Malta)  it 
was  ratified,  and  formed  the  basis  for  the  Third  Coalition. 
The  aims  of  the  allies  were  to  bring  about  the  expulsion 
of  French  troops  from  North  Germany  ;  to  assure  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Republics  of  Holland  and  Switzerland; 
and  to  reinstate  the  King  of  Sardinia  in  Piedmont.  Half 
a  million  of  men  were  to  be  set  in  motion,  besides  the 
forces  of  Great  Britain  ;  and  the  latter  Power,  as  a  set-off 
to  her  lack  of  troops,  agreed  to  subsidize  her  allies  to  the 
extent  of  .£1,250,000  a  year  for  every  100,000  men  actu- 
ally employed  in  the  war.  It  was  further  stipulated  that 
a  European  Congress  at  the  close  of  the  war  should  en- 
deavour to  fix  more  surely  the  principles  of  the  Law  of 

1  This  refusal  has  been  severely  criticised.  Rut  the  knowledge  of  the 
British  Government  that  Napoleon  was  still  persevering  with  his  schemes 
against  Turkey,  and  that  the  Russians  themselves,  from  their  station  at 
Corfu,  were  working  to  gain  a  foothold  on  the  Albanian  coast,  surely  pre- 
scribed caution  ("F.  O.,"  Russia,  Nos.  55  and  56,  despatches  of  June 
26th  and  October  10th,  1804).  It  was  further  known  that  the  Austrian 
Government  had  proposed  to  the  Czar  plans  that  were  hostile  to  Turkey, 
and  were  not  decisively  rejected  at  St.  Petersburg  ;  and  it  is  clear  from 
the  notes  left  by  Czartoryski  that  the  prospect  of  gaining  Corfu,  Moldavia, 
parts  of  Albania,  and  the  precious  prize  of  Constantinople  was  kept  in 
view  by  his  master. 


8  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  char 

Nations  and  establish  a  federative  system.  Above  all, 
the  allies  bound  themselves  not  to  hinder  the  popular 
wish  in  France  respecting  the  form  of  government  —  a 
clause  which  deprived  the  war  of  the  Third  Coalition  of 
that  monarchical  character  which  had  pervaded  the  league 
of  1793  and,  to  a  less  extent,  that  of  1799.  * 

What  was  the  attitude  of  Napoleon  towards  this  league  ? 
He  certainty  took  little  pains  to  conciliate  the  Czar.  In 
fact,  his  actions  towards  Russia  were  almost  openly  pro- 
vocative. Thus,  while  fully  aware  of  the  interest  which 
Alexander  felt  in  the  restoration  of  the  King  of  Sardinia, 
he  sent  the  proposal  that  that  unlucky  King  should  re- 
ceive the  Ionian  Isles  and  Malta  as  indemnities  for  his 
losses,  and  that  too  when  Russia  looked  upon  Corfu  as 
her  own.  To  this  offer  the  Czar  deigned  not  a  word  in 
reply.  Napoleon  also  sent  an  envoy  to  the  Shah  of  Per- 
sia with  an  offer  of  alliance,  so  as  to  check  the  advances 
of  Russia  on  the  shores  of  the  Caspian.2 

On  the  other  hand,  he  used  every  effort  to  allure  Prus- 
sia, by  secretly  offering  her  Hanover,  and  that  too  as  early 
as  the  close  of  July.3  For  a  brief  space,  also,  he  took  some 
pains  to  conciliate  Austria.  This  indeed  was  necessary : 
for  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  already  (November  6th,  1804) 
framed  a  secret  agreement  with  Russia  to  make  war  on 
Napoleon  if  he  committed  any  new  aggression  in  Italy  or 
menaced  any  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire.*  Yet  this  act 
was  really  defensive.  Francis  desired  only  to  protect  him- 
self against  Napoleon's  ambition,  and,  had  he  been  treated 
with  consideration,  would  doubtless  have  clung  to  peace. 

For  a  time  Napoleon  humoured  that  Court,  even  as 
regards  the  changes  now  mooted  in  Italy.  On  January 
1st,  1805,  he  wrote  to  Francis,  stating  that  he  was  about 

1  Garden,  "  Trails,"  vol.  viii.,  pp.  328-333.  It  is  clear  that  Gustavus 
IV.  was  the  ruler  who  insisted  on  making  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons 
the  chief  aim  of  the  Third  Coalition.  In  our  "  F.  O.  Records  "  (Sweden, 
No.  177)  is  an  account  (August  20th,  1804)  of  a  conversation  of  Lord  Har- 
rowby  with  the  Swedish  ambassador,  who  stated  that  such  a  declaration 
would  "palsy  the  arms  of  France."  Our  Foreign  Minister  replied  that 
it  would  "  much  more  certainly  palsy  the  arms  of  England :  that  we  made 
war  because  France  was  become  too  powerful  for  the  peace  of  Europe." 

2  "Corresp.,"  No.  8329. 

8  Bailleu,  "Preussen  und  Frankreich,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  354. 
4  Thiers  (bk.  xxi.)  gives  the  whole  text. 


xxn  ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  9 

to  proclaim  Joseph  Bonaparte  King  of  Italy,  if  the  latter 
would  renounce  his  claim  to  the  crown  of  France,  and  so 
keep  the  governments  of  France  and  Italy  separate,  as 
the  Treaty  of  Luneville  required ;  that  this  action  would 
enfeeble  his  (Napoleon's)  power,  but  would  carry  its  own 
recompense  if  it  proved  agreeable  to  the  Emperor  Francis. 
But  it  soon  appeared  that  Joseph  was  by  no  means  inclined 
to  accept  the  crown  of  Lombardy  if  it  entailed  the  sacrifice 
of  all  hope  of  succeeding  to  the  French  Empire.  He  had 
already  demurred  to  le  vilain  titre  de  roi,  and  on  Janu- 
ary 27th  announced  his  final  rejection  of  the  offer.  Napo- 
leon then  proposed  to  Louis  that  he  should  hold  that  crown 
in  trust  for  his  son  ;  but  the  suggestion  at  once  rekindled 
the  flames  of  jealousy  which  ever  haunted  Louis ;  and,  after 
a  violent  scene,  the  Emperor  thrust  his  brother  from  the 
room. 

Perhaps  this  anger  was  simulated.  He  once  admitted 
that  his  rage  only  mounted  this  high  —  pointing  to  his 
chin ;  and  the  refusals  of  his  brothers  were  certainly  to 
be  expected.  However  that  may  be,  he  now  resolved  to 
assume  that  crown  himself,  appointing  as  Viceroy  his  step- 
son, Eugene  Beauharnais.  True,  he  announced  to  the 
French  Senate  that  the  realms  of  France  and  Italy  would 
be  kept  separate  :  but  neither  the  Italian  deputies,  who 
had  been  summoned  to  Paris  to  vote  this  dignity  to  their 
master,  nor  the  servile  Senate,  nor  the  rulers  of  Europe, 
were  deceived.  Thus,  when  in  the  early  summer  Napoleon 
reviewed  a  large  force  that  fought  over  again  in  mimic 
war  the  battle  of  Marengo  ;  when,  amidst  all  the  pomp 
and  pageantry  that  art  could  devise,  he  crowned  himself 
in  the  cathedral  of  Milan  with  the  iron  circlet  of  the  old 
Lombard  Kings,  using  the  traditional  formula :  "  God 
gave  it  me,  woe  to  him  who  touches  it "  ;  when,  finally, 
he  incorporated  the  Ligurian  Republic  in  the  French 
Empire,  Francis  of  Austria  reluctantly  accepted  the 
challenges  thus  threateningly  cast  down,  and  began  to 
arm.1     The  records  of  our  Foreign  Office  show  conclu- 

1  The  annexation  of  the  Ligurian  or  Genoese  Republic  took  place  on 
June  4th,  the  way  having  been  prepared  there  by  Napoleon's  former 
patron,  Salicetti,  who  liberally  dispensed  bribes.  A  little  later  the 
Republic  of  Lucca  was  bestowed  on  Elisa  Bonaparte  and  her  spouse. 


10  THE  LITE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

sively  that  the  Hapsburg  ruler  felt  himself  girt  with  diffi- 
culties :  the  Austrian  army  was  as  yet  ill  organized :  the 
reforms  after  which  the  Archduke  Charles  had  been 
striving  were  ill  received  by  the  military  clique  ;  and  the 
sole  result  had  been  to  unsettle  rather  than  strengthen  the 
army,  and  to  break  down  the  health  of  the  Archduke.1 
Yet  the  intention  of  Napoleon  to  treat  Italy  as  a  French 
province  was  so  insultingly  paraded  that  Francis  felt  war 
to  be  inevitable,  and  resolved  to  strike  a  blow  while  the 
French  were  still  entangled  in  their  naval  schemes.  He 
knew  well  the  dangers  of  war  ;  he  would  have  eagerly 
welcomed  any  sign  of  really  peaceful  intentions  at  Paris  ; 
but  no  signs  were  given  ;  in  fact,  French  agents  were 
sent  into  Switzerland  to  intrigue  for  a  union  of  that  land 
with  France.  Here  again  the  pride  of  the  Hapsburgs  was 
cut  to  the  quick,  and  they  disdained  to  submit  to  humilia- 
tions such  as  were  eating  the  heart  out  of  the  Prussian 
monarchy. 

The  Czar,  too,  was  far  from  eager  for  war.  He  had 
sent  Novossiltzoff  to  Berlin  en  route  for  Paris,  in  the 
hope  of  coming  to  terms  with  Napoleon,  when  the  news 
of  the  annexation  of  Genoa  ended  the  last  hopes  of  a 
compromise.  "  This  man  is  insatiable,"  exclaimed  Alex- 
ander ;  "  his  ambition  knows  no  bounds  ;  he  is  a  scourge 
of  the  world  ;  he  wants  war  ;  well,  he  shall  have  it,  and 
the  sooner  the  better."  The  Czar  at  once  ordered  all 
negotiations  to  be  broken  off.  Novossiltzoff,  on  July  10th, 
declared  to  Baron  Hardenberg,  the  successor  of  Haug- 
witz  at  the  Prussian  Foreign  Office,  that  Napoleon  had 
now  passed  the  utmost  limits  of  the  Czar's  patience  ;  and 
he  at  once  returned  his  French  passports.  In  forward- 
ing them  to  the  French  ambassador  at  Berlin,  Harden- 
berg expressed  the  deep  regret  of  the  Prussian  monarch 
at  the  breakdown  of  this  most  salutary  negotiation  — 
a  phrase  which  showed  that  the  patience  of  Berlin  was: 
nearly  exhausted.2 

now  named  Prince  Bacciochi.  Parma,  hitherto  administered  by  a  French 
governor,  was  incorporated  in  the  French  Empire  about  the  same  time. 

1  Paget  to  Lord  Mulgrave  (March  19th,  1805). 

3  Beer,  "  Zehn  Jahre  oesterreich.  Politik  (1801-1810)."  The  notes  ol 
Novossiltzoff  and  Hardenberg  are  printed  in  Sir  G.  Jackson's  "  Diaries," 
vol.  L,  App. 


xxii  ULM   AND  TRAFALGAR  11 

Clearly,  then,  the  Third  Coalition  was  not  cemented 
by  English  gold,  but  by  Napoleon's  provocations.  While 
England  and  Russia  found  great  difficulty  in  coming  to 
an  accord,  and  Austria  was  arming  only  from  fear,  the 
least  act  of  complaisance  on  his  part  would  have  un- 
ravelled this  ill-knit  confederacy.  But  no  such  action 
was  forthcoming.  All  his  letters  written  in  North  Italy 
after  his  coronation  are  puffed  up  with  incredible  inso- 
lence. Along  with  hints  to  Eugene  to  base  politics  on 
dissimulation  and  to  seek  only  to  be  feared,  we  find 
letters  to  Ministers  at  Paris  scorning  the  idea  that  Eng- 
land and  Russia  can  come  to  terms,  and  asserting  that 
the  annexation  of  Genoa  concerns  England  alone  ;  but 
if  Austria  wants  to  find  a  pretext  for  war,  she  may  now 
find  it. 

Then  he  hurries  back  to  Fontainebleau,  covering  the 
distance  from  Turin  in  eighty-five  hours  ;  and,  after  a 
brief  sojourn  at  St.  Cloud,  he  reaches  Boulogne.  There, 
on  August  the  22nd,  he  hears  that  Austria  is  continuing 
to  arm  :  a  few  hours  later  comes  the  news  that  Ville- 
neuve  has  turned  back  to  Cadiz.  Fiercely  and  trench- 
antly he  resolves  this  fateful  problem.  He  then  sketches 
to  Talleyrand  the  outlines  of  his  new  policy.  He  will 
again  press,  and  this  time  most  earnestly,  his  offer  of 
Hanover  to  Prussia  as  the  price  of  her  effective  alliance 
against  the  new  coalition.  Perhaps  this  new  alliance 
will  strangle  the  coalition  at  its  birth  ;  at  any  rate  it 
will .  paralyze  Austria.  Accordingly,  he  despatches  to 
Berlin  his  favourite  aide-de-camp,  General  Duroc,  to  per- 
suade the  King  that  his  alliance  will  save  the  Continent 
from  war.1 

1  See  Bignon,  vol.  iv.,  pp.  271  and  334.  Probably  Napoleon  knew 
through  Laforest  and  Talleyrand  that  Russia  had  recently  urged  that 
George  III.  should  offer  Hanover  to  Prussia.  Pitt  rejected  the  proposal. 
Prussia  paid  more  heed  to  the  offer  of  Hanover  from  Napoleon  than  to 
the  suggestions  of  Czartoryski  that  she  might  receive  it  from  its  rightful 
owner,  George  III.  Yet  Duroc  did  not  succeed  in  gaining  more  from 
Frederick  William  than  the  promise  of  his  neutrality  (see  Garden, 
"Traite%"  vol.  viii.,  pp.  339-346).  Sweden  was  not  a  member  of  the 
Coalition,  but  made  treaties  with  Russia  and  England. 

The  high  hopes  nursed  by  the  Pitt  Ministry  are  seen  in  the  following 

I  estimate  of  the  forces  that  would  be  launched  against  France  :  Austria, 

250,000  ;  Russia,  180,000  ;  Prussia,  100,000  (Pitt  then  refused  to  subsidize 


12  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Meanwhile  the  Hapsburgs  were  completely  deceived. 
They  imagined  Napoleon  to  be  wholly  immersed  in  his 
naval  enterprise,  and  accordingly  formed  a  plan  of  cam- 
paign, which,  though  admirable  against  a  weak  and  guile- 
less foe,  was  fraught  with  danger  if  the  python's  coils 
were  ready  for  a  spring.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  was  far 
better  prepared  than  Austria.  As  late  as  July  7th,  the 
Court  of  Vienna  had  informed  the  allies  that  its  army 
would  not  be  ready  for  four  months  ;  yet  the  nervous 
anxiety  of  the  Hapsburgs  to  be  beforehand  with  Napoleon 
led  them  to  hurry  on  war  :  and  on  August  9th  they 
secretly  gave  their  adhesion  to  the  Russo-British  alli- 
ance. 

Then,  too,  by  a  strange  fatuity,  their  move  into  Bavaria 
was  to  be  made  with  a  force  of  only  59,000  men,  while 
their  chief  masses,  some  92,000  strong,  were  launched  into 
Italy  against  the  strongholds  on  the  Mincio.  To  guard 
the  flanks  of  these  armies,  Austria  had  34,000  men  in 
Tyrol;  but,  apart  from  raw  recruits,  there  were  fewer 
than  20,000  soldiers  in  the  rest  of  that  vast  empire.  In 
fact,  the  success  of  the  autumn  campaign  was  known  to 
depend  on  the  help  of  the  Russians,  who  were  expected 
to  reach  the  banks  of  the  Inn  before  the  20th  of  October, 
while  it  was  thought  that  the  French  could  not  possibly 
reach  the  Danube  till  twenty  days  later.1  It  was  intended, 
however,  to  act  most  vigorously  in  Italy,  and  to  wage  a 
defensive  campaign  on  the  Danube. 

Such  was  the  plan  concocted  at  Vienna,  mainly  under 
the  influence  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  who  took  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  in  Italy,  while  that  of  the  Danube  was 
assigned  to  the  Archduke  Ferdinand  and  Mack,  the  new 
Quartermaster-General.  This  soldier  had  hitherto  en- 
joyed a  great  reputation  in  Austria,  probably  because  he 

more  than  100,000)  ;  Sweden,  16,000  ;  Saxony,  16,000  ;  Hesse  and  Bruns- 
wick, 16,000  ;  Mecklenburg,  3,000  ;  King  of  Sardinia,  25,000  ;  Bavaria, 
Wiirtemberg,  and  Baden,  25,000 ;  Naples,  20,000.  In  a  P.  S.  he  adds 
that  the  support  of  the  King  of  Sardinia  would  not  be  needed,  and  that 
England  had  private  arrangements  with  Naples  as  to  subsidies.  This 
memoir  is  not  dated,  but  it  must  belong  to  the  beginning  of  September, 
before  the  defection  of  Bavaria  was  known  ("F.  O.,"  Prussia,  No. 
70). 

1  "  F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  57  ;  Gower's  note  of  July  22nd,  1805. 


xxn  ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  13 

was  the  only  general  who  had  suffered  no  great  defeat. 
Amidst  the  disasters  of  1797  he  seemed  the  only  man  able 
to  retrieve  the  past,  and  to  be  shut  out  from  command  by 
Thugut'S  insane  jealousy  of  his  "transcendent  abilities."1 
Brave  he  certainly  was  :  but  his  mind  was  always  swayed 
by  preconceived  notions  ;  he  belonged  to  the  school  of 
"  manoeuvre  strategists,"  of  whom  the  Duke  of  Brunswick 
was  the  leader  ;  and  he  now  began  the  campaign  of  1805 
with  the  fixed  purpose  of  holding  a  commanding  military 
position.  Such  a  position  the  Emperor  Francis  and  Mack 
had  discovered  in  the  weak  fortress  of  Ulm  and  the  line 
of  the  River  Iller.  Towards  these  points  of  vantage  the 
Austrians  now  began  to  move. 

The  first  thing  was  to  gain  over  the  Elector  of  Bavaria. 
The  Court  of  Vienna,  seeking  to  persuade  or  compel  that 
prince  to  join  the  Coalition,  made  overtures  (September 
3rd  to  6th)  with  which  he  dallied  for  a  day  or  two  until 
an  opportunity  came  of  escaping  to  the  fortress  of  Wurz- 
burg.  Mack  thereupon  crossed  the  River  Inn  and  sought, 
but  in  vain,  to  cut  off  the  Bavarian  troops  from  that  strong- 
hold. Accordingly,  the  Austrian  leader  marched  on  to 
Ulm,  where  he  arrived  in  the  middle  of  September  ;  and, 
not  satisfied  with  holding  this  advanced  position,  he  pushed 
on  his  outposts  to  the  chief  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest, 
while  other  regiments  held  the  valley  of  the  River  Iller 
and  strengthened  the  fortress  of  Memmingen.  Doubtless 
this  would  have  been  good  strategy,  had  his  forces  been 
equal  in  numbers  to  those  of  Napoleon.  At  that  time  the 
Black  Forest  was  the  only  physical  barrier  between  France 
and  Southern  Germany  ;  the  Rhine  was  then  practically 
a  French  river  ;  and,  only  by  holding  the  passes  of  that 
range  could  the  Austrians  hope  to  screen  Swabia  from 
invasion  on  the  side  of  Alsace. 

But  Mack  forgot  two  essential  facts.  Until  the  Rus- 
sians arrived,  he  was  too  weak  to  hold  so  advanced  a 
position  in  what  was  hostile  ground,  now  that  Bavaria 

1  Colonel  Graham's  despatches,  which  undoubtedly  influenced  the  Pitt 
Ministry  in  favouring  the  appointment  of  Mack  to  the  present  command. 
Paget  ("  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  238)  states  that  the  Iller  position  was  decided 
lou  by  Francis.  The  best  analysis  of  Mack's  character  is  in  Bernhardi's 
i" Memoirs  of  Count  Toll"  (vol.  i.,  p.  121).  The  State  Papers  are  in 
Burke's  "Campaign  of  1805,"  App. 


chap,  xxn  ULM  AND  TRAFALGAR  IB 

and  the  other  South  German  States  obeyed  Napoleon's 
summons  to  range  themselves  on  his  side.  Further,  he 
was  dangerously  exposed  on  the  north,  as  a  glance  at 
the  map  will  show.  Ulm  and  the  line  of  the  Iller  formed 
a  strong  defence  against  the  south-west :  but  on  the 
north  that  position  is  singularly  open :  it  can  be  turned 
from  the  valleys  of  the  Main,  the  Neckar,  and  the  Altmuhl, 
all  of  which  conduct  an  invader  to  the  regions  east  of 
Ulm.  Indeed,  it  passes  belief  how  even  the  Aulic  Coun- 
cil could  have  ignored  the  dangers  of  that  position. 
Possibly  the  fact  that  Ulm  had  been  stoutly  held  by 
Kray  in  1796  now  induced  them  to  overrate  its  present 
importance ;  but  at  that  time  the  fortified  camp  of  Ulm 
was  the  central  knot  of  vast  operations,  whereas  now  it 
was  but  an  advanced  outpost.1  If  Francis  and  his  advisers 
were  swayed  by  historical  reminiscences  it  is  strange  that 
they  forgot  the  fate  of  Melas  in  Piedmont.  The  real 
parallel  had  been  provided,  not  by  Kray,  but  by  the 
general  who  was  cut  off  at  Marengo.  Indeed,  in  its  broad 
outlines,  the  campaign  of  Ulm  resembles  that  of  Marengo. 
Against  foes  who  had  thrust  their  columns  far  from  their 
base,  Napoleon  now,  as  in  1800,  determined  to  deal  a 
crushing  blow.  On  the  part  of  the  Austrians  we  notice 
the  same  misplaced  confidence,  the  same  lack  of  timely 
news,  and  the  same  inability  to  understand  Napoleon's 
plan  until  his  dispositions  are  complete ;  while  his  strat- 
egy and  tactics  in  1805  recall  to  one's  mind  the  mas- 
terly simplicity  of  design,  the  subtlety  and  energy  of 
execution,  which  led  up  to  his  triumph  in  the  plains  of 
Piedmont. 

Meanwhile  the  allies  were  dissipating  their  strength. 
A  Russian  corps,  acting  from  Corfu  as  a  base,  and  an 
English  expedition  from  Malta,  were  jointly  to  attack 
St.  Cyr  in  the  south  of  Italy,  raise  the  country  at  his  rear 
and  compel  him  to  surrender.  This  plan  was  left  help- 
lessly flapping  in  the  air  by  a  convention  which  Napoleon 
imposed  on  the  Neapolitan  ambassador.  On  Septem- 
ber 21st  Tallej'rand  induced  that  envoy  to  guarantee  the 
neutrality  of  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  all  belligerents  being 
excluded  from  its  domains.     Consequently  St.  Cyr's  corps 

1  Marmont,  "Meuis.,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  310. 


16  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap 

evacuated  that  land  and  brought  a  welcome  reinforcement 
to  Massena  on  the  Mincio.  Equally  skilful  was  Napoleon's 
action  as  regards  Hanover.  On  that  side  also  the  allies 
planned  a  formidable  expedition.  From  the  fortress  of 
Stralsund  in  Swedish  Pomerania,  a  force  of  Russians 
and  Swedes,  which  Gustavus  burned  to  command,  was 
to  march  into  Hanover,  and,  when  strengthened  by  an 
Anglo-Hanoverian  corps,  drive  the  French  from  the  Low 
Countries.  It  is  curious  to  contrast  the  cumbrous  negoti- 
ations concerning  this  expedition  —  the  quarrels  about  the 
command,  the  anxiety  at  the  outset  lest  Villeneuve  should 
perhaps  sail  into  the  Baltic,  the  delays  of  the  British  War 
Office,  the  remonstrances  of  the  Czar,  and  the  efforts  to 
avert  the  jealousy  of  Prussia — with  the  serene  indifference 
of  Napoleon  as  to  the  whole  affair.  He  knew  full  well 
that  the  war  would  not  be  decided  by  diversions  at  the 
heel  of  Italy  or  on  the  banks  of  the  Ems,  but  by  the  shock 
of  great  masses  of  men  on  the  Danube.  He  denuded 
Hanover  of  French  troops,  except  at  its  southern  fortress 
of  Hameln,  so  that  he  could  overwhelm  the  levies  of 
Austria  before  the  Russians  came  up.  In  brief,  while  the 
Coalition  sought,  like  a  Briareus,  to  envelop  him  on  all 
sides,  he  prepared  to  deal  a  blow  at  its  heart. 

As  the  first  part  of  the  campaign  depended  almost  en- 
tirely on  problems  of  time  and  space,  it  will  be  well  to 
follow  the  chief  movements  of  the  hostile  forces  somewhat 
closely.  The  Austrian  plan  aimed  at  forestalling  the 
French  in  the  occupation  of  Swabia ;  and  its  apparent 
success  puffed  up  Mack  with  boundless  confidence.  At 
Ulm  he  threw  up  extensive  outworks  to  strengthen  that 
obsolete  fortress,  extended  his  lines  to  Memmingen  far 
on  the  south,  and  trusted  that  the  Muscovites  would  come 
up  long  before  the  French  eagles  hovered  above  the  sources 
of  the  Danube.  But  at  that  time  the  Russian  vanguard 
had  not  reached  Linz  in  Upper  Austria,  and  not  before 
October  10th  did  it  appear  on  the  banks  of  the  River 
Inn.1 

Far  from  being  the  last  to  move,  the  French  Emperor 
outstripped  his  enemies  in  the  speed  of  his  preparations. 

1  See  "  Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  224  ;  also  Schdnhal's  "  Der  Krieg  1806 
in  Deutschland,"  p.  67. 


XXII 


ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  17 


Whereas  the  Austrians  believed  he  would  not  be  able  to 
reach  the  Danube  in  force  before  November  10th,  he  in- 
tended to  have  200,000  men  in  Germany  by  September 
18th.  But  he  knew  not  at  first  the  full  extent  of  his  good 
fortune  :  it  did  not  occur  to  him  that  the  Austrians  would 
cross  the  Inn :  all  he  asks  Talleyrand,  on  August  23rd, 
is  that  such  news  may  appear  in  the  "  Moniteur  "  as  will 
»ain  him  twenty  days  and  give  General  Bertrand  time  to 
win  over  Bavaria,  while  "  I  make  my  200,000  men  pirou- 
ette into  Germany."  On  August  29th  the  Army  of  Eng- 
land became  the  Grand  Army,  composed  of  seven  corps, 
Led  by  Bernadotte,  Marmont,  Davoust,  Soult,  Lannes,  Ney, 
and  Augereau.  The  cavalry  was  assigned  to  Murat ;  while 
Bessieres  was  in  command  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  now 
numbering  some  10,000  men. 

Already  the  greater  part  of  this  vast  array  was  begin- 
ning to  move  inland ;  Davoust  and  Soult  left  some  regi- 
ments, 30,000  strong,  to  guard  the  flotilla,  and  Marmont 
detached  14,000  men  to  defend  the  coasts  of  Holland ;  but 
the  other  corps  on  September  2nd  began  their  march 
Rhinewards  in  almost  their  full  strength.  On  that  day 
Bernadotte  broke  up  his  cantonments  in  Hanover,  and 
began  his  march  towards  the  Main,  on  which  so  much 
was  to  turn.  The  Elector  of  Hesse-Cassel  now  espoused 
Napoleon's  cause.  Thus,  without  meeting  any  opposition, 
Bernadotte's  columns  reached  Wiirzburg  at  the  close  of 
September ;  there  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  welcomed  the 
Marshal  and  gave  him  the  support  of  his  20,000  troops ; 
ind  at  that  stronghold  he  was  also  joined  by  Mar- 
nont. 

In  order  to  mislead  the  Austrians,  Napoleon  remained 

ip  to  September  23rd  at  St.  Cloud  or  Paris  ;  and  during 

;iis  stay  appeared  a  senatus  consultum  ordering  that,  after 

fanuary  1st,  1806,  France  should  give  up  its  revolutionary 

jalendar  and  revert  to  the  Gregorian.     He  then  set  out 

lor  Strassburg,  as  though  the  chief  blows  were  to  be  dealt 

jhrough  the  passes  of   the  Black  Forest  at  the  front  of 

lack's  line  of  defence  ;  and,  to  encourage  that  general  in 

liis  belief,  Murat  received  orders  to  show  his  horsemen 

i  the  passes  held  by  Mack's  outposts,  but  to  avoid  any 

rious  engagements.     This  would  give  time  for  the  other 

VOL.   II C 


18  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

corps  to  creep  up  to  the  enemy's  rear.  Mack,  meanwhile, 
had  heard  of  the  forthcoming  junction  of  the  French  and 
Bavarians  at  Wurzburg,  but  opined  that  it  threatened 
Bohemia.1 

Accordingly,  he  still  clung  to  his  lines,  contenting  him- 
self with  sending  a  cavalry  regiment  to  observe  Berna- 
dotte's  movements  ;  but  neither  he  nor  his  nominal  chief, 
the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  divined  the  truth.  Indeed,  so 
far  did  they  rely  on  the  aid  of  the  Russians  as  to  order 
back  some  regiments  sent  from  Italy  by  the  more  sagacious 
Archduke  Charles  ;  but  11,000  troops  from  Tyrol  reached 
the  Swabian  army.  That  force  was  now  spread  out  so  as 
to  hold  the  bridges  of  the  Danube  between  Ingolstadt  and 
Ulm  ;  and  on  October  7th  the  Austrians  were  disposed 
as  follows  :  18,000  men  under  Kienmayer  were  guard- 
ing Ingolstadt,  Neuburg,  Donauworth,  Giinzburg,  and 
lesser  points,  while  Mack  had  about  35,000  men  at  Ulm 
and  along  the  line  of  the  Iller  ;  the  arrival  of  other  detach- 
ments brought  the  Austrian  total  to  upwards  of  70,000 
men.  Against  this  long,  scattered  line  Napoleon  led 
greatly  superior  forces.2  The  development  of  his  plans 
proceeded  apace.  Though  Prussia  had  proclaimed  her 
strict  neutrality,  he  did  not  scruple  to  violate  it  by  send- 
ing Bernadotte's  corps  through  her  principality  of  Ans- 
bach,  which  lay  in  their  path.  He  charged  Bernadotte  to 
"  offer  many  assurances  favourable  to  Prussia,  and  testify 
all  possible  affection  and  respect  for  her  —  and  then  rap- 
idly cross  her  land,  asserting  the  impossibility  of  doing 
anything  else."  Accordingly,  that  Marshal  was  lavish  in 
his  regrets  and  apologies,  but  ordered  his  columns  to  defile 
past  the  battalions  and  squadrons  of  Prussia,  that  were 
powerless  to  resent  the  outrage.3 

1  "  Corresp."  No.  9249.  See  too  No.  9254  for  the  details  of  the  envel- 
oping moves  which  Napoleon  then  (September  22nd)  accurately  planned 
twenty-five  days  before  the  final  blows  were  dealt :  yet  No.  9299  shows 
that,  even  on  September  30th,  he  believed  Mack  would  hurry  back  to  the 
Inn.     Beer,  p.  145. 

a  Rustow,  "Der  Krieg  1805."     Hormayr,  "  Geschichte  Hofers"  (vol. 
i.,  p.  96),  states  that,  in  framing  with  Russia  the  plan  of  campaign,  the  < 
Austrians  forgot  to  allow  for  the  difference  (twelve  days)  between  the  , 
Russian  and  Gregorian  calendars.     The  Russians  certainly  were  eleven  ! 
days  late. 

3  "Corresp.,"  No.  9319;  Sir  G.  Jackson's  "Diaries,"  vol.  i.,  p.  334. 


xxil  ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  19 

The  news  of  this  trespass  on  Prussian  territory  reached 
the  ears  of  Frederick  William  at  a  critical  time,  when  the 
Czar  sent  to  Berlin  a  kind  of  ultimatum,  intimating  that, 
even  if  Prussia  deserted  the  cause  of  European  indepen- 
dence, Russian  troops  must  nevertheless  pass  through  part 
of  Prussian  Poland.  Stung  by  this  note  from  his  usually 
passive  demeanour,  the  King  sent  off  an  answer  that  such 
a  step  would  entail  a  Franco-Prussian  alliance  against  the 
violators  of  his  territory,  when  the  news  came  that  Napo- 
leon had  actually  done  at  Ansbach  what  Alexander  had 
announced  his  intention  of  doing  in  the  east.  The  revul- 
sion of  feeling  was  violent  :  for  a  short  space  the  King 
declared  he  would  dismiss  Duroc  and  make  war  on  Napo- 
leon for  this  insult,  but  in  the  end  he  called  a  cabinet 
council  and  invited  the  Czar  to  come  to  Berlin.1 

While  the  Gallophil  counsellors,  Haugwitz  and  Lom- 
bard, were  using  all  their  arts  to  hinder  the  Prusso-Rus- 
sian  understanding,  the  meshes  were  being  woven  fast 
around  Mack  and  the  Archduke  Ferdinand.  Bernadotte's 
corps,  after  making  history  in  its  march,  was  detached  to 
the  south-east  so  as  to  hold  in  check  the  Russian  vanguard, 
and  to  given  plenty  of  room  to  the  troops  that  were  to  cut 
off  Mack  from  Austria,  a  move  which  may  be  compared 
with  the  march  of  Bonaparte  to  Milan,  before  he  essayed 
the  capture  of  Melas.  Both  steps  bespeak  his  desire  to 
have  ample  space  at  his  back  before  circling  round  his 
prey. 

On  October  6th  the  corps  of  Soult  and  Lannes,  helped 
by  Murat's  powerful  cavalry,  cut  the  Austrian  lines  on 
the  Danube  at  Donauworth,  and  gained  a  firm  footing 
on  the  right  bank.  Over  the  crossing  thus  secured  far 
in  Mack's  rear,  the  French  poured  in  dense  array,  and 
marched  south  and  south-west,  towards  the  back  of  the 
Austrian  positions,  while  Ney's  corps  marched  to  seize 
the  chief  bridges  over  the  Danube. 

A  study  of  the  processes  of  Mack's  brain  at  this  time 
is  not  without  interest.  It  shows  the  danger  of  intrust- 
ing the  fate  of  an  army  to  a  man  who  cannot  weigh  evi- 

1  Ibid.  ;  also  Metternich,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  iii.  For  Prussia's  pro- 
test to  Napoleon,  which  pulverized  the  French  excuses,  see  Garden,  vol. 
ix.,  p.  69. 


20  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

dence.  Mack  was  not  ignorant  of  the  course  of  events, 
though  his  news  generally  came  late.  The  mischief  was 
that  his  brain  warped  the  news.  On  October  6th  he 
wrote  to  Vienna  that  the  enemy  seemed  about  to  aim 
a  blow  at  his  communications :  on  October  7th,  when  he 
heard  of  the  loss  of  Donau worth,  he  described  it  as  an 
unfortunate  event,  which  no  one  thought  to  be  possible. 
The  Archduke  now  urged  the  need  of  an  immediate  re- 
treat towards  Munich,  and  marched  in  an  easterly  direc- 
tion on  Giinzburg  :  another  Austrian  division  of  8,000 
men  moved  on  Wertingen,  where,  on  October  8th,  it  was 
furiously  attacked  by  the  troops  of  Murat  and  Lannes. 
At  first  the  Imperialists  firmly  kept  their  ranks  ;  but  the 
unequal  contest  closed  with  a  hasty  flight,  which  left 
2,000  men  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  Then  Murat, 
pressing  on  through  the  woods,  cut  off  Mack's  retreat  to 
Augsburg.  Yet  that  general  still  took  a  cheerful  view 
of  his  position.  On  that  same  day  he  wrote  from  Giinz- 
burg that,  as  soon  as  the  enemy  had  passed  over  the 
Lech,  he  would  cross  the  Danube  and  cut  their  communi- 
cations at  Nordlingen.  He  wrote  thus  when  Ney's  corps 
was  striving  to  seize  the  Danube  bridges  below  Ulm. 
If  Mack  were  to  march  north-east  against  the  French 
communications  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  for  him 
to  hold  the  chief  of  these  bridges :  but  Ney  speedily 
seized  three  of  them,  and  on  the  9th  was  able  to  draw 
closer  the  toils  around  Ulm. 

From  his  position  at  Augsburg  the  French  Emperor 
now  directed  the  final  operations  ;  and,  as  before  Ma- 
rengo, he  gave  most  heed  to  that  side  by  which  he  judged 
his  enemy  would  strive  to  break  through,  in  this  case 
towards  Kempten  and  Tyrol.  This  would  doubtless 
have  been  Mack's  safest  course  ;  for  he  was  strong  enough 
to  brush  aside  Soult,  gain  Tyrol,  seal  up  its  valleys 
against  Napoleon,  and  carry  reinforcements  to  the  Arch- 
duke Charles.  But  he  was  still  intent  on  his  Nordlingen 
scheme,  even  after  the  loss  of  the  Danube  bridges  exposed 
his  march  thither  to  flank  attacks  from  the  four  French 
corps  now  south  of  the  river.  Nevertheless,  Napoleon's 
miscalculation  of  Mack's  plans,  or,  as  Thiers  has  striven 
to   prove,  a   misunderstanding   of   his  orders   by  Murat, 


xxii  ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  21 

gave  the  Austrians  a  chance  such  as  fortune  rarely 
bestows.1 

In  spite  of  Ney's  protests,  one  of  his  divisions,  that 
led  by  Dupont,  had  been  left  alone  to  guard  the  northern 
bank  of  the  Danube,  a  position  where  it  might  have  been 
overwhelmed  by  an  enterprising  foe.  What  is  more 
extraordinary,  Dupont,  with  only  6,000  men,  was  charged 
to  advance  on  Ulm,  and  carry  it  by  storm.  On  the  11th 
he  accordingly  advanced  against  Mack's  fortified  camp 
north  of  that  city.  The  Austrians  met  him  in  force,  and, 
despite  the  utmost  heroism  of  his  troops,  finally  wrested 
the  village  of  Hasslach  from  his  grasp ;  later  in  the  day 
a  cloud  of  their  horsemen,  swooping  round  his  right  wing, 
cut  up  his  tired  troops,  took  1,000  prisoners,  and  left 
1,500  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field.  Among  the  booty 
was  found  a  despatch  of  Napoleon  ordering  Dupont  to 
carry  Ulm  by  storm  —  which  might  have  shown  them 
that  the  French  Emperor  believed  that  city  to  be  all  but 
deserted.2  In  truth,  Napoleon's  miscalculation  opened 
for  Mack  a  path  of  safety  ;  and  had  he  at  once  marched 
away  to  the  north,  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs  might  have 
changed.  The  Russian  vanguard  was  on  the  banks  of 
the  Inn  :  all  the  French,  except  the  relics  of  Dupont's 
division,  were  south  of  the  Danube,  and  a  few  vigorous 
blows  at  their  communications  might  have  greatly  em- 
barrassed troops  that  had  little  artillery,  light  stores  of 
ammunition,  and  lived  almost  entirely  on  the  produce  of 
the  country.  We  may  picture  to  ourselves  the  fierce 
blows  that,  in  such  a  case,  Frederick  the  Great  would 
have  rained  on  his  assailants  as  he  wheeled  round  on  their 
rear  and  turned  their  turning  movements.  With  Freder- 
ick matched  against  Napoleon,  the  Lech  and  the  Danube 
would  have  witnessed  a  very  cyclone  of  war. 

But  Mack  was  not  Frederick :  and  he  had  to  do  with 
a  foe  who  speedily  made  good  an  error.  On  October  13th, 
when  Mack  seemed  about  to  cut  off  the  French  from  the 
Main,  he  received  news  through  Napoleon's  spies  that  the 
(English  had  effected  a  landing  at  Boulogne,  and  a  revolu- 

1  Schonhals  ;  S6gur,  ch.  xvi.,  exculpates  Murat  and  Ney. 

2  Schonhals,  p.  7.3.  Thiers  states  that  Dupont's  0,000  gained  a  victory 
over  25,000  Austrians  detached  from  the  60,000  who  occupied  Ulm  1 


22  THE  LIFE   OP  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

tion  had  broken  out  in  France.  The  tidings  found  easy 
entrance  into  a  brain  that  had  a  strange  bias  towards 
pleasing  falsities  and  rejected  disagreeable  facts.  At 
once  he  leaped  to  the  conclusion  that  the  moves  of  Soult, 
Murat,  Lannes,  Marmont,  and  Ney  round  his  rear  were 
merely  desperate  efforts  to  cut  back  a  way  to  Alsace. 
He  therefore  held  fast  to  his  lines,  made  only  feeble  efforts 
to  clear  the  northern  road,  and  despatched  reinforcements 
to  Memmingen.  The  next  day  brought  other  news  ;  that 
Memmingen  had  been  invested  by  Soult ;  that  Ney  by  a 
brilliant  dash  across  the  Danube  at  Elchingen  had  routed 
an  Austrian  division  there,  and  was  threatening  Ulm  from 
the  north-east;  and  that  the  other  French  columns  were 
advancing  from  the  south-east.  Yet  Mack,  still  viewing 
these  facts  in  the  twilight  of  his  own  fancies,  pictured 
them  as  the  efforts  of  despair,  not  as  the  drawing  in  of 
the  hunter's  toils. 

He  was  now  almost  alone  in  his  reading  of  events. 
The  Archduke  Ferdinand,  though  nominally  in  supreme 
command,  had  hitherto  deferred  to  Mack's  age  and  expe- 
rience, as  the  Emperor  Francis  enjoined.  But  he  now 
urged  the  need  of  instantly  marching  away  to  the  north 
with  all  available  forces.  Still  Mack  clung  to  his  notion 
that  it  was  the  French  who  were  in  sore  straits  ;  and  he 
forbade  the  evacuation  of  Ulm ;  whereupon  the  Arch- 
duke, with  Schwarzenberg,  Kollowrath,  Gyulai,  and  all 
whose  instincts  or  rank  prompted  and  enabled  them  to 
defy  the  madman's  authority,  assembled  1,500  horsemen 
and  rode  off  by  the  northern  road.  It  was  high  time  ; 
for  Ney,  firmly  established  at  Elchingen,  was  pushing 
on  his  vanguard  towards  the  doomed  city  :  Murat  and 
Lannes  were  charged  to  support  him  on  the  north  bank, 
while  across  the  river  Marmont,  and  further  south  Soult, 
cut  off  the  retreat  on  Tyrol. 

At  last  the  scales  fell  from  Mack's  eyes.  Even  now  he 
protested  against  the  mere  mention  of  surrender.  But 
again  he  was  disappointed.  Ney  stormed  the  Michaels- 
berg  north  of  Ulm,  a  position  on  whicli  the  Austrians  had 
counted  ;  and  on  October  17th  the  hapless  commander 
agreed  to  terms  of  capitulation,  whereby  his  troops  were 
to  march  out  and  lay  down  their  arms  in  six  days'  time, 


xxii  ULM  AND  TRAFALGAR  23 

if  an  Austro-Russian  army  able  to  raise  the  siege  did  not 
come  on  the  scene.  These  conditions  were  afterwards 
altered  by  the  captor,  who,  wheedling  his  captive  with  a 
few  bland  words,  persuaded  him  to  surrender  on  the  20th 
on  condition  that  Ney  and  his  corps  remained  before  Ulm 
until  the  25th.  This  was  Mack's  last  offence  against  his 
country  and  his  profession  ;  his  assent  to  this  wily  com- 
promise at  once  set  free  the  other  French  corps  for  offen- 
sive operations  ;  and  that  too  when  every  day  was  precious 
to  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia. 

On  October  20th  the  French  Emperor,  with  a  brilliant 
staff,  backed  by  the  solid  wall  of  his  Guard  and  flanked 
by  eight  columns  of  his  troops,  received  the  homage  of 
the  vanquished.  First  came  their  commander,  who,  bowed 
down  by  grief,  handed  his  sword  to  the  victor  with  the 
words,  "Here  is  the  unfortunate  Mack."  Then  there 
filed  out  to  the  foot  of  the  Michaelsberg  20,000  foot  and 
3,000  horse,  who  laid  down  their  arms  before  the  Emperor, 
some  with  defiant  rage,  the  most  part  in  stolid  dejection, 
while  others  flung  them  away  with  every  sign  of  indecent 
joy.1  As  if  the  elements  themselves  conspired  to  enhance 
the  brilliance  of  Napoleon's  triumph,  the  sun,  which  had 
been  obscured  for  days  by  storm-clouds  and  torrents  of 
rain,  now  shone  brightly  forth,  bathing  the  scene  in  the 
mild  radiance  of  autumn,  lighting  up  the  French  forces 
disposed  on  the  slopes  of  that  natural  amphitheatre,  while 
it  cast  deep  shadows  from  the  long  trail  of  the  vanquished 
beneath.  The  French  were  electrified  by  the  sight  :  the 
fatigues  of  their  forced  marches  through  the  dusty  heats 
of  September,  and  the  slush,  swamps,  and  torrents  of  the 
last  few  days  were  all  forgotten,  and  they  hailed  with 
jjubilant  shouts  the  chief  whose  sagacity  had  planned  and 
achieved  a  triumph  hitherto  unequalled  in  the  annals  of 
war.  "  Our  Emperor,"  said  they,  "  has  found  out  a  new 
way  of  making  war  :  he  no  longer  makes  it  with  our  arms, 
but  with  our  legs."2 

1  Marmont,  vol.  ii.,  p.  320  ;  Lejeune,  "  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  iii. 

2  Thiers,    bk.    xxii.     During   Mack's    interview    with    Napoleon    (see 
'Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  235),  when  the  Emperor  asked  him  why  he 

Sid  not  cut  his  way  through  to  Ansbach,  he  replied,  "Prussia  would 
ave  declared  against  us."  To  which  the  Emperor  retorted  :  "Ah  !  the 
Prussians  do  not  declare  so  quickly." 


24  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Meanwhile  the  other  Austrian  detachments  were  being 
hunted  down.  Only  a  few  men  escaped  from  Memmingen 
into  Tyrol ;  the  division,  which,  if  properly  supported, 
might  have  cut  a  way  through  to  Nordlingen  three  days 
earlier,  was  now  overwhelmed  by  the  troops  of  Murat  and 
Lannes  ;  out  of  13,000  foot-soldiers  very  few  escaped. 
Most  of  the  horsemen  succeeded  in  joining  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand,  on  whose  track  Murat  now  flung  himself  with 
untiring  energy.  The  beau  sabreur  swept  through  part  of 
Ansbach  in  pursuit,  came  up  with  Ferdinand  near  Nurem- 
berg, and  defeated  his  squadrons,  their  chief,  with  about 
1,700  horse  and  some  500  mounted  artillerymen,  finally 
reaching  the  shelter  of  the  Bohemian  Mountains.  All 
the  rest  of  Mack's  great  array  had  been  engulfed. 

Thus  closed  the  first  scene  of  the  War  of  the  Third 
Coalition.  Hasty  preparations,  rash  plans,  and,  above  all, 
Mack's  fatal  ingenuity  in  reading  his  notions  into  facts 
—  these  were  the  causes  of  a  disaster  which  ruined  the 
chances  of  the  allies.  The  Archduke  Charles,  who  had 
been  foiled  by  Massena's  stubborn  defence,  was  at  once 
recalled  from  Italy  in  order  to  cover  Vienna  ;  and,  worst 
of  all,  the  Court  of  Berlin  now  delayed  drawing  the  sword. 

Yet,  even  amidst  the  unstinted  boons  that  she  showered 
on  Napoleon  by  land,  Fortune  rudely  baffled  him  at  sea. 
When  he  was  hurrying  from  Ulm  towards  the  River  Inn, 
to  carry  the  war  into  Austria,  he  heard  that  the  French 
navy  had  been  shattered.  Trafalgar  was  fought  the  day 
after  Mack's  army  filed  out  of  Ulm.  The  greatest  sea- 
fight  of  the  century  was  the  outcome  of  Napoleon's  desire 
that  his  ships  should  carry  succour  to  his  troops  in  Italy. 
For  this  voyage  the  Emperor  was  about  to  substitute 
Admiral  Rosily  for  Villeneuve  :  and  the  unfortunate 
admiral,  divining  that  resolve,  sought  by  a  bold  stroke  to 
retrieve  his  fortunes.  He  put  to  sea,  and  Trafalgar  was 
the  result.  It  would  be  superfluous  to  describe  this  last 
and  most  splendid  of  Nelson's  exploits  ;  but  a  few  words 
as  to  the  bearing  of  this  great  victory  on  the  events  of 
that  time  may  not  be  out  of  place.  It  is  certain  that 
Villeneuve  at  Trafalgar  fought  under  more  favourable 
conditions  than  in  the  conflict  of  July  22nd.  He  had 
landed    his   very   numerous    sick,   his    crews   had    been 


xxii  ULM   AND   TRAFALGAR  26 

refreshed  and  reinforced,  and,  above  all,  the  worst  of  the 
Spanish  ships  had  been  replaced  by  seaworthy  and  service- 
able craft.  Yet  out  of  the  thirty-three  sail  of  the  line,  he 
lost  eighteen  to  an  enemy  that  numbered  only  twenty- 
seven  sail  ;  and  that  fact  alone  absolves  him  from  the 
charge  of  cowardice  in  declining  to  face  Cornwallis  and 
Calder  in  July  with  ships  that  were  cumbered  with  sick 
and  badly  needed  refitting. 

Then  again  :  it  is  often  stated  that  Trafalgar  saved 
England  from  invasion.  To  refute  this  error  it  is  merely 
needful  to  remind  the  reader  that  all  immediate  fear  of 
invasion  was  over,  when,  at  the  close  of  August,  Napoleon 
wheeled  the  Grand  Army  against  Austria.  Not  until  the 
Continent  was  conquered  could  the  landing  in  Kent  become 
practicable.  That  opportunity  occurred  two  years  later, 
after  Tilsit ;  then,  in  truth,  the  United  Kingdom  was  free 
from  panic  because  Trafalgar  had  practically  destroyed 
the  French  navy.  For  these  islands,  then,  the  benefits  of 
Trafalgar  were  prospective.  But,  for  the  British  Empire, 
they  were  immediate.  Every  French,  Dutch,  and  Spanish 
colony  that  now  fell  into  our  hands  was  in  great  measure 
the  fruit  of  Nelson's  victory,  which  heralded  the  second 
and  vaster  stage  of  imperial  growth. 

Finally,  the  decisive  advantage  which  Britain  now  gained 
over  Napoleon  at  sea  compelled  him,  if  he  would  realize 
the  world-wide  schemes  ever  closest  to  his  heart,  to  adopt 
the  method  of  warfare  against  us  which  he  had  all  along 
contemplated  as  an  effective  alternative.  As  far  back  as 
February,  1798,  he  pointed  out  that  there  were  three  ways 
of  attacking  and  ruining  England  :  either  a  direct  invasion, 
or  a  French  control  of  North  Germany  which  would  ruin 
British  commerce,  or  an  expedition  to  the  Indies.  After 
Trafalgar  the  first  of  these  alternatives  was  impossible, 
and  the  last  receded  for  a  time  into  the  background.  The 
second  now  took  the  first  place  in  his  thoughts ;  he  could 
only  bring  England  to  his  feet  and  gain  a  world-empire 
by  shutting  out  her  goods  from  the  whole  of  the  Continent, 
and  thus  condemning  her  to  industrial  strangulation.  In 
a  word,  Trafalgar  necessitated  the  adoption  of  the  Conti- 
nental System,  which  was  built  up  by  the  events  now  to 
be  described. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

AUSTERLITZ 

After  the  capitulation  of  Ulm,  the  French  Emperor 
marched  against  the  Russian  army,  which,  as  he  told  his 
troops,  English  gold  had  brought  from  the  ends  of  the  earth. 
As  is  generally  the  case  with  coalitions,  neither  of  the 
allies  was  ready  in  time  or  sent  its  full  quota.  In  place 
of  the  54,000  which  Alexander  had  covenanted  to  send 
to  Austria's  support,  he  sent  as  yet  only  46,000 ;  and  of 
these  8,000  were  detached  into  Podolia  in  order  to  watch 
the  warlike  moves  of  the  Turks,  whom  the  French  had 
stirred  up  against  the  Muscovite. 

But  Alexander  had  another  and  weightier  excuse  for 
not  denuding  his  realm  of  troops,  namely,  the  ambiguous 
policy  of  Prussia.  Up  to  the  middle  of  October  this  great 
military  Power  clung  to  her  somewhat  threatening  neu- 
trality, an  attitude  not  unlike  that  of  the  Scandinavian 
States,  which,  in  1691,  remained  deaf  to  the  entreaties  of 
William  of  Orange  to  take  up  the  cause  of  European  free- 
dom against  Louis  XIV.,  and  were  dubbed  the  Third 
Party.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  Prussian  King 
had  some  grounds  for  his  conduct  :  he  feared  the  Polish 
influence  which  Czartoryski  wielded  over  the  Czar,  and 
saw  in  the  Russian  request  for  a  right  of  way  through 
Prussian  Poland  a  deep-laid  scheme  for  the  seizure  of  that 
territory.  Indeed,  the  letters  of  Czartoryski  prove  that 
such  a  plan  was  pressed  forward,  and  found  much  favour 
with  the  Czar,  though  at  the  last  moment  he  prudently 
shelved  it.1 

For  a  time  the  hesitations  of  Prussia  were  ended  by 
Napoleon's  violation  at  Ansbach,  and  by  Alexander's 
frank  explanations  at  Potsdam  ;  but  meanwhile  the  de- 
lays caused  by  Prussia's  suspicions  had  marred  the  Aus- 

1  "Alexandre  I  et  Czartoryski,"  pp.  32-34. 
26 


chap,  xxni  AUSTERLITZ  27 

trian  plans.  A  week's  grace  granted  by  Napoleon,  or  a 
week  gained  by  the  Russians  on  their  actual  marching 
time,  would  have  altered  the  whole  situation  in  Bavaria 
—  and  Prussia  would  have  drawn  the  sword  against 
France  to  avenge  the  insult  at  Ansbach. 

On  October  10th  Hardenberg  informed  the  Austrian 
ambassador,  Metternich,  that  Frederick  William  was  on 
the  point  of  declaring  for  the  allies.  Nothing,  however, 
was  done  until  Alexander  reached  Potsdam,  and  the  first 
news  that  he  received  on  his  arrival  (October  25th)  was 
of  the  surrender  of  Ulm.  Nevertheless,  the  influence  of 
the  Czar  checkmated  the  efforts  of  Haugwitz  and  the 
French  party,  and  kept  that  Government  to  its  resolve, 
which  on  November  3rd  took  the  form  of  the  Treaty  of 
Potsdam  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia.  Fred- 
erick William  pledged  himself  to  offer  the  armed  media- 
tion of  Prussia,  and,  if  it  were  refused  by  Napoleon,  to 
join  the  allies.  The  Prussian  demands  were  as  follows: 
the  restoration  of  the  King  of  Sardinia ;  the  independence 
of  Naples,  Holland,  Germany,  and  Switzerland ;  and  the 
Mincio  as  Austria's  boundary  in  Italy.1 

An  envoy  was  to  offer  these  terms  to  Napoleon,  and 
to  bring  back  a  definite  answer  within  one  month  from 
the  time  of  his  departure,  and  in  the  meantime  180,000 
Prussians  prepared  to  threaten  his  flank  and  rear. 
Alexander  also  secretly  pledged  himself  to  use  his  influ- 
ence with  George  III.  to  gain  Hanover  for  Frederick 
William  at  the  close  of  the  war,  England  meanwhile  sub- 
sidizing Prussia  and  her  Saxon  allies  on  the  usual  scale. 
The  Czar  afterwards  accompanied  the  King  and  Queen  to 
the  crypt  of  the  Great  Frederick,  kissed  the  tomb,  and,  as 
he  took  his  leave  of  their  majesties,  cast  a  significant  look 
at  the  altar.2 

Did  he  fear  the  peace-loving  tendencies  of  the  King,  or 
the  treachery  of  Haugwitz  ?  It  is  difficult  to  see  good 
faith   in   every    detail   of   the   treaty.      Apart   from   the 

1  See  these  terms  compared  with  the  Anglo-Russian  treaty  of  April 
11th,  1805,  in  the  Appendix  of  Dr.  Ilansing's  "  Hardenberg  und  die  dritte 
Coalition"  (Berlin,  180!i). 

8  Ilausser,  vol.  ii.,  p.  617  (4th  edit.)  ;  Lettow-Vorbeck,  "  Der  Krieg  von 
1800-1807,"  vol.  i.,  adinit. 


28  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

strange  assumption  that  England  would  subsidize  Prussia 
and  also  give  up  Hanover,  the  manner  in  which  the  armed 
mediation  was  to  be  offered  left  several  loopholes  for 
escape.  After  the  surrender  of  Ulm,  speedy  and  vigorous 
action  was  needed  to  restore  the  balance  ;  yet  a  month's 
delay  was  bargained  for.  Then,  too,  Haugwitz,  who  was 
charged  with  this  most  important  mission,  deferred  his 
departure  for  ten  days  on  the  plea  that  Prussia's  forces 
could  not  be  ready  before  the  middle  of  December.  Such 
was  the  statement  of  the  leisurely  Duke  of  Brunswick  ; 
but  it  can  scarcely  be  reconciled  with  Frederick  William's 
threat,  a  month  earlier,  of  immediate  war  against  the 
Russians  if  they  entered  his  lands.  Yet  now  that  mon- 
arch approved  of  the  delay.  Haugwitz  therefore  did  not 
set  out  till  November  14th,  and  by  that  time  Napoleon 
was  master  of  Vienna,  and  the  allies  were  falling  back 
into  Moravia. 

We  now  turn  to  the  scene  of  war.  For  the  first  time 
in  modern  history  the  Hapsburg  capital  had  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  a  foreign  foe.  Napoleon  now  installed  him- 
self at  the  stately  palace  of  Schonbrunn,  while  Francis 
was  fleeing  to  Olmiitz  and  the  Archdukes  Charles  and 
John  were  struggling  in  the  defiles  of  the  Alps  to  disen- 
gage themselves  from  the  vanguard  of  Massena.  The 
march  of  the  French  on  Vienna,  and  thence  northwards 
to  Briinn,  led  to  only  one  incident  of  general  interest, 
namely,  the  filching  away  from  the  Austrians  of  the 
bridge  over  the  Danube  to  the  north  of  Vienna.  As  it 
nears  the  city,  that  great  river  spreads  out  into  several 
channels,  the  largest  being  on  the  north.  The  wooden 
bridge  further  up  the  river  having  been  burnt  by  the 
Russian  rearguard,  there  remained  only  the  bridge  or 
bridges,  opposite  the  city,  on  the  possession  of  which  Na- 
poleon set  much  store.  He  therefore  charged  Murat  and 
Lannes  to  secure  them  if  possible. 

Murat  was  smarting  under  the  Emperor's  displeasure 
for  a  rash  advance  on  Vienna  which  had  wellnigh  cost  the 
existence  of  Mortier's  corps  on  the  other  bank.  Indeed, 
only  by  the  most  resolute  bravery  did  the  remnant  of 
that  corps  hew  its  way  through  overwhelming  numbers. 
Murat,  who  should  have  kept  closely  in  touch  with  Mortier 


xxiii  AUSTERLITZ  29 

by  a  flotilla  of  boats,  was  eager  to  retrieve  his  fault,  and, 
with  Lannes,  Bertrand,  and  an  officer  of  engineers,  he  now 
approached  the  first  part  of  the  bridge  as  if  for  a  parley 
during  an  informal  armistice  which  had  just  been  dis- 
cussed but  not  concluded.  The  French  Marshals  had 
disposed  the  grenadiers  of  General  Oudinot,  a  body  of 
men  as  renowned  as  their  leader  for  fighting  qualities,  be- 
hind some  thickets  that  spread  along  the  southern  bank 
and  partly  screened  the  approach.  The  plank  barricade 
at  the  southern  end  was  now  thrown  down,  and  the  four 
Frenchmen  advanced.  An  Austrian  mounted  sentinel 
fired  his  carbine  and  galloped  away  to  the  main  bridge ; 
thereupon  the  four  men  advanced,  called  to  the  officer 
there  in  command  as  if  for  a  parley,  and  stopped  him  in 
the  act  of  firing  the  gunpowder  stored  beneath  the  bridge, 
with  the  assurance  that  an  armistice  was,  or  was  about  to 
be,  concluded. 

Reaching  the  northern  end,  they  repeated  their  tale, 
and  claimed  to  see  the  commander.  While  the  defenders 
were  hesitating,  Oudinot's  grenadiers  were  rapidly  march- 
ing forward.  As  soon  as  they  were  seen,  the  Austrians 
prepared  once  more  to  fire  the  bridge.  Again  they  were 
implored  to  desist,  as  peace  was  as  good  as  signed.  But 
when  the  grenadiers  had  reached  the  northern  bank,  the 
mask  was  dropped :  fresh  troops  were  hurrying  up  and 
the  chance  of  saving  the  bridge  from  their  grasp  was  now 
lost.  By  these  means  did  Murat  and  Lannes  secure  an 
undisputed  passage  to  the  northern  bank,  for  which  four 
years  later  the  French  had  desperately  to  fight.  Napoleon 
was  delighted  at  Murat's  exploit,  which  greatly  furthered 
his  pursuit  of  the  allies,  and  he  at  once  restored  that 
Marshal  to  high  favour.  But  those  who  placed  gentle- 
manly conduct  above  the  glamour  of  a  trickster's  success 
were  not  slow,  even  then,  to  express  their  disapproval  of 
this  act  of  perfidy.1 

The  prolonged  retreat  into  Moravia,  the  unexpected 
feebleness  of  the  Hapsburg  arms,  and  the  lack  of  supplies 
weighed  heavily  on  Alexander's  spirits,  as  is  shown  in 
his  letter  from  Olmiitz  to  the  King  of  Prussia  on  Novem- 

1  For  the  much  more  venial  stratagem  which  Kutusoff  played  on  Murat 
at  Hollabrunn,  see  Thiers,  bk.  xxiii. 


30  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ber  19th :  "  Our  position  is  more  than  critical :  we  stand 
almost  alone  against  the  French,  who  are  close  on  our 
heels.  As  for  the  Austrian  army,  it  does  not  exist.  .  .  . 
If  your  armies  advance,  the  whole  position  will  alter  at 
once." 1  A  few  days  later,  however,  when  27,000  more 
Russians  were  at  hand,  including  his  Imperial  Guard,  the 
Czar  passed  from  the  depths  of  depression  to  the  heights 
of  confidence.  The  caution  of  his  wary  commander, 
Kutusoff,  who  urged  a  Fabian  policy  of  delay  and  retreat, 
now  began  to  weary  him.  To  retire  into  northern  Hun- 
gary seemed  ignominious.  And  though  Frederick  Will- 
iam held  to  his  resolve  of  not  drawing  the  sword  before 
December  15th,  and  by  that  time  the  Archduke  Charles 
with  a  large  army  was  expected  below  Vienna,  yet  the 
susceptible  young  autocrat  spurned  the  behests  of  irksome 
prudence.  In  vain  did  Kutusoff  and  Schwarzenberg  urge 
the  need  of  delay  and  retreat :  Alexander  gave  more  heed 
to  the  rash  counsels  of  his  younger  officers.  An  advance 
was  ordered  on  Brunn,  and  a  successful  cavalry  skirmish 
at  Wischau  confirmed  the  Czar  in  his  change  from  the 
strategy  of  Fabius  to  that  of  Varro. 

Napoleon,  who  was  now  at  Brunn,  had  already  divined 
this  change  in  the  temper  of  his  foe,  and  called  back  his 
men  with  the  express  purpose  of  humouring  Alexander's 
latest  mood  and  tempting  him  on  to  a  decisive  battle.  He 
saw  clearly  the  advantage  of  fighting  at  once.  The  re- 
newed offers  of  an  armistice,  which  he  received  from  the 
prudent  Francis,  might  alone  have  convinced  him  of  this ; 
and  they  came  in  time  to  give  him  an  argument,  telling 
enough  to  daunt  the  Prussian  envoy,  who  was  now  draw- 
ing near  to  his  headquarters. 

After  proceeding  towards  Vienna  and  being  sent  back 
to  Briinn,  Haugwitz  arrived  there  on  November  29th.2 
Of  the  four  hours'  private  conference  that  ensued  with 
Napoleon  we  have  but  scanty  records,  and  those  by  Haug- 

1  Lord  Harrowby,  then  on  a  special  mission  to  Berlin,  reports  (Novem- 
ber 24th)  that  this  appeal  of  the  Czar  had  been  "  coolly  received,"  and  no 
Prussian  troops  would  enter  Bohemia  until  it  was  known  how  Prussia's 
envoy  to  Napoleon,  Count  Haugwitz,  had  been  received. 

2  Thiers  says  December  1st,  which  is  corrected  by  Napoleon's  letter  of 
November  30th  to  Talleyrand. 


XXIII 


AUSTERLITZ  31 


witz  himself,  who  had  every  reason  for  warping  the  truth. 
He  states  that  he  was  received  with  icy  coldness,  and  at 
once  saw  that  the  least  threat  of  hostile  pressure  by  Prus- 
sia would  drive  Napoleon  to  make  a  separate  peace  with 
Austria.  But  after  the  first  hour  the  Emperor  appeared 
to  thaw  :  he  discussed  the  question  of  a  Continental  peace 
and  laid  aside  all  resentment  at  Prussia's  conduct :  finally, 
he  gave  a  general  assent  to  her  proposals,  on  two  condi- 
tions, namely,  that  the  allied  force  then  in  Hanover  should 
not  be  allowed  by  Prussia  to  invade  Holland,  and  that  the 
French  garrison  in  the  fortres3  of  Hameln,  now  compassed 
about  by  Prussians,  should  be  provisioned.  To  both  of 
these  requests  Haugwitz  assented,  and  pledged  the  word 
of  his  King,  an  act  of  presumption  which  that  monarch 
was  to  repudiate. 

While  exceeding  his  instructions  on  this  side,  Haugwitz 
did  practically  nothing  to  advance  the  chief  business  of 
his  mission.  Either  his  own  fears,  or  the  crafty  mixture 
of  threats  and  flattery  that  cajoled  so  many  envoys,  led 
him  to  neglect  the  interests  of  Prussia,  and  to  play  into 
the  hands  of  the  very  man  whose  ambition  he  was  sent 
to  check.  After  the  interview,  when  the  envoy  had  re- 
tired to  his  lodging,  Caulaincourt  came  up  in  haste  to 
warn  him  that  a  battle  was  imminent,  that  his  personal 
safety  might  be  endangered,  and  that  Napoleon  requested 
him  to  repair  to  Vienna,  where  he  might  consult  with 
Talleyrand  on  affairs  of  State.  Horses  and  an  escort 
were  ready,  and  Haugwitz  set  out  for  that  city,  where  he 
arrived  on  November  30th,  only  to  find  that  Talleyrand 
was  strictly  forbidden  to  do  more  than  entertain  him  with 
commonplaces.  Thus,  the  all-important  question  as  to 
the  action  of  Prussia's  legions  was  again  postponed,  even 
when  150,000  Prussians  and  Saxons  were  ready  to  march 
against  the  French  communications. 

Napoleon's  letter  of  November  30th  to  Talleyrand  re- 
veals his  secret  anxiety  at  this  time.  In  truth,  the  crisis 
was  terrible.  With  a  superior  force  in  front,  with  the 
Archdukes  Ferdinand  and  Charles  threatening  to  raise 
Bohemia  and  Hungary  on  his  flanks,  while  two  Prussian 
armies  were  about  to  throw  themselves  on  his  rear,  his 
position  was  fully  as  serious  as  that  of  Hannibal  before 


32  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Cannae,  from  which  the  Carthaginian  only  freed  himself 
by  that  staggering  blow.  Did  that  example  inspire  the 
French  Emperor,  or  did  he  take  counsel  from  his  own 
boundless  resources  of  brain  and  will  ?  Certain  it  is  that, 
after  a  passing  fit  of  discouragement,  he  braced  himself  for 
a  final  effort,  and  staked  all  on  the  effect  of  one  mighty 
stroke.  In  order  to  hurry  on  the  battle  he  feigned  dis 
couragement  and  withdrew  his  lines  from  Austerlitz  to 
the  Goldbach.  Already  he  had  sent  General  Savary  to 
the  Czar  with  proposals  for  a  short  truce.1  The  word 
truce  now  spelt  guile ;  its  offer  through  Savary,  whose 
hands  were  stained  with  the  blood  of  the  Due  d'Enghien, 
was  in  itself  an  insult,  and  Alexander  gave  that  envoy 
the  coolest  reception.  In  return  he  sent  Prince  Dol- 
goruki,  the  leader  of  the  bellicose  youths  now  high  in 
favour,  who  proudly  declared  to  the  French  Emperor  the 
wishes  of  his  master  for  the  independence  of  Europe  — 
adding  among  other  things  that  Holland  must  be  free  and 
have  Belgium  added  to  it. 

This  suggestion  greatly  amused  Napoleon,  who  replied 
that  Russia  ought  now  to  think  of  her  own  advantages  on 
the  side  of  Turkey.  The  answer  convinced  the  Czar  that 
Napoleon  dreaded  a  conflict  in  his  dangerously  advanced 
position.  He  knew  not  his  antagonist's  resources.  Napo- 
leon had  hurried  up  every  available  regiment.  Berna- 
dotte's  corps  was  recalled  from  the  frontier  of  Bohemia ; 
Friant's  division  of  4,000  men  was  ordered  up  from 
Vienna ;  and  by  forced  marches  it  also  was  nigh  at  hand 
on  the  night  of  December  1st,  worn  with  fatigue  after 
covering  an  immense  space  in  two  days,  but  ready  to  do 
excellent  service  on  the  morrow.2  By  this  timely  concen- 
tration Napoleon  raised  his  forces  to  a  total  of  at  least 
73,000  men,  while  the  enemy  founded  their  plan  on  the 
assumption  that  Napoleon  had  less  than  50,000,  and  would 
scarcely  resist  the  onset  of  superior  forces. 

Their  plan  was  rash,  even  for  an  army  which  numbered 
about  80,000  men.  The  Austrian  General  Weyrother  had 
convinced  the  Czar  that  an  energetic  advance  of  his  left 

1  Thtebault,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  viii.  ;  Segur,  ch.  xviii.  ;  York  von  Wartenburg, 
"Nap.  als  Feldherr,"  vol.  i.,  p.  230. 

2  Davoust's  reports  of  December  2nd  and  5th  in  his  "  Corresp." 


xxin  AUSTERLITZ  33 

wing,  which  rested  on  the  southern  spurs  of  the  Pratzen- 
berg,  would  force  back  Napoleon's  right,  which  was  ranged 
between  the  villages  of  Kobelnitz  and  Sokelnitz,  and  so 
roll  up  his  long  line  that  stretched  beyond  Schlapanitz. 
This  move,  if  successful,  would  not  only  win  the  day,  but 
decide  the  campaign,  by  cutting  off  the  French  from  their 
supplies  coming  from  the  south  and  driving  them  into  the 
exhausted  lands  around  Olmiitz.  Such  was  Weyrother's 
scheme,  which  enchanted  the  Czar  and  moved  the  fears 
of  the  veteran  Kutusoff:  it  was  expounded  to  the  Russian 
and  Austrian  generals  after  midnight  on  December  the 
2nd.  Strong  in  the  great  central  hill,  the  Pratzenberg, 
and  the  cover  of  its  village  at  the  foot,  the  Czar  had  no 
fear  for  his  centre :  to  his  right  or  northern  wing  he  gave 
still  less  heed,  as  it  rested  firmly  on  villages  and  was 
powerful  in  cavalry  and  artillery ;  but  his  left  wing,  com- 
prising fully  two-fifths  of  the  allied  army,  was  expected 
easily  to  defeat  Napoleon's  weak  and  scattered  right,  and 
so  decide  the  day.  Kutusoff  saw  the  peril  of  massing  so 
great  a  force  there  and  weakening  the  centre,  but  sadly 
held  his  peace. 

Napoleon  had  already  divined  their  secret.  In  his 
order  of  battle  he  took  his  troops  into  his  confidence,  tell- 
ing them  that,  while  the  enemy  marched  to  turn  his  right, 
they  would  expose  their  flank  to  his  blows.  To  announce 
this  beforehand  was  strangely  bold,  and  it  has  been  thought 
that  he  had  the  plan  from  some  traitor  on  the  enemy's 
staff.  No  proof  of  this  has  been  given  ;  and  such  an 
explanation  seems  superfluous  to  those  who  have  observed 
Napoleon's  uncanny  power  of  fathoming  his  adversary's 
designs.  The  idea  of  withdrawing  one  wing  in  order  to 
tempt  the  foe  unduly  to  prolong  his  line  on  that  side,  and 
then  to  crush  it  at  the  centre,  or  sever  it  from  the  centre, 
is  common  both  to  Castiglione  and  Austerlitz.  It  is  true, 
the  peculiarities  of  the  ground,  the  ardour  of  the  Russian 
attack,  and  the  vastness  of  the  operations  lent  to  the  pres- 
ent conflict  a  splendour  and  a  horror  which  Castiglione 
lacked.  But  the  tactics  which  won  both  battles  were 
fundamentally  the  same. 

He  had  studied  the  ground  in  front  of  Austerlitz  ;  and 
the  priceless  gift  of  strategic  imagination  revealed  to  him 

VOL.    II  —  D 


34  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

what  a  rash  and  showy  leader  would  be  certain  to  do  on 
that  ground ; 1  he  tempted  him  to  it,  and  the  announce- 
ment of  the  enemy's  plan  to  the  French  soldiery  supplied 
the  touch  of  good  comradeship  which  insured  their  utmost 
devotion  on  the  morrow.  At  midnight,  as  he  returned 
from  visiting  the  outposts,  the  soldiers  greeted  him  with 
a  weird  illumination  :  by  a  common  impulse  they  tore 
down  the  straw  from  their  rude  shelters  and  held  aloft 
the  burning  wisps  on  long  poles,  dancing  the  while  in 
honour  of  the  short  gray-coated  figure,  and  shouting,  "  It 
is  the  anniversary  of  the  coronation.  Long  live  the  Em- 
peror." Thus  was  the  great  day  ushered  in.  The  welkin 
glowed  with  this  tribute  of  an  army's  hero-worship :  the 
frost-laden  clouds  echoed  back  the  multitudinous  acclaim  5 
and  the  Russians,  as  they  swung  forward  their  left,  sur- 
mised that,  after  all,  the  French  would  stand  their  ground 
and  fight,  whilst  others  saw  in  the  flare  a  signal  that  Na- 
poleon was  once  more  about  to  retreat. 

December  the  2nd  may  well  be  the  most  famous  day 
of  the  Napoleonic  calendar  :  it  was  the  day  of  his  corona- 
tion, it  was  the  day  of  Austerlitz,  and,  a  generation  later, 
another  Napoleon  chose  it  for  his  coup  oVStat.  The  "sun 
of  Austerlitz,"  which  the  nephew  then  hailed,  looked  down 
on  a  spectacle  far  different  from  that  which  he  wished  to 
gild  with  borrowed  splendour.  Struggling  dimly  through 
dense  banks  of  mist,  it  shone  on  the  faces  of  73,000 
Frenchmen  resolved  to  conquer  or  to  die  :  it  cast  weird 
shadows  before  the  gray  columns  of  Russia  and  the  white- 
coats  of  Austria  as  they  pressed  in  serried  ranks  towards 
the  frozen  swamps  of  the  Goldbach.  At  first  the  allies 
found  little  opposition  ;  and  Kienmayer's  horse  cleared 
the  French  from  Tellnitz  and  the  level  ground  beyond. 
But  Friant's  division,  hurrying  up  from  the  west,  restored 
the  fight  and  drove  the  first  assailants  from  the  village. 
Others,  however,  were  pressing  on,  twenty-nine  battalions 
strong,  and  not  all  the  tenacious  bravery  of  Davoust's 
soldiery  availed  to  hold  that  spot.  Nor  was  it  necessary. 
Napoleon's   plan  was  to  let  the  allied  left  compromise 

1  Segur,  Thtebault,  and  Lejeune  all  state  that  Napoleon  in  the  previous 
advance  northwards  had  foretold  that  a  great  battle  would  soon  be  fought 
opposite  Austerlitz,  and  explained  how  he  would  fight  it. 


XXIII 


AUSTERLITZ 


35 


itself  on  this  side,  while  he  rained  the  decisive  blows  at  its 
joint  with  the  centre  on  the  southern  spur  of  the  Pratzen- 
berg. 

For  this  reason  he  reduced  Davoust  to  defensive  tactics, 
for  which  his  stubborn  methodical  genius  eminently  fitted 
him,  until  the  French  centre  had  forced  the  Russians 
from  the  plateau.  Opposite  or  near  that  height  he  had 
posted  the  corps  of  Soult  and  Bernadotte,  supporting 
them  with  the  grenadiers  of  Oudinot  and    the  Imperial 


Stan-furds  (ra&yraph^&stub^&ortdor). 


Guard.  Confronting  these  imposing  forces  was  the  Rus- 
sian centre,  weakened  by  the  heavy  drafts  sent  towards 
Tellnitz,  but  strong  in  its  position  and  in  the  experience 
of  its  leader  Kutusoff.  Caution  urged  him  to  hold  back 
his  men  to  the  last  moment,  until  the  need  of  giving  co- 
hesion to  the  turning  movement  led  the  Czar  impatiently 
to  order  his  advance.  Scarcely  had  the  Russians  de- 
scended beyond  Pratzen  when  they  were  exposed  to  a 
furious  attack.  Vandamme,  noted  even  then  as  orte  of 
the  hardest  hitters  in  the  army,  was  leading  his  division 


36  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

of  Soult's  corps  up  the  northern  slopes  of  the  plateau  ;  by 
a  sidelong  slant  his  men  cut  off  a  detachment  of  Russians 
in  the  village,  and,  aided  by  the  brigade  of  Thiebault, 
swarmed  up  the  hill  at  a  speed  which  surprised  and  un- 
steadied  its  defenders.  Oudinot's  grenadiers  and  the 
Imperial  Guard  were  ready  to  sustain  Soult  :  but  the 
men  of  his  corps  had  the  glory  of  seizing  the  plateau  and 
driving  back  the  Russians.  Yet  these  returned  to  the 
charge.  Alexander  and  Kutusoff  saw  the  importance  of 
the  heights,  and  brought  up  a  great  part  of  their  reserves. 
Soon  the  divisions  of  Vandamme  and  St.  Hilaire  were 
borne  back  ;  and  it  needed  all  the  grand  fighting  powers 
of  their  troops  to  hold  up  against  the  masses  of  howling 
Russians.  For  two  hours  the  battle  there  swayed  to  and 
fro ;  and  Thiebault  has  censured  Napoleon  for  the  lack  of 
support,  and  Soult  for  his  apathy,  during  this  soldiers' 
battle. 

But  the  Emperor  was  awaiting  the  development  of  events 
on  the  wings.  A  sharp  fight  of  all  arms  was  raging  on 
the  plain  further  to  the  north.  There  the  allies  at  first 
gained  ground,  the  Austrian  horse  well  maintaining  its 
old  fame  :  but  the  infantry  of  Lannes'  corps,  supported 
by  powerful  artillery  ranged  on  a  small  conical  hill, 
speedily  checked  their  charges  ;  the  French  horse,  mar- 
shalled by  Murat  and  Kellermann  somewhat  after  the 
fashion  of  the  British  cavalry  at  Waterloo,  so  as  to  sup- 
port the  squares  and  dash  through  the  intervals  in  pur- 
suit, soon  made  most  effective  charges  upon  the  dense 
squadrons  of  the  allies,  and  finally  a  general  advance  of 
Lannes  and  Murat  overthrew  the  wavering  lines  opposite 
and  chased  them  back  towards  the  small  town  of  Auster- 
litz. 

Thus  by  noon  the  lines  of  fighting  swerved  till  they 
ranged  along  the  course  of  the  Littawa  stream,  save  where 
the  allies  had  thrust  forward  a  long  and  apparently  suc- 
cessful wedge  beyond  Tellnitz.  The  Czar  saw  the  danger 
of  this  almost  isolated  wing,  and  sought  to  keep  touch 
with  it ;  but  the  defects  of  the  allied  plan  were  now  pain- 
fully apparent.  Napoleon,  having  the  interior  lines,  while 
his  foes  were  scattered  over  an  irregular  arc,  could  rein- 
force his  hard-pressed  right.     There  Davoust  was  being 


xxin  AUSTERLITZ  37 

slowly  borne  back,  when  the  march  of  Duroc  with  part  of 
the  Imperial  Guard  restored  the  balance  on  that  side.  The 
French  centre  also  was  strengthened  by  the  timely  arrival 
of  part  of  Bernadotte's  corps.  That  Marshal  detached  a 
division  towards  the  northern  slopes  of  the  plateau  ;  for 
he  divined  that  there  his  master  would  need  every  man  to 
deal  the  final  blows.1 

In  truth,  Alexander  and  Kutusoff  were  struggling  hard 
to  regain  the  Pratzenberg.  Four  times  did  the  Musco- 
vites fling  themselves  on  the  French  centre,  and  not  with- 
out some  passing  gleams  of  success.  Here  occurred  the 
most  famous  cavalry  fight  of  the  war.  The  Russian 
Guards,  mounted  on  superb  horses,  had  cut  up  two  of 
Vandamme's  battalions,  when  Rapp  rode  to  their  rescue 
with  the  chasseurs  of  the  French  Imperial  Guard.  These 
choice  bodies  of  horsemen  met  with  a  terrible  shock,  which 
threw  the  Russians  into  disorder.  Rallied  by  other  squad- 
rons, these  now  overthrew  their  assailants  and  seemed 
about  to  overpower  them,  when  Bessieres  with  the  heavy 
cavalry  of  the  Guard  fell  on  the  flank  of  the  Muscovite 
horse  and  drove  their  lines,  horse  and  foot,  into  the  valley 
beyond. 

Assured  of  his  centre,  Napoleon  now  launched  Soult's 
corps  down  the  south-western  spurs  of  the  plateau  upon 
the  flank  and  rear  of  the  allied  left :  this  unexpected  onset 
was  decisive  :  the  French,  sweeping  down  the  slopes  with 
triumphant  shouts,  cut  off  several  battalions  on  the  banks 
of  the  Goldbach,  scattered  others  in  headlong  flight 
towards  Biiinn,  and  drove  the  greater  part  down  to  the 
Lake  of  Tellnitz.  Here  the  troubles  of  the  allies  culmi- 
nated. A  few  gained  the  narrow  marshy  gap  between  the 
two  lakes  ;  but  dense  bodies  found  no  means  of  escape 
save  the  frozen  surface  of  the  upper  lake.  In  some  parts 
the  ice  bore  the  weight  of  the  fugitives ;  but  where  they 
thronged  pell-mell,  or  where  it  was  cut  up  by  the  plung- 
ing fire  of  the  French  cannon  on  the  heights,  crowds  of 
men  sank  to  destruction.     The  victors  themselves  stood 

1  Thieliault  wrongly  attributes  this  succour  to  Lannes :  for  that  mar- 
shal, who  had  just  insulted  and  challenged  Soult,  Thifibault  had  a  mani- 
fest partiality.  Savary,  though  hostile  to  Bernadotte,  gives  him  bare 
justice  on  this  move. 


38  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

aghast  at  this  spectacle  ;  and,  for  the  credit  of  human 
nature  be  it  said,  many  sought  to  save  their  drowning 
foes.  Among  others,  the  youthful  Marbot  swam  to  a  floe 
to  help  bring  a  Russian  officer  to  land,  a  chivalrous  exploit 
which  called  forth  the  praise  of  Napoleon.  The  Emperor 
brought  this  glorious  day  to  a  fitting  close  by  visiting  the 
ground  most  thickly  strewn  with  his  wounded,  and  giving 
directions  for  their  treatment  or  removal.  As  if  satisfied 
with  the  victory,  he  gave  little  heed  to  the  pursuit.  In 
truth,  never  since  Marlborough  cut  the  Franco-Bavarian 
army  in  twain  at  Blenheim,  had  there  been  a  battle  so  ter- 
rible in  its  finale,  and  so  decisive  in  its  results  as  this  of 
the  three  Emperors,  which  cost  the  allies  33,000  men  and 
186  cannon. 

The  Emperors  Alexander  and  Francis  fled  eastwards 
into  the  night.  Between  them  there  was  now  a  tacit 
understanding  that  the  campaign  was  at  an  end.  On  that 
night  Francis  sent  proposals  for  a  truce  ;  and  in  two  days' 
time  Napoleon  agreed  to  an  armistice  (signed  on  Decem- 
ber 6th)  on  condition  that  Francis  would  send  away  the 
Russian  army  and  entirely  exclude  that  of  Prussia  from 
his  territories.  A  contribution  of  100,000,000  francs  was 
also  laid  upon  the  Hapsburg  dominions.  On  the  next  day 
Alexander  pledged  himself  to  withdraw  his  army  at  once  ; 
and  Francis  proceeded  to  treat  for  peace  with  Napoleon. 
This  was  an  infraction  of  the  treaties  of  the  Third  Coali- 
tion, which  prescribed  that  no  separate  peace  should  be 
made. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  conduct  of  the  Hapsburgs 
was  pardonable  :  but  the  seeming  break-up  of  the  coalition 
furnished  the  Court  of  Berlin  with  a  good  reason  for 
declining  to  bear  the  burden  alone.  It  was  not  Austerlitz 
that  daunted  Frederick  William  ;  for,  after  hearing  of 
that  disaster,  he  wrote  that  he  would  be  true  to  his  pledge 
given  on  November  3rd.  But  then,  on  the  decisive  day 
(December  15th),  came  the  news  of  the  defection  of  Aus- 
tria, the  withdrawal  of  Alexander's  army,  and  the  closing 
of  the  Hapsburg  lands  to  a  Prussian  force.  These  facts 
absolved  Frederick  William  from  his  obligations  to  those 
Powers,  and  allowed  him  with  perfect  good  faith  to  keep 
his  sword  in  the  scabbard.     The  change,  it  is  true,  sadly 


xxin  AUSTERLITZ  39 

dulled  the  warlike  ardour  of  his  army  ;  but  it  could  not 
be  called  desertion  of  Russia  and  Austria.1  The  disgrace 
came  later,  when,  on  Christmas  Day,  Haugwitz  reached 
Berlin,  and  described  to  the  King  and  Ministers  his  inter- 
view with  Napoleon  in  the  palace  of  Schonbrunn,  and  the 
treaty  which  the  victor  then  and  there  offered  to  Prussia 
at  the  sword's  point. 

For  most  men  a  great  victory  such  as  Austerlitz  would 
have  brought  a  brief  spell  of  rest,  especially  after  the 
ceaseless  toils  and  anxieties  of  the  previous  fortnight. 
Yet  now,  after  ridding  himself  of  all  fear  of  Austria,  Na- 
poleon at  once  used  every  device  of  his  subtle  statecraft 
to  dissolve  the  nascent  coalition.  And  Fortune  had  willed 
that,  when  flushed  with  triumph,  he  should  have  to  deal 
with  a  timorous  time-server. 

It  is  the  curse  of  a  policy  of  keeping  up  a  dainty  balance 
in  a  hurricane  that  it  unmans  the  balancer,  until  at  last 
the  peacemaker  resembles  a  juggler.  A  decade  of  com- 
promise and  evasion  of  difficulties  had  enfeebled  the  spirit 
of  Prussia,  until  the  hardest  trial  for  her  King  was  to  take 
any  step  that  could  not  be  retraced.  He  had  often  spoken 
"  feelingly,  if  not  energetically,"  of  the  predicaments  of 
his  position  between  France,  England,  and  Russia.2  And, 
as  in  the  case  of  that  other  bon  pere  de  famille,  Louis 
XVI.,  whom  Nature  framed  for  a  farm-house  and  Fate 
tossed  into  a  revolution,  his  lack  of  foresight  and  resolution 
took  the  heart  out  of  his  advisers  and  turned  statesmen 
into  trimmers.  Even  before  the  news  of  Austerlitz  reached 
the  ears  of  Talleyrand  and  Haugwitz  at  Vienna,  the  bearer 
of  Prussia's  ultimatum  was  posing  as  the  friend  of  France. 
On  all  occasions  he  wore  the  cordon  of  the  Legion  of 
Honour  ;  and  while  the  hosts  of  East  and  West  were  in 
the  death-grapple  on  the  Pratzenberg,  he  strove  to  con- 
vince the  French  Foreign  Minister  that  the  Prussians  had 
entered  Hanover  only  in  order  to  keep  the  peace  in  North 

1  Harrowby  evidently  thought  that  Prussia's  conduct  would  depend  on 
events.  Just  before  the  news  of  Austerlitz  arrived,  he  wrote  to  Downing 
Street:  "The  eyes  of  this  Government  are  turned  almost  exclusively  on 
Moravia.  It  is  there  the  fate  of  this  negotiation  must  be  decided."  Yet 
he  reports  that  192,000  Prussians  are  under  arms  ("F.  O.,"  Prussia, 
No.  70). 

2  Jackson,  "Diaries,"  vol.  i.,  p.  137. 


40  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Germany  ;  that,  as  Russians  had  traversed  Prussian  terri- 
tory, the  French  would,  of  course,  be  equally  free  to  do 
so  ;  that  Frederick  William  objected  to  the  descent  of  any 
English  force  in  Hanover,  which  belonged  de  facto  to 
France  ;  and  finally  that  the  Treaty  of  Potsdam  was  not 
a  treaty  at  all,  but  merely  a  declaration  with  the  "offer  of 
Prussia's  good  offices  and  of  mediation,  but  without  any 
mingling  of  hostile  intentions."  Well  might  Talleyrand 
write  to  Napoleon:  "I  am  very  satisfied  with  M.  Haug- 
witz."1 

Napoleon's  victory  over  Prussian  diplomacy  was  there- 
fore won,  even  before  the  lightning-stroke  of  Austerlitz 
blasted  the  Third  Coalition.  Haugwitz  began  his  confer- 
ence with  the  victor  at  Schonbrunn  on  December  13th,  by 
offering  Frederick  William's  congratulations  on  his  tri- 
umph at  Austerlitz,  to  which  the  Emperor  replied  by  a 
sarcastic  query  whether,  if  the  result  of  that  battle  had 
been  different,  he  would  have  spoken  at  all  about  the 
friendship  of  his  master.2  After  thus  disconcerting  the 
envoy  and  upbraiding  him  with  the  Treaty  of  Potsdam, 
Napoleon  unmasked  his  battery  by  offering  Prussia  the 
Electorate  of  Hanover  in  return  for  the  comparatively 
petty  sacrifices  of  Ansbach  to  Bavaria,  and  Cleves  and 
Neufchatel  to  France.  For  the  loss  of  these  outlying  dis- 
tricts Prussia  could  buy  that  long-coveted  land.3  The 
envoy  was  dazzled  by  this  glittering  offer,  and  by  others 
that  followed.  The  conqueror  proposed  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance,  whereby  France  and  Prussia  mutually 
guaranteed  their  lands  along  with  prospective  additions 
in  Germany  and  Italy ;  and  the  Court  of  Berlin  was  also 
to  uphold  the  independence  of  Turkey. 

Such  were  the  terms  that  Napoleon  peremptorily  required 
Haugwitz  to  sign  within  a  few  hours :  and  the  bearer  of 
Prussia's  ultimatum  on  December  15th  signed  this  Treaty 
of  Schonbrunn,  which  degraded  the  would-be  arbitress  of 

1  Lettres  incites  de  Talleyrand,"  pp.  205-208. 

2  Metternich,  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  iii. 

8  Hanover,  along  with  a  few  districts  of  Bavarian  Franconia,  would 
bring  to  Prussia  a  gain  of  989,000  inhabitants,  while  she  would  lose  only 
375,000.  Neufchatel  had  offered  itself  to  Frederick  I.  of  Prussia  in  1688, 
and  its  proposed  barter  to  France  troubled  Hardenberg  ("Mems.,"  voL 
U-,  p.  421). 


xxin  AUSTERLITZ  41 

Europe  to  her  former  position  of  well-fed  follower  of 
France.  This  was  the  news  which  Haugwitz  brought 
back  to  his  astonished  King.  His  reception  was  of  the 
coolest ;  for  Frederick  William  was  an  honest  man,  who 
sought  peace,  prosperity,  and  the  welfare  of  his  people, 
and  now  saw  himself  confronted  by  the  alternative  of 
war  or  national  humiliation.  In  truth,  every  turn  and 
double  of  his  course  was  now  leading  him  deeper  into 
the  discredit  and  ruin  which  will  be  described  in  the  next 
chapter. 

Leaving  for  the  present  that  unhappy  King  amidst  his 
increasing  perplexities,  we  return  to  the  affairs  of  Austria. 
Mack's  disaster  alone  had  cast  that  Government  into  the 
depths  of  despair,  and  we  learn  from  Lord  Gower,  our 
ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  he  had  seen  copies  of 
letters  written  by  the  Emperor  Francis  to  Napoleon 
"  couched  in  terms  of  humility  and  submission  unworthy 
of  a  great  monarch,"  to  which  the  latter  replied  in  a  tone 
of  superiority  and  affected  commiseration,  and  with  a 
demand  for  the  Hapsburg  lands  in  Venetia  and  Swabia.1 
The  same  tone  of  whining  dejection  was  kept  up  by 
Cobenzl  and  other  Austrian  Ministers,  even  before  Auster- 
litz,  when  Prussia  was  on  the  point  of  drawing  the  sword  ; 
and  they  sent  offers  of  peace,  when  it  was  rather  for  their 
foe  to  sue  for  it.  After  that  battle,  and,  still  more  so 
after  signing  the  armistice  of  December  6th,  they  were  at 
the  conqueror's  mercy  ;  and  Napoleon  knew  it.  After 
probing  the  inner  weakness  of  the  Berlin  Court,  he  now 
pressed  with  merciless  severity  on  the  Hapsburgs.  He 
i  proposed  to  tear  away  their  Swabian  and  Tyrolese  lands 
and  their  share  of  the  spoils  of  Venice.  In  vain  did  the 
Austrian  plenipotentiaries  struggle  against  these  harsh 
terms,  pleading  for  Tyrol  and  Dalmatia,  and  pointing  out 
|  the  impossibility  of  raising  100,000,000  francs  from  terri- 
|  tories  ravaged  by  war.  In  vain  did  they  proffer  a  claim 
to  Hanover  for  one  of  tjieir  Archdukes  :  though  Talley- 
rand urged  the  advantage  of  this  step  as  dissolving  the 
Anglo- Austrian  alliance,  yet  Napoleon  refused  to  hear  of 
it ;    for  at  that  time  he  was  offering  that  Electorate  to 

1  Gower  to  Lord  Harrowby  from  Olmiitz,  November  26th,  in  "  F.  O. 
Records,"  Russia,  No.  59. 


42  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Haugwitz.1  Still  less  would  he  hear  a  word  in  favour 
of  the  Court  of  Naples,  whose  conduct  had  aroused  his 
resentment.  The  utmost  that  the  Austrian  envoys  could 
wring  from  him  was  the  reduction  of  the  war  contribution 
to  40,000,000  francs. 

The  terms  finally  arranged  in  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg 
(December  26th,  1805)  may  be  thus  summarized :  Austria 
recognized  the  recent  acquisitions  and  changes  of  title 
made  by  Napoleon  in  Italy,  and  ceded  to  him  her  parts 
of  Venetia,  Istria,  and  Dalmatia.  She  recognized  the 
title  of  King  now  bestowed  by  Napoleon  on  the  Electors 
of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg,  a  change  which  was  not  to 
invalidate  their  membership  of  the  "Germanic  Confedera- 
tion." To  those  potentates  and  to  the  Elector  (now  Grand 
Duke)  of  Baden,  the  Hapsburgs  ceded  all  their  scattered 
Swabian  domains,  while  Bavaria  also  gained  Tyrol  and 
Vorarlberg.  As  a  slight  compensation  for  these  grievous 
losses,  Austria  gained  Salzburg,  whose  Elector  was  to 
receive  from  Bavaria  the  former  principality  of  Wiirz- 
burg.  The  domains  and  revenues  of  the  Teutonic  and 
Maltese  Orders  were  secularized,  so  as  to  furnish  appan- 
ages to  some  other  princes  of  the  Hapsburg  House  ;  and 
another  blow  was  dealt  at  the  Germanic  system  by  the 
declaration  that  Napoleon  guaranteed  the  full  and  entire 
sovereignty  of  the  rulers  of  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  and 
Baden.  In  fact,  as  will  appear  in  the  next  chapter,  Napo- 
leon now  usurped  the  place  in  Germany  previously  held 
by  the  Hapsburgs,  and  extended  his  influence  as  far  east 
as  the  River  Inn,  and,  on  the  south,  down  to  the  remote 
city  of  Ragusa  on  the  Adriatic. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  win  a  brilliant  diplomatic  triumph, 
and  quite  another  thing  to  secure  a  firm  and  lasting  peace. 
The  Peace  of  Pressburg  raised  Napoleon  to  heights  of 
power  never  dreamt  of  by  Louis  XIV. :  but  his  pre-emi- 
nence was  at  best  precarious.  When  by  moderate  terms 
he  might  have  secured  the  alliance  of  Austria  and  severed 
her  friendship  with  England,  he  chose  to  place  his  heel  on 
her  neck  and  drive  her  to  secret  but  irreconcilable  hatred. 

And  his  choice  was  deliberate.  Two  months  earlier, 
Talleyrand  had  sent  him  a  memorandum  on  the  subject  of 

i  "Lettres  incites  de  Tall.,"  p.  216. 


xxm  AUSTERL1TZ  43 

a  Franco-Austrian  alliance,  which  is  instinct  with  states- 
manlike foresight.  He  stated  that  there  were  four  Great 
Powers  —  France,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  Austria  :  he 
excluded  Prussia,  whose  rise  to  greatness  under  Frederick 
the  Great  was  but  temporary.  Austria,  he  claimed,  must 
remain  a  Great  Power.  She  had  opposed  revolutionary 
France  ;  but  with  Imperial  France  she  had  no  lasting 
quarrel.  Rather  did  her  manifest  destiny  clash  with  that 
of  Russia  on  the  lower  Danube,  where  the  approaching 
break-up  of  the  Ottoman  Power  must  bring  those  States 
into  conflict.  It  was  good  policy,  then,  to  give  a  decided 
but  friendly  turn  of  Hapsburg  policy  towards  the  east. 
Let  Napoleon  frankly  approach  the  Emperor  Francis  and 
say  in  effect  :  "  I  never  sought  this  war  with  you,  but  I 
have  conquered :  I  wish  to  restore  complete  harmony  be- 
tween us  :  and,  in  order  to  remove  all  causes  of  dispute, 
you  must  give  up  your  Swabian,  Tyrolese,  and  Venetian 
lands  :  of  these  Tyrol  shall  fall  to  a  prince  of  your  choice, 
and  Venice  (along  with  Trieste  and  Istria)  shall  form  an 
aristocratic  Republic  under  a  magistrate  nominated  in  the 
first  instance  by  me.  As  a  set-off  to  these  losses,  you 
shall  receive  Moldavia,  Wallachia,  and  northern  Bulgaria. 
If  the  Russians  object  to  this  and  attack  you,  I  will  be 
your  ally."      Such  was  Talleyrand's  proposal.1 

It  is  easy  to  criticise  it  in  many  details  ;  but  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  its  adoption  by  Napoleon  would  have 
laid  a  firmer  foundation  for  French  supremacy  than  was 
afforded  by  the  Treaties  of  Pressburg  and  Tilsit.  Austria 
would  not  have  been  deeply  wounded,  as  she  now  was  by 
the  transfer  of  her  faithful  Tyrolese  to  the  detested  rule 
of  Bavaria,  and  by  the  undisguised  triumph  of  Napoleon  in 
Italy  and  along  the  Adriatic.  Moreover,  the  erection  of 
Tyrol  and  Venetia  into  separate  States  would  have  been 
a  wise  concession  to  those  clannish  societies ;  and  Austria 
could  not  have  taken  up  the  championship  of  outraged 
Tyrolese  sentiment,  which  she  assumed  four  years  later. 
Instead  of  figuring  as  the  leader  of  German  nationality, 
she  would  have  been  on  the  worst  of  terms  with  the  Czar 

1  Printed  for  the  first  time  in  full  in  "  Lettres  in^ditesde  Tall.,"  pp.  156- 
j!74.  On  December  5th  Talleyrand  again  begged  Napoleon  to  strengthen 
Austria  as  "a  needful  bulwark  against  the  barbarians,  the  Russians.'' 


44  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

over  the  Eastern  Question  ;  and  their  discord  would  have 
enabled  France  to  dictate  her  own  terms  as  to  the  partition 
of  the  Sultan's  dominions.  Talleyrand  had  no  specific  for 
dissolving  the  traditional  friendship  of  England  and  Aus- 
tria, and  we  may  imagine  the  joy  with  which  he  heard 
from  the  Hapsburg  envoys  the  demand  for  Hanover,  at  a 
time  when  English  gold  wafe  pouring  into  the  empty  coffers 
at  Vienna.  Here  was  the  sure  means  of  embroiling  Eng- 
land and  Austria  for  a  generation  at  least.  But  this 
further  chance  of  preventing  future  coalitions  was  like- 
wise rejected  by  Napoleon,  who  deliberately  chose  to  make 
Austria  a  deadly  foe,  and  to  aggrandize  her  rival  Prussia.1 

Why  did  Napoleon  reject  Talleyrand's  plan  ?  Unques- 
tionably, I  think,  because  he  had  resolved  to  build  up  a 
Continental  System,  which  should  "hermetically  seal" 
the  coasts  of  Europe  against  English  commerce.  If  he 
was  to  realize  those  golden  visions  of  his  youth,  ships, 
colonies,  and  an  Eastern  empire,  which,  even  amidst  the 
glories  of  Austerlitz,  he  placed  far  above  any  European 
triumph,  he  must  extend  his  coast  system  and  subject  or 
conciliate  the  maritime  States.  Of  these  the  most  impor- 
tant were  Prussia  and  Russia.  The  sea-borne  commerce 
of  Austria  was  insignificant,  and  could  easily  be  controlled 
from  his  vassal  lands  of  Venetia  and  Dalmatia.  To  the 
would-be  conqueror  of  England  the  friendship  or  hatred 
of  Austria  seemed  unimportant  :  he  preferred  to  depress 
this  now  almost  land-locked  Power,  and  to  draw  tight  the 
bonds  of  union  with  Prussia,  always  provided  that  she 
excluded  British  goods.2 

The  same  reason  led  him  to  hope  for  a  Russian  alliance. 
Only  by  the  help  of  Russia  and  Prussia  could  he  shut 
England  out  from  the  Baltic  ;  and,  to  win  that  help,  he 
destined  Hanover  for  Prussia  and  the  Danubian  States  for 
the  Czar.  For  the  founder  of  the  Continental  System 
such  a  choice  was  natural ;  but,  viewed  from  the  stand- 
point of  Continental  politics,  his  treatment  of  Austria  wafl 

1  I  dissent,  though  with  much  diffidence,  from  M.  Vandal  ("Napoleon 
et  Alexandre,"  vol.  i.,  p.  9)  in  regard  to  Talleyrand's  proposal. 

2  Napoleon  to  Talleyrand  (December  14th,  1805):  "  Sur  de  la  Prusse, 
l'Autriche  en  passera  par  oil  je  voudrai.  Je  ferai  egalement  prononcer  la 
Prusse  contre  l'Angleterre." 


xuii  AUSTERLITZ  45 

a  serious  blunder.  His  frightful  pressure  on  her  motley 
lands  endowed  them  with  a  solidity  which  they  had  never 
known  before  ;  and  in  less  than  four  }Tears,  the  conqueror 
had  cause  to  regret  having  driven  the  Hapsburgs  to  des- 
peration. It  may  even  be  questioned  whether  Austerlitz 
itself  was  not  a  misfortune  to  him.  Just  before  that 
battle  he  thought  of  treating  Austria  leniently,  taking 
only  Verona  and  Legnago,  and  exchanging  Venetia  against 
Salzburg.  This  would  have  detached  her  from  the  Coali- 
tion, and  made  a  friend  of  a  Power  that  is  naturally  in- 
clined to  be  conservative. 

After  Austerlitz,  he-  rushed  to  the  other  extreme  and 
forced  the  Hapsburgs  to  a  hostility  in  which  the  Marie 
Louise  marriage  was  only  a  forced  and  uneasy  truce.  His 
motives  are  not,  in  my  judgment,  to  be  assigned  to  mere 
lust  of  domination,  but  rather  to  a  reasoned  though  ex- 
aggerated conviction  of  the  need  of  Prussia  and  Russia  to 
his  Continental  System.  Above  all  things,  he  now  sought 
to  humble  England,  so  that  finally  he  might  be  free  for 
his  long-deferred  Oriental  enterprise.  This  is  the  irony 
of  his  career,  that,  though  he  preferred  the  career  of  Alex- 
ander the  Great  to  that  of  Csesar  ;  though  he  placed  his 
victory  at  Austerlitz  far  below  the  triumph  of  the  great 
Macedonian  at  Issus  which  assured  the  conquest  of  the 
Orient,  yet  he  felt  himself  driven  to  the  very  measures 
which  tethered  him  to  cette  vieille  Europe  and  which  finally 
roused  the  Continent  against  him. 

Among  his  errors  of  judgment,  assuredly  his  behaviour 
to  Austria  in  1805  was  not  the  least.  The  recent  history 
of  Europe  supplies  a  suggestive  contrast.  Two  genera- 
tions after  Austerlitz,  the  Hapsburg  Power  was  shattered 
by  the  disaster  of  Koniggratz,  and  once  more  lost  all  influ- 
ence in  Germany  and  Italy  But  the  victor  then  showed 
consideration  for  the  vanquished.  Bismarck  had  pondered 
over  the  lessons  of  history,  because,  as  he  said,  history 
teaches  one  how  far  one  may  safely  go.  He  therefore  per- 
suaded King  William  to  forego  claims  that  would  have 
.embittered  the  rivalry  of  Prussia  and  Austria.  Nay  !  he 
recurred  to  Talleyrand's  policy  of  encouraging  the  Haps- 
burgs to  seek  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  compensation  for 
their  losses  in  the  west  :  and  within  fifteen  years  the  basis 


46  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxiii 

of  the  Triple  Alliance  was  firmly  laid.  Napoleon,  on  the 
other  hand,  for  lack  of  that  statesmanlike  moderation 
which  consecrates  victory  and  cements  the  fabric  of  an 
enduring  Empire,  soon  saw  the  political  results  of  Auster- 
litz  swept  away  by  the  rising  tide  of  the  nations'  wrath. 
In  less  than  nine  years  the  Austrians  and  their  allies  were 
masters  of  Paris. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

PRUSSIA  AND  THE  NEW  CHARLEMAGNE 

An  eminent  German  historian,  who  has  striven  to  say 
some  kind  words  about  Frederick  William's  Government 
before  the  collapse  at  Jena,  prefaces  his  apology  by  the 
axiom  that  from  a  Prussian  monarch  one  ought  to  expect, 
not  French,  English,  or  Russian  policy,  but  only  Prussian 
policy.     The  claim  may  well  be  challenged.     Doubtless, 
there  are  some  States  concerning  which  it  would  be  true. 
Countries  such  as  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  whose  areas 
are  clearly  denned  by  nature,  may  with  advantage  be  self- 
contained   until  their  peoples  overflow  into  new  lands : 
before   they   become   world    Powers,   they   may   gain   in 
strength  by  being  narrowly  national.     But  there  are  other 
States  whose  fortunes  are  widely  different.     They  repre- 
sent some  principle  of  life  or  energy,  in  the  midst  of  mere 
political  wreckage.     If  the  binding  power,  which  built  up 
an  older  organism,  should  decline,  as  happened  to  the  Holy 
Roman   Empire  after  the  religious  wars,  fragments  will 
fall  away  and  join  bodies  to  which  they  are  now  more  akin. 
Of  the  States  that  throve  among  the  crumbling  masses 
iof  the  old  Empire  the   chief  was   Brandenburg-Prussia. 
She  had  a  twofold  energy  which  the  older  organism  lacked: 
she  was  Protestant  and  she  was  national:  she  championed 
;the  new  creed  cherished  by  the  North  Germans,  and  she 
felt,  though  dimly  as  yet,  the  strength  that  came  from  an 
almost  single  kin.     Until  she  seized  on  part  of  the  spoils 
pf  Poland,  her  Slavonic  subjects  were  for  the  most  part 
Germanized  Slavs ;  and   even  after  acquiring  Posen  and 
Warsaw  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  she  could 
itill  claim  to  be  the  chief  Germanic  State.     A  generation 
jarlier,  Frederick  the  Great  had  seen  this  to  be  the  source 
>f  her  strength.     His  policy  was  not  merely  Prussian:  in 
ffect,  if  not  in  aim,  it  was  German.     His  victory  at  Ross- 
jach  over  a  great  polyglot  force  of  French  and  Imperialists 

47 


48  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

first  awakened  German  nationality  to  a  thrill  of  conscious 
life ;  and  the  last  success  of  his  career  was  the  champion- 
ship of  the  lesser  German  princes  against  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  Hapsburgs.  In  fact,  it  seems  now  a  mere 
commonplace  to  assert  that  Prussia  has  prospered  most 
when,  as  under  Frederick  the  Great,  and  William  the 
Great,  her  policy  has  been  truly  German,  and  that  she  has 
fallen  back  most  in  the  years  1795-1806  and  1848-1852, 
when  the  subservience  of  her  Frederick  Williams  to  France 
and  Austria  has  lost  them  the  respect  and  support  of  the 
rest  of  the  Fatherland.  A  State  that  would  attract  other 
fragments  of  the  same  nation  must  be  attractive,  and  it 
must  be  broadly  national  if  it  is  to  attract.  If  Stein  and 
Bismarck  had  been  merely  Prussians,  if  Cavour's  policy 
had  been  narrowly  Sardinian,  would  their  States  ever  have 
served  as  the  rallying  centres  for  the  Germany  and  Italy 
of  to-day? 

The  difficulties  which  beset  Frederick  William  III.  in 
1805  were  not  entirely  of  his  own  making.  His  predeces- 
sor of  the  same  ill-omened  name,  when  nearing  the  close 
of  his  inglorious  reign,  made  the  Peace  of  Basel  (1795), 
which  began  to  place  the  policy  of  Berlin  at  the  beck  and 
call  of  the  French  revolutionists.  But  the  present  ruler 
had  assured  Prussia's  subservience  to  France  at  the  time 
of  the  Secularizations,  when  he  gained  Erfurt,  Eichsfeld, 
Hildesheim,  Paderborn,  and  a  great  part  of  the  straggling 
bishopric  of  Miinster.  Even  at  that  time  of  shameless 
rapacity,  there  were  those  who  saw  that  the  gain  of  half 
a  million  of  subjects  to  Prussia  was  a  poor  return  for  the 
loss  of  self-respect  that  befell  all  who  shared  in  the  sacri- 
legious plunder  bartered  away  by  Bonaparte  and  Talley- 
rand. Frederick  William  III.  was  even  suspected  of  a 
leaning  towards  French  methods  of  Government;  and  a 
Prussian  statesman  said  to  the  French  ambassador : 

"You  have  only  the  nobles  against  you  :  the  King  and  the  people 
are  openly  for  France.  The  revolution  which  you  have  made  from 
below  upwards  will  be  slowly  effected  in  Prussia  from  above  down- 
wards :  the  King  is  a  democrat  after  his  fashion :  he  is  always  striv- 
ing to  curtail  the  privileges  of  the  nobles,  but  by  slow  means.  In  a 
few  years  feudal  rights  will  cease  to  exist  in  Prussia." 1 

1  Report  of  M.  Otto,  August,  1799. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  49 

Could  the  King  have  carried  out  these  much-needed 
reforms,  he  might  perhaps  have  opposed  a  solid  society 
to  the  renewed  might  of  France.  But  he  failed  to  set  his 
house  in  order  before  the  storm  burst  ;  and  in  1803  he  so 
far  gave  up  his  championship  of  North  German  affairs  as 
to  allow  the  French  to  occupy  Hanover,  a  land  that  he 
and  his  Ministers  had  long  coveted. 

We  saw  in  the  last  chapter  that  Hanover  was  the  bait 
whereby  Napoleon  hooked  the  Prussian  envoy,  Haugwitz, 
at  Schonbrunn  ;  and  that  the  very  man  who  had  been 
sent  to  impose  Prussia's  will  upon  the  French  Emperor 
returned  to  Berlin  bringing  peace  and  dishonour.  The 
surprise  and  annoyance  of  Frederick  William  may  be  im- 
agined. On  all  sides  difficulties  were  thickening  around 
him.  Shortly  before  the  return  of  Haugwitz  to  Berlin, 
the  Russian  troops  campaigning  in  Hanover  had  been 
placed  under  the  protection  of  Prussia  ;  and  the  King 
himself  had  offered  to  our  Minister,  Lord  Harrowby,  to 
protect  Cathcart's  Anglo-Hanoverian  corps  which,  with  the 
aid  of  Prussian  troops,  was  restoring  the  authority  of 
George  III.  in  that  Electorate. 

Moreover,  Frederick  William  could  not  complain  of  any 
shabby  treatment  from  our  Government.  Knowing  that 
he  was  set  on  the  acquisition  of  Hanover  and  could  only 
be  drawn  into  the  Coalition  by  an  equally  attractive  offer, 
the  Pitt  Ministry  had  proposed  through  Lord  Harrowby 
the  cession  to  Prussia  at  the  general  peace  of  the  lands 
south-west  of  the  Duchy  of  Cleves,  "  bounded  by  a  fron- 
tier line  drawn  from  Antwerp  to  Luxemburg,"  and  con- 
nected with  the  rest  of  her  territories.1  This  plan,  which 
would  have  planted  Prussia  firmly  at  Antwerp,  Liege, 
Luxemburg,  and  Cologne,  also  aimed  at  installing  the 
I  Elector  of  Salzburg  in  the  rest  of  the  new  Rhenish  acqui- 
sitions of  France  ;  while  the  equipoise  of  the  Powers  was 
to  be  adjusted  by  the  cession  of  Salzburg,  the  Papal  Lega- 
tions, and  the  line  of  the  Mincio  to  Austria,  she  in  her 
turn   giving  up  part  of   her  Dalmatian  lands  to  Russia. 

1Czartoryski  ("Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xii.)  states  that  England  offered 
Holland  to  Prussia.  I  find  no  prpof  of  this  in  our  Records.  The  districts 
between  Antwerp  and  Cleves  are  Belgian,  not  Dutch ;  and  we  never 
fvavered  in  our  support  of  the  House  of  Orange. 

VOL.  II  —  E 


60  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Prussia  was  to  be  the  protectress  of  North  Germany  and 
regard  any  incursion  of  the  French,  "  north  of  the  Maine 
or  at  least  of  the  Lahn,"  as  an  act  of  war.  Great  Britain, 
after  subsidizing  Prussia  for  100,000  troops  on  the  usual 
scale,  pledged  herself  to  restore  all  her  conquests  made, 
or  to  be  made,  during  the  war,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  :  but  no  questions  were  to  be  raised 
about  that  desirable  colony,  or  Malta,  or  the  British  mari- 
time code.1 

At  the  close  of  1805,  then,  Frederick  William  was  face 
to  face  with  the  offers  of  England  and  those  brought  by 
Haugwitz  from  Napoleon.  That  is,  he  had  to  choose  be- 
tween the  half  of  Belgium  and  the  Rhineland  as  offered 
by  England,  or  Hanover  as  a  gift  from  Napoleon.  The 
former  gain  was  the  richer,  but  apparently  the  more  risk}', 
for  it  entailed  the  hatred  of  France  :  the  latter  seemed 
to  secure  the  friendship  of  the  conqueror,  though  at  the 
expense  of  the  claims  of  honour  and  a  naval  war  with  Eng- 
land. His  confidential  advisers,  Lombard,  Beyme,  and 
Haugwitz,  were  determined  to  gain  the  Electorate,  pref- 
erably at  Napoleon's  hands  ;  while  his  Foreign  Minister, 
Hardenberg,  a  Hanoverian  hy  birth,  desired  to  assure  the 
union  of  his  native  land  with  Prussia  by  more  honourable 
means,  and  probably  by  means  of  an  exchange  with  George 
III.,  which  will  be  noticed  presently.  In  his  opposition 
to  French  influence,  Hardenberg  had  the  support  of  the 
more  patriotic  Prussians,  who  sought  to  safeguard  Prussia's 
honour,  and  to  avert  war  with  England.  The  difficulty 
in  accepting  the  Electorate  at  the  point  of  Napoleon's 
sword  was  not  merely  on  the  score  of  morality  :  it  was 
due  to  the  presence  of  a  large  force  of  English,  Hanove- 
rians, and  Russians  on  the  banks  of  the  Weser,  and  to  the 
protection  which  the  Prussian  Government  had  offered  to 
those  troops  against  any  French  attack,  always  provided 
that  they  did  not  move  against  Holland  and  retired  be- 
hind the  Prussian  battalions.2     The  indignation  of  British 

1  These  proposals,  dated  October  27th,  1805,  were  modified  somewhat 
on  the  news  of  Mack's  disaster  and  the  Treaty  of  Potsdam.  Hardenberg 
assured  Harrowby  (November  24th)  that,  despite  England's  liberal  pe- 
cuniary help,  Frederick  William  felt  great  difficulty  in  assenting  to  the 
proposed  territorial  arrangements  ("F.  O.,"  Prussia,  No.  70). 

2  Hardenberg's  "Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  377,  382. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW    CHARLEMAGNE  51 

officers  at  this  last  order  is  expressed  by  Christian  Omp- 
teda,  of  the  King's  German  Legion,  in  a  letter  to  his 
brother  at  Berlin  :  "  Aly  dear  fellow,  if  this  sort  of  thing 
goes  on,  the  Continent  will  soon  be  irrecoverably  lost. 
The  Russian  and  English  armies  will  not  long  creep  for 
refuge  under  the  contemptible  Prussian  cloak.  We  are 
here,  40,000  of  the  best  and  bravest  troops.  A  swift  move 
on  Holland  only  would  have  opened  the  road  to  certain  suc- 
cess. .  .  .  And  this  is  Lombard's  and  Haugwitz's  work !  "  1 
What  meanwhile  were  George  III.'s  Ministers  doing  ? 
At  this  crisis  English  policy  suffered  a  terrible  blow. 
Death  struck  down  the  "  stately  column "  that  held  up 
the  swaying  fortunes  of  our  race.  William  Pitt,  long  fail- 
ing in  health,  was  sore-stricken  by  the  news  of  Austerlitz 
and  the  defection  of  Austria.  But  the  popular  version  as 
to  the  cause  of  his  death  —  that  Austerlitz  killed  Pitt — is 
more  melodramatic  than  correct.  Among  the  many  causes 
that  broke  that  unbending  spirit,  the  news  of  the  miser- 
able result  of  the  Hanoverian  Expedition  was  the  last 
and  severest.  The  files  of  our  Foreign  Office  papers 
yield  touching  proof  of  the  hopes  which  the  Cabinet 
cherished,  even  after  Vienna  was  in  Napoleon's  hands. 
Harrowby  was  urged  to  do  everything  in  his  power  — 
short  of  conceding  Hanover  —  to  bring  Prussia  into  the 
field,  in  which  case  "nearly  300,000  men  will  be  avail- 
able in  North  Germany  at  the  beginning  of  the  next 
campaign,  which  will  include  70,000  British  and  Hano- 
verian troops  employed  there  or  in  maritime  enterprises."  2 
To  this  hope  Pitt  clung,  even  after  hearing  the  news  of 
Austerlitz,  and  it  was  doubtless  this  which  enabled  him 
to  bear  that  last  journey  from  Bath  to  Putney  Heath, 
with  less  fatigue  and  far  more  quickly  than  had  been 
expected.  He  arrived  home  on  Saturday  night,  January 
11th.  On  the  following  Wednesday  his  friend,  George 
Rose,  called  on  him  and  found  that  a  serious  change  for 
the  worse  had  set  in. 

"  On  the  Sunday  he  was  better,  and  continued  improving  till  Mon- 
day in  the  afternoon,  when  Lord  Castlereagh  insisted  on  seeing  him, 

1Ompteda,  p.  188.     The  army  returned  in  February,  1806. 
2  "F.  O.,"  Prussia,  No.  70  (November  23rd). 


52  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

and,  having  obtained  access  to  him,  entered  (Lord  Hawkesbury  being 
also  present)  on  points  of  public  business  of  the  most  serious  impor- 
tance (principally  respecting  the  bringing  home  the  British  troops 
from  the  Continent),  which  affected  him  visibly  that  evening  and  the 
next  day,  and  this  morning  the  effect  was  more  plainly  observed :  .  .  . 
his  countenance  is  extremely  changed,  his  voice  weak,  and  his  body 
almost  wasted." 

It  is  clear  also  from  the  medical  evidence  which  the  diarist 
gives  that  the  news  from  Hanover  was  the  cause  of  this 
sudden  change.  On  the  previous  Sunday,  that  is,  just  after 
the  fatigue  of  the  three  days'  journey,  the  physicians 
"thought  there  was  a  reasonable  prospect  of  Mr.  Pitt's 
recovery,  that  the  probability  was  in  favour  of  it,  and 
that,  if  his  complaint  should  not  take  an  unfavourable 
turn,  he  might  be  able  to  attend  to  business  in  about  a 
month."1  That  unfavourable  turn  took  place  when  the 
heroic  spirit  lost  all  hope  under  the  distressing  news 
from  Berlin  and  Hanover.  Austerlitz,  it  is  true,  had 
depressed  him.  Yet  that,  after  all,  did  not  concern 
British  honour  and  the  dearest  interests  of  his  master. 

But,  that  Frederick  William,  from  whom  he  had  hoped  so 
much,  to  whom  he  was  on  the  point  of  advancing  a  great  sub- 
sidy, should  now  fall  away,  should  talk  of  peace  with  Napo- 
leon and  claim  Hanover,  should  forbid  an  invasion  of  Holland 
and  request  the  British  forces  to  evacuate  North  Germany 
—  this  was  a  blow  to  George  III.,  to  our  military  prestige, 
and  to  the  now  tottering  Ministry.  How  could  he  face  the 
Opposition,  already  wellnigh  triumphant  in  the  sad  Mel- 
ville business,  with  a  King's  Speech  in  which  this  was  the 
chief  news  ?  Losing  hope,  he  lost  all  hold  on  life  :  he  sank 
rapidly  :  in  the  last  hours  his  thoughts  wandered  away  to 
Berlin  and  Lord  Harrowby.  "  What  is  the  wind  ?  "  he 
asked.  "  East ;  that  will  do  ;  that  will  bring  him  fast," 
he  murmured.  And,  on  January  23rd,  about  half  an  hour 
before  he  breathed  his  last,  the  servant  heard  him  say: 
"My  country  :  oh  my  country."2 

Thus  sank  to  rest,  amidst  a  horror  of  great  darkness, 
the  statesman  whose  noon  had  been  calm  and  glorious. 
Only  a  superficial  reading  of  his  career  can  represent  him 

1  "  Diaries  of  Right  Hon.  G.  Rose,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  223-224. 

2  lb.,  pp.  233-283  ;  Rosebery,  "  Life  of  Pitt,"  p.  268. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  53 

• 

as  eager  for  war  and  a  foe  to  popular  progress.  His  best 
friends  knew  full  well  his  pride  in  the  great  financial 
achievements  of  1784-6,  his  resolute  clinging  to  peace  in 
1792,  and  his  longing  for  a  pacification  in  1796,  1797,  and 
1800,  provided  it  could  be  gained  without  detriment  to 
our  allies  and  to  the  vital  interests  of  Britain.  His  defence 
lies  buried  amidst  the  documents  of  our  Record  Office,  and 
has  not  yet  fully  seen  the  light.  For  he  was  a  reserved 
man,  the  warmth  of  whose  nature  blossomed  forth  only  to 
a  few  friends,  or  on  such  occasions  as  his  inspired  speech 
on  the  emancipation  of  slaves.  To  outsiders  he  had  more 
than  the  usual  fund  of  English  coldness  :  he  wrote  no 
memoirs,  he  left  few  letters,  he  had  scant  means  of  influenc- 
ing public  opinion  ;  and  he  viewed  with  lofty  disdain  the 
French  clamour  that  it  was  he  who  made  and  kept  up  the 
war.  "  I  know  it,"  he  said  ;  "  the  Jacobins  cry  louder 
than  we  can,  and  make  themselves  heard."  1  He  was,  in 
fact,  a  typical  champion  of  our  rather  dumb  and  stolid 
race,  that  plods  along  to  the  end  of  the  appointed  stage, 
scarcely  heeding  the  cloud  of  stinging  flies.  Both  the 
people  and  its  champion  were  ill  fitted  to  cope  with  Napo- 
leon. None  of  our  statesmen  had  the  Latin  tact  and  the 
histrionic  gifts  needful  to  fathom  his  guile,  to  arouse  pub- 
lic opinion  against  him,  or  to  expose  his  double-dealing. 
But  Pitt  was  unfortunate  above  all  of  them.  It  was 
his  fate  to  begin  his  career  in  an  age  of  mediocrities  and 
to  finish  it  in  an  almost  single  combat  with  the  giant.  He 
was  no  match  for  Napoleon.  The  Coalition,  which  the 
Czar  and  he  did  so  much  to  form,  was  a  house  of  cards 
that  fell  at  the  conqueror's  first  touch  ;  and  the  Prussian 
alliance  now  proved  to  be  a  broken  reed.  His  notions  of 
strategy  were  puerile.  The  French  Emperor  was  not  to 
be  beaten  by  small  forces  tapping  at  his  outworks  ;  and 
Austria  might  reasonably  complain  that  our  neglect  to 
attack  the  rear  of  the  Grand  Army  in  Flanders  exposed  her 
to  the  full  force  of  its  onset  on  the  Danube.  But  though 
his  genius  pales  before  the  fiery  comet  of  Napoleon,  it 
shines  with  a  clear  and  steady  radiance  when  viewed  be- 
1  side  that  of  the  Continental  statesmen  of  his  age.  They 
flickered  for   a  brief  space  and  set.      His  was  the  rare 

1  Lord  Malmesbury's  "  Diary,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  114. 


54  THE  LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

virtue  of  dauntless  courage  and  unswerving  constancy. 
By  the  side  of  their  wavering  groups  he  stands  forth  like 
an  Abdiel  : 

"Unshaken,  unseduced,  unterrified, 
His  loyalty  he  kept,  his  love,  his  zeal : 
Nor  number  nor  example  with  him  wrought 
To  swerve  from  truth  or  change  his  constant  mind, 
Though  single." 

While  English  statesmanship  was  essaying  the  task  of 
forming  a  Coalition  Ministry  under  Fox  and  Grenville, 
Napoleon  with  untiring  activity  was  consolidating  his 
position  in  German}',  Italy,  and  France.  In  Germany  he 
allied  his  family  by  marriage  with  the  now  royal  Houses 
of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg.  He  chased  the  Bourbons 
of  Naples  from  their  Continental  domains.  In  France  he 
found  means  to  mitigate  a  severe  financial  crisis,  and  to 
strengthen  his  throne  by  a  new  order  of  hereditary  nobil- 
ity.    In  a  word,  he  became  the  new  Charlemagne. 

The  exaltation  of  the  South  German  dynasties  had  long 
been  a  favourite  project  with  Napoleon,  who  saw  in  the 
hatred  of  the  House  of  Bavaria  for  Austria  a  sure  basis  for 
spreading  French  influence  into  the  heart  of  Germany. 
Not  long  after  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  the  Elector  of  Bava- 
ria, while  out  shooting,  received  from  a  French  courier  a 
letter  directed  to  "  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  de  Baviere  et  de 
Suabe."1  This  letter  was  despatched  six  days  after  a  for- 
mal request  was  sent  through  Duroc,  that  the  Elector 
would  give  his  daughter  Augusta  in  marriage  to  Eugene 
Beauharnais.  The  affair  had  been  mooted  in  October  :  it 
was  clinched  by  the  victory  of  Austerlitz  ;  and  after  Napo- 
leon's arrival  at  Munich  on  the  last  day  of  the  year,  the 
final  details  were  arranged.  The  bridegroom  was  informed 
of  it  in  the  following  laconic  style  :  "  I  have  arrived  at 
Munich.  I  have  arranged  your  marriage  with  the  Prin- 
cess Augusta.  It  has  been  announced.  This  morning  the 
princess  visited  me,  and  I  spoke  with  her  for  a  long  time. 
She  is  very  pretty.  You  will  find  herewith  her  portrait 
on  a  cup  ;  but  she  is  much  better  looking."  The  wedding 
took  place  at  Munich  as  soon  as  the  bridegroom  could  cross 

1  Letter  of  December  27th,  1805  ;  Jackson,  "  Diaries,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  387. 


xxiv      •       PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  56 

the  Alps ;  and  Napoleon  delayed  his  departure  for  France 
in  order  to  witness  the  ceremony  which  linked  him  with 
an  old  reigning  family.  At  the  same  time  he  arranged  a 
match  between  Jerome  Bonaparte  and  Princess  Catherine 
of  Wurteinberg.  This  was  less  expeditious,  partly  because, 
in  the  case  of  a  Bonaparte,  Napoleon  judged  it  needful  to 
sound  the  measure  of  his  obedience.  But  Jerome  had  been 
broken  in  :  he  had  thrown  over  Miss  Paterson,  and,  after 
a  delay  of  a  year  and  a  half,  obeyed  his  brother's  behests, 
and  strengthened  the  ties  connecting  Swabia  with  France. 
A  third  alliance  was  cemented  by  the  marriage  of  the  heir 
to  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  with  Stephanie  de  Beauhar- 
nais,  niece  of  Josephine. 

In  the  early  part  of  1806  Napoleon  might  flatter  himself 
with  his  brilliant  success  as  a  match-maker.  Yet,  after  all, 
he  was  less  concerned  with  the  affairs  of  Hymen  than  with 
those  of  Mars  and  Mercury.  He  longed  to  be  at  Paris  for 
the  settlement  of  finances  ;  and  he  burned  to  hear  of  the 
expulsion  of  the  Bourbons  from  Naples.  For  this  last  he 
had  already  sent  forth  his  imperious  mandates  from  Vienna; 
and,  after  a  brief  sojourn  at  the  Swabian  capitals,  he  set 
out  for  Paris,  where  he  arrived  incognito  at  midnight 
of  January  26th.  During  his  absence  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  days  he  had  captured  or  destroyed  two  ar- 
mies, stricken  a  mighty  coalition  to  the  heart,  shattered  the 
Hapsburg  Power,  and  revolutionized  the  Germanic  system 
by  establishing  two  Napoleonic  kingdoms  in  its  midst. 

Yet,  as  if  nothing  had  been  done,  and  all  his  hopes  and 
thoughts  lay  in  the  future,  he  summoned  his  financial 
advisers  to  a  council  for  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
Scarcely  did  he  deign  to  notice  their  congratulations  on 
his  triumphs.  "  We  have,"  he  said,  "  to  deal  with  more 
serious  questions:  it  seems  that  the  greatest  dangers  of  the 
State  were  not  in  Austria  :  let  us  hear  the  report  of  the 
Minister  of  the  Treasury."  It  then  appeared  that  Barbe- 
Marbois  had  been  concerned  in  risky  financial  concerns 
with  the  Court  of  Spain,  through  a  man  named  Ouvrard. 
The  Minister  therefore  was  promptly  dismissed,  and  Mol- 
lien  then  and  there  received  his  post.  The  new  Minister 
states  in  his  memoirs  that  the  money,  which  had  sufficed 
to  carry  the  French  armies  from  the  English  Channel  to 


66  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

the  Rhine,  had  been  raised  on  extravagant  terms,  largely 
on  loans  on  the  national  domains.  In  fact,  it  had  been  an 
open  question  whether  victory  would  come  promptly  enough 
to  avert  a  wholesale  crash  at  Paris. 

So  bad  were  the  finances  that,  though  40,000,000  francs 
were  poured  every  year  into  France  as  subsidies  from  Italy 
and  Spain,  yet  loans  of  120,000,000  francs  had  been  in- 
curred in  order  to  meet  current  expenses.1  It  would 
exceed  the  limits  of  our  space  to  describe  by  what  forceful 
means  Napoleon  restored  the  financial  equilibrium  and 
assuaged  the  commercial  crisis  resulting  from  the  war  with 
England.  Mollien  soon  had  reason  to  know  that,  so  far 
from  avoiding  Continental  wars,  the  Emperor  thenceforth 
seemed  almost  to  provoke  them,  and  that  the  motto  —  War 
must  support  war  —  fell  far  short  of  the  truth.  Napoleon's 
wars,  always  excepting  his  war  with  England,  supported 
the  burdens  of  an  armed  peace.  In  this  respect  his  easy 
and  gainful  triumph  over  Austria  was  a  disaster  for  France 
and  Europe.     It  beckoned  him  on  to  Jena  and  Tilsit. 

While  reducing  his  finances  to  order  and  newspaper 
editors  to  servility,  the  conqueror  received  news  of  the 
triumph  of  his  arms  in  Southern  Italy.  There  the  Bour- 
bons of  Naples  had  mortally  offended  him.  After  con- 
cluding a  convention  for  the  peaceable  withdrawal  of  St. 
Cyr's  corps  and  the  strict  observance  of  neutrality  by  the 
kingdom  of  Naples,  Ferdinand  IV.  and  his  Queen  Caroline 
welcomed  the  arrival  at  their  capital  of  an  Anglo-Russian 
force  of  20,000  men,  and  intrusted  the  command  of  these 
and  of  the  Neapolitan  troops  to  General  Lacy.2  This  force, 
it  is  true,  did  little  except  weaken  the  northward  march  of 
Massena ;  but  the  violation  of  neutrality  by  the  Bourbons 
galled  Napoleon.  At  Vienna  he  refused  to  listen  to  the 
timid  pleading  of  the  Hapsburgs  on  their  behalf,  and  as 
soon  as  peace  was  signed  at  Pressburg  he  put  forth  a  bul- 
letin stating  that  St.  Cyr  was  marching  on  Naples  to  hurl 

1  Mollien,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  ad  Jin.,  and  vol.  ii.,  p.  80,  for  the  budget  of 
1806  ;  also,  Fie>£e-,  "  Mes  Relations  avec  Bonaparte,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  180-203. 

2  The  Court  of  Naples  asserted  that  in  the  Convention  with  France  its 
ambassador,  the  Comte  de  Gallo,  exceeded  his  powers  in  promising  neu- 
trality. See  Lucchesini's  conversation  with  Gentz,  quoted  by  Garden, 
"Trails,"  vol.  x.,  p.  129. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA  AND  THE  NEW  CHARLEMAGNE  57 

from  the  throne  that  guilty  woman  who  had  so  flagrantly 
violated  all  that  is  sacred  among  men.  France  would 
fight  for  thirty  years  rather  than  pardon  her  atrocious  act 
of  perfidy :  the  Queen  of  Naples  had  ceased  to  reign  :  let 
her  go  to  London  and  form  a  committee  of  sympathetic 
ink  with  Drake,  Spencer-Smith,  Taylor,  and  Wickham. 

This  diatribe  was  not  the  first  occasion  on  which  the 
conqueror  had  proved  that  he  was  no  gentleman.  In  his 
brutal  letter  of  January  2nd,  1805,  to  Queen  Caroline,  he 
told  her  that,  if  she  was  the  cause  of  another  war,  she  and 
her  children  would  beg  their  bread  all  through  Europe. 
That  and  similar  outbursts  afford  some  excuse  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  Bourbons  in  the  autumn  of  1805.  They  in- 
fringed the  neutrality  which  their  ambassador  had  engaged 
to  observe  :  but  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  Napoleon's 
invasion  of  the  Neapolitan  States  in  1803  was  a  gross 
violation  of  international  law,  which  the  French  Foreign 
Office  sought  to  cloak  by  fabricating  two  secret  articles 
of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens.1  And  though  troth  should 
doubtless  be  kept,  even  with  a  law-breaker,  yet  its  viola- 
tion becomes  venial  when  the  latter  adopts  the  tone  of  a 
bully.  For  the  present  he  triumphed.  Joseph  Bonaparte 
invaded  Naples  in  force,  and  on  January  13th  the  King, 
Queen,  and  Court  set  sail  for  Palermo.  The  Anglo-Rus- 
sian divisions  re-embarked  and  sailed  away  for  Malta  and 
Corfu.  One  of  the  Neapolitan  strongholds,  Gaeta,  held 
out  till  the  middle  of  July.  Elsewhere  the  Bourbon  troops 
gave  little  trouble. 

The  conquest  of  Naples  enabled  Napoleon  to  extend  his 
experiment  of  a  federation  of  Bonapartist  Kings.  He  an- 
nounced to  Miot  de  Melito,  now  appointed  one  of  Joseph's 
administrators,  his  intentions  in  an  interview  at  the  Tui- 
leries  on  January  28th.  Joseph  was  to  be  King  of  Naples, 
if  he  accepted  the  honour  quickly.  If  not,  the  Emperor 
would  adopt  a  son,  as  in  the  case  of  Eugene,  and  make 
ihim  King.  —  "I  don't  need  a  wife  to  have  an  heir.  It  is 
|by  my  pen  that  I  get  children." —  But  Joseph  must  also 
show  himself  worthy  of  the  honour.  Let  him  despise 
(fatigue,  get  wounded,  break  a  leg. 

*See  my  article  in  the  "Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,"  April,  1000. 


68  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

"  Look  at  me.  The  recent  campaign,  agitation,  and  movement 
have  made  me  fat.  I  believe  that  if  all  the  kings  coalesced  against 
me,  I  should  get  a  quite  ridiculous  stomach.  .  .  .  You  have  heard  my 
words.  I  can  no  longer  have  relatives  in  obscurity.  Those  who  will 
not  rise  with  me,  shall  no  longer  be  of  my  family.  1  am  making  a 
family  of  kings  attached  to  my  federative  system."  l 

The  threat  having  had  its  effect,  Joseph  was  proclaimed 
King  of  Naples  by  a  decree  of  Napoleon.  "  Keep  a  firm 
hand  :  I  only  ask  one  thing  of  you  :  be  entirely  the  master 
there. "  2  Such  was  the  advice  given  to  his  amiable  brother, 
who  after  enjoying  a  military  promenade  southwards  was 
charged  to  undertake  the  conquest  of  Sicily.  It  mattered 
little  that  the  overthrow  of  the  Neapolitan  Bourbons 
offended  the  Czar,  who  had  undertaken  the  protection  of 
that  House. 

As  though  intent  on  browbeating  Alexander  by  an  ex- 
hibition of  his  power,  Napoleon  lavished  Italian  titles  on 
his  Marshals  and  statesmen.  Talleyrand  became  Prince 
of  Benevento  ;  and  Bernadotte,  Prince  of  Ponte-Corvo 
(two  Papal  enclaves  in  Neapolitan  soil).  To  these  and 
other  titles  were  attached  large  domains  (not  divisible  at 
death),  which  enabled  his  paladins  and  their  successors  to 
support  their  new  dignities  with  pomp  and  splendour  ; 
especially  was  this  so  with  the  two  titles  which  his  bar- 
gains with  Prussia  and  Bavaria  enabled  him  to  bestow. 
Thanks  to  the  complaisance  of  their  Kings,  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Berg  and  Cleves  was  granted  to  Murat,  while 
the  energetic  and  trusty  Berthier  was  rewarded  with  the 
Principality  of  Neufchatel  and  a  truly  princely  fortune.3 

Thus  was  founded  the  Napoleonic  nobility  ;  and  thus 
was  fulfilled  Mme.  de  StaeTs  prophecy  that  the  priests  and 
nobles  would  be  the  caryatides  of  the  future  throne.  The 
change  was  brought  about  skilfully.  It  took  place  when 
pride  in  Napoleon's  exploits  was  at  its  height,  and  when 
the  "  Gazette  de  France  "  asserted  : 

1  Ducasse,  "  Les  Rois  Freres  de  Napoleon,"  p.  11. 

2  Letter  of  February  7th,  1806.  On  the  same  day  he  blames  Junot, 
then  commander  of  Parma,  for  too  great  lenience  to  some  rebels  near 
that  city.  The  Italians  were  a  false  people,  who  only  respected  a  strong 
Government.  Let  him,  then,  burn  two  large  villages  so  that  no  trace 
remained,  shoot  the  priest  of  one  village,  and  send  three  or  four  hundred 
of  the  guilty  to  the  galleys.     "  Trust  my  old  experience  of  the  Italians." 

8  For  a  list  of  the  chief  Napoleonic  titles,  see  Appendix,  ad  Jin. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  59 

"France  is  henceforth  the  arbitress  of  Europe.  .  .  .  Civilization 
would  have  perished  in  Europe,  if  forth  from  the  ruins  there  had  not 
arisen  one  of  these  men  before  whom  the  world  keeps  silence,  and  to 
whom  Providence  seems  to  intrust  its  destinies." 1 

This  adulation,  which  recalls  that  of  the  Court  of  Au- 
gustus or  Tiberius,  gives  the  measure  of  French  thought. 
In  truth,  Napoleon  showed  profound  insight  into  human 
nature  when  he  judged  the  hatred  of  an  order  of  nobility 
to  be  a  mere  passing  spasm  of  revolutionary  fever  ;  and 
he  evinced  equal  good  sense  in  restoring  that  order 
through  the  chiefs  of  the  one  truly  popular  institution  in 
France,  the  army.  Besides,  the  new  titles  were  not  taken 
from  French  domains,  which  would  have  revived  the  idea 
of  feudal  dependence  in  France  :  they  were  the  fruit  of 
Napoleon's  great  victory  ;  and  the  sound  of  distant  names 
like  Benevento,  Berg,  and  Dalmatia  skilfully  flattered  the 
pride  of  la  grande  nation. 

It  is  now  time  to  return  to  the  affairs  of  Prussia  and  to 
point  out  the  chief  stages  in  her  downward  course.  On 
January  3rd,  1806,  an  important  State  Council  was  held 
at  Berlin  in  order  to  decide  on  certain  modifications  to  the 
Schonbrunn  Treaty  with  Napoleon.  The  chief  change 
resolved  on  was  as  follows  :  Instead  of  the  cessions  of 
territory  being  immediate  and  absolute,  as  proposed  by 
Napoleon,  they  were  not  to  take  effect  before  the  general 
peace.  Until  that  took  place,  Frederick  William  resolved 
to  occupy  Hanover  provisionally,  meanwhile  answering  to 
France  for  the  tranquillity  of  the  north  of  Germany.2 
The  Prussian  Government  therefore  gave  strong  hints 
that  the  presence  of  a  British  force  there  was  objection- 
able, and  the  troops  were  withdrawn.3 

Napoleon  was  to  be  less  pliable.  And  yet  Haugwitz 
assured  the  Prussian  King  and  council  that  he  had  looked 
Napoleon  through  and  through,  and  had  discerned  an  un- 
expressed wish  to  deal  easily  with  Prussia.  As  to  liis 
acceptance  of  these  changes  in  the  Schonbrunn  Treaty, 

1  January  2nd,  1802  ;  so  too  Fi£v£e,  "  Mes  Relations  avec  Bonaparte," 
vol.  ii.,  p.  210,  who  notes  that,  by  founding  an  order  of  nobility,  Napoleon 
ended  his  own  isolation  and  attached  to  his  interests  a  powerful  landed 
caste. 

2  Hardenberg's  "Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  390-304. 
8  Hardenberg  to  Harrowby  on  January  7th,  "Prussia,"  No.  70. 


60  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Haugvvitz  felt  no  doubt  whatever,  at  least  so  his  foe, 
Mardenberg,  states.  But  the  Prussian  Ministers  were 
now  proposing,  not  the  offensive  and  defensive  treaty  of 
alliance  that  Napoleon  required,  but  rather  a  mediation 
for  peace  between  France  and  England.  They  were,  in 
fact,  striving  to  steer  halfway  between  Napoleon  and 
George  III.  — and  gain  Hanover.  Verily,  here  was  a  be- 
lief in  half  measures  passing  that  of  women. 

The  envoy  despatched  to  assure  Napoleon's  assent  to 
these  new  conditions  was  the  very  man  who  had  quailed 
before  the  Emperor  at  Schonbrunn.  Count  Haugwitz  set 
out  on  January  14th  for  Munich  and  thence  for  Paris  ; 
but  long  before  any  definite  news  was  received  from  him, 
the  Court  of  Berlin  decided,  on  the  strength  of  a  few  oily 
compliments  from  the  French  ambassador,  Laforest,  to 
regard  the  acceptance  of  Napoleon  as  fully  assured.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  January  24th,  the  Government  resolved  to 
place  the  Prussian  army  on  a  peace-footing  and  recall  the 
troops  from  Franconia,  as  a  daily  saving  of  100,000  thalers 
might  thereby  be  effected.  Never  was  there  a  greater  act 
of  extravagance.  As  soon  as  the  retreat  and  demobilizing 
of  the  Prussian  forces  was  announced,  the  French  troops 
in  Bavaria  and  Franconia  began  to  press  forward,  while 
others  poured  across  the  Rhine.  Affecting  to  ignore 
these  threatening  moves,  the  Prussian  Court  strove  peace- 
ably to  acquire  Hanover  by  secretly  offering  George  III. 
a  re-arrangement  of  territories,  whereby  the  Hanoverian 
lands  east  of  the  Weser,  along  with  a  few  districts  west 
of  Hameln  and  Nienburg,  should  pass  to  Prussia.  Fred- 
erick William  proposed  to  keep  Minden  and  Ravensburg, 
but  to  cede  East  Frisia  and  all  the  rest  of  his  Westphalian 
possessions  to  King  George,  who  would  retain  the  elec- 
toral dignity  for  these  new  lands.1  The  only  reply  that 
our  ruler  deigned  to  this  offer  was  that  he  trusted  : 

"  His  Prussian  Majesty  will  follow  the  honourable  dictates  of  his 
own  heart,  and  will  demonstrate  to  the  world  that  he  will  not  set  the 

1I  have  not  found  a  copy  of  this  project ;  but  in  "Prussia,"  No.  70 
(forwarded  by  Jackson  on  January  27th,  180(5),  there  is  a  detailed  "M£- 
moire  explicatif,"  whence  F  extract  these  details,  as  yet  unpublished.  I 
believe.  Neither  Hardenberg,  Garden,  Jackson,  nor  Paget  mentions 
them. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW    CHARLEMAGNE  61 

dreadful  example  of  indemnifying  himself  at  the  expense  of  a  third 
party,  whose  sentiments  and  conduct  towards  him  and  his  subjects 
have  been  uniformly  friendly  and  pacifick."  1 

But  by  the  close  of  February  this  appeal  fell  on  deaf  ears. 
Frederick  William  had  decided  to  comply  with  Napo- 
leon's terms  and  was  about  to  take  formal  possession  of 
Hanover. 

The  conqueror  was  far  from*  taking  that  easy  view  of 
the  changes  made  in  the  Schonbrunn  Treaty  which  the 
discerning  Haugwitz  had  trustfully  expected.  At  first, 
every  effort  was  made  by  Talleyrand  to  delay  his  inter- 
view with  the  Emperor,  evidently  in  the  hope  that  the 
subtle  flattery  of  Laforest  at  Berlin  would  lead  to  the 
demobilization  of  the  Prussian  forces.  This  fatal  step  was 
known  at  Paris  before  February  6th,  when  Haugwitz  was 
received  by  the  Emperor  ;  and  the  knowledge  that  Prus- 
sia was  at  his  mercy  decided  the  conqueror's  tone.  He 
began  by  some  wheedling  words  as  to  the  ability  shown 
by  Haugwitz  in  the  Schonbrunn  negotiation  : 

"  If  anyone  but  myself  had  treated  with  you  I  should  have  thought 
him  bought  over  by  you ;  but,  let  me  confess  to  you,  the  treaty  was 
due  to  your  talents  and  merit.  You  were  in  my  eyes  the  first  states- 
man in  Europe,  and  covered  yourself  with  immortal  glory." 

Before  that  interview,  forsooth,  he  had  decided  to  make 

war  on  Prussia  ;  and  only  Haugwitz  had  induced  him  to 

offer   her   peace   and  the  gift  of  Hanover.     Why,  then, 

had  that  treaty  been  so  criticised  at  Berlin  ?     Why  had 

the  French  ambassador  been  slighted?    Why  was  Harden- 

!berg  high  in  favour?     Why  had  not  the  King  dismissed 

I  that  tool  of   England  ?     Here   the  envoy  strove  to  stem 

ithe   rising   torrent   of   the    Emperor's  wrath  ;   his  words 

were   at  once  swept   aside  ;   and  the    deluge   flowed   on. 

|As  Prussia  had  not  ratified  the  treaty  pure  and  simple, 

she  was  in  a  state  of  war  with  France  ;  for  she  still  had 

(Russian   and    English   troops   on   her   soil.     Here   again 

Haugwitz  observed  that  those  forces  were  withdrawing, 

and  that  the  Prussians  were  entering  Hanover  in  force. 

(The  storm  burst  forth  anew.      What   right  had   Prussia 

fhus   to   carry    into    effect    a    treaty  which    she    had  not 

1  Records,  "  Prussia,"  No.  70,  dated  February  21st. 


62  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ratified  ?  If  her  forces  entered  Hanover,  his  troops  should 
forthwith  occupy  Ansbach,  Cleves,  and  Neufchatel  :  if 
Frederick  William  meant  to  have  Hanover,  he  should 
pay  dearly  for  it.  But  he  would  allow  Haugwitz  to  see 
Talleyrand,  so  as  to  prevent  an  immediate  war.1 

The  calm  of  the  Foreign  Minister  was  as  dangerous  as 
the  bluster  of  the  Emperor.  Talleyrand  was  no  friend 
to  Prussia.  He  had  long  known  Napoleon's  determina- 
tion to  press  on  a  war  between  England  and  Prussia, 
and  he  lent  himself  to  the  plan  of  undermining  the 
Hohenzollerns.  The  scales  now  fell  from  the  envoy's 
eyes.  He  saw  that  his  country  stood  friendless  before 
an  exacting  creditor,  who  now  claimed  further  sacrifices  — 
or  Prussia's  life-blood.  The  Emperor's  threats  were  partly 
fictitious  ;  and  when  Haugwitz  was  thoroughly  fright- 
ened and  ready  to  concede  almost  anything,  Napoleon 
came  to  the  real  point  at  issue,  and  demanded  that  the 
whole  of  the  German  coast-line  on  the  North  Sea  should 
be  closed  to  English  commerce.  With  this  stringent 
clause  superadded,  Hanover  was  now  handed  over  to 
Prussia.  Never  was  a  Greek  gift  more  skilfully  offered. 
The  present  of  Hanover  on  those  terms  implied  for  the 
recipient  Russia's  disapproval  and  the  hostility  of  Eng- 
land.2 

This  was  the  news  brought  by  Haugwitz  to  Berlin. 
Frederick  William  was  now  on  the  horns  of  the  very 
dilemma  which  he  had  sought  to  avoid.  Either  he  must 
accept  Napoleon's  terms,  or  defy  the  conqueror  to  almost 
single  combat.  The  irony  of  his  position  was  now  pain- 
fully apparent.  In  his  longing  for  peace  and  retrench- 
ment he  had  dismissed  his  would-be  allies,  and  had  sent 
his  own  soldiers  grumbling  to  their  homes.  Moreover, 
he   was   tied   by   his   previous    action.       If   he   accepted 

1  Hardenberg,  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  463-469;  "Nap.  Corresp.,"  No. 
9742,  for  Napoleon's  thoughts  as  to  peace,  when  he  heard  of  Fox  being 
our  Foreign  Minister. 

2  See  "  Nap.  Corresp.,"  Nos.  9742,  9773,  9777,  for  his  views  as  to  the 
weakness  of  England  and  Prussia.  This  treaty  of  February  15th,  1806, 
confirmed  the  session  of  Neufchatel  and  Cleves  to  France,  and  of  Ansbach 
to  Bavaria,  but  did  not  cede  any  Franconian  districts  to  Prussia's  Bai- 
reuth  lands.  See  Hardenberg,  "Memoires,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  483,  for  the  text 
of  the  treaty. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  68 

peace  from  Napoleon  at  Christmas,  when  300,000  men 
could  have  disputed  the  victor's  laurels,  how  much  more 
must  he  accept  it  now  !  He  not  only  gave  way  on  this 
point :  he  even  complied  with  Napoleon's  wishes  by  keep- 
ing Hardenberg  at  a  distance.  He  did  not  dismiss  him 
—  the  friendship  of  the  spirited  Queen  Louisa  forbade 
that  :  but  Hardenberg  yielded  up  to  Haugwitz  the  guid- 
ance of  foreign  affairs,  and  was  granted  unlimited  leave  of 
absence. 

Popular  feeling  was  deeply  moved  by  this  craven  com- 
pliance with  French  behests.  The  officers  of  the  Berlin 
garrison  serenaded  the  patriotic  statesman,  while '  Haug- 
witz twice  had  his  windows  smashed.  Public  opinion, 
it  is  true,  counted  for  little  in  Prussia.  The  rigorous 
separation  of  classes,  the  absence  of  popular  education, 
the  complete  subjection  of  the  journals  to  Government, 
and  the  mutual  jealousy  of  soldiers  and  civilians,  pre- 
vented any  general  expression  of  opinion  in  that  almost 
feudal  society. 

But  when  the  people  of  Ansbach  piteously  begged  not 
to  be  handed  over  to  Bavaria,  and  forthwith  saw  their 
land  occupied  by  the  French  before  Prussia  had  ratified 
the  cession  of  that  principality  ;  when  the  North  Germans 
found  that  the  gain  of  Hanover  by  Prussia  was  at  the  price 
of  war  with  England  and  the  ruin  of  their  commerce  ;  when 
it  was  seen  that  Frederick  William  and  Haugwitz  had 
clipped  the  wings  of  the  Prussian  eagle  till  it  shunned  a 
fight  with  the  Gallic  cock,  a  feeling  of  shame  and  indig- 
nation arose  which  proved  that  the  limits  of  endurance 
had  been  reached.  Observers  saw  that,  after  all,  the  old 
German  feeling  was  not  dead  ;  it  was  only  torpid  ;  and 
forces  were  beginning  to  work  which  threatened  ruin  to 
the  Hohenzollerns  if  they  again  tarnished  the  national 
honour.1 

Meanwhile  the  first  overtures  for  peace  were  exchanged 
between  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburg.    In  the  spring 

1The  strange  perversity  of  Haugwitz  is  nowhere  more  shown  than  in 
lis  self-congratulation  at  the  omission  of  the  adjectives  offensive  et  defen- 
sive from  the  new  treaty  of  alliance  between  France  and  Prussia  (Harden- 
>erg,  vol.  ii.,  p.  481).  Napoleon  was  now  not  pledged  to  help  Prussia  in 
lie  war  which  George  III.  declared  against  her  on  April  20th. 


64  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  1806  there  seemed  some  ground  for  hope  that  Europe 
might  find  repose,  at  least  on  land,  after  fourteen  years 
of  almost  constant  war.  France  was  no  longer  Jacobinical. 
Under  Napoleon  she  had  quickly  fallen  into  line  with  the 
monarchical  States,  and  the  questions  now  at  stake  merely 
related  to  boundaries  and  the  balance  of  power.  The  bel- 
licose ardour  of  the  Czar  had  melted  away  at  Austerlitz. 
The  seizure  of  Hanover  by  Prussia  moved  him  but  little, 
and  he  sought  to  compose  the  resulting  strife.  As  for  the 
other  Powers,  they  were  either  helpless  or  torpid.  The 
King  of  Sweden  was  venting  his  spleen  upon  Prussia. 
Italy,  South  Germany,  Holland,  and  Spain  were  at  Napo- 
leon's beck  ;  and  the  policy  of  England  under  the  new 
Grenville-Fox  Ministry  inclined  strongly  towards  peace. 
There  seemed,  then,  every  chance  of  founding  the  suprem- 
acy of  France  upon  lasting  foundations,  if  the  claims  of 
Britain  and  Austria  received  reasonable  satisfaction.  Na- 
poleon also  seems  to  have  wanted  peace  for  the  consoli- 
dation of  his  power  in  Europe  and  the  extension  of  his 
colonies  and  commerce.  As  at  the  close  of  all  his  land 
campaigns,  his  thoughts  turned  to  the  East,  and  on  Janu- 
ary 31st,  1806,  he  issued  orders  to  Decres  which,  far  from 
showing  any  despair  as  to  the  French  navy,  foreshadowed 
a  vigorous  naval  and  colonial  policy  ;  while  his  moves  on 
the  Dalmatian  coast,  and  the  despatch  of  Sebastiani  on  a 
mission  to  the  Porte,  revealed  the  magnetic  attraction 
which  the  Levant  still  had  for' him. 

A  peculiar  interest  therefore  attaches  to  the  negotia- 
tions for  peace  in  1806,  especially  as  they  were  pushed  on 
by  that  generous  orator,  Fox,  who  had  so  long  pleaded 
for  a  good  understanding  with  France.  On  February  20th, 
1806,  he  disclosed  to  Talleyrand  the  details  of  a  supposed 
plot  for  the  murder  of  the  French  Emperor,  which  some 
person  had  proposed  to  him,  an  offer  which  he  rejected 
with  horror,  at  the  same  time  ordering  the  man  to  be  ex- 
pelled from  the  kingdom.  It  is  more  than  probable  that 
the  whole  thing  was  got  up  by  the  French  police  as  a  test 
of  the  esteem  which  Fox  had  always  expressed  for  Bona- 
parte. 

The  experiment  having  turned  out  well,  Talleyrand 
assured  Fox  of  the  pacific  desires  of  the  French  Emperor 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHAKLEMAGNE  65 

as  recently  stated  to  the  Corps  Leyislatif,  namely,  that 
peace  could  be  had  on  the  terms  of  the  Treat}"  of  Amiens. 
Fox  at  once  clasped  the  outstretched  hand,  but  stated  that 
the  negotiations  must  be  in  concert  with  Russia,  and  the 
treaty  such  as  our  allies  could  honourably  accept.  To  this 
Talleyrand,  on  April  1st,  gave  a  partial  assent,  adding 
that  Napoleon  was  convinced  that  the  rupture  of  the  Peace 
of  Amiens  was  due  solely  to  the  refusal  of  France  to  grant 
a  treaty  of  commerce.  France  and  England  could  now 
come  to  satisfactory  terms,  if  England  would  be  content 
with  the  sovereignty  of  the  seas,  and  not  interfere  with 
Continental  affairs.1  France  desired,  not  a  truce,  but  a 
durable  peace. 

To  this  Fox  assented,  but  traversed  the  French  claim 
that  Russia's  participation  would  imply  her  mediation. 
Peace  could  only  come  from  an  honourable  understand- 
ing between  all  the  Powers  actually  at  war.  Talleyrand 
denied  that  Russia  was  at  war  with  France,  as  the  Third 
Coalition  had  lapsed  ;  but  Fox  held  his  ground,  and  de- 
clared there  must  be  peace  with  England  and  Russia, 
or  not  at  all  :  otherwise  France  would  be  seen  to  aim  at 
"  excluding  us  from  any  connection  with  the  Continental 
Powers  of  Europe."  2 

Such  a  beginning  was  disappointing  :  it  showed  that 
Napoleon  and  Talleyrand  were  intent  on  sowing  distrust 
between  England  and  Russia,  who  were  mutually  pledged 
not  to  make  peace  separately  ;  and  for  a  time  all  over- 
tures ceased  between  London  and  Paris,  until  it  was 
known  that  a  Russian  envoy  was  going  to  Paris.  Hith- 
erto the  French  Foreign  Office  had  won  brilliant  suc- 
cesses by  skilfully  separating  and  embittering  allies. 
But  now  it  seemed  that  their  tactics  were  foiled.  Two 
firm  and  trusty  allies  yet  remained,  Britain  and  Russia. 
To  Czartoryski  our  Foreign  Minister  had  expressed  his 
desire  that  the  former  offensive  alliance  should  now  take 
a  solely  defensive  cnaracter  :  "  If  we  cannot  reduce  the 

1  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  all  the  negotiations  that  followed,  Napoleon 
never  raised  any  question  about  our  exacting  maritime  code,  which  proves 
how  hollow  were  his  diatribes  against  the  tyrant  of  the  seas  at  other  times. 

2  Despatch  of  April  20th,  1806,  in  Papers  presented  to  Parliament  on 
December  22nd,  1806. 

VOL.    II F 


66  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

enormous  power  of  France,  it  will  always  be  something 
to  stop  its  progress."  To  these  opinions  the  Russian 
Minister  gave  a  cordial  assent,  and  despatched  a  special 
envoy  to  London  to  concert  terms  of  peace  along  with 
the  British  Ministry,  while  Oubril,  "  a  safe  man  on  whose 
prudence  and  principles  the  two  allied  Courts  may  safely 
rely,"  was  despatched  to  Vienna  and  Paris. 1 

Oubril  proceeded  to  Vienna,  where  he  had  long  dis- 
cussions with  the  British  and  French  ambassadors  : 
Fox  also  requested  that  Lord  Yarmouth,  one  of  the 
many  hundreds  of  Englishmen  still  kept  under  restraint 
in  France,  might  have  his  freedom  and  repair  at  once  to 
Paris  for  a  preliminary  discussion  with  Talleyrand.  The 
request  being  granted,  the  prisoner  left  the  depot  at 
Verdun,  and,  early  in  June,  saw  that  Minister  in  his  first 
flush  of  pride  at  the  new  title  of  Prince  of  Benevento.  At 
that  time  Paris  was  intoxicated  with  Napoleon's  glory. 
The  French  were  lords  of  Franconia,  whence  they  levied 
heavy  exactions  :  in  Italy  they  defied  the  Pope's  authority.2 
They  were  firmly  installed  at  Ancona,  despite  repeated 
protests  of  Pius  VII.  King  Joseph  with  an  army  of 
45,000  men  was  planning  the  expulsion  of  the  Bourbons 
from  Sicily.  And  in  these  early  days  of  June,  Louis  Bona- 
parte was  declared  King  of  Holland. 

Yet  Talleyrand  was  not  so  dazzled  by  this  splendour  as 
to  slight  the  idea  of  peace  with  England  ,  and  when  Lord 
Yarmouth  stated  that  George  III.  would  above  all  things 
require  the  restoration  of  Hanover,  the  Minister,  after  a 
delay  in  which  he  consulted  his  master,  stated  that  that 
would  make  no  difficulty.  As  to  the  other  questions, 
namely  Sicily  and  the  maintenance  of  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire, he  replied  :  "  You  hold  Sicily,  we  do  not  ask  it  of 
you  ;  if  we  possessed  it,  it  might  much  increase  our  diffi- 
culties "  ;  and  as  regards  Turkey  he  advised  that  England 
should  speedily  gain  the  guarantee  of  its  integrity  from 
France  —  "  for  much  is  being  prepared,  but  nothing  is  yet 
done."  After  reporting  these  views  at  Downing  Street, 
Lord  Yarmouth  returned  to  Paris  for  further  discussions, 

1  Czartory ski's  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xiii. 

2  u  I  do  not  intend  the  Court  of  Rome  to  mix  any  more  in  politics" 
(Nap.  to  the  Pope,  February  18th,  1806). 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  67 

with  the  general  understanding  that  the  principle  of  uti 
possidetis  should  form  their  basis  —  except  as  regards  Han- 
over. He  now  was  informed  by  Talleyrand  that  the  nego- 
tiations with  Russia  were  to  be  kept  separate,  and  that 
Napoleon  had  other  views  about  Sicily,  as  he  looked  on 
its  conquest  as  necessary  for  Joseph's  security  on  the 
mainland. 

Surprised  at  this  change,  our  envoy  stated  that  he  could 
not  discuss  any  terms  of  peace  in  which  Sicily  was  not 
kept  for  the  Bourbons  ;  whereupon  Talleyrand  replied 
that  things  were  altered,  and  that  we  ought  to  be  content 
with  regaining  Hanover  from  Prussia  and  keeping  Malta 
and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  On  Lord  Yarmouth  declin- 
ing to  proceed  further  until  the  French  claims  to  Sicily 
were  renounced,  the  offer  of  the  Hanse  Towns  (Liibeck, 
Hamburg,  and  Bremen)  was  made  for  his  Sicilian  Majesty ; 
and  on  the  refusal  of  that  bait,  Dalmatia,  Ragusa,  and 
Albania  were  proposed. 

As  Napoleon  had  offered  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of 
the  Turkish  Empire,  Lord  Yarmouth  showed  some  indig- 
nation at  a  proposal  which  would  have  begun  its  partition  ; 
and,  but  for  the  expected  arrival  of  Oubril,  would  have 
broken  off  the  negotiation.  On  July  8th  he  saw  the 
Russian  envoy  and  found  him  a  man  of  straw.  Oubril 
approved  everything.  He  was  glad  that  France  would 
give  back  Hanover  to  England,  because  that  would  sever 
the  Franco-Prussian  union  and  make  the  Court  of  Berlin 
dependent  on  Russia.  He  even  thought  it  might  be  well 
for  the  Hanse  Towns  to  go  to  the  Neapolitan  Bourbons, 
provided  those  towns  were  placed  under  the  Czar's  protec- 
tion. But  even  better  was  the  proposal  that  those  Bour- 
bons should  have  Dalmatia  and  neighbouring  lands  ;  for 
that  would  drive  a  wedge  between  Napoleon  and  Turkey. 
Such  was  the  gist  of  this  curious  interview.  Desirous  of 
testing  the  accuracy  of  his  account  of  it,  Lord  Yarmouth 
tread  it  over  to  Oubril  at  their  next  interview,  when  the 
Russian  envoy  added  the  following  written  corrections  : 

"  N.B.  M.  d'Oubril  believes,  though  he  has  no  directions  on  this 
Subject,  that  it  would  be  suitable  to  Russia,  and  even  advantageous 
tor  the  assuring  their  own  independence,  that  Hamburg  and  Liibeck 
ihould  pass   under  the  suzerainty  of   Russia.  —  N.B.     Although  M. 


68  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

d'Oubril  has  a  positive  order  to  insist  on  the  preservation  of  Sicily  for 
the  King  of  Naples,  yet  he  is  of  opinion  that  the  acquisition  of  Yvene- 
tia,  Istria,  Dalmatia,  and  Albania  "  [should  be  an  establishment  for 
his  Sicilian  Majesty].1 

That  a  reed  shaken  by  every  breeze  should  bow  before 
Napoleon's  will  was  not  surprising  ;  and  late  at  night  on 
July  20th  Lord  Yarmouth  heard  that  the  Russian  envoy 
had  just  signed  a  separate  peace  with  France,  whereby 
the  independence  of  the  Ionian  Isles  was  recognized  (Rus- 
sia keeping  only  4,000  troops  in  Corfu),  and  Germany 
was  to  be  evacuated  by  the  French.  But  the  sting  was 
in  the  tail  :  for  a  secret  article  stipulated  that  Ferdinand 
IV.  should  cede  Sicily  to  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  receive 
the  Balearic  Isles  from  Napoleon's  ally,  Spain. 

Such  was  the  news  which  our  envoy  heard,  after  forc- 
ing his  way  to  Oubril's  presence,  just  as  the  latter  was 
hurrying  off  to  St.  Petersburg.  At  that  city  an  important 
change  had  taken  place  ;  Czartoryski  had  retired  in  favour 
of  Baron  Budberg,  who  was  less  favourable  to  a  close 
alliance  with  England  ;  and  it  appears  certain  that  Oubril 
would  not  have  broken  through  his  instructions  had  he 
not  known  of  this  change.  What  other  motives  led  him 
to  break  faith  with  England,  Sicily,  and  Spain  are  not 
clearly  known.  He  claimed  that  the  new  order  of  things 
in  Germany  rendered  it  highly  important  to  get  the 
French  troops  out  of  that  land.  Doubtless  this  was  so  ; 
but  even  that  benefit  would  have  been  dearly  bought  at 
the  price  of  disgrace  to  the  Czar.2 

2I  translate  literally  these  N.B.'s  as  pasted  in  at  the  end  of  Yarmouth's 
Memoir  of  July  8th  ("France,"  No.  73).  As  Oubril's  instructions  have 
never,  I  believe,  been  published,  the  passage  given  above  is  somewhat 
important  as  proving  how  completely  he  exceeded  his  powers  in  bartering 
away  Sicily.  The  text  of  the  Oubril  Treaty  is  given  by  De  Clercq,  vol. 
ii.,  p.  180.  The  secret  articles  required  Russia  to  help  France  in  induc- 
ing the  Court  of  Madrid  to  cede  the  Balearic  Isles  to  the  Prince  Royal  of 
Naples  ;  the  dethroned  King  and  Queen  were  not  to  reside  there,  and 
Russia  was  to  recognize  Joseph  Bonaparte  as  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies. 

2  In  conversing  with  our  ambassador,  Mr.  Stuart,  Baron  Budberg 
excused  Oubril's  conduct  on  the  ground  of  his  nervousness  under  the 
threats  of  the  French  plenipotentiary,  General  Clarke,  who  scarcely  let 
him  speak,  and  darkly  hinted  at  many  other  changes  that  must  ensue  if 
Russia  did  not  make  peace  ;  Switzerland  was  to  be  annexed,  Germany 
overrun,  and  Turkey  partitioned.  That  Clarke  was  a  master  in  diplomatic 
hectoring  is  well  known  ;  but,  from  private  inquiries,  Stuart  discovered 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  69 

Leaving  for  the  present  Oubril  to  face  his  indignant 
master,  we  turn  to  notice  an  epoch-making  change,  the 
details  of  which  were  settled  at  Paris  in  the  midst  of  the 
negotiations  with  England  and  Russia.  On  July  12th 
was  quietly  signed  the  Act  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  that  destroyed  the  old  Germanic  Empire. 

Some  such  event  had  long  been  expected.  The  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  after  a  thousand  years  of  life,  had  been 
stricken  unto  death  at  Austerlitz.  The  seizure  of  Han- 
over by  Prussia  had  led  the  King  of  Sweden  to  declare 
that  he,  for  his  Pomeranian  lands,  would  take  no  more 
share  in  the  deliberations  of  the  senile  Diet  at  Ratisbon 
which  took  no  notice  of  that  outrage.  Moreover,  Ratis- 
bon was  now  merely  the  second  city  of  Bavaria,  whose 
King  might  easily  deny  to  that  body  its  local  habitation  ; 
and  the  use  of  the  term  Germanic  Confederation  in  the 
Treaty  of  Pressburg  sounded  the  death-knell  of  an  Em- 
pire which  Voltaire  with  equal  wit  and  truth  had  described 
as  neither  holy,  nor  Roman,  nor  an  Empire.  In  the  new 
age  of  trenchant  realities  how  could  that  venerable  fig- 
ment survive — where  the  election  of  the  Emperor  was  a 
sham,  his  coronation  a  mere  parade  of  tattered  robes  be- 
fore a  crowd  of  landless  Serenities,  and  where  the  Diet 
was  largely  concerned  with  regulating  the  claims  of  the 
envoys  of  princes  to  sit  on  seats  of  red  cloth  or  on  the  less 
honourable  green  cloth,  or  with  apportioning  the  tradi- 
tional thirty-seven  dishes  of  the  imperial  banquet  so  that 
the  last  should  be  borne  by  a  Westphalian  envoy  ? 1 

Among  these  spectral  survivals  of  an  outworn  life  the 
incursion  of  Napoleon  across  the  Rhine  had  aroused  a 
panic  not  unlike  that  which  the  sturdy  form  of  JEne&s  cast 
on  the  gibbering  shades  of  the  Greeks  in  the  mourning 
fields  of  Hades.  And  when,  on  August  1st,  1806,  the 
heir  to  the  Revolution  notified  to  the  Diet  at  Ratisbon 
that  neither  he  nor  the  States  of  South  and  Central  Ger- 


that  the  Czar,  in  his  private  conference  with  Oubril,  seemed  more  inclined 
towards  peace  than  Czartoryski :  when  therefore  the  latter  resigned, 
Oubril  might  well  give  way  before  Clarke's  bluster.  (Stuart's  Despatch 
of  August  9th,  1806,  F.  O.,  Russia,  No.  68  ;  also  see  Czartoryski's  "  Mems.," 
vol.  ii.,  ch.  xiv.  ;  and  Martens,  "Traites,"  Suppl.  vol.  iv.) 
1  ••  Memoirs  of  Karl  Heinrich,  Knight  of  Lang." 


70  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

many  any  longer  recognized  the  existence  of  the  old  Em- 
pire, feebler  protests  arose  than  came  from  the  straining 
throats  of  the  scared  comrades  of  Agamemnon.  The  Diet 
itself  uttered  no  audible  sound.  The  Emperor,  Francis 
II.,  forthwith  declared  that  he  laid  down  his  crown,  ab- 
solved all  the  electors  and  princes  from  their  allegiance, 
and  retired  within  the  bounds  of  the  Austrian  Empire. 

Thus  feebly  flickered  out  the  light  which  had  shed 
splendour  on  mediaeval  Christendom.  Kindled  in  the 
basilica  of  St.  Peter's  on  Christmas  Day  of  the  year  800 
in  an  almost  mystical  union  of  spiritual  and  earthly  power, 
by  the  blessing  of  Pope  Leo  on  Karl  the  Great,  it  was  now 
trodden  under  foot  by  the  chief  of  a  more  than  Frankish 
State,  who  aspired  to  unquestioned  sway  over  a  dominion 
as  great  as  that  of  the  mediaeval  hero.  For  Napoleon,  as 
Protector  of  the  Rhenish  Confederation,  now  controlled 
most  of  the  German  lands  that  acknowledged  Charlemagne, 
while  his  hold  on  Italy  was  immeasurably  stronger.  Fur- 
ther parallels  between  two  ages  and  systems  so  unlike  as 
those  of  Charlemagne  and  his  imitator  are  of  course  super- 
ficial ;  and  Napoleon's  attempt  at  impressing  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  Germans  seems  to  us  to  smack  of  unreality. 
Yet  we  must  remember  that  they  were  then  the  most 
impressionable  and  docile  of  nations,  that  his  attempt  was 
made  with  much  skill,  and  that  none  of  the  appointed 
guardians  of  the  old  Empire  raised  a  voice  in  protest  while 
he  imposed  a  constitution  on  the  sixteen  Princes  of  the 
new  Confederation. 

They  included  the  rulers  of  South  Germany,  as  well  as 
Dalberg  the  Arch-Chancellor,  who  now  took  the  title  of 
Prince  Primate,  the  Grand-Duke  of  Berg,  the  Landgrave, 
now  Grand-Duke,  of  Hesse-Darmstadt,  two  Princes  of  the 
House  of  Nassau,  and  eight  lesser  potentates.  The  old 
German  laws  were  soon  abolished  in  favour  of  the  Code 
Napoleon.  A  close  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  wal 
framed  between  France  and  these  States,  that  were  to  fur- 
nish in  all  63,000  troops  at  the  bidding  of  the  Protector. 
Napoleon  also  gained  some  control  over  their  fiscal  and  com- 
mercial codes  —  an  important  advantage,  in  view  of  the 
Continental  System,  that  was  soon  to  take  definite  form.1 

1  Garden,  vol.  ix.,  pp.  157,  189,  255. 


xxiv  PRUSSIA   AND   THE   NEW   CHARLEMAGNE  71 

As  a  set-off  to  this  surrender  of  all  questions  of  foreign 
policy  and  many  internal  rights,  what  did  these  rulers 
receive?  As  happened  almost  uniformly  in  Napoleon's 
aggrandizements,  he  struck  a  bargain  extremely  service- 
able to  himself,  less  so  to  those  whose  support  he  sought, 
and  in  which  the  losses  fell  crushingly  on  the  weak.  His 
statecraft  in  this  respect  was  more  cynical  than  that  of  the 
crowned  robbers  who  had  degraded  eighteenth-century 
politics  into  a  game  of  grab.  Their  robberies  were  at  least 
direct  and  straightforward.  It  was  reserved  for  Napoleon 
at  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio  to  win  huge  gains  mostly 
at  the  expense  of  a  weak  third  party,  namely,  Venice.  He 
pursued  the  same  profitable  tactics  in  the  Secularizations, 
when  France  and  the  greater  German  Powers  gained 
enormously  at  the  final  cost  of  the  Church  lands  and  the 
little  States ;  and  now  he  ground  up  the  German  domains 
that  were  to  cement  his  new  Rhenish  system. 

There  were  still  numbers  of  Imperial  Counts  and  Knights, 
as  well  as  free  cities,  that  had  not  been  absorbed  in  1803. 
The  survivors  were  now  wiped  out  by  Napoleon  for  the 
benefit  of  his  Rhenish  underlings,  the  spoliation  being 
veiled  under  the  term  Mediatization.  The  euphemism 
claims  a  brief  explanation.  In  old  German  law  the  nobles 
and  cities  that  gained  local  independence  by  shaking  off 
the  control  of  the  local  potentate  were  termed  immediate, 
because  they  owed  allegiance  directly  to  the  Emperor, 
without  any  feudal  intermediary  :  if  by  mischance  they 
fell  under  that  hated  control  they  were  said  to  be  medi- 
atized. This  term  was  now  applied  to  acts  that  subjected 
the  knight,  or  city,  not  to  feudal  control,  but  to  complete 
absorption  by  the  king  or  prince  of  Napoleon's  creation. 
Six  Imperial  or  Free  Cities  survived  the  Secularizations, 
namely,  the  three  Hanse  towns,  and  Augsburg,  Frankfurt, 
and  Nuremberg.  The  northern  towns  still  held  their 
ancient  rights ;  but  Augsburg  and  Nuremberg  now  fell  to 
the  King  of  Bavaria,  and  Frankfurt  was  bestowed  by 
Napoleon  on  Dalberg,  the  Prince  Primate  of  the  Confed- 
eration. 

German  life  began  to  lose  much  of  the  quaint  diversity 
beloved  of  artists  and  poets ;  but  it  also  gained  much. 
No  longer  did  the  Count  of  Limburg-Styrum  parade  his 


12  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxiv 

army  of  one  colonel,  six  officers,  and  two  privates  in  the 
valley  of  the  Roehr :  he  and  his  passed  under  the  sway 
of  Murat,  and  the  lapse  of  these  pigmy  forces  made  a 
national  army  possible  in  the  dim  future.  No  more  did 
the  Imperial  lawyers  at  Wetzlar  browse  on  evergreen  law- 
suits :  justice  was  administered  after  the  concise  methods 
of  Napoleon.  The  crops  of  the  Swabian  peasant  were 
now  comparatively  safe  from  the  deer  of  His  Translucency 
of  the  castle  hard  by  ;  for  the  spirit  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution breathed  upon  the  old  game  laws  and  robbed  them 
of  their  terrors.  And  the  German  patriot  of  to-day  must 
still  confess  that  the  first  impulse  for  reform,  however 
questionable  its  motives  and  brutal  its  application,  came 
from  the  new  Charlemagne. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  FALL  OF  PRUSSIA 

We  now  turn  to  consider  the  influence  which  the  found- 
ing of  the  Rhenish  Confederation  exerted  on  the  inter- 
national problems  which  were  being  discussed  at  Paris. 
Having  gained  this  diplomatic  victory,  Napoleon,  it  seems, 
might  well  afford  to  be  lenient  to  Prussia,  to  the  Czar, 
even  to  England.  Would  he  seize  this  opportunity,  and 
soothe  the  fears  of  these  Powers  by  a  few  timely  conces- 
sions, or  would  he  press  them  all  the  harder  because  the 
third  of  Germany  was  now  under  his  control  ?  Here  again 
he  was  at  the  parting  of  the  ways. 

As  the  only  obstacles  to  the  conclusion  of  a  durable 
peace  with  England  were  Sicily  and  Hanover,  it  may  be 
well  to  examine  here  the  bearing  of  these  questions  on  the 
peace  of  Europe  and  Napoleon's  future. 

It  is  clear  from  his  letters  to  Joseph  that  he  had  firmly 
resolved  to  conquer  Sicily.  Before  his  brother  had  reached 
Naples  he  warned  him  to  prepare  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
Bourbons  from  that  island.  For  that  purpose  the  French 
pushed  on  into  Calabria  and  began  to  make  extensive 
preparations  —  at  the  very  time  when  Talleyrand  stated  to 
Lord  Yarmouth  that  the  French  did  not  want  Sicily.  But 
the  English  forces  defending  that  island  prepared  to  deal 
a  blow  that  would  prevent  a  French  descent.  A  force  of 
about  5,000  men  under  Sir  John  Stuart  landed  in  the  Bay 
of  St.  Euphemia:  and  when,  on  the  4th  of  July,  1806, 
Reynier  led  7,000  troops  against  them  in  full  assurance  of 
victory,  his  choicest  battalions  sank  before  the  fierce  bayo- 
net charge  of  the  British  :  in  half  an  hour  the  French  were 
in  full  retreat,  leaving  half  their  numbers  on  the  field. 

The  moral  effect  of  this  victory  was  very  great.  Hith- 
erto our  troops,  except  in  Egypt,  had  had  no  opportunity 

73'  ' 


74  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

of  showing  their  splendid  qualities.  More  than  half  a 
century  had  passed  since  at  Minden  a  British  force  had 
triumphed  over  a  French  force  in  Europe  ;  and  Napoleon 
expressed  the  current  opinion  when  he  declared  to  Joseph 
his  joy  that  at  last  the  slow  and  clumsy  English  had  ven- 
tured on  the  mainland.1  Moreover,  the  success  at  Maida, 
the  general  rising  of  the  Calabrias  that  speedily  followed, 
and  Stuart's  capture  of  Reggio,  Cortone,  and  other  towns, 
with  large  stores  and  forty  cannon  destined  for  the  con- 
quest of  Sicily,  scattered  to  the  winds  the  French  hope  of 
carrying  Sicily  by  a  coup  de  main. 

If  there  was  any  chance  of  the  Russian  and  British 
Governments  deserting  the  cause  of  the  Bourbons,  it  was 
ended  by  the  news  from  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  Napoleon 
now  realized  that  the  mastery  of  that  sea  —  "  the  principal 
and  constant  aim  of  my  policy  "  —  had  once  more  slipped 
from  his  grasp  !  On  their  side  the  Bourbons  were  unduly 
elated  by  a  further  success  which  was  more  brilliant  than 
solid.  Queen  Caroline,  excited  at  the  capture  of  Capri  by 
Sir  Sidney  Smith,  sought  to  rouse  all  her  lost  provinces  : 
she  intrigued  behind  the  back  of  the  King  and  of  General 
Acton,  while  the  knight-errant  succeeded  in  paralyzing 
the  plans  of  Sir  John  Stuart.2  Meanwhile  Massena,  after 
reducing  the  fortress  of  Gaeta  to  surrender,  marched  south- 
ward with  a  large  force,  and  the  British  and  Bourbon 
forces  re-embarked  for  Sicily,  leaving  the  fierce  peasants 
and  bandits  of  Calabria  to  the  mercies  of  the  conquerors. 
But  Maida  was  not  fought  in  vain.  Sicily  thenceforth 
was  safe,  the  British  army  regained  something  of  its 
ancient  fame,  and  the  hope  of  resisting  Napoleon  was 
strengthened  both  at  St.  Petersburg  and  London. 

Peace  can  rarely  be  attained  unless  one  of  the  com- 
batants is  overcome  or  both  are  exhausted.  But  neither 
Great  Britain  nor  France  was  in  this  position.  By  sea  our 
successes  had  been  as  continuous  as  those  of  Napoleon 
over  our  allies  on  land.  In  January  we  captured  the  Cape 
from  the  Dutch  :  in  February  the  French  force  at  St. 
Domingo  surrendered  to  Sir  James  Duckworth  :  Admiral 

1 "  Corresp.."  Nos.  10522  and  10544.    For  a  French  account  see  the 
"Mems."  of  Baron  Desvernois,  p.  288. 
2"F.  O.  Records,"  Naples,  No.  73. 


xxv  THE   FALL  OF  PRUSSIA  76 

Warren  in  March  closed  the  career  of  the  adventurous  Linois ; 
and  early  in  July  a  British  force  seized  great  treasure  at 
Buenos  Ayres,  whence,  however,  it  was  soon  obliged  to 
retire.  After  these  successes  Fox  could  not  but  be  firm. 
He  refused  to  budge  from  the  standpoint  of  uti  possidetis, 
which  our  envoy  had  stated  as  the  basis  of  negotiations ; 
and  the  Earl  of  Lauderdale,  who  was  sent  to  support 
and  finally  to  supersede  the  Earl  of  Yarmouth,  at  once 
took  a  firm  tone  which  drew  forth  a  truculent  rejoinder. 
If  that  was  to  be  the  basis,  wrote  Clarke,  the  French  pleni- 
potentiary, then  France  would  require  Moravia,  Styria, 
the  whole  of  Austria  (Proper),  and  Hanover,  and  in  that 
case  leave  England  her  few  colonial  conquests. 

This  reply  of  August  8th  nearly  severed  the  negotia- 
tions on  the  spot :  but  Talleyrand  persistently  refused  to 
grant  the  passports  which  Lauderdale  demanded  —  evi- 
dently in  the  hope  that  the  Czar's  ratification  of  Oubril's 
treaty  would  cause  us  to  give  up  Sicily.1  He  was  in  error. 
On  September  3rd  the  news  reached  Paris  that  Alexander 
scornfully  rejected  his  envoy's  handiwork.  Nevertheless, 
Napoleon  refused  to  forego  his  claims  to  Sicily ;  and  the 
closing  days  of  Fox  were  embittered  by  the  thought  that 
this  negotiation,  the  last  hope  of  a  career  fruitful  in  dis- 
appointments, was  doomed  to  failure.  After  using  his 
splendid  eloquence  for  fifteen  years  in  defence  of  the 
Revolution  and  its  "  heir,"  he  came  to  the  bitter  conclu- 
sion that  liberty  had  miscarried  in  France,  and  that  that 
land  had  bent  beneath  the  yoke  in  order  the  more  com- 
pletely to  subjugate  the  Continent.  He  died  on  September 
13th. 

French  historians,  following  an  article  in  the  "  Moni- 
teur  "  of  November  26th,  have  often  asserted  that  the  death 
of  Fox  and  the  accession  to  power  of  the  warlike  faction 
c  hanged  the  character  of  the  negotiations.2  Nothing  can 
be  further  from  the  truth.  Not  long  before  his  end,  Fox 
thus  expressed  to  his  nephew  his  despair  of  peace  : 

1  This  was  on  Napoleon's  advice.  He  wrote  to  Talleyrand  from  Ram- 
aouillet  on  August  8th,  to  give  as  an  excuse  for  the  delay,  "  The  Emperor 
s  hunting  and  will  be  back  before  the  end  of  the  week." 

2  So  too  Napoleon  said  at  St.  Helena  to  Las  Cases:    "Fox's   death 
-s  one  of  the  fatalities  of  my  career." 


76  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

"  We  can  in  honour  do  nothing  without  the  full  and  bond  fide  con- 
sent of  the  Queen  and  Court  of  Naples ;  but,  even  exclusive  of  that 
consideration  and  of  the  great  importance  of  Sicily,  it  is  not  so  much 
the  value  of  the  point  in  dispute  as  the  manner  in  which  the  French 
fly  from  their  word  that  disheartens  me.  It  is  not  Sicily,  but  the 
shuffling,  insincere  way  in  which  they  act,  that  shows  me  that  they 
are  playing  a  false  game ;  and  in  that  case  it  would  be  very  imprudent 
to  make  any  concessions,  which  by  any  possibility  could  be  thought 
inconsistent  with  our  honour,  or  could  furnish  our  allies  with  a  plau- 
sible pretence  for  suspecting,  reproaching,  or  deserting  us." 

It  is  further  to  be  noted  that  Lauderdale  stayed  on  at 
Paris  three  weeks  after  the  death  of  Fox  ;  that  he  put 
forward  no  new  demand,  but  required  that  Talleyrand 
should  revert  to  his  first  promise  of  renouncing  all  claim 
to  Sicily,  and  should  treat  conjointly  with  England  and 
Russia.  It  was  in  vain.  Napoleon's  final  concessions 
were  that  the  Bourbons,  after  losing  Sicily,  should  have 
the  Balearic  Isles  and  be  pensioned  by  Spain ;  that  Russia 
should  hold  Corfu  (as  she  already  did)  ;  and  that  we 
should  recover  Hanover  from  Prussia,  and  keep  Malta,  the 
Cape,  Tobago,  and  the  three  French  towns  in  India  ;  but 
except  Hanover,  all  of  these  were  in  our  power.  On  Sicily 
he  would  not  bate  one  jot  of  his  pretensions.  The  negotia- 
tions were  therefore  broken  off  on  October  6th,  twelve  days 
after  Napoleon  left  Paris  to  marshal  his  troops  against 
Prussia.1  The  whole  affair  revealed  Napoleon's  determi- 
nation to  trick  the  allies  into  signing  separate  and  disad- 
vantageous treaties,  and  thus  to  regain  by  craft  the  ground 
which  he  had  lost  in  fair  fight  at  Maida. 

If  Sicily  was  the  rock  of  stumbling  between  us  and 
Napoleon,  Hanover  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  war  be- 
tween France  and  Prussia.  During  the  negotiations  at 
Paris,  Lord  Yarmouth  privately  informed  Lucchesini,  the 
Prussian  ambassador,  that  Talleyrand  made  no  difficulty 
about  the  restitution  of  Hanover  to  George  III.  The 
news,  when  forwarded  to  Berlin  at  the  close  of  July, 
caused  a  nervous  flutter  in  ministerial  circles,  where 
every  effort  was  being  made  to  keep  on  good  terms  with 
France. 

Even  before  this  news  arrived,  the  task  was  far  from 
easy.     Murat,  when  occupying  his  new  Duchy  of  Berg, 

1  Despatches  of  September  26th  and  October  6th. 


xxv  THE  FALL  OF  PRUSSIA  77 

pushed  on  his  troops  into  the  old  Church  lands  of  Essen 
and  Werden.  Prussia  looked  on  these  districts  as  her 
own,  and  the  sturdy  patriot  Bliicher  at  once  marched  in 
his  soldiers,  tore  down  Murat's  proclamations,  and  re- 
stored the  Prussian  eagle  with  blare  of  trumpet  and  beat 
of  drum.1  A  collision  was  with  difficulty  averted  by  the 
complaisance  of  Frederick  William,  who  called  back  his 
troops  and  referred  the  question  to  lawyers  ;  but  even 
the  King  was  piqued  when  the  Grand-Duke  of  Berg  sent 
him  a  letter  of  remonstrance  on  Bliicher's  conduct,  com- 
mencing with  the  familiar  address,  Monfrere. 

Bliicher  meanwhile  and  the  soldiery  were  eating  out 
their  hearts  with  rage,  as  they  saw  the  French  pouring 
across  the  Rhine,  and  constructing  a  bridge  of  boats  at 
Wesel;  and  had  they  known  that  that  important  strong- 
hold, the  key  of  North  Germany,  was  quietly  declared  to 
be  a  French  garrison  town,  they  would  probably  have 
forced  the  hands  of  the  King.2  For  at  this  time  Frederick 
William  and  Haugwitz  were  alarmed  by  the  formation  of 
the  Rhenish  Confederation,  and  were  not  wholly  reassured 
by  Napoleon's  suggestion  that  the  abolition  of  the  old 
Empire  must  be  an  advantage  to  Prussia.  They  clutched 
eagerly,  however,  at  his  proposal  that  Prussia  should 
form  a  league  of  the  North  German  States,  and  made 
overtures  to  the  two  most  important  States,  Saxony  and 
Hesse-Cassel.  During  a  few  halcyon  days  the  King  even 
proposed  to  assume  the  title  Emperor  of  Prussia,  from 
which,  however,  the  Elector  of  Saxony  ironically  dissuaded 
him.  This  castle  in  the  air  faded  away  when  news 
reached  Berlin  at  the  beginning  of  August  that  Napoleon 
was  seeking  to  bring  the  Elector  of  Hesse-Cassel  into  the 
Rhenish  Confederation,  and  was  offering  as  a  bait  the 
domains  of  some  Imperial  Knights  and  the  principality  of 
Fulda,  now  held  by  the  Prince  of  Orange,  a  relative  of 
Frederick  William.  Moreover,  the  moves  of  the  French 
troops  in  Thuringia  were  so  threatening  to  Saxony  that 
the  Court  of  Dresden  began  to  scout  the  project  of  a 
North  German  Confederation. 


1  Bailleu,  "  Frankreich  und  Preussen,"  In  trod. 

2  Decree  of  July  26th. 


78  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Still,  the  King  and  Haugwitz  tried  to  persuade  them- 
selves that  Napoleon  meant  well  for  Prussia,  that  Eng- 
land had  been  doing  her  utmost  to  make  bad  blood 
between  the  two  allies,  and  that  "great  results  could  not 
be  attained  without  some  friction."  In  this  hope  they 
were  encouraged  by  the  French  ambassador,  the  man  who 
had  enticed  Prussia  to  her  demobilization.  He  was 
charged  by  Talleyrand  to  report  at  Berlin  that  "peace 
with  England  would  be  made,  as  well  as  with  Russia,  if 
France  had  consented  to  the  restitution  of  Hanover.  —  I 
have  renewed,"  added  Laforest,  "the  assurance  that  the 
Emperor  [Napoleon]  would  never  yield  on  this  point." 

And  yet  at  that  very  time  the  French  Foreign  Office 
was  at  work  upon  a  Project  of  a  Treaty  in  which  the  resti- 
tution of  Hanover  to  George  III.  was  expressly  named 
and  received  the  assent  of  Napoleon.1  The  Prussian 
ambassador,  Lucchesini,  had  some  inkling  of  this  from 
French  sources,2  as  well  as  from  Lord  Yarmouth,  and  on 
July  28th  penned  a  despatch  which  fell  like  a  thunder- 
bolt on  the  optimists  of  Berlin.  It  crossed  on  the  way 
—  such  is  the  irony  of  diplomacy  —  a  despatch  from 
Berlin  that  required  him  to  show  unlimited  confidence  in 
Napoleon.  From  confidence  the  King  now  rushed  to  the 
opposite  extreme,  and  saw  Napoleon's  hand  in  all  the  fric- 
tion of  the  last  few  weeks. 

Here  again  he  was  wrong  ;  for  the  French  Emperor 
had  held  back  Murat  and  the  other  hot-bloods  of  the 
army  who  were  longing  to  measure  swords  with  Prussia.3 
His  correspondence  proves  that  his  first  thoughts  were 
always  in  the  Mediterranean.  For  one  page  that  he  wrote 
about  German  affairs  he  wrote  twenty  to  Joseph  or 
Eugene  on  the  need  of  keeping  a  firm  hand  and  punishing 
Calabrian  rebels  —  "  shoot  three  men  in  every  village  "  — 
above  all,  on  the  plans  for  conquering  Sicily.  It  was 
therefore  with  real  surprise  that  on  August  16th-18th  he 

1  See  "Corresp."  No.  10604,  note;  also  Talleyrand's  letter  of  August 
4th  ("  Lettres  inldites,"  p.  245),  showing  the  indemnities  that  might  be 
offered  to  Prussia  after  the  loss  of  Hanover :  they  included,  of  course, 
little  States,  Anhalt,  Lippe,  Waldeck,  etc. 

2  Gentz,  "  Ausgew.  Schriften,"  vol.  v.,  p.  252.  Conversation  with 
Lucchesini. 

8  "  Corresp.,"  Nos.  10575,  10587,  10633. 


sxv  THE   FALL   OF   PRUSSIA  79 

Learnt  from  a  purloined  despatch  of  Lucchesini  that  the 
Latter  suspected  him  of  planning  with  the  Czar  the  parti- 
tion of  Prussian  Poland.  He  treated  the  matter  with 
contempt,  and  seems  to  have  thought  that  Prussia  would 
meekly  accept  the  morsels  which  he  proposed  to  throw  to 
her  in  place  of  Hanover.  But  he  misread  the  character  of 
Frederick  William,  if  he  thought  so  grievous  an  insult 
would  be  passed  over,  and  he  knew  not  the  power  of  the 
Prussian  Queen  to  kindle  the  fire  of  patriotism. 

Queen  Louisa  was  at  this  time  thirty  years  of  age  and 
in  the  flower  of  that  noble  matronly  beauty  which  bespoke 
a  pure  and  exalted  being.  As  daughter  of  a  poverty- 
stricken  prince  of  Mecklenburg-Strelitz,  her  youth  had 
been  spent  in  the  homeliest  fashion,  until  her  charms  won 
the  heart  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia.  Her  first  entry 
into  Berlin  was  graced  by  an  act  that  proclaimed  a  lov- 
ing nature.  When  a  group  of  children  dressed  in  white 
greeted  her  with  verses  of  welcome,  she  lifted  up  and 
kissed  their  little  leader,  to  the  scandal  of  stiff  dowagers 
and  the  joy  of  the  citizens.  The  incident  recalls  the  easy 
grace  and  disregard  of  etiquette  shown  by  Marie  Antoi- 
nette at  Versailles  in  her  young  bridal  days  ;  and,  in 
truth,  these  queens  have  something  in  common  besides 
their  loveliness  and  tlieir  misfortunes.  Both  were  mated 
with  cold  and  uninspiring  consorts.  Destiny  had  refused 
both  to  Frederick  William  and  to  Louis  XVI.  the  power 
f  exciting  feelings  warmer  than  the  esteem  and  respect 
ue  to  a  worthy  man  ;  and  all  the  fervour  of  loyalty  was 
roused  by  their  queens. 

Louisa   was   a   North   German    Marie   Antoinette,  but 
more  staid  and  homely  than  the  vivacious  daughter  of 
Maria  Theresa.     Neither  did  she  interfere  much  in  poli- 
tics, until  the  great  crash  came  :  even  when  the  blow  was 
mpending  and  the  patriotic  statesmen,  with  whom  she 
lympathized,  begged  the  King  to  remove  Haugwitz,  she 
lisappointed  them  by  withholding  the  entreaties  which 
ler  instincts  urged  but  her  wifely  obedience  restrained. 
per   influence   as   yet   was   that   of  a  noble,  fascinating 
iroman,  who  softened  the  jars  occasioned  by  the  king's 
Harrow  and  pedantic  nature,  and  purified  the  Court  from 
•  he  grossness  of  the  past.    But  in  the  dark  days  that  were 


80  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

to  come,  her  faith  and  enthusiasm  breathed  new  force  into 
a  down-trodden  people  ;  and  where  all  else  was  shattered, 
the  King  and  Queen  still  held  forth  the  ideal  of  that  first 
and  strongest  of  Teutonic  institutions,  a  pure  family  life. 
The  "  Memoirs "  of  Hardenberg  show  that  the  Queen 
quietly  upheld  the  patriotic  cause  ;l  and  in  the  tone  of 
the  letter  that  Frederick  William  wrote  to  the  fczar 
(August  8th)  there  is  something  of  feminine  resentment 
against  the  French  Emperor  :  after  recounting  his  griev- 
ances at  Napoleon's  hands,  he  continued  : 

"  If  the  news  be  true,  if  he  be  capable  of  perfidy  so  black,  be  con- 
vinced, Sire,  that  it  is  not  merely  a  question  about  Hanover  between 
him  and  me,  but  that  he  has  decided  to  make  war  against  me  at  all 
costs.  He  wants  no  other  Power  beside  his  own.  .  .  .  Tell  me,  Sire, 
I  conjure  you,  if  I  may  hope  that  your  troops  will  be  within  reach  of 
succour  for  me,  and  if  I  may  count  on  them  in  case  of  aggression." 

Alexander  wrote  a  cheering  response,  advising  him  to 
settle  his  differences  with  England  and  Sweden,  and 
assuring  him  of  help.  Whereupon  the  King  replied 
(September  6th)  that  he  had  reopened  the  North  Sea 
rivers  to  British  ships  and  hoped  for  peace  and  pecuniary 
help  from  London.     He  concluded  thus  : 

"  Meanwhile,  Bonaparte  has  left  me  at  my  ease :  for  not  only  does 
he  not  enter  into  any  explanation  about  my  armaments,  but  he  has 
even  forbidden  his  Ministers  to  give  and  receive  any  explanations 
whatever.  It  appears,  then,  that  it  is  I  who  am  to  take  the  initiative. 
My  troops  are  marching  on  all  sides  to  hasten  that  moment."  2 

These  last  sentences  are  the  handwriting  on  the  wall  for 
the  ancien  regime  in  Prussia.  Taking  the  bland  assurances 
of  Talleyrand  and  the  studied  indifference  of  Laforest  as 
signs  that  Napoleon  might  be  caught  off  his  guard,  Prussia 
continued  her  warlike  preparations  ;  and  in  order  to  gain 
time  Lucchesini  was  recalled  and  replaced  by  an  envoy  who! 
was  to  enter  into  lengthy  explanations.  The  trick  did  notj 
deceive  Napoleon,  who  on  September  3rd  had  heard  with), 
much  surprise  that  Russia  meant  to  continue  the  war. 
At  once  he  saw  the  germ  of  a  new  Coalition,  and  bent  hisji 

1  "Mems.,"  vol.  hi.,  pp.  155,  et  seq.  The  Prusso-Russian  conventiorl 
of  July,  by  which  these  Powers  mutually  guaranteed  the  integrity  o :  j 
their  States,  was  mainly  the  work  of  Hardenberg. 

2  Bailleu,  pp.  540-552.    See  too  Fournier's  "  Napoleon,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  106 


xxv  THE   FALL   OF   PRUSSIA  81 

energies  to  the  task  of  conciliating  Austria,  and  of  foment- 
ing the  disputes  between  Russia  and  Turkey.  Towards 
Frederick  William  his  tone  was  that  of  a  friend  who 
grieves  at  an  unexpected  quarrel.  How  —  he  exclaimed 
to  Lucchesini  on  the  ambassador's  departure  —  how  could 
the  King  credit  him  with  encouraging  the  intrigues  of  a 
fussy  ambassador  at  Cassel  or  the  bluster  of  Murat  ? 

As  for  Hanover,  he  had  intended  sending  some  one  to 
Berlin  to  propose  an  equivalent  for  it  in  case  England  still 
made  its  restitution  a  sine  qud  non  of  peace.  "  But,"  he 
added,  "  if  your  young  officers  and  your  women  at  Berlin 
want  war,  I  am  preparing  to  satisfy  them.  Yet  my  am- 
bition turns  wholly  to  Italy.  She  is  a  mistress  whose 
favours  I  will  share  with  no  one.  I  will  have  all  the 
Adriatic.  The  Pope  shall  be  my  vassal,  and  I  will  con- 
quer Sicily.  On  North  Germany  I  have  no  claims  :  I  do 
not  object  to  the  Hanse  towns  entering  your  confederation. 
As  to  the  inclusion  of  Saxony  in  it,  my  mind  is  not  yet 
made  up."1 

Indeed,  the  tenor  of  his  private  correspondence  proves 
that  before  the  first  week  of  September  he  did  not  expect 
a  new  Coalition.  He  believed  that  England  and  Russia 
would  give  way  before  him,  and  that  Prussia  would  never 
dare  to  stir.  For  the  Court  of  Berlin  he  had  a  sovereign 
contempt,  as  for  the  "  old  coalition  machines  "  in  general. 
His  conduct  of  affairs  at  this  time  betokens,  not  so  much 
desire  for  war  as  lack  of  imagination  where  other  persons' 
susceptibilities  are  concerned.  It  is  probable  that  he  then 
wanted  peace  with  England  and  peace  on  the  Continent; 
for  his  diplomacy  won  conquests  fully  as  valuable  as  the 
booty  of  his  sword,  and  only  in  a  naval  peace  could  he  lay 
(the  foundations  of  that  oriental  empire  which,  he  assured 
O'Meara  at  St.  Helena,  held  the  first  place  in  his  thoughts 
after  the  overthrow  of  Austria.  But  it  was  not  in  his 
hature  to  make  the  needful  concessions.  "  I must  follow 
\ny  policy  in  a  geometrical  line"  he  said  to  Lucchesini. 
pngland  might  have  Hanover  and  a  few  colonies  if  she 
ivould  let  Sicily  go  to  a  Bonaparte  :  as  for  Prussia,  she 
i bight  absorb  half-a-dozen  neighbouring  princelings. 

i   J  Bailleu,  pp.  556-557.      So  too  Napoleon's  letter  of  September  5th  to 
jerthier  is  tlie  first  hint  of  his  thought  of  a  Continental  war. 

VOL.  II  —  G 


82  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

That  is  the  gist  of  Napoleon's  European  policy  in  the 
summer  of  1806  ;  and  the  surprise  which  he  expressed  to 
Mollien  at  the  rejection  of  his  offers  is  probably  genuine. 
Sensitive  to  the  least  insult  himself,  his  bluntness  of  per- 
ception respecting  the  honour  of  others  might  almost 
qualify  him  to  rank  with  Aristotle's  man  devoid  of  feel- 
ing. It  is  perfectly  true  that  he  did  not  make  war  on 
Prussia  in  1806  any  more  than  on  England  in  1803.  He 
only  made  peace  impossible.1 

The  condition  on  which  Prussia  now  urgently  insisted 
was  the  entire  evacuation  of  Germany  by  French  troops. 
This  Napoleon  refused  to  concede  until  Frederick  Will- 
iam demobilized  his  army,  a  step  that  would  have  once 
more  humbled  him  in  the  eyes  of  his  people.  It  might 
even  have  led  to  his  dethronement.  For  an  incident 
had  just  occurred  in  Bavaria  that  fanned  German  senti- 
ment to  a  flame.  A  bookseller  of  Nuremberg,  named 
Palm,  was  proved  by  French  officers  to  have  sold  an 
anonymous  pamphlet  entitled  "  Germany  in  her  deep 
Humiliation."  It  was  by  no  means  of  a  revolutionary 
type,  and  the  worthy  man  believed  it  to  be  a  mistake 
when  he  was  arrested  by  the  military  authorities.  He 
was  wrong.  Napoleon  had  sent  orders  that  a  terrible 
example  must  be  made  in  order  to  stop  the  sale  of  patri- 
otic German  pamphlets.  Palm  was  therefore  haled  away 
to  Braunau,  an  Austrian  town  then  held  by  French  troops, 
was  tried  by  martial  law  and  shot  (August  25th).  Never 
did  the  Emperor  commit  a  greater  blunder.  The  out- 
rage sent  a  thrill  of  indignation  through  the  length  and 
breadth  of  Germany.  Instead  of  quenching,  it  inflamed 
the  national  sentiment,  and  thus  rendered  doubly  difficult 
any  peaceful  compromise  between  Frederick  William  and 
Napoleon.  The  latter  was  now  looked  upon  as  a  tyrant 
by  the  citizen  class  which  his  reforms  were  designed  to 
conciliate :  and  Frederick  William  became  almost  the 
champion  of  Germany  when  he  demanded  the  withdrawal 
of  the  French  troops. 

Unfortunately,  the  King  refused  to  appoint  Ministers 

1  Queen  Louisa  said  to  Gentz  (October  9th)  that  war  had  been  decided 
on,  not  owing  to  selfish  calculations,  but  the  sentiment  of  honour  (Garden, 
"Traites,"  vol.  x.,  p.  133). 


xxv  THE   FALL   OF   PRUSSIA  83 

who  inspired  confidence.  With  Hardenberg  in  place  of 
Haugwitz,  men  would  have  felt  sure  that  the  sword 
would  not  again  be  tamely  sheathed ;  great  efforts  were 
made  to  effect  this  change,  but  met  with  a  chilling  repulse 
from  the  King.1  It  is  true  that  Haugwitz  and  Bey  me 
now  expressed  the  bitterest  hatred  of  Napoleon,  as  well 
they  might  for  a  man  who  had  betrayed  their  confidence. 
But,  none  the  less,  the  King's  refusal  to  change  his  men 
along  with  his  policy  was  fatal.  Both  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  London  no  trust  was  felt  in  Prussia  as  long  as  Haug- 
witz was  at  the  helm.  The  man  who  had  twice  steered 
the  ship  of  state  under  Napoleon's  guns  might  do  it  again  ; 
and  both  England  and  Russia  waited  to  see  some  irrevo- 
cable step  taken  before  they  again  risked  an  army  for  that 
prince  of  waverers. 

Grenville  rather  tardily  sent  Lord  Morpeth  to  arrange 
an  alliance,  but  only  after  he  should  receive  a  solemn 
pledge  that  Hanover  would  be  restored.  That  envoy 
approached  the  Prussian  headquarters  just  in  time  to  be 
swept  away  in  the  torrent  of  fugitives  from  Jena.  As  for 
Russia,  she  had  awaited  the  arrival  of  a  Prussian  officer 
at  St.  Petersburg  to  concert  a  plan  of  campaign.  When 
he  arrived  he  had  no  plan ;  and  the  Czar,  perplexed  by 
the  fatuity  of  his  ally,  and  the  hostility  of  the  Turks, 
refused  to  march  his  troops  forthwith  into  Prussia.2 
Equally  disappointing  was  the  conduct  of  Austria.  This 
Power,  bleeding  from  the  wounds  of  last  year  and  smart- 
ing under  the  jealousy  of  Russia,  refused  to  move  until 
the  allies  had  won  a  victory.  And  so,  thanks  to  the 
jealousies  of  the  old  monarchies,  Frederick  William  had 
no  Russian  or  Austrian  troops  at  his  side,  no  sinews  of 
war  from  London  to  invigorate  his  preparations,  when  he 
staked  his  all  in  the  high  places  of  Thuringia.  He  gained, 
it  is  true,  the  support  of  Saxony  and  Weimar ;  but  this 
brought  less  than  21,000  men  to  his  side. 

1  A  memorial  was  handed  in  to  him  on  September  2nd.  It  was  signed 
by  the  King's  brothers,  Henry  and  William,  also  by  the  leader  of  the  war- 
like party,  Prince  Louis  Ferdinand,  by  Generals  Riichel  and  Phull,  and 
by  the  future  dictator,  Stein.  The  King  rebuked  all  of  them.  See  Pertz, 
"  Stein,"  vol.  i.,  p.  347. 

2"F.  0.,"  Russia,  No.  64.  Stuart's  despatches  of  September  30th 
and  October  21st. 


84  THE   LITE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

On  the  other  hand,  Napoleon,  as  Protector  of  the  Rhen- 
ish Confederation,  secured  the  aid  of  25,000  South  Ger- 
mans, as  well  as  an  excellent  fortified  base  at  Wurzburg. 
His  troops,  holding  the  citadels  of  Passau  and  Braunau 
on  the  Austrian  frontier,  kept  the  Hapsburgs  quiet ;  and 
60,000  French  and  Dutch  troops  at  Wesel  menaced  the 
Prussians  in  Hanover.  Above  all,  his  forces  already  in 
Germany  were  strengthened  until,  in  the  early  days  of 
October,  some  200,000  men  were  marching  from  the 
Main  towards  the  Duchy  of  Weimar.  Soult  and  Ney  led 
60,000  men  from  Amberg  towards  Baireuth  and  Hof: 
Bernadotte  and  Davoust,  with  90,000,  marched  towards 
Schleitz,  while  Lannes  and  Augereau,  with  46,000,  moved 
by  a  road  further  to  the  left  towards  Saalfeld. 

The  progress  of  these  dense  columns  near  together  and 
through  a  hilly  country  presented  great  difficulties,  which 
only  the  experience  of  the  officers,  the  energy  and  patience 
of  the  men,  and  the  genius  of  their  great  leader,  could 
overcome.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  quietly  left  Paris 
on  September  25th.  Travelling  at  his  usual  rapid  rate, 
he  reached  Mainz  on  the  28th  :  he  was  at  Wurzburg  on 
October  2nd  ;  there  he  directed  the  operations,  confident 
that  the  impact  of  his  immense  force  would  speedily  break 
the  Prussians,  drive  them  down  the  valley  of  the  Saale 
and  thus  detach  the  Elector  of  Saxony  from  an  alliance 
that  already  was  irksome. 

The  French,  therefore,  had  a  vast  mass  of  seasoned 
fighters,  a  good  base  of  operations,  and  a  clear  plan  of 
attack.  The  Prussians,  on  the  contrary,  could  muster 
barely  128,000  men,  including  the  Saxons,  for  service  in 
the  field  ;  and  of  these  27,000  with  Riichel  were  on  the 
frontier  of  Hesse-Cassel  seeking  to  assure  the  alliance  of 
the  Elector.  The  commander-in-chief  was  the  septuage- 
narian Duke  of  Brunswick,  well  known  for  his  failure  at 
Valmy  in  1792  and  his  recent  support  to  the  policy  of 
complaisance  to  France.  His  appointment  aroused  anger 
and  consternation  ;  and  General  Kalckreuth  expressed  to 
Gentz  the  general  opinion  when  he  said  that  the  Duke 
was  quite  incompetent  for  such  a  command :  "  His  char- 
acter is  not  strong  enough,  his  mediocrity,  irresolution, 
and  untrust worthiness  would  ruin  the  best  undertaking." 


xxv  THE  FALL  OF  PRUSSIA  85 

The  Duke  himself  was  aware  of  his  incompetence.  Wiry, 
then,  we  ask,  did  he  accept  the  command  ?  The  answer 
is  startling  ;  but  it  rests  on  the  evidence  of  General  von 
Muffling  : 

"  The  Duke  of  Brunswick  had  accepted  the  command  in  order  to 
avert  war.  I  can  affirm  this  with  perfect  certainty,  since  I  have  heard 
it  from  his  own  lips  more  than  once.  He  was  fully  aware  of  the  weak- 
nesses of  the  Prussian  army  and  the  incompetence  of  its  officers."  * 

Thus  there  was  seen  the  strange  sight  of  a  diffident,  peace- 
loving  King  accompanying  the  army  and  sharing  in  all 
the  deliberations  ;  while  these  were  nominally  presided 
over  by  a  despondent  old  man  who  still  intrigued  to  pre- 
serve peace,  and  shifted  on  to  the  King  the  responsibility 
of  every  important  act.  And  yet  there  were  able  gen- 
erals who  could  have  acted  with  effect,  even  if  they  fell 
short  of  the  opinion  hopefully  bruited  by  General  Riichel, 
that  "several  were  equal  to  M.  de  Bonaparte."  Events 
were  to  prove  that  Gneisenau,  Scharnhorst,  and  Blucher 
rivalled  the  best  of  the  French  Marshals  ;  but  in  this  war 
their  lights  were  placed  under  bushels  and  only  shone 
forth  when  the  official  covers  had  been  shattered.  Scharn- 
horst, already  renowned  for  his  strategic  and  administra- 
tive genius,  took  part  in  some  of  the  many  councils  of  war 
where  everything  was  discussed  and  little  was  decided  ; 
but  his  opinion  had  no  weight,  for  on  October  7th  he 
wrote :  "  What  we  ought  to  do  I  know  right  well,  what 
we  shall  do  only  the  gods  know."2  He  evidently  referred 
to  the  need  of  concentration.  At  that  time  the  thin 
Prussian  lines  were  spread  out  over  a  front  of  eighty-five 
miles,  the  Saxons  being  near  Gera,  the  chief  army,  under 
Brunswick,  at  Erfurth,  while  Riichel  was  so  far  distant 
on  the  west  that  he  could  only  come  up  at  Jena  just  one 
hour  too  late  to  avert  disaster. 

And  yet  with  these  weak  and  scattered  forces,  Prince 
Hohenlohe  proposed  a  bold  move  forward  to  the  Main. 
Brunswick,  on  the  other  hand,  counselled  a  prudent  de- 
fensive ;  but  he  could  not,  or  would  not,  enforce  his  plan  ; 
and  the  result  was  an  oscillation  between  the  two  extremes. 

1  Muffling,  "  Aus  meinem  Leben." 

8  Lettow-Vorbeck,  "  Der  Krieg  von  1806-7,"  p.  163. 


86  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Had  lie  massed  all  his  forces  so  as  to  command  the  valleys 
of  the  Saale  and  Elster  near  Jena  and  Gera,  the  campaign 
might  possibly  have  been  prolonged  until  the  Russians 
came  up.  As  it  was,  the  allies  dulled  the  ardour  of  their 
troops  by  marches,  counter-marches,  and  interminable 
councils-of-war,  while  Napoleon's  columns  were  threading 
their  way  along  those  valleys  at  the  average  rate  of  fifteen 
miles  a  day,  in  order  to  turn  the  allied  left  and  cut  the 
connection  between  Prussia  and  Saxony.1 

The  first  serious  fighting  was  on  October  the  10th  at 
Saalfeld,  where  Prince  Louis  Ferdinand  of  Prussia  with  a 
small  force  sought  to  protect  Hohenlohe's  flank  march 
westwards  on  Jena.  The  task  was  beyond  the  strength 
even  of  this  flower  of  Prussian  chivalry.  He  was  over- 
powered by  the  weight  and  vigour  of  Lannes'  attack,  and 
when  already  wounded  in  a  cavalry  melSe  was  pierced 
through  the  body  by  an  officer  to  whom  he  proudly  re- 
fused to  surrender.  The  death  of  this  hero,  the  "  Alci- 
biades"  of  Prussia,  cast  a  gloom  over  the  whole  army,  and 
mournful  faces  at  headquarters  seemed  to  presage  yet 
worse  disasters.  Perhaps  it  was  some  inkling  of  this  dis- 
couragement, or  a  laudable  desire  to  stop  "  an  impolitic 
war,"  that  urged  Napoleon  two  days  later  to  pen  a  letter 
to  the  King  of  Prussia  urging  him  to  make  peace  before 
he  was  crushed,  as  he  assuredly  would  be.  In  itself  the 
letter  seems  admirable — until  one  remembers  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case.  The  King  had  pledged  his  word  to 
the  Czar  to  make  war  ;  if,  therefore,  he  now  made  peace 
and  sent  the  Russians  back,  he  would  once  more  stand 
condemned  of  preferring  dishonourable  ease  to  the  noble 
hazards  of  an  affair  of  honour.  As  Napoleon  was  aware 
of  the  union  of  the  King  and  Czar,  this  letter  must  be 
regarded  as  an  attempt  to  dissolve  the  alliance  and  tarnish 
Frederick  William's  reputation.  It  was  viewed  in  that 
light  by  that  monarch  ;  and  there  is  not  a  hint  in  Napo- 
leon's other  letters  that  he  really  expected  peace. 

He  was  then  at  Gera,  pushing  forward  his  corps  towards 
Naumburg  so  as  to  cut  off  the  Prussians  from  Saxony  and 

1  See  Prince  Hohenlohe's  "Letters  on  Strategy  "  (p.  62,  Eng.  ed.)  for 
the  effect  of  this  rapid  marching  ;  Foucart's  "  Campagne  de  Prusse,"  vol 
i.,  pp.  323-343  ;  also  Lord  Fitzmaurice's  "  Duke  of  Brunswick." 


xxv  THE   FALL   OF   PRUSSIA  87 

the  Elbe.  Great  as  was  his  superiority,  these  movements 
occasioned  such  a  dispersion  of  his  forces  as  to  invite  attack 
from  enterprising  foes ;  but  he  despised  the  Prussian 
generals  as  imbeciles,  and  endeavoured  to  unsteady  their 
rank  and  file  by  seizing  and  burning  their  military  stores 
at  the  latter  town.  He  certainly  believed  that  they  were 
all  in  retreat  northwards,  and  great  was  his  surprise  when 
he  heard  from  Lannes  early  on  October  13th  that  his 
scouts,  after  scaling  the  hills  behind  Jena  in  a  dense  mist, 
had  come  upon  the  Prussian  army.  The  news  was  only 
partly  correct.  It  was  only  Hohenlohe's  corps  :  for  the 
bulk  of  that  army,  under  Brunswick,  was  retreating  north- 
wards, and  nearly  stumbled  upon  the  corps  of  Davoust  and 
Bernadotte  behind  Naumburg. 

Lannes  also  was  in  danger  on  the  Landgrafenberg. 
This  is  a  lofty  hill  which  towers  above  the  town  of  Jena 
and  the  narrow  winding  vale  of  the  Saale  ;  while  its  other 
slopes,  to  the  north  and  west,  rise  above  and  dominate  the 
broken  and  irregular  plateau  on  which  Hohenlohe's  force 
was  encamped.  Had  the  Prussians  attacked  his  weary 
regiments  in  force,  they  might  easily  have  hurled  them 
into  the  Saale.  But  Hohenlohe  had  received  orders  to 
retire  northwards  in  the  rear  of  Brunswick,  as  soon  as 
he  had  rallied  the  detachment  of  Ruchel  near  Weimar, 
and  was  therefore  indisposed  to  venture  on  the  bold 
offensive  which  now  was  his  only  means  of  safety.  The 
respite  thus  granted  was  used  by  the  French  to  hurry 
every  available  regiment  up  the  slopes  north  and  west  of 
Jena.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  Napoleon  himself  ascended 
the  Landgrafenberg  to  survey  the  plateau  ;  while  a  pastor 
of  the  town  was  compelled  to  show  a  path  further  north 
which  leads  to  the  same  plateau  through  a  gulley  called 
the  Rau-thal.1 

On  the  south  the  heights  sink  away  into  a  wider  valley, 
the  Miihl-thal,  along  which  runs  the  road  to  Weimar  ; 
and  on  this  side  too  their  wooded  brows  are  broken  by 
gulleys,  up  one  of  which  runs  a  winding  track  known  as 
the  Sclmecke  or  Snail.  Villages  and  woods  diversified 
(the  plateau  and  hindered  the  free  use  of  that  extended 
jline  formation  on  which  the  Prussians  relied,  while  favour- 

1  Hopfner,  vol.  i.,  p.  383  ;  and  Lettow-Vorbeck,  vol.  i.,  p.  345. 


88 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I 


CHAP. 


ing  the  operations  of  dense  columns  preceded  by  clouds 
of  skirmishers  by  which  Napoleon  so  often  hewed  his  way 
to  victory.  His  greatest  advantage,  however,  lay  in  the 
ignorance  of  his  foes.  Hohenlohe,  believing  that  he  was 
confronted  only  by  Lannes'  corps,  took  little  thought 
about  what  was  going  on  in  his  front,  and  judging  the 
Muhl-thal  approach  alone  to  be  accessible,  posted  his  chief 
force  on  this  side.  So  insufficient  a  guard  was  therefore 
kept  on  the  side  of  the  Landgrafenberg  that  the  French, 
under  cover  of  the  darkness,  not  only  crowned  the  summit 


btanforcU  Gr&jnapk  £sfa6r,  London 

densely  with  troops,  but  dragged  up  whole  batteries  of 
cannon. 

The  toil  was  stupendous:  in  one  of  the  steep  hollow 
tracks  a  number  of  cannon  and  wagons  stuck  fast  ;  but 
the  Emperor,  making  his  rounds  at  midnight,  brought  the 
magic  of  his  presence  to  aid  the  weary  troops  and  rebuke 
the  officers  whose  negligence  had  caused  this  block.  Lan- 
tern in  hand,  he  went  up  and  down  the  line  to  direct  the 
work  ;  and  Savary,  who  saw  this  scene,  noted  the  wonder 
of  the  men,  as  they  caught  sight  of  the  Emperor,  the 
renewed  energy  of  their  blows  at  the  rocks,  and  their 


xxv  THE   FALL   OF   PRUSSIA  89 

whispers  of  surprise  that  he  should  come  in  persou  when 
their  officers  were  asleep.  The  night  was  far  spent  when, 
after  seeing  the  first  wagon  right  through  the  narrow 
steep,  he  repaired  to  his  bivouac  amidst  his  Guards  on  the 
summit,  and  issued  further  orders  before  snatching  a  brief 
repose.  By  such  untiring  energy  did  he  assure  victory. 
Apart  from  its  immense  effect  on  the  spirits  of  his  troops, 
his  vigilance  reaped  a  rich  reward.  Jena  was  won  by  a 
rapid  concentration  of  troops,  and  the  prompt  seizure  of  a 
commanding  position  almost  under  the  eyes  of  an  unenter- 
prising enemy.  The  corps  of  Soult  and  Ney  spent  most 
of  the  night  and  early  morning  in  marching  towards  Jena 
and  taking  up  their  positions  on  the  right  or  north  wing, 
while  Lannes  and  the  Guard  held  the  central  height,  and 
Augereau's  corps  in  the  Miihl-thal  threatened  the  Saxons 
and  Prussians  guarding  the  Schnecke.1 

A  dense  fog  screened  the  moves  of  the  assailants  early 
on  the  morrow,  and,  after  some  confused  but  obstinate 
fighting,  the  French  secured  their  hold  on  the  plateau  not 
only  above  the  town  of  Jena,  where  their  onset  took  the 
Prussians  by  surprise,  but  also  above  the  Miihl-thal,  where 
the  enemy  were  in  force. 

By  ten  o'clock  the  fog  lifted,  and  the  warm  rays  of  the 
autumn  sun  showed  the  dense  masses  of  the  French  ad- 
vancing towards  the  middle  of  the  plateau.  Hohenlohe 
now  saw  the  full  extent  of  his  error  and  despatched  an 
urgent  message  to  Ruchel  for  aid.  It  was  too  late.  The 
French  centre,  led  by  Lannes,  began  to  push  back  the 
Prussian  lines  on  the  village  named  Vierzehn  Heiligen. 
It  was  in  vain  that  Hohenlohe's  choice  squadrons  flung 
themselves  on  the  serried  masses  in  front :  the  artillery 
and  musketry  fire  disordered  them,  while  French  dragoons 
were  ready  to  profit  by  their  confusion.  The  village  was 
lost,  then  retaken  by  a  rally  of  the  Prussians,  then  lost 
again  when  Ney  was  reinforced ;  and  when  the  full 
vigour  of  the  French  attack  was  developed  by  the  advance 
of  Soult  and  Augereau  on  either  wing,  Napoleon  launched 
his  reserves,  his  Guard,  and  Murat's  squadrons  on  the  dis- 
ordered lines.  The  impact  was  irresistible,  and  Hohen- 
lohe's force  was  swept  away.     Then  it  was  that  Ruchel's 

iFoucart,  op.  cit.,  pp.  606-623. 


90  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

force  drew  near,  and  strove  to  stem  the  rout.  Advancing 
steadily,  as  if  on  parade,  his  troops  for  a  brief  space  held 
up  the  French  onset ;  but  neither  the  dash  of  the  Prussian 
horse  nor  the  bravery  of  the  foot-soldiers  could  dam  that 
mighty  tide,  which  laid  low  the  gallant  leader  and  swept 
his  lines  away  into  the  general  wreck.1 

In  the  headlong  flight  before  Murat's  horsemen,  the 
fugitives  fell  in  with  another  beaten  army,  that  of 
Brunswick.  At  Jena  the  Prussians,  if  defeated,  were  not 
disgraced :  before  the  first  shot  was  fired  their  defeat  was 
a  mathematical  certainty.  At  the  crisis  of  the  battle  they 
had  but  47,400  men  at  hand,  while  Napoleon  then  dis- 
posed of  83,600  combatants.2  But  at  Auerstadt  they  were 
driven  back  and  disgraced.  There  they  had  a  decided 
superiority  in  numbers,  having  more  than  35,000  of  their 
choicest  troops,  while  opposite  to  them  stood  only  the 
27,000  men  of  Davoust's  corps. 

Hitherto  Davoust  had  been  remarkable  rather  for  his 
dog-like  devotion  to  Napoleon  than  for  any  martial  genius  ; 
and  the  brilliant  Marmont  had  openly  scoffed  at  his  receiv- 
ing the  title  of  Marshal.  But,  under  his  quiet  exterior 
and  plodding  habits,  there  lay  concealed  a  variety  of  gifts 
which  only  needed  a  great  occasion  to  shine  forth  and 
astonish  the  world.3  The  time  was  now  at  hand.  Fred- 
erick William  and  Brunswick  were  marching  from  Auer- 
stadt to  make  good  their  retreat  on  the  Elbe,  when  their 
foremost  horsemen,  led  by  the  gallant  Bliicher,  saw  a  solid 
wall  of  French  infantry  loom  through  the  morning  fog. 
It  was  part  of  Davoust's  corps,  strongly  posted  in  and 
around  the  village  of  Hassenhausen. 

1  Marbot  says  Riichel  was  killed :  but  he  recovered  from  his  wound, 
and  did  good  service  the  next  spring. 

Vernet's  picture  of  Napoleon  inspecting  his  Guards  at  Jena  before  their 
charge  seems  to  represent  the  well-known  incident  of  a  soldier  calling  out 
"  en  avant  "  ;  whereupon  Napoleon  sharply  turned  and  bade  the  man  wait 
till  he  had  commanded  in  twenty  battles  before  he  gave  him  advice. 

2  Foucart,  p.  671. 

8  Lang  thus  describes  four  French  Marshals  whom  he  saw  at  Ansbach : 
"  Bernadotte,  a  very  tall  dark  man,  with  fiery  eyes  under  thick  brows; 
Mortier,  still  taller,  with  a  stupid  sentinel  look  ;  Lefebvre,  an  old  Alsatian 
camp-boy,  with  his  wife,  former  washer-woman  to  the  regiment;  and 
Davoust,  a  little,  smooth-pated,  unpretending  man,  who  was  never  tired 
of  waltzing." 


xxv  THE   FALL  OF  PRUSSIA  91 

At  once  Blucher  charged,  only  to  be  driven  back  with 
severe  loss.  Again  he  came  on,  this  time  supported  by 
infantry  and  cannon  :  again  he  was  repulsed ;  for  Davoust, 
aided  by  the  fog,  had  seized  the  neighbouring  heights 
which  commanded  the  high-road,  and  held  them  with  firm 
grip.  Determined  to  brush  "aside  or  crush  this  stubborn 
foe,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  now  led  heavy  masses  along 
the  narrow  defile  ;  but  the  steady  fire  of  the  French  laid 
him  low,  with  most  of  the  officers ;  and  as  the  Prussians 
fell  back,  Davoust  swung  forward  his  men  to  threaten  their 
flanks.  The  King  was  dismayed  at  these  repeated  checks, 
and  though  the  Prussian  reserves  under  Kalckreuth  could 
have  been  called  up  to  overwhelm  the  hard-pressed  French 
by  the  weight  of  numbers,  yet  he  judged  it  better  to  draw 
off  his  men  and  fall  back  on  Hohenlohe  for  support. 

But  what  a  support !  Instead  of  an  army,  it  was  a 
terrified  mob  flying  before  Murat's  sabres,  that  met  them 
half-way  between  Auerstadt  and  Weimar.  Threatened 
also  by  Bernadotte's  corps  on  their  left  flank,  the  two 
Prussian  armies  now  melted  away  in  one  indistinguishable 
torrent  that  was  stemmed  only  by  the  sheltering  walls  of 
Erfurt,  Magdeburg,  and  of  fortresses  yet  more  remote. 

Of  the  twin  battles  of  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  the  latter 
was  unquestionably  the  more  glorious  for  the  French  arms. 
That  Napoleon  should  have  beaten  an  army  of  little  more 
than  half  his  numbers  is  in  no  way  remarkable.  What  is 
strange  is  that  so  consummate  a  leader  should  have  been 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  distribution  of  the  enemy's  forces, 
and  should  have  left  Davoust  with  only  27,000  men  ex- 
posed to  the  attack  of  Brunswick  with  nearly  40,000. 1 
In  his  bulletins,  as  in  the  "  Relation  Officielle,"  the  Em- 
peror sought  to  gloze  over  his  error  by  magnifying  Hohen- 
lohe's  corps  into  a  great  army  and  attenuating  Davoust's 
splendid  exploit,  which  in  his  private  letters  he  warmly 
praised.  The  fact  is,  he  had  made  all  his  dispositions  in 
the  belief  that  he  had  the  main  body  of  the  Prussians 
before  him  at  Jena. 

That  is  why,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  13th,  he  hastily 

1  Davoust,  "Operations  du  3me  Corps,"  pp.  SI,  32.  French  writers  re- 
duce their  force  to  24,000,  and  raise  Brunswick's  total  to  60,000.  Leh- 
mann's  "Scharnhorst,"  vol.  i.,  p.  433,  gives  the  details. 


92  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

sent  to  recall  Murat's  horse  and  Bernadotte's  corps  from 
Nauniburg  and  its  vicinity  ;  and  in  consequence  Berna- 
dotte  took  no  very  active  part  in  the  fighting.  For  this 
he  has  been  bitterly  blamed,  on  the  strength  of  an  asser- 
tion that  Napoleon  during  the  night  of  the  13th-14th  sent 
him  an  order  to  support  Davoust.  This  order  has  never 
been  produced,  and  it  finds  no  place  in  the  latest  and  full- 
est collection  of  French  official  despatches,  which,  how- 
ever, contains  some  that  fully  exonerate  Bernadotte.1 
Unfortunately  for  Bernadotte's  fame,  the  tattle  of  memoir- 
writers  is  more  attractive  and  gains  more  currency  than 
the  prosaic  facts  of  despatches. 

Fortune  plays  an  immense  part  in  warfare  ;  and  never 
did  she  favour  the  Emperor  more  than  on  October  the  14th, 
1806.  Fortune  and  the  skill  and  bravery  of  Davoust  and 
his  corps  turned  what  might  have  been  an  almost  doubt- 
ful conflict  into  an  overwhelming  victory.  Though  Na- 
poleon was  as  ignorant  of  the  movements  of  Brunswick  as 
he  was  of  the  flank  march  of  Bliicher  at  Waterloo,  yet  the 
enterprise  and  tenacity  of  Davoust  and  Lannes  yielded 
him,  on  the  Thuringian  heights,  a  triumph  scarcely  par- 
alleled in  the  annals  of  war.  It  is  difficult  to  overpraise 
those  Marshals  for  the  energy  with  which  they  clung  to 
the  foe  and  brought  on  a  battle  under  conditions  highly 
favourable  to  the  French  :  without  their  efforts,  the  Prus- 
sian army  could  never  have  been  shattered  on  a  single  day. 

The  flood  of  invasion  now  roared  down  the  Thuringian 
valleys  and  deluged  the  plains  of  Saxony  and  Branden- 
burg. Rivers  and  ramparts  were  alike  helpless  to  stay 
that  all-devouring  tide.  On  October  the  16th,  16,000 
men  surrendered  at  Erfurt  to  Murat :  then,  spurring  east- 
ward, le  beau  sabreur  rushed  on  the  wreck  of  Hohenlohe's 
force,  and  with  the  aid  of  Lannes'  untiring  corps  com- 
pelled it  to  surrender  at  Prenzlau.2     Bliicher  meanwhile 

1  Foucart,  pp.  604-606,  070,  and  694-697,  who  only  blames  him  for 
slowness.  But  he  set  out  from  Naumburg  before  dawn,  and,  though  de- 
layed by  difficult  tracks,  was  near  Apolda  at  4  p.m.,  and  took  1,000 
prisoners. 

2  For  this  service,  as  for  his  exploits  at  Austerlitz,  Napoleon  gave  few 
words  of  praise.  Lannes'  remonstrance  is  printed  by  General  Thoumas, 
"Le  Marshal  Lannes,"  p.  169.  The  Emperor  secretly  disliked  Lannes 
for  his  very  independent  bearing. 


xxv  THE  FALL  OF  PRUSSIA  93 

stubbornly  retreated  to  the  north  ;  but,  with  Murat,  Soult, 
and  Bernadotte  dogging  his  steps,  he  finally  threw  himself 
into  Liibeck,  where,  after  a  last  desperate  effort,  he  surren- 
dered to  overpowering  numbers  (November  7th). 

Here  the  gloom  of  defeat  was  relieved  by  gleams  of 
heroism  ;  but  before  the  walls  of  other  Prussian  strong- 
holds disaster  was  blackened  by  disgrace.  Held  by  timid 
old  men  or  nerveless  pedants,  they  scarcely  waited  for  a 
vigorous  attack.  A  few  cannon-shots,  or  even  a  demon- 
stration of  cavalry,  generally  brought  out  the  white  flag. 
In  quick  succession,  Spandau,  Stettin,  Kustrin,  Magde- 
burg, and  Hameln  opened  their  gates,  the  governor  of  the 
last-named  being  mainly  concerned  about  securing  his 
future  retiring  pension  from  the  French  as  soon  as  Han- 
over passed  into  their  keeping. 

Amidst  these  shameful  surrenders  the  capital  fell  into 
the  hands  of  Davoust  (October  25th).  Varnhagen  von 
Ense  had  described  his  mingled  surprise  and  admiration 
at  seeing  those  "lively,  impudent,  mean-looking  little  fel- 
lows," who  had  beaten  the  splendid  soldiers  trained  in  the 
school  of  Frederick  the  Great.  His  wonder  was  natural  ; 
but  all  who  looked  beneath  the  surface  well  knew  that 
Prussia  was  overthrown  before  the  first  shot  was  fired. 
She  was  the  victim  of  a  deadening  barrack  routine,  of 
official  apathy  or  corruption,  and  of  a  degrading  policy 
which  dulled  the  enthusiasm  of  her  sons. 

Thirteen  days  after  the  great  battle,  Napoleon  himself 
entered  Berlin  in  triumph.  It  was  the  first  time  that  he 
allowed  himself  a  victor's  privilege,  and  no  pains  were 
spared  to  impress  the  imagination  of  mankind  by  a  parade 
of  his  choicest  troops.  First  came  the  foot  grenadiers  and 
chasseurs  of  the  Imperial  Guard  :  behind  the  central 
group  marched  other  squadrons  and  battalions  of  these 
veterans,  already  famed  as  the  doughtiest  fighters  of  their 
age.  In  their  midst  came  the  mind  of  this  military  ma- 
chine—  Napoleon,  accompanied  by  three  Marshals  and  a 
brilliant  staff.  Among  them  men  noted  the  plain,  soldier- 
like Berthier,  the  ever  trusty  and  methodical  chief  of  the 
staff.  At  his  side  rode  Davoust,  whose  round  and  placid 
face  gave  little  promise  of  his  rapid  rush  to  the  front  rank 
among  the  French  paladins.    There  too  was  the  tall,  hand- 


94  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxv 

some,  threatening  form  of  Augereau,  whose  services  at 
Jena,  meritorious  as  they  were,  scarcely  maintained  his 
fame  at  the  high  level  to  which  it  soared  at  Castiglione. 
Then  came  Napoleon's  favourite  aide-de-camp,  Duroc,  a 
short,  stern,  war-hardened  man,  well  known  in  Berlin, 
where  twice  he  had  sought  to  rivet  close  the  bonds  of  the 
French  alliance. 

Above  all,  the  gaze  of  the  awe-struck  crowd  was  fixed 
on  the  figure  of  the  chief,  now  grown  to  the  roundness  of 
robust  health  amidst  toils  that  would  have  worn  most 
men  to  a  shadow ;  and  on  the  face,  no  longer  thin  with 
the  unsatisfied  longings  of  youth,  but  square  and  full  with 
toil  requited  and  ambition  wellnigh  sated  —  a  visage  re- 
deemed from  the  coarseness  of  the  epicure's  only  by  the 
knitted  brows  that  bespoke  ceaseless  thought,  and  by  the 
keen,  melancholy,  unfathomable  eyes. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:    FRIEDLAND 

"  I  know  full  well  that  London  is  a  corner  of  the  world,  and  that 
Paris  is  its  centre."  —  Letter  of  Napoleon,  August  18th,  1806. 

On  the  21st  of  November,  1806,  Napoleon  issued  at  Ber- 
lin the  decree  which  proclaimed  open  and  unrelenting  war 
on  English  industry  and  commerce,  a  war  that  was  to  em- 
broil the  whole  civilized  world  and  cease  only  with  his 
overthrow.  After  reciting  his  complaints  against  the 
English  maritime  code,  he  declared  the  British  Isles  to  be 
in  a  state  of  blockade,  interdicted  all  commerce  vfith  them, 
threatened  seizure  and  imprisonment  to  English  goods  and 
subjects  wherever  found  by  French  or  allied  troops,  for- 
bade all  trade  in  English  and  colonial  wares,  and  excluded 
from  French  and  allied  ports  any  ship  that  had  touched  at 
those  of  Great  Britain  ;  while  any  ship  that  connived  at 
the  infraction  of  the  present  decree  was  to  be  held  a  good 
prize  of  war.1  This  ukase,  which  was  binding  for  France, 
Italy,  Switzerland,  Holland,  and  the  Rhenish  Confedera- 
tion, formed  the  foundation  of  the  Continental  System,  a 
term  applicable  to  the  sum  total  of  the  measures  that  aimed 
at  ruining  England  by  excluding  her  goods  from  the 
Continent. 

The  plan  of  strangling  Britain  by  her  own  wealth  was 
not  peculiar  to  Napoleon.  In  common  with  much  of  his 
political  stock-in-trade  he  had  it  from  the  Jacobins,  who 
stoutly  maintained  that  England's  wealth  was  fictitious 
and  would  collapse  as  soon  as  her  commerce  was  attacked 
in  the  Indies  and  excluded  from  the  Rhine  and  Elbe.  At 
first  the  fulminations  of  Parisian  legislators  fell  idly 
on   the  stately  pile   of  British   industry  ;    but  when  the 

1  "Nap.  Corresp.,"  November  21st,  1807  ;  Baron  Lumbroso's  "Napo- 
:leone  I  e  1'  Inghilterra,"  p.  103  ;  Garden,  vol.  x.,  p.  307. 

95 


! 


96  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

young  Bonaparte  appeared  on  the  scene,  the  commercial 
warfare  became  serious.  As  soon  as  his  victories  in  Italy 
widened  the  sphere  of  French  influence,  the  Directory 
banned  the  entry  of  all  our  products,  counting  all  cotton 
and  woollen  goods  as  English  unless  the  contrary  could 
be  proved  by  certificates  of  origin.1  Public  opinion  in 
France,  which,  unless  held  in  by  an  intelligent  monarch, 
has  always  swung  towards  protection  or  prohibition, 
welcomed  that  vigorous  measure  ;  and  great  was  the  out- 
cry of  manufacturers  when  it  was  rumoured  in  1802  that 
Napoleon  was  about  to  make  a  commercial  treaty  with  the 
national  enemy.  Tradition  and  custom,  therefore,  were  all 
on  his  side,  when,  after  Trafalgar,  he  concentrated  all  his 
energy  on  his  "coast-system."2 

Ostensibly  the  Berlin  Decree  was  a  retort  to  our  Order 
in  Council  of  May  16th,  1806,  which  declared  all  the  coast 
between  Brest  and  the  Elbe  in  a  state  of  blockade  ;  and 
French  historians  have  defended  it  on  this  ground,  assert- 
ing that  it  was  a  necessary  reply  to  England's  aggressive 
action.3  But  this  plea  can  scarcely  be  maintained.  The 
aggressor,  surely,  was  the  man  who  forced  Prussia  to 
close  the  neutral  North  German  coast  to  British  goods 
(February,  1806).  Besides,  there  is  indirect  proof  that 
Napoleon  looked  on  our  blockade  of  the  northern  coasts  as 
not  unreasonable.  In  his  subsequent  negotiations  with 
us,  he  raised  no  protest  against  it,  and  made  no  difficulty 
about  our  maritime  code  :  if  we  would  let  him  seize  Sicily, 
we  might,  it  seems,  have  re-enacted  that  code  in  all  its 
earlier  stringency.  Far  from  doing  so,  Fox  and  his  suc- 
cessors relaxed  the  blockade  of  North  Germany ;  and  by 
an  order  dated  September  25th,  the  coast  between  the 
Elbe  and  the  Ems  was  declared  free. 

Napoleon's  grievance  against  us  was  thereby  materially 

1  This  decree,  of  10  Brumaire,  an  V. ,  is  printed  in  full,  and  commented 
on  by  Lumbroso,  op.  cit.,  p.  49.  See  too  Sorel,  •"  L' Europe  et  la  Re>. 
Fr.,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  389 ;  and  my  article,  "  Napoleon  and  English  Commerce," 
in  the  "  Eng.  Hist.  Rev."  of  October,  1893. 

2  This  phrase  occurs,  I  believe,  first  in  the  conversation  of  Napoleon  on 
May  1st,  1803  :  "  We  will  form  a  more  complete  coast-system,  and  Eng- 
land shall  end  by  shedding  tears  of  blood  "  (Miot  de  Melito,  "  Mems.," 
vol.  i.,  chap.  xiv.). 

8  E.g.,  Fauchille,  "  Du  Blocus  maritime,"  pp.  93  et  seq. 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:   FRIEDLAND  97 

lessened,  and  his  protest  against  fictitious  blockades  in 
the  preamble  of  the  Berlin  decree  really  applied  only  to 
our  action  on  the  coast  between  the  Helder  and  Brest, 
where  our  cruisers  were  watching  the  naval  preparations 
still  going  on.  His  report  in  the  interests  of  outraged  law 
was  certainly  curious  ;  he  declared  our  3,000  miles  of 
coast  in  a  state  of  blockade  —  a  mere  brutum  fulmen  in 
point  of  fact,  but  designed  to  give  a  show  of  legality  to 
his  Continental  System.  Yet,  apart  from  this  thin  pre- 
text, he  troubled  very  little  about  law.  Indeed,  blockade 
is  an  act  of  war  ;  and  its  application  to  this  or  that  part 
or  coast  depends  on  the  will  and  power  of  the  belligerents. 
Napoleon  frankly  recognized  that  fact ;  and,  however  much 
his  preambles  appealed  to  law,  his  conduct  was  decided 
solely  by  expediency.  When  he  wanted  peace  (along 
with  Sicily)  he  said  nothing  about  our  maritime  claims  : 
when  the  war  went  on,  he  used  them  as  a  pretext  for  an 
action  that  was  ten  times  as  stringent. 

The  gauntlet  thrown  down  by  him  at  Berlin  was 
promptly  taken  up  by  Great  Britain.  An  Order  in  Council 
of  January  7th,  1807,  forbade  neutrals  to  trade  between  the 
ports  of  France  and  her  allies,  or  between  ports  that  ob- 
served the  Berlin  decree,  under  pain  of  seizure  and  confis- 
cation of  the  ship  and  cargo.  In  return  Napoleon  issued 
from  Warsaw  (January  27th)  a  decree,  ordering  the  seiz- 
ure in  the  Hanse  Towns  of  all  English  goods  and 
colonial  produce.  By  way  of  reprisal  England  reimposed 
a  strict  blockade  on  the  North  German  coast  (March  11th) ; 
and  after  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  laid  the  Continent  at  the  feet 
of  Napoleon,  he  frankly  told  the  diplomatic  circle  at  Fon- 
tainebleau  that  he  would  no  longer  allow  any  commercial 
or  political  relations  between  the  Continent  and  England. 

"The  sea  must  be  subdued  by  the  land."  In  these 
'words  Napoleon  pithily  summed  up  his  enterprise  ;  and 
[whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  means  which  he  adopted, 
jthe  design  is  not  without  grandeur.  Granted  that  Britan- 
nia ruled  the  waves,  yet  he  ruled  the  land ;  and  the  land, 
as  the  active  fruitful  element,  must  overpower  the  barren 
sea.  Such  was  the  notion  :  it  was  fallacious,  as  will  ap- 
pear later  on ;  but  it  appealed  strongly  to  the  French 
magination  as  providing  an  infallible  means  of  humbling 

VOL.    II—    II 


98  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  traditional  foe.  Furthermore,  it  placed  in  Napoleon's 
hands  a  potent  engine  of  government,  not  only  for  assur- 
ing his  position  in  France,  but  for  extending  his  sway 
over  North  Germany  and  all  coasts  that  seemed  needful 
to  the  success  of  the  experiment. 

Indirectly  also  it  seems  to  have  fed,  without  satisfying, 
his  ever-growing  love  of  power.  Here  we  touch  on  the 
difficult  question  of  motive  ;  and  it  is  perhaps  impossible, 
except  for  dogmatists,  to  determine  whether  the  enterprises 
that  led  to  his  ruin  —  the  partition  of  Portugal,  which  slid 
easily  into  the  occupation  of  Spain,  together  with  his 
\  Moscow  adventure  —  were  prompted  by  ambition  or  by  a 
semi-fatalistic  feeling  that  they  were  necessary  to  the 
complete  triumph  of  his  Continental  System.  He  himself, 
with  a  flash  of  almost  uncanny  insight,  once  remarked  to 
Roederer  that  his  ambition  was  different  from  that  of 
other  men  :  for  they  were  slaves  to  it,  whereas  it  was 
so  interwoven  with  the  whole  texture  of  his  being  as 
to  interfere  with  no  single  process  of  thought  and  will. 
Whether  that  is  possible  is  a  question  for  psychologists 
and  casuists  ;  but  every  open-minded  student  of  Napo- 
leon's career  must  at  times  pause  in  utter  doubt,  whether 
this  or  that  act  was  prompted  by  mad  ambition,  or  fol- 
lowed naturally,  perhaps  inevitably,  from  that  world- 
embracing  postulate,  the  Continental  System. 

England  also  derived  some  secondary  advantages  from 
this  war  of  the  elements.  In  order  to  stalemate  her 
mighty  foe,  she  pushed  on  her  colonial  conquests  so  as  to 
control  the  resources  of  the  tropics,  and  thus  prevent 
that  deadly  tilting  of  the  balance  landwards  which  Napo- 
leon strove  to  effect.  And  fate  decreed  that  the  conquests 
of  English  seamen  and  settlers  were  to  be  more  enduring 
than  those  of  Napoleon's  legions.  While  the  French  were 
gaining  barren  victories  beyond  the  Vistula  and  Ebro,  our 
seamen  seized  French  and  Dutch  colonies  and  our  pioneers 
opened  up  the  interior  of  Australia  and  South  Africa. 

We  also  used  our  maritime  monopoly  to  depress  neutral 
commerce.     We  have  not  space  to  discuss  the  compl' 
question  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  in  time  of  war,  which 
would  involve  an  examination  of  the  "  rule  of  1756  "  and 
the  compromises  arrived  at  after  the  two  Armed  Neu- 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:   FKIEDLAND  99 

trality  Leagues.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  our  merchants  had 
recently  been  indignant  at  the  comparative  immunity 
enjoyed  by  neutral  ships,  and  had  pressed  for  more  vigor- 
ous action  against  such  as  traded  to  French  ports.1  Yet 
the  statement  that  our  Orders  in  Council  were  determined 
by  the  clamour  of  the  mercantile  class  is  an  exaggeration: 
they  were  reprisals  against  Napoleon's  acts,  following 
them  in  almost  geometrical  gradations.  To  his  domina- 
tion over  the  industrial  resources  of  the  Continent  we  had 
nothing  to  oppose  but  our  manufacturing  skill,  our  su- 
premacy in  the  tropics,  and  our  control  of  the  sea.  The 
methods  used  on  both  sides  were  alike  brutal,  and,  when 
carried  to  their  logical  conclusion  at  the  close  of  the  year, 
crushed  the  neutrals  between  the  upper  and  the  nether 
millstone.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  other  alternative 
was  open  to  an  insular  State  that  was  all-powerful  at  sea 
and  weak  on  land.  Our  very  existence  was  bound  up 
with  maritime  commerce  ;  and  an  abandonment  of  the 
carrying  trade  to  neutrals  would  have  been  the  tamest 
of  surrenders,  at  a  time  when  surrender  meant  political 
extinction. 

We  turn  now  to  follow  the  chief  steps  in  Napoleon's 
onward  march,  which  enabled  him  to  impose  his  system 
on  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Continent.  While  encamped  in 
the  Prussian  capital  he  decreed  the  deposition  of  the  Elec- 
tor of  Hesse-Cassel,  and  French  and  Dutch  troops  forth- 
with occupied  that  Electorate.  Towards  Saxony  he  acted 
with  politic  clemency  ;  and  on  December  11th,  1806,  the 
Elector  accepted  the  French  alliance,  entered  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine,  and  received  the  title  of  King.2 

Meanwhile  Frederick  William,  accompanied  by  his 
grief-stricken  consort,  was  striving  to  draw  together  an 
army  in  his  eastern  provinces.  Some  overtures  with  a 
view  to  peace  had  been  made  after  Jena;  but  Napoleon 

1  See  especially  the  pamphlet,  "  War  in  Disguise,  or  the  Frauds  of 
the  Neutral  Flags"  (1805),  by  J.  Stephen.  It  has  been  said  that  this 
pamphlet  was  a  cause  of  the  Orders  in  Council.  The  whole  question  is 
discussed  by  Manning,  "  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Nations"  (1875) ; 
Lawrence,  "International  Law"  ;  Mahan,  "  Infl.  of  Sea  Power,"  vol.  ii., 
pp.  274-277  ;  Mollien,  vol.  iii.,  p.  289  (1st  edit.)  ;  and  Chaptal,  p.  275. 

2  Hausser,  vol.  iii.,  p.  61  (4th  edit.).  The  Saxon  federal  contingent 
was  fixed  at  20,000  meu. 


100  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

finally  refused  to  relax  his  pursuit  unless  the  Prussians 
retired  beyond  the  Vistula,  and  yielded  up  to  him  all  the 
western  parts  of  the  kingdom,  with  their  fortresses. 
Besides,  he  let  it  be  known  that  Prussia  must  join  him  in 
a  close  alliance  against  Russia,  with  a  view  to  checking 
her  ambitious  projects  against  Turkey;  for  the  Czar,  resent- 
ing the  Sultan's  deposition  of  the  hospodars  of  the  Danu- 
bian  Principalities,  an  act  suggested  by  the  French,  had 
sent  an  armv  across  the  River  Pruth,  even  when  the  Porte 
timidly  revoked  its  objectionable  firman.1  The  Eastern 
Question  having  been  thus  reopened,  Napoleon  suggested 
a  Franco-Prussian  alliance  so  as  to  avert  a  Russian  conquest 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  But  now,  as  ever,  his  terms  to 
Prussia  were  too  exacting.  The  King  deigned  not  to 
stoop  to  such  humiliation,  but  resolved  to  stake  his  all 
on  the  courage  of  his  troops  and  the  fidelity  of  the  Czar. 

The  Russians,  though  delayed  by  their  distrust  of 
Haugwitz,  and  by  their  insensate  war  with  Turkey,  were 
now  marching,  73,000  strong,  into  Prussian  Poland,  but 
were  too  late  to  save  the  Silesian  fortresses,  most  of 
which  surrendered  to  the  French.  The  fighting  in  the 
open  also  went  against  the  allies,  though  at  Pultusk,  a 
town  north  of  Warsaw,  the  Russians  claimed  that  the  con- 
test had  been  drawn  in  their  favour. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  the  armies  went  into  winter- 
quarters.  It  was  high  time.  The  French  were  ill  sup- 
plied for  a  winter  campaign  amid  the  desolate  wastes  of 
Poland.  Snow  and  rain,  frosts  and  thaws,  had  turned  the 
wretched  tracks  into  muddy  swamps,  where  men  sank  to 
their  knees,  horses  to  their  bellies,  and  carriages  beyond 
their  axles.  The  carriage  conveying  Talleyrand  was  a 
whole  night  stuck  fast,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  ten  horses 
to  drag  it  out.  The  opinion  of  the  soldiery  on  Poland  and 
the  Poles  is  well  expressed  by  that  prince  of  raconteurs, 
Marbot  :  "  Weather  frightful,  victuals  very  scarce,  no 
wine,  beer  detestable,  water  muddy,  no  bread,  lodgings 
shared  with  cows  and  pigs.  'And  they  call  this  their 
country,'  said  our  soldiers." 

Yet  Polish  patriotism  had  been  a  mighty  power  in  the 
world;  and  Napoleon,  ever  on  the  watch   for  the  weak 

1  Papers  presented  to  Parliament,  December  22nd,  1806. 


BAM 

xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEMi_£RIE-MrAND  101 

places  of  his  foes,  saw  how  effective  a  lever  it  might  be. 
This  had  been  his  constant  practice  :  he  had  pitted  Ital- 
ians against  Austrians,  Copts  against  Mamelukes,  Druses 
against  Turks,  Irish  against  English,  South  Germans  against 
the  Hapsburgs  and  Hohenzollerns,  and  for  the  most  part 
with  success.  But,  except  in  the  case  of  the  Italian  people 
and  the  South  German  princes,  he  rarely,  if  ever,  bestowed 
boons  proportionate  to  the  services  rendered.  It  is  very 
questionable  whether  he  felt  more  warmly  for  Irish  na- 
tionalists than  for  Copts  and  Druses.1  Except  in  regard 
to  his  Italian  kindred,  none  of  the  nationalist  aspirations 
that  were  to  mould  the  history  of  the  century  touched  a 
responsive  chord  in  his  nature.  In  this,  as  in  other  affairs 
of  state,  he  held  "  true  policy  "  to  be  "  nothing  else  than 
the  calculation  of  combinations  and  chances." 

It  was  in  this  spirit  that  he  surveyed  the  Polish  Ques- 
tion. Arising  out  of  the  partitions  of  that  unhappy  land 
by  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  it  had  distracted  the  re- 
pose of  Europe  scarcely  less  than  the  French  Revolution  ; 
and  now  the  heir  to  the  Revolution,  after  hewing  his  way 
through  the  weak  monarchies  of  Central  Europe,  was  about 
to  probe  this  ulcer  of  Christendom.  As  usual,  nothing 
had  been  done  to  forestall  him.  Czar tory ski  had  begged 
Alexander  to  declare  Russian  Poland  an  autonomous  king- 
dom united  with  Russia  only  by  the  golden  link  of  the 
crown,  but  this  timely  proposal  was  rejected; 2  and  the  Czar 
displayed  the  weakness  of  his  judgment  and  the  strength 
of  his  vanity  by  plunging  into  war  with  Turkey  and  Per- 
sia, at  a  time  when  Poland  was  opening  her  arms  to  the 
victor  of  a  hundred  rights.  It  was,  therefore,  easy  for 
Napoleon  to  surround  Russia  with  foes  ;  and,  as  will 
shortly  appear,  he  took  steps  to  invigorate  even  the  remote 
Persian  Empire. 

But,  above  all,  he  spurred  on  the  Poles  to  take  up  arms. 
His  encouragements  were  discreetly  vague.  True,  he 
countenanced  Polish  proclamations,  which  spoke  grandilo- 

1  After  the  interview  of  November  28th,  1801,  Comwallis  reports  that 
Napoleon  "  expressed  a  wish  that  we  could  agree  to  remove  disaffected 
persons  from  either  country  .  .  .  and  declared  his  willingness  to  send 
away  United  Irishmen  "  ("  F.  O.  Records,"  No.  015). 

a  Czartoryski,  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xv. 


102  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

quently  of  national  liberty  ;  but  proclamations  he  ever 
viewed  as  the  ballons  d'essai  of  politics.  He  also  warned 
Murat  not  to  promise  the  Poles  too  much  :  "  My  greatness 
does  not  depend  on  the  aid  of  a  few  thousand  Poles.  Let 
them  show  a  firm  resolve  to  be  independent :  let  them 
pledge  themselves  to  support  the  King  that  will  be  given 
to  them,  and  then  I  will  see  what  is  to  be  done." 

There  were  two  reasons  for  this  caution.  His  Marshals 
found  no  very  general  disposition  among  the  Poles  to  take 
up  arms  for  France  ;  and  he  desired  not  to  offend  Austria 
by  revolutionizing  Galicia  and  her  district  south  and  east 
of  Warsaw.  Already  the  Hapsburgs  were  nervously  mus- 
tering their  troops,  and  Napoleon  had  no  wish  to  tempt 
fortune  by  warring  against  three  Powers  a  thousand  miles 
away  from  his  own  frontiers.  He  therefore  calmed  the 
Court  of  Vienna  by  promising  that  he  would  discourage 
any  rising  in  Austrian  Poland,  and  he  held  forth  the  pros- 
pect of  regaining  Silesia.  This  tempting  offer  was  made 
secretly  and  conditionally  ;  and  evoked  no  expression  of 
thanks,  but  rather  a  redoubling  of  precautions.  Yet,  de- 
spite the  efforts  of  England  and  Russia,  the  Hapsburg 
ruler  refused  to  join  the  allies  :  he  preferred  to  play  the 
waiting  game  which  had  ruined  Prussia.1 

The  campaign  was  reopened  amidst  terrible  weather  by 
a  daring  move  of  Bennigsen's  Russians  westwards,  in  the 
hope  of  saving  Danzig  and  Graudenz  from  the  French. 
At  first  a  screen  of  forests  well  concealed  his  advance. 
Bijt,  falling  in  with  Bernadotte  near  the  River  Passarge, 

1  In  our  "F.  O.  Records,"  Prussia,  No.  74,  is  a  report  of  Napoleon's 
reply  to  a  deputation  at  Warsaw  (January,  1807)  :  "  I  warn  you  that 
neither  I  nor  any  French  prince  cares  for  your  Polish  throne :  I  have 
crowns  to  give  and  don't  know  what  to  do  with  them.  You  must  first 
of  all  think  of  giving  bread  to  my  soldiers  — '  Bread,  bread,  bread.'  .  .  . 
I  cannot  support  my  troops  in  this  country,  where  there  is  no  one  besides 
nobles  and  miserable  peasants.  Where  are  your  great  families  ?  They 
are  all  sold  to  Russia.  It  is  Czartoryski  who  wrote  to  Kosciusko  not  to 
come  back  to  Poland."  And  when  a  Galician  deputy  asked  him  of  the 
fate  of  his  province,  he  turned  on  him  :  "Do  you  think  that  I  will  draw 
on  myself  new  foes  for  one  province."  Nevertheless,  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  Poles  was  not  wholly  chilled.  Their  contingents  did  good  service  for 
him.  Somewhat  later,  female  devotion  brought  a  beautiful  young  Polish 
lady  to  act  as  his  mistress,  primarily  with  the  hope  of  helping  on  the  lib- 
eration of  her  land,  and  then  as  a  willing  captive  to  the  charm  which  he 
exerted  on  all  who  approached  him.    Their  son  was  Count  Walewska. 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:    FKIEDLAND  103 

his  progress  was  checked  and  his  design  revealed.  At 
once  Napoleon  prepared  to  march  northwards  and  throw 
the  Russians  into  the  sea,  a  plan  which  in  its  turn  was 
foiled  by  the  seizure  of  a  French  despatch  by  Cossacks. 
Bennigsen,  now  aware  of  his  danger,  at  once  retreated 
towards  Konigsberg,  but  at  Eylau  turned  on  his  pursuers 
and  fought  the  bloodiest  battle  fought  in  Europe  since 
Malplaquet.  The  numbers  on  both  sides  were  probably 
about  equal,  numbering  some  75,000  men,  the  Russians 
having  a  slight  superiority  in  men  and  still  more  in  artil- 
lery. Driven  from  Eylau  on  the  night  of  February  7th 
after  confused  fighting,  the  Muscovite  withdrew  to  a 
strong  position  formed  by  an  irregular  line  of  hills,  which 
he  crowned  with  cannon. 

As  the  dawn  peered  through  the  snow-laden  clouds,  guns 
began  to  deal  death  amongst  the  hostile  masses,  and  heavy 
columns  moved  forward.  Davoust,  on  the  French  right, 
began  to  push  back  the  Russians  on  that  side,  whereupon 
Napoleon  ordered  Augereau's  corps  to  complete  the  ad- 
vantage by  driving  in  the  enemy's  centre.  Gallantly  the 
French  advanced.  Their  leading  regiment,  the  14th,  had 
seized  a  hillock  which  commanded  the  enemy's  lines,1  when, 
amidst  a  whirlwind  of  snow  that  beat  in  their  faces,  a 
deadly  storm  of  grape  and  canister  almost  annihilated  the 
corps.  Its  shattered  lines  fell  back,  leaving  the  14th  to 
its  fate.  But  a  cloud  of  Cossacks  now  swept  on  the  retir- 
ing companies,  stabbing  with  their  long  spears  ;  and  it 
was  a  scanty  band  that  found  safety  in  their  former  posi- 
tion. Russian  cannon  and  cavalry  also  stopped  the  ad- 
vance of  Davoust,  and  the  fighting  for  a  time  resolved 
itself  into  confused  but  murderous  charges  at  close  quar- 
ters. As  if  to  increase  the  horrors  of  the  scene,  snow- 
storms again  swept  over  the  field,  dazing  the  French  and 
shrouding  with  friendly  wings  the  fierce  charges  of  Cos- 
sacks. Yet  the  Grand  Army  fought  on  with  devoted 
heroism  ;  and  the  chief,  determined  to  snatch  at  victory, 
launched  eighty  squadrons  of  horse  against  the  Russian 
centre.  Sweeping  aside  the  Cossacks,  and  defying  the 
cannon  that  riddled  their  files,  they  poured  upon  the  first 
line  of  Russian  infantry  :  for  a  time  they  were  stemmed, 

1  Marbot,  ch.  xxviii. 


104  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap- 

but,  finding  some  weaker  places,  the  cuirassiers  burst 
through,  only  to  be  thrown  back  by  the  second  line  ;  and, 
when  furiously  charged  by  Cossacks,  they  fell  back  in  dis- 
order. "  These  Russians  fight  like  bulls,"  said  the  French. 
The  simile  was  just.  Even  while  Murat  was  hacking  at 
their  centre,  a  column  of  4,000  Russian  grenadiers,  detach- 
ing itself  from  their  mangled  line,  marched  straight  for- 
ward on  the  village  of  Eylau.  With  the  same  blind 
courage  that  nerved  Solmes'  division  at  Steinkirk,  they 
beat  aside  the  French  light  horse  and  foot,  and  were  now 
threatening  the  cemetery  where  Napoleon  and  his  staff 
were  standing. 

"  I  never  was  so  much  struck  with  anything  in  my  life,"  said  Gen- 
eral Bertrand  at  St.  Helena,  "  as  by  the  Emperor  at  Eylau  when  he 
was  almost  trodden  under  foot  by  the  Russian  column.  He  kept  his 
ground  as  the  Russians  advanced,  saying  frequently, '  What  boldness.' " 

But,  when  all  around  him  trembled,  and  Berthier  ordered 
up  the  horses  as  if  for  retreat,  he  himself  quietly  signalled 
for  his  Guards.  These  sturdy  troops,  long  fuming  at  their 
inaction,  marched  forward  with  a  stern  joy.  As  at  Stein- 
kirk the  French  Household  Brigade  disdained  to  fire  on 
the  bull-dogs,  so  now  the  Guards  rushed  on  the  Musco- 
vites with  the  cold  steel.  The  shock  was  terrible  ;  but 
the  pent-up  fury  of  the  French  carried  all  before  it,  and 
the  grenadiers  were  wellnigh  destroyed.  The  battle 
might  still  have  ended  in  a  French  victory  ;  for  Davoust 
was  obstinately  holding  the  village  which  he  had  seized 
in  the  morning,  and  even  threatened  the  rear  of  Bennig- 
sen's  centre.  But  when  both  sides  were  wellnigh  exhausted, 
the  Prussian  General  Lestocq  with  8,000  men,  urged  on 
by  the  counsels  of  Scharnhorst,  hurried  up  from  the  side 
of  Konigsberg,  marched  straight  on  Davoust,  and  checked 
his  forward  movements.  Ney  followed  Lestocq,  but  at  so 
great  a  distance  that  his  arrival  at  nightfall  served  only 
to  secure  the  French  left. 

Thus  darkness  closed  over  some  100,000  men,  who 
wearily  clung  to  their  posts,  and  over  snowy  wastes  where 
half  that  number  lay  dead,  dying,  or  disabled.  Well 
might  Ney  exclaim  :  "  What  a  massacre,  and  without  any 
issue  !  "     Each  side  claimed  -the  victory,  and,  as  is  usual 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:    FRIEDLAND  105 

in  such  cases,  began  industriously  to  minimize  its  own 
and  to  magnify  the  enemy's  losses.  The  truth  seems  to 
be  that  both  sides  had  about  25,000  men  hors  de  combat ; 
but,  as  Bennigsen  lacked  tents,  supplies,  and,  above  all, 
the  dauntless  courage  of  Napoleon,  he  speedily  fell  back, 
and  thus  enabled  the  Emperor  to  claim  a  decisive  victory.1 

Exhausted  by  this  terrific  strife,  the  combatants  now 
relaxed  their  efforts  for  a  brief  space  ;  but  while  Napoleon 
used  the  time  of  respite  in  hurrying  up  troops  from  all 
parts  of  his  vast  dominions,  the  allies  did  little  to  improve 
their  advantage.  This  inertness  is  all  the  more  strange  as 
Prussia  and  Russia  came  to  closer  accord  in  the  Treaty  of 
Bartenstein  (April  26th,  1807). 2 

The  two  monarchs  now  recur  to  the  generous  scheme 
of  a  European  peace,  for  which  the  Czar  and  William  Pitt 
had  vainly  struggled  two  years  before.  The  present  war 
is  to  be  fought  out  to  the  end,  not  so  as  to  humble  France 
and  interfere  in  her  internal  concerns,  but  in  order  to 
assure  to  Europe  the  blessings  of  a  solid  peace  based  on 
the  claims  of  justice  and  of  national  independence.  France 
must  be  satisfied  with  reasonable  boundaries,  and  Prussia 
be  restored  to  the  limits  of  1805  or  their  equivalent. 
German}^  is  to  be  freed  from  the  dictation  of  the  French, 
and  become  a  "  constitutional  federation,"  with  a  boundary 
"  parallel  to  the  Rhine."  Austria  is  to  be  asked  to  join 
the  present  league,  regaining  Tyrol  and  the  Mincio  fron- 
tier. England  and  Sweden  must  be  rallied  to  the  common 
cause.  The  allies  will  also  take  steps  to  cause  Denmark 
to  join  the  league.  For  the  rest,  the  integrity  of  Turkey 
is  to  be  maintained,  and  the  future  of  Italy  decided  in 
concert  with  Austria  and  England,  the  Kings  of  Sardinia 
and  Naples  being  restored.     Even  should  Austria,  Eng- 

1  Lettow- Vorbeck  estimates  the  French  loss  at  more  than  24,000  ;  that 
of  the  Russians  as  still  heavier,  but  largely  owing  to  the  bad  commissariat 
and  wholesale  straggling.  On  this  see  Sir  R.  Wilson's  "Campaign  in 
Poland,"  ch.  i. 

2  Napoleon  on  February  13th  charged  Bertrand  to  offer  verbally  but  not 
in  writing,  to  the  King  of  Prussia  a  separate  peace,  without  respect  to 

|  the  Czar.  Frederick  William  was  to  be  restored  to  his  States  east  of  the 
I  Elbe.  He  rejected  the  offer,  which  would  have  broken  his  engagements 
I  to  the  Czar.  Napoleon  repeated  the  offer  on  February  20th,  which  shows 
that,  at  this  crisis,  he  did  wish  for  peace  with  Prussia.  See  "  Nap.  Cor- 
iresp.,"  No.  11810;  and  Hausser,  vol.  iii.,  p.  74. 


106  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  1  chap. 

*and,  and  Sweden  not  join  them,  yet  Russia  and  Prussia 
will  continue  the  struggle  and  not  lay  down  their  arms 
save  by  mutual  consent. 

Had  all  the  Powers  threatened  by  Napoleon  at  once 
come  forward  and  acted  with  vigour,  these  ends  might, 
even  now,  have  been  attained.  But  Austria  merely  re- 
newed her  offers  of  mediation,  a  well-meaning  but  hope- 
less proposal.  England,  a  prey  to  official  incapacity, 
joined  the  league,  promised  help  in  men  and  money,  and 
did  little  or  nothing  except  send  fruitless  expeditions  to 
Alexandria  and  the  Dardanelles  with  the  aim  of  forcing 
the  Turks  to  a  peace  with  Russia.  In  Sicily  we  held 
our  own  against  Joseph's  generals,  but  had  no  men  to 
spare  for  a  diversion  against  Marmont's  forces  in  Dal- 
matia,  which  Alexander  urged.  Still  less  could  we  send 
from  our  own  shores  any  force  for  the  effective  aid  of 
Prussia.  Though  we  had  made  peace  with  that  Power, 
and  ordinary  prudence  might  have  dictated  the  taking 
of  steps  to  save  the  coast  fortresses,  Danzig  and  Colberg, 
from  the  French  besiegers,  yet  our  efforts  were  limited 
to  the  despatch  of  a  few  cruisers  to  the  former  strong- 
hold. Even  more  urgent  was  the  need  of  rescuing  Stral- 
sund,  the  chief  fortress  of  Swedish  Pomerania.  Such  an 
expedition  clearty  offered  great  possibilities  with  the  min- 
imum of  risk.  From  the  Isle  of  Riigen  Mortier's  corps 
could  be  attacked ;  and  when  Stralsund  was  freed,  a  dash 
on  Stettin,  then  weakly  held  by  the  French,  promised  an 
easy  success  that  would  raise  the  whole  of  North  Germany 
in  Napoleon's  rear.1 

But  arguments  were  thrown  away  upon  the  British 
Government,  which  clung  to  its  old  plan  of  doing  noth- 
ing, and  of  doing  it  expensively.  The  Foreign  Secretary, 
Earl  Howick,  replied  that  the  allies  must  not  expect  any 
considerable  aid  from  our  land  forces.  Considering  that 
the  Income  or  War  Tax  of  2s.  in  the  £  had  yielded  close 
on  £ 20,000,000,  and  that  the  army  numbered  192,000  men 

1  "I  have  been  repeatedly  pressed  by  the  Prussian  and  Russian  gov- 
ernments," wrote  Lord  Hutchinson,  our  envoy  at  Memel,  March  9th, 
1807,  "  on  the  subject  of  a  diversion  to  be  made  by  British  troops  against 
Mortier.  .  .  .  Stettin  is  a  large  place  with  a  small  garrison  and  in  a  bad 
state  of  defence  "  ("F.  O.,"  Prussia,  No.  74). 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL    SYSTEM  :   FKIEDLAND  107 

(exclusive  of  those  in  India),  this  declaration  did  not 
shed  lustre  on  the  Ministry  of  all  the  Talents.  That 
bankrupt  Cabinet,  however,  was  dismissed  by  George  III. 
in  March,  1807,  because  it  declined  to  waive  the  question 
of  Catholic  Emancipation,  and  its  place  was  filled  by  the 
Duke  of  Portland,  with  Canning  as  Foreign  Minister. 
Soon  it  was  seen  that  Pitt's  cloak  had  fallen  on  worthy 
shoulders,  and  a  new  vigour  began  to  inspirit  our  foreign 
policy.  Yet  the  bad  results  of  frittering  away  our  forces 
on  distant  expeditions  could  not  be  wiped  out  at  once. 
In  fact,  our  military  expert,  Lord  Cathcart,  reported  that 
only  some  12,000  men  could  at  present  be  spared  for  ser- 
vice in  the  Baltic  ;  and,  as  it  would  be  beneath  our  dig- 
nity to  send  so  small  a  force,  it  would  be  better  to  keep  it 
at  home  ready  to  menace  any  part  of  the  French  coast. 
As  to  Stralsund,  he  thought  that  plan  was  more  feasible, 
but  that,  even  there,  the  allies  would  not  make  head 
against  Mortier's  corps.1 

This  is  a  specimen  of  the  reasoning  that  was  fast 
rendering  Britain  contemptible  alike  to  friends  and  foes. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  such  timorous  selfishness  should 
have  at  last  moved  the  Czar  to  say  to  our  envoy  :  "  Act 
where  you  please,  provided  that  you  act  at  all."2  In  the 
end  the  new  Ministry  did  venture  to  act  :  it  engaged  to 
send  20,000  men  to  the  succour  of  Stralsund  ;  but,  with 
the  fatality  that  then  dogged  our  steps,  that  decision  was 
formed  on  June  the  17th,  three  days  after  the  Coalition 
was  shattered  by  the  mighty  blow  of  Friedland. 

In  striking  contrast  to  the  faint-hearted  measures  of 
the  allies  was  the  timely  energy  of  Napoleon  in  bringing 
up  reinforcements.  These  were  drawn  partly  from  Mor- 
tier's corps  in  Pomerania,  now  engaged  in  watching  the 
Swedes,  who   made    a  truce  ;  partly  from  the  Bavarians 

1  Lord  Cathcart's  secret  report  to  the  War  Office,  dated  April  22nd, 
1807,  dealt  with  the  appeal  made  by  Lord  Hutchinson,  and  with  a 
Projet  of  Dumouriez,  both  of  whom  strongly  urged  the  expedition  to 
Stralsund.  On  May  30th  Castlereagh  received  a  report  from  a  Hanove- 
rian officer,  Kuckuck,  stating  that  Hanover  and  Hesse  were  ripe  for  revolt, 
and  that  Hameln  might  easily  be  seized  if  the  North  Germans  were  en- 
couraged by  an  English  force  ("Castlereagh  Letters,"  vol.  vi.,  pp.  109 
and  211). 

2"F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  69. 


108  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

and  Saxons  ;  but  mostly  from  French  troops  already  in 
Central  Germany,  their  places  being  taken  by  Italians, 
Spaniards,  Swiss,  and  Dutch.  In  France  a  new  levy  of 
conscripts  was  ordered  —  the  third  since  the  outbreak  of 
war  with  Prussia.  The  Turks  were  encouraged  to  press 
on  the  war  against  Russia  and  England  ;  and  a  mission 
was  sent  to  the  Shah  of  Persia  to  strengthen  his  arms 
against  the  Czar.     To  this  last  we  will  now  advert. 

For  some  time  past  Napoleon  had  been  coquetting  with 
Persia,  and  an  embassy  from  the  Shah  now  came  to  the 
castle  of  Finkenstein,  a  beautiful  seat  not  far  from  the 
Vistula,  where  the  Emperor  spent  the  months  of  spring. 
A  treaty  was  drawn  up,  and  General  Gardane  was  de- 
puted to  draw  closer  the  bonds  of  friendship  with  the 
Court  of  Teheran.  The  instructions  secretly  issued  to 
this  officer  are  of  great  interest.  He  is  ordered  to  pro- 
ceed to  Persia  by  way  of  Constantinople,  to  concert  an 
alliance  between  Sultan  and  Shah,  to  redouble  Persia's 
efforts  against  her  "  natural  enemy,"  Russia,  and  to  ex- 
amine the  means  of  invading  India.  For  this  purpose  a 
number  of  officers  are  sent  with  him  to  examine  the  routes 
from  Egypt  or  Syria  to  Delhi,  as  also  to  report  on  the 
harbours  in  Persia  with  a  view  to  a  maritime  expedition, 
either  by  way  of  Suez  or  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The 
Shah  is  to  be  induced  to  form  a  corps  of  12,000  men, 
drilled  on  the  European  model  and  armed  with  weapons 
sold  by  France.  This  force  will  attack  the  Russians  in 
Georgia  and  serve  later  in  an  expedition  to  India.  With 
a  view  to  the  sending  of  20,000  French  troops  to  India, 
Gardane  is  to  communicate  with  the  Mahratta  princes  and 
prepare  for  this  enterprise  by  every  possible  means. 

We  may  note  here  that  Gardane  proceeded  to  Persia 
and  was  urging  on  the  Shah  to  more  active  measures 
against  Russia  when  the  news  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  di- 
verted his  efforts  towards  the  East.  At  the  close  of  the 
year  he  reported  to  Napoleon  that,  for  the  march  over- 
land from  Syria  to  the  Ganges,  Cyprus  was  an  indispen- 
sable base  of  supplies  :  he  recommended  the  route  Bir, 
Mardin,  Teheran,  Herat,  Cabul,  and  Peshawur  :  forty  to 
fifty  thousand  French  troops  would  be  needed,  and  thirty 
or   forty   thousand    Persians   should   also    be   taken   up. 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:   FRIEDLAND  109 

Nothing  came  of  these  plans  ;  but  it  is  clear  that,  even 
when  Napoleon  was  face  to  face  with  formidable  foes  on 
the  Vistula,  his  thoughts  still  turned  longingly  to  the 
banks  of  the  Ganges.1 

The  result  of  Napoleon's  activity  and  the  supineness  of 
his  foes  were  soon  apparent.  Danzig  surrendered  to  the 
French  on  May  the  24th,  and  Neisse  in  Silesia  a  little 
later  ;  and  it  was  not  till  the  besiegers  of  these  fortresses 
came  up  to  swell  the  French  host  that  Bennigsen  opened 
the  campaign.  He  was  soon  to  rue  the  delay.  His  efforts 
to  drive  the  foe  from  the  River  Passarge  were  promptly 
foiled,  and  he  retired  in  haste  to  his  intrenched  camp  at 
Heilsberg.  There,  on  June  the  10th,  he  turned  fiercely 
at  bay  and  dealt  heavy  losses  to  the  French  vanguard.  In 
vain  did  Soult's  corps  struggle  up  towards  the  intrench- 
ments  ;  his  men  were  mown  down  by  grapeshot  and  mus- 
ketry :  in  vain  did  Napoleon,  who  hurried  up  in  the 
afternoon,  launch  the  fusiliers  of  the  Guard  and  a  divi- 
sion of  Lannes'  corps.  The  Muscovites  held  firm,  and  the 
day  closed  ominously  for  the  French.  It  was  Eylau  over 
again  on  a  small  scale. 

But  Bennigsen  was  one  of  those  commanders  who,  after 
fighting  with  great  spirit,  suffer  a  relapse.  Despite  the 
entreaties  of  his  generals,  he  had  retreated  after  Eylau  ; 
and  now,  after  a  day  of  inaction,  his  columns  filed  off 
towards  Konigsberg  under  cover  of  the  darkness.  In 
excuse  for  this  action  it  has  been  urged  that  he  had  but 
two  days'  supply  of  bread  in  the  camp,  and  that  a  forward 
move  of  Davoust's  corps  round  his  right  flank  threatened 
to  cut  him  off  from  his  base  of  supplies,  Konigsberg.2 

The  first  excuse  only  exposes  him  to  greater  censure. 
The  Russian  habit  at  that  time  usually  was  to  live  almost 
from  hand  to  mouth  ;  but  that  a  carefully-prepared  posi- 
tion like  that  of  Heilsberg  should  be  left  without  adequate 
supplies  is  unpardonable.     On  the  two  next  days  the  rival 

1  "Corresp.,"  No.  12563;  also,  "La  Mission  du  Gen.  Gardane  en 
jPerse,"  par  le  comte  de  Gardane.  Napoleon,  in  his  proclamation  of  De- 
cember 2nd.  1806,  told  the  troops  that  their  victories  had  won  for  France 
her  Indian  possessions  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

2  Wilson,  "Campaign  in  Poland;"  "Operations  du  3rae  Corps  [Da- 
voust's], 1806-1807."  p.  199. 


110  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

hosts  marched  northward,  the  one  to  seize,  the  other  to 
save,  Konigsberg.  They  were  separated  by  the  winding 
vale  of  the  Alle.  But  the  course  of  this  river  favoured 
Napoleon  as  much  as  it  hindered  Bennigsen.  The  Alle 
below  Heilsberg  makes  a  deep  bend  towards  the  north- 
east, then  northwards  again  towards  Friedland,  where  il 
comes  within  forty  miles  of  Konigsberg,  but  in  its  lower 
course  flows  north-east  until  it  joins  the  Pregel. 

An  army  marching  from  Heilsberg  to  the  old  Prussian 
capital  by  the  right  bank  would  therefore  easily  be  out- 
stripped by  one  that  could  follow  the  chord  of  the  arc 
instead  of  the  irregular  arc  itself.  Napoleon  was  in  this 
fortunate  position,  while  the  Russians  plodded  amid 
heavy  rains  over  the  semicircular  route  further  to  the 
east.  Their  mistake  in  abandoning  Heilsberg  was  now 
obvious.  The  Emperor  halted  at  Eylau  on  the  13th  for 
news  of  the  Prussians  in  front  and  of  Bennigsen  on  his 
right  flank.  Against  the  former  he  hurled  his  chief 
masses  under  the  lead  of  Murat  in  the  hope  of  seizing 
Konigsberg  at  one  blow.1  But,  foreseeing  that  the 
Russians  would  probably  pass  over  the  Alle  at  Friedland, 
he  despatched  Lannes  to  Domnau,  to  see  whether  they 
had  already  crossed  in  force.  Clearly,  then,  Napoleon 
did  not  foresee  what  the  morrow  had  in  store  for  him : 
his  aim  was  to  drive  a  solid  wedge  between  Bennigsen 
and  the  defenders  of  Konigsberg,  to  storm  that  city  first, 
and  then  to  turn  on  Bennigsen.  The  claim  of  some  of 
Napoleon's  admirers  that  he  laid  a  trap  for  the  Russians 
at  Friedland,  as  he  had  done  at  Austerlitz,  is  therefore 
refuted  by  the  Emperor's  own  orders. 

None  the  less  did  Bennigsen  walk  into  a  trap,  and  one 
of  his  own  choosing.  Anxious  to  thrust  himself  between 
Napoleon  and  the  old  Prussian  capital,  he  crossed  the 
river  at  Friedland,  and  sought  to  strengthen  his  position 
on  the  left  bank  by  driving  Lannes'  vanguard  back  on 
Domnau,  by  throwing  three  bridges  over  the  stream,  and 
by  crowning  the  hills  on  the  right  bank  with  a  formidable 
artillery.     But  he  had  to  deal  with  a  tough  and  daring 

1  "  Corresp.,"  Nos.  12749  and  12751.  Lejeune,  in  his  "  Memoirs,"  also 
shows  that  Napoleon's  chief  aim  was  to  seize  Konigsberg. 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:    FRIEDLAND  111 

opponent.  Throughout  the  winter  Lannes  had  been  a 
prey  to  ill -health  and  resentment  at  his  chief's  real  or 
fancied  injustice  :  but  the  heats  of  summer  reawakened 
his  thirst  for  glory  and  restored  him  to  his  wonted  vigour. 
Calling  up  the  Saxon  horse,  Grouchy's  dragoons,  and 
Oudinot's  grenadiers,  he  held  his  ground  through  the 
brief  hours  of  darkness.  Before  dawn  he  posted  his 
10,000  troops  among  the  woods  and  on  the  plateau  of 
Posthenen  that  lies  to  the  west  of  Friedland  and  strove 
to  stop  the  inarch  of  40,000  Russians.  After  four  hours 
of  fighting,  his  men  were  about  to  be  thrust  back,  when 
the  divisions  of  Verdier  and  Dupas  —  the  latter  from 
Mortier's  corps  —  shared  the  burden  of  the  fight  until 
the  sun  was  at  its  zenith.  When  once  more  the  fight  was 
doubtful,  the  dense  columns  of  Ney  and  Victor  were  to  be 
seen,  and  by  desperate  efforts  the  French  vanguard  held 
its  ground  until  this  welcome  aid  arrived. 

Napoleon,  having  received  Lannes'  urgent  appeals  for 
help,  now  rode  up  in  hot  haste,  and  in  response  to  the 
cheers  of  his  weary  troops  repeatedly  exclaimed  :  "  To- 
day is  a  lucky  day,  the  anniversary  of  Marengo."  Their 
ardour  was  excited  to  the  highest  pitch,  Oudinot  saluting 
his  chief  with  the  words  :  "  Quick,  sire  !  my  grenadiers 
can  hold  no  longer  :  but  give  me  reinforcements  and  I'll 
pitch  the  Russians  into  the  river."  *  The  Emperor  cau- 
tiously gave  them  pause  :  the  fresh  troops  marched  to  the 
front  and  formed  the  first  line,  those  who  had  fought  for 
nine  hours  now  forming  the  supports.  Ney  held  the  post 
of  honour  in  the  woods  on  the  right  flank,  nearly  above 
Friedland  ;  behind  him  was  the  corps  of  Bernadotte, 
which,  since  the  disabling  of  that  Marshal  by  a  wound, 
had  been  led  by  General  Victor  :  there  too  were  the 
dragoons  of  Latour-Maubourg  and  the  imposing  masses 
of  the  Guard.  In  the  centre,  but  bending  in  towards  the 
I  rear,  stood  the  remnant  of  Lannes'  indomitable  corps, 
now  condemned  for  a  time  to  comparative  inactivity  ; 
and  defensive  tactics  were  also  enjoined  on  Mortier  and 
jGrouchy  on  the  left  wing,  until  Ney  and  Victor  should 
klecide  the  fortunes  of  the  second  fight.  The  Russians, 
as  if  bent  on  favouring  Napoleon's  design,  continued  to 

1  "  Memoirs  of  Oudinot,"  ch.  ii. 


112 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I 


CHAP. 


deploy  in  front  of  Friedland,  keeping  up  the  while  a 
desultory  fight  ;  and  Bennigsen,  anxious  now  about  his 
communications  with  Konigsberg,  detached  6,000  men 
down  the  right  bank  of  the  river  towards  Wehlau.  Only 
46,000  men  were  thus  left  to  defend  Friedland  against 
a  force  that  now  numbered  80,000  :  yet  no  works  were 
thrown    up   to   guard   the    bridges  —  and   this   after  the 


-iW-»  sjo  •r^a  l*a  :c*kj~, 


SttutArA  Gtofruplt '  Stiai'  Unidmv. 


arrival  of  Napoleon  with  strong  reinforcements  was  known 
by  the  excitement  along  the  enemy's  front. 

Nevertheless;  as  late  as  3  p.m.,  Napoleon  was  in  doubt 
whether  he  should  not  await  the  arrival  of  Murat.  At 
his  instructions,  Berthier  ordered  that  Marshal  to  leave 
Soult  at  Konigsberg  and  hurry  back  with  Davoust  and 
the  cavalry  towards  Friedland:  "If  I  perceive  at  the 
beginning  of  this  fight  that  the  enemy  is  in  too  great 
force,  I  might  be  content  with  cannonading  to-day  and 


xxvi  THE   CONTINENTAL   SYSTEM:   FRIEDLAND  113 

awaiting  your  arrival."  But  a  little  later  the  Emperor 
decides  for  instant  attack.  The  omens  are  all  favourable. 
If  driven  back,  the  Russians  will  fight  with  their  backs  to 
a  deep  river.  Besides,  their  position  is  cut  in  twain  by  a 
mill-stream  which  flows  in  a  gully,  and  near  the  town  is 
dammed  up  so  as  to  form  a  small  lake.  Below  this  lies 
Friedland  in  a  deep  bend  of  the  river  itself.  Into  this 
cul-de-sac  he  will  drive  the  Russian  left,  and  fling  their 
broken  lines  into  the  lake  and  river. 

At  five  o'clock  a  salvo  of  twenty  guns  opened  the  second 
and  greater  battle  of  Friedland.  To  rush  on  the  Mus- 
covite van  and  clear  it  from  the  wood  of  Sortlack  was  for 
Ney's  leading  division  the  work  of  a  moment ;  but  on 
reaching  the  open  ground  their  ranks  were  ploughed  by 
the  shot  of  the  Russian  guns  ranged  on  the  hills  beyond 
the  river.  Staggered  by  this  fire,  the  division  was  waver- 
ing, when  the  Russian  Guards  and  their  choicest  squad- 
rons of  horse  charged  home  with  deadly  effect.  But  Ney's 
second  division,  led  by  the  gallant  Dupont,  hurried  up  to 
restore  the  balance,  while  Latour-Maubourg's  dragoons 
fell  on  the  enemy's  horsemen  and  drove  them  pell-mell 
towards  Friedland. 

The  Russian  artillery  fared  little  better :  Napoleon 
directed  Senarmont  with  thirty-six  guns  to  take  it  in 
flank  and  it  was  soon  overpowered.  Freed  now  from  the 
Russian  grapeshot  and  sabres,  Ney  held  on  his  course  like 
a  torrent  that  masters  a  dam,  reached  the  upper  part  of 
the  lake,  and  threw  the  bewildered  foe  into  its  waters  or 
into  the  town.  Friedland  was  now  a  death-trap  :  huddled 
together,  plied  by  shell,  shot,  and  bayonet,  the  Russians 
fought  from  street  to  street  with  the  energy  of  despair, 
but  little  by  little  were  driven  back  on  the  bridges.  No 
help  was  to  be  found  there  ;  for  Senarmont,  bringing  up 
his  guns,  swept  the  bridges  with  a  terrific  fire  :  when 
part  of  the  Russian  left  and  centre  had  fled  across,  they 
burst  into  flames,  a  signal  that  warned  their  comrades 
further  north  of  their  coming  doom.  On  that  side,  too, 
a  general  advance  of  the  French  drove  the  enemy  back 
towards  the  steep  banks  of  the  river.  But  on  those  open 
plains  the  devotion  and  prowess  of  the  Muscovite  cavalry 
bore  ampler  fruit :  charging  the  foe  while  in  the  full  swing 

VOL.  II  —  I 


114  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxvt 

of  victory,  these  gallant  riders  gave  time  for  the  infantry 
to  attempt  the  dangers  of  a  deep  ford :  hundreds  were 
drowned,  but  others,  along  with  most  of  the  guns,  stole 
away  in  the  darkness  down  the  left  bank  of  the  river. 

On  the  morrow  Bennigsen's  army  was  a  mass  of  fugi- 
tives straggling  towards  the  Pregel  and  fighting  with 
one  another  for  a  chance  to  cross  its  long  narrow  bridge. 
Even  on  the  other  side  they  halted  not,  but  wandered  on 
towards  the  Niemen,  no  longer  an  army  but  an  armed  mob. 
On  its  banks  they  were  joined  by  the  defenders  of  Konigs- 
berg,  who  after  a  stout  stand  cut  their  way  through 
Soult's  lines  and  made  for  Tilsit.  There,  behind  the 
broad  stream  of  the  Niemen,  the  fugitives  found  rest. 

It  will  always  be  a  mystery  why  Bennigsen  held  on  to 
Friedland  after  French  reinforcements  arrived  ;  and  the 
feeling  of  wonder  and  exasperation  finds  expression  in 
the  report  of  our  envoy,  Lord  Hutchinson,  founded  on 
the  information  of  two  British  officers  who  were  at  the 
Russian  headquarters  : 

"  Many  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  Battle  of  Friedland  are 
unexampled  in  the  annals  of  war.  We  crossed  the  River  Alle,  not 
knowing  whether  we  had  to  contend  with  a  corps  or  the  whole  French 
army.  From  the  commencement  of  the  battle  it  was  manifest  that 
we  had  a  great  deal  to  lose  and  probably  little  to  gain :  .  .  .  General 
Bennigsen  would,  I  believe,  have  retired  early  in  the  day  from  ground 
which  he  ought  never  to  have  occupied ;  but  the  corps  in  our  front 
made  so  vigorous  a  resistance  that,  though  occasionally  we  gained  a 
little  ground,  yet  we  were  never  able  to  drive  them  from  the  woods 
or  the  village  of  Heinrichsdorf."  1 

This  evidence  shows  the  transcendent  services  of  Lannes, 
Oudinot,  and  Grouchy  in  the  early  part  of  the  day ;  and 
it  is  clear  that,  as  at  Jena,  no  great  battle  would  have 
been  fought  at  all  but  for  the  valour  and  tenacity  with 
which  Lannes  clung  to  the  foe  until  Napoleon  came  up. 

1  The  report  is  dated  Memel,  June  21st,  1807,  in  "F.  O.,"  Prussia, 
No.  74.  Hutchinson  thinks  the  Russians  had  not  more  than  45,000  men 
engaged  at  Friedland,  and  that  their  losses  did  not  exceed  15,000 ;  but 
there  were  "  multitudes  of  stragglers."  Lettow-Vorbeck  gives  about  the 
same  estimates.  Those  given  in  the  French  bulletin  are  grossly  exag- 
gerated. 


CHAPTER   XXVII 

TILSIT 

Even  now  matters  were  not  hopeless  for  the  allies. 
Crowds  of  stragglers  rejoined  the  colours  at  Tilsit,  and 
Tartar  reinforcements  were  near  at  hand.  The  gallant 
Gneisenau  was  still  holding  out  bravely  at  Kolberg  against 
Brune's  divisions;  and  two  of  the  Silesian  fortresses  had 
not  yet  surrendered.  Moreover,  Austria  seemed  about  to 
declare  against  Napoleon,  and  there  were  hopes  that  before 
long  England  would  do  something.  But,  above  all,  since 
the  war  was  for  Prussia  solely  an  affair  of  honour,1  it 
deeply  concerned  Alexander's  good  name  not  to  desert 
an  ally  to  whom  he  was  now  pledged  by  all  the  claims  of 
chivalry  until  satisfactory  terms  could  be  gained. 

But  Alexander's  nature  had  not  as  yet  been  strength- 
ened by  misfortune  and  religious  convictions  :  it  was  a 
sunny  background  of  flickering  enthusiasms,  flecked  now 
and  again  by  shadows  of  Eastern  cunning  or  darkened  by 
warlike  ambitions  —  a  nature  in  which  the  sentimentalism 
of  Rousseau  and  the  passions  of  a  Boyar  alternately  gained 
the  mastery.  No  realism  is  more  crude  than  that  of  the 
disillusionized  idealist;  and  for  months  the  young  Czar 
had  seen  his  dream  of  a  free  and  happy  Europe  fade  away 
amidst  the  smoke  of  Napoleon's  guns  and  the  mists  of 
English  muddling.  At  first  he  blenched  not  even  at  the 
news  of  Friedland.  In  an  interview  with  our  ambassador, 
Lord  Gower,  on  June  the  17th,  he  bitterly  upbraided  him 
with  our  inactivity  in  the  Baltic  and  the  Mediterranean, 
and  the  non-fulfilment  of  our  promise  of  a  loan  ;  as  for 

1  On  June  17th,  1807,  Queen  Louisa  wrote  to  her  father:  "...  we 
fall  with  honour.     The   King  has  proved  that  he  prefers  honour  to 
shameful  submission."     On  June  23rd  Bennigsen  professed  a  wish  to 
fight,  while  secretly  advising  surrender  (Hardenberg,  "Mems.,"  vol.  iii 
p.  469). 

116 


116  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

himself,  "  he  would  never  stoop  to  Bonaparte  :  he  would 
rather  retire  to  Kazan  or  even  to  Tobolsk."  But  five 
days  later,  acting  under  pressure  from  his  despairing  gen- 
erals, some  of  whom  reminded  him  of  his  father's  fate,  he 
arranged  an  armistice  with  the  conqueror.1  Five  days 
only  were  allowed  in  which  Prussia  might  decide  to  follow 
his  example  or  proceed  with  the  war  alone.  She  accepted 
the  inevitable  on  the  following  day. 

The  international  situation  was  now  strangely  like  that 
which  followed  immediately  upon  the  battle  of  Austerlitz. 
Then  it  was  Prussia,  now  it  was  Austria,  that  played  the 
part  of  the  cautious  friend  at  the  very  time  when  the  beaten 
allies  were  meditating  surrender.  For  some  time  past  the 
Court  of  Vienna  had  been  offering  its  services  for  media- 
tion ;  they  were  well  received  at  London,  with  open  dis- 
appointment by  Prussia,  and  with  ill-concealed  annoyance 
by  Napoleon.  As  at  the  time  when  Haugwitz  came  to 
him  to  dictate  Prussia's  terms,  so  now  the  Emperor  kept 
the  Austrian  envoy  waiting  without  an  answer,  until  the 
blow  of  Friedland  was  dealt.2  Even  then  Austria  seemed 
about  to  enter  the  lists,  when  news  arrived  of  the  con- 
clusion of  the  armistice  of  Tilsit.  This  enabled  her  to 
sheathe  her  sword  with  no  loss  of  honour  ;  but,  as  was  the 
case  with  Prussia  at  the  close  of  1805,  her  conduct  was 
seen  to  be  timid  and  time-serving  ;  and  it  merited  the 
secret  rebuke  of  Canning  that  she  "was  (as  usual)  just 
ten  days  too  late  in  her  determination,  or  the  world  might 
have  been  saved."3 

Whether  Austria  had  been  beguiled  by  the  recent 
diplomatic  caresses  of  Napoleon  may  well  be  doubted  ; 
for  they  were  obviously  aimed  at  keeping  her  quiet  until 
he  had  settled  scores  with  Prussia  and  Russia.  His  ad- 
vances only  began  on  the  eve  of  the  last  war,  and  the 
sharpness  of  the  transition  from  threats  to  endearments 

1  "  F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  69.  Soult  told  Lord  Holland  ("  Foreign  Remi- 
niscences," p.  185)  that  Bennigsen  was  plotting  to  murder  the  Czar,  and 
he  (S.)  warned  him  of  it. 

2  "Lettres  incites  de  Talleyrand,"  p.  468  ;  also  Garden,  vol.  x.,  pp. 
205-210  ;  and  "  Ann.  Reg."  (1807),  pp.  710-724,  for  the  British  replies  to 
Austria. 

8  Canning  to  Paget  ("Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  324).  So  too  Can- 
ning's despatch  of  July  21st  to  Gower  (Russia,  No.  69). 


xivii  TILSIT  117 

could  not  be  smoothed  over  even  by  Talle}rrand's  finesse.1 
When  the  slaughter  at  Eylau  placed  him  in  peril,  he  again 
bade  Talleyrand  soothe  the  Austrian  envoy  with  assur- 
ances that,  if  his  master  was  anxious  to  maintain  the  in- 
tegrity of  Turkey,  France  would  maintain  it ;  or  if  he 
desired  to  share  in  an  eventual  partition,  France  would 
also  arrange  that  to  his  liking.2  But  as  the  prospects  for 
the  campaign  improved,  Napoleon's  tone  hardened.  On 
March  the  14th  he  states  that  he  has  enough  men  to  keep 
Austria  quiet  and  to  "get  rid  of  the  Russians  in  a  month." 
And  now  he  looks  on  an  alliance  with  the  Hapsburgs 
merely  as  giving  a  short  time  of  quiet,  whereas  an  alliance 
with  Russia  would  be  "  very  advantageous."  3  He  had  also 
felt  the  value  of  alliance  with  Prussia,  as  his  repeated  over- 
tures during  the  campaign  testify  ;  but  when  Frederick 
William  persistently  rejected  all  accommodation  with  the 
man  who  had  so  deeply  outraged  his  kingly  honour,  he 
turned  finally  to  Alexander. 

The  Czar  was  made  of  more  pliable  stuff.  Moreover, 
he  now  cherished  one  sentiment  that  brought  him  into 
sympathy  with  Napoleon,  namely,  hatred  of  England.  He 
certainly  had  grave  cause  for  complaint.  We  had  done 
nothing  to  help  the  allies  in  the  Polish  campaign  except 
to  send  a  few  cruisers  and  60,000  muskets,  which  last  did 
not  reach  the  Swedish  and  Russian  ports  until  the  war 
was  over.  True,  we  had  gone  out  of  our  way  to  attack 
Constantinople  at  his  request  ;  but  that  attack  had  failed  ; 
and  our  attitude  towards  his  Turkish  policy  was  one  of 
veiled  suspicion,  varied  with  moral  lectures.4  As  for  the 
loan  of  five  millions  sterling  which  the  Czar  had  asked  us 
to  guarantee,  we  had  put  him  off,  our  envoy  finally  re- 
minding him  that  it  had  been  of  the  first  importance  to 
help  Austria  to  move.  Worst  of  all,  our  cruisers  had 
seized  some  Russian  merchantmen  coming  out  of  French 
ports,  and  despite  protests  from  St.  Petersburg  the  legality 

1  Stadion  saw  through  it.     See  Beer,  p.  243. 

2  "Nap.  Corresp.,"  No.  11918. 

8  lb.,  No.  12028.  This  very  important  letter  seems  to  me  to  refute 
M.  Vandal's  theory  ("Nap.  et  Alexandre,1'  cli.  i.),  that  Napoleon  was 
throughout  seeking  for  an  alliance  with  Austria,  or  Prussia,  or  Russia. 

4  Canning  to  Paget,  May  Kith,  1807  ("  Paget  Papers,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  200). 


118  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

of  that  seizure  was  maintained.  Thus,  in  a  war  which 
concerned  our  very  existence  we  had  not  rendered  him  a 
single  practical  service,  and  yet  strained  the  principles  of 
maritime  law  at  the  expense  of  Russian  commerce.1 

Over  against  our  policy  of  blundering  delay  there  was 
that  of  Napoleon,  prompt,  keen,  and  ever  victorious.  The 
whole  war  had  arisen  out  of  the  conflict  of  these  two 
Powers  ;  and  Napoleon  had  never  ceased  to  declare  that 
it  was  essentially  a  struggle  between  England  and  the 
Continent.  After  Eylau  Alexander  was  proof  against 
these  arguments ;  but  now  the  triumphant  energy  of 
Napoleon  and  the  stolid  apathy  of  England  brought  about 
a  quite  bewildering  change  in  Russian  policy.  Delicate 
advances  having  been  made  by  the  two  Emperors,  an 
interview  was  arranged  to  take  place  on  a  raft  moored  in 
the  middle  of  the  River  Niemen  (June  25th). 

"  I  hate  the  English  as  much  as  you  do,  and  I  will 
second  you  in  all  your  actions  against  them."  Such  are 
said  to  have  been  the  words  with  which  Alexander  greeted 
Napoleon  as  they  stepped  on  to  the  raft.  Whereupon  the 
conqueror  replied  :  "  In  that  case  all  can  be  arranged  and 
peace  is  made."2  As  the  two  Emperors  were  unaccom- 
panied at  that  first  interview,  it  is  difficult  to  see  on  what 
evidence  thissiory  rests.  It  is  most  unlikely  that  either 
Emperor  would  divulge  the  remarks  of  the  other  on  that 
occasion  ;  and  the  words  attributed  to  Alexander  seem 
highly  impolitic.  For  what  was  his  position  at  this  time  ? 
He  was  striving  to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  case  against  an 
opponent  whose  genius  he  secretly  feared.  Besides,  we 
know  for  certain  that  he  was  most  anxious  to  postpone  his 
rupture  with  England  for  some  months.3  All  desire  for 
an  immediate  break  was  on  Napoleon's  side. 

We  can  therefore  only  guess  at  what  transpired,  from 
the  vague  descriptions  of  the  two  men  themselves.     They 

1  Garden,  vol.  x.,  pp.  214-218;  and  Gower's  despatch  of  June  17th, 
1807  (Russia,  No.  69). 

2  All  references  to  the  story  rest  ultimately  on  Bignon,  "Hist,  de 
France"  (vol.  vi.,  p.  316),  who  gives  no  voucher  for  it.  For  the  reasons 
given  above  I  must  regard  the  story  as  suspect.  Among  a  witty,  phrase- 
loving  people  like  the  French,  a  good  mot  is  almost  certain  to  gain  cre- 
dence and  so  pass  into  history. 

8  Tatischeff,  "  Alexandre  I  et  Napol6on"  (pp.  144-148). 


xxvn  TILSIT  119 

are  characteristic  enough  :  "  I  never  had  more  prejudices 
against  anyone  than  against  him"  said  Alexander  after- 
wards ;  "  but,  after  three-quarters  of  an  hour  of  conversa- 
tion, they  all  disappeared  like  a  dream  "  ;  and  later  he 
exclaimed  :  "  Would  that  I  had  seen  him  sooner  :  the 
veil  is  torn  aside  and  the  time  of  error  is  past."  As  for 
Napoleon,  he  wrote  to  Josephine  :  "  I  have  just  seen  the 
Emperor  Alexander  :  I  have  been  very  pleased  with  him  : 
he  is  a  very  handsome,  good,  and  young  Emperor :  he  has 
an  intellect  above  what  is  commonly  attributed  to  him."1 
The  tone  of  these  remarks  strikes  the  keynote  of  all  the 
conversations  that  followed.  At  the  next  day's  confer- 
ence, also  held  in  the  sumptuous  pavilion  erected  on  the 
raft,  the  King  of  Prussia  was  present;  but  towards  him 
Napoleon's  demeanour  was  cold  and  threatening.  He  up- 
braided him  with  the  war,  lectured  him  on  the  duty  of 
a  king  to  his  people,  and  bade  him  dismiss  Hardenberg. 
Frederick  William  listened  for  the  most  part  in  silence  ; 
his  nature  was  too  stiff  and  straightforward  to  practise 
any  Byzantine  arts  ;  but  when  his  trusty  Minister  was 
attacked,  he  protested  that  he  should  not  know  how  to 
replace  him.  Napoleon  had  foreseen  the  plea  and  at  once 
named  three  men  who  would  give  better  advice.  Among 
them  was  the  staunch  patriot  Stein  ! 

From  the  ensuing  conferences  the  King  was  almost 
wholly  excluded.  They  were  held  in  a  part  of  the  town 
of  Tilsit  which  was  neutralized  for  that  purpose,  as  also 
for  the  guards  and  diplomatists  of  the  three  sovereigns. 
There,  too,  lived  the  two  Emperors  in  closest  intercourse, 
while  on  most  days  the  Prussian  King  rode  over  from 
a  neighbouring  village  to  figure  as  a  sad,  reproachful  guest 
at  the  rides,  parades,  and  dinners  that  cemented  the  new 
Franco-Russian  alliance.  Yet,  amid  all  the  melodious 
raptures  of  Alexander  over  Napoleon's  newly  discovered 
virtues,  it  is  easy  to  detect  the  clinging  ground-tone  of 
Muscovite  ambition.  An  event  had  occurred  which  ex- 
cited the  hopes  of  both  Emperors.  At  the  close  of  May, 
the  Sultan  Selim  was  violently  deposed  by  the  Janissaries, 
who  clamoured  for  more  vigorous  measures  against  the 

1  Reports  of  Savary  and  Lesseps,  quoted  by  Vandal,  op.  cit.,  p.  61; 
"Corresp.,"  No.  12825. 


120  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Russians.  Never  did  news  come  more  opportunely  fot 
Napoleon  than  this,  which  reached  him  at  Tilsit  on,  or 
before,  June  the  24th.  He  is  said  to  have  exclaimed  to 
the  Czar  with  a  flash  of  dramatic  fatalism  :  "  It  is  a  decree 
of  Providence  which  tells  me  that  the  Turkish  Empire  can 
no  longer  exist." 1 

Certain  it  is  that  the  most  potent  spell  exerted  by  the 
great  conqueror  over  his  rival  was  a  guarded  invitation  to 
share  in  some  future  partition  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 
That  scheme  had  fascinated  Napoleon  ever  since  the  year 
1797,  when  he  gazed  on  the  Adriatic.  Though  laid  aside 
for  a  time  in  1806,  when  he  roused  the  Turks  against 
Russia,  it  was  never  lost  sight  of  ;  and  now,  on  the  basis 
of  a  common  hatred  of  England  and  a  common  desire  to 
secure  the  spoils  of  the  Ottoman  Power,  the  stately  fabric 
of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  was  reared. 

On  his  side,  Alexander  required  some  assurance  that 
Poland  should  not  be  reconstituted  in  its  integrity  —  a 
change  that  would  tear  from  Russia  the  huge  districts 
stretching  almost  up  to  Riga,  Smolensk,  and  Kiev,  which 
were  still  Polish  in  sympathy.  Here  Napoleon  reassured 
him,  at  least  in  part.  He  would  not  re-create  the  great 
kingdom  of  Poland  :  he  would  merely  carve  out  from 
Prussia  the  greater  part  of  her  Polish  possessions. 

These  two  important  questions  being  settled,  it  only 
remained  for  the  Czar  to  plead  for  the  King  of  Prussia,  to 
acknowledge  Napoleon's  domination  as  Emperor  of  the 
West,  while  he  himself,  as  autocrat  of  the  East,  secured 
a  better  western  boundary  for  Russia.  At  first  he  strove 
to  gain  for  Frederick  William  the  restoration  of  several  of 
his  lands  west  of  the  Elbe.  This  championship  was  not 
wholly  disinterested  ;  for  it  is  now  known  that  the  Czar 
had  set  his  heart  on  a  great  part  of  Prussian  Poland. 

In  truth,  he  was  a  sufficiently  good  disciple  of  the  French 
revolutionists  to  plead  very  cogently  his  claims  to  a  "  natu- 

1  Vandal,  p.  73,  says  that  the  news  reached  Napoleon  at  a  review  when 
Alexander  was  by  his  side.  If  so,  the  occasion  was  carefully  selected  with 
a  view  to  effect ;  for  the  news  reached  him  on,  or  before,  June  24th  (see 
"Corresp.,"  No.  12819).  Gower  states  that  the  news  reached  Tilsit  as 
early  as  the  15th  ;  and  Hardenberg  secretly  proposed  a  policy  of  partition 
of  Turkey  on  June  23rd  ("  Mems.,"  vol.  hi.,  p.  463).  Hardenberg  re- 
signed office  on  July  4th,  as  Napoleon  refused  to  treat  through  him. 


xxvn  TILSIT  121 

ral  frontier."  He  disliked  a  "dry  frontier":  he  must 
have  a  riverine  boundary  :  in  fact,  he  claimed  the  banks 
of  the  Lower  Niemen,  and,  further  south,  the  course  of  the 
rivers  Wavre,  Narew,  and  Bug.  To  this  claim  he  had  per- 
haps been  encouraged  by  some  alluring  words  of  Napo- 
leon that  thenceforth  the  Vistula  must  be  the  boundary  of 
their  empires.  But  his  ally  was  now  determined  to  keep 
Russia  away  from  the  old  Polish  capital  ;  and  in  strangely 
prophetic  words  he  pointed  out  that  the  Czar's  claims  would 
bring  the  Russian  eagles  within  sight  of  Warsaw,  which 
would  be  too  clear  a  sign  that  that  city  was  destined  to 
pass  under  the  Russian  rule.1  Divining  also  that  Alexan- 
der's plea  for  the  restoration  by  France  of  some  of  Prus- 
sia's western  lands  was  linked  with  a  plan  which  would 
give  Russia  some  of  her  eastern  districts,2  Napoleon  re- 
solved to  press  hard  on  Prussia  from  the  west.  While 
handing  over  to  the  Czar  only  the  small  district  around 
Bialystock,  he  remorselessly  thrust  Prussia  to  the  east  of 
the  Elbe. 

From  this  neither  the  arguments  of  the  Czar  nor  the 
entreaties  of  Queen  Louisa  availed  to  move  him.  And 
yet,  in  the  fond  hope  that  her  tears  might  win  back  Mag- 
deburg, that  noble  bulwark  of  North  German  indepen- 
dence, the  forlorn  Queen  came  to  Tilsit  to  crave  this  boon 
(July  6th).  It  was  a  terrible  ordeal  to  do  this  from  the 
man  who  had  repeatedly  insulted  her  in  his  official  jour- 
nals, figuring  her,  first  as  a  mailed  Amazon  galloping  at 
the  head  of  her  regiment,  and  finally  breathing  forth  scan- 
dals on  her  spotless  reputation. 

Yet,  for  the  sake  of  her  husband  and  her  people,  she 
braced  herself  up  to  the  effort  of  treating  him  as  a  gentle- 
man and  appealing  to  his  generosity.  If  she  was  able  to 
conceal  her  loathing,  this  was  scarcely  so  with  her  devoted 
lady  in  waiting,  the  Countess  von  Voss,  who  has  left  us  an 
acrid  account  of  Napoleon's  visit  to  the  Queen  at  the  mil- 
ler's house  at  Tilsit.3 

1  "  Corresp.,"  No.  12862,  letter  of  July  6th. 

2  Tatischeff  (pp.  146-148  and  163-168)  proves  from  the  Russian  archives 
that  these  schemes  were  Alexander's,  and  were  in  the  main  opposed  by 
Napoleon.  This  disproves  Vandal's  assertion  (p.  101)  that  Napoleon 
pressed  Alexander  to  take  the  Memel  and  Polish  districts. 

8  " Erinnerungen  der  Grafin  von  Voss." 


122  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

"  He  is  excessively  ugly,  with  a  fat  swollen  sallow  face,  very  corpu- 
lent, besides  short  and  entirely  without  figure.  His  great  eyes  roll 
gloomily  around ;  the  expression  of  his  features  is  severe ;  he  looks 
like  the  incarnation  of  fate  :  only  his  mouth  is  well  shaped,  and  his 
teeth  are  good.  He  was  extremely  polite,  talked  to  the  Queen  a  long 
time  alone.  .  .  .  Again,  after  dinner,  he  had  a  long  conversation  with 
the  Queen,  who  also  seemed  pretty  well  satisfied  with  the  result." 1 

Queen  Louisa's  verdict  about  his  appearance  was 
more  favourable  :  she  admired  his  head  "as  that  of  a 
Caesar."  With  winsome  boldness  inspired  by  patriotism, 
she  begged  for  Magdeburg.  Taken  aback  by  her  beauty 
and  frankness,  Napoleon  had  recourse  to  compliments 
about  her  dress.  "  Are  we  to  talk  about  fashion,  at  such 
a  time  ?  "  was  her  reply.  Again  she  pleaded,  and  again 
he  fell  back  on  vapidities.  Nevertheless,  her  appeals  to 
his  generosity  seemed  to  be  thawing  his  statecraft,  when 
the  entrance  of  that  unlucky  man,  her  husband,  gave  the 
conversation  a  colder  tone.  The  dinner,  however,  passed 
cheerfully  enough  ;  and,  according  to  French  accounts, 
Napoleon  graced  the  conclusion  of  dessert  by  offering  her 
a  rose.  Her  woman's  wit  flew  to  the  utterance  :  "  May  I 
consider  it  a  token  of  friendship,  and  that  you  grant  my 
request  for  Magdeburg  ? "  But  he  was  on  his  guard, 
parried  her  onset  with  a  general  remark  as  to  the  way  in 
which  such  civilities  should  be  taken,  and  turned  the 
conversation.  Then,  as  if  he  feared  the  result  of  a  second 
interview,  he  hastened  to  end  matters  with  the  Prussian 
negotiators.2 

He  thus  described  the  interview  in  a  letter  to  Josephine : 

"  I  have  had  to  be  on  my  guard  against  her  efforts  to  oblige  me  to 
some  concessions  for  her  husband ;  but  I  have  been  gallant,  and  have 
held  to  my  policy." 

This  was  only  too  clear  on   the  following  day,  when  the 
Queen  again  dined  with  the  sovereigns. 

1  Probably  this  refers  not  to  the  restitution  of  Silesia,  which  he  politely 
offered  to  her  (though  he  had  previously  granted  it  on  the  Czar's  request), 
but  to  Magdeburg  and  its  environs  west  of  the  Elbe.  On  July  7th  he  said 
to  Goltz,  the  Prussian  negotiator,  "  I  am  sorry  if  the  Queen  took  as  posi- 
tive assurances  the  phrases  de politesse  that  one  speaks  to  ladies"  (Har- 
denberg's  "Mems.,"  vol.  in.,  p.  512). 

2  See  the  new  facts  published  by  Bailleu  in  the  "  Hohenzollern  Jahr- 
buch  "  (1899).    The  "  rose  "  story  is  not  in  any  German  source. 


xxvn  TILSIT  123 

"  Napoleon,"  says  the  Countess  von  Voss,  "  seemed  malicious  and 
spiteful,  and  the  conversation  was  brief  and  constrained.  After  dinner 
the  Queen  again  conversed  apart  with  him.  On  taking  leave  she  said 
to  him  that  she  went  away  feeling  it  deeply  that  he  should  have  de- 
ceived her.     My  poor  Queen  :  she  is  quite  in  despair." 

When  conducted  to  her  carriage  by  Talleyrand  and 
Duroc,  she  sank  down  overcome  by  emotion.  Yet,  amid 
her  tears  and  humiliation,  the  old  Prussian  pride  had 
flashed  forth  in  one  of  her  replies  as  the  rainbow  amidst 
the  rain-storm.  When  Napoleon  expressed  his  surprise 
that  she  should  have  dared  to  make  war  on  him  with 
means  so  utterly  inadequate,  she  at  once  retorted  :  "  Sire, 
I  must  confess  to  Your  Majesty,  the  glory  of  Frederick 
the  Great  had  misled  us  as  to  our  real  strength  "  —  a  retort 
which  justly  won  the  praise  of  that  fastidious  connoisseur, 
Talleyrand,  for  its  reminder  of  Prussia's  former  greatness 
and  the  transitoriness  of  all  human  grandeur.1 

On  that  same  day  (July  7th)  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  was 
signed.  Its  terms  may  be  thus  summarized.  Out  of 
regard  for  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  Napoleon  consented 
to  restore  to  the  King  of  Prussia  the  province  of  Silesia, 
and  the  old  Prussian  lands  between  the  Elbe  and  Niemen. 
But  the  Polish  lands  seized  by  Prussia  in  the  second  and 
third  partitions  were  (with  the  exception  of  the  Bialystock 
district,  now  gained  by  Russia)  to  form  a  new  State 
called  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw.  Of  this  duchy  the  King  of 
Saxony  was  constituted  ruler.  Danzig,  once  a  Polish 
city,  was  now  declared  a  free  city  under  the  protection 
of  the  Kings  of  Prussia  and  Saxony,  but  the  retention 
there  of  a  French  garrison  until  the  peace,  made  it  prac- 
tically a  French  fortress.  Saxe-Coburg,  Oldenburg,  and 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin  were  restored  to  their  dukes,  but 
the  two  last  were  to.  be  held  by  French  troops  until 
England  made  peace  with  France.  With  this  aim  in 
view,  Napoleon  accepted  Alexander's  mediation  for  the 
conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  England,  provided 
that  she  accepted  that  mediation  within  one  month  of 
the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty. 

1  In  his  "  Memoirs"  (vol.  i.,  pt.  iii.)  Talleyrand  says  that  he  repeated 
this  story  several  times  at  the  Tuileries,  until  Napoleon  rebuked  him 
for  it. 


124  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

On  his  side,  the  Czar  now  recognized  the  recent  changes 
in  Naples,  Holland,  and  Germany  ;  among  the  last  of 
these  was  the  creation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Westphalia 
for  Jerome  Bonaparte  out  of  the  Prussian  lands  west  of 
the  Elbe,  the  Duchy  of  Brunswick,  and  the  Electorate  of 
Hesse-Cassel.  Holland  gained  East  Frisia  at  the  expense 
of  Prussia.  As  regards  Turkey,  the  Czar  pledged  himself 
to  cease  hostilities  at  once,  to  accept  the  mediation  of  Napo- 
leon in  the  present  dispute,  and  to  withdraw  Russian  troops 
from  the  Danubian  Provinces  as  soon  as  peace  was  con- 
cluded with  the  Sublime  Porte.  Finally,  the  two  Emper- 
ors mutually  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  their  possessions 
and  placed  their  ceremonial  and  diplomatic  relations  on  a 
footing  of  complete  equality. 

Such  were  the  published  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 
Even  if  this  had  been  all,  the  European  system  would 
have  sustained  the  severest  blow  since  the  Thirty  Years' 
War.  The  Prussian  monarchy  was  suddenly  bereft  of 
half  its  population,  and  now  figured  on  the  map  as  a  dis- 
jointed land,  scarcely  larger  than  the  possessions  of  the 
King  of  Saxony,  and  less  defensible  than  Jerome  Bona- 
parte's Kingdom  of  Westphalia  ;  while  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  soon  to  be  aggrandized  by  the  accession  of 
Mecklenburg  and  Oldenburg,  seemed  to  doom  the  House 
of  Hohenzollern  to  lasting  insignificance.1 

But  the  published  treaty  was  by  no  means  all.  There 
were  also  secret  articles,  the  chief  of  which  were  that  the 
Cattaro  district  —  to  the  west  of  Montenegro  —  and  the 
Ionian  Islandsi  should  go  to  France,  and  that  the  Czar 
would  recognize  Joseph  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Sicily  when 
Ferdinand  of  Naples  should  have  received  "an  indemnity 
such  as  the  Balearic  Isles,  or  Crete,  or  their  equivalent." 
Also,  if  Hanover  should  eventually  be  annexed  to  the 
Kingdom  of  Westphalia,  a  Westphalian  district  with  a 
population  of  from  three  to  four  hundred  thousand  souls 
would  be  retroceded  to  Prussia.  Finally,  the  chiefs  of  the 
Houses  of  Orange-Nassau,  Hesse-Cassel,  and  Brunswick 
were  to  receive  pensions  from  Murat  and  Jerome  Bona- 
parte, who  dispossessed  them. 

1  Before  Tilsit  Prussia  had  9,744,000  subjects,  afterwards  only  4,938,000. 
See  her  frontiers  in  map  on  p.  22-'>. 


xxvn  TILSIT  125 

Most  important  of  all  was  the  secret  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Russia,  also  signed  on  July  7th,  whereby  the  two 
Emperors  bound  themselves  to  make  common  cause  in 
any  war  that  either  of  them  might  undertake  against  any 
European  Power,  employing,  if  need  be,  the  whole  of  their 
respective  forces.  Again,  if  England  did  not  accept  the 
Czar's  mediation,  or  if  she  did  not,  by  the  1st  of  Decem- 
ber, 1807,  recognize  the  perfect  equality  of  all  flags 
at  sea,  and  restore  her  conquests  made  from  France  and 
her  allies  since  1805,  then  Russia  would  make  war  on 
her.  In  that  case,  the  present  allies  will  "  summon  the 
three  Courts  of  Copenhagen,  Stockholm,  and  Lisbon  to 
close  their  ports  against  the  English  and  declare  war 
against  England.  If  any  one  of  the  three  Courts  refuse, 
it  shall  be  treated  as  an  enemy  by  the  high  contracting 
parties,  and  if  Sweden  refuse,  Denmark  shall  be  compelled 
to  declare  war  on  her.''''  Pressure  would  also  be  put  on 
Austria  to  follow  the  same  course.  But  if  England  made 
peace  betimes,  she  might  recover  Hanover,  on  restoring 
her  conquests  in  the  French,  Spanish;  and  Dutch  colonies. 
Similarly,  if  Turkey  refused  the  mediation  of  Napoleon, 
he  would  in  that  case  help  Russia  to  drive  the  Turks 
from  Europe  — "  the  city  of  Constantinople  and  the 
province  of  Roumelia  alone  excepted."1 

The  naming  of  the  city  of  Constantinople,  which  is  in 
Roumelia,  betokens  a  superfluity  of  prudence.  But  it 
helps  to  confirm  the  statement  of  Napoleon's  secretary, 
M.  Meneval,  that  the  future  of  that  city  led  to  a  decided 
difference  of  opinion  between  the  Emperors.  After  one 
of  their  discussions,  Napoleon  stayed  poring  over  a  map, 
and  finally  exclaimed,  "  Constantinople  !  Never  !  It  is 
the  empire  of  the  world."  Doubtless  it  was  on  this  sub- 
ject that  Alexander  cherished  some  secret  annoyance. 
Certain  it  is  that,  despite  all  his  professions  of  devotion 
to  Napoleon,  he  went  back  to  St.  Petersburg  ill  at  ease 
[ind  possessed  with  a  certain  awe  of  the  conqueror.  For 
tvhat  had  he  gained  ?  He  received. a  small  slice  of  Prussian 
Doland,  and  the  prospect  of  aggrandizement  on  the  side  of 


1  The  exact  terms  of  the  secret  articles  and  of  the  secret  treaty  have 
•nly  been  known  since  1890,  when,  owing  to  the  labours  of  MM.  Fournier, 
ratischeff,  and  Vandal,  they  saw  the  light. 


126  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Turkey  and  Sweden,  Finland  being  pointed  out  as  an  easy 
prey.  For  these  future  gains  he  was  to  close  his  ports  to 
England  and  see  his  commerce,  his  navy,  and  his  seaboard 
suffer.  It  is  not  surprising  that  before  leaving  Tilsit  he 
remarked  to  Frederick  William  that  "  the  most  onerous 
condition  imposed  by  Napoleon  was  common  to  Russia  and 
Prussia."1 

This  refers  to  the  compulsion  put  upon  them  to  join 
Napoleon's  Continental  System.  In  the  treaty  signed 
with  Prussia  on  July  9th,  Napoleon  not  only  wrested 
away  half  her  lands,  but  required  the  immediate  closing 
of  all  her  ports  to  British  vessels.  We  may  also  note 
here  that,  by  the  extraordinary  negligence  of  the  Prussian 
negotiator,  Marshal  Kalckreuth,  the  subsequent  conven- 
tion as  to  the  evacuation  of  Prussia  by  the  French  troops 
left  open  a  loophole  for  its  indefinite  occupation.  Each 
province  or  district  was  to  be  evacuated  when  the  French 
requisitions  had  been  satisfied.2  The  exaction  of  impos- 
sible sums  would  therefore  enable  the  conquerors,  quite 
legally,  to  keep  their  locust  swarms  in  that  miserable  land. 
And  that  was  the  policy  pursued  for  sixteen  months. 

Why  this  refinement  of  cruelty  to  his  former  ally  ? 
Why  not  have  annexed  Prussia  outright  ?  Probably  there 
were  two  reasons  against  annexation  :  first,  that  his  army 
could  live  on  her  in  a  way  that  would  not  be  possible  with 
his  own  subjects  or  allies  ;  second,  that  the  army  of  occu- 
pation would  serve  as  a  guarantee  both  for  Russia's  good 
faith  and  for  the  absolute  exclusion  of  British  goods  from 
Prussia.3  This  had  long  been  his  aim.  He  now  attained 
it,  but  only  by  war  that  bequeathed  a  legacy  of  war,  and 
a  peace  that  was  no  peace. 

1  Gower's  despatch  of  July  12th.     "F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  69. 

2  De  Clercq,  "Traites,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  223-225;  Garden,  vol.  x.,  p.  233 
and  277-290.  Our  envoy,  Jackson,  reported  from  Memel  on  July  28th: 
"  Nothing  can  exceed  the  insolence  and  extortions  of  the  French.  No 
sooner  is  one  demand  complied  with  than  a  fresh  one  is  brought  forward." 

8  That  he  seriously  thought  in  November,  1807,  of  leaving  to  Prussia 
less  than  half  of  her  already  cramped  territories,  is  clear  from  his  instruc- 
tions to  Caulaincourt,  his  ambassador  to  the  Czar  :  "  Is  it  not  to  Prussia's 
interest  for  her  to  place  herself,  at  once,  and  with  entire  resignation, 
among  the  inferior  Powers  ?  "  A  new  treaty  was  to  be  framed,  under  the 
guise  of  interpreting  that  of  Tilsit,  Russia  keeping  the  Danubian  Provinces, 
and  Napoleon  more  than  half  of  Prussia  (Vandal,  vol.  i.,  p.  509). 


xxvn  TILSIT  .  127 

Napoleon's  behaviour  at  Tilsit  has  generally  been  re- 
garded, at  least  in  England,  as  prompted  by  an  insane 
lust  of  power  ;  and  the  treaty  has  been  judged  as  if  its 
aim  was  the  domination  of  the  Continent.  But  another 
explanation,  though  less  sweeping  and  attractive,  seems 
more  consonant  with  the  facts  of  the  case. 

He  hoped  that,  before  so  mighty  a  confederacy  as  was 
framed  at  Tilsit,  England  would  bend  the  knee,  give  up 
not  only  her  maritime  claims  but  her  colonial  conquests, 
and  humbly  take  rank  with  Powers  that  had  lived  their 
day.  The  conqueror  who  had  thrice  crumpled  up  the 
Hapsburg  States,  and  shattered  Prussia  in  a  day,  might 
well  believe  that  the  men  of  Downing  Street,  expert  only 
in  missing  opportunities  and  exasperating  their  friends, 
would  not  dare  to  defy  the  forces  of  united  Europe,  but 
would  bow  before  his  prowess  and  grant  peace  to  a  weary 
world.  In  his  letter  of  July  6th,  1807,  to  the  Czar,  he 
advised  the  postponement  of  the  final  summons  to  the 
British  Government,  because  it  would  "  give  five  months 
in  which  the  first  exasperation  will  die  down  in  England, 
and  she  will  have  time  to  understand  the  immense  con- 
sequences that  would  result  from  so  imprudent  a  struggle." 
Neither  Napoleon  nor  Alexander  was  deaf  to  generous 
aspirations.  They  both  desired  peace,  so  that  their  em- 
pires might  expand  and  consolidate.  Above  all,  France 
was  weary  of  war  ;  and  by  peace  the  average  Frenchman 
meant,  not  respite  from  Continental  strifes  that  yielded  a 
^urfeit  of  barren  glories,  but  peace  with  England.  The 
'words  of  Lucchesini,  the  former  Prussian  ambassador  in 
Paris,  on  this  subject  are  worth  quoting  : 

"  The  war  with  England  was  at  bottom  the  only  one  in  which  the 
French  public  took  much  interest,  since  the  evils  it  inflicted  on  France 
were  felt  every  moment  :  nothing  was  spoken  of  so  decidedly  among 
all  classes  of  the  people  as  the  wish  to  have  done  with  that  war;  and 
fvhen  one  spoke  of  peace  at  Paris,  one  always  meant  peace  with  Eng- 

and :  peace  with  the  othere  was  as  indifferent  to  the  public  as  the 

ictories  or  the  conquests  of  Bonaparte."  * 

If  the  French  middle  classes  longed  for  a  maritime  peace 
o  that  coffee  and  sugar  might  become  reasonably  cheap, 

1  Lucchesini  to  Gentz  in  October,  1806,  in   Gentz's  "Ausgewahlte 
>chriften,"  vol.  v.,  p.  257. 


128  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

■ 

how  much  more  would  their  ruler,  whose  heart  was  set  on 
colonies  and  a  realm  in  the  Orient  ?  In  Poland  he  had 
cheered  his  troops  with  the  thought  that  they  were  win- 
ning back  the  French  colonial  empire  ;  and,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  was  even  then  preparing  the  ground  in  Persia  for 
a  future  invasion  of  India.  These  plans  could  only  be 
carried  out  after  a  time  of  peace  that  should  rehabilitate 
the  French  navy.  Humanitarian  sentiment,  patriotism, 
and  even  the  promptings  of  a  wider  ambition,  therefore 
bade  him  strive  for  a  general  pacification,  such  as  he 
seemed  to  have  assured  at  Tilsit. 

But  the  means  which  he  adopted  were  just  those  that 
were  destined  to  defeat  this  aim.  Where  he  sought  to 
intimidate,  he  only  aroused  a  more  stubborn  resistance  : 
where  he  should  have  allayed  national  fears,  he  redoubled 
them.  He  did  not  understand  our  people  :  he  saw  not 
that,  behind  our  official  sluggishness  and  muddling,  there 
was  a  quenchless  national  vitality,  which,  if  directed  by  a 
genius,  could  defy  a  world-wide  combination.  If,  instead 
of  making  secret  compacts  with  the  Czar  and  trampling 
on  Prussia  ;  if,  instead  of  intriguing  with  the  Sultan  and 
the  Shah,  and  thus  reawakening  our  fears  respecting  Egypt 
and  India,  he  had  called  a  Congress  and  submitted  all  the 
present  disputes  to  general  discussion,  there  is  reason  to 
think  that  Great  Britain  would  have  received  his  over- 
tures. George  III.'s  Ministers  had  favoured  the  proposal 
of  a  Congress  when  put  forward  by  Austria  in  the  spring  ; 1 
and  they  would  doubtless  have  welcomed  it  from  Napoleon 
after  Friedland,  had  they  not  known  of  far-reaching  plans 
which  rendered  peace  more  risky  than  open  war.  This 
great  genius  had,  in  fact,  one  fatal  defect ;  he  had  little 
faith  except  in  outward  compulsion  ;  and  his  superabun- 
dant energy  of  menace  against  England  blighted  the  hopes 
of  peace  which  he  undoubtedly  cherished. 

Long  before  Alexander's  offer  of  mediation  was  for- 
warded to  London,  our  Ministers  had  taken  a  sudden  and 
desperate  resolution.  They  determined  to  compel  Den- 
mark to  join  England  and  Sweden,  and  to  hold  the  fleet 
at  Copenhagen  as  a  gauge  of  Danish  fidelity. 

1  See  Canning's  reply  to  Stahremberg'a  Note,  on  April  25th,  1807,  in 
the  "Ann.  Reg.,"  p.  724. 


xxvn  TILSIT  129 

That  momentous  resolve  was  formed  on  or  just  before 
July  the  16th,  in  consequence  of  news  that  had  arrived 
from  Memel  and  Tilsit.  The  exact  purport  of  that  news, 
and  the  manner  of  its  acquisition,  have  been  one  of  the 
puzzles  of  modern  history.  But  the  following  facts  seem 
to  furnish  a  solution.  Our  Foreign  Office  Records  show 
that  our  agent  at  Tilsit,  Mr.  Mackenzie,  who  was  on  confi- 
dential terms  with  General  Bennigsen,  left  post  haste  for 
England  immediately  after  the  first  imperial  interview  ; 
and  the  news  which  he  brought,  together  with  reports  of 
the  threatening  moves  of  the  French  on  Holstein,  clinched 
the  determination  of  our  Government  to  checkmate  the 
Franco-Russian  aims  by  bringing  strong  pressure  to  bear 
on  Denmark.  To  keep  open  the  mouth  of  the  Baltic  was 
an  urgent  necessity,  otherwise  we  should  lose  touch  with 
the  Anglo-Swedish  forces  campaigning  against  the  French 
near  Stralsund.1  Furthermore,  it  should  be  noted  that 
Denmark  held  the  balance  in  naval  affairs.  France  and 
her  allies  now  had  fifty-nine  sail  of  the  line  ready  for  sea  : 
the  compact  with  the  Czar  would  give  her  twenty-four 
more  ;  and  if  Napoleon  seized  the  eighteen  Danish  and 
nine  Portuguese  battleships,  his  fighting  strength  would  be 
nearly  equal  to  our  own.2  Canning  therefore  determined, 
on  July  16th,  to  compel  Denmark  to  side  with  us,  or  at 
least  to  observe  a  neutrality  favourable  to  the  British 
cause  ;  and,  to  save  her  honour,  he  proposed  to  send  an 
irresistible  naval  force. 

"  Denmark's  safety,"  he  wrote  on  July  16th,  "is  to  be  found,  under 
the  present  circumstances  of  the  world,  only  in  a  balance  of  opposite 
dangers.  For  it  is  not  to  be  disguised  that  the  influence  which  France 
has  acquired  from  recent  events  over  the  North  of  Europe,  might,  un- 
less balanced  by  the  naval  power  of  Great  Britain,  leave  to  Denmark 
no  other  option  than  that  of  compliance  with  the  demands  of  Bona- 
parte."8 

A  balance  of  opposite  dangers!  In  this  phrase  Canning 
summed  up  his  policy  towards  Denmark.     Threatened  by 

1  For  Mackenzie's  report  and  other  details  gleaned  from  our  archives, 
see  my  article  "  A  British  Agent  at  Tilsit,"  in  the  "  Eng.  Hist.  Rev."  of 
October,  1901. 

2 James,  "Naval  History,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  408. 

8"F.  O.,"  Denmark,  No.  53. 

VOL.    II K 


130  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Napoleon  on  the  land,  she  was  to  be  threatened  by  us 
from  the  sea  ;  and  Canning  hoped  that  these  opposite 
forces  would,  at  least,  secure  Danish  neutrality,  without 
which  Sweden  must  succumb  in  her  struggle  against 
France.  That  some  compulsion  would  be  needed  had 
long  been  clear.  In  fact,  the  use  of  compulsion  had 
first  been  recommended  by  the  Russian  and  Prussian 
Governments,  which  had  gone  so  far  as  to  include 
in  the  Treaty  of  Bartenstein  a  proposal  of  common 
action,  along  with  England,  Austria,  and  Sweden,  to 
compel  Denmark  to  side  with  the  allies  against  Napoleon.1 
To  this  resolve  England  still  clung,  despite  the  defec- 
tion of  the  Czar.  In  truth,  his  present  conduct  made 
the  case  for  the  coercion  of  Denmark  infinitely  more 
urgent. 

As  to  the  reality  of  Napoleon's  designs  on  Denmark, 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  After  his  return  to  France,  he 
wrote  from  St.  Cloud,  directing  Talleyrand  to  express  his 
displeasure  that  Denmark  had  not  fulfilled  her  promises  : 
"  Whatever  my  desire  to  treat  Denmark  well,  I  cannot  hin- 
der her  suffering  from  having  allowed  the  Baltic  to  be  vio- 
lated [by  the  English  expedition  to  Stralsund]  ;  and,  if 
England  refuses  Russia's  mediation,  Denmark  must  choose 
either  to  make  war  against  England,  or  against  me."2 
Whence  it  is  clear  that  Denmark  had  given  Napoleon 
grounds  for  hoping  that  she  would  declare  the  Baltic  a 
mare  clausum. 

The  British  Government  had  so  far  fathomed  these 
designs  as  to  see  the  urgency  of  the  danger.  Accordingly 
it  proposed  to  Denmark  a  secret  defensive  alliance,  the 
chief  terms  of  which  were  the  handing  over  of  the  Danish 
fleet,  to  be  kept  as  a  "  sacred  pledge  "  by  us  till  the  peace, 
a  subsidy  of  ,£100,000  paid  to  Denmark  for  that  fleet,  and 
the  offer  of  armed  assistance  in  case  she  should  be  attacked 
by  France.  This  offer  of  defensive  alliance  was  repulsed, 
and  the  Danish  Prince  Royal  determined  to  resist  even 

1  Garden,  vol.  x. ,  p.  408. 

2uCorresp.,"  No.  12962  ;  see  too  No.  12936,  ordering  the  15,000  Span- 
ish troops  now  serving  him  near  Hamburg  to  form  the  nucleus  of  Ber- 
nadotte's  army  of  observation,  which,  "in  case  of  events,"  was  to  be 
strengthened  by  as  many  Dutch. 


cxvn  TILSIT  131 

the  mighty  armada  which  was  now  nearing  his  shores. 
Towards  the  close  of  August,  eighty-eight  British  ships 
were  in  the  Sound  and  the  Belt ;  and  when  the  transports 
from  Rugen  and  Stralsund  joined  those  from  Yarmouth, 
is  many  as  15,400  troops  were  at  hand,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lord  Cathcart.  A  landing  was  effected  near 
Copenhagen,  and  offers  of  alliance  were  again  made,  in- 
cluding the  deposit  of  the  Danish  fleet ;  "  but  if  this  offer 
is  rejected  now,  it  cannot  be  repeated.  The  captured 
property,  public  and  private,  must  then  belong  to  the  cap- 
tors :  and  the  city,  when  taken,  must  share  the  fate  of 
conquered  places."  The  Danes  stoutl}-  repelled  offers  and 
threats  alike  :  the  English  batteries  thereupon  bombarded 
the  city  until  the  gallant  defenders  capitulated  (Septem- 
ber 7th).  The  conditions  hastily  concluded  by  our  com- 
manders were  that  the  British  forces  should  occupy  the 
citadel  and  dockyard  for  six  weeks,  should  take  possession 
of  the  ships  and  naval  stores,  and  thereupon  evacuate 
Zealand. 

These  terms  were  scrupulously  carried  out  ;  and  at  the 

close  of  six  weeks  our  forces  sailed  away  with  the  Danish 

fleet,  including  fifteen  sail  of  the  line,  fifteen  frigates,  and 

thirty-one  small  vessels.     This  end  to  the  expedition  was 

keenly  regretted  by  Canning.      In  a  lengthy  Memorandum 

he  left  it  on  record  that  he  desired,  not  merely  Denmark's 

fleet,  but  her  alliance.      In  his  view  nothing  could  save 

Europe  but  a  firm  Anglo-Scandinavian  league,  which  would 

keep  open  the  Baltic  and  set  bounds  to  the  designs  of  the 

lwo  Emperors.     Only  by  such  an  alliance  could  Sweden 

pe  saved  from  Russia  and  France.      Indeed,  foreseeing  the 

langer  to  Sweden  from  a  French  army  acting  from  Zea- 

and  as  a  base,  Canning   proposed  to  Gustavus   that  he 

hould  occupy  that  island,  or,  failing  that,  receive  succour 

rom  a  British  force  on  his  own  shore  of  the  Sound.     But 

>oth  offers  were  declined.     The  final  efforts  made  to  draw 

)enmark  into  our  alliance  were  equally  futile,  and  she 

ept  up  hostilities  against  us  for  nearly  seven  years.     All 

hat  resulted,  then,  from  Canning's  action  was  the  hatred 

•  |f  a  brave  people  and  the  possession  of  their  fleet  ;  and  our 

atesman,  while  blaming  the  precipitate  action  of  our  com- 

landers  in  insisting  solely  upon  the  surrender  of  the  fleet, 


112  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap, 

declared  that  that  action,  apart  from  an  Anglo-Danish 
alliance,  was  "an  act  of  great  injustice."1 

And  as  such  it  has  been  generally  regarded,  that  is, 
by  those  who  did  not,  and  could  not,  know  the  real  state 
of  the  case.  In  one  respect  our  action  was  unpardonable  : 
it  was  not  the  last  desperate  effort  of  a  long  period  of 
struggle  :  it  came  after  a  time  of  selfish  torpor  fatal  alike 
to  our  reputation  and  the  interests  of  our  allies.  After 
protesting  their  inability  to  help  them,  Ministers  belied 
their  own  words  by  the  energy  with  which  they  acted 
against  a  small  State.  And  the  prevalent  opinion  found 
expression  in  the  protests  uttered  in  Parliament  that  it 
would  have  been  better  to  face  the  whole  might  of  the 
French,  Russian,  and  Danish  navies  than  to  emulate  the 
conduct  of  those  who  had  overrun  and  despoiled  Switzer- 
land. 

Moreover,  our  action  did  not  benefit  Sweden,  but  just 
the  reverse.  Cathcart's  force,  that  had  been  helping  the 
Swedes  in  the  defence  of  their  Pomeranian  province,  was 
withdrawn  in  order  to  strengthen  our  hands  against 
Copenhagen.  Thereupon  the  gallant  Gustavus,  over- 
borne by  the  weight  of  Marshal  B rune's  corps,  sued  for 
an  armistice.  It  was  granted  only  on  the  condition  that 
Stralsund  should  pass  into  Brune's  hands  (August  20th) ; 
and  the  Swedes,  unable  even  to  hold  Rugen,  were  forced 
to  give  up  that  island  also.  Sick  in  health  and  weary  of 
a  world  that  his  chivalrous  instincts  scorned,  Gustavus 
withdrew  his  forces  into  Sweden.  Even  there  he  was 
menaced.  The  hostilities  which  Denmark  forthwith 
commenced  against  England  and  Sweden  exposed  his 
southern  coasts  ;  but  he  now  chose  to  lean  on  the  valour 
of  his  own  subjects  rather  than  on  the  broken  reed  of 
British  assistance,  and  awaited  the  attacks  of  the  Danes 
on  the  west  and  of  the  Russians  on  his  province  of  Finland. 

The  news  from  Copenhagen  also   furnished   the  Czar 

1  "F.  O.,"  Denmark,  No.  53.  I  published  this  Memorandum  of  Can- 
ning and  other  unpublished  papers  in  an  article,  "  Canning  and  Denmark," 
in  the  '« Eng.  Hist.  Rev."  of  January,  1896.  The  terms  of  the  capitulation 
were,  it  seems,  mainly  decided  on  by  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  who  wrote  to 
Canning  (September  8th) :  "I  might  have  carried  our  terms  higher  .  .  . 
had  not  our  troops  been  needed  at  home."  ("  Well.  Despatches,"  vol.  ih.t 
p.  7). 


xxvn  TILSIT  133 

with  a  good  excuse  for  hostilities  with  England.  For 
such  an  event  he  had  hitherto  been  by  no  means  de- 
sirous. On  his  return  from  Tilsit  to  St.  Petersburg  he 
found  the  nobility  and  merchants  wholly  opposed  to  a 
rupture  with  the  Sea  Power,  the  former  disdaining  to 
clasp  the  hand  of  the  conqueror  of  Friedland,  the  latter 
foreseeing  ruin  from  the  adoption  of  the  Continental 
System  ;  and  when  Napoleon  sent  Savary  on  a  special 
mission  to  the  Czar's  Court,  the  Empress-Mother  and 
nobles  alike  showed  their  abhorrence  of  "the  executioner 
of  the  Due  d'Enghien."  In  vain  were  imperial  favours 
lavished  on  this  envoy.  He  confessed  to  Napoleon  that 
only  the  Czar  and  the  new  Foreign  Minister,  Romantzoff, 
were  favourable  to  France  ;  and  it  was  soon  obvious 
that  their  ardour  for  a  partition  of  Turkey  must  disturb 
the  warily  balancing  policy  which  Napoleon  adopted  as 
soon  as  the  Czar's  friendship  seemed  assured. 

The  dissolution  of  this  artificial  alliance  was  a  task  far 
beyond  the  powers  of  British  statesmanship.  To  Alex- 
ander's offer  of  mediation  between  France  and  England 
Canning  replied  that  we  desired  first  to  know  what  were 
"the  just  and  equitable  terms  on  which  France  intended 
to  negotiate,"  and  secondly  what  were  the  secret  articles 
of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  That  there  were  such  was  obvious  ; 
for  the  published  treaty  made  no  mention  of  the  Kings  of 
Sardinia  and  of  the  two  Sicilies,  in  whom  Alexander  had 
taken  so  deep  an  interest.  But  the  second  request  annoyed 
the  Czar ;  and  this  feeling  was  intensified  by  our  action  at 
Copenhagen.  Yet,  though  he  pronounced  it  an  act  of 
"  unheard-of  violence,"  the  Russian  official  notes  to  our 
i  Government  were  so  far  reassuring  that  Lord  Castlereagh 
was  able  to  write  to  Lord  Cathcart  (September  22nd)  : 
i"  Russia  does  not  show  any  disposition  to  resent  or  to 
!  complain  of  what  we  have  done  at  Copenhagen.  .  .  .  The 
|  tone  of  the  Russian  cabinet  has  become  much  more  con- 
ciliatory to  us  since  they  heard  of  your  operations  at 
Copenhagen."  1    It  would  seem,  however,  that  this  double- 

1  Castlereagh's  "Corresp.,"  vol.  vi.  So  too  Gower  reported  from  St. 
Petersburg  on  October  1st  that  public  opinion  was  "  decidedly  averse  to 
war  with  England,  .  .  .  and  it  appears  to  me  that  the  English  name  was 
scarcely  ever  more  popular  in  Russia  than  at  the  present  time." 


134  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

dealing  was  prompted  by  naval  considerations.  The  Czar 
desired  to  temporize  until  his  Mediterranean  squadron 
should  gain  a  place  of  safety  and  his  Baltic  ports  be 
encased  in  ice ;  but  on  the  27th  October  (8th  November, 
N.S.)  he  broke  off  all  communications  with  us,  and 
adopted  the  Continental  System. 

Meanwhile,  at  the  other  extremity  of  Europe,  events 
were  transpiring  that  served  as  the  best  excuse  for  our 
harshness  towards  Denmark.  Even  before  our  fleet  sailed 
for  the  Sound,  Napoleon  was  weaving  his  plans  for  the 
destruction  of  Portugal.  It  is  clear  that  he  designed  to 
strike  her  first  before  taking  any  action  against  Denmark. 
During  his  return  journey  from  Tilsit  to  Paris,  he  directed 
Talleyrand  to  send  orders  to  Lisbon  for  the  closing  of  all 
Portuguese  ports  against  British  goods  by  September  the 
1st  —  "in  default  of  which  I  declare  war  on  Portugal." 
He  also  ordered  the  massing  of  20,000  French  troops  at 
Bayonne  in  readiness  to  join  the  Spanish  forces  that  were 
to  threaten  the  little  kingdom.1 

What  crime  had  Portugal  committed?  She  had  of  late 
been  singularly  passive  :  anxiously  she  looked  on  at  the 
gigantic  strifes  that  were  engulfing  the  smaller  States 
one  by  one.  Her  conduct  towards  Napoleon  had  been  far 
less  provocative  than  that  of  Denmark  towards  England. 
Threatened  with  partition  by  him  and  Spain  in  1801,  she 
had  eagerly  snatched  at  peace,  and  on  the  rupture  of  the 
Peace  of  Amiens  was  fain  to  purchase  her  neutrality  at 
the  cost  of  a  heavy  subsidy  to  France,  which  she  still  paid 
in  the  hope  of  prolonging  her  "existence  on  sufferance."2 
That  hope  now  faded  away. 

As  far  back  as  February,  1806,  Napoleon  had  lent  a 
ready  ear  to  the  plans  which  Godoy,  the  all-powerful 
Minister  at  Madrid,  had  proposed  for  the  partition  of 
Portugal ;  and,  in  the  month  of  July  following,  Talley- 
rand held  out  to  our  plenipotentiary  at  Paris  the  threat 
that,  unless  England  speedily  made  peace  with  France, 
Napoleon  would  annex  Switzerland  —  "but  still  less  can 

1  Letters  of  July  19th  and  29th. 

2  The  phrase  is  that  of  Viscount  Strangford,  our  ambassador  at  Lisbon 
("F.  O.,"  Portugal,  No.  65).  So  Baumgarten,  "Geschichte  Spaniens," 
vol.  i.,  p.  136. 


xxvn  TILSIT  135 

we  alter,  for  any  other  consideration,  our  intention  of 
invading  Portugal.  The  army  destined  for  that  purpose 
is  already  assembling  at  Bayonne."  A  year's  respite  was 
gained  for  the  House  of  Braganza  by  the  campaigns  of 
Jena  and  Friedland.  But,  now,  with  the  tenacity  of  his 
nature,  the  Emperor  returned  to  the  plan,  actually  tried 
in  1801  and  prepared  for  in  1806,  of  crushing  our  faithful 
ally  in  order  to  compel  us  to  make  peace.  On  this  occa- 
sion he  counted  on  certain  success,  as  may  be  seen  by  the 
following  extract  from  the  despatch  of  the  Portuguese 
ambassador  at  Paris  to  his  Government : 

"On  Sunday  afternoon  [August  2nd]  there  was  a  diplomatic 
Levee.  The  Emperor  came  up  to  me  as  I  stood  in  the  circle,  and  in  a 
low  voice  said :  '  Have  you  written  to  your  Court  ?  Have  your  de- 
spatched a  courier  with  my  final  determination  ? '  —  I  replied  in  the 
affirmative.  —  'Very  well,'  said  the  Emperor,  'then  by  this  time  your 
Court  knows  that  she  must  break  with  England  before  the  1st  of 
September.  It  is  the  only  way  to  accelerate  peace.'  —  As  the  place  did 
not  permit  discussion  on  my  part,  I  answered :  '  I  should  think,  Sire, 
that  England  must  now  be  sincerely  anxious  to  make  peace.'  — '  Oh,' 
replied  the  Emperor,  '  we  are  very  certain  of  that :  however,  in  all 
cases,  you  must  break  either  with  England  or  France  before  the  1st 
of  September.'  —  He  then  turned  about  and  addressed  himself  to  the 
Danish  Minister,  as  far  as  I  could  judge  to  the  same  purport."  l 

.  Equally  confident  is  Napoleon's  tone  in  the  lately  pub- 
lished letter  of  September  7th  : 

* 

"  As  soon  as  I  received  news  of  the  English  expedition  against 
Copenhagen,2 1  caused  Portugal  to  be  informed  that  all  her  ports  must 
be  closed  to  England,  and  I  massed  an  army  of  40,000  men  at  Bayonne 
to  join  the  Spaniards  in  enforcing  this  action,  if  necessary.  But  a 
letter  I  have  just  received  from  the  Prince  Regent  [of  Portugal]  leads 
me  to  presume  that  this  last  measure  will  not  be  necessary,  that  the 
Portuguese  ports  will  be  closed  to  the  English  by  the  time  this  is  read, 
and  that  Portugal  will  have  declared  war  against  England.  On  the 
jother  hand,  my  flotilla  will  be  ready  for  action  on  1st  October,  and  I 
jshall  have  a  large  army  at  Boulogne,  ready  to  attempt  a  coup  de  main 
|on  England." 


1  Report  of  the  Portuguese  ambassador,  Lourenc,o  de  Lima,  dated 
ugust  7th,  1807,  inclosed  by  Viscount  Strangford  ("F.  O.,"  Portugal, 
o.  55). 

2  This  statement  as  to  the  date  of  the  summons  to  Portugal  is  false :  it 
as  July  19th  when  he  ordered  it  to  be  sent,  that  is,  long  before  the  Copen- 
hagen news  reached  him. 


! 


136  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

The  letter  concludes  by  ordering  that  all  British  diplo- 
matists are  to  be  driven  out  of  Europe,  and  that  Sweden 
must  make  common  cause  with  France  and  Russia.  Such 
were  the  means  to  be  used  for  forcing  affrighted  Peace 
again  to  visit  this  distracted  earth. 

In  truth,  the  fate  of  the  British  race  seemed  for  the 
time  to  hang  upon  the  events  at  Copenhagen  and 
Lisbon.  Very  much  depended  on  the  action  of  the 
Prince  Regent  of  Portugal.  Had  he  tamely  submitted 
to  Napoleon's  ukase  and  placed  his  fleet  and  his  vast 
colonial  empire  at  the  service  of  France,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  even  the  high-souled  Canning  would  not  have 
stooped  to  surrender  in  face  of  odds  so  overwhelming. 
The  young  statesman's  anxiety  as  to  the  action  of  Por- 
tugal is  attested  by  many  a  long  and  minutely  corrected 
despatch  to  Viscount  Strangford,  our  envoy  at  Lisbon. 
But,  fortunately  for  us,  Napoleon  committed  the  blunder 
which  so  often  marred  his  plans :  he  pushed  them  too 
far :  he  required  the  Prince  Regent  to  adopt  a  course  of 
conduct  repellent  to  an  honourable  man,  namely,  to  con- 
fiscate the  merchandise  and  property  of  British  merchants 
who  had  long  trusted  the  good  faith  of  the  House  of 
Braganza.  To  this  last  demand  the  prince  opposed  a 
dignified  resistance,  though  on  all  other  points  he  gave 
way.  This  will  appear  from  Lord  Strangford's  despatch 
of  August  13th  : 

"...  The  Portuguese  Ministers  place  all  their  hopes  of  being  able 
to  ward  off  this  terrible  blow  in  the  certainty  which  they  entertain  of 
England  being  obliged  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  a  general 
peace.  .  .  .  The  very  existence  of  the  Portuguese  Monarchy  depends 
on  the  celerity  with  which  England  shall  meet  the  pacific  interference 
of  the  Emperor  of  Russia.  The  Prince  Regent  gives  the  most  solemn 
promise  that  he  will  not  on  any  account  consent  to  the  measure  of  con- 
fiscating the  property  of  British  subjects  residing  under  his  protection. 
But  T  think  that  if  France  could  be  induced  to  give  up  this  point,  and 
limit  her  demands  to  the  exclusion  of  British  commerce  from  Portugal, 
the  Government  of  this  country  would  accede  to  them.  .  .  ." 

A  week  later  he  states  that  Portugal  begged  England  to 
put  up  with  a  temporary  rupture,  and  reports  that  a 
quantity  of  diamonds  had  been  taken  out  of  the  Treasury 
and  sent  to  Paris  to  be  distributed  in  presents  to  persons 
supposed   to  possess  influence  over  the  minds  of   Bona- 


xxvn  TILSIT  137 

parte  and  Talleyrand.  It  would  be  interesting  to  trace 
the  history  of  these  diamonds.  But,  as  Napoleon  had 
recently  awarded  sums  amounting  in  all  to  26,582,000 
francs  from  out  of  the  estates  confiscated  in  Poland,1 
signs  of  sudden  affluence  were  widespread  in  Paris  and 
rendered  it  difficult  to  detect  the  receivers  of  the  gems. 
Talleyrand  was  the  usual  recipient  of  such  douceurs. 
But  on  August  the  14th  he  had  retired  from  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  gaining  the  title  of  Vice  Grand- 
Elector  ;  and,  if  we  are  to  be  guided,  not  by  the  state- 
ments of  his  personal  foes,  Hauterive  and  Pasquier,  but 
by  the  determination  which  he  is  known  to  have  formed 
at  Tilsit,  that  he  would  not  be  "  the  executioner  of 
Europe,"  we  may  judge  that  he  disapproved  of  the 
barbarous  treatment  meted  out  to  Prussia  and  now 
planned  against  Portugal.2 

As  has  been  stated  above,  the  partition  of  this  kingdom 
had  been  planned  by  Godoy  in  concert  with  Napoleon 
early  in  1806.  That  pampered  minion  of  the  Spanish 
Court,  angry  at  the  shelving  of  plans  which  promised  to 
yield  him  a  third  of  Portugal,  called  Spain  to  arms  while 
Napoleon  was  marching  to  Jena,  an  affront  which  the  con- 
queror seemed  to  overlook  but  never  really  forgave.  Now, 
however,  he  appeared  wholly  to  enter  into  Godoy's  scheme  ; 
and,  while  the  Prince  Regent  of  Portugal  was  appealing 
to  his  pity,  the  Emperor  (September  25th,  1807)  charged 
Duroc  to  confer  with  Godoy 's  confidential  agent  at  Paris, 
Don  Izquierdo.  "...  As  for  Portugal,  I  make  no  diffi- 
culty about  granting  to  the  King  of  Spain  a  suzerainty 
over  Portugal,  and  even  taking  part  of  it  away  for  the 
Queen  of  Etruria  and  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  [Godoy]." 

1  "Corresp.,"  No.  12830. 

2  See  Lady  Blennerhasset's  "  Talleyrand,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xvi.,  for  a  dis- 
cussion of  Talleyrand's  share  in  the  new  policy.  This  question,  together 
with  many  others,  cannot  be  solved,  owing  to  Talleyrand's  destruction  of 
most  of  his  papers.  In  June,  1806,  he  advised  a  partition  of  Portugal ;  and 
in  the  autumn  he  is  said  to  have  favoured  the  overthrow  of  the  Spanish 
Bourbons.  But  there  must  surely  be  some  connection  between  Napo- 
leon's letter  to  him  of  July  19th,  1807,  on  Portuguese  affairs  and  the  resig- 
nation which  he  persistently  offered  on  their  return  to  Paris.  On  August 
10th  he  wrote  to  the  Emperor  that  that  letter  would  be  the  last  act  of  his 
Ministry  ("Lettros  infrlites  de  Tall.,"  p.  476).  He  was  succeeded  by 
Champagny. 


138  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Duroc  was  also  to  point  out  the  difficulty,  now  that  "all 
Italy "  belonged  to  Napoleon,  of  allowing  "  that  deform- 
ity," the  kingdom  of  Etruria,  to  disfigure  the  peninsula. 
The  change  would,  in  fact,  doubly  benefit  the  French 
Emperor.  It  would  enable  him  completely  to  exclude 
British  commerce  from  the  port  of  Leghorn,  where  it  was 
trickling  in  alarmingly,  and  also  to  place  the  mouths  of  the 
Tagus  and  Douro  in  the  hands  of  obedient  vassals. 

Such  was  the  scheme  in  outline.  Despite  the  offer  of 
the  Prince  Regent  to  obey  all  Napoleon's  behests  except 
that  relating  to  the  seizure  of  British  subjects  and  their 
property,  war  was  irrevocably  resolved  on  by  October  the 
12th.1  And  on  October  the  27th  a  secret  convention  was 
signed  at  the  Palace  of  Fontainebleau  for  arranging  "  the 
future  lot  of  Portugal  by  a  healthy  policy  and  conformably 
to  the  interests  of  France  and  Spain."  Portugal  was  now 
to  be  divided  into  three  very  unequal  parts  :  the  largest 
portion,  comprising  Estremadura,  Beira,  and  Tras-os 
Montes,  was  reserved  for  a  future  arrangement  at  the  gen- 
eral peace,  but  meanwhile  was  to  be  held  by  France  : 
Algarve  and  Alemtejo  were  handed  over  to  Godoy  ;  while 
the  diminutive  province  of  Entre  Minho  e  Bouro'was  flung 
as  a  sop  to  the  young  King  of  Etruria  and  his  consort,  a 
princess  of  the  House  of  Spain,  to  console  them  for  the 
loss  of  Etruria.  A  vague  promise  was  made  that  the 
House  of  Braganza  might  be  reinstated  in  the  first  of 
these  three  portions,  in  case  England  restored  Gibraltar, 
Trinidad,  and  other  colonies  taken  by  her  from  Spain  or 
her  allies  ;  and  Napoleon  guaranteed  to  the  King  of  Spain 
his  possessions  in  Europe,  exclusive  of  the  Balearic  Isles, 
offering  also  to  recognize  him  as  Emperor  of  the  Two 
Americas. 

Meanwhile  Junot  was  leading  his  army  corps  from 
Bayonne  towards  Salamanca  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  to  give 
effect  to  this  healthful  arrangement.  This  general,  whom 
it  was  desirable  to  remove  from  Paris  on  account  of  his 
rather  too  open  liaison  with  one  of  the  Bonaparte  prin- 
cesses, was  urged  to  the  utmost  speed  and  address  by  the 
Emperor.  He  must  cover  the  whole  200  leagues  in  thirty- 
five  days  ;  lack  of  provisions  must  not  hinder  the  march, 

i  "  Corresp.,"  Nos.  13235,  37,  43. 


xxvn  TILSIT  139 

for  "  20,000  men  can  live  anywhere,  even  in  a  desert "  ; 
and,  above  all,  as  the  Prince  Regent  had  again  offered  to 
declare  war  on  England,  he  (Junot)  could  represent  that 
he  came  as  an  ally  :  "  I  have  already  informed  you  that 
my  intention  in  authorizing  you  to  enter  that  land  as  an 
ally  was  to  enable  you  to  seize  its  fleet,  but  that  my  mind 
was  fully  made  up  to  take  possession  of  Portugal."1  Lis- 
bon, in  fact,  was  to  be  served  as  Venice  was  ten  years  be- 
fore, the  lion  donning  the  skin  of  the  fox  so  as  to  effect 
a  peaceful  seizure.  But  that  ruse  could  hardly  succeed 
twice.  The  Prince  Regent  had  his  ships  ready  for  flight. 
The  bluff  and  headstrong  Junot,  nicknamed  "the  tempest" 
by  the  army,  was  too  artless  to  catch  the  prince  by  guile  ; 
but  he  hurried  his  soldiers  over  mountains  and  through 
flooded  gorges  until,  on  November  30th,  1,500  tattered, 
shoeless,  famished  grenadiers  straggled  into  Lisbon  —  to 
find  that  the  royal  quarry  had  flown. 

The  Prince  Regent  took  this  momentous  resolve  with 
the  utmost  reluctance.  For  many  weeks  he  had  clung  to 
the  hope  that  Napoleon  would  spare  him  ;  and  though  he 
accepted  a  convention  with  England,  whereby  he  gained 
the  convoy  of  our  men-of-war  across  the  Atlantic  and  the 
promise  of  aggrandizement  in  South  America,  he  still  con- 
tinued to  temporize,  and  that  too,  when  a  British  fleet  was 
at  hand  in  the  Tagus  strong  enough  to  thwart  the  designs 
of  the  Russian  squadron  there  present  to  prevent  his  de- 
parture. When  the  French  were  within  two  days'  march 
of  Lisbon,  Lord  Strangford  feared  that  the  Portuguese  fleet 
would  be  delivered  into  their  hands  ;  and  only  after  a 
trenchant  declaration  that  further  vacillation  would  be 
taken  as  a  sign  of  hostility  to  Great  Britain,  did  the  Prince 
Regent  resolve  to  seek  beyond  the  seas  the  independence 
which  was  denied  to  him  in  his  own  realm.2 

1  "Corresp.,"  Nos.  13314  and  13327.  So  too,  to  General  Clarke,  his  new 
Minister  of  War,  he  wrote  :  "  Junot  may  say  anything  he  pleases,  so  long 
as  he  gets  hold  of  the  fleet"  ("New  Letters  of  Nap.."  October  28th,  1807). 

2Strangford's  despatches  quite  refute  Thiers'  confident  statement  that 
the  Portuguese  answers  to  Napoleon  were  planned  in  concert  with  us.  I 
cannot  find  in  our  archives  a  copy  of  the  Anglo-Portuguese  Convention 
signed  by  Canning  on  October  22nd,  1807  ;  but  there  arc  many  references 
to  it  in  his  despatches.  It  empowered  us  to  occupy  Madeira  ;  and  our 
fleet  did  so  at  the  close  of  the  year.  In  April  next  we  exchanged  it  for 
the  Azores  and  Goa. 


140  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

Few  scenes  are  more  pathetic  than  the  departure  of  the 
House  of  Braganza  from  the  cradle  of  its  birth.  Love  for 
the  Prince  Regent  as  a  man,  mingled  with  pity  for  the 
demented  Queen,  held  the  populace  of  Lisbon  in  tearful 
silence  as  the  royal  family  and  courtiers  filed  along  the 
quays,  followed  by  agonized  groups  of  those  who  had  de- 
cided to  share  their  trials.  But  silence  gave  way  to  wails 
of  despair  as  the  exiles  embarked  on  the  heaving  estuary 
and  severed  the  last  links  with  Europe.  Slowly  the  fleet 
began  to  beat  down  the  river  in  the  teeth  of  an  Atlantic 
gale.  Near  the  mouth  the  refugees  were  received  with 
a  royal  salute  by  the  British  fleet,  and  under  its  convoy 
they  breasted  the  waves  of  the  ocean  and  the  perils  of  the 
future. 

The  conduct  of  England  towards  Denmark  and  that  of 
Napoleon  towards  Portugal  call  for  a  brief  comparison. 
Those  small  kingdoms  were  the  victims  of  two  powerful 
States  whose  real  or  fancied  interests  prompted  them  to 
the  domination  of  the  land  and  of  the  sea.  But  when  we 
compare  the  actions  of  the  two  Great  Powers,  important 
differences  begin  to  reveal  themselves.  England  had  far 
more  cause  for  complaint  against  Denmark  than  Napoleon 
had  against  Portugal.  The  hostility  of  the  Danes  to  the 
recent  coalition  was  notorious.  To  compel  them  to 
change  their  policy  without  loss  of  national  honour,  we 
sent  the  most  powerful  armada  that  had  ever  left  our 
shores,  with  offers  of  alliance  and  a  demand  that  their 
fleet,  the  main  object  of  Napoleon's  designs,  should  be 
delivered  up  to  be  held  in  deposit.  The  offer  was  refused, 
and  we  seized  the  fleet.  The  act  was  brutal,  but  it  was 
at  least  open  and  above  board,  and  the  capitulation  of 
September  7th  was  scrupulously  observed,  even  when  the 
Danes  prepared  to  renew  hostilities. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  demands  of  Napoleon  on  the 
Court  of  Lisbon  were  such  as  no  honourable  prince  could 
accept ;  they  were  relentlessly  pressed  on  in  spite  of  the 
offer  of  the  Prince  Regent  to  meet  him  in  ev.ery  particular 
save  one  ;  the  appeals  of  the  victim  were  deliberately 
used  by  the  aggressor  to  further  his  own  rapacious 
designs  ;  and  the  enterprise  fell  short  of  ending  in  a 
massacre  only  because  the  glamour  of  the  French  arms  so 


xxvn  TILSIT  141 

dazzled  the  susceptible  people  of  the  south  that,  for  the 
present,  they  sank  helplessly  away  at  the  sight  of  two 
battalions  of  spectres.  Penally,  Portugal  was  partitioned 
—  or  rather  it  was  kept  entirely  by  Napoleon  ;  for,  after 
the  promises  of  partition  had  done  their  work,  the  sleep- 
ing partners  in  the  transaction  were  quietly  shelved,  and 
it  was  then  seen  that  Portugal  had  finally  served  as  the 
bait  for  ensnaring  Spain.  To  this  subject  we  shall  return 
in  the  next  chapter. 

In  Italy  also,  the  Juggernaut  car  of  the  Continental 
System  rolled  over  the  small  States.  The  Kingdom  of 
Etruria,  which  in  1802  had  served  as  an  easy  means  of 
buying  the  whole  of  Louisiana  from  the  Spanish  Bourbons, 
was  now  wrested  from  that  complaisant  House,  and  in 
December  was  annexed  to  the  French  Empire. 

The  Pope  also  passed  under  the  yoke.  For  a  long  time 
the  relations  between  Pius  VII.  and  Napoleon  had  been 
strained.  Gentle  as  the  Pontiff  was  by  nature,  he  had 
declined  to  exclude  all  British  merchandise  from  his 
States,  or  to  accept  an  alliance  with  Eugene  and  Joseph. 
He  also  angered  Napoleon  by  persistently  refusing  to 
dissolve  the  marriage  of  Jerome  Bonaparte  with  Miss 
Paterson  ;  and  an  interesting  correspondence  ensued,  cul- 
minating in  a  long  diatribe  which  Eugene  was  charged  to 
forward  to  the  Vatican  as  an  extract  from  a  private  letter 
of  Napoleon  to  himself.1  Pius  VII.  was  to  be  privately 
warned  that  Napoleon  had  done  more  good  to  religion 
than  the  Pope  had  done  harm.  Christ  had  said  that 
His  Kingdom  was  not  of  this  world.  Why  then  did  the 
Pope  set  himself  above  Christ  ?  Why  did  he  refuse  to 
render  to  Caesar  that  which  was  Caesar's  ?  —  A  fortnight 
later  the  Emperor  advised  Eugene  to  despatch  troops  in 
the  direction  of  Bologna  —  "  and  if  the  Pope  commits  an 
imprudence,  it  will  be  a  fine  opportunity  for  depriving 
him  of  the  Roman  States." 

No  imprudence  was  committed.  Yet,  in  the  following 
January,  Napoleon  ordered  his  troops  to  occupy  Rome, 
alleging  that  the  Eternal  City  was  a  hotbed  of  intrigues 
fomented  by  England  and  the  ex-Queen  of  Naples,  that 
Neapolitan    rebels   had    sought  an  asylum    in    the    Papal 

^'Corresp.,"  July  22nd,  1807. 


142  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

States,  and  that,  though  he  had  no  wish  to  deprive  the 
Pope  of  his  territories,  yet  he  must  include  him  in  his 
"system."  When  Pius  VII.  refused  to  commit  himself 
to  a  policy  which  would  involve  war  with  England,  Napo- 
leon ordered  that  his  lands  east  of  the  Apennines  should 
be  annexed  to  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  (April  2nd,  1808). 
Napoleon  thus  gained  complete  control  over  the  Adriatic 
coasts,  which,  along  with  the  island  of  Corfu,  had  long 
engaged  his  most  earnest  attention.1 

True  to  his  aim  of  forcing  or  enticing  all  maritime 
States  into  a  mighty  confederacy  for  the  humiliation  of 
England,  Napoleon  had  given  most  heed  to  lands  possess- 
ing extensive  sea-boards.  Northern  Italy,  Holland,  Naples, 
North  Germany,  Prussia,  Russia,  Portugal,  Spain,  Den- 
mark, and  Central  Italy  had,  in  turn,  adopted  his  system. 
On  Austria  he  exerted  a  less  imperious  pressure  ;  for  her 
coast-line  of  Trieste  and  Croatia  was  so  easily  controlled 
by  his  Italian  and  Dalmatian  territories  that  English  mer- 
chandise with  difficulty  found  admittance.  Yet,  in  order 
to  carry  out  there  also  his  policy  of  "Thorough,"  he 
brought  the  arguments  of  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg  to  bear 
on  the  Court  of  Vienna  ;  and  on  February  18th,  1808, 
Austria  was  enrolled  in  a  league  that  might  well  be  called 
continental  ;  for  in  the  spring  of  that  year  it  embraced 
every  land  save  Sweden  and  Turkey. 

His  activity  at  this  time  almost  passes  belief.  While 
he  fastened  his  grip  on  the  Continent,  gallicized  the  in- 
stitutions of  Italy  and  Germany,  and  almost  daily 
instructed  his  brothers  in  the  essentials  of  successful 
statecraft,  he  found  time  to  turn  his  thoughts  once  more 
to  the  East,  and  to  mark  every  device  of  England  for 
lengthening  her  lease  of  life.  Noticing  that  we  had  an- 
nulled our  blockade  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser,  with  the  aim 
of  getting  our  goods  introduced  there  by  neutral  ships, 
Napoleon  charged  his  Finance  Minister,  Gaudin,  to  pre- 

1  Between  September  1st,  1807,  and  November  23rd,  1807,  he  wrote 
eighteen  letters  on  the  subject  of  Corfu,  which  he  designed  to  be  his  base 
of  operations  as  soon  as  the  Eastern  Question  could  be  advantageously 
reopened.  On  February  8th,  1808,  he  wrote  to  Joseph  that  Corfu  was 
more  important  than  Sicily,  and  that  "  in  the  present  state  of  Europe,  the 
loss  of  Corfu  would  be  the  greatest  of  disasters."  This  points  to  his 
proposed  partition  of  Turkey. 


xxvn  TILSIT  143 

pare  a  decree  for  pressing  hard  on  neutrals  who  had 
touched  at  any  of  our  ports  or  carried  wares  that  could 
be  proved  to  be  of  British  origin.1 

He  was  perfectly  correct  in  his  surmise  that  English 
goods  were  about  to  be  sent  into  the  Continent  exten- 
sively on  neutral  vessels.  After  the  consequences  of  the 
Treaty  of  Tilsit  had  been  fully  developed,  that  was  almost 
their  only  means  of  entry.  "  In  August,  September,  and 
October,  British  commerce  lay  prostrate  and  motionless 
until  a  protecting  and  self-defensive  system  was  inter- 
posed by  our  Orders  in  Council."2  The  first  of  these 
ordered  reprisals  against  the  new  Napoleonic  States 
(November  4th)  :  a  week  later  came  a  second  which 
declared  that,  as  the  Orders  of  January  had  not  induced 
the  enemy  to  relax  his  commercial  hostilities,  but  these 
were  now  enforced  with  increased  rigour,  any  port  whence 
the  British  flag  was  excluded  would  be  treated  as  if  it 
were  actually  blockaded  ;  that  is,  the  principle  of  the 
legality  of  a  nominal  blockade,  abandoned  in  1801,  was 
now  reaffirmed.  The  carriage  of  hostile  colonial  products 
was  likewise  prohibited  to  neutrals,  though  certain  excep- 
tions were  allowed.  Also  any  neutral  vessel  carrying 
"  certificates  of  origin "  —  a  device  for  distinguishing 
between  British  and  neutral  goods  —  was  to  be  considered 
a  lawful  prize  of  war.  A  third  Order  in  Council  of  the 
same  date  allowed  goods  to  be  imported  into  the  United 
Kingdom  from  a  hostile  port  in  neutral  ships,  subject  to 
I  the  ordinary  duties,  and  bonding  facilities  were  granted 
ifor  the  re-exportation  of  such  goods  to  any  friendly  or 
(neutral  port.3  These  orders  were  designed  'to  draw 
neutral  commerce  through  our  ports,  and  to  give  secret 
facilities  for  the  carriage  of  our  goods  by  neutrals,  while 
pressing  upon  those  that  obeyed  Napoleon's  system. 

The  harshest  of  them  was  that  which  encouraged  the 
[searching  of  neutral  vessels  for  certificates  of  origin  —  a 

1  Letter  of  October  13th,  1807. 

2  "  Ann.  Register"  for  1807,  pp.  227,  747. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  749-750.  Another  Order  in  Council  (November  25th) 
Allowed  neutral  ships  a  few  more  facilities  for  colonial  trade,  and  Prussian 
nerchantmen  were  set  free  (ibid.,  pp.  755-759).  In  April,  1809,  we 
'urther  favoured  the  carrying  of  British  goods  on  neutral  ships,  especially 
o  or  from  the  United  States. 


144  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

measure  as  severe  as  the  confiscation  of  British  property 
by  Napoleon,  which  it  was  designed  to  defeat.  And  we 
may  note  here  that  the  friction  resulting  from  our  Orders 
in  Council  and  our  enforcement  of  the  right  of  search 
led  to  the  United  States  passing  a  Non-Intercourse  Act 
(December  23rd,  1807)  that  precluded  active  hostilities 
against  us.  It  also  led  Napoleon  to  confiscate  all  Ameri- 
can ships  in  his  harbours  after  April  17th,  1808. 

The  November  Orders  in  Council  soon  drew  a  reply 
from  Napoleon.  He  heard  of  them  during  a  progress 
through  the  north  of  Italy,  and  from  Milan  he  flung 
back  his  retort,  the  famous  Milan  Decrees  of  November 
23rd  and  December  17th.  He  thereby  declared  every 
neutral  ship,  which  submitted  to  those  orders,  to  be 
denationalized  and  good  prize  of  war  ;  and  the  same  doom 
was  pronounced  against  every  vessel  sailing  to  or  from 
any  port  in  the  United  Kingdom  or  its  colonies  or  posses- 
sions. But  these  measures  were  not  to  affect  ships  of 
those  States  that  compelled  Great  Britain  to  respect  their 
flag.  The  islanders  might  well  be  dismayed  at  the  pros- 
pect of  a  seclusion  which  promised  to  recall  the  Virgilian 

line  : 

"  Penitus  a  toto  divisos  orbe  Britannos." 

Yet  they  resolved  to  pit  the  resources  of  the  outer  world 
against  the  militarism  of  Napoleon  ;  and,  drawing  the 
resources  of  the  tropics  to  the  new  power-looms  of  Lanc- 
ashire and  Yorkshire,  they  might  well  hope  to  pour  their 
unequalled  goods  into  Europe  from  points  of  vantage 
such  as  Sicily,  Gibraltar,  the  Channel  Islands,  and  Heli- 
goland. There  were  many  Englishmen  who  believed  that 
the  November  Orders  in  Council  brought  nothing  but 
harm  to  our  cause.  They  argued  that  our  manufactured 
goods  must  find  their  way  into  the  Continent  in  spite  of 
the  Berlin  Decrees  ;  and  they  could  point  to  the  curious 
fact  that  Bourrienne,  Napoleon's  agent  at  Hamburg,  when 
charged  to  procure  fifty  thousand  overcoats  for  the  French 
army  during  the  Eylau  campaign,  was  obliged  to  buy 
them  from  England.1 

1  Bourrienne,  "  Memoirs."  The  case  against  the  Orders  in  Council  is 
fairly  stated  by  Lumbroso,  and  by  Alison,  ch.  50. 


XXVII 


TILSIT  145 


The  incident  certainly  proves  the  folly  of  the  Conti- 
nental System.  And  if  we  had  had  to  consult  our  manu- 
facturing interests  alone,  a  policy  of  laisser  /aire  would 
doubtless  have  been  the  best.  England,  however,  prided 
herself  on  her  merchant  service  :  to  that  she  looked  as  the 
nursery  for  the  royal  navy  :  and  the  abandonment  of  the 
world's  carrying  trade  to  neutrals  would  have  seemed  an 
act  of  high  treason.  Her  acts  of  retaliation  against  the 
Berlin  Decrees  and  the  policy  of  Tilsit  were  harsh  and 
high-handed.  But  they  were  adopted  during  a  pitiless 
commercial  strife ;  and,  in  warfare  of  so  novel  and 
desperate  a  kind,  acts  must  unfortunately  be  judged  by 
their  efficacy  to  harm  the  foe  rather  than  by  the  stand- 
ards of  morality  that  hold  good  during  peace.  Out- 
wardly, it  seemed  as  if  England  were  doomed.  She  had 
lost  her  allies  and  alienated  the  sympathies  of  neutrals. 
But  from  the  sea  she  was  able  to  exert  on  the  Napoleonic 
States  a  pressure  that  was  gradual,  cumulative,  and  re- 
sistless ;  and  the  future  was  to  prove  the  wisdom  of  the 
words  of  Mollien  :  "  England  waged  a  warfare  of  modern 
times  ;  Napoleon,  that  of  ancient  times.  There  are  times 
and  cases  when  an  anachronism  is  fatal." 

Moreover,  at  the  very  time  when  the  Emperor  was 
about  to  complete  his  great  experiment  by  subduing 
Sweden  and  preparing  for  the  partition  of  Turkey,  it 
sustained  a  fatal  shock  by  the  fierce  rising  of  the  Spanish 
people  against  his  usurped  authority. 


VOL.   II  — L 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE   SPANISH  RISING 

The  relations  of  Spain  to  France  during  the  twelve 
years  that  preceded  the  rising  of  1808  are  marked  by  acts 
of  folly  and  unmanly  complaisance  that  promised  utterly 
to  degrade  a  once  proud  and  sensitive  people.  They  were 
the  work  of  the  senile  and  spiritless  King,  Charles  IV.,  of 
his  intriguing  consort,  and,  above  all,  of  her  paramour,  the 
all-powerful  Minister  Godoy.  Of  an  ancient  and  honour- 
able family,  endowed  with  a  fine  figure,  courtly  address, 
and  unscrupulous  arts,  this  man  had  wormed  himself  into 
the  royal  confidence  ;  and  after  bringing  about  a  favourable 
peace  with  France  in  1795,  he  was  styled  The  Prince  of 
the  Peace. 

In  the  next  year  the  meaning  of  the  French  alliance  was 
revealed  in  the  treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso,  which  required  Spain 
to  furnish  troops,  ships,  and  subsidies  for  the  war  against 
England,  a  state  of  vassalage  which  was  made  harder  by 
Napoleon.  The  results  are  well  known.  After  being 
forced  by  him  to  cede  Trinidad  to  us  at  the  Peace  of 
Amiens,  she  sacrificed  her  navy  at  Trafalgar,  saw  her 
colonies  and  commerce  decay  and  her  finances  shrivel  for 
lack  of  the  golden  streams  formerly  poured  in  by  Mexico 
and  Peru. 

In  the  summer  of  1806,  while  sinking  into  debt  and 
disgrace,  the  Court  of  Madrid  heard  with  indignation  of 
Napoleon's  design  to  hand  over  the  Balearic  Isles  to  the 
Spanish  Bourbons  whom  he  had  driven  from  Naples  and 
proposed  to  drive  from  Sicily.  At  once  Spanish  pride 
caught  fire  and  clutched  at  means  of  revenge.1  Godoy 
was  further  incensed  by  the  sudden  abandonment  of  the 
plans  which  he  had  long  discussed  with  Napoleon  for  the 

1  Gower  reported  (on  September  22nd)  that  the  Spanish  ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg  had  been  pleading  for  help  there,  so  as  to  avenge  thi» 
insult. 

146 


xxvm  THE   SPANISH  RISING  147 

partition  of  Portugal,  plans  which  gave  him  the  prospect 
of  reigning  as  King  over  the  southern  portion  of  that 
realm.1  Accordingly,  when  the  Emperor  was  entering 
upon  the  Jena  campaign,  he  summoned  the  Spanish  people 
to  arms  in  a  most  threatening  manner.  The  news  of  the 
collapse  of  Prussia  ended  his  bravado.  Complaisance  again 
reigned  at  Madrid,  and  15,000  Spaniards  were  sent,  at 
Napoleon's  demand,  to  serve  on  the  borders  of  Denmark, 
while  the  autocrat  of  the  West  perfected  his  plans  against 
the  Iberian  Peninsula.  As  was  noted  in  the  previous 
chapter,  the  Emperor  renewed  his  offers  of  a  partition 
of  Portugal  in  the  early  autumn  of  1807 ;  and  in  pursu- 
ance of  the  secret  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  Junot's  corps 
marched  through  Spain  into  Portugal,  where  they  were 
helped  by  a  Spanish  corps. 

It  is  significant  that,  as  early  as  October  17th,  1807,  Na- 
poleon ordered  his  general  to  send  a  detailed  description 
of  the  country  and  of  his  line  of  march,  the  engineer  offi- 
cers being  specially  charged  to  send  sketches,  "  which  it  is 
important  to  have."  Other  French  divisions  then  crossed 
the  Pyrenees,  under  plea  of  keeping  open  Junot's  commu- 
nications with  France ;  and  spies  were  sent  to  observe 
the  state  of  the  chief  Spanish  strongholds.  Others  were 
charged  to  report  on  the  condition  of  the  Spanish  army 
and  the  state  of  public  opinion  ;  while  Junot  was  cautioned 
to  keep  a  sharp  watch  on  the  Spanish  troops  in  Portugal, 
to  allow  no  fortress  to  be  in  their  hands,  and  to  send  all 
the  Portuguese  troops  away  to  France.  Thus,  in  the  early 
days  of  1808,  Napoleon  had  some  20,000  troops  in  Portugal, 
about  40,000  in  the  north  of  Spain,  and  12,000  in  Catalonia. 
By  various  artifices  they  gained  admission  into  the  strong- 
holds of  Pamplona,  Monjuik,  Barcelona,  St.  Sebastian,  and 
Figueras,  so  that  by  the  month  of  March  the  north  and 
west  of  the  peninsula  had  passed  quietly  into  his  hands, 
while  the  greater  part  of  the  Spanish  army  was  doing  his 
work  in  Portugal  or  on  the  shores  of  the  Baltic.2 

These  proceedings  began  to  arouse  alarm  and  discontent 

1  Baumgarten,  "Geschichte  Spaniens.'1  vol.  i.,  p.  138. 

2  "  Nap.  Corresp."  of  October  17th  and  31st,  November  13th,  December 
23rd,  1807,  and  February  20th,  1808 ;  also  Napier,  "  Peninsular  War," 
bk.  i.,  ch.  ii. 


148  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

among  the  Spanish  people ;  but  on  its  Government  their 
influence  was  as  benumbing  as  that  which  the  boa-constrictor 
exerts  on  its  prey.  In  vain  did  Charles  IV.  and  Godoy 
strive  to  set  a  limit  to  the  numbers  of  the  auxiliaries  that 
poured  across  the  Pyrenees  to  help  them  against  fabled 
English  expeditions.  In  vain  did  they  beg  that  the  parti- 
tion of  Portugal  might  now  proceed  in  accordance  with 
the  terms  of  the  secret  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau.  The  King 
was  curtly  told  that  affairs  were  not  yet  ripe  for  the  publi- 
cation of  that  treaty.1  And  the  growing  conviction  that 
he  had  been  duped  poured  gall  into  the  cup  of  family 
bitterness  that  had  long  been  full  to  overflowing. 

The  scandalous  relations  of  the  Queen  with  Godoy 
had  deeply  incensed  the  heir  to  the  throne,  Ferdinand, 
Prince  of  Asturias.  His  attitude  of  covert  opposition  to 
his  parents  and  their  minion  was  strengthened  by  the 
influence  of  his  bride,  a  daughter  of  the  ex-Queen  of 
Naples,  and  their  palace  was  the  headquarters  of  all  who 
hoped  to  end  the  degradation  of  the  kingdom.  As  later 
events  were  to  prove,  Ferdinand  had  not  the  qualities  of 
courage  and  magnanimity  that  command  general  homage ; 
but  it  was  enough  for  his  countrymen  that  he  opposed 
the  Court.  In  1806  his  consort  died;  and  on  October 
11th,  1807,  without  consulting  his  father,  he  secretly 
wrote  to  Napoleon,  requesting  the  hand  of  a  Bonaparte 
princess  in  marriage,  and  stating  that  such  an  alliance 
was  the  ardent  wish  of  all  Spaniards,  while  they  would  abhor 
his  union  with  a  sister  of  the  Princess  of  the  Peace.  To 
this  letter  Napoleon  sent  no  reply.  But  Charles  IV.  had 
some  inkling  of  the  fact  that  the  prince  had  been  treating 
direct  with  Napoleon ;  and  this,  along  with  another  un- 
filial  action  of  the  prince,  furnished  an  excuse  for  a  charge 
of  high  treason.  It  was  spitefully  pressed  home  and  was 
revoked  only  on  his  humble  request  for  the  King's  pardon. 

Now,  this  "  School  for  Scandal "  was  being  played  at 
Madrid  at  the  time  when  Napoleon  was  arranging  the 
partition  of  Portugal ;  and  the  schism  in  the  Spanish  royal 
House  may  well  have  strengthened  his  determination  to 
end  its  miserable  existence  and  give  a  good  government  to 
Spain.     At  the  close  of  the  so-called  palace  plot,  Charles 

1  Letter  of  January  10th,  1808. 


xxvin  THE   SPANISH   RISING  149 

IV.  informed  his  august  ally  of  that  frightful  attempt, 
and  begged  him  to  give  the  aid  of  his  lights  and  his  counsels.1 
The  craven-hearted  King  thus  himself  opened  the  door 
for  that  intervention  which  Napoleon  had  already  medi- 
tated. His  resolve  now  rapidly  hardened.  At  the  close 
of  January,  1808,  he  wrote  to  Junot  asking  him  :  "If  unex- 
pected events  occurred  in  Spain,  what  would  you  fear  from 
the  Spanish  troops?  Could  you  easily  rid  yourself  of 
them?"2  On  February  the  20th  he  appointed  Murat, 
Grand  Duke  of  Berg,  to  be  his  Lieutenant  in  Spain  and 
commander  of  the  French  forces.  The  choice  of  this  bluff, 
headstrong  cavalier,  who  had  done  so  much  to  provoke 
Prussia  in  1806,  certainly  betokened  a  forward  policy. 
Yet  the  Emperor  continued  to  smile  on  the  Spanish  Court, 
and  gave  a  sort  of  half  sanction  to  the  union  of  Ferdinand 
with  a  daughter  of  Lucien  Bonaparte.3  In  fact,  the  hope 
of  this  alliance  was  now  used  to  keep  quiet  the  numerous 
partisans  of  Ferdinand,  while  Murat  advanced  rapidty 
towards  Madrid.  To  his  Lieutenant  the  Emperor  wrote 
(March  16th) :  "  Continue  your  kindly  talk.  Reassure 
the  King,  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  the  Prince  of  Asturias, 
the  Queen.  The  chief  thing  is  to  reach  Madrid,  to  rest 
your  troops  and  replenish  your  provisions.  Say  that  I  am 
about  to  come  so  as  to  arrange  matters." 

As  to  Napoleon's  real  aims,  Murat  was  in  complete  igno- 
rance ;  and  he  repeatedly  complained  of  the  lack  of  confi- 
dence which  a  brother-in-law  had  a  right  to  expect.     But 
while  the  Grand  Duke  of  Berg  beamed  on  the  Spaniards 
with  meaningless  affability,  Izquierdo,  Godoy's  secret  agent 
I  at  Paris,  troubled  his  master  with  gloomy  reports  of  the 
I  deepening  reserve  and  lowering  threats  of   Ministers    at 
Paris.     There  was  talk  of  requiring  from  Spain  the  cession 
of  her  lands  between  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Ebro :   there 
were  even  dark  suggestions  as  to  the  need  of  dethroning 
I  the  Spanish  Bourbons  once   for    all.      Interpreting  these 
j hints  in  the  light   of   their  own    consciences,  the   King, 
Queen,  and  favourite  saw  themselves  in  imagination  flung 

1  Letter  of  Charles  IV.  to  Napoleon  of  October  29th,  1807,  published  in 
"Murat,  Lieutenant  de  l'Empereur  en  Espagne,"  Appendix  viii. 

2  "  New  Letters  of  Napoleon." 

8  "Corresp.,"  letter  of  February  25th. 


150  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

forth  into  the  Atlantic,  a  butt  to  the  scorn  of  mankind  ; 
and  they  prepared  to  flee  to  the  New  World  betimes,  with 
the  needful  treasure. 

But  there,  too,  Napoleon  forestalled  them.  On  Feb- 
ruary 21st  a  secret  order  was  sent  to  a  French  squadron  to 
anchor  off  Cadiz  and  stop  the  King  and  Queen  of  Spain  if 
they  sought  to  "repeat  the  scene  of  Lisbon."1  Their 
escape  to  America  would  be  even  more  favourable  to  Eng- 
land than  the  flight  of  the  Court  of  Lisbon  had  been ;  and 
Napoleon  took  good  care  that  the  King,  .to  whom  he  had 
awarded  the  title  of  Emperor  of  the  two  Americas,  should 
remain  a  prisoner  in  Europe.  Scared,  however,  by  the 
approach  of  Murat  and  the  news  from  Paris,  Charles  still 
prepared  for  flight ;  and  the  Queen's  anxiety  to  save  her 
favourite  from  the  growing  fury  of  the  populace  also  bent 
her  desires  seawards. 

The  Court  was  at  the  palace  of  Aranjuez,  not  far  from 
Madrid,  and  it  seemed  easy  to  escape  into  Andalusia,  and 
to  carry  away,  by  guile  or  by  force,  the  heir  to  the  throne. 
But  Ferdinand,  who  hoped  for  deliverance  at  the  hands  of 
the  French,  thwarted  the  scheme  by  a  timely  hint  to  his 
faithful  guards.  At  once  his  partisans  gathered  round 
him  ;  and  the  people,  rushing  to  Godoy's  residence,  madly 
ransacked  it  in  the  hope  of  tearing  to  pieces  the  author  of 
the  nation's  ruin.  After  thirty-six  hours'  concealment, 
Godoy  ventured  to  steal  forth  ;  at  once  he  was  discovered, 
was  kicked  and  beaten  ;  and  only  the  intervention  of  Fer- 
dinand, prompted  by  the  agonized  entreaties  of  his  mother, 
availed  to  save  the  dregs  of  that  wretched  life.  The  roars 
of  the  crowd  around  the  palace,  and  the  smashing  of  the 
royal  carriage,  now  decided  the  King  to  abdicate  ;  and  he 
declared  that  his  declining  years  and  failing  health  now  led 
him  to  yield  the  crown  to  Ferdinand  (March  19th,  1808). 

Loud  was  the  acclaim  that  greeted  the  young  King 
when  he  entered  Madrid ;  but  the  rejoicings  were  soon 
damped  by  the  ambiguous  behaviour  of  Murat,  who,  on 
entering  Madrid  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  skilfully  evaded 
any  recognition  of  Ferdinand  as  King.  In  fact,  Murat  had 
received  (March  21st)  a  letter  from  Charles  IV. 's  daugh- 

1  Thiers,  notes  to  bk.  xxix.  Murat  in  1814  told  Lord  Holland  ("  For- 
eign Reminiscences,"  p.  131)  he  had  had  no  instructions  from  Napoleon. 


xxvin  THE   SPANISH   RISING  151 

ter  begging  for  his  help  to  her  parents  at  Aranjuez  ;  and 
it  soon  transpired  that  the  ex-King  and  Queen  now  re- 
pented of  their  abdication,  which  they  represented  as 
brought  about  by  force  and  therefore  null  and  void.  The 
Grand  Duke  of  Berg  saw  the  advantage  which  this  dis- 
pute might  give  to  Napoleon  ;  and  he  begged  the  Em- 
peror to  come  immediately  to  Madrid  for  the  settlement  of 
matters  on  which  he  alone  could  decide.  To  this  Napo- 
leon replied  (March  30th)  commending  his  Lieutenant's 
prudence,  and  urging  him  to  escort  Charles  IV.  to  the 
Escurial  as  King,  while  Godoy  was  also  to  be  protected 
and  sent  to  Bayonne. 

To  this  town  the  Emperor  set  out  on  April  the  2nd,  as 
though  he  would  thence  proceed  to  Madrid.  Ferdinand, 
meanwhile,  was  treated  with  guarded  courtesy  that  kept 
alive  his  hope  of  an  alliance  with  a  French  princess. 
To  favour  this  notion,  Napoleon  despatched  the  wariest 
of  his  agents,  Savary,  who  artfully  persuaded  him  to  meet 
the  Emperor  at  Burgos.  He  succeeded,  and  even  induced 
him  to  continue  his  journey  to  Vittoria.  At  that  place 
the  citizens  sought  to  cut  the  traces  of  the  royal  carriage, 
so  much  did  they  fear  treachery  if  he  proceeded  further. 
Yet  the  young  King,  beguiled  by  the  Emperor's  letter  of 
April  16th,  which  offered  the  hand  of  a  French  princess, 
prolonged  his  journey,  crossed  the  frontier,  and  was  re- 
ceived by  Napoleon  at  Bayonne  (April  20th).  His  argu- 
ments, proving  that  his  father's  abdication  had  been 
voluntary,  fell  on  deaf  ears.  The  Emperor  invited  him 
to  dinner,  and  afterwards  sent  Savary  to  inform  him  that 
he  must  hand  back  the  crown  to  his  father.  To  this  Fer- 
dinand returned  a  firm  refusal ;  and  his  advisers,  Escoiquiz 
and  Labrador,  ventured  to  warn  the  Emperor  that  the 
Spaniards  would  swear  eternal  hatred  to  France  if  he  tam- 
jpered  with  the  crown  of  Spain.  Napoleon  listened  good- 
jhumouredly,  pulled  Escoiquiz  by  the  ear  as  a  sign  of  his 
personal  regard,  and  added :  "  You  are  a  deep  fellow  ; 
but,  I  tell  you,  the  Bourbons  will  never  let  me  alone.' 
On  the  next  day  he  offered  Ferdinand  the  throne  of 
Etruria.     It  was  coldly  declined.1 

1 "  Memoires  pour  servir  a  l'histoire  de  la  Revolution  d'Espagne,  par  Nel- 
lerto"  ;  also  "The  Journey  of  Ferdinand  VII.  to  Bayonne,"  by  Escoiquiz. 


152  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Charles  IV.,  his  Queen,  and  Godoy,  arrived  at  Bayonne 
at  the  close  of  April.  The  ex-King  had  offered  to  put  him- 
self and  his  claim  in  Napoleon's  hands,  which  was  exactly 
what  the  Emperor  desired.  The  feeble  creature  now 
poured  forth  his  bile  on  his  disobedient  son,  and  peevishly 
bade  him  restore  the  crown.  Ferdinand  assented,  provided 
his  father  would  really  reign,  and  would  dismiss  those  ad- 
visers who  were  hated  by  the  nation ;  but  the  attempt  to 
impose  conditions  called  forth  a  flash  of  senile  wrath,  along 
with  the  remark  that  "  one  ought  to  do  everything  for  the 
people  and  nothing  by  the  people." 

Meanwhile  the  men  of  Madrid  were  not  acting  with  the 
passivity  desired  by  their  philosophizing  monarch.  At  first 
they  had  welcomed  Murat  as  delivering  them  from  the  de- 
tested yoke  of  Godoy ;  but  the  conduct  of  the  French  in 
their  capital,  and  the  detention  of  Ferdinand  at  Bayonne, 
aroused  angry  feelings,  which  burst  forth  on  May  the  2nd, 
and  long  defied  the  grapeshot  of  Murat's  guns  and  the 
sabres  of  his  troopers.  The  news  of  this  so-called  revolt 
gave  Napoleon  another  handle  against  his  guests.  He  hur- 
ried to  Charles  and  cowed  him  by  well-simulated  signs  of 
anger,  which  that  roi  faineant  thereupon  vented  on  his  son, 
with  a  passion  that  was  only  outdone  by  the  shrill  gibes  of 
the  Queen.  At  the  close  of  this  strange  scene,  the  Em- 
peror interposed  with  a  few  stern  words,  threatening  to 
treat  the  prince  as  a  rebel  if  he  did  not  that  very  evening 
restore  the  crown  to  his  father.  Ferdinand  braved  the 
parental  taunts  in  stolid  silence,  but  before  the  trenchant 
threats  of  Napoleon  he  quailed,  and  broke  down. 

Resistance  was  now  at  an  end.  On  that  same  night 
(May  5th)  the  Emperor  concluded  with  Godoy  a  conven- 
tion whereby  Charles  IV.  agreed  to  hand  over  to  Napoleon 
the  crowns  of  Spain  and  the  Indies,  on  consideration  that 
those  dominions  should  remain  intact,  should  keep  the 
Roman  Catholic  faith  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others,  and 
that  he  himself  should  be  pensioned  off  with  the  estates  of 
Compiegne  and  Chambord,  receiving  a  yearly  income  of 
seven  and  a  half  million  francs,  payable  by  the  French 
treasury.  The  Spanish  princes  were  similarly  treated, 
Ferdinand  signing  away  his  rights  for  a  castle  and  a  pen- 
sion.    To  crown  the  farce,  Napoleon  ordered  Talleyrand 


xxvih  THE   SPANISH   RISING  163 

to  receive  them  at  his  estate  of  ValenQay,  and  amuse  them 
with  actors  and  the  charms  of  female  society.  Thus  the 
choicest  humorist  of  the  age  was  told  off  to  entertain  three 
uninteresting  exiles ;  and  the  ex-Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  who  disapproved  of  the  treachery  of  Bayonne, 
was  made  to  appear  the  Emperor's  accomplice. 

Such  were  the  means  whereby  Napoleon  gained  the 
crowns  of  Spain  and  the  Indies,  without  striking  a  blow. 
His  excuse  for  the  treachery  as  expressed  at  the  time  was 
as  follows :  "  My  action  is  not  good  from  a  certain  point  of 
view,  I  know.  But  my  policy  demands  that  I  shall  not 
leave  in  my  rear,  so  near  to  Paris,  a  dynasty  hostile  to 
mine."  From  this  and  from  other  similar  remarks,  it 
would  seem  that  his  resolve  to  dethrone  the  Bourbons  was 
taken  while  on  his  march  to  Jena,  but  was  thrust  down 
into  the  abyss  of  his  inscrutable  will  for  a  whole  year, 
until  Junot's  march  to  Lisbon  furnished  a  safe  means  for 
effecting  the  subjugation  of  Spain.  This  end  he  thence- 
forth pursued  unswervingly  with  no  sign  of  remorse,  or 
even  of  hesitation  —  unless  we  accept  as  genuine  the 
almost  certainly  spurious  letter  of  March  29th,  1808. 
That  letter  represents  him  as  blaming  Murat  for  entering 
Madrid,  when  he  had  repeatedly  urged  him  to  do  so ;  as 
asking  his  advice  after  he  had  all  along  kept  him  in  igno- 
rance as  to  his  aims ;  and  as  writing  a  philosophical  homily 
on  the  unused  energies  of  the  Spanish  people,  for  whom  in 
his  genuine  letters  he  expressed  a  lofty  contempt.1 

The  whole  enterprise  is,  indeed,  a  masterpiece  of  skill, 
but  a  masterpiece  marred  by  ineffaceable  stains  of 
treachery.  And  at  the  close  of  his  life,  he  himself  said:  "I 
embarked  very  badly  on  the  Spanish  affair,  I  confess :  the 
immorality  of  it  was  too  patent,  the  injustice  too  cynical, 
and  the  whole  thing  wears  an  ugly  look  since  I  have 
fallen  ;  for  the  attempt  is  only  seen  in  its  hideous  naked- 

1 "  Corresp.,"  No.  13696.  A  careful  comparison  of  this  laboured,  halt- 
ing effusion,  with  the  curt  military  style  of  the  genuine  letters  —  and 
especially  with  Nos.  93,  94,  and  100  of  the  "New  Letters1'  —  must  dem- 
onstrate its  non-authenticity.  Thiers'  augument  to  the  contrary  effect  is 
rambling  and  weak.  Count  Murat  in  his  recent  monograph  on  his  father 
pronounces  the  letter  a  fabrication  of  St.  Helena  or  later.  It  was  first 
published  in  the  "  Memorial  de  St.  Helene,"  an  untrustworthy  compilation 
made  by  Las  Cases  after  Napoleon's  death  from  notes  taken  at  St.  Helena. 


154  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ness  deprived  of  all  majesty  and  of  the  many  benefits  which 
completed  my  intention." 

That  he  hoped  to  reform  Spain  is  certain.  Political 
and  social  reforms  had  hitherto  consolidated  the  work 
of  conquest;  and  those  which  he  soon  offered  to  the 
Spaniards  might  possibly  have  renovated  that  nation, 
had  they  not  been  handed  in  at  the  sword's  point;  but 
the  motive  was  too  obvious,  the  intervention  too  insult- 
ing, to  render  success  possible  with  the  most  sensitive 
people  in  Europe.  On  May  2nd  he  wrote  to  Murat 
that  he  intended  King  Joseph  of  Naples  to  reign  at 
Madrid,  and  offered  to  Murat  either  Portugal  or  Naples.1 
He  chose  the  latter.  Joseph  was  allowed  no  choice  in 
the  matter.  He  was  summoned  from  Naples  to  Bayonne, 
and,  on  arriving  at  Pau,  heard  with  great  surprise  that  he 
was  King  of  Spain. 

Napoleon's  selection  was  tactful.  At  Naples,  the  eldest 
of  the  Bonapartes  had  effected  many  reforms  and  was 
generally  popular;  but  the  treachery  of  Bayonne  blasted 
all  hopes  of  his  succeeding  at  Madrid.  Though  the 
grandees  of  Spain  welcomed  the  new  monarch  with 
courtly  grace,  though  Charles  IV.,  gave  him  his  bless- 
ing, though  Ferdinand  demeaned  himself  by  advising 
his  former  subjects  quietly  to  submit,  the  populace  willed 
otherwise. 

Every  instinct  of  the  Spanish  nature  was  aflame  with 
resentment.  Loathing  for  Charles  IV.,  his  Queen,  and 
their  favourite,  whom  Napoleon  richly  dowered,  love  of 
the  young  King  whom  he  falsely  filched  away,  detesta- 
tion of  the  French  troops  who  outraged  the  rights  of 
hospitality,  and  zeal  for  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
whose  chief  had  just  been  robbed  of  half  his  States, 
goaded  the  Spaniards  to  madness.  Their  indignation 
rumbled  hoarsely  for  a  time,  like  a  volcano  in  labour,  and 
then  burst  forth  in  an  explosion  of  fury.  The  constitu- 
tion which  Napoleon  presented   to  the  Spanish  Notables 

1  Napoleon  had  at  first  intended  the  Spanish  crown  for  Louis,  to  whom 
he  wrote  on  March  27th:  "The  climate  of  Holland  does  not  suit  you. 
Besides,  Holland  can  never  rise  from  her  ruins."  Louis  declined,  on  the 
ground  that  his  call  to  Holland  had  been  from  heaven,  and  not  from 
Napoleon  I 


xxviii  THE   SPANISH   RISING  155 

at  Bayonne  was  accepted  by  them,  only  to  be  flung  back 
with  scorn  by  the  people.  The  men  of  enlightenment  who 
counselled  prudence  and  patience  were  slain  by  raging 
mobs  or  sought  safety  in  flight.  The  rising  was  at  once 
national  in  its  grand  spontaneity  and  local  in  its  intensity. 
Province  after  province  rose  in  arms,  except  the  north  and 
centre,  where  80,000  French  troops  held  the  patriots  in 
check.  In  the  van  of  the  movement  was  the  rugged  little 
province  of  Asturias,  long  ago  the  forlorn  hope  of  the 
Christians  in  their  desperate  conflicts  with  the  Moors. 
Intrenched  behind  their  mountains  and  proud  of  their 
ancient  fame,  the  Asturians  ventured  on  the  sublime 
folly  of  declaring  war  against  the  ruler  of  the  West  and 
the  lord  of  900,000  warriors.  Swiftly  Galicia  and  Leon 
in  the  north  repeated  the  challenge ;  while  in  the  south, 
the  fertile  lands  of  Andalusia,  Murcia,  and  Valencia  flashed 
back  from  their  mountains  the  beacon  lights  of  a  national 
war.  The  former  dislike  of  England  was  forgotten.  The 
Juntas  of  Asturias,  Galicia,  and  Andalusia  sent  appeals  to 
us  for  help,  to  which  Canning  generously  responded ;  and, 
on  July  4th,  we  passed  at  a  single  bound  from  war  with  the 
Spanish  Bourbons  to  an  informal  alliance  with  the  people  of 
Spain. 

Napoleon  now  began  to  see  the  magnitude  of  his  error. 
Instead  of  gaining  control  over  Spain  and  the  Indies,  he 
bad  changed  long-suffering  allies  into  irreconcilable  foes. 
He  prepared  to  conquer  Spain.  While  Joseph  was  escorted 
to  his  new  capital  by  a  small  army,  Napoleon  from  Bayonne 
directed  the  operations  of  his  generals.  Holding  the  north- 
ern road  from  Bayonne  to  Burgos  and  Madrid,  they  were 
to  send  out  cautious  feelers  against  the  bands  of  insur- 
gents ;  for,  as  Napoleon  wrote  to  Savary  (July  13th)  :  "  In 
civil  wars  it  is  the  important  posts  that  must  be  held:  one 
ought  not  to  go  everywhere."  Weighty  words,  which 
his  lieutenants  in  Spain  were  often  to  disregard !  Bes- 
sieres  in  the  north  gained  a  success  at  Medina  de  Rio  Seco ; 
but  a  signal  disaster  in  the  south  ruined  the  whole  cam- 
paign. Dupont,  after  beating  the  levies  of  Andalusia, 
penetrated  into  the  heart  of  that  great  province,  and, 
when  cumbered  with  plunder,  his  divided  forces  were  sur- 
rounded, cut  on0  from  their  supplies,  and  forced  to  surren- 


156  THE   LIFE   OE   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

der  at  Baylen  —  in  all  about  20,000  men  (July  19th) .  The 
news  that  a  French  army  had  laid  down  its  arms  caused  an 
immense  sensation  in  an  age  when  Napoleon's  troops  were 
held  to  be  invincible.  Baylen  was  hailed  everywhere  by 
despairing  patriots  as  the  dawn  of  a  new  era.  And  such 
it  was  to  be.  If  Valmy  proclaimed  the  advent  of  militant 
democracy,  the  victory  of  Spaniards  over  one  of  the  bravest 
of  Napoleon's  generals  was  felt  to  be  an  even  greater  por- 
tent. It  ushered  in  the  epoch  of  national  resistance  to  the 
overweening  claims  of  the  Emperor  of  the  West. 

That  truth  he  seems  dimly  to  have  surmised.  His  rage 
on  hearing  of  the  capitulation  was  at  first  too  deep  for 
words.  Then  he  burst  out:  "Could  I  have  expected  that 
from  Dupont,  a  man  whom  I  loved,  and  was  rearing  up  to 
become  a  Marshal  ?  They  say  he  had  no  other  way  to  save 
the  lives  of  his  soldiers.  Better,  far  better,  to  have  died 
with  arms  in  their  hands.  Their  death  would  have  been 
glorious:  we  should  have  avenged  them.  You  can  always 
supply  the  place  of  soldiers.  Honour  alone,  when  once 
lost,  can  never  be  regained." 

Moreover,  the  material  consequences  were  considerable. 
The  Spaniards  speedily  threatened  Madrid ;  and,  on  the 
advice  of  Savary,  Joseph  withdrew  from  his  capital  after  a 
week's  sojourn,  and  fell  back  hurriedly  on  the  line  of  the 
Upper  Ebro,  where  the  French  rallied  for  a  second  advance. 

Their  misfortunes  did  not  end  here.  In  the  northeast 
the  hardy  Catalans  had  risen  against  the  invaders,  and  by 
sheer  pluck  and  audacity  cooped  them  up  in  their  ill-gotten 
strongholds  of  Barcelona  and  Figueras.  The  men  of  Ar- 
ragon,  too,  never  backward  in  upholding  their  ancient 
liberties,  rallied  to  defend  their  capital  Saragossa.  Their 
rage  was  increased  by  the  arrival  of  Palafox,  who  had  es- 
caped in  disguise  from  the  suite  of  Ferdinand  at  Bayonne, 
and  brought  news  of  the  treachery  there  perpetrated. 
Beaten  outside  their  ancient  city,  and  unable  to  hold  its 
crumbling  walls  against  the  French  cannon  and  columns 
of  assault,  the  defenders  yet  fiercely  turned  to  bay  amidst 
its  narrow  lanes  and  massive  monasteries.  There  a  novel 
warfare  was  waged.  From  street  to  street  and  house  to 
house  the  fight  eddied  for  days,  the  Arragonese  opposing 
to  French  valour  the  stubborn  devotion  ever  shown  by  the 


xxviii  THE   SPANISH    RISING  157 

peoples  of  the  peninsula  in  defence  of  their  walled  cities, 
and  an  enthusiasm  kindled  by  the  zeal  of  their  monks  and 
the  heroism  of  the  Maid  of  Saragossa.  Finally,  on  August 
10th  the  noble  city  shook  off  the  grip  of  the  15,000  assail- 
ants, who  fell  back  to  join  Joseph's  forces  higher  up  the 
Ebro. 

Even  now  the  Emperor  did  not  fully  realize  the  serious 
nature  of  the  war  that  was  beginning.  Despite  Savary's 
warnings  of  the  dangers  to  be  faced  in  Spain,  he  persisted 
in  thinking  of  it  as  an  ordinary  war  that  could  be  ended  by 
good  strategy  and  a  few  victories.  He  censured  Joseph 
and  Savary  for  giving  up  the  line  of  the  upper  Douro  :  he 
blamed  them  next  for  the  evacuation  of  Tudela,  and 
summed  up  the  situation  by  stating  that  "  all  the  Spanish 
forces  are  not  able  to  overthrow  25,000  French  in  a  reason- 
able position  "  —  adding,  with  stinging  satire  :  "  In  war  men 
are  nothing  :  it  is  a  man  who  is  everything." 

When,  at  the  close  of  August,  Napoleon  penned  these 
memorable  words  in  his  palace  of  St.  Cloud,  he  knew  not 
that  a  man  had  arrived  on  the  scene  of  action.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  that  month,  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  with  a  British 
force  of  12,300  men  landed  at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Mon- 
dego,  and,  aided  by  Portuguese  irregulars,  began  his  march 
on  Lisbon.  This  is  not  the  place  for  a  review  of  the  char- 
acter and  career  of  our  great  warrior :  in  truth,  a  volume 
would  be  too  short  for  the  task.  With  fine  poetic  insight, 
Lord  Tennyson  has  noted  in  his  funeral  Ode  the  qualities 
that  enabled  him  to  overcome  the  unexampled  difficulties 
caused  by  our  own  incompetent  Government  and  by  jealous, 
exacting,  and  slipshod  allies  : 

"Mourn  for  the  man  of  long-enduring  blood, 
The  statesman-warrior,  moderate,  resolute, 
Whole  in  himself,  a  common  good." 

Glory  and  vexation  were  soon  to  be  his.  On  the  17th 
he  drove  the  French  vanguard  from  Rolic,a  ;  and  when,  four 
days  later,  Junot  hurried  up  with  all  his  force,  the  British 
inflicted  on  that  presumptuous  leader  a  signal  defeat  at 
Vimiero.  So  bad  were  Junot's  tactics  that  his  whole  force 
would  have  been  cut  off  from  Torres  Vedras,  had  not  Welles- 
jley's  senior  officer,  Sir  Harry  Burrard,  arrived  just  in  time 


158  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

to  take  over  the  command  and  stop  the  pursuit.  Thereupon 
Wellesley  sarcastically  exclaimed  to  his  staff :  "  Gentlemen, 
nothing  now  remains  to  us  but  to  go  and  shoot  red-legged 
partridges."  The  peculiarities  of  our  war  administration 
were  further  seen  in  the  supersession  of  Burrard  by  Sir 
Hew  Dalrymple,  whose  chief  title  to  fame  is  his  signing 
of  the  Convention  of  Cintra. 

By  this  strange  compact  the  whole  of  Junot's  force  was 
to  be  conveyed  from  Portugal  to  France  on  British  ships, 
while  the  Russian  squadron  blockaded  in  the  Tagus  was  to 
be  held  by  us  in  pledge  till  the  peace,  the  crews,  being  sent 
on  to  Russia.  The  convention  itself  was  violently  attacked 
by  the  English  public ;  but  it  has  found  a  defender  in  Na- 
pier, who  dwells  on  the  advantages  of  getting  the  French 
at  once  out  of  Portugal,  and  thus  providing  a  sure  base  for 
the  operations  in  Spain.  Seeing,  however,  that  Junot's  men 
were  demoralized  by  defeat,  and  that  the  nearest  succour- 
ing force  was  in  Navarre,  these  excuses  seem  scarcely  ten- 
able, except  on  the  ground  that,  with  such  commanders  as 
Burrard  and  Dalrymple,  it  was  certainly  desirable  to  get 
the  French  speedily  away. 

On  his  side,  Napoleon  showed  much  annoyance  at  Junot's 
acceptance  of  this  convention,  and  remarked :  "  I  was  about 
to  send  Junot  to  a  council  of  war :  but  happily  the  English 
got  the  start  of  me  by  sending  their  generals  to  one,  and 
thus  saved  me  from  the  pain  of  punishing  an  old  friend." 
With  his  customary  severity  to  those  who  had  failed,  he 
frowned  on  all  the  officers  of  the  Army  of  Portugal,  and,  on 
landing  in  France,  they  were  strictly  forbidden  to  come  to 
Paris.  The  fate  of  Dupont  and  of  all  his  officers  who  were 
not  cooped  up  in  Spanish  galleys,  was  even  harder :  on  their 
return  they  were  condemned  to  imprisonment.  By  such 
means  did  Napoleon  exact  the  uttermost  from  his  troops, 
even  in  a  service  so  detested  as  that  in  Spain  ever  was.1 

Despite  the  blunderings  of  our  War  Office,  the  silly 
vapourings  of  the  Spaniards,  and  the  insane  quarrels  of 
their  provincial  juntas  about  precedence  and  the  sharing 
of  English  subsidies,  the  summer  of  1808  saw  Napoleon's 
power  stagger  under  terrible  blows.     Not  only  did  he  lose 

1  Memoirs  of  Thigbault  and  De  Broglie  ;  so,  too,  De  Rocca,  "  La 
Guerre  en  Espagne." 


xxvm  THE   SPANISH   RISING  159 

Spain  and  Portugal  and  the  subsidies  which  they  had 
meekly  paid,  but  most  of  the  fifteen  thousand  Spanish 
troops  which  had  served  him  on  the  shores  of  the  Baltic 
found  means  to  slip  away  on  British  ships  and  put  a  back- 
bone into  the  patriotic  movements  in  the  north  of  Spain. 
But  worst  of  all  was  the  loss  of  that  moral  strength,  which 
he  himself  reckoned  as  three-fourths  of  the  whole  force  in 
war.  Hitherto  he  had  always  been  able  to  marshal  the 
popular  impulse  on  his  side.  As  the  heir  to  the  Revolu- 
tion he  had  appealed,  and  not  in  vain,  to  the  democratic 
forces  which  he  had  hypnotized  in  France  but  sought  to 
stir  up  in  his  favour  abroad.  Despite  the  efforts  of 
Czartoryski  and  Stein  to  tear  the  democratic  mask  from 
his  face,  it  imposed  on  mankind  until  the  Spanish  Revolu- 
tion laid  bare  the  truth ;  and  at  St.  Helena  the  exile  gave 
his  own  verdict  on  the  policy  of  Bayonne :  "  It  was  the 
Spanish  ulcer  which  ruined  me." 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

ERFURT 

"At  bottom  the  great  question  is  —  who  shall  have  Constants 
nople?  "  —  Napoleon,  May  31st,  1808. 

The  Spanish  Rising  made  an  immense  rent  in  Napo- 
leon's plans.  It  opened  valuable  markets  for  British  goods 
both  in  the  Peninsula  and  in  South  and  Central  America, 
and  that  too  at  the  very  time  when  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem was  about  to  enfold  us  in  its  deadly  grip.1  And 
finally  it  disarranged  schemes  that  reached  far  beyond 
Europe.     To  these  we  must  now  briefly  recur. 

Even  amidst  his  greatest  military  triumphs  Napoleon's 
gaze  turned  longingly  towards  the  East;  and  no  sooner 
did  he  force  peace  on  the  conquered  than  his  thoughts 
centred  once  more  on  his  navy  and  colonies,  on  Egypt 
and  India.  The  Treaty  of  Tilsit  gave  him  leisure  to 
renew  these  designs.  The  publication  in  1807  of  his 
official  Atlas  of  Australia,  in  which  he  claimed  nearly  half 
that  continent  for  France,  proves  that  he  never  accepted 
Trafalgar  as  a  death-blow  to  his  maritime  and  colonial 
aspirations.  And  the  ardour  of  his  desire  for  the  con- 
quest of  India  is  seen  in  the  letter  which  he  wrote  to  the 
Czar  on  February  2nd,  1808.  After  expressing  his  desire 
for  the  glory  and  expansion  of  Russia,  and  advising  the 
Czar  to  conquer  Finland,  he  proceeds : 

"An  army  of  50,000  men,  Russians,  French,  and  perhaps  a  few 
Austrians,  that  penetrated  by  way  of  Constantinople  into  Asia,  would 
not  reach  the  Euphrates  before  England  would  tremble  and  bow  the 
knee  before  the  Continent.  I  am  ready  in  Dalmatia.  Your  Majesty 
is  ready  on  the  Danube.     A  month  after  we  came  to  an  agreement  the 

1  See  the  letter  of  an  Englishman  from  Buenos  Ayres  of  September 
27th,  1809,  in  "  Cobbett's  Register"  for  1810  (p.  25(5),  stating  that  the 
new  popular  Government  there  was  driven  by  want  of  funds,  "not  from 
their  good  wishes  to  England,"  to  open  their  ports  to  all  foreign  com' 
merce  on  moderate  duties. 

160 


chap,  xxix  ERFURT  161 

army  could  be  on  the  Bosporus.  ...  By  the  1st  of  May  our  troops 
can  be  in  Asia,  and  at  the  same  time  those  of  Your  Majesty,  at  Stock- 
holm. Then  the  English,  threatened  in  the  Indies,  and  chased  from 
the  Levant,  will  bs  crushed  under  the  weight  of  events  with  which  the 
atmosphere  will  be  charged." 1 

There  were  several  reasons  why  Napoleon  should  urge 
on  this  scheme.  He  was  irritated  by  the  continued  resist- 
ance of  Great  Britain,  and  thought  to  terrify  us  into  sur- 
render by  means  of  those  oriental  enterprises  which 
convinced  our  statesmen  that  we  must  fight  on  for  dear 
life.  He  also  desired  to  restore  the  harmony  of  his  rela- 
tions with  Alexander.  For,  in  truth,  the  rapturous  harmo- 
nies of  Tilsit  had  soon  been  marred  by  discord.  Alexander 
did  not  withdraw  his  troops  from  the  Danubian  provinces; 
whereupon  Napoleon  declined  to  evacuate  Silesia;  and  the 
friction  resulting  from  this  wary  balancing  of  interests  was 
increased,  when,  at  the  close  of  1807,  a  formal  proposal  was 
sent  from  Paris  that,  if  Russia  retained  those  provinces, 
Silesia  should  be  at  the  disposal  of  France.2  The  dazzling 
vistas  opened  up  to  Alexander's  gaze  at  Tilsit  were  thus 
shrouded  by  a  sordid  and  distasteful  bargain,  which  he 
hotly  repelled.  To  repair  this  false  step,  Napoleon  now 
wrote  the  alluring  letter  quoted  above ;  and  the  Czar 
exclaimed  on  perusing  it :  "  Ah,  this  is  the  language  of 
Tilsit." 

Yet,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  Napoleon  desired  to 
press  on  an  immediate  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Power. 
His  letter  invited  the  Czar  to  two  great  enterprises,  the 
conquest  of  Finland  and  the  invasion  of  Persia  and  India. 
The  former  by  itself  was  destined  to  tax  Russia's  strength. 
Despite  Alexander's  offer  of  a  perpetual  guarantee  for  the 
Finnish  constitution  and  customs,  that  interesting  people 
opposed  a  stubborn  resistance.  Napoleon  must  also  have 
known  that  Russia's  forces  were  then  wholly  unequal  to 
the  invasion  of  India;  and  his  invitation  to  Alexander  to 
engage  in  two  serious  enterprises  certainly  had  the  effect 
of  postponing  the  partition  of  Turkey.  Delay  was  all  in 
his  favour,  if  he  was  to  gain  the  lion's  share  of  the  spoils. 

1  Vandal,  "Napoleon  et  Alexandre,"  ch.  vii.  It  is  not  published  in 
the  "  Correspondence  "  or  in  the  "  New  Letters." 

2  Vandal,  "Napoleon  et  Alexandre,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  iv.,  and  App.  II. 

VOL.   II  —  M 


162  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Russian  troops  were  ready  on  the  banks  of  the  Danube; 
but  he  was  not  as  yet  fully  prepared.  His  hold  on  Dalma- 
tia,  Ragusa,  and  Corfu  was  not  wholly  assured.  Sicily 
and  Malta  still  defied  him ;  and  not  until  he  seized  Sicily 
could  he  gain  the  control  of  the  Mediterranean  — "  the 
constant  aim  of  my  policy."  Only  when  that  great  sea 
had  become  a  French  lake  could  he  hope  to  plant  himself 
firmly  in  Albania,  Thessaly,  Greece,  Crete,  Egypt,  and 
Syria. 

For  the  present,  then,  the  Czar  was  beguiled  with  the 
prospect  of  an  eastern  expedition ;  and,  while  Russian 
troops  were  overrunning  Finland,  Napoleon  sought  to  con- 
quer Sicily  and  reduce  Spain  to  the  rank  of  a  feudatory 
State.  From  this  wider  point  of  view,  he  looked  on  the 
Iberian  Peninsula  merely  as  a  serviceable  base  for  a  greater 
enterprise,  the  conquest  of  the  East.  This  is  proved  by  a 
letter  that  he  wrote  to  Decres,  Minister  of  Marine  and  of 
the  Colonies,  from  Bayonne  on  May  17th,  1808,  when  the 
Spanish  affair  seemed  settled:  "  There  is  not  much  news 
from  India.  England  is  in  great  penury  there,  and  the 
arrival  of  an  expedition  [from  France]  would  ruin  that 
colony  from  top  to  bottom.  The  more  I  reflect  on  this 
step,  the  less  inconvenience  I  see  in  taking  it."  Two  days 
later  he  wrote  to  Murat  that  money  must  be  found  for 
naval  preparations  at  the  Spanish  ports :  "  I  must  have 
ships,  for  I  intend  striking  a  heavy  blow  towards  the  end 
of  the  season."  But  at  the  close  of  June  he  warned 
Decres  that  as  Spanish  affairs  were  going  badly,  he  must 
postpone  his  design  of  despatching  a  fleet  far  from  Euro- 
pean waters.1 

Spain  having  proved  to  be,  not  a  meek  purveyor  of  fleets, 
but  a  devourer  of  French  armies,  there  was  the  more  need 
of  a  close  accord  with  the  Czar.  Napoleon  desired,  not 
only  to  assure  a  further  postponement  of  the  Turkish 
enterprise,  but  also  to  hold  Austria  and  Germany  in  check. 

1  In  the  conversations  which  Metternich  had  with  Napoleon  and  Talley- 
rand on  and  after  January  22nd,  1808,  he  was  convinced  that  the  French 
Emperor  intended  to  partition  Turkey  as  soon  as  it  suited  him  to  do  so, 
which  would  be  after  he  had  subjected  Spain.  Napoleon  said  to  him : 
"  When  the  Russians  are  at  Constantinople  you  will  need  France  to  help 
you  against  them."  —  "  Metternich  Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  188. 


xxix  ERFURT  163 

The  former  Power,  seeing  Napoleon  in  difficulties,  pushed 
on  apace  her  military  organization ;  and  Germany  heaved 
with  suppressed  excitement  at  the  news  of  the  Spanish 
Rising.  The  dormant  instinct  of  German  nationality  had 
already  shown  signs  of  awakening.  In  the  early  days  of 
1808  the  once  cosmopolitan  philosopher,  Fichte,  delivered  at 
Berlin  within  sound  of  the  French  drums  his  "  Addresses 
to  the  German  Nation,"  in  which  he  dwelt  on  the  un- 
quenchable strength  of  a  people  that  determined  at  all 
costs  to  live  free. 

On  the  philosopher's  theme  the  Spaniards  now  furnished 
a  commentary  written  with  their  life-blood.  Thinkers  and 
soldiers  were  alike  moved  by  the  stories  of  Baylen  and 
Saragossa.  Varnhagen  von  Ense  relates  how  deep  was  the 
excitement  of  the  quaint  sage,  Jean  Paul  Richter,  who 
"  doubted  not  that  the  Germans  would  one  day  rise  against 
the  French  as  the  Spaniards  had  done,  and  that  Prussia 
would  revenge  its  insults  and  give  freedom  to  Ger- 
many. ...  I  proved  to  him  how  hollow  and  weak  was 
Napoleon's  power:  how  deeply  rooted  was  the  opposition 
to  it.  The  Spaniards  were  the  refrain  to  everything,  and 
we  always  returned  to  them." 

The  beginnings  of  a  new  civic  life  were  then  being  laid 
in  Prussia  by  Stein.  Called  by  the  King  to  be  virtually  a 
civic  dictator,  this  great  statesman  carried  out  the  most 
drastic  reforms.  In  October,  1807,  there  appeared  at 
Memel  the  decrees  of  emancipation  which  declared  the 
abolition  of  serfdom  with  all  its  compulsory  and  menial 
services.  The  old  feudal  society  was  further  invigorated 
by  the  admission  of  all  classes  to  the  holding  of  land  or  to 
any  employment,  while  trade  monopolies  were  similarly 
swept  away.  Municipal  self-government  gave  new  zest 
and  energy  to  civic  life  ;  and  the  principle  that  the  army 
"ought  to  be  the  union  of  all  the  moral  and  physical 
energies  of  the  nation"  was  carried  out  by  the  military 
organizer  Scharnhorst,  who  conceived  and  partly  realized 
the  idea  that  all  able-bodied  men  should  serve  their  time 
with  the  colours  and  then  be  drafted  into  a  reserve.  This 
military  reform  excited  Napoleon's  distrust,  and  he  forced 
the  King  to  agree  by  treaty  (September,  1808)  that  the 
Prussian  army  should  never  exceed  42,000  men,  a  measure 


164  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

which  did  not  hinder  the  formation  of  an  effective  reserve, 
and  was  therefore  complied  with  to  the  letter,  if  not  in 
spirit. 

In  fact,  in  the  previous  month  a  plan  of  a  popular 
insurrection  had  been  secretly  discussed  by  Stein,  Scharn- 
horst,  and  other  patriotic  Ministers.  The  example  of  the 
Spaniards  was  everywhere  to  be  followed,  and,  if  Austria 
sent  forth  her  legions  on  the  Danube  and  England  helped 
in  Hanover,  there  seemed  some  prospect  of  shaking  off 
the  Napoleonic  yoke.  The  scheme  miscarried,  and  largely 
owing  to  the  interception  of  a  letter  in  which  Stein  impru- 
dently referred  to  the  exasperation  of  public  feeling  in 
Germany  and  the  lively  hope  excited  by  the  events  in 
Spain  and  the  preparations  of  Austria.  Napoleon  caused 
the  letter  to  be  printed  in  the  "  Moniteur  "  of  September 
8th,  and  sequestered  Stein's  property  in  Westphalia.  He 
also  kept  his  grip  on  Prussia  ;  for  while  withdrawing  most 
of  his  troops  from  that  exhausted  land,  he  retained  French 
garrisons  in  Stettin,  Glogau,  and  Kiistrin.  Holding  these 
fortresses  on  the  strong  defensive  line  of  the  Oder,  he 
might  smile  at  the  puny  efforts  of  Prussian  patriots  and 
hope  speedily  to  crush  the  Spanish  rebels,  provided  he 
could  count  on  the  loyal  support  of  Alexander  in  holding 
Austria  in  check. 

To  gain  this  support  and  to  clear  away  the  clouds  that 
bulked  on  their  oriental  horizon,  Napoleon  urgently  de- 
sired an  interview  with  his  ally.  For  some  months  it  had 
been  proposed ;  but  the  Spanish  Rising  and  the  armaments 
of  Austria  made  it  essential. 

The  meeting  took  place  at  Erfurt  (September  27th). 
The  Thuringian  city  was  ablaze  with  uniforms,  and  the 
cannon  thundered  salvoes  of  welcome  as  the  two  poten- 
tates and  their  suites  entered  the  ancient  walls  and  filed 
through  narrow  streets  redolent  of  old  German  calm,  an 
abode  more  suited  to  the  speculations  of  a  Luther  than 
to  the  world-embracing  schemes  of  the  Emperors  of  the 
West  and  East.  With  them  were  their  chief  warriors  and 
Ministers,  personages  who  now  threw  into  the  shade  the 
new  German  kings.  There,  too,  were  the  lesser  German 
princes,  some  of  them  to  grace  the  Court  of  the  man  who 
had  showered  lands  and  titles  on  them,  others  to  hint  a 


xxix  ERFURT  165 

wish  for  more  lands  and  higher  titles.  In  truth,  the  title 
of  king  was  tantalizingly  common  ;  and  if  we  may  credit 
a  story  of  the  time,  the  French  soldiery  had  learnt  to  de- 
spise it.  For,  on  one  occasion,  when  the  guard  of  honour, 
deceived  by  the  splendour  of  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg's 
chariot,  was  about  to  deliver  the  triple  salute  accorded 
only  to  the  two  Emperors,  the  officer  in  command  angrily 
exclaimed :  "  Be  quiet :  it's  only  a  king." 

The  Emperors  at  Erfurt  devoted  the  mornings  to  per- 
sonal interviews,  the  afternoons  to  politics,  the  evenings 
to  receptions  and  the  theatre.  The  actors  of  the  Come'die 
Franchise  had  been  brought  from  Paris,  and  played  to  the 
Emperors  and  a  parterre  of  princes  the  masterpieces  of  the 
French  stage,  especially  those  which  contained  suitable 
allusions.  A  notable  incident  occurred  on  the  recital  of 
the  line  in  the  "  CEdipe  "  of  Voltaire : 

"  L'amitie  d'un  grand  horarae  est  un  bienfait  des  dieux." 

As  if  moved  by  a  sudden  inspiration,  Alexander  arose  and 
warmly  pressed  the  hand  of  Napoleon,  who  was  then  half- 
dozing  at  his  side.1  On  the  surface,  indeed,  everything 
was  friendship  and  harmony.  With  urbane  facility,  the 
Czar  accompanied  his  ally  to  the  battlefield  of  Jena, 
listened  to  the  animated  description  of  the  victor,  and 
then  joined  in  the  chase  in  a  forest  hard  by. 

But  beneath  these  brilliant  shows  there  lurked  suspi- 
cions and  fears.  Alexander  was  annoyed  that  Napoleon 
retained  French  garrisons  in  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder 
and  claimed  an  impossible  sum  as  indemnity  from  Prussia. 
This  was  not  the  restoration  of  Prussia's  independence,  for 
which  he,  Alexander,  had  pleaded;  and  while  the  French 
eagles  were  at  Kustrin,  the  Russian  frontier  could  not  be 
deemed  wholly  safe.2  Then  again  the  Czar  had  been  se- 
cretly warned  by  Talleyrand  against  complaisance  to  the 
French  Emperor.  "  Sire,  what  are  you  coming  here  for  ? 
It  is  for  you  to  save  Europe,  and  you  will  only  succeed  in 
that  by  resisting  Napoleon.  The  French  are  civilized,  their 
sovereign  is  not.  The  sovereign  of  Russia  is  civilized,  her 
people  are  not.     Therefore  the  sovereign  of  Russia  must 

1  So  Soult  told  Lord  Holland  ("  Foreign  Reminiscences,"  p.  171). 

2  Vandal,  vol.  i.,  p.  384. 


166  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

be  the  ally  of  the  French  people." 1  We  may  doubt 
whether  this  symmetrical  proposition  would  have  had 
much  effect,  if  Alexander  had  not  received  similar  warn- 
ings from  his  own  ambassador  at  Paris ;  and  it  would  seem 
that  too  much  importance  has  been  assigned  to  what  is 
termed  Talleyrand's  treachery  at  Erfurt.2  Affairs  of  high 
policy  are  determined,  not  so  much  by  the  logic  of  words  as 
by  the  sterner  logic  of  facts.  Ever  since  Tilsit,  Napoleon 
had  been  prodigal  of  promises  to  his  ally,  but  of  little  else. 
The  alluring  visions  set  forth  in  his  letter  of  February  2nd 
were  as  visionary  as  ever ;  and  Romantzoff  expressed  the 
wish  of  his  countrymen  in  his  remark  to  Champagny : 
"  We  have  come  to  Erfurt  to  set  a  limit  to  this  conduct." 
It  was  evident  that  if  Napoleon  had  his  way  completely, 
the  partition  of  Turkey  would  take  place  at  the  time  and 
in  the  manner  desired  by  him;  this  the  Czar  was  deter- 
mined to  prevent,  and  therefore  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  his 
ally's  proposal  that  they  should  summon  Austria  to  explain 
her  present  ambiguous  behaviour  and  frankly  to  recognize 
Joseph  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Spain.  If  Austria  put  a  stop 
to  her  present  armaments,  the  supremacy  of  Napoleon  in 
Central  Europe  would  be  alarmingly  great.  Clearly  it 
was  not  to  Russia's  interest  to  weaken  the  only  buffer-state 
that  remained  between  her  and  the  Empire  of  the  West. 

These  fears  were  quietly  fed  by  a  special  envoy  of  the 
Court  of  Vienna,  Baron  Vincent,  who  brought  compli- 
mentary notes  to  the  two  Emperors  and  remained  to  feel 
the  pulse  of  European  policy.  It  boded  peace  for  Austria 
for  the  present.  Despite  Napoleon's  eager  arguments  that 
England  would  never  make  peace  until  Austria  accepted 
the  present  situation  in  Spain,  Alexander  quietly  but 
firmly  refused  to  take  any  steps  to  depress  the  Hapsburg 
Power.  The  discussions  waxed  warm;  for  Napoleon  saw 
that,  unless  the  Court  of  Vienna  were  coerced,  England 
would  persist  in  aiding  the  Spanish  patriots ;  and  Alex- 
ander showed  an  unexpected  obstinacy.     Napoleon's  plea, 

1  Metternich,  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  298  (Eng.  edit.). 

2 1  think  that  Beer  (pp.  330-340)  errs  somewhat  in  ranking  Talleyrand's 
work  at  Erfurt  at  that  statesman's  own  very  high  valuation,  which  he 
enhanced  in  later  years  :  see  Greville's  "Mems.,"  Second  Part,  vol.  ii., 
p.  193. 


xxix  ERFURT  167 

that  peace  could  only  be  assured  by  the  entire  discourage- 
ment of  England,  Austria,  and  the  Spanish  "rebels,"  had 
no  effect  on  him :  in  fact,  he  began  to  question  the  sincer- 
ity of  a  peacemaker  whose  methods  were  war  and  intimi- 
dation. Finding  arguments  useless,  Napoleon  had  recourse 
to  anger.  At  the  end  of  a  lively  discussion,  he  threw  his 
cap  on  the  ground  and  stamped  on  it.  Alexander  stopped, 
looked  at  him  with  a  meaning  smile,  and  said  quietly : 
"  You  are  violent:  as  for  me,  I  am  obstinate:  anger  gains 
nothing  from  me  :  let  us  talk,  let  us  reason,  or  I  go."  He 
moved  towards  the  door,  whereupon  Napoleon  called  him 
back  —  and  they  reasoned. 

It  was  of  no  avail.  Though  Alexander  left  his  ally  a 
free  hand  in  Spain,  he  refused  to  join  him  in  a  diplomatic 
menace  to  Austria ;  and  Napoleon  saw  that  "  those  devilish 
Spanish  affairs  "  were  at  the  root  of  this  important  failure, 
which  was  to  cost  him  the  war  on  the  Danube  in  the  fol- 
lowing year. 

As  a  set-off  to  this  check,  he  disappointed  Alexander 
respecting  Prussia  and  Turkey.  He  refused  to  withdraw 
his  troops  from  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder,  and  grudgingly 
consented  to  lower  his  pecuniary  claims  on  Prussia  from 
140,000,000  francs  to  120,000,000.  Towards  the  Czar's 
Turkish  schemes  he  showed  little  more  complaisance. 
After  sharp  discussions  it  was  finally  settled  that  Russia 
should  gain  the  Danubian  provinces,  but  not  until  the 
following  year.  France  renounced  all  mediation  between 
Alexander  and  the  Porte,  but  required  him  to  maintain 
the  integrity  of  all  the  other  Turkish  possessions,  which 
meant  that  the  partition  of  Turkey  was  to  be  postponed 
until  it  suited  Napoleon  to  take  up  his  oriental  schemes  in 
earnest.  The  golden  visions  of  Tilsit  were  thus  once  more 
relegated  to  a  distant  future,  and  the  keenness  of  the 
Czar's  disappointment  may  be  measured  by  his  striking 
statement  quoted  by  Caulaincourt  in  one  of  his  earlier 
reports  from  St.  Petersburg :  "  Let  the  world  be  turned 
upside  down  provided  that  Russia  gains  Constantinople 
and  the  Dardanelles."  J 

The  Erfurt  interview  left  another  hidden  sore.  It  was 
there  that  the  divorce  from  Josephine  was  officially  dis- 

1  Vandal,  vol.  i.,  p.  307. 


168  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

cussed,  with  a  view  to  a  more  ambitious  alliance.  Per- 
sistent as  the  rumours  of  a  divorce  had  been  for  seven 
years  past,  they  seem  to  have  emanated,  not  from  the  hus- 
band, but  from  jealous  sisters-in-law,  intriguing  relatives, 
and  officious  Ministers.  To  the  most  meddlesome  of  these 
satellites,  Fouche\  who  had  ventured  to  suggest  to  Jose- 
phine the  propriety  of  sacrificing  herself  for  the  good  of 
the  State,  Napoleon  had  lately  administered  a  severe  re- 
buke. But  now  he  caused  Talleyrand  and  Caulaincourt 
to  sound  the  Czar  as  to  the  feasibility  of  an  alliance  with 
one  of  his  sisters.  The  response  was  equally  vague  and 
discreet.  Alexander  expressed  his  gratification  at  the 
friendship  which  proffered  such  a  request  and  his  desire 
for  the  founding  of  a  Napoleonic  House.  Further  than 
this  he  did  not  go :  and  eight  days  after  his  return  to 
St.  Petersburg  his  only  marriageable  sister,  Catherine,  was 
affianced  to  the  heir  to  the  Duchy  of  Oldenburg.  This 
event,  it  is  true,  was  decided  by  the  Dowager  Empress ; 
but  no  one,  least  of  all  Napoleon,  could  harbour  any  doubts 
as  to  its  significance. 

In  truth,  Napoleon's  chief  triumphs  at  Erfurt  were 
social  and  literary.  His  efforts  to  dazzle  German  princes 
and  denationalize  two  of  her  leading  thinkers  were  partly 
successful.  Goethe  and  Wieland  bowed  before  his  great- 
ness. To  the  former  Napoleon  granted  a  lengthy  inter- 
view. He  flattered  the  aged  poet  at  the  outset  by  the 
words,  "  You  are  a  man  " :  he  then  talked  about  several 
works  in  a  way  that  Goethe  thought  very  just ;  and  he 
criticised  one  passage  of  the  poet's  youthful  work,  "  Wer- 
ther,"  as  untrue  to  nature,  with  which  Goethe  agreed. 
On  Voltaire's  "Mahomet"  he  heaped  censure,  for  its  un- 
worthy portraiture  of  the  conqueror  of  the  East  and  its  in- 
effective fatalism.  "  These  pieces  belong  to  an  obscure 
age.  Besides,  what  do  they  mean  with  their  fatalism? 
Politics  is  fatalism."  The  significance  of  this  saying  was 
soon  to  be  emphasized,  so  that  misapprehension  was  im- 
possible. After  witnessing  Voltaire's  "  La  Mort  de  Ce*sar," 
Napoleon  suggested  that  the  poet  ought  to  write  a  tragedy 
in  a  grander  style  than  Voltaire's,  so  as  to  show  how  the 
world  would  have  benefited  if  the  great  Roman  had  had 
time  to  carry  out  his  vast  plans. 


xxix  ERFURT  169 

Finally,  Goethe  was  invited  to  come  to  Paris,  where 
he  would  find  abundant  materials  for  his  poetic  creations. 
Fortunately,  Goethe  was  able  to  plead  his  age  in  excuse ; 
and  the  world  was  therefore  spared  the  sight  of  a  great 
genius  saddled  with  an  imperial  commission  and  writing  a 
Napoleonized  version  of  Caesar's  exploits  and  policy.  But 
the  pressing  character  of  the  invitation  reveals  the  Em- 
peror's dissatisfaction  with  his  French  poetasters  and  his 
intention  to  denationalize  German  literature.  He  had  a 
dim  perception  that  Teutonic  idealism  was  a  dangerous 
foe,  inasmuch  as  it  kept  alive  the  sense  of  nationality 
which  he  was  determined  to  obliterate.  He  was  right. 
The  last  and  most  patriotic  of  Schiller's  works,  "  Wilhelm 
Tell,"  the  impassioned  discourses  of  Fichte,  the  efforts  of 
the  new  patriotic  league,  the  Tugendbund,  and  last,  but 
not  least,  the  memory  of  the  murdered  Palm,  all  these 
were  influences  that  baffled  bayonets  and  diplomacy.  Con- 
quer and  bargain  as  he  might,  he  could  not  grapple  with 
the  impalpable  forces  of  the  era  that  was  now  dawning. 
The  younger  generation  throbbed  responsive  to  the  teach- 
ings of  Fichte,  the  appeals  of  Stein,  and  the  exploits  of  the 
Spaniards ;  it  was  blind  to  the  splendours  of  Erfurt :  and 
it  heard  with  grief,  but  with  no  change  of  conviction,  that 
Goethe  and  Wieland  had  accepted  from  Napoleon  the  cross 
of  the  Legion  of  Honour,  and  that  too  on  the  anniversary 
of  the  Battle  of  Jena. 

After  thus  finally  belittling  the  two  poets,  he  shot  a  part- 
ing shaft  at  German  idealism  in  his  farewell  to  the  acade- 
micians. He  bade  them  beware  of  idealogues  as  dangerous 
dreamers  and  disguised  materialists.  Then,  raising  his 
voice,  he  exclaimed :  "  Philosophers  plague  themselves 
with  weaving  systems:  they  will  never  find  a  better  one 
than  Christianity,  which,  reconciling  man  with  himself, 
also  assures  public  order  and  repose.  Your  idealogues  de- 
stroy every  illusion  ;  and  the  time  of  illusions  is  for  peoples 
and  individuals  alike  the  time  of  happiness.  I  carry  one 
away,  that  you  will  think  kindly  of  me."  He  then  mounted 
his  carriage  and  drove  away  to  Paris  to  resume  his  con- 
quest of  Spain.1 

^klower,  "L'Entrevue  de  Napolgon  avec  Goethe1';  Mrs.  Austin's 
"Germany  from  1760  to  1814"  ;  Oncken,  bk.  vii.,  ch.  i.     For  Napoleon's 


170  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

The  last  diplomatic  proceeding  at  Erfurt  was  the  draw- 
ing up  of  a  secret  convention  which  assigned  Finland  and 
the  Danubian  Provinces  to  Russia,  and  promised  Russia's 
help  to  Napoleon  in  case  Austria  should  attack  him.  The 
Czar  also  recognized  Joseph  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Spain 
and  joined  Napoleon  in  a  joint  note  to  George  III.  sum- 
moning him  to  make  peace.  On  the  same  day  (October 
12th)  that  note  was  drawn  up  and  despatched  to  London. 
In  reply,  Canning  stated  our  willingness  to  treat  for  peace, 
provided  that  it  should  include  all  parties :  that,  although 
bound  by  no  formal  treaty  to  Ferdinand  VII.  and  the 
Spanish  people,  yet  we  felt  ourselves  none  the  less  pledged 
to  them,  and  presumed  that  they,  as  well  as  our  other 
allies,  would  be  admitted  to  the  negotiations.  Long  before 
this  reply  reached  Paris,  Napoleon  had  left  for  Spain.  But 
on  November  19th,  he  charged  Champagny  to  state  that 
the  Spanish  rebels  could  no  more  be  admitted  than  the 
Irish  insurgents :  as  for  the  other  parties  to  the  dispute  he 
would  not  refuse  to  admit  "  either  the  King  reigning  in 
Sweden,  or  the  King  reigning  in  Sicily,  or  the  King  reign- 
ing in  Brazil."  This  insulting  reply  sufficiently  shows  the 
insincerity  of  his  overtures  and  the  peculiarity  of  his  views 
of  monarchy.  The  Spaniards  were  rebels  because  they  re- 
fused to  recognize  the  forced  abdication  of  their  young 
King;  and  the  rulers  of  Sweden,  Naples,  and  Portugal 
were  Kings  as  long  as  it  suited  Napoleon  to  tolerate  them, 
and  no  longer.  It  is  needless  to  add  that  our  Government 
refused  to  desert  the  Spaniards ;  and  in  his  reply  to  St. 
Petersburg,  Canning  expressed  George  III.'s  deep  regret 
that  Alexander  should  sanction 

"  An  usurpation  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  the  world.  ...  If 
these  be  the  principles  to  which  the  Emperor  of  Russia  has  inviolably 
attached  himself  .  .  .  deeply  does  His  Majesty  [George  III.]  lament 
a  determination  by  which  the  sufferings  of  Europe  must  be  aggravated 
and  prolonged.  But  not  to  His  Majesty  is  to  be  attributed  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  calamities  of  war,  by  the  disappointment  of  all  hope 
of  such  a  peace  as  would  be  compatible  with  justice  and  honour."  1 

dispute  with  Wieland  about  Tacitus  see  Talleyrand,  "Mems.,"  vol.,  i.,  pt.  5. 
When  the  Emperors'  carriages  were  ready  for  departure,  Talleyrand  whis- 
pered to  Alexander:  "Ah !  si  Votre  Majeste"  pouvait  se  tromper  de  voiture." 
1  "  F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  74,  despatch  of  December  9th,  1808.  On  January 
14th,  1809,  Canning  signed  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  Spanish  people, 


xxix  ERFURT  171 

No  open-minded  person  can  peruse  the  correspondence 
on  this  subject  without  concluding  that  British  policy,  if 
lacking  the  breadth,  grip,  and  finesse  that  marked  that  of 
France  and  Russia,  yet  possessed  the  sterling  merits  of 
manly  truthfulness  and  staunch  fidelity.  The  words  quoted 
above  were  the  words  of  Canning,  but  the  spirit  that  ani- 
mated them  was  that  of  George  III.  His  storm-tossed  life 
was  now  verging  towards  the  dread  bourne  of  insanity ; 
but  it  was  given  to  him  to  make  this  stern  yet  half- 
pleading  appeal  to  the  Czar's  better  nature.  And  who 
shall  say  that  the  example  of  constancy  which  the  aged 
King  displayed  amidst  the  gathering  gloom  of  his  public 
and  private  life  did  not  ultimately  bear  fruit  in  the  later 
and  grander  phase  of  Alexander's  character  and  career? 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  was  bursting  through  the  Spanish 
defence.  The  patriots,  puffed  up  with  their  first  successes, 
had  been  indulging  in  dreams  of  an  invasion  of  France ; 
and  their  provincial  juntas  quarrelled  over  the  sharing  of 
the  future  spoils  as  over  the  apportionment  of  English 
arms  and  money.  Their  awakening  was  terrible.  With 
less  than  90,000  raw  troops  they  were  attacked  by  150,000 
men  led  by  the  greatest  warrior  of  the  age.  Everywhere 
they  were  routed,  and  at  a  last  fight  at  the  pass  over  the 
Somosierra  mountain,  the  superiority  of  the  French  was 
strikingly  shown.  While  the  Spaniards  were  pouring 
down  grapeshot  on  the  struggling  masses  of  the  assailants, 
the  Emperor  resolved  to  hurl  his  light  Polish  horse  uphill 
at  the  death-dealing  guns.  Dashingly  was  the  order  obeyed. 
Some  forty  or  fifty  riders  bit  the  dust,  but  the  rest  swept 
on,  sabred  the  gunners,  and  decided  the  day.  The  Span- 
iards, amazed  at  these  unheard-of  tactics,  took  to  their 
heels,  and  nothing  now  stayed  Napoleon's  entry  into  Ma- 
drid (December  4th).  There  he  strove  to  popularize 
Joseph's  rule  by  offering  several  desirable  reforms,  such 
as  the  abolition  of  feudal  laws  and  of  the  Inquisition.  It 
was  of  no  avail.  The  Spaniards  would  have  none  of  them 
at  his  hands. 

After  a   brief   stay  in  Madrid,  he  turned  to  crush  Sir 

both  sides  agreeing  never  to  make  peace  with  Napoleon  except  by  common 
consent.     It  was  signed  when  the  Spanish  cause  seemed  desperate  ;  but  it 
|  was  religiously  observed. 


172  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

John  Moore.  That  brave  soldier,  relying  on  the  empty 
promises  of  the  patriots,  had  ventured  into  the  heart  of 
Leon  with  a  British  force  of  26,000  men.  If  he  could  not 
save  Madrid,  he  could  at  least  postpone  a  French  conquest 
of  the  south.  In  this  he  succeeded;  his  chivalrous  dar- 
ing drew  on  him  the  chief  strength  of  the  invaders ;  and 
when  hopelessly  outnumbered  he  beat  a  lion-like  retreat  to 
Corunna.  There  he  turned  and  dealt  the  French  a  blow 
that  closed  his  own  career  with  glory  and  gained  time  for 
his  men  to  embark  in  safety. 

While  the  red-coats  saw  the  snowy  heights  of  Galicia 
fade  into  the  sky,  Napoleon  was  spurring  back  to  the 
Pyrenees.  He  had  received  news  that  portended  war  with 
Austria ;  and,  cherishing  the  strange  belief  that  Spain  was 
conquered,  he  rushed  back  to  Paris  to  confront  the  Haps- 
burg  Power.  But  Spain  was  not  conquered.  Scattered 
her  armies  were  in  the  open,  and  even  brave  Saragossa 
fell  in  glorious  ruins  under  Lannes'  persistent  attacks. 
But  the  patriots  fiercely  rallied  in  the  mountains,  and 
Napoleon  was  to  find  out  the  truth  of  the  Roman  histo- 
rian's saying :  "  In  no  land  does  the  character  of  the  peo- 
ple and  the  nature  of  the  country  help  to  repair  disasters 
more  readily  than  in  Spain." 

There  was  another  reason  for  Napoleon's  sudden  return. 
Rumours  had  reached  him  as  to  the  rapprochement  of  those 
usually  envious  rivals,  Talleyrand  and  Fouche*,  who  now 
walked  arm  in  arm,  held  secret  conclaves,  and  seemed  to 
have  some  understanding  with  Murat.  Were  they  plot- 
ting to  bring  this  ambitious  man  and  his  still  more  ambi- 
tious and  vindictive  consort  from  the  despised  throne  at 
Naples  to  seize  on  power  at  Paris  while  the  Emperor  was 
engulfed  in  the  Spanish  quagmire  ?  A  story  ran  that 
Fouche*  had  relays  of  horses  ready  between  Naples  and 
Paris  for  this  enterprise.1  But.  where  Fouche*  and  Talley- 
rand are  concerned,  truth  lurks  at  the  bottom  of  an  unfath- 
omable well. 

All  we  know  for  certain  is  that  Napoleon  flew  back  to 
Paris  in  a  towering  rage,  and  that,  after  sharply  rebuking 
Fouche*,  he  subjected  the  Prince  of  Benevento  to  a  violent 
tirade :  just  as  he  (Talleyrand)  had  first  advised  the  death 

^adelin's  "  Fouch6,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  80 ;  Pasquier,  vol.  i.,  pp.  353-360. 


xxix  ERFURT  173 

of  the  Due  d'Enghien  and  then  turned  that  event  to  his 
sovereign's  discredit,  so  now,  after  counselling  the  over- 
throw of  the  Spanish  dynasty,  he  was  making  the  same 
underhand  use  of  the  miscarriage  of  that  enterprise.  The 
Grand  Chamberlain  stood  as  if  unmoved  until  the  storm 
swept  by,  and  then  coldly  remarked  to  the  astonished  cir- 
cle :  "  What  a  pity  that  so  great  a  man  has  been  so  badly 
brought  up."  Nevertheless,  the  insult  rankled  deep  in  his 
being,  there  to  be  nursed  for  five  years,  and  then  in  the 
fulness  of  time  to  dart  forth  with  a  snake-like  revenge. 
In  1814  and  1815  men  saw  that  not  the  least  serious  result 
of  Napoleon's  Spanish  policy  was  the  envenoming  of  his 
relations  with  the  two  cleverest  of  living  Frenchmen. 


CHAPTER   XXX 

NAPOLEON  AND  AUSTRIA 

"Never  maltreat  an  enemy  by  halves":  such  was  the 
sage  advice  of  Prussia's  warrior  King  Frederick  the  Great, 
who  instinctively  saw  the  folly  of  half  measures  in  dealing 
with  a  formidable  foe.  The  only  statesmanlike  alterna- 
tives were,  to  win  his  friendship  by  generous  treatment, 
or  to  crush  him  to  the  earth  so  that  be  could  not  rise  to 
deal  another  blow. 

As  we  have  seen,  Napoleon  deliberately  took  the  peril- 
ous middle  course  with  the  Hapsburgs  after  Austerlitz. 
He  tore  away  from  them  their  faithful  Tyrolese  along  with 
all  their  Swabian  lands,  and  he  half  crippled  them  in  Italy 
by  leaving  them  the  line  of  the  Adige  instead  of  the 
Mincio.  Later  on,  he  compelled  Austria  to  join  the  Con- 
tinental System,  to  the  detriment  of  her  commerce  and 
revenue ;  and  his  thinly  veiled  threats  at  Erfurt  nerved 
her  to  strike  home  as  soon  as  she  saw  him  embarked  on 
the  Spanish  enterprise.  She  had  some  grounds  for  con- 
fidence. The  blows  showered  on  the  Hapsburg  States 
had  served  to  weld  them  more  closely  together  ;  reforms 
effected  in  the  administration  under  the  guidance  of  the 
able  and  Mgh-spirited  minister,  Stadion,  promised  to  re- 
invigorate  the  whole  Empire ;  and  army  reforms,  cham- 
pioned by  the  Archduke  Charles,  had  shelved  the  petted 
incapables  of  the  Court  and  opened  up  undreamt-of  vistas 
of  hope  even  to  the  common  soldier.  Moreover,  it  was 
certain  that  the  Tyrolese  would  revolt  against  the  cast- 
iron  Liberalism  now  imposed  on  them  from  Munich, 
which  interfered  with  their  cherished  customs  and  church 
festivals. 

Throughout  Germany,  too,  there  were  widespread  move- 
ments for  casting  off  the  yoke  of  Napoleon.  The  benefits 
gained  by  the  adoption  of  his  laws  were  already  balanced 
by  the  deepening  hardships  entailed  by  the  Continental 

174 


chap,  xxx  NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA  176 

System ;  and  the  national  German  sentiment,  which  Napo- 
leon ever  sought  to  root  out,  persistently  clung  to  Berlin 
and  Vienna.  A  new  thrill  of  resentment  ran  through 
Germany  when  Napoleon  launched  a  decree  of  proscription 
against  Stein,  who  had  resigned  office  on  November  24th. 
It  was  dated  from  Madrid  (December  16th,  1808),  and 
ordered  that  "  the  man  named  Stein,"  for  seeking  to  excite 
troubles  in  Germany,  should  be  held  an  enemy  of  France 
and  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  suffer  confisca- 
tion of  his  property  and  seizure  of  his  person,  wherever 
he  might  be.  The  great  statesman  thereupon  fled  into 
Austria,  where  all  the  hopes  of  German  nationalists  now 
centred.1 

On  April  the  6th  the  Archduke  Charles  issued  a  procla- 
mation in  which  the  new  hopes  of  reformed  Austria  found 
eloquent  expression  :  "  The  freedom  of  Europe  has  sought 
refuge  beneath  your  banners.  Soldiers,  your  victories  will 
break  her  chains :  your  German  brothers  who  are  now  in 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy  wait  for  their  deliverance."  These 
hopes  were  premature.  Austria  was  too  late  or  too  soon : 
she  was  too  late  to  overpower  the  Bavarians,  or  to  catch 
the  French  forces  leaderless,  and  too  soon  to  gain  the  full 
benefit  from  her  recent  army  reforms  and  from  the  diver- 
sion promised  by  England  on  the  North  Sea.2  But  our 
limits  of  space  render  it  impossible  adequately  to  describe 
the  course  of  the  struggle  on  the  Danube  or  of  the  Tyro- 
lese  rising. 

Napoleon,  hurrying  from  Paris,  found  his  forces  spread 
out  over  a  front  of  sixty  miles  from  Ratisbon  to  posi- 
tions south  of  Augsburg,  and  it  needed  all  his  skill  to 
mass  them  before  the  Archduke's  blows  fell.  Thanks  to 
Austrian  slowness  the  danger  was  averted,  and  a  difficult 
retrograde  movement  was  speedily  changed  into  a  trium- 
phant offensive.    Five  successive  days  saw  as  many  French 

1  Seeley,  "  Life  and  Times  of  Stein,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  316  ;  Hausser,  vol.  iii., 
p.  219  (4th  edition). 

2  Our  F.  O.  Records  show  that  we  wanted  to  help  Austria ;  but  a  long 
delay  was  caused  by  George  III.'s  insisting  that  she  should  make  peace 
(with  us  first.  Canning  meanwhile  sent  £250,000  in  silver  bars  to  Trieste. 
But  in  his  note  of  April  20th  he  assured  the  Court  of  Vienna  that  our 
treasury  had  been  '-nearly  exhausted"  by  the  drain  of  the  Peninsular 
War.     (Austria,  No.  90. ) 


17G  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

victories,  the  chief  of  which,  at  Eckmiihl  (April  22nd), 
forced  the  Archduke  with  the  Austrian  right  wing  north- 
wards towards  Ratisbon,  which  was  stormed  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  Charles  now  made  for  the  Bohmer  Wald, 
while  his  left  wing  on  the  south  of  the  Danube  fell  back 
towards  the  Inn.  Pushing  his  advantage  to  the  utmost, 
the  victor  invaded  Austria  and  forced  Vienna  to  surrender 
(May  13th). 

At  that  city  Napoleon  issued  (May  17th)  a  decree  which 
reveals  the  excess  of  his  confidence.  It  struck  down  the 
temporal  power  of  the  Pope,  and  annexed  to  the  French 
Empire  the  part  of  the  Papal  States  which  he  had  spared 
the  year  before.  The  form  of  the  decree  was  as  remark- 
able as  its  substance.  With  an  effrontery  only  equalled 
by  its  historical  falsity,  it  cited  the  example  of  "  Charle- 
magne, my  august  predecessor,  Emperor  of  the  French  "  ; 
and,  after  exalting  the  Imperial  dignity,  it  proceeded  to 
lower  the  Popes  to  the  position  of  Bishops  of  Rome.  The 
subordination  of  the  spiritual  to  the  civil  power  was  also 
assured  by  the  assigning  of  a  yearly  stipend  of  2,000,000 
francs  to  the  Pope. 

When  Pius  VII.  protested  against  the  seizure  of  his 
States,  and  hurled  a  bull  of  excommunication  at  the  spoli- 
ator, Napoleon  issued  orders  which  led  to  his  arrest;  and 
shortly  after  midsummer  the  unfortunate  pontiff  was 
hurried  away  from  Rome  to  Florence. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  experienced  an  unlooked-for 
reverse.  Though  so  far  cowed  by  his  defeats  in  Bavaria 
as  to  send  Napoleon  a  cringing  request  for  peace,  to  which 
the  victor  deigned  no  reply,  the  Archduke  Charles  obsti- 
nately clung  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Danube  opposite 
the  capital,  and  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  on  the  Emperor 
when  the  latter  sought  to  drive  him  from  Aspern-Essling 
(May  21st-22nd).  Had  the  Austrian  commander  had  that 
remorseless  resolve  which  ever  prompted  Napoleon  to 
wrest  from  Fortune  her  utmost  favours,  the  white-coats 
might  have  driven  their  foes  into  the  river  ;  for  at  the 
close  of  both  of  those  days  of  carnage  they  had  a  clear 
advantage.  A  French  disaster  was  in  fact  averted  only 
by  the  combined  efforts  of  Napoleon,  Massena,  Lannes, 
and  General  Mouton  ;  and  even  they  were  for  a  time  dis- 


xxx  NAPOLEON  AND  AUSTRIA  177 

mayed  by  the  frightful  losses,  and  by  the  news  that  the 
bridges,  over  which  alone  they  could  retire,  had  been 
swept  away  by  trees  and  barges  sent  down  the  flooded 
stream.  But,  as  at  Eylau,  Napoleon's  iron  will  imposed 
on  his  foes,  and,  under  cover  of  darkness,  the  French  were 
withdrawn  into  the  island  of  Lobau,  after  losing  some 
25,000  men.1 

Among  them  was  that  prince  of  vanguard  leaders, 
Lannes.  On  hearing  that  his  old  friend  was  mortally 
wounded,  the  Emperor  hurried  to  him,  and  tenderly 
embraced  him.  The  interview,  says  Marbot,  who  was  sup- 
porting the  Marshal's  shoulders,  was  most  affecting,  both 
these  stern  warriors  displaying  genuine  emotion.  And 
yet,  it  is  reported  that,  after  Lannes  was  removed  to 
Ebersdorf,  his  last  words  were  those  of  reproach  to  the 
Emperor  for  his  ambition.  At  that  time,  however,  the 
patient  was  delirious,  and  the  words,  if  really  uttered, 
were  meaningless  ;  but  the  inventor  of  the  anecdote  might 
plead  that  it  was  consonant  with  the  recent  tenor  of  the 
Marshal's  thoughts.  Like  all  thoughtful  soldiers,  who 
placed  France  before  Napoleon,  Lannes  was  weary  of  these 
endless  wars.  After  Jena  his  heart  was  not  in  the  work  ; 
and  he  wrote  thus  about  Napoleon  during  the  siege  of 
Danzig  :  "  I  have  always  been  the  victim  of  my  attach- 
ment to  him.  He  only  loves  you  by  fits  and  starts,  that 
is,  when  he  has  need  of  you."  His  presentiment  was  true. 
He  was  a  victim  to  a  war  that  was  the  outcome  solely  of 
Napoleon's  Continental  System,  and  not  of  the  needs  of 
France.  He  passed  away,  leaving  a  brilliant  military  fame 
and  a  reputation  for  soldierly  republican  frankness  which 
was  fast  vanishing  from  the  camps  and  salons  of  the  Empire.2 

1  For  the  campaign  see  the  memoirs  of  Macdonald,  Marbot,  Lejeune, 
Pelet,  and  Marmont.  The  last  (vol.  iii.,  p.  216)  says  that,  had  the  Austrians 
pressed  home  their  final  attacks  at  Aspern,  a  disaster  was  inevitable  ;  or 
had  Charles  later  on  cut  the  French  communications  near  Vienna*  the 
same  result  must  have  followed.  But  the  investigations  of  military  histo- 
rians leave  no  doubt  that  the  Austrian  troops  were  too  exhausted  by  their 
heroic  exertions,  and  their  supplies  of  ammunition  too  much  depleted,  to 
warrant  any  risky  moves  for  several  days  ;  and  by  that  time  reinforce- 
ments had  reached  Napoleon.     See  too  Angelis'  "  Der  Erz-IIerzog  Karl." 

2  Thoumas,  "  Le  Marshal  Lannes,"  pp.  20."),  :v>:\  et  seq.  Desvernois 
("Mems.,"  ch.  xii.)  notes  that  after  Austerlitz  none  of  Napoleon's  wars 
had  the  approval  of  France. 

VOL.    II  —  N 


178  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

As  yet,  however,  Napoleon's  genius  and  the  martial 
ardour  of  his  soldiers  sufficed  to  overbear  the  halting 
efforts  of  Austria  and  her  well-wishers.  On  retiring  into 
Lobau  Island  he  put  forth  to  the  utmost  his  extraordinary 
powers  of  organization.  Boats  brought  vast  supplies  of 
stores  and  ammunition  from  Vienna,  which  the  French 
still  held.  The  menacing  front  of  Massena  and  Davoust 
imposed  on  the  enemy.  Reinforcements  were  hurried  up 
from  Bavaria.  Tyrol  was  denuded  of  Franco-Bavarian 
troops,  so  that  the  peasants,  under  the  lead  of  the  brave 
innkeeper,  Hofer,  were  able  to  organize  a  systematic  de- 
fence. And  a  French  army  which  had  finally  beaten  the 
Austrians  in  Venetia,  now  began  to  drive  them  back  into 
Hungary.  In  Poland  the  white-coats  were  held  in  check, 
and  the  Franco-Russian  compact  deterred  Frederick  Will- 
iam from  making  any  move  against  France  such  as  Prussian 
patriots  ardently  counselled. 

To  have  done  so  would  have  been  madness,  unless  Eng- 
land sent  powerful  aid  on  the  side  of  Hanover ;  and  that 
aid  was  not  forthcoming.  Yet  the  patriotic  ardour  of  the 
Germans  led  to  two  daring  efforts  against  the  French. 
Schill,  with  a  Prussian  cavalry  regiment,  sought  to  seize 
Magdeburg,  and  failing  there  moved  north  in  hopes  of 
British  help.  His  adventurous  ride  was  ended  by  Napo- 
leon's Dutch  and  North  German  troops,  who  closed  in  on 
him  at  Stralsund,  and,  on  May  31st,  cut  to  pieces  his  brave 
troop.  Schill  met  a  warrior's  death  :  most  of  the  survivors 
were  sent  to  the  galleys  in  France.  Undeterred  by  this 
failure,  the  young  Duke  of  Brunswick  sought  to  rouse 
Saxony  and  Westphalia  by  a  dashing  cavalry  raid  (June) ; 
but,  beyond  showing  the  weakness  of  Jerome  Bonaparte's 
rule  and  the  general  hatred  of  the  French,  he  effected 
little :  with  his  2,000  followers  he  was  finally  saved  by 
British  cruisers  (August)  Had  the  British  expedition, 
which  in  the  ensuing  autumn  rotted  away  on  Walcheren. 
been  landed  at  Stralsund,  or  in  Hanover  during  the  spring, 
it  is  certain  that  Germany  would  have  risen  in  Napoleon's 
rear  ;  and  in  that  case,  the  doubtful  struggle  which  closed 
at  Wagram  might  have  ended  very  differently.1 

1  For  the  Walcheren  expedition  see  Alison,  vol.  viii.;  James,  vol.  iv. ; 
also  for  Gainbier's  failure  at  Rochefort.     The  letters  of  Sir  Byam  Martin, 


xxx  NAPOLEON  AND  AUSTRIA  179 

All  hopes  for  European  independence  centred  in  Welles- 
ley  and  the  Archduke  Charles.  Although  there  was  no 
formal  compact  between  England  and  Austria,  yet  the 
Hapsburgs  rested  their  hopes  largely  on  the  diversions 
made  by  our  troops.  In  the  early  part  of  the  Peninsular 
campaign  of  1809,  these  hopes  were  brilliantly  fulfilled. 
Wellesley  moved  against  Soult  at  Oporto,  and,  by  a  dex- 
trous crossing  of  that  river  in  his  rear,  compelled  him  to 
beat  a  calamitous  retreat  on  Spain,  with  the  loss  of  all  his 
cannon  and  stores.  The  French  reached  Lugo  an  armed 
rabble,  and  were  greeted  there  with  jeers  and  execrations 
by  the  men  of  Ney's  corps.  The  two  Marshals  themselves 
took  up  the  quarrel,  and  so  fierce  were  the  taunts  of  Ney 
that  Soult  drew  his  sword,  and  a  duel  was  barely  averted.* 
An  appearance  of  concord  was  restored  during  their  opera- 
tions in  Galicia  and  Asturias  :  but  no  opportunity  was 
missed  of  secretly  thwarting  the  hated  rival ;  and  here,  as 
all  through  the  Peninsular  War,  the  private  jealousies  of 
the  French  leaders  fatally  compromised  the  success  of  their 
arms.  Wellesley,  seeing  that  the  operations  in  Galicia 
would  never  decide  the  war,  began  to  prepare  a  deadly 
blow  at  the  centre  of  French  authority,  Madrid. 

While  Wellesley  thrust  a  thin  wedge  into  the  heart  of 
Spain,  the  Archduke  Charles  was  overthrown  on  the 
banks  of  the  Danube.  After  drawing  in  reinforcements 
from  France,  the  Rhenish  Confederation,  and  Eugene's 
army  of  Italy,  the  French  Emperor  disposed  of  180,000 
highly  trained  troops,  whom  he  massed  in  the  Lobau 
Island,  or  on  the  right  shore  of  the  Danube.  Every  prep- 
aration was  made  for  deceiving  the  Austrians  as  to  the 
point  of  crossing  and  with  complete  success.  With  great 
labour  the  defenders  threw  up  intrenchments  facing  the 
north  side  of  the  island.  But,  on  a  thick  stormy  night 
(July  4th),  six  bridges  of  boats  were  quickly  swung 
across  the  stream  lower  down,  that  is,  on  the  east  side  of 
Lobau,  while  a  furious  cannonade  on  the  north  side  mis- 
lied  their  foes.  The  crossing  was  effected  without  loss  by 
lOudinot  and  Massena ;  and  sunrise  saw  the  whole  French 

Ithen  cruising  off  Danzig,  show  how  our  officers  wished  to  give  timely  aid 
fco  Schill  ("  Navy  Records,"  vol.  xii.). 

1  Captain  Boothby's  "A  Prisoner  of  France,"  ch.  iii. 


180  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

army  advancing  rapidly  northwards,  thereby  outflanking 
the  Austrian  earthworks,  which  were  now  evacuated. 

Charles  was  outmanoeuvred  and  outnumbered.  His 
brother,  the  Archduke  John,  was  at  Pressburg  with 
20,000  men,  watched  hitherto  by  Davoust.  But  the  French 
Marshal  cleverly  withdrew  his  corps,  leaving  only  enough 
men  to  impose  on  that  unenterprising  leader.  Other 
Austrian  detachments  were  also  far  away  at  the  criti- 
cal time,  and  thus  Napoleon  had  a  superiority  of  force  of 
about  50,000  men.  Nevertheless,  the  defence  at  Wagram 
was  most  obstinate  (July  6th).  Holding  his  own  on  the 
hills  behind  the  Russbach,  the  Archduke  swung  forward 
his  right  in  such  strength  as  to  drive  back  Massena  on 
Aspern  ;  but  his  weakened  centre  was  now  pushed  back 
and  endangered  by  the  persistent  vigour  of  Macdonald's 
onset.  This  success  at  the  centre  gave  time  for  Davoust 
to  wrest  Neusiedel  from  the  white-coats,  a  movement 
which  would  have  been  stopped  or  crushed,  had  the  Arch- 
duke John  obeyed  his  brother's  orders  and  marched  from 
the  side  of  Pressburg  on  Napoleon's  unguarded  right 
flank.  Finally,  after  an  obstinate  stand,  the  Austrians 
fell  back  in  good  order,  effectively  covering  their  retreat 
by  a  murderous  artillery  fire.  A  total  loss  of  some 
50,000  men,  apportioned  nearly  equally  on  either  side, 
was  the  chief  result  of  this  terrible  day.  It  was  not 
remarkable  for  brilliant  tactics  ;  and,  as  at  Aspern,  the 
Austrians  fully  equalled  their  foes  in  courage. 

Such  was  the  battle  of  Wagram,  one  of  the  greatest  of 
all  time,  if  the  number  of  combatants  be  counted,  but  one 
of  the  least  decisive  in  its  strictly  military  results.  If  we 
may  compare  Austerlitz  with  Blenheim,  Wagram  may 
with  equal  fitness  be  matched  with  the  vast  slaughter  of 
Malplaquet  exactly  a  century  before.  The  French  now 
felt  the  hardening  of  the  national  defence  of  Austria  and 
the  falling  off  in  their  own  fighting  powers.  Marmont 
tells  how,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  the  approach  of  the 
Archduke  John's  scouts  struck  panic  into  the  conquerors, 
so  that  for  a  time  the  plain  on  the  east  was  covered  with 
runaway  conscripts  and  disconcerted  plunderers.  The 
incident  proved  the  deterioration  of  the  Grand  Army 
from  the  times  of  Ulm  and  Jena.     Raw  conscripts  raised 


XXX 


NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA 


181 


before  their  time  and  hurriedly  drafted  into  the  line  had 
impaired  its  steadiness,  and  men  noted  as  another  omi- 
nous fact  that  few  un  wounded  prisoners  were  taken  from 
the  Austrians,  and  only  nine  guns  and  one  colour.  In  fact, 
the  only  reputation  enhanced  was  that  of  Macdonald,  who 
for  his  great  services  at  the  centre  enjoyed  the  unique 
honour  of  receiving  a  Marshal's  baton  from  Napoleon  on 
the  field  of  battle. 

Had  the  Archduke  Charles  been  made  of  the  same  stuff  as 
Wellington,  the  campaign  might  still  have  been  retrieved. 


WAGRAM 


AUSTRIAN 


FRENCH' 


VIENNA 


« ■ '  ■» 


.».«■■? 


INCUSH    MILES 


But  softness  and  irresolution  were  the  characteristics  of 
Austria's  generals  no  less  than  of  her  rulers.1  The 
Hapsburg  armies  were  still  led  with  the  old  leisurely 
insouciance  ;  and  their  counsels  swayed  to  and  fro  under 
the  wavering  impulses  of  a  seemingly  decrepit  dynasty. 
Francis  had  many  good  qualities  :  he  was  a  good  husband 
and  father,  and  his  kindly  manners  endeared  him  to  the 
Viennese  even  in  the  midst  of  defeat.  But  he  was  capri- 
cious and  shortsighted ;  anything  outside  of  the  well- 
worn  ruts  of  routine  vexed  and  alarmed  him ;  and  it  is 
a    supreme    proof   of   the   greatness  *  and  courage  of   his 

1  For  Charles's  desire  to  sue  for  peace  after  the  first  battles  on  the 
Upper  Danube,  see  Hausser,  vol.  iii.,  p.  341  ;  also,  after  Wagram,  ib., 
pp.  412-413. 


182  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

reforming  Minister,  Stadion,  that  his  innovations  should 
have  been  tolerated  for  so  long.  Now  that  disasters  were 
shaking  his  throne  he  began  to  suspect  the  reformer ;  and 
Stadion  confessed  to  the  publicist,  Gentz,  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  reckon  on  the  Emperor  for  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  together,  unless  one  stayed  by  him  all  the  twenty- 
four  hours.  —  "  After  a  great  defeat,  he  will  get  himself 
out  of  the  dust  and  will  calmly  commend  us  to  God."  — 
This  was  what  now  happened.  Another  failure  at  Znaim 
so  daunted  the  Archduke  that  he  sued  for  an  armistice 
(July  12th).  For  this  there  was  some  excuse.  The  lat- 
est news  both  from  Spain  and  Prussia  inspired  the  hope 
that,  if  time  were  gained,  important  diversions  might  be 
made  in  both  quarters. 

As  we  have  seen,  Sir  Arthur  Welleslej1,  opened  the  cam- 
paign with  a  brilliant  success,  and  then  prepared  to  strike 
at  the  heart  of  the  French  power.  The  memorable  cam- 
paign of  Talavera  was  the  result.  Relying  on  promises 
of  aid  from  the  Spanish  Junta  and  from  their  cross- 
grained  commander,  Cuesta,  he  led  a  small  British  force 
up  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  to  seize  Madrid,  while  the 
chief  French  armies  were  engaged  in  distant  provinces. 
In  one  sense  he  achieved  his  aim.  He  compelled  the 
enemy  to  loose  their  hold  on  those  provinces  and  concen- 
trate to  save  the  capital.  And  before  they  fully  effected 
their  concentration,  he  gave  battle  to  King  Joseph  and 
Marshals  Jourdan  and  Victor  at  Talavera  (July  28th). 
Skilfully  posting  the  Spaniards  behind  intrenchments  and 
in  gardens  where  their  raw  levies  could  fight  with  every 
advantage,  he  extended  his  thin  red  lines  —  he  had  only 
17,000  British  troops  —  along  a  ridge  stretching  up  to  a 
plateau  that  dominated  the  broken  ground  north  of  the 
town.  On  that  hill  Wellesley  planted  his  left:  and  all 
the  efforts  of  Victor  to  turn  that  wing  or  to  break  it 
by  charges  across  the  intervening  ravine  were  bloodily 
beaten  off. 

The  fierce  heat  served  but  to  kindle  French  and  British 
to  greater  fury.  Finally,  the  dashing  charge  of  our  23rd 
dragoons  and  the  irresistible  advance  of  the  48th  regiment 
of  foot  overthrew  the  enemy's  centre;  and  as  the  day 
waned,  the  30,000  French  retired,  with  a  loss  of  17  can- 


xxx  NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA  183 

non  and  of  7,000  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners. 
Had  the  other  Spanish  armies  now  offered  the  support 
which  Wellesley  expected,  he  would  doubtless  have  seized 
Madrid.  He  had  written  three  days  before  Talvera : 
"  With  or  without  a  battle  we  shall  be  at  Madrid  soon." 
But  his  allies  now  failed  him  utterly  :  they  did  not  hold 
the  mountain  passes  which  confronted  Soult  in  his  march 
from  Salamanca  into  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  ;  and  they 
left  the  British  forces  half  starving.  — "  We  are  here 
worse  off  than  in  a  hostile  country,"  wrote  our  com- 
mander ;  "  never  was  an  army  so  ill  used :  we  had  no 
assistance  from  the  Spanish  army :  we  were  obliged  to 
unload  our  ammunition  and  our  treasure  in  order  to  em- 
ploy the  cars  in  the  removal  of  our  sick  and  wounded." 
Meanwhile  Soult,  with  50,000  men,  was  threading  his  way 
easily  through  the  mountains  and  threatened  to  cut  us  off 
from  Portugal :  but  by  a  rapid  retreat  Wellesley  saved 
his  army,  vowing  that  he  would  never  again  trust  Spanish 
offers  of  help.1 

Far  more  dispiriting  was  the  news  that  reached  the 
Austrian  negotiators  from  the  North  Sea.  There  the 
British  Government  succeeded  in  eclipsing  all  its  former 
achievements  in  forewarning  foes  and  disgusting  its 
friends.  Very  early  in  the  year,  the  men  of  Downing 
Street  knew  that  Austria  was  preparing  to  fight  Napoleon 
and  built  her  hopes  of  success,  partly  on  the  Peninsular 
War,  partly  on  a  British  descent  in  Hanover,  where 
everything  was  ripe  for  revolution.  Unfortunately,  we 
were  still,  formally,  at  war  with  her :  and  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  was  so  long  delayed  at  Vienna 
that  July  was  almost  gone  before  the  Austrian  ratifica- 
tion reached  London,  and  our  armada  set  sail  from 
Dover.2      The   result  is  well  known.      Official  favourit- 

1  Napier,  bk.  viii. ,  chs.  ii.  and  iii.  In  the  App.  of  vol.  iii.  of  "Well- 
ington's Despatches"  is  Napoleon's  criticism  on  the  movements  of  Joseph 
and  the  French  marshals.  He  blames  them  for  their  want  of  ensemble, 
and  for  the  precipitate  attack  which  Victor  advised  at  Talavera.  He  con- 
cluded: "As  long  as  you  attack  good  troops  like  the  English  in  good  posi- 
tions, without  reconnoitring  them,  you  will  lead  men  to  death  en  pure 
perte." 

2  An  Austrian  envoy  had  been  urging  promptitude  at  Downing  Street. 
On  June  1st  he  wrote  to  Canning  :  "The  promptitude  of  the  enemy  has 


184  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

ism  handed  over  the  command  of  40,000  troops  to  Earl 
Chatham,  who  wasted  precious  days  in  battering  down 
the  walls  of  Flushing  when  he  should  have  struck  straight 
at  the  goal  now  aimed  at,  Antwerp.  That  fortress  was 
therefore  ready  to  beat  him  off ;  and  he  finally  withdrew 
his  army  into  the  Isle  of  Walcheren,  into  whose  fever- 
laden  swamps  Napoleon  had  refused  to  send  a  single  French 
soldier.  A  tottering  remnant  was  all  that  survived  by  the 
close  of  the  year  :  and  the  climax  of  our  national  disgrace 
was  reached  when  a  court-martial  acquitted  the  command- 
ers.    Napoleon  would  have  had  them  shot. 

Helpless  as  the  old  monarchies  were  to  cope  with  Napo- 
leon, a  wild  longing  for  vengeance  was  beginning  to  throb 
among  the  peoples.  It  showed  itself  in  a  remarkable 
attempt  on  his  life  during  a  review  at  Schonbrunn.  A 
delicate  youth  named  Staps,  son  of  a  Thuringian  pastor, 
made  his  way  to  the  palace,  armed  with  a  long  knife,  in- 
tending to  stab  him  while  he  read  a  petition  (October 
12th).  Berthier  and  Rapp,  noting  the  lad's  importunity, 
had  him  searched  and  brought  before  Napoleon.  "  What 
did  you  mean  to  do  with  that  knife?  "  asked  the  Emperor. 
"  Kill  you,"  was  the  reply.  "  You  are  an  idiot  or  an  Illu- 
minat."  "I  am  not  an  idiot  and  do  not  know  what  an 
Illuminat  is."  "Then  you  are  diseased."  "No,  I  am 
quite  well."  "  Why  do  you  wish  to  kill  me? "  "  Because 
you  are  the  curse  of  my  Fatherland."  "  You  are  a  fanatic  ; 
I  will  forgive  you  and  spare  your  life."  "I  want  no  for- 
giveness." "Would  you  thank  me  if  I  pardoned  you?" 
"I  would  seek  to  kill  you  again."  The  quiet  firmness 
with  which  Staps  gave  these  replies  and  then  went  to  his 
doom  made  a  deep  impression  on  Napoleon  ;  and  he  sought 
to  hurry  on  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  these  odd  Ger- 
mans whom  he  could  conquer  but  not  convince. 

always  been  the  key  to  his  success.  A  long  experience  has  proved  this  to 
the  world,  which  seems  hitherto  not  to  have  profited  by  this  knowledge." 
On  July  20th  Canning  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  the  Austrian  ratifica- 
tion of  peace  with  us,  "accompanied  by  the  afflicting  intelligence  of  the 
armistice  concluded  on  the  12th  instant  between  the  Austrian  and  French 
armies."  He  adds  that  England  will  make  every  effort  to  help  Austria, 
but  that  the  destination  of  the  fleet  is  changed  "  because  the  information 
of  the  Austrian  Court  as  to  the  state  of  North  Germany  was  found  to  be 
inexact." 


xxx  NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA  185 

The  Emperor  Francis  was  now  resigned  to  his  fate,  but 
he  refused  to  hear  of  giving  up  his  remaining  seacoast  in 
Istria.  On  this  point  Metternich  strove  hard  to  bend 
Napoleon's  will,  but  received  as  a  final  answer :  "  Then 
war  is  unavoidable."1  In  fact,  the  victor  knew  that  Aus- 
tria was  in  his  power.  The  Archduke  Charles  had  thrown 
up  his  command,  the  soldiery  were  depressed,  .and  a  great 
part  of  the  Empire  was  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  Eng- 
land's efforts  had  failed  ;  and  of  all  the  isolated  patriotic 
movements  in  Germany  only  that  of  the  Tyrolese  moun- 
taineers still  struggled  on.  Napoleon  could  therefore  dic- 
tate his  own  terms  in  the  Treaty  of  Schonbrunn  (October 
14th),  which  he  announced  as  complete,  when  as  yet  Fran- 
cis had  not  signed  it.2  Austria  thereby  recognized  Joseph 
as  King  of  Spain,  and  ceded  Salzburg  and  the  Inn-viertel 
to  Napoleon,  to  be  transferred  by  him  to  Bavaria.  To  the 
French  Empire  she  yielded  up  parts  of  Austrian  Friuli  and 
Carinthia,  besides  Carniola,  the  city  and  district  of  Trieste, 
and  portions  of  Croatia  and  Dalmatia  to  the  south  of  the 
River  Save.  Her  spoils  of  the  old  Polish  lands  now  went 
to  aggrandize  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  a  small  strip  of 
Austrian  Galicia  also  going  to  Russia.  Besides  losing 
3,500,000  subjects,  Austria  was  mulcted  in  an  indemnity 
of  .£3,400,000,  and  again  bound  herself  to  exclude  all 
British  products.  By  a  secret  clause  she  agreed  to  limit 
her  army  to  150,000  men. 

Perhaps  the  severest  loss  was  the  abandonment  of  the 
faithful  Tyrolese.  After  Aspern,  the  Emperor  Francis 
promised  that  he  would  never  lay  down  his  arms  until 
they  were  re-united  with  his  Empire.  This  promise  now 
went  the  way  of  the  many  fond  hopes  of  reform  and 
championship  of  German  nationality  which  her  ablest 
men  had  lately  cherished,  and  the  Empire  settled  down 
in  torpor  and  bankruptcy.  In  dumb  wrath  and  despair 
Austrian  patriots  looked  on,  while  the  Tyrolese  were 
beaten  down  by  French,  Bavarian,  and  Italian  forces. 
Hofer  finally  took  to  the  hills,  was  betrayed  by  a  friend, 
and  was  taken  to  Mantua.  Some  of  the  officers  who 
there  tried  him  desired  to  spare  his  life,  but  a  special 

1  Beer,  p.  441. 

2  Vandal,  vol.  ii.,  p.  161  ;  Metternich,  vol.  i.,  p.  114. 


186  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

despatch  of  Napoleon1  ordered  his  execution,  and  the 
brave  mountaineer  fell,  with  the  words  on  his  lips  : 
"  Long  live  the  Emperor  Francis."  Tyrol,  meanwhile, 
was  parcelled  out  between  Bavaria,  Illyria,  and  the  King- 
dom of  Italy  ;  but  bullets  and  partitions  were  of  no  avail 
against  the  staunch  patriotism  of  her  people,  and  the 
Tyrolese  campaign  boded  ill  for  Napoleon  if  monarchs, 
generals,  and  statesmen  should  ever  be  inspired  by  the 
sturdy  faith  and  hardihood  of  that  noble  peasantry. 

As  yet,  however,  prudence  and  timidity  reigned  supreme. 
Though  the  Czar  uttered  some  snappish  words  at  the 
threatening  increase  to  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  he  still 
posed  as  Napoleon's  ally.  The  Swedes,  weary  of  their 
hopeless  strifes  with  France,  Russia,  and  Denmark,  de- 
posed the  still  bellicose  Gustavus  IV.  ;  and  his  successor, 
Charles  XIII.,  made  peace  with  those  Powers,  retaining 
Swedish  Pomerania,  but  only  at  the  cost  of  submitting  to 
the  Continental  System.  Prussia  seemed,  to  official  eyes, 
utterly  cowed.  The  Hapsburgs,  having  failed  in  their 
bold  championship  of  the  cause  of  reform  and  of  German 
nationality,  now  fell  back  into  a  policy  marked  by  timid 
opportunism  and  decorously  dull  routine. 

The  change  was  marked  by  the  retirement  of  Stadion, 
a  man  whose  enterprising  character,  no  less  than  his  enthu- 
siasm for  reform,  ill  fitted  him  for  the  time  of  compromise 
and  subservience  now  at  hand.  He  it  was  who  had  urged 
Austria  forward  in  the  paths  of  progress  and  had  sought 
safety  in  the  people  :  he  was  the  Stein  of  Austria.  But 
now,  on  the  eve  of  peace,  he  earnestly  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  resign  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  ;  and  the  Em- 
peror Francis  thereupon  summoned  to  that  seemingly 
thankless  office  a  young  diplomatist,  who  was  destined  to 
play  a  foremost  part  in  the  mighty  drama  of  Napoleon's 
overthrow,  and  thereafter  to  wield  by  his  astute  policy 
almost  as  great  an  influence  in  Central  and  Southern 
Europe  as  the  autocrat  himself. 

Metternich  was  born  at  Coblentz  in  1773,  and  was  there- 
fore four  years  the  junior  of  Napoleon.  He  came  of  an 
old  family  of  the  Rhineland,  and  his  father's  position  in 

1  Letter  of  February  10th,  1810,  quoted  by  Lanfrey.  See,  too,  the 
"  Mems."  of  Prince  Eugene,  vol.  vi.,  p.  277. 


xxx  NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA  187 

the  service  of  the  old  Empire  secured  him  early  entrance 
into  the  diplomatic  circle.  After  acting  as  secretary  to 
the  Imperial  delegates  at  the  Congress  of  Rastatt,  he 
occupied  the  post  of  Austrian  ambassador  successively 
at  the  Courts  of  Dresden  and  Berlin  ;  and  in  1806  he 
was  suddenly  called  to  take  up  the  embassy  in  Paris. 
There  he  displayed  charms  of  courtly  tact,  and  lively 
and  eloquent  conversation,  which  won  Napoleon's  ad- 
miration and  esteem.  He  was  looked  on  as  a  Gallophil ; 
and,  like  Bismarck  at  a  later  crisis,  he  used  his  social 
gifts  and  powers  of  cajolery  so  as  to  gain  a  correct  esti- 
mate of  the  characters  of  his  future  opponents. 

Yet,  besides  these  faculties  of  finesse  and  intrigue  —  and 
the  Miltonic  Belial  never  told  lies  with  more  winsome 
grace  —  Metternich  showed  at  times  a  manly  composure 
and  firmness,  even  when  Napoleon  unmasked  a  searching 
fire  of  diplomatic  questions  and  taunts.  Of  this  he  had 
given  proof  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  late  war, 
and  his  conduct  had  earned  the  thanks  of  the  other  am- 
bassadors for  giving  the  French  Emperor  a  lesson  in 
manners,  while  the  autocrat  liked  him  none  the  less,  but 
rather  the  more,  for  standing  up  to  him.  But  now,  after 
the  war,  all  was  changed  ;  craft  was  more  serviceable 
than  fortitude  ;  and  the  gay  Rhinelander  brought  to  the 
irksome  task  of  subservience  to  the  conqueror  a  courtly 
insouciance  under  which  he  nursed  the  hope  of  ultimate 
revenge.  —  "  From  the  day  when  peace  is  signed,"  he  wrote 
to  the  Emperor  Francis  on  August  10th,  1809,  "  we  must 
confine  our  system  to  tacking  and  turning,  and  flattering. 
Thus  alone  may  we  possibly  preserve  our  existence,  till 
the  day  of  general  deliverance." 1  This  was  to  be  the 
general  drift  of  Austrian  policy  for  the  next  four  years  ; 
and  it  may  be  granted  that  only  by  bending  before  the 
blast  could  that  sore-stricken  monarchy  be  saved  from 
destruction.  An  opportunity  soon  occurred  of  carry- 
ing the  new  system  into  effect.  Metternich  offered  the 
conqueror  an  Austrian  Archduchess  as  a  bride. 

After  the  humiliation  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  of  the 
Spanish  patriots,  nothing  seemed  wanting  to  Napoleon's 
triumph  but  an  heir  who  should  found  a  durable  dynasty. 

1  "Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  365  (Eng.  ed.). 


188  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

This  aim  was  now  to  be  reached.  As  soon  as  the  Em- 
peror returned  to  Paris,  his  behaviour  towards  Josephine 
showed  a  marked  reserve.  The  passage  communicating 
between  their  private  apartments  was  closed,  and  the 
gleams  of  triumphant  jealousy  that  flashed  from  her 
sisters-in-law  warned  Josephine  of  her  approaching  doom. 
The  divorce  so  long  bruited  by  news-mongers  was  at 
hand.  The  Emperor  broke  the  tidings  to  his  consort  in 
the  private  drawing-room  of  the  Tuileries  on  November 
30th,  and  strove  to  tone  down  the  harshness  of  his  de- 
cision by  basing  it  on  the  imperative  needs  of  the  State. 
But  she  spurned  the  dictates  of  statecraft.  With  all  her 
faults,  she  was  affectionate  and  tender ;  she  was  a  woman 
first  and  an  Empress  afterwards ;  she  now  clung  to 
Napoleon,  not  merely  for  the  splendour  of  the  destiny 
which  he  had  opened  to  her,  but  also  from  genuine  love. 

Their  relations  had  curiously  changed.  At  the  outset 
she  had  slighted  his  mad  devotion  by  her  shallow  cold- 
ness and  occasional  infidelities,  until  his  lava-like  passion 
petrified.  Thenceforth  it  was  for  her  to  woo,  and  woo 
in  vain.  For  years  past  she  had  to  bemoan  the  waning 
of  his  affection  and  his  many  conjugal  sins.  And  now 
the  chasm,  which  she  thought  to  have  spanned  by  the 
religious  ceremony  on  the  eve  of  the  coronation,  yawned 
at  her  feet.  The  woman  and  the  Empress  in  her  shrank 
back  from  the  black  void  of  the  future  ;  and  with  piteous 
reproaches  she  flung  back  the  orders  of  the  Emperor  and 
the  soothings  of  the  husband.  Napoleon,  it  would  seem, 
had  nerved  himself  against  such  an  outbreak.  In  vain  did 
Josephine  sink  down  at  his  feet  with  heart-rending  cries 
that  she  would  never  survive  the  disgrace  :  failing  to  calm 
her  himself,  he  opened  the  door  and  summoned  the 
prefect  of  the  palace,  Bausset,  and  bade  him  bear  her 
away  to  her  private  apartments.  Down  the  narrow  stairs 
she  was  borne,  the  Emperor  lifting  her  feet  and  Bausset 
supporting  her  shoulders,  until,  half  fainting,  she  was  left 
to  the  sympathies  of  her  women  and  the  attentions  of 
Corvisart.  But  hers  was  a  wound  that  no  sympathy  or 
skill  could  cure.1 

On  his  side,  Napoleon  felt  the  wrench.     Not  only  the 

1  Bausset,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xix. 


xxx  NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA  189 

ghost  of  his  early  love,  but  his  dislike  of  new  associates 
and  novel  ways  cried  out  against  the  change.  "In 
separating  myself  from  my  wife,"  Napoleon  once  said 
to  Talleyrand,  "  I  renounce  much.  I  should  have  to 
study  the  tastes  and  habits  of  a  young  woman.  Jo- 
sephine accommodates  herself  to  everything :  she  under- 
stands me  perfectly."1  But  his  boundless  triumphs,  his 
alliance  with  the  Czar  and  total  overthrow  of  the  Bour- 
bons and  the  Pope,  had  fed  the  fires  of  his  ambition. 
He  aspired  to  give  the  mot  d'ordre  to  the  universe  ;  and 
he  scrupled  not  to  put  aside  a  consort  who  could  not 
help  him  to  found  a  dynasty.  Yet  it  was  not  without 
pangs  of  sorrow  and  remorse.  His  laboured,  panting 
breath  and  almost  gasping  words  left  on  Bausset  the 
impression  that  he  was  genuinely  affected  ;  and,  con- 
summate actor  though  he  was,  we  may  well  believe  that 
he  felt  the  parting  from  his  early  associations.  Under- 
neath his  generally  cold  exterior  he  hid  a  nervous  nature, 
dominated  by  an  inflexible  will,  but  which  now  and 
again  broke  through  all  restraint,  bathing  the  beloved 
object  with  sudden  tenderness  or  blasting  a  foe  with 
fiery  passion.  And  it  would  seem  that  Josephine's  pangs 
had  power  to  reawaken  the  feelings  of  his  more  generous 
youth.  The  ceremony  of  divorce  took  place  on  December 
15th,  Josephine  declaring  with  agonized  pride  that  she 
gave  her  assent  for  the  welfare  of  France. 

Already  the  new  marriage  negotiations  had  begun. 
They  are  unique  even  amidst  the  frigid  annals  of  royal 
betrothals.  The  French  ambassador,  Caulaincourt,  was 
charged  to  make  definite  overtures  at  St.  Petersburg  for 
the  hand  of  the  Czar's  younger  sister  ;  the  conditions 
could  easily  be  arranged  ;  religion  need  be  no  difficulty  ; 
but  time  was  pressing  ;  the  Emperor  had  need  of  an  heir; 
"  we  are  counting  the  minutes  here,"  ran  the  despatch  ; 
and  an  answer  was  expected  from  St.  Petersburg  after  an 
interval  of  two  days?     The  request  caused  Alexander  the 

1  Mme.  de  Remusat,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xxvii. 

2Tatischeff,  "Alexandre  et  Napoleon,"  p.  519.  Welschinger,  "Le 
jDivorce  de  Napoleon,"  ch.  ii.  ;  he  also  examines  the  alleged  irregularities 
lof  the  religious  marriage  with  Josephine  ;  Fesch  and  most  impartial  au- 
thorities brushed  them  aside  as  a  flimsy  excuse. 


190  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

greatest  perplexity.  He  parried  it  with  the  reply,  correct 
enough  in  form  as  in  fact,  that  the  disposal  of  his  sister 
rested  with  the  Dowager  Empress.  But  her  hostility  to 
Napoleon  was  well  known.  After  the  half  overtures  of 
Erfurt  she  had  at  once  betrothed  her  elder  daughter  to 
the  Duke  of  Oldenburg.  No  similar  escape  was  now 
possible  for  the  younger  one  :  but,  after  leaving  Napo- 
leon's request  unanswered  until  February  4th,  the  reply 
was  then  despatched  that  the  tender  age  of  the  princess, 
she  being  only  twenty  years  old,  formed  an  insuperable 
obstacle. 

Some  such  answer  had  long  been  expected  at  Paris. 
Metternich  asserts  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  that  Napoleon  had 
caused  Laborde,  one  of  his  diplomatic  agents  at  Vienna, 
tentatively  to  sound  that  Court  as  to  his  betrothal  with 
the  Archduchess  Marie  Louise.  But  the  French  archives 
show  that  the  first  hint  came  from  Metternich,  who  saw 
in  it  a  means  of  weakening  the  Franco-Russian  alliance 
and  saving  Austria  from  further  disasters.1  A  little  later 
the  Countess  Metternich  was  at  Paris  ;  and  great  was 
her  surprise  when,  on  January  2nd,  1810,  Josephine  in- 
formed her  that  she  favoured  a  marriage  between  Napo- 
leon and  Marie  Louise.  "  I  spoke  to  him  of  it  yesterday," 
she  said  ;  "  his  choice  is  not  yet  fixed  ;  but  he  thinks 
that  this  would  be  his  choice  if  he  were  sure  of  its  being 
accepted."  Thereafter  the  Countess  received  the  most 
flattering  attentions  at  Court,  a  proof  that  the  Hapsburg 
match  was  now  favoured,  even  though  the  coyness  of  the 
Czar  was  as  yet  unknown. 

At  the  close  of  January  a  Privy  Council  was  held  at 
the  Tuileries  to  decide  on  the  imperial  bride.  The  votes 
were  nearly  equal  :  four  voted  for  Austria,  four  for  Sax- 
ony, and  three  for  Russia.  After  listening  quietly  to  the 
arguments,  Napoleon  summed  up  the  discussion  by  pro- 
nouncing firmly  and  warmly  in  favour  of  Austria.  The 
marriage  contract  was  therefore  drawn  up  on  February 

. J  Metternich's  despatch  of  December  25th,  1809,  in  his  "  Mems.,"  vol. 
ii.,  §  150.  The  first  hints  were  dropped  by  him  to  Laborde  on  November 
29th  (Vandal,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  204,  548)  :  they  reached  Napoleon's  ears  about 
December  15th.  For  the  influence  of  these  marriage  negotiations  in  pre- 
paring for  Napoleon's  rupture  with  the  Czar,  see  chap,  xxxii.  of  this  work. 


xxx  NAPOLEON   AND   AUSTRIA  191 

7th  ;  and  Berthier  was  despatched  to  Vienna  to  claim  the 
hand  of  Marie  Louise.  He  entered  that  city  over  the 
ruins  of  the  old  ramparts,  which  were  now  being  dis- 
mantled in  accordance  with  the  French  demands. 

The  marriage  took  place  at  Vienna  by  proxy  ;  the 
bride  was  conducted  to  Paris  ;  and  the  final  ceremony 
took  place  at  Notre  Dame  on  April  2nd,  but  not  until  the 
union  had  been  consummated.  Such  were  Napoleon's 
second  wooing  and  wedding.  Nevertheless,  he  showed 
himself  an  attentive  and  even  indulgent  spouse,  and  he 
remarked  at  St.  Helena  that  if  Josephine  was  all  grace 
and  charm,  Marie  Louise  was  innocence  and  nature  her- 
self. 

The  Austrian  marriage  was  an  event  of  the  first  im- 
portance. It  gained  a  few  years'  respite  for  the  despairing 
Hapsburgs,  and  gave  tardy  satisfaction  to  Talleyrand's 
statesmanlike  scheme  of  a  Franco-Austrian  alliance  which 
should  be  in  the  best  sense  conservative.  Had  Napoleon 
taken  this  step  after  Austerlitz  in  the  way  that  his  coun- 
sellor advised,  possibly  Europe  might  have  reached  a  con- 
dition of  stable  equilibrium,  always  provided  that  he  gave 
up  his  favourite  scheme  of  partitioning  Turkey.  But 
that  was  not  to  be  ;  and  when  Austria  finally  yielded  up 
Marie  Louise  as  an  unpicturesque  Iphigenia  on  the  mar- 
riage altar,  she  did  so  only  as  a  desperate  device  for 
appeasing  an  inexorable  destiny.  And,  strange  to  say, 
she  succeeded.  For  Alexander  took  offence  at  the  mar- 
riage negotiations ;  and  thus  was  opened  a  breach  in  the 
Franco-Russian  alliance  which  other  events  were  rapidly 
to  widen,  until  Western  and  Central  Europe  hurled  them- 
selves against  the  East,  and  reached  Moscow. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

THE  EMPIRE  AT  ITS   HEIGHT 

Napoleon's  star  had  now  risen  to  its  zenith.  After 
his  marriage  with  a  daughter  of  the  most  ancient  of 
continental  dynasties,  nothing  seemed  lacking  to  his 
splendour.  He  had  humbled  Pope  and  Emperor  alike  : 
Germany  crouched  at  his  feet  :  France,  Italy,  and  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine  gratefully  acknowledged  the 
benefits  of  his  vigorous  sway  :  the  Czar  was  still  follow- 
ing the  lead  given  at  Erfurt  :  Sweden  had  succumbed  to 
the  pressure  of  the  two  Emperors  :  and  Turkey  survived 
only  because  it  did  not  yet  suit  Napoleon  to  shear  her 
asunder:  he  must  first  complete  the  commercial  ruin  of 
England  and  drive  Wellington  into  the  sea.  Then  events 
would  at  last  be  ripe  for  the  oriental  schemes  which  the 
Spanish  Rising  had  postponed. 

He  might  well  hope  that  England's  strength  was  run- 
ning out :  near  the  close  of  1810  the  three  per  cent,  con- 
sols sank  to  sixty-five,  and  the  declared  bankruptcies 
averaged  250  a  month.  The  failure  of  the  Walcheren 
expedition  had  led  to  terrible  loss  of  men  and  treasure, 
and  had  clouded  over  the  reputation  of  her  leaders. 
After  mutual  recriminations  Canning  and  Castlereagh 
resigned  office  and  fought  a  duel.  Shortly  afterwards 
the  Premier,  the  Duke  of  Portland,  fell  ill  and  resigned : 
his  place  was  taken  by  Mr.  Perceval,  a  man  whose  sole 
recommendation  for  the  post  was  his  conscientious  Tory- 
ism and  powers  of  dull  plodding.  Ruled  by  an  ill- 
assorted  Ministry  and  a  King  whose  reason  was  now 
hopelessly  overclouded,  weakened  by  the  strangling  grip 
of  the  Continental  System,  England  seemed  on  the  verge 
of  ruin  ;  and,  encouraged  alike  by  the  factious  conduct  of  | 
our  parliamentary  Opposition  and  by  Soult's  recent  con- 
quest of  Andalusia    Napoleon  bent  himself  to  the  final 

182 


chap,  xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT  193 

grapple  by  extending  his  coast  system,  and  by  sending 
Massena  and  his  choicest  troops  into  Spain  to  drive  the 
leopards  into  the  sea. 

The  limits  of  our  space  prevent  any  description  of  the 
ensuing  campaign  of  Torres  Vedras  ;  and  we  must  refer 
our  readers  to  the  ample  canvas  of  Napier  if  they  would 
realize  the  sagacity  of  Wellington  in  constructing  to  the 
north  of  Lisbon  that  mighty  tete  de  pont  for  the  Sea 
Power  against  Masse"na's  veteran  army.  After  dealing 
the  staggering  blow  of  Busaco  at  that  presumptuous 
Marshal,  our  great  leader  fell  back,  through  a  tract  which 
he  swept  bare  of  supplies,  on  this  sure  bulwark,  and  there 
watched  the  French  host  of  some  65,000  men  waste  away 
amidst  the  miseries  of  hunger  and  the  rains  and  diseases  of 
autumn.  At  length,  in  November,  Massena  drew  off  to 
positions  near  Santarem,  where  he  awaited  the  succour 
which  Napoleon  ordered  Soult  to  bring.  It  was  in  vain  : 
Soult,  puffed  up  by  his  triumphs  in  Andalusia,  was  re- 
solved to  play  his  own  game  and  reduce  Badajoz  ;  he  won 
his  point  but  marred  the  campaign  ;  and,  at  last,  foiled 
by  Wellington's  skilful  tactics,  Massena  beat  a  retreat 
northwards  out  of  Portugal  after  losing  some  35,000  men 
(March,  1811).  Wellington's  success  bore  an  immeasur- 
able harvest  of  results.  The  unmanly  winnings  of  the 
English  Opposition  were  stilled  ;  the  replies  of  the  Czar 
to  Napoleon's  demands  grew  firmer  ;  and  the  patriots  of 
the  Peninsula  stiffened  their  backs  in  a  resistance  so  stub- 
born, albeit  unskilful,  that  370,000  French  troops  utterly 
failed  to  keep  Wellington  in  check,  and  to  stamp  out  the 
national  defence  in  the  summer  of  1811. 

In  truth,  Napoleon  had  exasperated  the  Spaniards  no 
less  than  their  soi  disant  king,  by  a  series  of  provocations 
extending  over  the  year  1810.  On  the  plea  that  Spain 
must  herself  meet  the  expenses  of  the  war,  he  erected  the 
four  northern  provinces  into  commands  for  French  gen- 
erals, who  were  independent  of  his  brother's  authority  and 
levied  all  the  taxes  over  that  vast  area  (February).  On 
May  29th  he  withdrew  Burgos  and  Valladolid  from 
Joseph's  control,  and  divided  the  greater  part  of  Spain 
[for  military  and  administrative  purposes  into  districts  that 
Were  French  satrapies  in  all  but  name.     The  decree  was 

VOL.   II —  O 


194  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

doubly  disastrous  :  it  gave  free  play  to  the  feuds  of  the 
French  chiefs  ;  and  it  seemed  to  the  Spaniards  to  fore- 
shadow a  speedy  partition  of  Spain.  The  surmise  was 
correct.  Napoleon  intended  to  unite  to  France  the  lands 
between  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Ebro.  Indeed,  in  his  con- 
ception, the  conquest  of  Portugal  was  mainly  desirable 
because  it  would  provide  his  brother  with  an  indemnity  in 
the  west  for  the  loss  of  his  northern  provinces.  Joseph's 
protests  against  such  a  partition  of  the  land,  which  Napo- 
leon had  sworn  at  Bayonne  to  keep  intact,  were  disre- 
garded ;  but  letters  on  this  subject  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Spanish  guerillas  and  were  published  by  order  of  the 
Regency  at  Cadiz.  Despised  b}'  the  Spaniards,  flouted  by 
Napoleon,  set  at  defiance  by  the  French  satraps,  and 
reduced  wellnigh  to  bankruptcy,  the  puppet  King  felt  his 
position  insupportable,  and,  hurrying  to  Paris,  tendered 
his  resignation  of  the  crown  (May,  1811).  In  his  anxiety 
to  huddle  up  the  scandal,  Napoleon  appeased  his  brother, 
promised  him  one-fourth  of  the  taxes  levied  by  the  French 
commanders,  and  coaxed  or  drove  him  to  resume  his 
thankless  task  at  Madrid.  But  the  doggedness  of  the 
Emperor's  resolve  may  be  measured  by  the  fact  that,  even 
when  on  the  brink  of  war  with  Russia,  he  defied  Spanish 
national  sentiment  by  annexing  Catalonia  to  France 
(March,  1812). 

It  seems  strange  that  Napoleon  did  not  himself  proceed 
to  Spain  in  order  to  direct  the  operations  in  person  and 
thus  still  the  jealousies  of  the  Marshals  which  so  hampered 
his  armies.  Wellington  certainly  feared  his  coming.  At 
a  later  date  he  told  Earl  Stanhope  that  Napoleon  was 
vastly  superior  to  any  of  his  Marshals  :  "  There  was 
nothing  like  him.  He  suited  a  French  army  so  exactly. 
.  .  .  His  presence  on  the  field  made  a  difference 
of  40,000  men."1  That  estimate  is  certainly  modest 
if  one  looks  not  merely  at  tactics  but  at  the  strategy  of 
the  whole    Peninsular    War.     But  the  Emperor  did  not 

1  "Conversations  with  the  Duke  of  Wellington,"  p.  9.  The  disobedi- 
ence of  Ney  and  Soult  did  much  to  ruin  Mass^na's  campaign,  and  he  lost 
the  battle  of  Fuentes  d'Onoro  mainly  through  that  of  Bessieres.  Still,  as 
he  failed  to  satisfy  Napoleon's  maxim,  "Succeed  :  I  judge  men  only  by 
results,"  he  was  disgraced. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT  195 

again  come  into  Spain.  At.the  outset  of  1810  he  prepared 
to  do  so  ;  but,  as  soon  as  the  Austrian  marriage  was 
arranged,  he  abandoned  this  salutary  project. 

There  were  thenceforth  several  reasons  why  he  should 
remain  in  or  near  Paris.  His  attentions  to  his  young 
wife,  and  his  desire  to  increase  the  splendour  of  the 
Court,  counted  for  much.  Yet  more  important  was  it  to 
curb  the  clericals  (now  incensed  at  the  imprisonment  of 
the  Pope),  and  sharply  to  watch  the  intrigues  of  the 
royalists  and  other  malcontents.  Public  opinion,  also, 
still  needed  to  be  educated  ;  the  constant  drain  of  men 
for  the  wars  and  the  increase  in  the  price  of  necessaries 
led  to  grumblings  in  the  Press,  which  claimed  the  presence 
of  his  Argus  eye  and  the  adoption  of  a  very  stringent 
censorship.1  But,  above  all,  there  was  the  commercial 
war  with  England.  This  could  be  directed  best  from 
Paris,  where  he  could  speedily  hear  of  British  endeavours 
to  force  goods  into  Germany,  Holland,  or  Italy,  and  of  any 
change  in  our  maritime  code. 

Important  as  was  the  war  in  Spain,  it  was  only  one 
phase  of  his  world-wide  struggle  with  the  mistress  of  the 
seas  ;  and  he  judged  that  if  she  bled  to  death  under  his 
Continental  System,  the  Peninsular  War  must  subside 
into  a  guerilla  strife,  Spain  thereafter  figuring  merely  as  a 
greater  Vendee.  Accordingly,  the  year  1810  sees  the 
climax  of  his  great  commercial  experiment. 

The  first  land  to  be  sacrificed  to  this  venture  was 
Holland.  For  many  months  the  Emperor  had  been  dis- 
contented with  his  brother  Louis,  who  had  taken  into 
his  head  the  strange  notion  that  he  reigned  there  by 
divine  right.  As  Napoleon  pathetically  said  at  St.  Helena, 
when  reviewing  the  conduct  of  his  brothers,  "If  I  made 
one  a  king,  he  imagined  that  he  was  King  by  the  grace  of 
God.  He  was  no  longer  my  lieutenant  :  he  was  one 
enemy  more  for.  me  to  watch."  A  singular  fate  for  this 
iking-maker,  that  he  should  be  forgotten  and  the  holy  oil 
alone  remembered  !  Yet  Louis  probably  used  that  mediae- 
val notion  as  a  shield  against  his  brother's  dictation.     The 

1  Decree  of  February  5th,  1810.  See  Welschinger,  "  La  Censure  sous 
le  premier  Empire,"  p.  31.  For  the  seizure  of  Madame  de  Stael's 
*' Allemagne  "  and  her  exile,  see  her  preface  to  "  Dix  Annies  d'Exil." 


I 


196  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

tough  Bonaparte  nature  brooked  not  the  idea  of  mere 
lieutenancy.  He  declined  to  obey  orders  from  the  brother 
whom  he  secretly  detested.  He  flatly  refused  to  be  trans- 
ferred from  the  Hague  to  Madrid,  or  to  put  in  force  the 
burdensome  decrees  of  the  Continental  System. 

On  his  side,  Napoleon  upbraided  him  with  governing 
too  softly,  and  with  seeking  popularity  where  he  should 
seek  control.  After  the  Walcheren  expedition,  he  chid 
him  severely  for  allowing  the  English  fleet  ever  to  show 
its  face  in  the  Scheldt ;  for  "  the  fleets  of  that  Power 
ought  to  find  nothing  but  rocks  of  iron  "  in  that  river, 
"  which  is  as  important  to  France  as  the  Thames  to  Eng- 
land."1 But  the  head  and  front  of  his  offending  was 
that  British  goods  still  found  their  way  into  Holland. 
In  vain  did  the  Emperor  forbid  that  American  ships 
which  had  touched  at  English  ports  should  be  debarred 
from  those  of  Holland.  In  vain  did  he  threaten  to  close 
the  Scheldt  and  Rhine  to  Dutch  barges.  Louis  held  on 
his  way,  with  kindly  patience  towards  his  merchants,  and 
with  a  Bonapartist  obstinacy  proof  against  fraternal 
advice  or  threats.  At  last,  early  in  1810,  Napoleon  sent 
troops  to  occupy  Walcheren  and  neighbouring  Dutch 
lands.  It  seemed  for  a  time  as  though  this  was  but  a 
device  to  extort  favourable  terms  of  peace  from  England 
in  return  for  an  offer  that  France  would  not  annex  Hol- 
land. Negotiations  to  this  effect  were  set  on  foot  through 
the  medium  of  Ouvrard  and  Labouchere,  son-in-law  of  the 
banker  Baring:  Fouche  also,  without  the  knowledge  of 
his  master,  ventured  to  put  forth  a  diplomatic  feeler  as 
to  a  possible  Anglo-French  alliance  against  the  United 
States,  an  action  for  which  he  was  soon  very  properly  dis- 
graced.2 

The  negotiation  failed,  as  it  deserved  to  do.  Our  ob- 
jections were,  not  merely  to  the  absurd  proposal  that  we 
should  give  up  our  maritime  code  if  Napoleon  would 
abstain  from  annexing  Holland  and  the  Hanseatic  towns, 
but  still  more  against  the  man  himself  and  his  whole  policy. 

iMollien,  "Mems.,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  183. 

2  Fouch6  retired  to  Italy,  and  finally  settled  at  Aix.  His  place  at  the 
Ministry  of  Police  was  taken  by  Savary,  Due  de  Rovigo.  See  Madelin's 
"Fouche,"  chap.  xx. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS    HEIGHT  197 

We  had  every  reason  to  distrust  the  good  faith  of  the  man 
who  had  betrayed  the  Turks  at  Tilsit,  Portugal  at  Fon- 
tainebleau,  and  the  Spaniards  at  Bayonne.  To  pause  in 
the  strife,  to  relax  our  hold  on  our  new  colonies,  and  to 
desert  the  Spaniards,  in  order  to  preserve  the  merely  titu- 
lar independence  of  Holland  and  the  Hanse  Towns,  would 
have  been  an  act  of  singular  simplicity.  Nor  does  Napo- 
leon seem  to  have  expected  it.  He  wrote  to  his  Foreign 
Minister,  Champagny,  on  March  20th,  1810  :  "From  not 
having  made  peace  sooner,  England  has  lost  Naples,  Spain, 
Portugal,  and  the  market  of  Trieste.  If  she  delavs  much 
longer,  she  will  lose  Holland,  the  Hanse  Towns,  and  Sic- 
ily." And  surely  this  Sibylline  conduct  of  his  required 
that  he  should  annex  these  lands  and  all  Europe  in  order 
to  exact  a  suitable  price  from  the  exhausted  islanders. 
Such  was  the  corollary  of  the  Continental  System. 

Meanwhile  Louis,  nettled  by  the  inquisitions  of  the 
French  douaniers,  and  by  the  order  of  his  brother  to  seize 
all  American  ships  in  Dutch  ports,  was  drawing  on  him- 
self further  reproaches  and  threats :  "  Louis,  you  are  in- 
corrigible .  .  .  you  do  not  want  to  reign  for  any  length  of 
time.  States  are  governed  by  reason  and  policy,  and  not 
by  acrimony  and  weakness."  Twenty  thousand  French 
troops  were  approaching  Amsterdam  to  bring  him  to  rea- 
son, when  the  young  ruler  decided  to  be  rid  of  this  royal 
mummery.  On  the  night  of  July  1st  he  fled  from  Haar- 
lem, and  travelled  swiftly  and  secretly  eastwards  until  he 
reached  Teplitz,  in  Bohemia.  The  ignominy  of  this  flight 
rested  on  the  brother  who  had  made  kingship  a  mockery. 
The  refugee  left  behind  him  the  reputation  of  a  man  who, 
lovable  by  nature  but  soured  by  domestic  discords,  sought 
to  shield  his  subjects  from  the  ruin  into  which  the  rigid 
application  of  the  Continental  System  was  certain  to  plunge 
them.  That  fate  now  befell  the  unhappy  little  land.  On 
July  9th  it  was  annexed  to  the  French  Empire,  and  all  the 
commercial  decrees  were  carried  out  as  rigidly  at  Rotter- 
dam as  at  Havre. 

At  the  close  of  the  year,  Napoleon's  coast  system  was 
extended  to  the  borders  of  Holstein  by  the  annexation  of 
Oldenburg,  the  northern  parts  of  Berg,  Westphalia,  and 
Hanover,  along  with  Lauenburg  and  the  Hanse  Towns. 


198 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I 


CHAP. 


Bremen,  Hamburg,  and  Liibeck.     The  little  Swiss  Repub- 
lic of  Valais  was  also  absorbed  in  the  Empire. 

This   change   in   North    Germany,    which   carried   the 
French  flag  to  the  shores  of  the  Baltic,  was  his  final  ex- 

CENTRAL  EUROPE  AFTER  1810 


Stanford's  Geog'Csttbt 


pedient  for  assuring  England's  commercial  ruin.  As  far 
back  as  February,  1798,  he  had  recommended  the  exten- 
sion of  French  influence  over  the  Hanse  Towns  as  a  means 
of  reducing  his  most  redoubtable  foe  to  surrender,  and  now 
there  were  two  special  reasons  for  this  annexation.     First, 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS    HEIGHT  199 

the  ships  of  Oldenburg  had  been  largely  used  for  convey- 
ing British  produce  into  North  Germany  ; 1  and  secondly, 
the  French  commercial  code  was  so  rigorous  that  no  officials 
with  even  the  semblance  of  independence  could  be  trusted 
with  its  execution.  On  August  5th  a  decree  had  been 
promulgated  at  the  Trianon,  near  Versailles,  which  imposed 
enormous  duties  on  every  important  colonial  product. 
Cotton  —  especially  that  from  America  —  sugar,  tea,  coffee, 
cocoa,  and  other  articles  were  subjected  to  dues,  generally  of 
half  their  value  and  irrespective  of  their  place  of  production. 

Traders  were  ordered  to  declare  their  possession  of  all 
colonial  wares  and  to  pay  the  duty,  under  pain  of  confisca- 
tion. Depots  of  such  goods  within  four  days'  distance 
from  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire  were  held  to  be  clandes- 
tine ;  and  troops  were  sent  forthwith  into  Germany. 
Switzerland,  and  Spain  to  seize  such  stores,  a  proceeding 
which  aroused  the  men  of  Stuttgart,  Frankfurt,  ami 
Berne  to  almost  open  resistance.  It  is  difficult  to  see  the 
reason  for  this  decree,  except  on  the  supposition  that  the 
Continental  System  did  not  stop  British  imports,  and  that 
all  tropical  products  were  British. 

Napoleon's  own  correspondence  shows  that  he  believed 
this  to  be  so.  At  that  same  time  he  issued  orders  that  all 
colonial  produce  found  at  Stettin  should  be  confiscated 
because  it  was  evidently  English  property  brought  on 
American  ships.  He  further  recommended  Murat  and 
Eugene  to  press  hard  on  such  wares  in  order  to  replenish 
their  exchequers  and  raise  funds  for  restoring  their  com- 
merce. Eugene  must,  however,  be  careful  to  tax  Ameri- 
can and  colonial  cotton  most  heavily,  while  letting  in  that 
of  the  Levant  on  favourable  terms. 

Jerome,  too,  was  bidden  rigorously  to  enforce  the 
Trianon  tariff  in  Westphalia  ;  and  the  hint  was  to  be 
passed  on  to  Prussia  and  the  Rhenish  Confederation  that, 
by  subjecting  colonial  goods  to  these  enormous  imposts, 
those  States  would  gain  several  millions  of  francs  "  and 
the  loss  would  fall  partly  on  English  commerce  and  partly 
on  the  smugglers."2     In  fact,  all  his  acts  and  words  at 

1  Porter,  "  Progress  of  the  Nation,"  p.  388. 

2  Letters  of  August  6th,  7th,  29th.  The  United  States  had  just  re- 
pealed their  Non-Intercourse   Act  of   1807.      For  their  relations   with 


200  THE  LITE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

this  time  reveal  the  densest  ignorance,  not  only  of 
political  economy,  but  of  the  elementary  facts  of  com- 
merce, as  when  heN  imagined  that  officials,  who  were 
sufficiently  hard  worked  with  watching  a  nimble  host  of 
some  100,000  smugglers  along  an  immense  frontier,  would 
also  be  able  to  distinguish  between  Syrian  and  American 
cottons,  and  to  exact  800  francs  from  100  kilogrammes  of 
the  latter,  as  against  400  francs  from  tiie  former,  or  that 
six  times  as  much  could  ever  be  levied  on  Chinese  teas  as 
on  other  teas  !  Such  a  tariff  called  for  a  highly  drilled 
army  of  those  sufficiently  rare  individuals,  honest  doua- 
niers,  endowed  also  with  Napoleonic  activity  and  omni- 
science. But,  as  Chaptal  remarked,  the  Emperor  had 
never  thought  much  about  the  needs  of  commerce,  and  he 
despised  merchants  as  persons  who  had  "  neither  a  faith 
nor  a  country,  whose  sole  object  was  gain."  His  own 
notion  about  commerce  was  that  he  could  "  make  it  ma- 
noeuvre like  a  regiment "  ;  and  this  military  conception  of 
trade  led  him  to  entertain  the  fond  hope  that  exchequers 
benefited  by  confiscation  and  prohibitive  tariffs,  that  a 
"national  commerce"  could  be  speedily  built  up  by  cutting 
off  imports,  and  that  the  burden  of  loss  in  the  present  com- 
mercial war  fell  on  England  and  not  on  the  continental 
consumer. 

Such  was  the  penalty  which  the  great  man  paid  for 
scorning  all  new  knowledge  as  idSalogie.  The  principles 
set  forth  by  Quesnay,  Turgot,  and  Adam  Smith  were  to 
him  mere  sophistical  juggling.  He  once  said  to  Mollien : 
"  I  seek  the  good  that  is  practical,  not  the  ideal  best  :  the 
world  is  very  old :  we  must  profit  by  its  experience  :  it 
teaches  that  old  practices  are  worth  more  than  new  theo- 
ries :  you  are  not  the  only  one  who  knows  trade  secrets."1 
This  was  his  general  attitude  towards  the  exponents  of 
new  financial  or  commercial  views.  Indeed,  we  can  hardly 
think  of  this  great  champion  of  external  control  and  state 
intervention  favouring  the  open-handed  methods  of  laisser 
/aire.    Unhappy  France,  that  gave  this  motto  to  the  world 

Napoleon  and  England,  see  Channing's  "The  United  States  of  America," 
chs.  vi.  and  vii. ;  also  the  Anglo-American  correspondence  in  Cobbett'i 
"Register  for  1809  and  1810." 
1  Mollien,  "Meras."  vol.  i.,  p.  316. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT -SOI 

but  let  her  greatest  ruler  emphasize  her  recent  reaction 
towards  commercial  medievalism  !  Luckless  Emperor, 
who  aspired  to  found  the  United  States  of  Europe,  but 
outraged  the  principle  which  most  surely  and  lastingly 
works  for  international  harmony,  that  of  Free  Trade  ! 

While  the  Trianon  tariff  sought  to  hinder  the  import 
of  England's  colonial  products,  or,  failing  that,  to  reap  a 
golden  harvest  from  them,  Napoleon  further  endeavoured 
to  terrify  continental  dealers  from  accepting  any  of  her 
manufactures.  His  Fontainebleau  decree  of  October  18th, 
1810,  ordered  that  all  such  goods  should  be  seized  and 
publicly  burnt ;  and  five  weeks  later  special  tribunals  were 
instituted  for  enforcing  these  ukases  and  for  trying  all  per- 
sons, whether  smugglers  caught  red-handed  or  shopkeepers 
who  inadvertently  offered  for  sale  the  cottons  of  Lancashire 
or  the  silks  of  Bengal. 

The  canon  was  now  complete.  It  only  remained  to 
convert  the  world  to  the  new  gospel  of  pacific  war.  The 
results  were  soon  clearly  visible  in  a  sudden  rise  of  prices 
throughout  France,  Germany,  and  Italy.  Raw  cotton  now 
fetched  10  to  11  francs,  sugar  6  to  7  francs,  coffee  8  francs, 
and  indigo  21  francs,  per  pound,  or  on  the  average  about 
ten  times  the  prices  then  ruling  at  London.1  The  reason 
for  this  advantage  to  the  English  consumer  and  manufac- 
turer is  clear.  England  swayed  the  tropics  and  held  the 
seas  ;  and,  having  a  monopoly  of  colonial  produce,  she 
could  import  it  easily  and  abundantly,  while  the  conti- 
nental purchaser  had  ultimately  to  pay  for  the  risks  in- 
curred by  his  shopkeeper,  by  British  merchants,  and  by 
their  smugglers,  who  "  ran  in  "  from  Heligoland,  Jersey, 
or  Sicily.  These  classes  vied  in  their  efforts  to  prick  holes 
in  the  continental  decrees.  Bargees  and  women,  dogs  and 
hearses,  were  pressed  into  service  against  Napoleon.  The 
last-named  device  was  for  a  time  tried  with  much  success 
near  Hamburg,  until  the  French  authorities,  wondering  at 
the  strange  increase  of  funerals  in  a  river-side  suburb, 
peered  into  the  hearses,  and  found  them  stuffed  full  with 
bales  of  British  merchandise.  This  gruesome  plan  failing, 
others  were  tried.     Large  quantities  of  sand  were  brought 

1  Tooke,  "  Hist,  of  Prices,"  vol.  i.,  p.  811  ;  Mollien,  vol.  iii.,  p.  135,  289  ; 
Pasquier,  vol.  i.,  p.  295  ;  Chaptal,  p.  275. 


202  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

from  the  seashore,  until,  unfortunately  for  the  housewives, 
some  inquisitive  official  found  that  it  hailed  from  the  West 
Indies. 

Or  again,  devious  routes  were  resorted  to.  Sugar  was 
smuggled  from  London  into  Germany  by  way  of  Salon  ira, 
that  being  now  almost  the  only  neutral  port  open  to  British 
commerce.  Thence  it  was  borne  in  panniers  on  the  backs 
of  mules  over  the  Balkans  to  Belgrade,  where  it  was  trans- 
ferred to  barges  and  carried  up  the  Danube..  Another 
illicit  trade  route  was  from  the  desolate  shores  of  Dalmatia 
through  Hungary.  The  writer  of  a  pamphlet,  "  England, 
Ireland,  and  America,"  states  that  his  firm  then  employed 
500  horses  on  and  near  that  coast  in  carrying  British  goods 
into  Central  Europe,  and  that  the  cost  of  getting  them  into 
France  was  "  about  <£28  per  cwt.,  or  more  than  fifty  times 
the  present  freight  to  Calcutta."  In  fact,  the  result  of 
the  Emperor's  economic  experiments  may  be  summed  up 
in  the  statement  of  Chaptal  that  the  general  run  of  prices 
in  France  was  higher  by  one-third  than  it  was  before  1789. 

Now  the  merest  tyro  might  see  that  the  difference  in 
price  above  the  normal  level  was  paid  by  the  consumer. 
The  colonial  producer,  the  British  merchant  and  shipper 
were  certainly  harassed,  and  trade  was  dislocated ;  but, 
as  Mollien  observed,  commerce  soon  adapted  itself  to 
altered  conditions ;  and  merchants  never  parted  with 
their  wares  without  getting  hard  cash  or  resorting  to  the 
primitive  method  of  barter.  Money  was  also  frequently 
melted  down  in  France  and  Germany  so  as  to  effect  bar- 
gains with  England  in  bars  of  metal.  And  so,  in  one 
way  or  another,  trade  was  carried  on,  with  infinite  dis- 
comfort and  friction,  it  is  true ;  but  it  never  wholly 
ceased  even  between  England  and  France  direct. 

In  fact,  Napoleon  so  clung  to  the  old  mercantilist  craze 
of  stimulating  exports  in  order  that  they  might  greatly 
exceed  the  imports,  as  to  favour  the  sending  of  agricul- 
tural produce  to  England,  provided  that  such  cargoes  com- 
prised manufactured  goods.  He  allowed  this  privilege  not 
only  to  his  Empire,  but  also  to  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.1 
The  difficulty  was  that  England  would  not  receive  the 
manufactured  goods  of  her  enemies ;    and,  as  corn  and 

1  Letter  of  August  6th,  1810,  to  Eugene. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT  203 

cheese  could  not  be  exported  to  England,  unless  a  certain 
proportion  of  silk  and  cloths  went  with  them,  the  latter 
were  got  up  so  as  to  satisfy  the  French  customs  officers 
and  then  cast  into  the  sea.  It  is  needless  to  add  that  this 
export  of  manufactures  to  England,  on  which  Napoleon 
prided  himself,  was  limited  to  showy  but  worthless  articles, 
which  were  made  solely  ad  usum  delphinorum. 

It  was  fortunate  for  us  that  Napoleon  entertained  these 
crude  ideas  on  political  economy ;  for  his  action  opened 
for  us  a  loophole  of  escape  from  a  very  serious  difficulty. 
At  that  time  our  fast-growing  population  was  barely  fed 
by  our  own  wheat  even  after  good  seasons ;  and  Provi- 
dence afflicted  us  in  1809  and  1810  with  very  poor  har- 
vests. In  1810  the  average  price  was  103  shillings  the 
quarter,  the  highest  ever  known  except  in  1800  and  1801  ; 
and  as  commerce  was  dislocated  by  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem and  hand-labour  was  being  largely  replaced  by  the 
new  power-looms  and  improved  spinning  machinery,  the 
outlook  would  have  been  hopeless,  had  not  our  great 
enemy  allowed  us  to  import  continental  corn.  This  de- 
vice, which  he  imagined  would  impoverish  us  to  enrich 
his  own  States,  was  the  greatest  aid  that  he  could  have 
rendered  to  our  hard-pressed  social  system ;  and  readers 
of  Charlotte  Bronte's  realistic  sketches  of  the  Luddite 
rioting  in  Yorkshire  may  imagine  what  would  have  be- 
fallen England  if,  besides  lack  of  work  and  low  wages, 
there  had  been  the  added  horrors  of  a  bread  famine. 
But  fortunately  the  curious  commercial  notions  harboured 
by  our  foe  enabled  us  in  the  winter  of  1810-11  to  get 
supplies  of  corn  not  only  from  Prussia  and  Poland,  but 
even  from  Italy  and  France. 

In  one  sense  this  incident  has  been  misunderstood.  It 
has  been  referred  to  by  Porter 1  and  other  hopeful  persons 
as  proof  positive  that  as  long  as  we  can  buy  corn  we  shall 
get  it,  even  from  our  enemies.  It  proves  nothing  of  the 
sort.  Napoleon's  correspondence  and  his  whole  policy 
with  regard  to  licences,  which  we  shall  presently  examine, 
show  clearly  that  he  believed  he  would  greatly  benefit 
his  own  States  and  impoverish  our  people  by  selling  us 
large  stores  of  corn  at  a  very  high  price.     There  is  no 

i  "Progress  of  the  Nation,"  p.  148. 


204  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

hint  in  any  of  his  letters  that  he  ever  framed  the  notion 
of  starving  us  into  surrender.  All  that  he  looked  to  was 
the  draining  away  of  our  wealth  by  cutting  off  our  exports, 
and  by  allowing  imports  to  enter  our  harbours  much  as 
usual.  As  long  as  he  prevented  us  selling  our  produce, 
he  heeded  little  how  much  we  bought  from  his  States  :  in 
fact,  the  more  we  bought,  the  sooner  we  should  be  bank- 
rupt —  such  was  his  notion. 

It  is  strange  that  he  never  sought  to  cut  off  our  corn- 
supplies.  They  were  then  drawn  almost  entirely  from  the 
Baltic  ports.  The  United  States  and  Canada  had  as  yet 
only  sent  us  a  few  driblets  of  corn.  La  Plata  and  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope  were  quite  undeveloped  ;  and  our  settle- 
ments in  New  South  Wales  were  at  that  time  often 
troubled  by  dearth.  The  plan  of  sealing  up  the  corn- 
fields of  Europe  from  Riga  to  Trieste  would  have  been 
feasible,  at  least  for  a  few  weeks ;  French  troops  held 
Danzig  and  Stettin;  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Denmark  were 
at  his  beck  and  call  ;  and  an  imperial  decree  forbidding 
the  export  of  corn  from  France  and  her  allied  States  to 
the  United  Kingdom  could  hardly  have  failed  to  reduce 
us  to  starvation  and  surrender  in  the  very  critical  winter 
of  1810-11.  But  that  strange  mental  defect  of  clinging 
with  ever  increasing  tenacity  to  preconceived  notions  led 
Napoleon  to  allow  and  even  to  favour  exports  of  corn  to 
us  in  the  time  of  our  utmost  need ;  and  Britain  survived 
the  strain.1 

What  folly,  however,  to  refer  to  the  action  of  this  man 
of  one  economic  idea  as  being  likely  to  determine  the  con- 
duct of  continental  statesmen  in  some  future  naval  war 
with  England.  In  truth,  the  urgency  of  the  problem  of 
our  national  food -supply  in  time  of  a  great  war  can  only 
be  fully  understood  by  those  who  have  studied  the  Napo- 
leonic era.  England  then  grew  nearly  enough  corn  for 
her  needs  ;  her  fleets  swept  the  seas ;  and  Napoleon's  eco- 
nomic hobby  left  her  foreign  food-supply  unhampered  at 

1  So  Mollien,  vol.  Hi.,  p.  135:  "  One  knows  that  his  powerful  imagina- 
tion was  fertile  in  illusions :  as  soon  as  they  had  seduced  him,  he  sought 
with  a  kind  of  good  faith  to  enhance  their  prestige,  and  he  succeeded 
easily  in  persuading  many  others  of  what  he  had  convinced  himself.  He 
braved  business  difficulties  as  he  braved  dangers  in  war." 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT  ITS   HEIGHT  205 

the  severest  crisis.  Yet,  even  so,  the  price  of  the  quartern 
loaf  rose  to  more  than  fifteenpence,  and  we  were  brought 
to  the  verge  of  civil  war.  A  comparison  of  that  time  with 
the  conditions  that  now  prevail  must  yield  food  for  reflec- 
tion to  all  but  the  case-hardened  optimists. 

But  already  Napoleon  was  convinced  that  the  Conti- 
nental System  must  be  secretly  relaxed  in  special  cases. 
Despite  the  fulsome  addresses  which  some  Chambers  of 
Commerce  sent  up,  he  knew  that  his  seaports  were  in 
the  depths  of  distress,  and  that  French  cotton  manu- 
facturers could  not  hope  to  compete  with  those  of  Lan- 
cashire now  that  his  own  tariff  had  doubled  the  price  of 
raw  cotton  and  dyes  in  France.  He  therefore  hit  upon 
the  curious  device  of  allowing  continental  merchants  to 
buy  licences  for  the  privilege  of  secretly  evading  his  own 
decrees.  The  English  Government  seems  to  have  been 
the  first  to  issue  similar  secret  permits;  but  Napoleon 
had  scarcely  signed  his  Berlin  Decree  for  the  blockade 
of  England  before  he  connived  at  its  infraction.  When 
sugar,  coffee,  and  other  comforts  became  scarce,  they 
were  secretly  imported  from  perfidious  Albion  for  the 
imperial  table.  The  final  stage  was  reached  in  July, 
1810,  when  licences  to  import  forbidden  goods  were 
secretly  sold  to  favoured  merchants,  and  many  officials 
—  among  them  Bourrienne  —  reaped  a  rich  harvest  from 
the  sale  of  these  imperial  indulgences.  Merchants  were 
so  eager  to  evade  the  hated  laws  that  they  offered  high 
prices  to  the  treasury  and  douceurs  to  officials  for  the 
coveted  boon  ;  and  as  much  as  £40,000  is  said  to  have 
been  paid  for  a  single  licence. 

On  both  sides  of  the  Channel  this  device  was  abhorred, 
but  its  results  were  specially  odious  in  Napoleon's  States, 
where  the  burdens  to  be  evaded  were  far  heavier  than 
those  entailed  by  the  Orders  in  Council.  In  fact,  the  Con- 
tinental System  was  now  seen  to  be  an  organized  hypoc- 
risy, which,  in  order  to  ruin  the  mistress  of  the  seas, 
exposed  the  peoples  to  burdens  more  grievous  than  those 
borne  by  England,  and  left  all  but  the  wealthiest  mer- 
chants a  prey  to  a  grinding  fiscal  tyraniry.  And  the 
sting  of  it  all  was  its  social  injustice  ;  for  while  the  poor 
were  severely  punished,  sometimes  with  death,  for  smug- 


206  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  char 

gling  sugar  or  tobacco,  Napoleon  and  the  favoured  few 
who  could  buy  licences  often  imported  these  articles  in 
large  quantities.  What  wonder,  then,  that  Russia  and 
Sweden  should  decline  long  to  endure  these  gratuitous 
hardships,  and  should  seek  to  evade  the  behests  of  the 
imperial  smuggler  of  the  Tuileries ! 

Nevertheless,  as  no  inventive  people  can  ever  be  thrown 
wholly  on  its  own  resources  without  deriving  some  benefit, 
we  find  that  France  met  the  crisis  with  the  cheery  patience 
and  unflagging  ingenuity  which  she  has  ever  evinced.  In 
a  great  Empire  which  embraced  all  the  lands  between 
Hamburg,  Bayonne,  and  Rome,  not  to  mention  Illyria  and 
Dalmatia,  a  great  variety  of  products  might  readily  reward 
the  inventor  and  the  husbandman.  Tobacco,  rice,  and  cot- 
ton could  be  reared  in  the  southern  portions.  Valiant  efforts 
were  also  made  to  get  Asiatic  produce  overland,  so  as  to 
disappoint  the  English  cruisers  ;  and  the  coffee  of  Arabia 
was  taxed  very  lightly,  so  as  to  ruin  the  American  pro- 
ducer. When  the  fragrant  berry  became  more  and  more 
scarce,  chicory  was  discovered  by  good  patriots  to  be  a 
palatable  substitute,  and  scientific  men  sought  to  induce 
their  neighbours  to  use  the  isatis  plant  for  the  same  pur- 
pose. Prizes  were  offered  by  the  State  and  by  local  Cham- 
bers of  Commerce  to  those  who  should  make  up  for  the 
lack  of  tropical  goods  and  dyes. 

In  one  case  a  noteworthy  discovery  was  made,  namely, 
that  sugar  could  be  extracted  from  beet-root,  a  piece  of 
news  which  delighted  the  Emperor.  He  also  hoped  that 
a  chemical  substitute  for  indigo  had  been  found,  and  ex- 
claimed to  a  doleful  deputation  of  merchants,  who  came  to 
the  Tuileries  in  the  early  summer  of  1811,  that  chemistry 
would  soon  revolutionize  commerce  as  completely  as  the 
discovery  of  the  compass  had  done.  Besides,  the  French 
Empire  was  the  richest  country  in  the  world,  and  could 
almost  do  without  foreign  commerce,  at  least  until  Eng- 
land had  given  way  ;  and  that  would  soon  come  to  pass  ; 
for  the  pressure  of  events  would  soon  compel  London  mer- 
chants to  throw  their  sugar  and  indigo  into  the  Thames.1 

1  Miot  de  Melito,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xv.  For. some  favourable  symptoms  in 
French  industry,  see  Lumbroso,  pp.  165-226,  and  Chaptal,  p.  287.  They 
have  been  credited  to  the  Continental  System  ;  but  surely  they  resulted 
from  the  internal  free  trade  and  intelligent  administration  which  France 
had  enjoyed  since  the  Revolution. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT  207 

In  reality,  he  placed  commerce  far  behind  agriculture, 
which  he  considered  to  be  the  basis  of  a  nation's  wealth 
and  a  nation's  health.  But  he  also  took  a  keen  interest 
in  manufactures.  The  silk  industry  at  Lyons  found  in 
him  a  generous  patron.  He  ordered  that  the  best  scien- 
tific training  should  there  be  given,  so  as  to  improve  the 
processes  of  manufacture  ;  and,  as  silk  of  nearly  all  kinds 
could  be  produced  in  France  and  Italy,  Lyons  was  com- 
paratively prosperous.  When,  however,  it  suffered  from 
the  general  rise  of  prices  and  from  the  impaired  buying 
power  of  the  community,  he  adopted  heroic  remedies. 
He  ordered  that  all  ships  leaving  France  should  carry  silk 
fabrics  equal  in  value  to  one-fourth  of  the  whole  freight ; 
but  whether  these  stuffs  went  to  adorn  women  or  mer- 
maids seems  an  open  question.  Or  again,  on  the  advice 
of  Chaptal,  the  Emperor  made  large  purchases  of  surplus 
stocks  of  Lyons  silk,  Rouen  cottons,  and  Ste.  Antoine 
furniture,  so  as  to  prevent  an  imminent  collapse  of  credit 
and  a  recrudescence  of  Jacobinism  in  those  industrial  cen- 
tres ;  for  as  he  said  :  "I  fear  a  rising  brought  about  by 
want  of  bread  :  I  had  rather  fight  an  army  of  200,000  men 
than  that."  1 

In  the  main,  this  policy  of  giving  panem  et  circenses  was 
successful  in  France  ;  at  least,  it  kept  her  quiet.  The 
national  feeling  ran  strongly  in  favour  of  commercial  pro- 
hibition. In  1787  Arthur  Young  found  the  cotton-workers 
of  the  north  furious  at  the  recent  inroads  of  Lancashire 
cottons,  while  the  wine-growers  of  the  Garonne  were 
equally  favourable  to  the  enlightened  Anglo-French  com- 
mercial treaty  of  1786.  It  was  Napoleon's  lot  to  win  the 
favour  of  the  rigid  protectionists,  while  not  alienating  that 
of  the  men  of  the  Gironde,  who  saw  in  him  the  champion 
of  agrarian  liberty  against  the  feudal  nobles.  Moreover, 
the  nation  still  cherished  the  pathetic  belief  that  the  war 
was  due  to  Albion's  perfidy  respecting  Malta,  and  burned 
with  a  desire  to  chastise  the  recreant  islanders.  For  these 
reasons,  Frenchmen  endured  the  drain  of  men  and  money 
with  but  little  show  of  grumbling. 

They  were  tired  of  the  wars.  We  have  had  enough  glory, 
they  said,  even  in  the  capital  itself,  and  an  acute  German 

1  "Nap.  Corresp.,"  May  8th,  1811. 


208  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

observer  describes  the  feeling  there  as  curiously  mixed. 
Parisian  gaiety  often  found  vent  in  lampoons  against  the 
Emperor  ;  and  much  satire  at  his  expense  might  with 
safety  be  indulged  in  among  a  crowd,  provided  it  were 
seasoned  with  wit.  The  people  seemed  not  to  fear  Napo- 
leon, as  he  was  feared  in  Germany  :  the  old  revolutionary 
party  was  still  active  and  might  easily  become  far  more 
dangerous  than  the  royalist  coteries  of  the  Boulevard  St. 
Germain.  For  the  rest,  they  were  all  so  accustomed  to 
political  change  that  they  looked  on  his  government  as 
provisional,  and  put  up  with  him  only  as  long  as  the  army 
triumphed  abroad  and  he  could  make  his  power  felt  at 
home.  Such  was  the  impression  of  Paris  gained  by  Varn- 
hagen  von  Ense.  Public  opinion  in  the  provinces  seems 
to  have  been  more  favourable  to  Napoleon  ;  and,  on  the 
whole,  pride  in  the  army  and  in  the  vigorous  administra- 
tion which  that  nation  loves,  above  all,  hatred  of  England 
and  the  hope  of  wresting  from  her  the  world's  empire,  led 
the  French  silently  to  endure  rigorous  press  laws,  in- 
creased taxes,  war  prices,  licences,  and  chicory. 

For  Germans  the  hardships  were  much  greater  and  the 
alleviations  far  less.  They  had  no  deep  interest  in  Malta 
or  in  the  dominion  of  the  seas  ;  and  political  economy 
was  then  only  beginning  to  dawn  on  the  Teutonic  mind. 
The  general  trend  of  German  thought  had  inclined  tow- 
ards the  Everlasting  Nay,  until  Napoleon  flashed  across 
its  ken.  For  a  time  he  won  the  admiration  of  the  chief 
thinkers  of  Germany  by  brushing  away  the  feudal  cob- 
webs from  her  fair  face.  He  seemed  about  to  call  her 
sons  to  a  life  of  public  activity  ;  and  in  the  famous  solilo- 
quy of  Faust,  in  which  he  feels  his  way  from  word  to 
thought,  from  thought  to  might,  and  from  might  to  action, 
we  may  discern  the  literary  projection  of  the  influence 
exerted  by  the  new  Charlemagne  on  that  nation  of 
dreamers.1  But  the  promise  was  fulfilled  only  in  the 
most  harshly  practical  way,  namely,  by  cutting  off  all  sup- 
plies of  tobacco  and  coffee  ;  and  when  Teufelsdrockh  him- 
self, admirer  though  he  was  of  the  French  Revolution, 
found  that  the  summons  for  his  favourite  beverage  —  the 

1  Goethe  published  the  first  part  of  "Faust,"  in  full,  early  in  1808. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT  209 

"  dear  melancholy  coffee,  that  begets  fancies,"  of  Lessing 
—  produced  only  a  muddy  decoction  of  acorns,  there  was 
the  risk  of  his  tendencies  earthwards  taking  a  very  prac- 
tically revolutionary  turn. 

In  truth,  the  German  universities  were  the  leaders  of 
the  national  reaction  against  the  Emperor  of  the  West. 
Fichte's  pleading  for  a  truly  national  education  had  taken 
effect.  Elementary  instruction  was  now  being  organized 
in  Prussia  ;  and  the  divorce  of  thought  from  action,  which 
had  so  long  sterilized  German  life,  was  ended  by  the 
foundation  of  the  University  of  Berlin  by  Humboldt. 
Thus,  in  1810,  the  year  of  Prussia's  deepest  woe,  when 
her  brave  Queen  died  of  a  stricken  heart,  when  French 
soldiers  and  douaniers  were  seizing  and  burning  colonial 
wares,  her  thinkers  came  into  closer  touch  with  her  men 
of  action,  with  mutually  helpful  results.  Thinkers  ceased 
to  be  mere  dreamers,  and  Prussian  officials  gained  a  wider 
outlook  on  life.  The  life  of  beneficent  activity,  to  which 
Napoleon  might  have  summoned  the  great  majority  of 
Germans,  dawned  on  them  from  Berlin,  not  from  Paris. 

His  influence  was  more  and  more  oppressive.  The 
final  results  of  his  commercial  decrees  on  the  trade  of  Ham- 
burg were  thus  described  by  Perthes,  a  well-known  writer 
and  bookseller  of  that  town  :  "  Of  the  422  sugar-boiling- 
houses,  few  now  stood  open  :  the  printing  of  cottons  had 
ceased  entirely  :  the  tobacco-dressers  were  driven  away 
by  the  Government.  The  imposition  of  innumerable 
taxes,  door  and  window,  capitation  and  land  taxes,  drove 
the  inhabitants  to  despair."  Bat  the  same  sagacious 
thinker  was  able  to  point  the  moral  of  it  all,  and  prove  to 
his  friends  that  their  present  trials  were  due  to  the  selfish 
particularism  of  the  German  States  :  "  It  was  a  necessity 
that  some  great  power  should  arise  in  the  midst  of  the 
degenerate  selfishness  of  the  times  and  also  prove  victo- 
rious, for  there  was  nothing  vigorous  to  oppose  it.  Napo- 
leon is  an  historical  necessity."  1 

Thus,  both  in  the  abodes  of  learning  and  in  the  centres 
of  industry  men  were  groping  after  a  higher  unity  and  a 
firmer  political  organization,  which,  after  the  Napoleonic 

1  Baur,  "  Stein  und  Perthes,"  p.  85. 

VOL.   II  —  P 


210  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

deluge  had  swept  by,  was  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  New 
Germany. 

To  all  appearances,  however,  Napoleon's  power  seemed 
to  be  more  firmly  established  than  ever  in  the  ensuing 
year.  On  March  20th,  1811,  a  son  was  born  to  him. 
At  the  crisis  of  this  event,  he  revealed  the  warmth  of  his 
family  instincts.  On  hearing  that  the  life  of  mother  or 
infant  might  have  to  be  sacrificed,  he  exclaimed  at  once, 
"Save  the  mother."  *  When  the  danger  was  past,  he  very 
considerately  informed  Josephine,  stating,  "he  has  my 
chest,  my  mouth,  and  my  eyes.  I  trust  that  he  will  fulfil 
his  destiny."  That  destiny  was  mapped  out  in  the  title 
conferred  on  the  child,  "  King  of  Rome,"  which  was  de- 
signed to  recall  the  title  "  King  of  the  Romans,"  used  in 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

Napoleon  resolved  that  the  old  elective  dignity  should 
now  be  renewed  in  a  strictly  hereditary  Empire,  vaster 
than  that  of  Charlemagne.  Paris  was  to  be  its  capital, 
Rome  its  second  city,  and  the  future  Emperors  were  always 
to  be  crowned  a  second  time  at  Rome.  Furthermore,  lest 
the  mediaeval  dispute  as  to  the  supremacy  of  Emperor  or 
Pope  in  Rome  should  again  vex  mankind,  the  Papacy 
was  virtually  annexed :  the  status  of  the  pontiff  was  de- 
fined in  the  most  Erastian  sense,  imperial  funds  were 
assigned  for  his  support,  and  he  was  bidden  to  maintain  two 
palaces,  "the  one  necessarily  at  Paris,  the  other  at  Rome." 

It  is  impossible  briefly  to  describe  the  various  conflicts 
between  Pius  VII.  and  Napoleon.  Though  now  kept  in 
captivity  by  Napoleon,  the  Pope  refused  to  ratify  these 
and  other  ukases  of  his  captor ;  and  the  credit  which 
Napoleon  had  won  by  his  worldly-wise  Concordat  was 
now  lost  by  his  infraction  of  many  of  its  clauses  and  by 
his  harsh  treatment  of  a  defenceless  old  man.  It  is  true 
that  Pius  had  excommunicated  Napoleon ;  but  that  was 
for  the  crime  of  annexing  the  Papal  States,  and  public 
opinion  revolted  at  the  spectacle  of  an  all-powerful 
Emperor  now  consigning  to  captivity  the  man  who  in 
former  years  had  done  so  much  to  consolidate  his 
authority.  After  the  disasters  of  the  Russian  campaign, 
he  sought  to  come  to  terms  with  the  pontiff ;  but  even 

1  Lavalette,  "Mems.,"  ch.  xxv. 


xxxi  THE   EMPIRE   AT   ITS   HEIGHT  211 

then  the  bargain  struck  at  Fontainebleau  was  so  hard 
that  his  prisoner,  though  unnerved  by  ill-health,  retracted 
the  unholy  compromise.  Whereupon  Napoleon  ordered 
that  the  cardinals  who  advised  this  step  should  be 
seized  and  carried  away  from  Fontainebleau.  Few  of 
Napoleon's  actions  were  more  harmful  than  this  series  of 
petty  persecutions  ;  and  among  the  influences  that 
Drought  about  his  fall,  we  may  reckon  the  dignified 
resistance  of  the  pontiff,  whose  meekness  threw  up  in 
sharp  relief  the  pride  and  arrogance  of  his  captor.  The 
Papacy  stooped,  but  only  to  conquer. 

For  the  present,  everything  seemed  to  favour  the  new 
Charlemagne.  Never  had  the  world  seen  embodied 
might  like  that  of  Napoleon's  Empire  ;  and  well  might 
he  exclaim  at  the  birth  of  the  King  of  Rome,  "  Now 
begins  the  finest  epoch  of  my  reign."  All  the  auguries 
seemed  favourable.  In  France,  the  voice  of  opposition 
was  all  but  hushed.  Italians,  Swiss,  and  even  some 
Spaniards,  helped  to  keep  down  Prussia.  Dutchmen 
and  Danes  had  hunted  down  Schill  for  him  at  Stralsund. 
Polish  horsemen  had  charged  up  the  Somosierra  Pass 
against  the  Spanish  guns,  and  did  valiant  service  on  the 
bloody  field  of  Albuera.  The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
could  send  forth  150,000  men  to  fight  his  battles.  The 
Hapsburgs  were  his  vassals,  and  only  faint  shadows  of 
discord  as  yet  clouded  his  relations  with  Alexander. 
One  of  his  Marshals,  Bernadotte,  had  been  chosen  to 
succeed  to  the  crown  of  Sweden ;  and  at  the  other  end 
of  Europe,  it  seemed  that  Wellington  and  the  Spanish 
patriots  must  ultimately  succumb  to  superior  numbers. 

Surely  now  was  the  time  for  the  fulfilment  of  those 
glowing  oriental  designs  beside  which  his  European 
triumphs  seemed  pale.  In  the  autumn  of  1810  he  sent 
agents  carefully  to  inspect  the  strongholds  of  Egypt  and 
Syria,  and  his  consuls  in  the  Levant  were  ordered  to  send 
a  report  every  six  months  on  the  condition  of  the  Turkish 
Empire.1  Above  all,  he  urges  on  the  completion  of  dock- 
yards and  ships  of  war.  Vast  works  were  pushed  on  at 
Antwerp  and  Cherbourg  :  ships  and  gunboats  were  to  be 
built  at  every  suitable  port  from  the  Texel  to  Naples  and 

1  Letters  of  October  10th  and  13th,  1810,  and  January  1st,  1811. 


212  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxxi 

Trieste  ;  and  as  the  result  of  these  labours,  the  Emperor 
counted  on  having  104  ships  of  the  line,  which  would 
cover  the  transports  from  the  Mediterranean,  Cherbourg, 
Boulogne,  and  the  Scheldt,  and  threatened  England  with 
an  array  of  200,000  fighting  men.1 

In  March,  1811,  this  plan  was  modified,  possibly  because, 
as  in  1804,  he  found  the  difficulties  of  a  descent  on  our 
coasts  greater  than  he  first  imagined.  He  now  seeks 
merely  to  weary  out  the  English  in  the  present  year.  But 
in  the  next  year,  or  in  1813,  he  will  send  an  expedition  of 
40,000  men  from  the  Scheldt,  as  if  to  menace  Ireland  ; 
and,  having  thrown  us  off  our  guard,  he  will  divide  that 
force  into  four  parts  for  the  recovery  of  the  French  and 
Dutch  colonies  in  the  West  Indies.  He  counts  also  on 
having  a  part  of  his  army  in  Spain  free  for  service  else- 
where :  it  must  be  sent  to  seize  Sicily  or  Egypt. 

But  this  was  not  all.  His  thoughts  also  turn  to  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Eight  thousand  men  are  to  sail  from 
Brest  to  seize  that  point  of  vantage  at  which  he  had  gazed 
so  longingly  in  1803.  Of  these  plans,  the  recovery  of 
Egypt  evidently  lay  nearest  to  his  heart.  He  orders  the 
storage  at  Toulon  of  everything  needful  for  an  Egyptian 
expedition,  along  with  sixty  gun-vessels  of  light  draught 
suitable  for  the  navigation  of  the  Nile  or  of  the  lakes  near 
the  coast.2  Decrds  is  charged  to  send  models  of  these 
craft  ;  and  we  may  picture  the  eager  scrutiny  which  they 
received.  For  the  Orient  was  still  the  pole  to  which 
Napoleon's  whole  being  responded.  Turned  away  per- 
force by  wars  with  Austria,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Spain,  it 
swung  round  towards  Egypt  and  India  on  the  first  chance 
of  European  peace,  only  to  be  driven  back  by  some 
untoward  shock  nearer  home.  In  1803  he  counted  on  the 
speedy  opening  of  a  campaign  on  the  Ganges.  In  1811  he 
proposes  that  the  tricolour  shall  once  more  wave  on  the 
citadel  of  Cairo,  and  threaten  India  from  the  shores  of  the 
Red  Sea.  But  a  higher  will  than  his  disposed  of  these 
events,  and  ordained  that  he  should  then  be  flung  back 
from  Russia  and  fight  for  his  Empire  in  the  plains  of 
Saxony. 

1  Letters  of  September  17th,  1810.  a  Letter  of  March  8th,  1811. 


CHAPTER   XXXII 

THE   RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN 

Two  mighty  and  ambitious  potentates  never  fully  trust 
one  another.  Under  all  the  shows  of  diplomatic  affection, 
there  remains  a  thick  rind  of  reserve  or  fear.  Especially 
must  that  be  so  with  men  who  spring  from  a  fierce  untamed 
stock.  Despite  the  training  of  Laharpe,  Alexander  at 
times  showed  the  passions  and  finesse  of  a  Boyar.  And 
who  shall  say  that  the  early  Jacobinism  and  later  culture 
of  Napoleon  was  more  than  a  veneer  spread  all  too  thinly 
over  an  Italian  condottiere  of  the  Renaissance  age  ?  These 
men  were  too  expert  at  wiles  really  to  trust  to  the  pom- 
pous assurances  of  Tilsit  and  Erfurt.  De  Maistre  tells  us 
that  Napoleon  never  partook  of  Alexander's  repasts  on  the 
banks  of  the  Niemen.  For  him  Muscovite  cookery  was 
suspect. 

Amidst  the  glories  of  Erfurt,  Oudinot  saw  an  incident 
that  revealed  the  Czar's  hidden  feelings.  During  one  of 
their  rides,  the  Emperors  were  stopped  by  a  dyke,  which 
Napoleon's  steed  refused  to  take  ;  accordingly  the  Marshal 
had  to  help  it  across  ;  but  the  Czar,  proud  of  his  horse- 
manship,  finally  cleared  the  obstacle  with  a  splendid  bound,, 
though  at  the  cost  of  a  shock  which  broke  his  sword-belt. 
The  sword  fell  to  the  ground,  and  Oudinot  was  about  to 
hand  it  to  Alexander,  when  Napoleon  quickly  said  :  "  Keep 
that  sword  and  bring  it  to  me  later  "  :  then,  turning  to  the 
Czar,  he  added  :  "  You  have  no  objection,  Sire  ?  "  A  look 
of  surprise  and  distrust  flashed  across  the  Czar's  features  ; 
but,  resuming  his  easy  bearing,  he  gave  his  assent.  Later 
in  the  day,  Napoleon  sent  his  own  sword  to  Alexander, 
and  thus  came  off  easily  best  from  an  incident  which 
threatened  at  first  to  throw  him  into  the  shade.  The  affair 
shows  the  ready  wit  and  mental  superiority  of  the  one  man 
no  less  than  the  veiled  reserve  and  uneasiness  of  the  other. 

213 


214  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

At  the  close  of  1809,  Alexander  confessed  his  inner  feel- 
ing to  Czartoryski.  Napoleon,  he  said,  was  a  man  who 
would  not  scruple  to  use  any  means  so  long  as  he  gained 
his  end  :  his  mental  strength  was  unquestioned  :  in  the 
worst  troubles  he  was  cool  and  collected  :  his  fits  of  pas- 
sion were  only  meant  to  intimidate  :  his  every  act  was  the 
result  of  calculation :  it  was  absurd  to  say  that  his  prodi- 
gious exertions  would  drive  him  mad  :  his  health  was 
splendid  and  was  equal  to  any  effort  provided  that  he  had 
eight  hours'  sleep  every  day.  The  impression  left  on  the 
ex-Minister  was  that  Alexander  understood  his  ally  thor- 
oughly and  feared  him  greatly.1 

A  few  days  later  came  Napoleon's  request  for  the  hand 
of  the  Czar's  sister,  a  request  which  Alexander  declined 
with  many  expressions  of  goodwill  and  regret.  What, 
then,  was  his  surprise  to  find  that,  before  the  final  answer 
had  been  returned,  Napoleon  was  in  treaty  for  the  hand 
of  an  Austrian  Archduchess.2  This  time  it  was  for  him 
to  feel  affronted.  And  so  this  breathless  search  for  a  bride 
left  sore  feelings  at  both  capitals,  at  Paris  because  the 
Czar  declined  Napoleon's  request,  at  St.  Petersburg  because 
the  imperial  wooer  was  off  on  another  scent  before  the  first 
had  given  out. 

Alexander's  annoyance  was  increased  by  his  ally's  doubt- 
ful behaviour  about  Poland.  After  the  recent  increase 
of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  he  had  urged  Napoleon  to  make 
a  declaration  that  "  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  shall  never  be 
re-established."  This  matter  was  being  discussed  side  by 
side  with  the  matrimonial  overtures ;  and,  after  their  col- 
lapse, Napoleon  finally  declined  to  give  this  assurance 
which  Alexander  felt  needful  for  checking  the  rising  hopes 
of  Poles  and  Lithuanians.  The  utmost  the  French  Em- 
peror would  do  was  to  promise,  in  a  secret  clause,  that  he 
would  never  aid  any  other  Power  or  any  popular  move- 
ment that  aimed  at  the  re-establishment  of  that  kingdom.8 

1  Czartoryski,  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xv-ii.  At  this  time  he  was  taken 
back  to  the  Czar's  favour,  and  was  bidden  to  hope  for  the  re-establish- 
ment of  Poland  by  the  Czar  as  soon  as  Napoleon  made  a  blunder. 

2  Tatischeff,  p.  526  ;  Vandal,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  vii. 

3  "Corresp.,"  No.  16178  ;  Vandal,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  vii.  The  expose  of  De- 
cember 1st,  1809,  had  affirmed  that  Napoleon  did  not  intend  to  re-estab- 
lish Poland.     But  this  did  not  satisfy  Alexander. 


xxxn  THE  RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN  215 

In  fact,  as  the  Muscovite  alliance  was  on  the  wane,  he 
judged  it  bad  policy  to  discourage  the  Poles,  who  might 
do  so  much  for  him  in  case  of  a  Franco-Russian  war.  He 
soon  begins  to  face  seriously  the  prospect  of  such  an  event. 
At  the  close  of  1810  he  writes  that  the  Russians  are  in- 
trenching themselves  on  the  Dwina  and  Dniester,  which 
"shows  a  bad  spirit." 

But  the  great  difficulty  is  Russia's  imperfect  observa- 
tion of  the  Continental  System.  He  begs  the  Czar  to 
close  his  ports  against  English  ships  :  600  of  them  are 
wandering  about  the  Baltic,  after  being  repulsed  from  its 
southern  shores,  in  the  hope  of  getting  into  Russian 
harbours.  Let  Alexander  seize  their  cargoes,  and  Eng- 
land, now  at  her  last  gasp,  must  give  in.  Five  weeks 
later  he  returns  to  the  charge.  It  is  not  enough  to  seize 
British  ships  ;  the  hated  wares  get  in  under  American, 
Swedish,  Spanish,  and  Portuguese,  even  under  French 
flags.  Of  the  2,000  ships  that  entered  the  Baltic  in  1810, 
not  one  was  really  a  neutral  :  they  were  all  charged  with 
English  goods,  with  false  papers  and  forged  certificates  of 
origin  manufactured  in  London.1  Any  other  unit  among 
earth's  millions  would  have  been  convinced  of  the  futility 
of  the  whole  enterprise,  now  that  his  own  special  devices 
were  being  turned  against  him.  It  was  not  enough  to 
conquer  and  enchain  the  Continent.  Every  customs 
officer  must  be  an  expert  in  manufactures,  groceries, 
documents,  and  the  water-marks  of  paper,  if  he  was  to 
detect  the  new  "frauds  of  the  neutral  flags." 

But  Napoleon  knew  not  the  word  impossible  — "  a 
word  that  exists  only  in  the  dictionary  of  fools."  In 
fact,  his  mind,  naturally  unbending,  was  now  working 
more  and  more  in  self-made  grooves.  Of  these  the 
deepest  was  his  commercial  warfare  ;  and  he  pushed  on, 
reckless  of  Europe  and  reckless  of  the  Czar.  In  the 
middle  of  December  he  annexed  the  North  Sea  coast  of 
Germany,  including  Oldenburg.  The  heir  to  this  duchy 
had  married  Alexander's  sister,  whose  hand  Napoleon 
had  claimed  at  Erfurt.  The  duke,  it  is  true,  was  offered 
the  district  of  Erfurt  as  an  indemnity  ;  but  that  proposal 
only  stung  the  Czar  the  more.  The  deposition  of  the 
1  Letters  of  October  23rd  and  December  2nd,  1810. 


216  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

duke  was  not  merely  a  personal  affront ;  it  was  an  in- 
fraction of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  which  had  restored  him  to 
his  duchy. 

A  fortnight  later,  when  as  yet  he  knew  not  of  the 
Oldenburg  incident,  Alexander  himself  broke  that  treaty.1 
At  the  close  of  1810  he  declined  to  admit  land-borne  goods 
on  the  easy  terms  arranged  at  Tilsit,  but  levied  heavy 
dues  on  them,  especially  on  the  articles  de  luxe  that  mostly 
hailed  from  France.  Some  such  step  was  inevitable. 
Unable  to  export  freely  to  England,  Russia  had  not 
money  enough  to  buy  costly  French  goods  without  dis- 
ordering the  exchange  and  ruining  her  credit.  While 
seeking  to  raise  revenue  on  French  manufactures,  the 
Czar  resolved  to  admit  on  easy  terms  all  colonial  goods, 
especially  American.  English  goods  he  would  shut  out 
as  heretofore  ;  and  he  claimed  that  this  new  departure 
was  well  within  the  limits  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  Far 
different  was  Napoleon's  view  :  "  Here  is  a  great  planet 
taking  a  wrong  direction.  I  do  not  understand  its  course 
at  all."2  Such  were  his  first  words  on  reading  the  text 
of  the  new  ukase.  A  fatalistic  tone  now  haunts  his 
references  to  Russia's  policy.  On  April  2nd  he  writes  : 
"  If  Alexander  does  not  quickly  stop  the  impetus  which 
has  been  given,  he  will  be  carried  away  by  it  next  year  ; 
and  thus  war  will  take  place  in  spite  of  him,  in  spite  of  me, 
in  spite  of  the  interests  of  France  and  Russia.  ...  It  is 
an  operatic  scene,  of  which  the  English  are  the  shifters." 
What  madness  !  As  if  Russia's  craving  for  colonial  wares 
and  solvency  were  a  device  of  the  diabolical  islanders.3 
As  if  his  planetary  simile  were  anything  more  than  a  claim 
that  he  was  the  centre  of  the  universe  and  his  will  its 
guiding  and  controlling  power. 

Nevertheless,  Russia  held  on  her  way.  In  vain  did 
Alexander  explain  to  his  ally  the  economic  needs  of  his 
realm,  protest  his  fidelity  to  the  Continental  System,  and 
beg  some  consideration  for  the  Duke  of  Oldenburg.     It 


1  Vandal,  vol.  ii.,  p.  529. 

2  Tatischeff,  p.  555. 
8  Vandal,  vol.  ii.,  p.  535,  admits  that  we  had  no  hand  in  it.     But  the 

Czar  naturally  became  more  favourable  to  us,  and  at  the  close  of  1811 
secretly  gave  entry  to  our  goods. 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN  217 

was  evident  that  the  Emperor  of  the  West  would  make  no 
real  concession.  In  fact,  the  need  of  domination  was  the 
quintessence  of  his  being.  And  Maret,  Due  de  Bassano, 
who  was  now  his  Foreign  Minister,  or  rather,  we  should 
say,  the  man  who  wrote  and  signed  his  despatches,  revealed 
the  psychological  cause  of  the  war  which  cost  the  lives  of 
nearly  a  million  of  men,  in  a  note  to  Lauriston,  the  French 
ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  Napoleon,  he  wrote,  cared 
little  about  interviews  or  negotiations  unless  the  move- 
ments of  his  450,000  men  caused  serious  concern  in  Russia, 
recalled  her  to  the  Continental  System  as  settled  at  Tilsit, 
and  "  brought  her  back  to  the  state  of  inferiority  in  which 
she  was  then."  * 

This  was,  indeed,  the  gist  of  the  whole  question.  Na- 
poleon saw  that  Alexander  was  slipping  out  of  the  leading 
strings  of  Tilsit,  and  that  he  was  likely  to  come  off  best 
from  that  bargain,  which  was  intended  to  confirm  the 
supremacy  of  the  Western  Empire.  For  both  potentates 
that  treaty  had  been,  at  bottom,  nothing  more  than  a  truce. 
Napoleon  saw  in  it  a  means  of  subjecting  the  Continent  to 
his  commercial  code,  and  of  preparing  for  a  Franco-Rus- 
sian partition  of  Turkey.  The  Czar  hailed  it  as  a  breath- 
ing space  wherein  he  could  reorganize  his  army,  conquer 
Finland,  and  stride  towards  the  Balkans.  The  Erfurt 
interview  prolonged  the  truce  ;  for  Napoleon  felt  the  su- 
preme need  of  stamping  out  the  Spanish  Rising  and  of 
postponing  the  partition  of  Turkey  which  his  ally  was 
eager  to  begin.  By  the  close  of  1811  both  potentates  had 
exhausted  all  the  benefits  likely  to  accrue  from  their  alli- 
ance.2 Napoleon  flattered  himself  that  the  conquest  of 
Spain  was  wellnigh  assured,  and  that  England  was  in  her 
last  agonies.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia  had  recovered 
her  military  strength,  had  gained  Finland,  and  planted  her 
foot  on  the  Lower  Danube,  and  now  sought  to  shuffle  off 
Napoleon's  commercial  decrees.  In  fine,  the  monarch,  who 
at  Tilsit  had  figured  as  mere  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  Cor- 
sican  potter,  had  proved  himself  to  be  his  equal  both  in 
cunning  and  tenacity.  The  seeming  dupe  of  1807  now 
promised  to  be  the  victor  in  statecraft. 

Quoted  by  Garden,  vol.  xiii.,  p.  171.  • 

2  Bernhardi's  "  Denkwiirdigkeiten  des  Grafen  von  Toll,"  vol.  i.,  p.  223. 


218  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Then  there  was  the  open  sore  of  Poland.  The  challenge, 
on  this  subject,  was  flung  down  by  Napoleon  at  a  diplo- 
matic reception  on  his  birthday,  August  15th,  1811. 
Addressing  the  Russian  envoy,  he  exclaimed  :  "  I  am  not 
so  stupid  as  to  think  that  it  is  Oldenburg  which  troubles 
you.  I  see  that  Poland  is  the  question  :  you  attribute  to 
me  designs  in  favour  of  Poland.  I  begin  to  think  that 
you  wish  to  seize  it.  No  :  if  your  army  were  encamped 
on  Montmartre,  I  would  not  cede  an  inch  of  the  Warsaw 
territory,  not  a  village,  not  a  windmill."  His  fears  as  to 
Russia's  designs  were  far-fetched.  Alexander's  sounding 
of  the  Poles  was  a  defensive  measure,  seriously  undertaken 
only  after  Napoleon's  refusal  to  discourage  the  Polish 
nationalists.  But  it  suited  the  French  Emperor  to  aver 
that  the  quarrel  was  about  Poland  rather  than  the  Conti- 
nental System,  and  the  scene  just  described  is  a  good 
specimen  of  his  habit  of  cool  calculation  even  in  seemingly 
chance  outbursts  of  temper.  His  rhapsody  gained  him  the 
ardent  support  of  the  Poles,  and  was  vague  enough  to 
cause  no  great  alarm  to  Austria  and  Prussia.1 

On  the  next  day  Napoleon  sketched  to  his  Ministers  the 
general  plan  of  campaign  against  Russia.  The  whole  of 
the  Continent  was  to  be  embattled  against  her.  On  the 
Hapsburg  alliance  he  might  well  rely.  But  the  conduct 
of  Prussia  gave  him  some  concern.  For  a  time  she  seemed 
about  to  risk  a  war  a  outrance,  such  as  Stein,  Fichte,  and 
the  staunch  patriots  of  the  Tugendbund  ardently  craved. 
Indeed,  Napoleon's  threats  to  this  hapless  realm  seemed 
for  a  time  to  portend  its  annihilation.  The  King,  there- 
fore, sent  Scharnhorst  first  to  St.  Petersburg  and  then  to 
Vienna  with  secret  overtures  for  an  alliance.  They  were 
virtually  refused.  Prudence  was  in  the  ascendant  at  both 
capitals  ;  and,  as  will  presently  appear,  the  more  sagacious 
Prussians  soon  came  to  see  that  a  war,  in  which  Napoleon 
could  be  enticed  into  the  heart  of  Russia,  might  deal  a 
mortal  blow  at  his  overgrown  Empire.  Certainly  it  was 
quite  impossible  for  Prussia  to  stay  the  French  advance.    A 

1  Czartoryski,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xvii.  At  Dresden,  in  May,  1812,  Napoleon 
admitted  to  De  Pradt,  his  envoy  at  Warsaw,  that  Russia's  lapse  from  the 
Continental  System  was  the  chief  cause  of  war:  "  Without  Russia,  the 
Continental  System  is  an  absurdity." 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  219 

guerilla  warfare,  such  as  throve  in  Spain,  must  surely  be 
crushed  in  her  open  plains ;  and  the  diffident  King  re- 
turned Gneisenau's  plan  of  a  rising  of  the  Prussian  people 
against  Napoleon  with  the  chilling  comment,  "  Very  good 
as  poetry." 

Thus,  when  Napoleon  wound  up  his  diplomatic  threats 
by  an  imperious  summons  to  side  with  him  or  against  him, 
Frederick  William  was  fain  to  abide  by  his  terms,  send- 
ing 20,000  troops  against  Russia,  granting  free  passage  to 
Napoleon's  army,  and  furnishing  immense  supplies  of  food 
and  forage,  the  payment  of  which  was  to  be  settled  by 
some  future  arrangement  (February,  1812).  These  con- 
ditions seemed  to  thrust  Prussia  down  to  the  lowest  circle 
of  the  Napoleonic  Inferno ;  and  great  was  the  indignation 
of  her  patriots.  They  saw  not  that  only  by  stooping 
before  the  western  blast  could  Prussia  be  saved.  To  this 
topic  we  shall  recur  presently,  when  we  treat  of  the  Rus- 
sian plan  of  campaign. 

Sweden  was  less  tractable  than  Napoleon  expected.  He 
had  hoped  that  the  deposition  of  his  personal  enemy, 
Gustavus  IV.,  the  enthronement  of  a  feeble  old  man, 
Charles  XIII.,  and  the  choice  of  Bernadotte  as  heir  to 
the  Swedish  crown,  would  bring  that  land  back  to  its  tra- 
ditional alliance  with  France.  But,  on  accepting  his  new 
dignity,  Bernadotte  showed  his  customary  independence 
of  thought  by  refusing  to  promise  that  he  would  never 
bear  arms  against  France  —  a  refusal  that  cost  him  his 
principality  of  Ponte  Corvo.  He  at  once  adopted  a  for- 
ward Scandinavian  policy ;  and,  as  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance  waned,  he  offered  Swedish  succour  to  Napoleon 
if  he  would  favour  the  acquisition  of  Norway  by  the  Court 
of  Stockholm. 

The  Emperor  had  himself  mooted  this  project  in  1802, 
but  he  now  returned  a  stern  refusal  (February  25th,  1811), 
and  bade  Sweden  enforce  the  Continental  System  under 
pain  of  the  occupation  of  Swedish  Pomerania  by  French 
troops.  Even  this  threat  failed  to  bend  the  will  of  Berna- 
dotte, and  the  Swedes  preferred  to  forego  their  trouble- 
some German  province  rather  than  lose  their  foreign 
commerce.  In  the  following  January,  Napoleon  carried 
out  his  threat,  thereby  throwing  Sweden  into  the  arms  of 


220  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Russia.  By  the  treaty  of  March-April,  1812,  Bernadotte 
gained  from  Alexander  the  prospect  of  acquiring  Norway, 
in  return  for  the  aid  of  Sweden  in  the  forthcoming  war 
against  Napoleon.  This  was  the  chief  diplomatic  suc- 
cess gained  by  Alexander ;  for  though  he  came  to  terms 
with  Turkey  two  months  later  (retaining  Bessarabia),  the 
treaty  was  ratified  too  late  to  enable  him  to  concentrate  all 
his  forces  against  the  Napoleonic  host  that  was  now  flood- 
ing the  plains  of  Prussia.1 

The  results  of  this  understanding  with  the  Court  of 
Stockholm  were  seen  in  the  Czar's  note  presented  at  Paris 
at  the  close  of  April.  He  required  of  Napoleon  the  evac- 
uation of  Swedish  Pomerania  by  French  troops  and  a 
friendly  adjustment  of  Franco-Swedish  disputes,  the  evac- 
uation of  Prussia  by  the  French,  the  reduction  of  their 
large  garrison  at  Danzig,  and  the  recognition  of  Russia's 
right  to  trade  with  neutrals.  If  these  terms  were  ac- 
corded by  France,  Alexander  was  ready  to  negotiate  for 
an  indemnity  for  the  Duke  of  Oldenburg  and  a  mitiga- 
tion of  the  Russian  customs  dues  on  French  goods.2  The 
reception  given  by  Napoleon  to  these  reasonable  terms 
was  unpromising.  "You  are  a  gentleman,"  he  exclaimed 
to  Prince  Kurakin,  "  —  and  yet  you  dare  to  present  to  me 
such  proposals  ?  —  You  are  acting  as  Prussia  did  before 
Jena."  Alexander  had  already  given  up  all  hope  of  peace. 
A  week  before  that  scene,  he  had  left  St.  Petersburg  for 
the  army,  knowing  full  well  that  Napoleon's  cast-iron 
will  might  be  shivered  by  a  mighty  blow,  but  could  never 
be  bent  by  diplomacy. 

On  his  side,  Napoleon  sought  to  overawe  his  eastern 
rival  by  a  display  of  imposing  force.     Lord  of  a  dominion 

1  For  the  overtures  of  Russia  and  Sweden  to  us  and  their  exorbitant 
requests  for  loans,  see  Mr.  Hereford  George's  account  in  his  careful  and 
systematic  study,  "Napoleon's  Invasion  of  Russia,"  ch.  iv.  It  was  not 
till  July,  1812,  that  we  formally  made  peace  with  Russia  and  Sweden, 
and  sent  them  pecuniary  aid.  We  may  note  here  that  Napoleon,  in 
April,  1812,  sent  us  overtures  for  peace,  if  we  would  acknowledge 
Joseph  as  King  of  Spain  and  Murat  as  King  of  Naples,  and  withdraw  our 
troops  from  the  Peninsula  and  Sicily  :  Napoleon  would  then  evacuate 
Spain.    Castlereagh  at  once  refused  an  offer  which  would  have  left  Napo- 

*  leon  free  to  throw  his  whole  strength  against  Russia  (Garden,  vol.  xiii., 
pp.  215,  254). 

2  Garden,  vol.  xiii. ,  p.  329. 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  221 

that  far  excelled  that  of  the  Czar  in  material  resources, 
suzerain  of  seven  kingdoms  and  thirty  principalities,  he 
called  his  allies  and  vassals  about  him  at  Dresden,  and 
gave  to  the  world  the  last  vision  of  that  imperial  splen- 
dour which  dazzled  the  imagination  of  men. 

It  was  an  idle  display.  In  return  for  secret  assurances 
that  he  might  eventually  regain  his  Illyrian  provinces,  the 
Emperor  Francis  had  pledged  himself  by  treaty  to  send 
.30,000  men  to  guard  Napoleon's  flank  in  Volhynia.  But 
everyone  at  St.  Petersburg  knew  that  this  aid,  along  with 
that  of  Prussia,  was  forced  and  hollow.1  The  example 
of  Spain  and  the  cautious  strategy  of  Wellington  had  dis- 
solved the  spell  of  French  invincibility  ;  and  the  Czar 
was  resolved  to  trust  to  the  toughness  of  his  people  and 
the  defensive  strength  of  his  boundless  plains.  The  time 
of  the  Macks,  the  Brunswicks,  the  Bennigsens,  was  past  : 
the  day  of  Wellington  and  of  truly  national  methods  of 
warfare  had  dawned. 

Yet  the  hosts  now  moving  against  Alexander  bade  fair 
to  overwhelm  the  devotion  of  his  myriad  subjects  and  the 
awful  solitudes  of  his  steppes.  It  was  as  if  Peter  the 
Hermit  had  arisen  to  impel  the  peoples  of  Western  and 
Central  Europe  once  more  against  the  immobile  East. 
Frenchmen  to  the  number  of  200,000  formed  the  kernel 
of  this  vast  body  :  147,000  Germans  from  the  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine  followed  the  new  Charlemagne  :  nearly 
80,000  Italians  under  Eugene  formed  an  Army  of  Obser- 
vation :  60,000  Poles  stepped  eagerly  forth  to  wrest  their 
nation's  liberty  from  the  Muscovite  grasp  ;  and  Illyrians, 
Swiss,  and  Dutch,  along  with  a  few  Spaniards  and  Portu- 
guese, swelled  the  Grand  Army  to  a  total  of  600,000  men. 
Nor  was  this  all.  Austria  and  Prussia  sent  their  contin- 
gents, amounting  in  all  to  50,000  men,  to  guard  Napo- 
leon's flanks  on  the  side  of  Volhynia  and  Courland.  And 
this  mighty  mass,  driven  on  by  Napoleon's  will,  gained  a 
momentum  which  was  to  carry  its  main  army  to  Moscow. 

1  Hereford  George,  op.  cit.  pp.  34-37.  Metternich  ("Memoirs,"  vol. 
ii.,  p.  517,  Eng.  ed.)  shows  that  Napoleon  had  also  been  holding  out  to 
Austria  the  hope  of  gaining  Servia,  Wallachia,  and  Moldavia  (the  latter 
of  which  were  then  overrun  by  Russian  troops),  if  she  would  furnish 
60,000  troops :  but  Metternich  resisted  successfully. 


222  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

After  reviewing  his  vassals  at  Dresden,  and  hurrying 
on  the  arrangements  for  the  transport  of  stores,  Napoleon 
journeyed  to  the  banks  of  the  Niemen.  On  all  sides  were 
to  be  seen  signs  of  the  passage  of  a  mighty  host,  broken- 
down  carts,  dead  horses,  wrecked  villages,  and  dense 
columns  of  troops  that  stripped  Prussia  wellnigh  bare. 
Yet,  despite  these  immense  preparations,  no  hint  of  dis- 
couragement came  from  the  Czar's  headquarters.  On 
arriving  at  the  Niemen,  Napoleon  issued  to  the  Grand, 
Army  a  proclamation  which  was  virtually  a  declaration  of 
war.  In  it  there  occurred  the  fatalistic  remark  :  "  Rus- 
sia is  drawn  on  by  fate  :  her  destinies  must  be  fulfilled." 
Alexander's  words  to  his  troops  breathed  a  different  spirit : 
"  God  fights  against  the  aggressor." 

Much  that  is  highly  conjectural  has  been  written  about 
the  plans  of  campaigns  of  the  two  Emperors.  That  of 
Napoleon  may  be  briefly  stated  :  it  was  to  find  out  the 
enemy's  chief  forces,  divide  them,  or  cut  them  from  their 
communications,  and  beat  them  in  detail.  In  other 
words,  he  never  started  with  any  set  plan  of  campaign, 
other  than  the  destruction  of  the  chief  opposing  force. 
But,  in  the  present  instance,  it  may  be  questioned  whether 
he  had  not  sought  by  his  exasperating  provocations  to 
drive  Prussia  into  alliance  with  the  Czar.  In  that  case, 
Alexander  would  have  been  bound  in  honour  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  his  ally.  And  if  the  Russians  ventured  across 
the  Niemen,  or  the  Vistula,  as  Napoleon  at  first  believed 
they  would,1  his  task  would  doubtless  have  been  as  easy 
as  it  proved  at  Friedland.  Many  Prussian  officers,  so 
Muffling  asserts,  believed  that  this  was  the.  aim  of  French 
diplomacy  in  the  early  autumn  of  1811,  and  that  the 
best  reply  was  an  unconditional  surrender.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  the  fact  that  St.  Marsan,  Napoleon's  am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  assured  that  Government,  on  October 
29th,  that  his  master  did  not  wish  to  destroy  Prussia,  but 
laid  much  stress  on  the  supplies  which  she  could  furnish 
him  —  a  support  that  would  enable  the  Grand  Army  to 
advance  on  the  Niemen  like  a  rushing  stream. 
'  The  metaphor  was  strangely  imprudent.     It  almost  in- 

1  See  his  words  to  Metternich  at  Dresden,  Metternich's  "  Mems.,"  vol. 
i.,  p.  152  ;  as  also  that  he  would  not  advance  beyond  Smolensk  in  1812. 


xxxn  THE    RUSSIAN    CAMPAIGN  223 

vited  Prussia  to  open  wide  her  sluices  and  let  the  flood  foam 
away  on  to  the  sandy  wastes  of  Lithuania  ;  and  we  may 
fancy  that  the  more  discerning  minds  at  Berlin  now  saw 
the  advantage  of  a  policy  which  would  entice  the  French 
into  the  wastes  of  Muscovy.  It  is  strange  that  Napoleon's 
Syrian  adage,  "  Never  make  war  against  a  desert,"  did 
not  now  recur  to  his  mind.  But  he  gradually  steeled 
himself  to  the  conviction  that  war  with  .Alexander  was 
inevitable,  and  that  the  help  of  Austria  and  Prussia  would 
enable  him  to  beat  back  the  Muscovite  hordes  into  their 
eastern  steppes.  For  a  time  he  had  unquestionably 
thought  of  destroying  Prussia  before  he  attacked  the 
Czar  ;  but  he  finally  decided  to  postpone  her  fate  until  he 
had  used  her  for  the  overthrow  of  Russia.1 

After  the  experiences  of  Austerlitz  and  Friedland,  the 
advantages  of  a  defensive  campaign  could  not  escape  the 
notice  of  the  Czar.  As  early  as  October,  1811,  when 
Scharnhorst  was  at  St.  Petersburg,  he  discussed  these 
questions  with  him  ;  and  not  all  that  officer's  pleading  for 
the  cause  of  Prussian  independence  induced  Alexander 
to  offer  armed  help  unless  the  French  committed  a  wanton 
aggression  on  Konigsberg.  Seeing  that  there  was  no  hope 
of  bringing  the  Russians  far  to  the  west,  Scharnhorst 
seems  finally  to  have  counselled  a  Fabian  strategy  for  the 
ensuing  war  ;  and,  when  at  Vienna,  he  drew  up  a  memoir 
in  this  sense  for  the  guidance  of  the  Czar.2 

Alexander  was  certainly  much  in  need  of  sound  guidance. 
Though  Scharnhorst  had  pointed  out  the  way  of  salvation, 
a  strategic  tempter  was  soon  at  hand  in  the  person  of  Gen- 

1  Bernhardi's  "Toll,"  vol.  i.,  p.  226;  Stern,  "  Abhandlungen,"  pp. 
850-366;  Muffling,  "  Aus  meinem  Leben  "  ;  L'Abbe"  de  Pradt,  "L'his- 
toire  de  l'Ambassade  de  Varsovie." 

2  "  Erinnerungen  des  Gen.  von  Boyen,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  254.  This,  and 
other  facts  that  will  later  be  set  forth,  explode  the  story  foisted  by  the 
Prussian  General  von  dem  Knesebeck  in  his  old  age  on  Muffling.  Knese- 
beck  declared  that  his  mission  early  in  1812  to  the  Czar,  which  was  to 
persuade  him  to  a  peaceful  compromise  with  Napoleon,  was  directly  con- 
troverted by  the  secret  instructions  which  he  bore  from  P'rederick  William 
to  Alexander.  He  described  several  midnight  interviews  with  the  Czar  at 
the  Winter  Palace,  in  which  he  convinced  him  that  by  war  with  Napoleon, 
and  by  enticing  him  into  the  heart  of  Russia,  Europe  would  be  saved. 
Lehmann  has  shown  ("  Knesebeck  und  Schon  ")  that  this  story  is  con- 
tradicted by  all  the  documentary  evidence.      It  may  be  dismissed  as  the 

i  offspring  of  senile  vanity. 


224  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

eral  von  Phull,  an  uncompromising  theorist  who  planned 
campaigns  with  an  unquestioning  devotion  to  abstract 
principles.  Untaught  by  the  catastrophes  of  the  past, 
Alexander  once  more  let  his  enthusiasm  for  theories  and 
principles  lead  him  to  the  brink  of  the  abyss.  Phull 
captivated  him  by  setting  forth  the  true  plan  of  a  defen- 
sive campaign  which  he  had  evolved  from  patient  study 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War.  Everything  depended  on  the 
proper  selection  of  defensive  positions  and  the  due  dispo- 
sition of  the  defending  armies.  There  must  be  two 
armies  of  defence,  and  at  least  one  great  intrenched  camp. 
One  army  must  oppose  the  invader  on  a  line  near,  or  lead- 
ing up  to,  the  camp  ;  while  the  other  army  must  manoeuvre 
on  his  rear  or  flanks.  And  the  camp  must  be  so  placed 
as  to  stretch  its  protecting  influence  over  one,  or  more, 
important  roads.  It  need  not  be  on  any  one  of  them  : 
in  fact,  it  was  better  that  it  should  be  some  distance  away ; 
for  it  thus  fulfilled  better  the  all-important  function  of  a 
"flanking  position." 

Such  a  position  Phull  had  discovered  at  Drissa  in  a 
curve  of  the  river  Dwina.  It  was  sufficiently  far  from 
the  roads  leading  from  the  Niemen  to  St.  Petersburg 
and  to  Moscow  efficiently  to  protect  them  both.  There, 
accordingly,  he  suggested  that  vast  earthworks  should 
be  prepared  ;  for  there,  at  that  artificial  Torres  Vedras, 
Russia's  chief  force  might  await  the  Grand  Army,  while 
the  other  force  harassed  its  flank  or  rear.1 

Napoleon  had  not  probed  this  absurdity  to  its  inmost 
depths  :  but  he  early  found  out  that  the  Russians  were 
in  two  widely  separated  armies  ;  and  this  sufficed  to 
decide  his  movements  and  the  early  part  of  the  campaign. 
Having  learnt  that  one  army  was  near  Vilna,  and  the 
other  in  front  of  the  marshes  of  the  Pripet,  he  sought  to 
hold  them  apart  by  a  rapid  irruption  into  the  intervening 
space,  and  thereafter  to  destroy  them  piecemeal.  Never 
was  a  visionary  theory  threatened  by  a  more  terrible 
realism.  For  Napoleon  at  midsummer  was  mustering  a 
third  of  a  million  of  men  on  the  banks  of  the  Niemen, 

1  "  Toll,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  256  et  seq.  Muffling  was  assured  by  Phull  in  1819 
that  the  Drissa  plan  was  only  part  of  a  grander  design  which  had  never 
had  a  fair  chance  ! 


i 


xxxii  THE   RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN  225 

while  the  Russians,  with  little  more  than  half  those 
numbers  as  yet  available  for  the  fighting-line,  had  them 
spread  out  over  an  immense  space,  so  as  to  facilitate  those 
flanking  operations  on  which  Phull  set  such  store.1 

On  the  morn  of  June  23rd,  three  immense  French 
columns  wound  their  way  to  the  pontoon  bridges  hastily 
thrown  over  the  Niemen  near  Kovno  ;  and  loud  shouts 
of  triumph  greeted  the  great  leader  as  the  vanguard  set 
foot  on  Lithuanian  soil.  No  Russians  were  seen  except 
a  few  light  horsemen,  who  galloped  up,  inquired  of  the 
engineers  why  they  were  building  the  bridges,  and  then 
rode  hastily  away.  During  three  days  the  Grand  Army 
filed  over  the  river  and  melted  away  into  the  sandy 
wastes.  No  foe  at  first  contested  their  march,  but  neither 
were  they  met  by  the  crowds  of  downtrodden  natives 
whom  their  fancy  pictured  as  thronging  to  welcome  the 
liberators.  In  truth,  the  peasants  of  Lithuania  had  no 
very  close  racial  affinity  to  the  Poles,  whose  offshoots  were 
found  chiefly  among  the  nobles  and  the  wealthier  towns- 
folk. Solitude,  the  sultry  heat  of  a  Russian  midsummer, 
and  drenching  thunderstorms  depressed  the  spirits  of  the 
invaders.  The  miserable  cart  tracks  were  at  once  cut  up 
by  the  passage  of  the  host,  and  10,000  horses  perished  of 
fatigue  or  of  disease  caused  by  the  rank  grass,  in  the  fifty 
miles'  march  from  the  Niemen  to  Vilna. 

The  difficulties  of  the  transport  service  began  at  once, 
and  they  were  to  increase  with  every  day's  march.  With 
his  usual  foresight,  Napoleon  had  ordered  the  collection 
of  immense  stores  of  all  kinds  at  Danzig,  his  chief  base 
of  supplies.  Two  million  pairs  of  boots  were  required 
for  the  wear  and  tear  of  a  long  campaign,  and  all  prep- 
arations were  on  the  same  colossal  scale.  In  this  con- 
nection it  is  noteworthy  that  no  small  proportion  of  the 
cloaks  and  boots  came  from  England,  as  the  industrial 
resources  of  the  Continent  were  .wholly  unequal  to  supply- 
ing the  crusaders  of  the  Continental  System. 

1  Bernhardi's  "  Toll  "  (vol.  i.,  p.  231)  gives  Barclay's  chief  "army  of 
the  west"  as  really  mustering  only  127,000  strong,  along  with  0,000  Cos- 
sacks ;  Bagration,  with  the  second  "  army  of  the  west,"  numbered  at  first 
only  35,000,  with  4,000  Cossacks  ;  while  Tormasov's  corps  observing  Gali- 
cia  was  about  as  strong.     Clausewitz  gives  rather  higher  estimates. 

VOL.   II  —  Q 


226  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

A  great  part  of  those  stores  never  reached  the  troops  in 
Russia.  The  wherries  sent  from  Danzig  to  the  Niemen 
were  often  snapped  up  by  British  cruisers,  and  the  carriage 
of  stores  from  the  Niemen  entailed  so  frightful  a  waste 
of  horseflesh  that  only  the  most  absolute  necessaries  could 
keep  pace  with  the  army  in  its  rapid  advance.  The  men 
were  thus  left  without  food  except  such  as  marauding 
could  extort.  In  this  art  Napoleon's  troops  were  experts. 
Many  miles  of  country  were  scoured  on  either  side  of  the 
line  of  march,  and  the  Emperor,  on  reaching  Vilna,  had  to 
order  Ney  to  send  out  cavalry  patrols  to  gather  in  the 
stragglers,  who  were  committing  "  horrible  devastations  " 
and  would  "  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Cossacks." 

At  Vilna  the  Grand  Army  met  with  a  more  cheering 
reception  than  heretofore.  Deftly  placing  his  Polish 
regiments  in  front  and  chasing  the  retiring  Russians 
beyond  the  town,  Napoleon  then  returned  to  find  a  wel- 
come in  the  old  Lithuanian  capital.  The  old  men  came 
forth  clad  in  the  national  garb,  and  it  seemed  that  that 
province,  once  a  part  of  the  great  Polish  monarchy,  would 
break  away  from  the  empire  of  the  Czars  and  extend  Napo- 
leon's influence  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Smolensk.1  The 
newly-formed  Diet  at  Warsaw  also  favoured  this  project : 
it  constituted  itself  into  a  general  confederation,  declared 
the  Kingdom  of  Poland  to  be  restored,  and  sent  a  deputa- 
tion to  Napoleon  at  Vilna  begging  him  to  utter  the  crea- 
tive words  :  "  Let  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  exist."  The 
Emperor  gave  a  guarded  answer.  He  declared  that  he 
loved  the  Poles,  he  commended  them  for  their  patriotism, 
which  was  "  the  first  duty  of  civilized  man,"  but  added 
that  only  by  a  unanimous  effort  could  they  now  compel 
their  enemies  to  recognize  their  rights  ;  and  that,  having 
guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  he  could 
not  sanction  any  movement  which  would  disturb  its  remain- 
ing Polish  provinces.  This  diplomatic  reply  chilled  his 
auditors.  But  what  would  have  been  their  feelings  had 
they  known  that  the  calling  of  the  Diet  at  Warsaw,  and 
the  tone  of  its  address  to  Napoleon,  had  all  been  sketched 
out  five  weeks  before  by  the  imperial  stage  manager  him- 
self ?     Yet  such  was  the  case. 

1  Labaume,  "  Narrative  of  1812,"  and  Segur. 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN    CAMPAIGN  227 

The  scene-shifter  was  the  Abbe  de  Pradt,  Archbishop  of 
Malines,  whom  Napoleon  sent  as  ambassador  to  Warsaw, 
with  elaborate  instructions  as  to  the  summoning'  of  the 
Diet,  the  whipping-up  of  Polish  enthusiasm,  the  revolu- 
tionizing of  Russian  Poland,  and  the  style  of  the  address 
to  him.  Nay,  his  passion  for  the  regulation  of  details 
even  led  him  to  inform  the  ambassador  that  the  imperial 
reply  would  be  one  of  praise  of  Polish  patriotism  and  of 
warning  that  Polish  liberty  could  only  be  won  by  their 
"  zeal  and  their  efforts."  The  trickery  was  like  that  which 
he  had  played  upon  the  Poles  shortly  before  Eylau.  In 
effect,  he  said  now,  as  then  :  "  Pour  out  your  blood  forme 
first,  and  I  will  do  something  for  you."  But  on  this  occa- 
sion the  scenic  setting  was  more  impressive,  the  rush  of 
the  Poles  to  arms  more  ardent,  the  diplomatic  reply  more 
astutely  postponed,  and  the  finale  more  awful.1 

Still,  the  Poles  marched  on  ;  but  their  devotion  became 
more  questioning.  The  feelings  of  the  Lithuanians  were 
also  ruffled  by  Napoleon's  reply  to  the  Polish  deputies  : 
nor  were  they  consoled  by  his  appointment  of  seven  mag- 
nates to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the  districts  of  Lithuania, 
under  the  regis  of  French  commissioners,  who  proved  to 
be  the  real  governors.  Worst  of  all  was  the  marauding 
of  Napoleon's  troops,  who,  after  their  long  habituation  to 
the  imperial  maxim  that  "  war  must  support  war,"  could 
not  now  see  the  need  of  enduring  the  pangs  of  hunger  in 
order  that  Lithuanian  enthusiasm  might  not  cool. 

Meanwhile  the  war  had  not  progressed  altogether  as  he 
desired.  His  aim  had  been  to  conceal  his  advance  across 
the  Niemen,  to  surprise  the  two  chief  Russian  armies 
while  far  separated,  and  thus  to  end  the  war  on  Lithuanian 
soil  by  a  blow  such  as  he  had  dealt  at  Friedland.  The 
Russian  arrangements  seemed  to  favour  his  plan.  Their 
two  chief  arrays,  that  led  by  the  Czar  and  by  General 
Barclay  de  Tolly,  some  125,000  strong  north  of  Vilna,  and 

1  See  the  long  letter  of  May  28th,  1812,  to  De  Pradt ;  also  the  Due  de 
Broglie's  "Memoirs"  (vol.  i.,  ch.  iv.)  for  the  hollowness  of  Napoleon's 
Polish  policy.  Bignon,  "Souvenirs  d'un  Diplomate"  (ch.  xx.),  errs  in 
saying  that  Napoleon  charged  De  Pradt  —  "  Tout  agiter,  toutenflammor.'' 
At  St.  Helena,Napoleon  said  to  Montholon  ("Captivity,"  vol.  iii.,  ch.iii.) : 
"Poland  and  its  resources  were  but  poetry  in  the  first  months  of  the 
year  1812." 


chap,  xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  229 

that  of  Prince  Bagration  mustering  now  about  45,000 
effectives,  in  the  province  of  Volhynia,  were  labouring  to 
carry  out  the  strategy  devised  by  Phull.  The  former  was 
directly  to  oppose  the  march  of  Napoleon's  main  army, 
while  the  smaller  Russian  force  was  to  operate  on  its  flanks 
and  rear.  Such  a  plan  could  only  have  succeeded  in  the 
good  old  times  when  war  was  conducted  according  to 
ceremonious  etiquette  ;  it  courted  destruction  from  Napo- 
leon. At  Vilna  the  Emperor  directed  the  movements 
that  were  to  ensnare  Bagration.  Already  he  had  urged 
on  the  march  of  Davoust,  who  was  to  circle  round  from 
the  north,  and  the  advance  of  Jerome  Bonaparte's  West- 
phalians,  who  were  bidden  to  hurry  on  eastwards  from  the 
town  of  Grodno  on  the  Upper  Niemen.  Their  conver- 
gence would  drive  Bagration  into  the  almost  trackless 
marshes  of  the  Pripet,  whence  his  force  would  emerge,  if 
at  all,  as  helpless  units. 

Such  was  Napoleon's  plan,  and  it  would  have  succeeded 
but  for  a  miscalculation  in  the  time  needed  for  Jerome's 
march.  Napoleon  underrated  the  difficulties  of  his  ad- 
vance or  else  overrated  his  brother's  military  capacity. 
The  King  of  Westphalia  was  delayed  a  few  days  at 
Grodno  by  bad  weather  and  other  difficulties  ;  thus  Bagra- 
tion, who  had  been  ordered  by  the  Czar  to  retire,  was  able 
to  escape  the  meshes  closing  around  him  by  a  speedy 
retreat  to  Bobruisk,  whence  he  moved  northwards.  Napo- 
leon was  enraged  at  this  loss  of  a  priceless  opportunity, 
and  addressed  vehement  reproaches  to  Jerome  for  his  slow- 
ness and  "small-mindedness."  The  youngest  of  the 
Bonapartes  resented  this  rebuke  which  ignored  the  difficul- 
ties besetting  a  rapid  advance.  The  prospect  of  being 
subjected  to  that  prince  of  martinets,  Davoust,  chafed  his 
pride  ;  and,  throwing  up  his  command,  he  forthwith 
returned  to  the  pleasures  of  Cassel. 

By  great  good  fortune,  Bagration's  force  had  escaped 
from  the  snares  strewn  in  its  path  by  the  strategy  of  Phull 
and  the  counter-moves  of  Napoleon.  The  fickle  goddess 
also  favoured  the  rescue  of  the  chief  Russian  army  from 
imminent  peril  at  Drissa.  In  pursuance  of  Phull's  scheme, 
the  Czar  and  Barclay  de  Tolly  fell  back  with  that  arm)' 
towards  the  intrenched  camp  on  the  Dwina.     But  doubts 


230  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

had  already  begun  to  haunt  their  minds  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  Phull's  plans.  In  fact,  the  bias  of  Barclay's  nature 
was  towards  the  proven  and  the  practical.  He  came  of  a 
Scottish  family  which  long  ago  had  settled  in  Livonia,  and 
had  won  prosperity  and  esteem  in  the  trade  of  Riga.  His 
ancestry  and  his  early  surroundings  therefore  disposed 
him  to  the  careful  weighing  of  evidence  and  distrust  of 
vague  theories.  His  thoroughness  in  military  organization 
during  the  war  in  Finland  and  his  unquestioned  probity 
and  open-mindedness,  had  recently  brought  him  high  into 
favour  with  the  Czar,  who  made  him  War  Minister.  He 
had  no  wide  acquaintance  with  the  science  of  warfare,  and 
has  been  judged  altogether  deficient  in  a  wide  outlook  on 
events  and  in  those  masterly  conceptions  which  mark  the 
great  warrior.1  But  nations  are  sometimes  ruined  by  lofty 
genius,  while  at  times  they  may  be  saved  by  humdrum 
prudence  ;  and  Barclay's  common  sense  had  no  small 
share  in  saving  Russia. 

Two  months  before  the  Grand  Army  passed  the  Niemen, 
he  had  expressed  the  hope  that  God  would  send  retreat  to 
the  Russian  armies  ;  and  we  may  safely  attribute  to  his 
influence  with  the  Czar  the  timely  order  to  Bagration  to 
desist  from  flanking  tactics  and  beat  a  retreat  while  yet 
there  was  time.  That  portion  of  Phull's  strategy  having 
signally  failed,  Alexander  naturally  became  more  sus- 
picious about  the  Drissa  plan  ;  and  during  the  retirement 
from  Vilna,  he  ordered  a  survey  of  the  works  to  be  made 
by  Phull's  adjutant,  a  young  German  named  Clausewitz, 
who  was  destined  to  win  a  name  as  an  authority  in 
strategy.  This  officer  was  unable  conscientiously  to  pre- 
sent a  cheering  report.  He  found  the  camp  deficient  in 
many  respects.  Nevertheless,  Alexander  still  clung  to  the 
hope  of  checking  the  French  advance  before  these  great 
intrenchments. 

On  his  arrival  there,  on  July  8th,  this  hope  also  was 
dashed.  Michaud,  a  young  Sardinian  engineer,  pointed 
out  several  serious  defects  in  their  construction.  Barclay 
also  protested  against  shutting  up  a  large  part  of  the 
defending  army  in  a  camp  which  could  easily  be  blockaded 
by  Napoleon's  vast  forces.       Finally,  as  the  Russian  re- 

141  Toll,"  vol.  i.,  p.  239;  Wilson,  "  Invasion  of  Russia,"  p.  384. 


xxxn  THE    RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  231 

serves  stationed  there  proved  to  be  disappointingly  weak 
both  in  numbers  and  efficiency,  the  Czar  determined  to 
evacuate  the  camp,  intrust  the  sole  command  to  Barclay, 
and  retire  to  his  northern  capital.  It  is  said  that,  before 
he  left  the  army,  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  a  friend  of 
of  the  French  cause,  made  a  last  effort  to  induce  him  to 
come  to  terms  with  Napoleon,  now  that  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign had  failed.  If  so,  Alexander  repelled  the  attempt. 
Pride  as  a  ruler  and  a  just  resentment  against  Napoleon 
prevented  any  compromise  ;  and  probably  he  now  saw  that 
safety  for  himself  and  ruin  for  his  foe  lay  in  the  firm 
adoption  of  that  Fabian  policy  of  retreat  and  delay, 
which  Scharnhorst  had  advocated  and  Barclay  was  now 
determined  to  carry  out. 

Though  still  hampered  by  the  intrigues  of  Constantine, 
Bennigsen,  and  other  generals,  who  hated  him  as  a  for- 
eigner and  feigned  to  despise  him  as  a  coward,  Barclay  at 
once  took  the  step  which  he  had  long  felt  to  be  necessary  ; 
he  ordered  a  retreat  which  would  bring  him  into  touch 
with  Bagration.  Accordingly,  leaving  Wittgenstein  with 
25,000  men  to  hold  Oudinot's  corps  in  check  on  the  middle 
Dwina,  he  marched  eastwards  towards  Vitepsk.  True,  he 
left  St.  Petersburg  open  to  attack  ;  but  it  was  not  likely 
that  Napoleon,  when  the  summer  was  far  spent,  would 
press  so  far  north  and  forego  his  usual  plan  of  striking  at 
the  enemy's  chief  forces.  He  would  certainly  seek  to 
hinder  the  junction  of  the  two  Russian  armies,  as  soon  as 
he  saw  that  this  was  Barclay's  aim.  Such  proved  to  be 
the  case.  Napoleon  soon  penetrated  his  design,  and  strove 
to  frustrate  it  by  a  rapid  move  from  Vilna  towards  Polotsk 
on  Barclay's  flank,  but  he  failed  to  cut  into  his  line  of 
march,  and  once  more  had  to  pursue. 

Despite  the  heavy  shrinkage  in  the  Grand  Army  caused 
by  a  remorseless  rush  through  a  country  wellnigh  stripped 
of  supplies,  the  Emperor  sought  to  force  on  a  general  en- 
gagement. He  hoped  to  catch  Barcla}'  at  Vitepsk.  "  The 
whole  Russian  army  is  at  Vitepsk  —  we  are  on  the  eve  of 
great  events,"  he  writes  on  July  25th.  But  the  Russians 
skilfully  withdrew  by  night  from  their  position  in  front 
of  that  town,  which  he  entered  on  July  28th.  Chagrined 
and  perplexed,  the  chief  stays  a  fortnight  to  organize  sup- 


232  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    1  chap 

plies  and  stores,  while  his  vanguard  presses  on  to  envelop 
the  Russians  at  Smolensk.  Again  his  hopes  revive  when 
he  hears  that  Barclay  and  Bagration  are  about  to  join  near 
that  city.  In  fact,  those  leaders  there  concluded  that 
strategic  movement  to  the  rear  which  was  absolutely  nec- 
essary if  they  were  not  to  be  overwhelmed  singly.  They 
viewed  the  retreat  in  a  very  different  light.  To  the  cau- 
tious Barclay  it  portended  a  triumph  long  deferred,  but 
sure :  while  the  more  impulsive  Muscovite  looked  upon 
the  constant  falling  back  as  a  national  disgrace. 

The  feelings  of  the  soldiery  also  forbade  a  spiritless 
abandonment  of  the  holy  city  of  the  Upper  Dnieper  that 
stands  as  sentinel  to  Russia  Proper.  On  these  feelings 
Napoleon  counted,  and  rightly.  He  was  now  in  no  haste 
to  strike :  the  blow  must  be  crushing  and  final.  At  last 
he  hears  that  Davoust,  the  leader  whose  devotion  and  me- 
thodical persistence  merit  his  complete  trust,  has  bridged 
the  River  Dnieper  below  the  city,  and  has  built  ovens  for 
supplying  the  host  with  bread.  And,  having  now  drawn 
up  troops  and  supplies  from  the  rear,  he  pushes  on  to  end 
the  campaign. 

Barclay  was  still  for  retreat;  but  religious  sentiment 
and  patriotism  bade  the  defenders  stand  firm  behind 
those  crumbling  walls,  while  Bagration  secured  the  line 
of  retreat.  The  French,  ranged  around  on  the  low  hills 
which  ring  it  on  the  south,  looked  for  an  easy  triumph, 
and  Napoleon  seems  to  have  felt  an  excess  of  confidence. 
At  any  rate,  his  dispositions  were  far  from  masterly.  He 
made  no  serious  effort  to  threaten  the  Russian  communi- 
cations with  Moscow,  nor  did  he  wait  for  his  artillery  to 
overwhelm  the  ramparts  and  their  defenders.  The  corps 
of  Ney,  Davoust,  and  Poniatowski,  with  Murat's  cavalry 
and  the  Imperial  Guard  posted  in  reserve,  promised  an 
easy  victory,  and  the  dense  columns  of  foot  moved  eagerly 
to  the  assault.  They  were  received  with  a  terrific  fire. 
Only  after  three  hours'  desperate  fighting  did  they  master 
the  southern  suburbs,  and  at  nightfall  the  walls  still  defied 
their  assaults.  Yet  in  the  meantime  Napoleon's  cannon 
had  done  their  work.  The  wooden  houses  were  every- 
where on  fire ;  a  speedy  retreat  alone  could  save  the  gar- 
rison from  ruin ;    and  amidst  a  whirlwind  of  flame  and 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  233 

smoke  Barclay  drew  off  his  men  to  join  Bagration  on  the 
road  to  Moscow  (August  17th). 

Once  more,  then,  the  Russian  army  had  slipped  from 
Napoleon's  grasp,  though  this  time  it  dealt  him  a  loss 
of  12,000  in  killed  or  wounded.  And .  the  momentous 
question  faced  him  whether  he  should  halt,  now  that 
summer  was  on  the  wane,  or  snatch  under  the  walls  of 
Moscow  the  triumph  which  Vilna,  Vitepsk,  and  Smolensk 
had  promised  and  denied.  It  is  stated  by  that  melo- 
dramatic narrator,  Count  Philip  Segur,  that  on  entering 
Vitepsk,  the  Emperor  exclaimed :  "  The  campaign  of 
1812  is  ended,  that  of  1813  will  do  the  rest."  But  the 
whole  of  Napoleon's  "  Correspondence  "  refutes  the  anec- 
dote. Besides,  it  was  not  Napoleon's  habit  to  go  into 
winter  quarters  in  July,  or  to  rest  before  he  had  defeated 
the  enemy's  main  army.1 

At  Smolensk  the  question  wore  another  aspect.  Na- 
poleon told  Metternich  at  Dresden  that  he  would  not 
in  the  present  year  advance  beyond  Smolensk,  but 
would  organize  Lithuania  during  winter  and  advance 
again  in  the  spring  of  1813,  adding :  "  My  enterprise  is 
one  of  those  of  which  the  solution  is  to  be  found  in 
patience."  A  policy  of  masterly  inactivity  certainly 
commended  itself  to  his  Marshals.  But  the  desire  to 
crush  the  enemy's  rear  drew  Ney  and  Murat  into  a 
sharp  affair  at  Valutino  or  Lubino  :  the  French  lost 
heavily,  but   finally  gained   the  position :    and   the  hope 

1  We  may  here  also  clear  aside  the  statements  of  some  writers  who 
aver  that  Napoleon  intended  to  strike  at  St.  Petersburg.  Perhaps  he  did 
so  for  a  time.  On  July  9th  he  wrote  at  Vilna  that  he  proposed  to  march 
both  on  Moscoio  and  St.  JPetersburrf.  But  that  was  while  he  still  hoped 
that  Davoust  would  entrap  Bagration,  and  while  Barclay's  retreat  on 
Drissa  seemed  likely  to  carry  the  war  into  the  north.  Napoleon  always 
aimed  first  at  the  enemy's  army  ;  and  Barclay's  retreat  from  Drissa  to 
Vitepsk,  and  thence  to  Smolensk,  finally  decided  Napoleon's  move  towards 
Moscow.  If  he  had  any  preconceived  scheme  —  and  he  always  regulated 
his  moves  by  events  rather  than  by  a  cast-iron  plan  —  it  was  to  strike  at 
Moscow.  At  Dresden  he  said  to  De  Pradt :  "I  must  finish  the  war  by 
the  end  of  September.  ...  I  am  going  to  Moscow  :  one  or  two  battles 
will  settle  the  business.  I  will  burn  Tula,  and  Russia  will  be  at  my  feet. 
Moscow  is  the  heart  of  that  Empire.  I  will  wage  war  with  Polish  blood.1' 
De  Pradt's  evidence  is  not  wholly  to  be  trusted  ;  but  I  am  convinced  that 
Napoleon  never  seriously  thought  of  taking  200,000  men  to  the  barren 
tracts  of  North  Russia  late  in  the  summer,  while  the  English,  Swedish, 
and  Russian  fleets  were  ready  to  worry  his  flank  and  stop  supplies. 


234  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

that  the  foe  were  determined  to  fight  the  decisive  battle 
at  Dorogobuzh  lured  Napoleon  on,  despite  his  earlier 
decision.1  Besides,  his  position  seemed  less  hazardous 
than  it  was  before  Austerlitz.  The  Grand  Army  was 
decidedly  superior  to  the  united  forces  of  Barclay  and 
Bagration.  On  the  Dwina,  Oudinot  held  the  Russians 
at  bay ;  and  when  he  was  wounded,  his  successor, 
Gouvion  St.  Cyr,  displayed  a  tactical  skill  which  enabled 
him  easily  to  foil  a  mere  fighter  like  Wittgenstein.  On 
the  French  right  flank,  affairs  were  less  promising  ;  for 
the  ending  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war  now  left  the 
Russian  army  of  the  Pruth  free  to  march  into  Volhynia. 
But,  for  the  present,  Napoleon  was  able  to  summon  up 
strong  reserves  under  Victor,  and  assure  his  rear. 

With  full  confidence,  then,  he  pressed  onwards  to 
wrest  from  Fortune  one  last  favour.  It  was  granted  to 
him  at  Borodino.  There  the  Russians  made  a  deter- 
mined stand.  National  jealousy  of  Barclay,  inflamed  by 
his  protracted  retreat,  had  at  last  led  to  his  being  super- 
seded by  Kutusoff ;  and,  having  about  110,000  troops, 
the  old  fighting  general  now  turned  fiercely  to  bay. 
His  position  on  the  low  convex  curve  of  hills  that  rise 
behind  the  village  of  Borodino  was  of  great  strength. 
On  his  right  was  the  winding  valley  of  the  Kolotza,  an 
affluent  of  the  Moskwa,  and  before  his  centre  and  left 
the  ground  sloped  down  to  a  stream.  On  this  more 
exposed  side  the  Russians  had  hastily  thrown  up  earth- 
works, that  at  the  centre  being  known  as  the  Great 
Redoubt,  though  it  had  no  rear  defences. 

Napoleon  halted  for  two  days,  until  his  gathering  forces 
mustered  some  125,000  men,  and  he  now  prepared  to  end 
the  war  at  a  blow.  After  surveying  the  Russian  position, 
he  saw  Kutusoff's  error  in  widely  extending  his  lines  to 
the  north ;  and  while  making  feints  on  that  side,  so  as 
to  prevent  any  concentration  of  the  Muscovite  array,  he 
planned  to  overwhelm  the  more  exposed  centre  and  left, 
by  the  assaults  of  Davoust  and  Poniatowski  on  the 
south,  and  of  Ney's  corps  and  Eugene's  Italians  on  the 

1  Letter  of  August  24th  to  Maret ;  so  too  Labaume's  "  Narrative,"  and 
Garden,  vol.  xiii.,  p.  418.  Mr.  George  thinks  that  Napoleon  decided  on 
August  21st  to  strike  at  Moscow  on  grounds  of  general  policy. 


xxxii  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  235 

redoubts  at  the  centre.  Davoust  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  outflank  the  Russian  left ;  but  Napoleon  refused, 
perhaps  owing  to  a  fear  that  the  Russians  might  retreat 
early  in  the  day,  and  decided  on  dealing  direct  blows  at 
the  left  and  centre.  As  the  7th  of  September  dawned 
with  all  the  splendour  of  a  protracted  summer,  cannon 
began  to  thunder  against  the  serried  arrays  ranged  along 
the  opposing  slopes,  and  Napoleon's  columns  moved 
against  the  redoubts  and  woods  that  sheltered  the  Mus- 
covite lines.  The  defence  was  most  obstinate.  Time 
after  time  the  smaller  redoubts  were  taken  and  retaken  ; 
and  while,  on  the  French  right  centre,  the  tide  of  battle 
surged  up  and  down  the  slope,  the  Great  Redoubt  dealt 
havoc  among  Eugene's  Italians,  who  bravely  but,  as  it 
seemed,  hopelessly  struggled  up  that  fatal  rise. 

Then  was  seen  a  soul-stirring  sight.  Of  a  sudden,  a  mass 
of  Cuirassiers  rushed  forth  from  the  invaders'  ranks,  flung 
itself  uphill,  and  girdled  the  grim  earthwork  with  a  stream 
of  flashing  steel.  There,  for  a  brief  space,  it  was  stayed 
by  the  tough  Muscovite  lines,  until  another  billow  of  horse- 
men, marshalled  by  Grouchy  and  Chastel,  swept  all  before 
it,  took  the  redoubt  on  its  weak  reverse,  and  overwhelmed 
its  devoted  defenders.1  In  vain  did  the  Russian  cavalry 
seek  to  save  the  day  :  Murat's  horsemen  were  not  to  be 
denied,  and  Kutusoff  was  at  last  fain  to  draw  back  his 
mangled  lines,  but  slowly  and  defiantly,  under  cover  of  a 
crushing  artillery  fire. 

Thus  ended  the  bloodiest  fight  of  the  century.  For 
several  hours  800  cannon  had  dealt  death  among  the  op- 
posing masses  ;  the  Russians  lost  about  40,000  men,  and, 
whatever  Napoleon  said  in  his  bulletins,  the  rents  in  his 
array  were  probably  nearly  as  great.  He  has  been  cen- 
sured for  not  launching  his  Guard  at  the  wavering1  foe  at 
the  climax  of  the  fight  ;  and  the  soldiery  loudly  blamed 
its  commander,  Bessieres,  for  dissuading  his  master  from 
this  step.  But  to  have  sacrificed  those  veterans  to  Rus- 
sian cannon  would  have  been  a  perilous  act.2     His  Guard 

1  Labaume,  "Narrative"  ;  Lejeune's  "Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  vi. 

2  Marbot's  "  Mems."  Bausset,  a  devoted  servant  to  Napoleon,  refutes 
the  oft-told  story  that  he  was  ill  at  Borodino.  He  had  nothing  worse  than 
a  bad  cold.     It  is  curious  that  such  stories  are  told  about  Napoleon  after 


236  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

was  the  solid  kernel  of  his  army  :  on  it  he  could  always 
rely,  even  when  French  regulars  dissolved,  as  often  hap- 
pened after  long  marches,  into  bands  of  unruly  marauders ; 
and  its  value  was  to  be  found  out  during  the  retreat. 
More  fitly  may  Napoleon  be  blamed  for  not  seeking  earlier 
in  the  day  to  turn  the  Russian  left,  and  roll  that  long  line 
up  on  the  river.  Here,  as  at  Smolensk,  he  resorted  to 
a  frontal  attack,  which  could  only  yield  success  at  a  fright- 
ful cost.  The  day  brought  little  glory  to  the  generals, 
except  to  Ney,  Murat,  and  Grouchy.  For  his  valour  in 
the  melee,  Ney  received  the  title  of  Prince  de  la  Moskwa. 

A  week  before  this  Pyrrhic  triumph,  Napoleon  had 
heard  of  a  terrible  reverse  to  French  arms  in  Spain.  His 
old  friend,  Marmont,  who  had  won  the  Marshal's  baton 
after  Wagram,  measured  his  strength  with  Wellington  in 
the  plains  of  Leon  with  brilliant  success  until  a  false  move 
near  Salamanca  exposed  him  to  a  crushing  rejoinder,  and 
sent  his  army  flying  back  towards  Burgos.  Madrid  was 
now  uncovered  and  was  occupied  for  a  time  by  the  Eng- 
lish army  (August  13th).  Thus  while  Napoleon  was  gasp- 
ing at  Moscow,  his  brother  was  expelled  from  Madrid, 
until  the  recall  of  Soult  from  Andalusia  gave  the  French 
a  superiority  in  the  centre  of  Spain  which  forced  Welling- 
ton to  retire  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  He  lost  the  fruits  of  his 
victory,  save  that  Andalusia  was  freed  :  but  he  saved  his 
army  for  the  triumphant  campaign  of  1813.  Had  Napo- 
leon shown  the  like  prudence  by  beating  a  timely  retreat 
from  Moscow,  who  can  say  that  the  next  hard-fought  fights 
in  Silesia  and  Saxony  would  not  have  once  more  crowned 
his  veterans  with  decisive  triumph  ? 

As  it  was,  the  Grand  Army  toiled  on  through  heat, 
dust,  and  the  smoke  of  burning  villages,  to  gain  peace  and 
plenty  at  Moscow.  But  when,  on  September  the  14th, 
the  conqueror  entered  that  city  with  his  vanguard,  soli- 
tude reigned  almost  unbroken.  A  few  fanatics,  clinging 
to  the  tradition  that  the  Kremlin  was  impregnable,  idly 
sought  to  defend  it ;  but  troops,  officials,  nobles,  mer- 
chants, and  the  great  mass  of  the  people  were  gone,  and 

every  battle  when  his  genius  did  not  shine.  In  this  case,  it  rests  on  the 
frothy  narrative  of  Segur,  and  is  out  of  harmony  with  those  of  Gourgaud 
and  Pelet.  Clause witz  justifies  Napoleon's  caution  in  withholdinghis  Guard. 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN  237 

the  military  stores  had  been  burnt  or  removed.  Rostop- 
chin,  the  governor,  had  released  the  prisoners  and  broken 
the  fire  engines.  Flames  speedily  burst  forth,  and  Baus- 
set,  the  Prefect  of  Napoleon's  Palace,  affirms  that  while 
looking  forth  from  the  Kremlin  he  saw  the  flames  burst 
forth  in  several  districts  in  quick  succession  ;  and  that 
a  careful  examination  of  cellars  often  proved  them  to  be 
stored  with  combustibles,  vitriol  in  one  case  being  swal- 
lowed by  a  French  soldier  who  took  it  for  brandy  !  If  all 
this  be  true,  it  proves  that  the  Muscovites  were  determined 
to  fire  their  capital.  But  their  writers  have  as  stoutly 
affirmed  that  the  fires  were  caused  by  French  and  Polish 
plunderers.1  Three  d&ys  later,  the  powers  of  the  air  and 
the  demons  of  drink  and  frenzy  raged  uncontrolled;  and  Na- 
poleon himself  barely  escaped  from  the  whirlwinds  of  flame 
that  enveloped  the  Kremlin  and  nearly  scorched  to  death 
the  last  members  of  his  staff.  For  several  hours  the  confla- 
gration was  fanned  by  an  equinoctial  gale,  and  when,  on  the 
20th,  it  died  down,  convicts  or  plunderers  kindled  it  anew. 

Yet  the  army  did  not  want  for  shelter,  and,  as  Ser- 
geant Bourgogne  remarks,  if  every  house  had  been  gutted 
there  were  still  the  caves  and  cellars  that  promised  protec- 
tion from  the  cold  of  winter.  The  real  problem  was  now, 
as  ever,  the  food-supply.  The  Russians  had  swept  the 
district  wellnigh  bare  ;  and  though  the  Grand  Army 
feasted  for  a  fortnight  on  dainties  and  drink,  yet  bread, 
flour,  and  meat  were  soon  very  scarce.  In  vain  did  the 
Emperor  seek  to  entice  the  inhabitants  back  ;  they  knew 
the  habits  of  the  invaders  only  too  well  ;  and  despite 
several  distant  raids,  which  sometimes  cost  the  French 
dear,  the  soldiery  began  to  suffer. 

October  wore  on  with  delusive  radiance,  but  brought 
no  peace.  Soon  after  the  great  conflagration  at  Moscow, 
Napoleon  sent  secret  and  alluring  overtures  to  Alexander, 
offering  to  leave  Russia  a  free  hand  in  regard  to  Turkey, 
inclusive  of  Constantinople,  which  he  had  hitherto  strictly 
reserved,  and   hinting  that  Polish  affairs  might   also  be 

1  Bausset,  "  Cour  de  Napoleon."  Tolstoi  ("War  and  Liberty") 
asserts  that  the  fires  were  the  work  of  tipsy  pillagers.  So  too  Arndt, 
"  Mems.,"  p.  204.  Dr.  Tzenoff,  in  a  scholarly  monograph  (Berlin,  1900), 
comes  to  the  same  conclusion.    Lejeune  and  Bourgogne  admit  both  causes. 


238  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

arranged  to  the  Czar's  liking.1  But  Alexander  refused 
tamely  to  accept  the  fruits  of  victory  from  the  man  who, 
he  believed,  had  burnt  holy  Moscow,  and  clung  to  his  vow 
never  to  treat  with  his  rival  as  long  as  a  single  French 
soldier  stood  on  Russian  soil.  His  resolve  saved  Europe. 
Yet  it  cost  him  much  to  defy  the  great  conqueror  to  the 
death  :  he  had  so  far  feared  the  capture  of  St.  Petersburg 
as  to  request  that  the  Cronstadt  fleet  might  be  kept  in 
safety  in  England.2  But  gradually  he  came  to  see  that 
the  sacrifice  of  Moscow  had  saved  his  empire  and  lured 
Napoleon  to  his  doom.  Kutusoff  also  played  a  waiting 
game.  Affecting  a  wish  for  peace,  he  was  about  secretly 
to  meet  Napoleon's  envoy,  Lauriston,  when  the  Russian 
generals  and  our  commissioner,  Sir  R.  Wilson,  intervened, 
and  required  that  it  should  be  a  public  step.  It  seems 
likely,  however,  that  Kutusoff  was  only  seeking  to  entrap 
the  French  into  barren  negotiations  ;  he  knew  that  an 
answer  could  not  come  from  the  banks  of  the  Neva  until 
winter  began  to  steal  over  the  northern  steppes. 

Slowly  the  truth  begins  to  dawn  on  Napoleon  that  Mos- 
cow is  not  the  heart  of  Russia,  as  he  had  asserted  to  De 
Pradt  that  it  was.  Gradually  he  sees  that  that  primitive 
organism  had  no  heart,  that  its  almost  amorphous  life  was 
widespread  through  myriads  of  village  communes,  vegetat- 
ing apart  from  Moscow  or  Petersburg,  and  that  his  march 
to  the  old  capital  was  little  more  than  a  sword-slash  through 
a  pond.3  Had  he  set  himself  to  study  with  his  former  care 
the  real  nature  of  the  hostile  organism,  he  would  certainly 
never  have  ventured  beyond  Smolensk  in  the  present  year. 
But  he  had  now  merged  the  thinker  in  the  conqueror,  and — 
sure  sign  of  coming  disaster  —  his  mind  no  longer  accu- 
rately gauged  facts,  it  recast  them  in  its  own  mould. 

By  long  manipulation  of  men  and  events,  it  had  framed  a 
dogma  of  personal  infallibility.    This  vice  had  of  late  been 

1  Garden,  vol.  xiii.,  p.  452  ;  vol.  xiv.,  pp.  17-19. 

2  Cathcart,  p.  41  ;  see  too  the  Czars  letters  in  Sir  Byam  Martin's  "De- 
spatches," vol.  ii.,  p.  311.  This  fact  shows  the  frothiness  of  the  talk 
indulged  in  by  Russians  in  1807  as  to  "our  rapacity  and  perfidy"  in 
seizing  the  Danish  fleet. 

3  E.g.,  the  migration  of  Rostopchin's  serfs  en  masse  from  their  village, 
near  Moscow,  rather  than  come  under  French  dominion  (Wilson,  "  French 
Invasion  of  Russia,"  p.  179). 


xxxn  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  239 

growing  on  him  apace.  It  was  apparent  even  in  trifles. 
The  Countess  Metternich  describes  how,  early  in  1810, 
he  persisted  in  saying  that  Kaunitz  was  her  brother,  in 
spite  of  her  frequent  disclaimers  of  that  honour  ;  and, 
somewhat  earlier,  Marmont  noticed  with  half-amused 
dismay  that  when  the  Emperor  gave  a  wrong  estimate 
of  the  numbers  of  a  certain  corps,  no  correction  had  the 
slightest  effect  on  him  ;  his  mind  always  reverted  to  the 
first  figure.  In  weightier  matters  this  peculiarity  was 
equally  noticeable.  His  clinging  to  preconceived  notions, 
however  unfair  or  burdensome  they  were  to  Britain, 
Prussia,  or  Austria,  had  been  the  underlying  cause  of  his 
wars  with  those  Powers.  And  now  this  same  defect, 
burnt  into  his  being  by  the  blaze  of  a  hundred  victories, 
held  him  to  Moscow  for  five  weeks,  in  the  belief  that 
Russia  was  stricken  unto  death,  and  that  the  facile  Czar 
whom  he  had  known  at  Tilsit  would  once  more  bend 
the  knee.  An  idle  hope.  "  I  have  learnt  to  know  him 
now,"  said  the  Czar ;  "  Napoleon  or  I  ;  I  or  Napoleon  ; 
we  cannot  reign  side  by  side."  Buoyed  up  by  religious 
faith  and  by  his  people's  heroism,  Alexander  silently 
detied  the  victor  of  Moscow  and  rebuked  Kutusoff  for 
receiving  the  French  envoy. 

At  last,  on  October  18th,  the  Russians  threw  away  the 
scabbard  and  surprised  Murat's  force  some  forty  miles 
south  of  Moscow,  inflicting  a  loss  of  3,000  men.  But 
already,  a  day  or  two  earlier,  Napoleon  had  realized  the 
futility  of  his  hope  of  peace  and  had  resolved  to  retreat. 
The  only  alternative  was  to  winter  at  Moscow,  and  he 
judged  that  the  state  of  French  and  Spanish  affairs 
rendered  such  a  course  perilous.  He  therefore  informed 
:  Maret  that  the  Grand  Army  would  go  into  winter  quarters 
between  the  Dnieper  and  the  Dwina.1 

There  is  no  hint  in  his  letters  that  he  anticipated  a  dis- 
astrous retreat.     The  weather  hitherto  had  been  "as  fine 
as  that  at  Fontainebleau  in  September,"  and  he  purposed 
retiring  by  a  more  southerly  route  which  had  not  been 

|  x  Letter  of  October  16th  ;  see  too  his  undated  notes  ("Corresp.,"  No. 
19237).  Bausset  and  many  others  thought  the  best  plan  would  be  to 
winter  at  Moscow.  He  also  says  that  the  Emperor's  favourite  book  while 
|at  Moscow  was  Voltaire's  "  History  of  Charles  XII." 


240  THE   LITE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

exhausted  by  war.  Full  of  confidence,  then,  he  set  out  on 
the  19th,  with  115,000  men,  persuaded  that  he  would  easily 
reach  friendly  Lithuania  and  his  winter  quarters  "  before 
severe  cold  set  in."  The  veil  was  rudely  torn  from  his 
eyes  when,  south  of  Malo-Jaroslavitz,  his  Marshals  found 
the  Russians  so  strongly  posted  that  any  further  attack 
seemed  to  be  an  act  of  folly.  Eugene's  corps  had 
suffered  cruelly  in  an  obstinate  fight  in  and  around  that 
town,  and  the  advice  of  Berthier,  Murat,  and  Bessieres  was 
against  its  renewal.  For  an  hour  or  more  the  Emperor  sat 
silently  gazing  at  a  map.  The  only  prudent  course  now  left 
was  to  retreat  north  and  then  west  by  way  of  Borodino, 
over  his  devastated  line  of  advance.1  Back,  then,  towards 
Borodino  the  army  mournfully  trudged  (October  26th)  : 

"  Everywhere  (says  Labaume)  we  saw  wagons  abandoned  for  want 
of  horses  to  draw  them.  Those  who  bore  along  with  them  the  spoils 
of  Moscow  trembled  for  their  riches ;  but  we  were  disquieted  most  of 
all  at  seeing  the  deplorable  state  of  our  cavalry.  The  villages  which 
had  but  lately  given  us  shelter  were  level  with  the  ground :  under 
their  ashes  were  the  bodies  of  hundreds  of  soldiers  and  peasants.  .  .  . 
But  most  horrible  was  the  field  of  Borodino,  where  we  saw  the  forty 
thousand  men,  who  had  perished  there,  yet  lying  unburied." 

For  a  time,  Kutusoff  forbore  to  attack  the  sore-stricken 
host  ;  but,  early  in  November,  the  Russian  horse  began 
to  infest  the  line  of  march,  and  at  Viasma  their  gather- 
ing forces  were  barely  held  off  :  had  Kutusoff  aided  his 
lieutenants,  he  might  have  decimated  his  famished  foes. 
Hitherto  the  weather  had  been  singularly  mild  and 
open,  so  much  so  that  the  superstitious  peasants  looked 
on  it  as  a  sign  that  God  was  favouring  Napoleon.  But, 
at  last,  on  November  the  6th,  the  first  storm  of  winter  fell 
on  the  straggling  array,  and  completed  its  miseries.  The 
icy  blasts  struck  death  to  the  hearts  of  the  feeble  ;  and  the 
puny  fighting  of  man  against  man  was  now  merged  in  the 
awful  struggle  against  the  powers  of  the  air.  Drifts  of 
snow  blotted  out  the  landscape  ;  the  wandering  columns 
often  lost  the  road  and  thousands  forthwith  ended  their 
miseries.     Except  among  the  Old  Guard  all  semblance  of 

1  Lejeune,  vol.  ii.,  chap.  vi.  As  it  chanced,  Kutusoff  had  resolved  on 
retreat  if  Napoleon  attacked  him.  This  is  perhaps  the  only  time  when 
Napoleon  erred  through  excess  of  prudence.  Fezensac  noted  at  Moscow 
that  he  would  not  see  or  hear  the  truth. 


xxxii  THE  RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  241 

military  order  was  now  lost,  and  battalions  melted  away 
into  groups  of  marauders. 

The  search  for  food  and  fuel  became  furious,  even  when 
the  rigour  of  the  cold  abated.  The  behaviour  of  Bour- 
gogne,  a  sergeant  in  the  Imperial  Guard,  may  serve  to  show 
by  what  shifts  a  hardy  masterful  nature  fought  its  way 
through  the  wreckage  of  humanity  around  :  "  If  I  could 
meet  anybody  in  the  world  with  a  loaf,  I  would  make  him 
give  me  half  —  nay,  I  would  kill  him  so  as  to  get  the 
whole."  These  were  his  feelings  :  he  acted  on  them  by 
foraging  in  the  forest  and  seizing  a  pot  in  which  an  orderly 
was  secretly  cooking  potatoes  for  his  general.  Bourgogne 
made  off  with  the  potatoes,  devoured  most  of  them  half- 
boiled,  returned  to  his  comrades  and  told  them  he  had 
found  nothing.  Taking  his  place  near  their  fire,  he 
scooped  out  his  bed  in  the  snow,  lay  under  his  bearskin, 
and  clasped  his  now  precious  knapsack,  while  the  others 
moaned  with  hunger.  Yet,  as  his  narrative  shows,  he  was 
not  naturally  a  heartless  man  :  in  such  a  situation  man  is 
apt  to  sink  to  the  level  of  the  wolf.  The  best  food  obtain- 
able was  horseflesh,  and  hungry  throngs  rushed  at  every 
horse  that  fell,  disputing  its  carcass  with  the  packs  of  dogs 
or  wolves  that  hung  about  the  line  of  march.1 

Smolensk  was  now  the  thought  dearest  to  every  heart ; 
and,  buoyed  with  the  hope  of  rest  and  food,  the  army 
tottered  westwards  as  it  had  panted  eastwards  through  the 
fierce  summer  heats  with  Moscow  as  its  cynosure.  The 
hope  that  clung  about  Smolensk  was  but  a  cruel  mirage. 
The  wreck  of  that  city  offered  poor  shelter  ;  the  stores 
were  exhausted  by  the  vanguard  ;    and,  to  the  horror  of 

aIt  has  been  constantly  stated  by  Napoleon,  and  by  most  French  his- 
torians of  this  campaign,  that  his  losses  were  mainly  due  to  an  excep- 
tionally severe  and  early  winter.  The  statement  will  not  bear  examination. 
Sharp  cold  usually  sets  in  before  November  6th  in  Russia  at  latitude  55°  ; 
the  severe  weather  which  he  then  suffered  was  succeeded  by  alternate 
thaws  and  slighter  frosts  until  the  beginning  of  December,  when  intense 
cold  is  always  expected.  Moreover,  the  bulk  of  the  losses  occurred  before 
the  first  snowstorm.  The  Grand  Army  which  marched  on  Smolensk  and 
Moscow  may  be  estimated  at  400,000  (including  reinforcements).  At 
Viasma,  before  severe  cold  set  in,  it  had  dwindled  to  55,000.  We  may 
note  here  the  curious  fact,  substantiated  by  Alison,  that  the  French  troops 
stood  the  cold  better  than  the  Poles  and  North  Germans.  See  too  N. 
Senior's  "Conversations,"  vol.  i.,  p.  239. 

VOL.   II — R 


242  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Eugene's  Italians,  men  swarmed  out  of  that  fancied  abode 
of  plenty  and  pounced  on  every  horse  that  stumbled  to  its 
doom  on  the  slippery  banks  of  the  Dnieper.  With  incon- 
ceivable folly,  Napoleon,  or  his  staff,  had  provided  no 
means  for  roughing  the  horses'  shoes.  The  Cossacks, 
when  they  knew  this,  exclaimed  to  Wilson  :  "  God  has 
made  Napoleon  forget  that  there  was  a  winter  here." 

Disasters  now  thickened  about  the  Grand  Army.  Dur- 
ing his  halt  at  Smolensk  (November  9th-14th),  Napoleon 
heard  that  Victor's  force  on  the  Dwina  had  been  worsted 
by  the  Russians,  and  there  was  ground  for  fearing  that  the 
Muscovite  army  of  the  Ukraine  would  cut  into  the  line  of 
retreat.  The  halt  at  Smolensk  also  gave  time  for  Kutusoff 
to  come  up  parallel  with  the  main  force,  and  had  he  pressed 
on  with  ordinary  speed  and  showed  a  tithe  of  his  wonted 
pugnacity,  he  might  have  captured  the  Grand  Army  and 
its  leader.  As  it  was,  his  feeble  attack  on  the  rearguard 
at  Krasnoe  only  gave  Ney  an  opportunity  of  showing  his 
dauntless  courage.  The  "  bravest  of  the  brave  "  fought 
his  way  through  clouds  of  Cossacks,  crossed  the  Dnieper, 
though  with  the  loss  of  all  his  guns,  and  rejoined  the  main 
body.  Napoleon  was  greatly  relieved  on  hearing  of  the 
escape  of  this  Launcelot  of  the  Imperial  chivalry.  He 
ordered  cannon  to  be  fired  at  suitable  intervals  so  as  to  for- 
ward the  news  if  it  were  propitious  ;  and  on  hearing  their 
distant  boomings,  he  exclaimed  to  his  officers  :  "  I  have 
more  than  400,000,000  francs  in  the  cellars  of  the  Tuileries, 
and  would  gladly  have  given  the  whole  for  the  ransom  of 
my  faithful  companion  in  arms." J 

Far  greater  was  the  danger  at  the  River  Beresina.  The 
Russian  army  of  the  south  had  seized  the  bridge  at  Borisoff 
on  which  Napoleon's  safety  depended,  and  Oudinot  vainly 
struggled  to  wrest  it  back.  The  Muscovites  burnt  it 
under  his  eyes.  Such  was  the  news  which  Napoleon  heard 
at  Bobr  on  November  24th.  It  staggered  him  ;  for,  with 
his  usual  excess  of  confidence,  he  had  destroyed  his  pon- 
toons on  the  banks  of  the  Dnieper  ;  and  now  there  was  no 
means  of  crossing  a  river,  usually  insignificant,  but  swollen 
by  floods  and  bridged  only  by  half -thawed  ice.  Yet  French 
resource  was  far  from  vanquished.     General    Corbineau, 

1  Bausset,  "Cour  de  Napoleon  "  ;  Wilson,  pp.  271-277. 


xxxii  THE   RUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN  243 

finding  from  some  peasants  that  the  river  was  fordable 
three  leagues  above  Borisoff,  brought  the  news  to  Oudinot, 
who  forthwith  prepared  to  cross  there.  Napoleon,  coming 
up  on  the  26th,  approved  the  plan,  and  cheeringly  said  to 
his  Marshal,  "  Well,  you  shall  be  my  locksmith  and  open 
that  passage  for  me."  l 

To  deceive  the  foe,  the  Emperor  told  off  a  regiment  or 
two  southwards  with  a  long  tail  of  camp-followers  •  that 
were  taken  to  be  an  army.  And  this  wily-  move,  harmo- 
nizing with  recent  demonstrations  of  the  Austrians  on  the 
side  of  Minsk,  convinced  the  Muscovite  leader  that  Napo- 
leon was  minded  to  clasp  hands  with  them.2  While  the 
Russians  patrolled  the  river  on  the  south,  French  sappers 
were  working,  often  neck  deep  in  the  water,  to  throw  two 
light  bridges  across  the  stream  higher  up.  By  heroic  toil, 
which  to  most  of  them  brought  death,  the  bridges  were 
speedily  finished,  and,  as  the  light  of  November  26th  was 
waning,  Oudinot's  corps  of  7,000  men  gained  a  firm  foot- 
ing on  the  homeward  side.  But  they  were  observed  by 
Russian  scouts,  and  when  on  the  next  day  Napoleon  and 
other  corps  had  struggled  across,  the  enemy  came  up,  cap- 
tured a  whole  division,  and  on  the  morrow  strove  to  hurl 
the  invaders  into  the  river.  Victor  and  the  rearguard 
staunchly  kept  them  at  bay  ;  but,  as  night  drew  on,  the 
Russian  army  of  the  Dwina  came  up  and  swept  the  bridges 
and  their  approaches  with  artillery  fire. 

Then  the  panic-stricken  throngs  of  wounded  and  strag- 
glers, women  and  camp-followers,  writhed  and  fought  their 
way  until  the  frail  planks  were  piled  high  with  living  and 
dead.  To  add  to  the  horrors,  one  bridge  gave  way  under 
the  weight  of  the  cannon.  The  rush  for  the  one  remain- 
ing bridge  became  yet  more  frantic  and  the  night  passed 
amidst  scenes  of  unspeakable  woe.  Stout  swimmers  threw 
themselves  into  the  stream,  only  to  fall  victims  to  the  ice 
floes  and  the  numbing  cold.  At  dawn  of  the  29th,  the 
French  rearguard  fired  the  bridge  to  cover  the  retreat. 
Then  a  last,  loud  wail  of  horror  arose  from  the  farther 
bank,  and  despair  or  a  loathing  of  life  drove  many  to  end 
their  miseries  in  the  river  or  in  the  flames. 

Such  was  the  crossing  of  the  Beresina.     The  ghastly 

1  Oudinot,  "  Memoires."  2  Hereford  George,  pp.  349-350. 


244  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

tale  was  told  once  more  with  renewed  horrors  when  the 
floods  of  winter  abated  and  laid  bare  some  12,000  corpses 
along  the  course  of  that  fatal  stream.  It  would  seem  that 
if  Napoleon,  or  his  staff,  had  hurried  on  the  camp-follow- 
ers to  cross  on  the  night  of  the  28th  to  the  29th,  those 
awful  scenes  would  not  have  happened,  for  on  that  night 
the  bridges  were  not  used  at  all.  Grosser  carelessness  than 
this  cannot  be  conceived  ;  and  yet,  even  after  this  shock- 
ing blunder,  the  devotion  of  the  soldiers  to  their  chief 
found  touching  expression.  When  he  was  suffering  from 
cold  in  the  wretched  bivouac  west  of  the  river,  officers  went 
round  calling  for  dry  wood  for  his  fire  ;  and  shivering  men 
were  seen  to  offer  precious  sticks,  with  the  words,  "  Take 
it  for  the  Emperor." 1 

On  that  day  Napoleon  wrote  to  Maret  that  possibly  he 
would  leave  the  army  and  hurry  on  to  Paris.  His  pres- 
ence there  was  certainly  needed,  if  his  crown  was  to  be 
saved.  On  November  6th,  the  day  of  the  first  snow- 
storm, he  heard  of  the  Quixotic  attempt  of  a  French 
republican,  General  Malet,  to  overthrow  the  Government 
at  Paris.  With  a  handful  of  followers,  but  armed  with  a 
false  report  of  Napoleon's  capture  in  Russia,  this  man 
had  apprehended  several  officials,  until  the  scheme  col- 
lapsed of  sheer  inanity.2  "  How  now,  if  we  were  at 
Moscow,"  exclaimed  the  Emperor,  on  hearing  this 
curious  news  ;  and  he  saw  with  chagrin  that  some  of  his 
generals  merely  shrugged  their  shoulders.  After  cross- 
ing the  Beresina,  he  might  hope  that  the  worst  was  over, 
and  that  the  stores  at  Vilna  and  Kovno  would  suffice  for 
the  remnant  of  his  army.  The  cold  for  a  time  had  been 
less  rigorous.  The  behaviour  of  Prussia  and  Austria  was, 
in  truth,  more  important  than  the  conduct  of  the  retreat. 
Unless  those  Powers  were  kept  to  their  troth,  not  a 
Frenchman  would  cross  the  Elbe. 

At  Smorgoni,  then,  on  December  the  5th,  he  informed 
his  Marshals  that  he  left  them  in  order  to  raise  300,000 
men  ;  and,  intrusting  the  command  to  Murat,  he  hurried 
away.  His  great  care  was  to  prevent  the  extent  of  the 
disaster  being  speedily  known.  "  Remove  all  strangers 
from  Vilna,"  he  wrote  to  Maret:  "the  army  is  not  fine  to 

1  Bourgogne,  cb.  viii.  2  Pasquier,  vol.  ii.,  ad  init. 


XXXII 


THE  RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN 


245 


look  upon  just  now."  The  precaution  was  much  needed. 
Frost  set  in  once  more,  and  now  with  unending  grip. 
Vilna  offered  a  poor  haven  of  refuge.  The  stores  were 
soon  plundered,  and,  as  the  Cossacks  drew  near,  Murat 
and  the  remnant  of  the  Grand  Army  decamped  in  piti- 
able panic.  Amidst  ever  deepening  misery  they  struggled 
on,  until,  of  the  600,000  men  who  had  proudly  crossed 
the  Niemen  for  the  conquest  of  Russia,  only  20,000 
famished,  frost-bitten,  unarmed  spectres  staggered  across 
the  bridge  of  Kovno  in  the  middle  of  December.  The 
auxiliary  corps  furnished  by  Austria  and  Prussia  fell 
back  almost  unscathed.  But  the  remainder  of  that 
mighty  host  rotted  away  in  Russian  prisons  or  lay  at  rest 
under  Nature's  winding  sheet  of  snow.1  . 

1  Colonel  Desprez,  who  accompanied  the  retreat,  thus  described  to 
King  Joseph  its  closing  scenes  :  "  The  truth  is  best  expressed  by  saying 
that  the  army  is  dead.  The  Young  Guard  was  8,000  strong  when  we  left 
Moscow :  at  Vilna  it  scarcely  numbered  400.  .  .  .  The  corps  of  Victor 
and  Oudinot  numbered  30,000  men  when  they  crossed  the  Beresina  : 
two  days  afterwards  they  had  melted  away  like  the  rest  of  the  army. 
Sending  reinforcements  only  increased  the  losses." 

The  following  French  official  report,  a  copy  of  which  I  have  found  in 
our  F.  O.  Records  (Russia,  No.  84),  shows  how  frightful  were  the  losses 
after  Smolensk.  But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  rank  and  tile  in  this  case 
numbered  only  300  at  Smolensk,  and  had  therefore  lost  more  than  half 
their  numbers  —  and  this  in  a  regiment  of  the  Guard. 


Garde  Imperiale:  6«e  Regiment  de  Tirailleurs 
lire  Division.     Situation  a.  Vepoque  du  19  Decembre,  1812 


Perte  depuis  le  depart  de  Smolensk. 

Present  sous 

les  armes  au 

depart  de 

Smolensk. 

Restes  sur 

le  cbamp 

de  bataille. 

Blesses  qui 

n'ont  pu 

suivre, 

restes  au 

pouvoir  de 
I'ennemi. 

Morts  de 

froid  ou  de 

misere. 

Restes  en 
arriere, 

geles,  ou 
pour  cause 
de  maladie, 
au  pouvoir 
de  I'ennemi. 

Total  des 
Pertes. 

Reste 
presents 
sous  les 

armes. 

Off. 

Tr. 

Off. 

Tr. 

Off. 

Tr. 

Off. 

Tr. 

Off. 

Tr. 

Off. 

Tr. 

Off. 

Tr. 

31 

300 

— 

13 

4 

52 

— 

24 

13 

201 

17 

290 

14 

10 

Signe" 


Les  autres  regiments  sont  plus 
ou  moins  dans  le  merae  £tat. 


le  Colonel  Major  Commandant 
le  dit  Regiment,     Carre. 


CHAPTER   XXXIII 

THE  FIRST  SAXON  CAMPAIGN 

Despite  the  loss  of  the  most  splendid  army  ever  mar- 
shalled by  man,  Napoleon  abated  no  whit  of  his  resolve  to 
dominate  Germany  and  dictate  terms  to  Russia.  At  War- 
saw, in  his  retreat,  he  informed  De  Pradt  that  there  was 
but  one  step  from  the  sublime  to  the  ridiculous,  that  is, 
from  the  advance  on  Moscow  to  the  retreat.  At  Dresden 
he  called  on  his  allies,  Austria  and  Prussia,  to  repel  the 
Russians  ;  and  at  Paris  he  strained  every  nerve  to  call  the 
youth  of  the  Empire  to  arms.  The  summons  met  with  a 
ready  response  :  he  had  but  to  stamp  his  foot  when  the 
news  from  East  Prussia  looked  ominous,  and  an  array  of 
350,000  conscripts  was  promised  by  the  Senate  (Janu- 
ary 10th). 

In  truth,  his  genius  had  enthralled  the  mind  of  France. 
The  magnificence  of  his  aims,  his  hitherto  triumphant 
energy,  and  the  glamour  of  his  European  supremacy  had 
called  forth  all  the  faculties  of  the  French  and  Italian 
peoples,  and  set  them  pulsating  with  ecstatic  activity. 
He  knew  by  instinct  all  the  intricacies  of  their  being, 
which  his  genius  controlled  with  the  easy  decisiveness  of 
a  master-key.  The  rude  shock  of  the  Russian  disaster 
served  but  to  emphasize  the  thoroughness  of  his  domina- 
tion, and  the  dumb  trustfulness  of  his  forty-three  millions 
of  subjects. 

And  yet  their  patience  might  well  have  been  exhausted. 
His  military  needs  had  long  ago  drawn  in  levies  the  year 
before  they  were  legally  liable  ;  but  the  mighty  swirl  of 
the  Moscow  campaign  now  sucked  150,000  lads  of  under 
twenty  years  of  age  into  the  devouring  vortex.  In  the 
Dutch  and  German  provinces  of  his  Empire  the  number 
of  those  who  evaded  the  clutches  of  the  conscription  was 
very  large.       In  fact,    the    number  of   "refractory   con- 

246 


chap,  xxxm         THE   FIRST   SAXON  CAMPAIGN  247 

scripts  "  in  the  whole  realm  amounted  to  40,000.  Large 
bands  of  them  ranged  the  woods  of  Brittany  and  La 
Vendee,  until  mobile  columns  were  sent  to  sweep  them 
into  the  barracks. 

But  in  nearly  the  whole  of  France  (Proper),  Napoleon's 
name  was  still  an  unfailing  talisman,  appealing  as  it  did 
to  the  two  strongest  instincts  of  the  Celt,  the  clinging  to 
the  soil  and  the  passion  for  heroic  enterprise.  Thus  it 
came  about  that  the  peasantry  gave  up  their  sons  to  be 
"  food  for  cannon  "  with  the  same  docility  that  was  shown 
by  soldiers  who  sank  death-stricken  into  a  snowy  bed  with 
no  word  of  reproach  to  the  author  of  their  miseries.  A 
like  obsequiousness  was  shown  by  the  officials  and  legis- 
lators of  France,  who  meekly  listened  to  the  Emperor's 
reproaches  for  their  weakness  in  the  Malet  affair,  and 
heard  with  mild  surprise  his  denunciation  against  republi- 
can idealogy  —  the  cloudy  metaphysics  to  which  all  the  mis- 
fortunes of  our  fair  France  may  be  attributed.  No  tongue 
dared  to  utter  the  retort  which  must  have  fermented  in 
every  brain.1 

But  his  explanations  and  appeals  did  not  satisfy  every 
Frenchman.  Many  were  appalled  at  the  frightful  drain 
on  the  nation's  strength.  They  asked  in  private  how  the 
deficit  of  1812  and  the  further  expenses  of  1813  were  to 
be  met,  even  if  he  allotted  the  communal  domains  to  the 
service  of  the  State.  They  pointed  to  allies  ruined  or 
lost  ;  to  Spain,  where  Joseph's  throne  still  tottered  from 
the  shock  of  Salamanca  ;  to  Poland,  lying  mangled  at  the 
feet  of  the  Muscovites  ;  to  Italy,  desolated  by  the  loss  of 
her  bravest  sons  ;  to  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine, 
equally  afflicted  and  less  resigned  ;  to  Austria  and  Prussia, 
where  timid  sovereigns  and  calculating  Courts  alone  kept 
the  peoples  true  to  the  hated  French  alliance.  Only  by  a 
change  of  system,  they  averred,  could  the  hatred  of 
Europe  be  appeased,  and  the  formation  of  a  new  and  vaster 
Coalition    avoided.       Let   Napoleon    cease   to  force   his 

1  "Corresp.,"  December  20th,  1812.  For  the  so-called  Concordat  of 
1813,  concluded  with  the  captive  Pius  VII.  at  Fontainebleau,  see  "Cor- 
resp." of  January  25th,  1813.  The  Pope  repudiated  it  at  the  first  oppor- 
tunity. Napoleon  wanted  him  to  settle  at  Avignon  as  a  docile  subject  of 
the  Empire. 


248  THE  LLFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

methods  of  commercial  warfare  on  the  Continent :  let 
him  make  peace  on  honourable  terms  with  Russia,  where 
the  chief  Minister,  Romantzoff,  was  ready  to  meet  him 
half-way  :  let  him  withdraw  his  garrisons  from  Prussian 
fortresses,  soothe  the  susceptibilities  of  Austria  —  and 
events  would  tend  to  a  solid  and  honourable  peace. 

To  all  promptings  of  prudence  Napoleon  was  deaf. 
His  instincts  and  his  experience  of  the  Kings  prevented 
him  yielding  on  any  important  point.  He  determined  to 
carry  on  the  war  from  the  Tagus  to  the  Vistula,  to  bolster 
up  Joseph  in  Spain,  to  keep  his  garrisons  fast  rooted  in 
every  fortress  as  far  east  as  Danzig.  Russia  and  Prussia, 
he  said,  had  more  need  of  peace  than  France.  If  he 
began  by  giving  up  towns,  they  would  demand  kingdoms, 
whereas  by  yielding  nothing  he  would  intimidate  them. 
And  if  they  did  form  a  league,  their  forces  would  be 
thinly  spread  out  over  an  immense  space;  he  would 
easily  dispose  of  their  armies  when  they  were  not  aided  by 
the  climate  ;  and  a  single  victory  would  undo  the  clumsy 
knot  (ce  nceud  mal  assorti').1 

In  truth,  if  he  left  Spain  out  of  his  count,  the  survey 
of  the  military  position  was  in  many  ways  reassuring. 
England's  power  was  enfeebled  by  the  declaration  of  war 
by  the  United  States.  In  Central  Europe  his  position 
was  still  commanding.  He  held  nearly  all  the  fortresses 
of  Prussia,  and  though  he  had  lost  a  great  army,  that 
loss  was  spread  out  very  largely  over  Poles,  Germans, 
Italians,  and  smaller  peoples.  Many  of  the  best  French 
troops  and  all  his  ablest  generals  had  survived.  His 
Guard  could  therefore  be  formed  again,  and  the  brains  of 
his  army  were  also  intact.  The  war  had  brought  to  light 
no  military  genius  among  the  Russians  ;  and  all  his  past 
experience  of  the  "  old  coalition  machines  "  warranted  the 
belief  that  their  rusty  cogwheels,  even  if  oiled  by  English 
subsidies,  would  clank  slowly  along  and  break  down  at 
the  first  exceptional  strain.  Such  had  been  the  case  at 
Marengo,  at  Austerlitz,  at  Friedland.  Why  should  not 
history  repeat  itself  ? 

1  Mollien,  vol.  iii.,  ad  fin.  For  his  vague  offers  to  mitigate  the  harsh 
terms  of  Tilsit  for  Prussia,  and  to  grant  her  a  political  existence  if  she 
would  fight  for  him,  see  Hardenberg,  "Mems.,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  350, 


xxxin  THE  FIRST  SAXON  CAMPAIGN  249 

While  he  was  guiding  his  steps  solely  by  the  light  of 
past  experience,  events  were  occurring  that  heralded  the 
dawn  of  a  new  era  for  Central  Europe.  On  the  30th  of 
December,  the  Prussian  General  Yorck,  who  led  the  Prus- 
sian corps  serving  previously  under  Macdonald  in  Cour- 
land,  concluded  the  Convention  of  Tauroggen  with  the 
Russians,  stipulating  that  this  corps  should  hold  the  dis- 
trict around  Memel  and  Tilsit  as  neutral  territor}%  until 
Frederick  William's  decision  should  be  known.  Strictly 
considered,  this  convention  was  a  grave  breach  of  inter- 
national law  and  an  act  of  treachery  towards  Napoleon. 
The  King  at  first  viewed  it  in  that  light ;  but  to  all  his 
subjects  it  seemed  a  noble  and  patriotic  action.  To  con- 
tinue the  war  with  Russia  for  the  benefit  of  Napoleon 
would  have  been  an  act  of  political  suicide. 

Yet,  for  some  weeks,  Frederick  William  waited  on 
events  ;  and  these  events  decided  for  war,  not  against 
Russia,  but  against  France.  The  Prussian  Chancellor, 
Hardenberg,  did  his  best  to  hoodwink  the  French  at 
Berlin,  and  quietly  to  play  into  the  hands  of  the  ardent 
German  patriots.  After  publishing  an  official  rebuke  to 
Yorck,  he  secretly  sent  Major  Thile  to  reassure  him.  He 
did  more:  in  order  to  rescue  the  King  from  French  influ- 
ence, still  paramount  at  Berlin,  he  persuaded  him  to  set 
out  for  Breslau,  on  the  pretext  of  raising  there  another 
contingent  for  service  under  Napoleon.  The  ruse  com- 
pletely succeeded  :  it  deceived  the  French  ambassador, 
St.  Marsan  :  it  fooled  even  Napoleon  himself.  With  his 
now  invariable  habit  of  taking  for  granted  that  events 
would  march  according  to  his  word  of  command,  the  Em- 
peror assumed  that  this  was  for  the  raising  of  the  corps  of 
30,000  men  which  he  had  requested  Frederick  William 
to  provide,  and  said  to  Prince  Hatzfeld  (January  29th)  : 
"  Your  King  is  going  to  Breslau  :  I  think  it  a  timely 
step."  Such  was  Napoleon's  frame  of  mind,  even  after  he 
heard  of  Yorck's  convention  with  the  Russians.  That 
event  he  considered  "  the  worst  occurrence  that  could 
happen."  Yet  neither  that  nor  the  patriotic  ferment  in 
Prussia  reft  the  veil  from  his  eyes.  He  still  believed 
that  the  Prussians  would  follow  their  King,  and  that  the 
King  would  obey  him.     On  February  the  3rd  he  wrote  to 


250  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Maret,  complaining  that  2,000  Prussian  horsemen  were 
shutting  themselves  up  in  Silesian  towns,  "  as  if  they  were 
afraid  of  us,  instead  of  helping  us  and  covering  their 
country." 

Once  away  from  Berlin,  Frederick  William  found  him- 
self launched  on  a  resistless  stream  of  national  enthusiasm. 
At  heart  he  was  no  less  a  patriot  than  the  most  ardent 
of  the  university  students ;  but  he  knew  far  better  than 
they  the  awful  risks  of  war  with  the  'French  Empire.  His 
little  kingdom  of  4,700,000  souls,  with  but  half-a-dozen 
strongholds  it  could  call  its  own,  a  realm  ravaged  by 
Napoleon's  troops  alike  in  war  and  peace  until  commerce 
and  credit  were  but  a  dim  memory  —  such  a  land  could  ill 
afford  to  defy  an  empire  ten  times  as  populous  and  more 
than  ten  times  as  powerful.  True,  the  Russians  were 
pouring  in  under  the  guise  of  friendship ;  but  the  bitter 
memories  of  Tilsit  forbade  any  implicit  trust  in  Alexan- 
der. And,  if  the  dross  had  been  burnt  out  of  his  nature 
by  a  year  of  fiery  trial,  could  his  army,  exhausted  by  that 
frightful  winter  campaign  and  decimated  by  the  diseases 
which  Napoleon's  ghastly  array  scattered  broadcast  in  its 
flight,  ever  hope,  even  with  the  help  of  Prussia's  young 
levies,  to  cope  with  the  united  forces'  of  Napoleon  and 
Austria  ? 

For  at  present  it  seemed  that  the  Court  of  Vienna 
would  hold  fast  to  the  French  alliance.  There  Metter- 
nich  was  all-powerful,  and  the  keystone  of  his  system  was 
a  guarded  but  profit-seeking  subservience  to  Napoleon. 
Not  that  the  Emperor  Francis  and  he  loved  the  French 
potentate ;  but  they  looked  on  him  now  as  a  pillar  of 
order,  as  a  barrier  against  Jacobinism  in  France,  against 
the  ominous  pan-Germanism  preached  by  Prussian  enthu- 
siasts, and  against  Muscovite  aggrandizement  in  Turkey 
and  Poland.  Great  was  their  concern,  first  at  the  Russo- 
Turkish  peace  which  installed  the  Muscovites  at  the 
northern  mouth  of  the  Danube,  and  still  more  at  the 
conquering  swoops  of  the  Russian  eagle  on  Warsaw  and 
Posen.  How  could  they  now  hope  to  gain  from  Turkey 
the  set-off  to  the  loss  of  Tyrol  and  Illyria  on  which  they 
had  recently  been  counting,  and  how  save  any  of  the 
Polish  lands  from  the  grip  of  Russia?     For  the  present 


xxxiii  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  251 

Russia  was  more  to  be  feared  than  Napoleon.  Her  influ- 
ence seemed  the  more  threatening  to  the  policy  of  balance 
on  which  the  fortunes  of  the  Hapsburgs  were  delicately 
poised. 

Only  by  degrees  were  these  fears  and  jealousies  laid  to 
rest.  It  needed  all  the  address  of  a  British  envoy,  Lord 
Walpole,  who  repaired  secretly  to  Vienna  and  held  out 
the  promise  of  tempting  gains,  to  assuage  these  alarms, 
and  turn  Austria's  gaze  once  more  on  her  lost  provinces, 
Tyrol,  Illyria,  and  Venetia.  For  the  present,  however, 
nothing  came  of  these  overtures  ;  and  when  the  French  dis- 
covered Walpole's  presence  at  Vienna,  Metternich  begged 
him  to  leave.1 

For  the  present,  then,  Austria  assumed  a  neutral  atti- 
tude. A  truce  was  concluded  with  Russia,  and  a  special 
envoy  was  sent  to  Paris  to  explain  the  desire  of  the 
Emperor  Francis  to  act  as  mediator,  with  a  view  to  the 
conclusion  of  a  general  peace.  The  latest  researches  into 
Austrian  policy  show  that  the  Kaiser  desired  an  honour- 
able peace  for  all  parties  concerned,  and  that  Metternich 
may  have  shared  his  views.  But,  early  in  the  negotia- 
tions, Napoleon  showed  flashes  of  distrust  as  to  the  sincer- 
ity of  his  father-in-law,  and  Austria  gradually  changed 
her  attitude.  The  change  was  to  be  fatal  to  Napoleon. 
But  the  question  whether  it  was  brought  about  by  Napo- 
leon's obstinacy,  or  Metternich's  perfidy,  or  the  force  of 
circumstances,  must  be  postponed  for  the  present,  while 
we  consider  events  of  equal  importance  and  of  greater 
interest. 

While  Austria  balanced  and  Frederick  William  nego- 
tiated, the  sterner  minds  of  North  Germany  rushed  in  on 
the  once  sacred  ground  of  diplomacy  and  statecraft.  The 
struggle  against  Napoleon  was  prepared  for  by  the  exile 
Stein,  and  war  was  first  proclaimed  by  a  professor. 

Among  the  many  influences  that  urged  on  the  Czar  to 

1  Walpole  reports  (December  19th  and  22nd,  1812)  Metternich's  envy 
of  the  Russian  successes  and  of  their  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube.  Walpole  said  he  believed  Alexander  would  grant  Austria  a  set- 
off against  this;  but  Metternich  seemed  entirely  Bunapartist  ("  F.  O.," 
Russia,  No.  84).  See  too  the  full  account,  based  on  documentary  evi- 
dence, in  Luckwaldt's  "  Oesterreich  und  die  Anfange  des  Befreiungs-, 
krieges"  (Berlin,  1808). 


252  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

a  war  for  the  liberation  of  Prussia  and  Europe,  not  the 
least  was  that  wielded  at  his  Court  in  the  latter  half  of 
1812  by  the  staunch  German  patriot,  Stein.  His  heroic 
spirit  never  quailed,  even  in  the  darkest  hour  of  Prussia's 
humiliation  ;  and  he  now  pointed  out  convincingly  that 
the  only  sure  means  of  overthrowing  Napoleon  was  to 
raise  Germany  against  him.  To  remain  on  a  tame  defen- 
sive at  Warsaw  would  be  to  court  another  French  inva- 
sion in  1813.  The  safety  of  Russia  called  for  a  pursuit 
of  the  French  beyond  the  Elbe  and  a  rally  of  the  Germans 
against  the  man  they  detested.  The  appeal  struck  home. 
It  revived  Alexander's  longings  for  the  liberation  of 
Europe,  which  he  had  buried  at  Tilsit ;  and  it  agreed 
with  the  promptings  of  an  ambitious  statecraft.  Only 
by  overthrowing  Napoleon's  supremacy  in  Germany  could 
the  Czar  gain  a  free  hand  for  a  lasting  settlement  of  the 
Polish  Question.  The  eastern  turn  given  to  his  policy 
in  1807  was  at  an  end  —  but  not  before  Russia  had  taken 
another  step  towards  the  Bosphorus.  With  one  leg 
planted  at  the  mouth  of  the  Danube,  the  Colossus  now 
prepared  to  stride  over  Central  Europe.  The  aims  of 
Catherine  II.  in  1792  were  at  last  to  be  realized.  While 
Europe  was  wrestling  with  Revolutionary  France,  the 
Muscovite  grasp  was  to  tighten  on  Poland.  It  is  not  sur- 
prising that  Alexander,  on  January  13th,  commented  on 
the  "  brilliance  of  the  present  situation,"  or  that  he  decided 
to  press  onward.  He  gave  little  heed  to  the  Gallophil 
counsels  of  Romantzoff  or  the  dolorous  warnings  of  the 
German-hating  Kutusoff  ;  and,  on  January  18th,  he  em- 
powered Stein  provisionally  to  administer  in  his  name  the 
districts  of  Prussia  (Proper)  when  occupied  by  Russian 
troops. 

So  irregular  a  proceeding  could  only  be  excused  by 
dire  necessity  and  by  success.  It  was  more  than  excused  ; 
it  was  triumphantly  justified.  Four  days  later  Stein 
arrived  at  Konigsberg,  in  company  with  the  patriotic  poet, 
Arndt.  The  Estates,  or  Provincial  Assemblies,  of  East 
and  West  Prussia  were  summoned,  and  they  heartily 
voted  supplies  for  forming. a  Landwehr  or  militia,  as  well 
as  a  last  line  of  defence  called  the  Landsturm.  This  step, 
unique  in  the  history  of  Prussia,  was  taken  apart  from, 


xxxm  THE   FIRST  SAXON  CAMPAIGN  253 

almost  in  defiance  of,  the  royal  sanction  :  it  was,  in  fact, 
due  to  the  masterful  will  of  Stein,  who  saw  that  a  great 
popular  impulse,  and  it  alone,  could  overcome  the  inertia 
of  King  and  officials.  That  impulse  he  himself  originated, 
and  by  virtue  of  powers  conferred  on  him  by  the  Emperor 
Alexander.  And  the  ball  thus  set  rolling  at  Konigsberg 
was  to  gather  mass  and  momentum  until,  thanks  to  the 
powerful  aid  of  Wellington  in  the  South,  it  overthrew 
Napoleon  at  Paris. 

The  action  of  the  exile  was  furthered  by  the  word  of  a 
thinker  and  seer.  A  worthy  professor  at  the  University 
of  Breslau,  named  Steffens,  had  long  been  meditating  on 
some  means  of  helping  his  country.  The  arrival  of  Fred- 
erick William  had  kindled  a  flame  of  devotion  which  per- 
plexed that  modest  and  rather  pedantic  ruler.  But  he 
so  far  responded  to  it  as  to  allow  Hardenberg  to  issue 
(February  3rd)  an  appeal  for  volunteers  to  "  reinforce  the 
ranks  of  the  old  defenders  of  the  country."  The  appeal 
was  entirely  vague  :  it  did  not  specify  whether  they  would 
serve  against  the  nominal  enemy,  Russia,  or  the  real 
enemy,  Napoleon.  Pondering  this  weighty  question,  as 
did  all  good  patriots,  Steffens  heard,  in  the  watches  of  the 
night,  the  voice  of  conscience  declare  :  "  Thou  must 
declare  war  against  Napoleon."  At  his  early  morning  lec- 
ture on  Physics,  which  was  very  thinly  attended,  he  told 
the  students  that  he  would  address  them  at  eleven  on  the 
call  for  volunteers.  That  lecture  was  thronged  ;  and  to 
the  sea  of  eager  faces  Steffens  spoke  forth  the  thought 
that  simmered  in  every  brain,  the  burning  desire  for  war 
with  Napoleon.  He  offered  himself  as  a  recruit  :  200  stu- 
dents from  Breslau  and  258  from  the  University  of  Berlin 
soon  flocked  to  the  colours,  and  that,  too,  chiefly  from  the 
classes  which  of  yore  had  detested  the  army.  Thanks  to 
the  teachings  of  Fichte  and  the  still  deeper  lessons  of 
adversity,  the  mind  of  Germany  was  now  ranged  on  the 
side  of  national  independence  and  against  an  omnivorous 
imperialism . 

.  Where  the  mind  led  the  body  followed,  yet  still  some- 
what haltingly.  In  truth  the  King  and  his  officials  were 
in  a  difficult  position.  They  distrusted  the  Russians,  who 
seemed  chiefly  eager  to  force  Frederick  William  into  war 


254  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

with  France  and  to  arrange  the  question  of  a  frontier 
afterwards.  But  the  eastern  frontier  was  a  question  of 
life  and  death  for  Prussia.  If  Alexander  kept  the  whole 
of  the  great  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  the  Hohenzollern  States 
would  be  threatened  from  the  east  as  grievously  as  ever 
they  were  on  the  west  by  the  French  at  Magdeburg.  And 
the  Czar  seemed  resolved  to  keep  the  whole  of  Poland. 
He  told  the  Prussian  envoy,  Knesebeck,  that,  while  hand- 
ing over  to  Frederick  William  the  whole  of  Saxony,  Russia 
must  retain  all  the  Polish  lands,  a  resolve  which  would 
have  planted  the  Russian  standards  almost  on  the  banks, 
of  the  Oder.  Nay,  more  :  Knesebeck  detected  among  the 
Russian  officials  a  strong,  though  as  yet  but  half  expressed, 
longing  for  the  whole  of  Prussia  east  of  the  lower  Vistula. 
For  his  part,  Frederick  William  cherished  lofty  hopes. 
He  knew  that  the  Russian  troops  had  suffered  horribly 
from  privations  and  disease,  that  as  yet  they  mustered 
only  forty  thousand  effectives  on  the  Polish  borders,  and 
that  they  urgently  needed  the  help  of  Prussia.  He  there- 
fore claimed  that,  if  he  joined  Russia  in  a  war  against 
Napoleon,  he  must  recover  the  whole  of  what  had  been 
Prussian  Poland,  with  the  exception  of  the  district  of 
Bialystock  ceded  at  Tilsit.1  It  seemed,  then,  that  the 
Polish  Question  would  once  more  exert  on  the  European 
concert  that  dissolving  influence  which  had  weakened  the 
Central  Powers  ever  since  the  days  of  Valmy.  Had  Na- 
poleon now  sent  to  Breslau  a  subtle  schemer  like  Savary, 
the  apple  of  discord  might  have  been  thrown  in  with  fatal 
results.  But  the  fortunes  of  his  Empire  then  rested  on  a 
Piedmontese  nobleman,  St.  Marsan,  who  showed  a  singu- 
lar credulity  as  to  Prussia's  subservience.  He  accepted 
all  Hardenberg's  explanations  (including  a  thin  official 
reproof  to  Steffens),  and  did  little  or  nothing  to  counter- 
mine the  diplomatic  approaches  of  Russia.  The  ground 
being  thus  left  clear,  it  was  possible  for  the  Czar  to  speak 
straight  to  the  heart  of  Frederick  William.  This  he  now 
did.  Knesebeck  was  set  aside  ;  and  Alexander,  meeting 
the  Prussian  demands  half-way,  promised  in  a  treaty, 
signed  at  Kalisch  on  February  27th,  to  leave  Prussia  all 
her  present  territories,  and  to  secure  for  her  the  equiva- 

1  Hardenberg,  "  Mems.,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  366. 


xxxin  THE  FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  255 

lent,  in  a  "statistical,  financial,  and  geographical  sense," 
of  the  lands  which  she  had  lost  since  1806,  along  with 
a  territory  adapted  to  connect  Prussia  Proper  with  the 
province  of  Silesia.1 

It  seems  certain  that  Stein's  influence  weighed  much 
with  Alexander  in  this  final  compromise,  which  postponed 
the  irritating  question  of  the  eastern  frontier  and  bent  all 
the  energies  of  two  great  States  to  the  War  of  Liberation. 
Stein  was  sent  to  Frederick  William  at  Breslau  ;  but  the 
King  hardly  deigned  to  see  him,  and  the  greatest  of  Ger- 
man patriots  was  suffered  to  remain  in  a  garret  of  that 
city  during  a  wearisome  attack  of  fever.  But  he  lived 
through  disease  and  official  neglect  as  he  triumphed  over 
Slavonic  intrigues  ;  and  he  had  at  hand  that  salve  of  many 
an  able  man  —  the  knowledge  that,  even  while  he  himself 
was  slighted,  his  plans  were  adopted  with  beneficent  and 
far-reaching  results. 

The  Russo-Prussian  alliance  was  firmly  upheld  by  Lord 
Cathcart,  the  British  ambassador  to  Russia,  who  reached 
headquarters  on  March  the  2nd.  For  the  present,  Great 
Britain  did  not  definitely  join  the  allies ;  but  the  discus- 
sions on  the  Hanoverian  Question,  which  had  previously 
sundered  us  from  Prussia,  soon  proved  that  wisdom  had 
been  learnt  in  the  school  of  adversity.  The  Hohenzollerns 
now  renounced  all  claims  to  Hanover,  though  they  showed 
some  repugnance  to  our  Prince-Regent's  demand  that  the 
Electorate  should  receive  some  territorial  gain. 

Thus  the  two  questions  on  which  Napoleon  had  counted 
as  certain  to  clog  the  wheels  of  the  Coalition,  as  they  had 
done  in  the  past,  were  removed,  and  the  way  was  cleared 
for  a  compact  firmer  than  any  which  Europe  had  hitherto 
known.  On  March  17th  a  Russo-Prussian  Convention  was 
concluded  at  Breslau  whereby  those  Powers  agreed  to  de- 
liver Germany  from  France,  to  dissolve  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  and  to  summon  the  German  princes  and  peo- 
ple to  help  them  ;  every  prince  that  refused  would  suffer 
the  loss  of  his  States ;  and  arrangements  were  made  for 
the  provisional  administration  of  the  lands  which  the  allies 
should  occupy.     Frederick  William  also  appealed  to  his 

1  Oncken,  "  Oesterreich  und  Preussen,"  vol.  ii.  ;  Garden,  vol.  xiv., 
p.  167  ;  Seeley's  "  Stein,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  iii. 


256  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

people  and  to  his  army,  and  instituted  that  coveted  order 
of  merit,  the  Iron  Cross. 

But  there  was  small  need  of  appeals  and  decorations. 
The  people  rushed  to  arms  with  an  ardour  that  rivalled 
the  levee  en  masse  of  France  in  1793.  Nobles  and  students, 
professors  and  peasants,  poets  and  merchants,  shouldered 
their  muskets.  Housewives  and  maidens  brought  their 
scanty  savings  or  their  treasured  trinkets  as  offerings  for 
the  altar  of  the  Fatherland.  One  incident  deserves  spe- 
cial notice.  A  girl,  Nanny  by  name,  whose  ringlets  were 
her  only  wealth,  shore  them  off,  sold  them,  and  brought 
the  price  of  them,  two  thalers,  for  the  sacred  cause.  A 
noble  impulse  thrilled  through  Germany.  Volunteers 
came  from  far,  many  of  whom  were  to  ride  with  Lutzow's 
irregular  horse  in  his  wild  ventures.  Most  noteworthy  of 
these  was  the  gifted  young  poet,  Korner,  a  Saxon  by  birth, 
who  now  forsook  a  life  of  ease,  radiant  with  poetic  promise, 
at  the  careless  city  of  Vienna,  to  follow  the  Prussian  eagle. 
"A  great  time  calls  for  great  hearts,"  he  wrote  to  his 
father  :  "  am  I  to  write  vaudevilles  when  I  feel  within 
me  the  courage  and  strength  for  joining  the  actors  on 
the  stage  of  real  life  ?  "  Alas  !  for  him  the  end  was  to 
be  swift  and  tragic.  Not  long  after  inditing  an  ode  to  his 
sword,  he  fell  in  a  skirmish  near  Hamburg. 

Germany  mourned  his  loss ;  but  she  mourned  still  more 
that  her  greatest  poet,  Goethe,  felt  no  throb  of  national 
enthusiasm.  The  great  Olympian  was  too  much  wrapped 
up  in  his  lofty  speculations  to  spare  much  sympathy  for 
struggling  mortals  below  :  "  Shake  your  chains,  if  you 
will :  the  man  (Napoleon)  is  too  strong  for  you  :  you 
will  not  break  them."  Such  was  his  unprophetic  utter- 
ance at  Dresden  to  the  elder  Korner.  Men  who  touched 
the  people's  pulse  had  no  such  doubts.  "  Ah  !  those  were 
noble  times,"  wrote  Arndt :  "  the  fresh  young  hope  of  life 
and  honour  sang  in  all  hearts ;  it  echoed  along  every  street ; 
it  rolled  majestically  down  every  chancel."  The  sight  of 
Germans  thronging  from  all  parts  into  Silesia  to  fight  for 
their  Prussian  champions  awakened  in  him  the  vision  of  a  j 
United  Germany,  which  took  form  in  the  song,  "  What  is 
the  German's  Fatherland  ?  "  l 

1  Arndt,  "  Wanderungen  "  ;  Steffens,  "  Was  ich  erlebte." 


xxxin  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  257 

Against  this  ever- rising  tide  of  national  enthusiasm 
Napoleon  pitted  the  resources  which  Gallic  devotion  still 
yielded  up  to  his  demands.  They  were  surprisingly  great. 
In  less  than  half  a  year,  after  the  loss  of  half  a  million  of 
men,  a  new  army  nearly  as  numerous  was  marshalled  under 
the  imperial  eagles.  Thirty  thousand  tried  troops  were 
brought  from  Spain,  thereby  greatly  relieving  the  pressure 
on  Wellington.  Italy  and  the  garrison  towns  of  the  Em- 
pire sent  forth  a  vast  number.  But  the  majority  were 
young,  untrained  troops  ;  and  it  was  remarked  that  the 
conscripts  born  in  the  years  of  the  Terror,  1793—4,  had 
not  the  stamina  of  the  earlier  levies.  Brave  they  were, 
superbly  brave  ;  and  the  Emperor  sought  by  every  means 
to  breathe  into  them  his  own  indomitable  spirit.  One  of 
them  has  described  how,  on  handing  them  their  colours, 
he  made  a  brief  speech ;  and,  at  the  close,  rising  in  his 
stirrups  and  stretching  forth  his  hand,  he  shot  at  them 
the  question  :  "  '  You  swear  to  guard  them  ?  '  I  felt,  as 
we  all  felt,  that  he  snatched  from  our  very  navel  the  cry, 
'Yes,  we  swear.'"  Truly,  the  Emperor  could  make  boys 
heroes,  but  he  could  never  repair  the  losses  of  1812.  Guns 
he  possessed  to  the  number  of  a  thousand  in  his  arsenals; 
but  he  lacked  the  thousands  of  skilled  artillerymen  :  youths 
he  could  find  and  horses  he  could  buy  :  but  not  for  many 
a  month  had  he  the  resistless  streams  of  horsemen  that 
poured  over  Prussia  after  Jena,  or  swept  into  the  Great 
Redoubt  at  Borodino.  Nevertheless,  the  energy  which 
embattled  a  new  host  within  five  months  of  a  seemingly 
overwhelming  disaster,  must  be  considered  the  most  ex- 
traordinary event  of  an  age  fertile  in  marvels.  "  The 
imagination  sinks  back  confounded,"  says  Pasquier,  "when 
one  thinks  of  all  the  work  to  be  done  and  the  resources  of 
all  kinds  to  be  found,  in  order  to  raise,  clothe,  and  equip 
such  an  army  in  so  short  a  time." 

While  immersed  in  this  prodigious  task,  the  Emperor 
heard,  with  some  surprise  but  with  no  dismay,  the  news 
of  Prussia's  armaments  and  disaffection.  At  first  he 
treats  it  as  a  passing  freak  which  will  vanish  with  firm 
treatment.  "  Remain  at  Berlin  as  long  as  you  can,"  he 
writes  to  Eugene,  March  5th.  "  Make  examples  for  the 
sake  of  discipline.     At  the  least  insult,  whether  from  a 

VOL.  II  —  s 


258  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

village  or  a  town,  were  it  from  Berlin  itself,  burn  it 
down."  The  chief  thing  that  still  concerns  him  is  the 
vagueness  of  Eugene's  reports,  which  leave  him  no 
option  but  to  get  news  about  his  troops  in  Germany 
from  the  English  newspapers.  "  Do  not  forget,"  he 
writes  again  on  March  14th,  "  that  Prussia  has  only  four 
millions  of  people.  She  never  in  her  most  prosperous 
times  had  more  than  150,000  troops.  She  will  not  have 
more  than  40,000  now."  That,  indeed,  was  the  number 
to  which  he  had  limited  her  after  Tilsit  ;  and  he  was 
unable  to  conceive  that  Scharnhorst's  plan  of  passing 
men  into  a  reserve  would  send  triple  that  force  into  the 
field.1  As  for  the  Russians,  he  writes,  they  are  thinned 
by  disease,  and  must  spread  out  widely  in  order  to  be- 
siege the  many  fortresses  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Elbe.  Indeed,  he  assures  his  ally,  the  King  of  Bavaria, 
that  it  will  be  good  policy  to  let  them  advance  :  "  The 
farther  they  advance,  the  more  certain  is  their  ruin." 
Sixty  thousand  troops  are  being  led  by  Bertrand  from 
Italy  into  Bavaria.2  These,  along  with  the  corps  of 
Eugene  and  Davoust,  will  crush  the  Russian  columns. 
And,  while  the  allies  were  busy  in  Saxony,  Napoleon 
proposed  to  mass  a  great  force  under  the  shelter  of  the 
Harz  Mountains,  cross  the  Elbe  near  Havelberg,  make 
a  rush  for  the  relief  of  Stettin,  and  stretch  a  hand  to  the 
large  French  force  beleaguered  at  Danzig. 

Such  was  his  first  plan.  It  was  upset  by  the  rapidity 
of  the  Cossacks  and  the  general  uprising  of  Prussia. 
Augereau's  corps  was  driven  from  Berlin  by  a  force  of 
Cossacks  led  by  Tettenborn  ;  and  this  daring  free  lance, 
a  native  of  Hamburg,  thereupon  made  a  dash  for  the 
liberation  of  his  city.  For  the  time  he  was  completely 
successful  :  the  fury  of  the  citizens  against  the  French 
douaniers  gave  the  Cossacks  and  patriots  an  easy  triumph 
there  and  throughout  Hanover.  This  news  caused  Napo- 
leon grave  concern.     The  loss  of  the  great  Hanse  Town 

1  At  this  time  she  had  only  61,500  men  ready  for  the  fighting  line; 
but  she  had  28,000  in  garrison  and  32,000  in  Pomerania  and  Prussia 
(Proper),  according  to  Scharnhorst's  report  contained  in  "  F.  O.,"  Russia, 
No.  85. 

2  Letters  of  March  2nd  and  11th. 


xxxm  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  259 

opened  a  wide  door  for  English  goods,  English  money, 
and  English  troops  into  Germany.  It  must  be  closed  at 
all  costs :  and,  with  severe  rebukes  to  Eugene  and  Lauris- 
ton,  who  were  now  holding  the  line  of  the  middle  Elbe, 
he  charged  Davoust  (March  18th)  to  hold  the  long  wind- 
ing course  of  that  river  between  Magdeburg  and  Hamburg. 
The  advance  of  this  determined  leader  was  soon  to  change 
the  face  of  affairs  in  North  Germany. 

Shortly  before  Napoleon  left  Paris  for  the  seat  of  war, 
he  received  the  new  Austrian  ambassador,  Prince  Schwar- 
zenberg  (April  9th).  With  a  jocular  courtesy  that  veiled 
the  deepest  irony,  he  complimented  him  on  having  waged 
a  fine  campaign  in  1812.  Austria's  present  requests  were 
not  reassuring.  While  professing  the  utmost  regard  for 
the  welfare  of  Napoleon,  she  renewed  her  offer  of  media- 
tion in  a  more  pressing  way.  In  fact,  Metternich's  aim 
now  was  to  free  Austria  from  the  threatening  pressure  of 
Napoleon  on  the  west  and  of  Russia  on  the  east.  She  must 
now  assure  to  Europe  a  lasting  peace  —  "  not  a  mere  truce 
in  disguise,  like  all  former  treaties  with  Napoleon  "  —  but 
a  peace  that  would  restrict  the  power  of  France  and  "  es- 
tablish a  balance  of  power  among  the  chief  States."1  Such 
was  the  secret  aim  of  Austria's  mediation.  Obviously,  it 
gave  her  many  advantages.  While  posing  as  mediator, 
she  could  claim  her  share  in  the  territorial  redistribution 
which  must  accompany  the  peace.  The  blessing  awarded 
to  the  peacemaker  must  be  tangible  and  immediate. 

Napoleon's  reply  to  the  ambassador  was  carefully 
guarded.  War  was  not  to  his  interest.  It  would  cost 
more  blood  than  the  Moscow  campaign.  The  great 
hindrance  to  any  settlement  would  be  England.  Russia 
also  seemed  disposed  to  a  fight  a  outrance ;  but  if  the 
Czar  wanted  peace,  it  was  for  him,  not  for  France,  to 
take  the  initiative  :  "  I  cannot  take  the  initiative  :  that 
would  be  like  capitulating  as  if  I  were  in  a  fort :  it  is 
for  the  others  to  send  me  their  proposals."  And  he 
expressed  his  resolve  to  accept  no  disadvantageous  terms 
in  these  notable  words :  "  If  I  concluded  a  dishonourable 
peace,  it  would  be  my  overthrow.  I  am  a  new  man ;  I 
must  pay  the  more  heed  to  public  opinion,  because  I  stand 

1  Metternich's  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  159  ;  Luckwaldt,  op.  cit.,  ch.  vi. 


260  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

in  need  of  it.  The  French  have  lively  imaginations  :  they 
love  fame  and  excitement,  and  are  nervous.  Do  you  know 
the  prime  cause  of  the  fall  of  the  Bourbons?  It  dates  from 
Rossbach."  Benevolent  assurances  as  to  Napoleon's  desire 
for  peace  and  for  the  assembly  of  a  Congress  were  all  that 
Schwarzenberg  could  gain ;  and  his  mission  was  barren 
of  result,  except  to  increase  suspicions  on  both  sides. 

In  fact,  Napoleon  was  playing  his  cards  at  Vienna. 
He  had  sent  Count  Narbonne  thither  on  a  special  mis- 
sion, the  purport  of  which  stands  revealed  in  the  envoy's 
"  verbal  note "  of  April  7th.  In  that  note  Austria  was 
pressed  to  help  France  with  100,000  men,  against  Russia 
and  Prussia,  in  case  they  should  open  hostilities ;  her 
reward  was  to  be  the  rich  province  of  Silesia.  As  for  the 
rest  of  Prussia,  two  millions  of  that  people  were  to  be 
assigned  to  Saxony,  Frederick  William  being  thrust  to 
the  east  of  the  lower  Vistula,  and  left  with  one  million 
subjects.1  Such  was  the  glittering  prize  dangled  before 
Metternich.  But  even  the  prospect  of  regaining  the 
province  torn  away  by  the  great  Frederick  moved  him 
not.  He  judged  the  establishment  of  equilibrium  in 
Europe  to  be  preferable  to  a  mean  triumph  over  Prus- 
sia. To  her  and  to  the  Czar  he  had  secretly  held  out 
hopes  of  succour  in  case  Napoleon  should  prove  intrac- 
table :  and  to  this  course  of  action  he  still  clung.  True, 
he  trampled  on  la  petite  morale  in  neglecting  to  aid  his 
nominal  ally,  Napoleon.  But  to  abandon  him,  if  he 
remained  obdurate,  was,  after  all,  but  an  act  of  treachery 
to  an  individual  who  had  slight  claims  on  Austria,  and 
whose  present  offer  was  alike  immoral  and  insulting. 
Four  days  later  Metternich  notified  to  Russia  and  Prus- 
sia that  the  Emperor  Francis  would  now  proceed  with 
his  task  of  armed  mediation.2 

Austria's  overtures  for  a  general  peace  met  with  no 
encouragement  at  London.     Her  envoy,  Count  Wessen- 

1  See  the  whole  note  in  Luckwaldt,  Append.  No.  4. 

2  Oncken,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  205.  So  too  Metternich's  letter  to  Nessel- 
rode  of  April  21st  ("  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  405,  Eng.  ed.)  :  "  I  beg  of  you 
to  continue  to  confide  in  me.  If  Napoleon  will  be  foolish  enough  to  fight, 
let  us  endeavour  not  to  meet  with  a  reverse,  which  I  feel  to  be  only  too 
possible.     One  battle  lost  for  Napoleon,  and  all  Germany  will  be  under 


xxxm  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  261 

berg,  was  now  treated  with  the  same  cold  reserve  that 
had  been  accorded  to  Lord  Walpole  at  Vienna  early  in 
the  year.  On  April  9th  Castlereagh  informed  him  that 
all  hope  of  peace  had  failed  since  the  "  Ruler  of  France  " 
had  declared  to  the  Legislative  Body  that  the  French 
Dynasty  reigned  and  ivould  continue  to  reign  in  Spain, 
and  that  he  had  already  stated  all  the  sacrifices  that  he 
could  consent  to  make  for  peace. 

"  Whilst  he  [Napoleon]  shall  continue  to  declare  that  none  of  the 
territories  arbitrarily  incorporated  into  the  French  Empire  shall 
become  matter  of  negotiation,  it  is  in  vain  to  hope  that  His  Imperial 
Majesty's  beneficent  intentions  can  by  negotiation  be  accomplished. 
It  is  for  His  Imperial  Majesty  to  consider,  after  a  declaration  in  the 
nature  of  a  defiance  from  the  Ruler  of  France,  a  declaration  highly 
insulting  to  His  Imperial  Majesty  when  his  intervention  for  peace 
had  been  previously  accepted,  whether  the  moment  is  not  arrived  for 
all  the  (ireat  Powers  of  Europe  to  act  in  concert  for  their  common 
interests  and  honour.  To  obtain  for  their  States  what  may  deserve 
the  name  of  peace  they  must  look  again  to  establish  an  Equilibrium 
in  Europe." 

Finally,  the  British  Government  refused  to  lend  itself  to 
a  negotiation  which  must  weaken  and  distract  the  efforts 
of  Russia  and  Prussia.1 

For  the  present  Napoleon  indulged  the  hope  that  the 
bribe  of  Silesia  would  range  Austria's  legions  side  by 
side  with  his  own,  and  with  Poniatowski's  Poles.  Ani- 
mated with  this  hope,  he  left  Paris  before  the  dawn  of 
April  15th  ;  and,  travelling  at  furious  speed,  his  carriage 
rolled  within  the  portals  of  Mainz  in  less  than  forty 
hours.  There  he  stayed  for  a  week,  feeling  every  throb 
of  the  chief  arteries  of  his  advance.  They  beat  full  and 
fast  ;  the  only  bad  symptom  was  the  refusal  of  Saxony 
to  place  her  cavalry  at  his  disposal.  But,  at  the  close  of 
the  week,  Austria's  attitude  gave  him  concern.  It  was 
clear  that  she  had  not  swallowed  the  bait  of  Silesia,  and 
that  her  troops  could  not  be  counted  on. 

1  "F.  0.,"  Austria,  No.  105.  Doubtless,  as  Oncken  has  pointed  out 
with  much  acerbity,  Castlereagh's  knowledge  that  Austria  would  suggest 
the  modification  of  our  maritime  claims  contributed  to  his  refusal  to  con- 
sider her  proposal  for  a  general  peace :  but  I  am  convinced,  from  the  tone 
of  our  records,  that  his  chief  motive  was  his  experience  of  Napoleon's 
intractability  and  a  sense  of  loyalty  to  our  Spanish  allies :  we  were  also 
pledged  to  help  Sweden  and  Russia. 


262  THE  LIFE  OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

At  once  he  takes  precautions.  His  troops  in  Italy  are 
to  be  made  ready,  the  strongholds  of  the  Upper  Danube 
strengthened,  and  his  German  vassals  are  closely  to 
watch  the  policy  of  Vienna.1  He  then  proceeds  to 
Weimar.  There,  on  April  29th,  he  mounts  his  war- 
horse  and  gazes  with  searching  eyes  into  the  columns 
that  are  winding  through  the  Thuringian  vales  towards 
Leipzig.  The  auguries  seem  favourable.  The  men  are 
full  of  ardour  :  the  line  of  march  is  itself  an  inspiration  ; 
and  the  veterans  cheer  the  young  conscripts  with  tales  of 
the  great  day  of  Jena  and  Auerstadt. 

At  the  close  of  April  the  military  situation  was  as 
follows.  Eugene  Beauharnais,  who  commanded  the 
relics  of  the  Grand  Army,  after  suffering  a  reverse  at 
Mockern,  had  retired  to  the  line  of  the  Elbe  ;  and 
French  garrisons  were  thus  left  isolated  in  Danzig, 
Modlin,  Zamosc,  Glogau,  Kustrin,  and  Stettin.2  Napo- 
leon's first  plan  of  an  advance  direct  to  Stettin  and 
Danzig  having  miscarried,  he  now  sought  to  gather  an 
immense  force  as  secretly  as  possible  near  the  Main, 
speedily  to  reinforce  Eugene,  crush  the  heads  of  the 
enemy's  columns,  and,  rolling  them  up  in  disorder,  carry 
the  war  to  the  banks  of  the  Oder,  and  relieve  his  be- 
leaguered garrisons  by  way  of  Leipzig  and  Torgau.  The 
plan  would  have  the  further  advantage  of  bringing  a  for- 
midable force  near  to  the  Austrian  frontier,  and  holding 
fast  the  Hapsburgs  and  Saxons  to  the  French  alliance. 

Meanwhile  the  allied  army  was  pressing  westwards  with 
no  less  determination.  The  Czar  and  King  had  addressed 
a  menacing  summons  to  the  King  of  Saxony  to  join  them, 
but,  receiving  no  response,  invaded  his  States.  There- 
upon Frederick  Augustus  fled  into  Bohemia,  relying  on 
an  offer  from  Vienna  which  guaranteed  him  his  German 
lands  if  he  would  join  the  Hapsburgs  in  their  armed 
mediation.3  For  the  present,  however,  Saxony  was  to  be 
the  battlefield  of  the  two  contending  principles  of  nation- 
ality and  Napoleonic  Imperialism. 

1  Letters  of  April  24th. 

2  Napoleon's  troops  in  Thorn  surrendered  on  April  17th ;  those  in 
Spandau  on  April  24th  (Fain,  "Manuscrit  de  1813,"  vol.  ii.,  ch.  i.). 

8  Oncken,  vol.  ii.,  p.  272. 


xxxiii  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  263 

They  clashed  together  on  the  historic  ground  of  Liitzen. 
Not  only  the  associations  of  the  place,  but  the  reputation 
of  the  leaders,  helped  to  kindle  the  enthusiasm  of  the  rank 
and  file.  On  the  one  side  was  the  great  conqueror  him- 
self, with  faculties  and  prestige  undimmed  even  by  the 
greatest  disaster  recorded  in  the  annals  of  civilized  nations. 
He  was  opposed  by  men  no  less  determined  than  himself. 
The  illness  and  finally  the  death  of  the  obstinate  old  Kutu- 
soff  had  stopped  the  intrigues  of  the  Slav  peace  party, 
hitherto  strong  in  the  Russian  camp  :  and  the  command 
now  devolved  on  Wittgenstein,  a  more  energetic  man, 
whose  heart  was  in  his  work. 

But  the  most  inspiring  influence  was  that  of  Blucher. 
The  staunch  patriot  seemed  to  embody  the  best  qualities  of 
the  old  regime  and  of  the  new  era.  The  rigour  learnt  in 
the  school  of  Frederick  the  Great  was  vivified  by  the  fresh 
young  enthusiasm  of  the  dawning  age  of  nationality.  Not 
that  the  old  soldier  could  appreciate  the  lofty  teachings  of 
Fichte  the  philosopher  and  Schleiermacher  the  preacher. 
But  his  lack  of  learning — he  could  never  write  a  despatch 
without  strange  torturings  of  his  mother-tongue  —  was 
more  than  made  up  by  a  quenchless  love  of  the  Fatherland, 
by  a  robust  common  sense,  which  hit  straight  at  the  mark 
where  subtler  minds  strayed  off  into  side  issues,  by  a  com- 
radeship that  endeared  him  to  every  private,  and  by  a 
courage  that  never  quailed.  And  all  these  gifts,  homely 
but  invaluable  in  a  people's  war,  were  wrought  to  utmost 
tension  by  an  all-absorbing  passion,  hatred  of  Napoleon. 
In  the  dark  days  after  Jena,  when,  pressed  back  to  the 
Baltic,  his  brave  followers  succumbed  to  the  weight  of 
numbers,  he  began  to  store  up  vials  of  fury  against  the 
insolent  conqueror.  Often  he  beguiled  the  weary  hours 
with  lunging  at  an  imaginary  foe,  calling  out  —  Napoleon. 
And  this  almost  Satanic  hatred  bore  the  old  man  through 
seven  years  of  humiliation  ;  it  gave  him  at  seventy-two 
years  of  age  the  energy  of  youth  ;  far  from  being  sated 
by  triumphs  in  Saxony  and  Champagne,  it  nerved  him 
with  new  strength  after  the  shocks  to  mind  and  body 
which  he  sustained  at  Ligny  ;  it  carried  him  and  his  army 
through  the  miry  lanes  of  Wavre  on  to  the  sunset  radiance 
of  Waterloo. 


264  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

What  he  lacked  in  skill  and  science  was  made  up  by  his 
able  coadjutors,  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  the  former 
pre-eminent  in  organization,  the  latter  in  strategy.  After 
organizing  Prussia's  citizen  army,  it  was  Scharnhorst's 
fate  to  be  mortally  wounded  in  the  first  battle  ;  but  his 
place,  as  chief  of  staff,  was  soon  filled  by  Gneisenau,  in 
whose  nature  the  sternness  of  the  warrior  was  happily 
blended  with  the  coolness  of  the  scientific  thinker.  The 
accord  between  him  and  Blucher  was  close  and  cordial  ; 
and  the  latter,  on  receiving  the  degree  of  doctor  of  laws 
from  the  University  of  Oxford,  wittily  acknowledged  his 
debt  to  the  strategist.  "  Well,"  said  he,  "  if  I  am  to  be 
a  doctor,  they  must  make  Gneisenau  an  apothecary;  for 
he  makes  up  the  pills  and  I  then  administer  them." 

On  these  resolute  chiefs  and  their  33,000  Prussians  fell 
the  brunt  of  the  fighting  near  Liitzen.  Wittgenstein,  with 
his  35,000  Russians,  showed  less  energy ;  but  if  a  fourth 
Russian  corps  under  Miloradovitch,  then  on  the  Elster, 
had  arrived  in  time,  the  day  might  have  closed  with  vic- 
tory for  the  allies.  Their  plan  was  to  cross  a  stream, 
called  the  Floss  Graben,  some  five  miles  to  the  south  of 
Liitzen,  storm  the  villages  of  Gross  Gorschen,  Rahna, 
and  Starsiedel,  held  by  the  French  vanguard,  and,  cut- 
ting into  Napoleon's  line  of  march  towards  Liitzen  and 
Leipzig,  throw  it  into  disorder  and  rout.  But  their  great 
enemy  had  recently  joined  his  array  to  that  of  Eugene : 
he  was  in  force,  and  was  then  planning  a  turning  move- 
ment on  the  north,  similar  to  that  which  threatened  his 
south  flank.  Ney,  on  whom  fell  Bliicher's  first  blows, 
had  observed  the  preparations,  and  one  of  his  divisions, 
that  of  Souham,  had  strengthened  the  village  of  Gross 
Gorschen  for  an  obstinate  defence.  The  French  position 
is  thus  described  by  Lord  Cathcart,  who  was  then  present 
at  the  allied  headquarters  : 

"  The  country  is  uncovered  and  open,  but  with  much  variety 
of  hill  and  valley,  and  much  intersected  by  hollow  ways  and  mill- 
streams,  the  former  not  discernible  till  closely  approached.  The 
enemy,  placed  behind  a  long  ridge  and  in  a  string  of  villages, 
with  a  hollow  way  in  front,  and  a  stream  sufficient  to  float  timber  on 
the  left,  waited  the  near  approach  of  the  allies.  He  had  an  immense 
quantity  of  ordnance  :  the  batteries  in  the  open  country  were  sup- 
ported by  masses  of  infantry  in  solid  squares.     The  plan   of  our 


xxxm  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  265 

operations  was  to  attack  Gross  Gbvschen  with  artillery  and  infantry, 
and  meanwhile  to  pierce  the  line,  to  the  enemy's  right  of  the  villages, 
with  a  strong  column  of  cavalry  in  order  to  cut  off  the  troops  in  the 
villages  from  support.  .  .  .  The  cavalry  of  the  Prussian  Reserve,  to 
whose  lot  this  attack  fell,  made  it  with  great  gallantry;  but  the 
showers  of  grapeshot  and  musketry  to  which  they  were  exposed 
in  reaching  the  hollow  way  made  it  impracticable  for  them  to 
penetrate ;  and,  the  enemy  appearing  determined  to  hold  the  villages 
at  any  expense,  the  affair  assumed  the  most  expensive  character  of 
attack  and  defence  of  a  post  repeatedly  taken,  lost,  and  retaken.  The 
cavalry  made  several  attempts  to  break  the  enemy's  line,  and  in  some 
of  their  attacks  succeeded  in  breaking  into  the  squares  and  cutting 
down  the  infantry.  Late  in  the  evening,  Bonaparte,  having  called  in 
the  troops  from  [the  side  of]  Leipzig  and  collected  all  his  reserves, 
made  an  attack  on  the  right  of  the  allies,  supported  by  the  fire  of 
several  batteries  advancing.  The  vivacity  of  this  movement  made  it 
expedient  to  change  the  front  of  our  nearest  brigades  on  our  right ; 
and,  as  the  whole  cavalry  from  our  left  was  ordered  to  the  right  to 
turn  this  attack,  I  was  not  without  hopes  of  witnessing  the  destruction 
of  Bonaparte  and  of  all  his  army ;  but  before  the  cavalry  could  arrive, 
it  became  so  dark  that  nothing  could  be  seen  but  the  flashes  of  the 
guns."  * 

The  desperate  fight  thus  closed  with  a  slight  advan- 
tage to  the  French,  due  to  the  timely  advance  of  Eugene 
with  Macdonald's  corps  against  the  right  flank  of  the 
wearied  allies,  when  it  was  too  late  for  them  to  make 
any  counter-move.  These  had  lost  severely,  and  among 
the  fallen  was  Scharnhorst,  whose  wound  proved  to  be 
mortal.  But  Blucher,  far  from  being  daunted  by  defeat 
or  by  a  wound,  led  seven  squadrons  of  horse  against  the 
victors  after  nightfall,  threw  them  for  a  brief  space  into 
a  panic,  and  nearly  charged  up  to  the  square  which 
sheltered  Napoleon.  The  Saxon  Captain  von  Odeleben, 
who  was  at  the  French  headquarters,  states  that  the 
Emperor  was  for  a  few  minutes  quite  dazed  by  the 
daring  of  this  stroke  ;  and  he  now  had  too  few  squad- 
rons to  venture  on  any  retaliation.  Both  sides  were,  in 
fact,  exhausted.  The  allies  had  lost  10,000  men  killed 
and  wounded,  but  no  prisoners  or  guns  :  the  French 
losses    were   nearly   as   heavy,   and   five   guns    and    800 

1  Cathcart's  report  in  "  F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  85.  Muffling  ("Aus 
meinem  Leben  ")  regards  the  delay  in  the  arrival  of  Miloradovitch,  and  the 
preparations  for  defence  which  the  French  had  had  time  to  make  at  Gross 
Gorschen,  as  the  causes  of  the  allies1  failure.  The  chief  victim  on  the 
French  side  was  Bessieres,  commander  of  the  Guard. 


266  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

prisoners  fell  into  Bliicher's  hands.  Both  armies  camped 
on  the  field  of  battle  ;  but,  as  the  supplies  of  ammunition 
of  the  allies  had  run  low,  and  news  came  to  hand  that 
Lauriston  had  dislodged  Kleist  from  Leipzig,  it  was  de- 
cided to  retreat  towards  Dresden. 

Napoleon  cautiously  followed  them,  leaving  behind 
Ney's  corps,  which  had  suffered  frightfully  at  Gross 
Gorschen ;  and  he  strove  to  inspirit  the  conscripts, 
many  of  whom  had  shown  unsteadiness,  by  proclaiming 
to  the  army  that  the  victory  of  Lutzen  would  rank  above 
Austerlitz,  Jena,  Friedland,  and  Borodino. 

Far  from  showing  dejection,  Alexander  renewed  to 
Cathcart  his  assurance  of  persevering  in  the  war.  At 
Dresden  our  envoy  was  again  assured  (May  7th)  that 
the  allies  would  not  give  in,  but  that  "  Austria  will  wear 
the  cloak  of  mediation  till  the  time  her  immense  force  is 
ready  to  act,  the  24th  instant.  Count  Stadion  is  hourly 
expected  here :  he  will  bring  proposals  of  terms  of  peace 
and  similar  ones  will  be  sent  to  the  French  headquarters. 
Receiving  and  refusing  these  proposals  will  occupy  most 
of  the  time."  In  fact,  Metternich  was  on  the  point  of 
despatching  from  Vienna  two  envoys,  Stadion  to  the 
allies,  Count  Bubna  to  Napoleon,  with  the  offer  of 
Austria's  armed  mediation. 

It  found  him  in  no  complaisant  mood.  He  had  entered 
Dresden  as  a  conqueror:  he  had  bitterly  chidden  the 
citizens  for  their  support  of  the  Prussian  volunteers, 
and  ordered  them  to  beg  their  oAvn  King  to  return 
from  Bohemia.  To  that  hapless  monarch '  he  had  sent 
an  imperious  mandate  to  come  back  and  order  the 
Saxon  troops,  who  obstinately  held  Torgau,  forthwith  to 
hand  it  over  to  the  French.  On  all  sides  his  behests 
were  obeyed,  the  Saxon  troops  grudgingly  ranging 
themselves  under  the  French  eagles.  And  while  he  was 
tearing  Saxony  away  from  the  national  cause,  he  was 
summoned  by  Austria  to  halt.  The  victor  met  the  re- 
quest with  a  flash  of  defiance.  After  a  reproachful 
talk  with  Bubna,  on  May  17th,  he  wrote  two  letters  to 
the  Emperor  Francis.  In  the  more  official  note  he 
assured  him  that  he  desired  peace,  and  that  he  assented 
to  the  opening  of  a  Congress  with  that  aim  in  view,  in 


xxxni  THE  FIRST  SAXON  CAMPAIGN  20: 

which  England,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  even  the  Spanish 
insurgents  might  take  part.  He  therefore  proposed  that 
an  armistice  should  be  concluded  for  the  needful  prep- 
arations. But  in  the  other  letter  he  assured  his  father- 
in-law  that  he  was  ready  to  die  at  the  head  of  all  the 
generous  men  of  France  rather  than  become  the  sport 
of  England.  His  resentment  against  Austria  finds  utter- 
ance in  his  despatch  of  the  same  day,  in  which  he  bids 
Caulaincourt  seek  an  interview  at  once  with  the  Czar  : 
"  The  essential  thing  is  to  have  a  talk  with  him.  .  .  . 
My  intention  is  to  build  him  a  golden  bridge  so  as  to 
deliver  him  from  the  intrigues  of  Aletternich.  If  I  must 
make  sacrifices,  I  prefer  to  make  them  to  a  straightfor- 
ward enemy,  rather  than  to  the  profit  of  Austria,  which 
Power  has  betrayed  my  alliance,  and,  under  the  guise  of 
mediator,  means  to  claim  the  right  of  arranging  every- 
thing." Caulaincourt  is  to  remind  Alexander  how  badly 
Austria  behaved  to  him  in  1812,  and  to  suggest  that  if  he 
treats  at  once  before  losing  another  battle,  he  can  retire 
with  honour  and  with  good  terms  for  Prussia  without  any 
intervention  from  Austria. 

His  other  letters  of  this  time  show  that  it  is  on  the 
H;ipsburgs  that  his  resentment  will  most  heavily  fall. 
Eugene,  who  had  recently  departed  to  organize  the 
forces  in  Italy,  is  urged  to  threaten  Austria  with  not 
fewer  than  80,000  men,  and  to  give  out  that  he  will  soon 
have  150,000  men  under  arms.  And,  while  straining 
every  nerve  in  Germany,  France,  and  Italy,  Napoleon 
asserts  that  there  will  be  an  armistice  for  the  conclusion 
of  a  general  peace.1  But  the  allies  were  not  to  be  duped 
into  a  peace  that  was  no  peace.  They  had  good  grounds 
for  expecting  the  eventual  aid  of  Austria ;  and  when 
Caulaincourt  craved  an  interview,  the  Czar  refused  his 
request,  thus  bringing  affairs  once  more  to  the  arbitra- 
ment of  the  sword.  The  only  effect  of  Caulaincourt's 
mission,  and  of  Napoleon's  bitter  words  to  Bubna,  was 
to  alarm  Austria. 

On  their  side,  the  allies  desired  to  risk  no  further 
check  ;  and  they  had  therefore  taken  up  a  strong  position 

1  "Corresp.,"  Nos.  20017-20031.  For  his  interview  with  Bubna,  see 
Luckwaldt,  p.  257. 


268  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

near  Bautzen,  where  they  could  receive  reinforcements 
and  effectually  cover  Silesia.  Their  extreme  left  rested 
on  the  spurs  of  the  Lusatian  mountains,  while  their  long 
front  of  some  four  miles  in  extent  stretched  northwards 
along  a  ridge  that  rose  between  the  River  Spree  and 
an  affluent,  and  bent  a  convex  threatening  brow  against 
that  river  and  town.  There  they  were  joined  by  Bar- 
clay, whose  arrival  brought  their  total  strength  to  82,000 
men.  But  again  Napoleon  had  the  advantage  in  num- 
bers. Suddenly  calling  in  Ney's  and  Lauriston's  force 
of  60,000  men,  which  had  been  sent  north  so  as  to 
threaten  Berlin,  he  confronted  the  allies  with  at  least 
130,000  men.1 

On  the  first  day  of  fighting  (May  20th)  the  French 
seized  the  town  of  Bautzen,  but  failed  to  drive  the  allies 
from  the  hilly,  wooded  ground  on  the  south.  The  fight- 
ing on  the  next  day  was  far  more  serious.  At  dawn  of 
a  beautiful  spring  morning,  in  a  country  radiant  with 
verdure  and  diversified  by  trim  villages,  the  thunder  of 
cannon  and  the  sputter  of  skirmishers'  lines  presaged  a 
stubborn  conflict.  The  allied  sovereigns  from  the  com- 
manding ridge  at  their  centre  could  survey  all  the  enemy's 
movements  on  the  hills  opposite ;  and  our  commissary, 
Colonel  (afterwards  Sir  Hudson)  Lowe,  has  thus  de- 
scribed his  view  of  Napoleon,  who  was  near  the  French 
centre  : 

"  He  was  about  fifty  paces  in  front  of  the  others,  accompanied  by 
one  of  his  marshals,  with  whom  he  walked  backwards  and  forwards 
for  nearly  an  hour.  He  was  dressed  in  a  plain  uniform  coat  and  a 
star  [nc],  with  a  plain  hat,  different  from  that  of  his  marshals  and 
generals,  which  was  feathered.  In  the  rear,  and  to  the  left  of  the 
ridge  on  which  he  stood,  were  his  reserves.  They  were  formed  in 
lines  of  squadrons  and  battalions,  appearing  like  a  large  column  of 
battalions:  their  number  must  have  been  between  15,000  and  20,000. 
After  he  had  retired  from  the  eminence,  several  of  the  battalions 
were  observed  to  be  drawn  off  to  his  left,  and  to  be  replaced  by  others 
from  the  rear :  the  masses  of  his  reserves  appeared  to  suffer  scarcely 
any  diminution.  .  .  .  Those  troops  which  were  to  act  against  our 
right  continued  their  march  :  the  others,  opposite  our  centre,  planted 
themselves  about  midway  on  the  slope,  which  descended  from  the 
ridge  towards  our  position ;  and,  under  the  protection  of  the  guns  that 

1  Bernhardi's  "  Toll,"  vol.  iii.,  pp.  490-492.  Marinont  gives  the  French 
150,000 ;  Thiers  says  100,000. 


xxxiii  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  269 

crowned  the  ridge,  they  appeared  to  set  our  cavalry  at  defiance.  .  .  . 
Yet  there  was  no  forward  movement  in  that  part.  To  turn  and  over- 
throw our  flanks,  particularly  the  right  one,  appeared  now  to  be  their 
main  object." 

This  was  the  case.  Napoleon  was  employing  his  usual 
tactics  of  assailing  the  allies  everywhere  by  artillery  and 
musketry  fire,  so  as  to  keep  them  in  their  already  very 
extended  position  until  he  could  deliver  a  decisive  blow. 
This  was  dealt,  though  somewhat  tardily,  by  Ney  with  his 
huge  corps  at  the  allied  right,  where  Barclay's  5,000  Rus- 
sians were  outmatched  and  driven  back.  The  village  of 
Preititz  was  lost,  and  with  it  the  allies'  communications 
were  laid  bare.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
recover  the  village ;  and  Bliicher,  at  the  right  centre, 
hard  pressed  though  he  was,  sent  down  Kleist's  brigade, 
which  helped  to  wrench  the  prize  from  that  Marshal's 
grasp.  But  Ney  was  too  strong  to  be  kept  off,  even  by 
the  streams  of  cannon-shot  poured  upon  his  dense  columns. 
With  the  help  of  Lauriston's  corps,  he  again  slowly 
pressed  on,  began  to  envelop  the  allies'  right,  and  threat- 
ened to  cut  off  their  retreat.  Bliicher  was  also  furiously 
assailed  by  Marmont  and  Bertrand.  On  the  left,  it  is 
true,  the  Russians  had  beaten  back  Oudinot  with  heavy 
loss ;  but,  as  Napoleon  had  not  yet  seriously  drawn  on  his 
reserves,  the  allied  chiefs  decided  to  draw  off  their  hard- 
pressed  troops  from  this  unequal  contest,  where  victory 
was  impossible  and  delay  might  place  everything  in 
jeopardy. 

The  retirement  began  late  in  the  afternoon.  Covered 
by  the  fire  of  a  powerful  artillery  from  successive  crests, 
and  by  the  charges  of  their  dauntless  cavalry,  the  allies 
beat  off  every  effort  of  the  French  to  turn  the  retreat  into 
a  rout.  In  vain  did  Napoleon  press1  the  pursuit.  As  at 
Lutzen,  he  had  cause  to  mourn  the  loss  in  the  plains  of 
Russia  of  those  living  waves  that  had  swept  his  enemies 
from  many  a  battlefield.  But  now  their  columns  refused 
to  melt  away.  They  filed  off,  unbroken  and  defiant,  under 
the  covering  wings  of  Uhlans  and  Cossacks.1 

1  In  his  bulletin  Napoleon  admitted  having  lost  11,000  to  12,000  killed 
and  wounded  in  the  two  days  at  Bautzen  ;  his  actual  losses  were  prob- 
ably over  20,000.  He  described  the  allies  as  having  150,000  to  160,000 
men,  nearly  double  their  actual  numbers. 


270  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

The  next  day  witnessed  the  same  sight,  the  allies  drawing 
steadily  back,  showering  shot  from  every  post  of  vantage, 
and  leaving  not  a  prisoner  or  a  caisson  in  the  conquerors' 
hands.  "  What  !  "  said  Napoleon,  "  after  such  a  butchery, 
no  results  ?  no  prisoners  ?  "  Scarcely  had  he  spoken  these 
words,  when  a  cannon-ball  tore  through  his  staff,  killing 
one  general  outright,  wounding  another,  and  shattering 
the  frame  of  Duroc,  Due  de  Friuli.  Napoleon  was  deeply 
affected  by  this  occurrence.  He  dismounted,  went  into 
the  cottage  where  Duroc  was  taken,  and  for  some  time 
pressed  his  hand  in  silence.  Then  he  uttered  the  words  : 
"  Duroc,  there  is  another  world  where  we  shall  meet  again." 
To  which  the  Grand  Marshal  made  reply  :  "  Yes,  sire  ;  bat 
it  will  be  in  thirty  years,  when  you  have  triumphed  over 
your  enemies  and  realized  all  the  hopes  of  your  country. " 
After  a  long  pause  of  painful  silence,  the  Emperor  mourn- 
fully left  the  man  for  whom  he  felt,  perhaps,  the  liveliest 
sympathy  and  affection  he  ever  bestowed.  Under  Duroc's 
cold,  reserved  exterior  the  Emperor  knew  that  there  beat 
a  true  heart,  devoted  and  loyal  ever  since  they  had  first 
met  at  Toulon.  He  received  no  one  else  for  the  rest  of 
that  night,  and  a  hush  of  awe  fell  on  the  camp  at  the 
unwonted  signs  of  grief  of  their  great  leader. 

Possibly  this  loss  strengthened  the  Emperor's  desire 
for  a  truce,  a  feeling  not  lessened  by  a  mishap  befalling 
one  of  his  divisions,  which  fell  into  an  ambush  laid  by 
the  Prussians  at  Hainau,  and  lost  1,500  men  and  18  guns. 

For  their  part,  the  allies  equally  desired  a  suspension  of 
arms.  Their  forces  were  in  much  confusion.  Alexander 
had  superseded  Wittgenstein  by  Barclay,  who  now  insisted 
on  withdrawing  the  Russians  into  Poland.  To  this  the 
Prussian  staff  offered  the  most  strenuous  resistance.  Such 
a  confession  of  weakness,  urged  Muffling,  would  dishearten 
the  troops  and  intimidate  the  Austrian  statesmen  who  had 
promised  speedy  succour.  Let  the  allies  cling  to  the  shel- 
tering rampart  of  the  Riesengebirge,  where  they  might 
defy  Napoleon's  attacks  and  await  the  white-coats.  The 
fortress  of  Schweidnitz  would  screen  their  retreat,  and  the 
Landwehr  of  Silesia  would  make  good  the  gaps  in  their 
ranks.  Towards  Schweidnitz,  then,  the  Czar  ordered  Bar- 
clay to  retreat. 


xxxih  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  271 

There  two  disappointments  awaited  them.  The  forti- 
fications, dismantled  by  the  French  in  1807,  were  still  in 
disrepair,  and  the  20,000  muskets  bought  in  Austria  for 
the  Silesian  levies  were  without  touch-holes  !  Again  Bar- 
clay declared  that  he  must  retreat  into  Poland,  and  only 
the  offer  of  a  truce  by  Napoleon  deterred  him  from  that 
step,  which  must  have  compromised  the  whole  military 
and  political  situation.  What  would  not  Napoleon  have 
given  to  know  the  actual  state  of  things  at  the  allied  head- 
quarters ?  1  But  no  spy  warned  him  of  the  truth  ;  and  as 
his  own  instincts  prompted  him  to  turn  aside,  so  as  to  pre- 
pare condign  chastisement  for  Austria,  he  continued  to 
treat  for  an  armistice. 

"  Nothing,"  he  wrote  to  Eugene  on  June  2nd,  "  can  be 
more  perfidious  than  that  Court.  If  I  granted  her  present 
demands,  she  would  afterwards  ask  for  Italy  and  Germany. 
Certainly  she  shall  have  nothing  from  me."  Events 
served  to  strengthen  his  resolve.  The  French  entered 
Breslau  in  triumph,  and  raised  the  siege  of  Glogau.  The 
coalition  seemed  to  be  tottering.  That  the  punishment 
dealt  to  the  allies  and  Austria  might  be  severe  and  final, 
he  only  needed  a  few  weeks  for  the  reorganization  of  his 
once  formidable  cavalry.  Then  he  could  vent  his  rage 
upon  Austria.  Then  he  could  overthrow  the  Hungarian 
horse,  and  crumple  up  the  ill-trained  Austrian  foot.  A 
short  truce,  he  believed,  was  useless  :  it  would  favour  the 
allies  more  than  the  French.  And,  under  the  specious 
plea  that  the  discussion  of  a  satisfactory  peace  must  take 
up  at  least  forty  days,  he  ordered  his  envoy,  Caulaincourt, 
to  insist  on  a  space  of  time  which  would  admit  of  the  French 
forces  being  fully  equipped  in  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  Illyria. 
■  If,"  he  wrote  to  Caulaincourt  on  June  4th,  "  we  did  not 
wish  to  treat  with  a  view  to  peace,  we  should  not  be  so 
stupid  as  to  treat  for  an  armistice  at  the  present  time." 
And  he  urged  him  to  jnsist  on  the  limit  of  July  20th, 
"always  on  the  same  reasoning,  namely,  that  we  must 
have  forty  full  days  to  see  if  we  can  come  to  an  under- 
standing." Far  different  was  his  secret  warning  to 
General  Clarke,  the  Minister  of  War.  To  him  he  wrote 
on  June  2nd  : 

1  Muffling,  "Aus  meinem  Leben." 


272  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

"  If  I  can,  I  will  wait  for  the  month  of  September  to  deal  great 
blows.  I  wish  then  to  be  in  a  position  to  crush  my  enemies,  though 
it  is  possible  that,  when  Austria  sees  me  about  to  do  so,  she  may  make 
use  of  her  pathetic  and  sentimental  style,  in  order  to  recognize  the 
chimerical  and  ridiculous  nature  of  her  pretensions.  I  have  wished  to 
write  you  this  letter  so  that  you  may  thoroughly  know  my  thoughts 
once  for  all." 

And  to  Maret,  his  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  he 
wrote  on  the  same  day  : 

"  We  must  gain  time,  and  to  gain  time  without  displeasing  Austria, 
we  must  use  the  same  language  we  have  used  for  the  last  six  months 
—  that  we  can  do  everything  if  Austria  is  our  ally.  .  .  .  Work  on  this, 
beat  about  the  bush,  and  gain  time.  .  .  .  You  can  embroider  on  this 
canvas  for  the  next  two  months,  and  find  matter  for  sending  twenty 
couriers." x 

In  such  cases,  where  Napoleon's  diplomatic  assurances 
are  belied  by  his  secret  military  instructions,  no  one  who 
has  carefully  studied  his  career  can  doubt  which  course 
would  be  adopted.  The  armistice  was  merely  the  pause 
that  would  be  followed  by  a  fiercer  onset,  unless  the 
allies  and  Austria  bent  before  his  will.  Of  this  they  gave 
no  sign  even  after  the  blow  of  Bautzen.  In  the  negotia- 
tions concerning  the  armistice  they  showed  no  timidity ; 
and  when,  on  June  4th,  it  was  signed  at  Poischwitz  up  to 
July  20th,  Napoleon  felt  some  doubts  whether  he  had  not 
shown  too  much  complaisance. 

It  was  so:  in  granting  a  suspension  of  arms  he  had 
signed  his  own  death  warrant. 

The  news  that  reached  him  at  Dresden  in  the  month 
of  June  helped  to  stiffen  his  resolve  once  more.  Davoust 
and  Vandamme  had  succeeded  in  dispersing  the  raw  levies 
of  North  Germany  and  in  restoring  Napoleon's  authority 
at  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser  ;  and  in  this  they 
now  had  the  help  of  the  Danes. 

For  some  time  the  allies  had  been  seeking  to  win  over 
Denmark.  But  there  was  one  insurmountable  barrier  in 
the  way,  the  ambition  of  Bernadotte.  As  we  have  seen, 
he  was  desirous  of  signalizing  his  prospective  succession 

1  "Lettres  incites. "  So  too  his  letters  to  Eugene  of  June  11th  and 
July  1st;  and  of  June  11th,  17th,  July  6th  and  29th,  to  Augereau,  wh» 
was  to  threaten  Austria  from  Bavaria. 


xxxm  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  273 

to  the  Swedish  throne  by  bringing  to  his  adopted  country 
a  land  that  would  amply  recompense  it  for  the  loss  of  Fin- 
land.1 This  could  only  be  found  in  Norway,  then  united 
with  Denmark  ;  and  this  was  the  price  of  Swedish  suc- 
cour, to  which  the  Czar  had  assented  during  the  war  of 
1812.  For  reasons  which  need  not  be  detailed  here, 
Swedish  help  was  not  then  forthcoming.  But  early  in 
1813  it  was  seen  that  a  diversion  caused  by  the  landing 
of  30,000  Swedes  in  North  Germany  might  be  most  valu- 
able, and  it  was  especially  desired  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment. Still,  England  was  loth  to  gain  the  alliance  of 
Bernadotte  at  the  price  of  Norway,  which  must  drive 
Denmark  into  the  arms  of  France.  Castlereagh,  there- 
fore, sought  to  tempt  him  by  the  offer  of  our  recent  con- 
quest of  Guadeloupe.  Or,  if  he  must  have  Norway,  would 
not  Denmark  give  her  assent  if  she  received  Swedish 
Pomerania  and  Liibeck  ?  Bernadotte  himself  once  sug- 
gested that  he  would  be  satisfied  with  the  Bishopric  of 
Trondjem,  the  northern  part  of  Norway,  if  he  could  gain 
no  compensation  for  Denmark  in  Germany.2 

This  offer  was  tentatively  made.  It  was  all  one. 
Denmark  would  not  hear  of  the  cession  of  Norway  or 
any  part  of  it  ;  and  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
with  England  she  even  put  in  a  claim  to  the  Hanse 
Towns,  which  was  at  once  rejected.  As  Denmark  was 
obdurate,  Bernadotte  insisted  that  Sweden  should  gain 
the  whole  of  Norway  as  the  price  of  her  help  to  the 
allies.  By  the  treaty  of  Stockholm  (March  3rd,  1813) 
we  acceded  to  the  Russo- Swedish  compact  of  the  pre- 
vious year,  which  assigned  Norway  to  Sweden  :  we  also 
promised  to  cede  Guadeloupe  to  Bernadotte,  and  to  pay 
£1,000,000  towards  the  support  of  the  Swedish  troops 
serving  against  Napoleon.3  In  the  middle  of  May  it 
was  known  at  Copenhagen  that  nothing  was  to  be  hoped 
for   from  Russia  and  England.       The   Danes,    therefore, 

1  See  his  conversation  with  our  envoy,  Thornton,  reported  by  the  latter 
in  the  "Castlereagh  Letters,"  2nd  series,  vol.  iv.,  p.  314. 

2  "  Castlereagh  Letters,"  2nd  series,  vol.  iv.,  p.  344. 

8  Garden,  vol.  xiv.,  p.  356.     We  also  stipulated  that  Sweden  should  not 

import  slaves  into  Guadeloupe,  and  should  repress  the  slave  trade.     When, 

I  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  that  Island  was  given  back  to  France,  we  paid 

I  Bernadotte  a  money  indemnity. 
VOL.   II  —  T 


274  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ranged  themselves  on  the  French  side,  with  results  that 
were  to  prove  fatal  to  the  welfare  of  their  kingdom. 

Thus  the  bargain  which  Bernadotte  drove  with  the 
allies  leagued  Denmark  against  them,  and  thereby  hin- 
dered the  liberation  of  North  Germany.  But,  such  is 
the  irony  of  fate,  the  transfer  of  Norway  from  Denmark 
to  Sweden  has  had  a  permanence  in  which  Napoleon's 
territorial  arrangements  have  been  signally  lacking. 

Bernadotte  landed  at  Stralsund  with  24,000  men,  on 
May  18th.  But  the  organization  of  his  troops  for  the 
campaign  was  so  slow  that  he  could  send  no  effective 
help  to  the  Cossacks  and  patriots  at  Hamburg.  His 
seeming  lethargy  at  once  aroused  the  Czar's  suspicions. 
This  the  Swedish  Prince  Royal  speedily  detected  ;  and, 
on  hearing  of  the  armistice,  he  feared  that  another  Tilsit 
would  be  the  result.  In  a  passionate  letter,  of  June  10th, 
he  begged  Alexander  not  to  accept  peace  :  "  To  accept  a 
peace  dictated  by  Napoleon  is  to  rear  a  sepulchre  for 
Europe  :  and  if  this  misfortune  happens,  only  England 
and  Sweden  can  remain  intact." 

This  was  the  real  Bernadotte.  Those  who  called  him  a 
disguised  friend  of  Napoleon  little  knew  the  depth  of  his 
hatred  for  the  Emperor,  a  hatred  which  was  even  then 
compassing  the  earth  for  means  of  overthrowing  him, 
and  saw  in  the  person  of  a  lonely  French  exile  beyond  the 
Atlantic  an  instrument  of  vengeance.  Already  he  had 
bidden  his  old  comrade  in  arms,  Moreau,  to  come  over  and 
direct  the  people's  war  against  the  tyrant  who  had  exiled 
him  ;  and  the  victor  of  Hohenlinden  was  soon  to  land  at 
Stralsund  and  spend  his  last  days  in  serving  against  the 
tricolour. 

For  the  present  the  prospects  of  the  allies  seemed 
gloomy  indeed.  In  the  south-east  they  had  lost  all  the 
land  up  to  Breslau  and  Glogau  ;  and  in  North  Germany 
Davoust  began  to  turn  Hamburg  into  a  great  fortress. 
This  was  in  obedience  to  Napoleon's  orders.  "  I  shall 
never  feel  assured,"  the  Emperor  wrote  to  his  Marshal, 
"until  Hamburg  can  be  looked  on  as  a  stronghold  pro- 
visioned for  several  months  and  prepared  in  every  way  for 
a  long  defence." — The  ruin  of  commercial  interests  was 
naught  to  him  ;  and  when  Savary  ventured  to  hint  at  the 


xxxm  THE   FIRST   SAXON   CAMPAIGN  275 

discontent  caused  in  French  mercantile  circles  by  these 
steps,  he  received  a  sharp  rebuke  :  "  .  .  .  The  cackling  of 
the  Paris  bankers  matters  very  little  to  me.  I  am  having 
Hamburg  fortified.  I  am  having  a  naval  arsenal  formed 
there.  Within  a  few  months  it  will  be  one  of  my  strong- 
est fortresses.  I  intend  to  keep  a  standing  army  of  15,000 
men  there."1  His  plan  was  ruthlessly  carried  out.  The 
wealth  of  Hamburg  was  systematically  extorted  in  order 
to  furnish  means  for  a  completer  subjection.  Boundless 
exactions,  robbery  of  the  bank,  odious  oppression  of  all 
classes,  these  were  the  first  steps.  Twenty  thousand 
persons  were  thereafter  driven  out,  first  the  young  and 
strong  as  being  dangerous,  then  the  old  and  weak  as  being 
useless  ;  and  a  once  prosperous  emporium  of  trade  became 
Napoleon's  chief  northern  stronghold,  a  centre  of  hope  for 
French  and  Danes,  and  a  stimulus  to  revenge  for  every 
patriotic  Teuton.2 

Yet  the  patriots  were  not  cast  down  by  recent  events. 
Their  one  desire  was  for  the  renewal  of  war  :  their  one 
fear  was  that  the  diplomatists  would  once  more  barter 
away  German  independence.  "  Our  people,"  cried  Karl 
Miiller,  "  is  still  too  lazy  because  it  is  too  wealthy.  Let 
us  learn,  as  the  Russians  did,  to  go  round  and  burn,  and 
then  find  ourselves  dagger  and  poison,  as  the  Spaniards 
did.  Against  those  two  peoples  Napoleon's  troops  could 
effect  nothing."  And  while  gloom  and  doubt  hung  over 
Germany,  a  cheering  ray  shot  forth  once  more  from  the 
south-west.  At  the  close  of  June  came  the  news  that 
Wellington  had  utterly  routed  the  French  at  Vittoria. 

1  "  Lettres  ingdites  de  Napoleon,"  June  18th,  1813.  See  too  that  of  July 
16th,  ibid. 

2  Letters  of  F.  Perthes. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

VITTORIA  AND  THE  ARMISTICE 

It  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work  to  describe 
in  detail  the  campaign  that  culminated  at  Vittoria.  Our 
task  must  be  limited  to  showing  what  was  the  position  of 
affairs  at  the  close  of  1812,  what  were  the  Emperor's  plans 
for  holding  part,  at  least,  of  Spain,  and  why  they  ended  in 
utter  failure. 

The  causes  which  had  all  along  weakened  the  French 
operations  in  Spain  operated  in  full  force  during  the  cam- 
paign of  1812.  The  jealousy  of  the  Marshals,  and,  still 
more,  their  insubordination  to  King  Joseph,  prevented 
that  timely  concentration  of  force  by  which  the  Emperor 
won  his  greatest  triumphs.  Discordant  aims  and  grudging 
co-operation  marked  their  operations.  Military  writers 
have  often  been  puzzled  to  account  for  the  rash  moves  of 
Marmont,  which  brought  on  him  the  crushing  blow  of 
Salamanca.  Had  he  waited  but  a  few  days  before  pressing 
Wellington  hard,  he  would  have  been  reinforced  by  King 
Joseph  with  14,000  men.1  But  he  preferred  to  risk  all  on 
a  last  dashing  move  rather  than  to  wait  for  the  King  and 
contribute,  as  second  in  command,  to  securing  a  substantial 
success. 

The  correspondence  of  Joseph  before  and  after  Sala- 
manca is  instructive.  We  see  him  unable  to  move  quickly 
to  the  support  of  Marmont,  because  the  French  Army  of 
the  North  neglects  to  send  him  the  detachment  needed  for 
the  defence  of  Madrid  ;  and  when,  on  hearing  the  news  of 
Salamanca,  he  orders  Soult  to  evacuate  Andalusia  so  as  to 
concentrate  forces  for  the  recovery  of  the  capital,  his  com- 
mand is  for  some  time  disobeyed.  When,  at  last,  Joseph, 
Soult,  and  Suchet  concentrate  their  forces  for  a  march  on 

1  Joseph  to  Marmont,  July  21st,  1812. 
276 


chap,  xxxiv        VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  277 

Madrid,  Wellington  is  compelled  to  retire.  Pushing  on 
his  rear  with  superior  forces,  Joseph  then  seeks  to  press 
on  a  battle  ;  but  again  Soult  moves  so  slowly  that  Welling- 
ton is  able  to  draw  off  his  men  and  make  good  his  retreat 
to  Ciudad  Rodrigo.1 

Apparently  Joseph  came  off  victor  from  the  campaign 
of  1812  ;  but  the  withdrawal  of  French  troops  towards 
Madrid  and  the  valley  of  the  Douro  had  fatal  conse- 
quences. The  south  was  at  once  lost  to  the  French  ;  and 
the  sturdy  mountaineers  of  Biscay,  Navarre,  and  Arragon 
formed  large  bands  whose  persistent  daring  showed  that 
the  north  was  far  from  conquered.  Encouraged  by  the 
presence  of  a  small  British  force,  they  seized  on  most  of 
the  northern  ports  ;  and  their  chief,  Mina,  was  able  to 
meet  the  French  northern  army  on  almost  equal  terms. 
In  the  east,  Suchet  held  his  own  against  the  Spaniards 
and  an  Anglo-Sicilian  expedition.  But  in  regard  to  the 
rest  of  Spain,  Soult's  gloomy  prophecy  was  fulfilled  : 
"  The  loss  of  Andalusia  and  the  raising  of  the  siege  of 
Cadiz  are  events  whose  results  will  be  felt  throughout  the 
whole  of  Europe." 

The  Spanish  Cortes,  or  Parliament,  long  cooped  up  in 
Cadiz,  now  sought  to  put  in  force  the  recently  devised 
democratic  constitution.  It  was  hailed  with  joy  by 
advanced  thinkers  in  the  cities,  and  with  loathing  by  the 
clergy,  the  nobles,  the  wealthy,  and  the  peasants.  But, 
though  the  Cortes  sowed  the  seeds  of  political  discord, 
they  took  one  very  commendable  step.  They  appointed 
Wellington  generalissimo  of  all  the  Spanish  armies  ;  and, 
in  a  visit  which  he  paid  to  the  Cortes  at  Christmastide,  he 
prepared  for  a  real  co-operation  of  Spanish  forces  in  the 
next  campaign. 

At  that  time  Napoleon  was  uneasily  looking  into  the 
state  of  Spanish  affairs.  As  soon  as  he  mastered  the 
contents  of  the  despatches  from  Madrid  he  counselled  a 
course  of  action  that  promised,  at  any  rate,  to  postpone 
the  overthrow  of  his  power.  The  advice  is  set  forth  in 
letters  written  on  January  4th  and  February  12th  by  the 
Minister   of   War,    General    Clarke  ;    for   Napoleon    had 

1  "M6ms.  du  Roi  Joseph,"  vols.  viii.  and  ix.;  Napier,  bk.  xix.,  ch.  v. 


278  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

practically  ceased  to  correspond  with  his  brother.  In  the 
latter  of  these  despatches  Clarke  explained  in  some  detail 
the  urgent  need  of  acting  at  once,  while  the  English  were 
inactive,  so  as  to  stamp  out  the  ever-spreading  flame  of 
revolt  in  the  northern  provinces.  Two  French  armies, 
that  of  the  North  and  the  so-called  "  Army  of  Portugal," 
were  to  be  told  off  for  this  duty  ;  and  Joseph  was  in- 
formed that  his  armies  of  the  south  and  of  the  centre 
would  for  the  present  suffice  to  hold  the  British  in  check. 
As  to  Joseph's  general  course  of  action,  it  was  thus  pre- 
scribed : 

"The  Emperor  commands  me  to  reiterate  to  your  Majesty  that  the 
use  of  Valladolid  as  a  residence  and  as  headquarters  is  an  indispen- 
sable preliminary.  From  that  place  must  be  sent  out  on  the  Burgos 
road,  and  on  other  fit  points,  the  troops  which  are  to  strengthen  or  to 
second  the  army  of  the  north.  Madrid,  and  even  Valencia,  form 
parts  of  this  system  only  as  posts  to  be  held  by  your  extreme  left,  not 
as  places  to  be  kept  by  a  concentration  of  forces.  .  .  .  To  occupy  Val- 
ladolid and  Salamanca,  to  use  the  utmost  exertion  to  pacify  Navarre 
and  Arragon,  to  keep  the  communication  with  France  rapid  and  safe, 
to  be  always  ready  to  take  the  offensive  —  these  are  the  Emperor's 
instructions  for  the  campaign,  and  the  principles  on  which  all  its 
operations  ought  to  be  founded.  .  .  ."  1 

A  fortnight  later,  Clarke  bade  the  King  threaten  Ciudad 
Rodrigo  so  as  to  make  Wellington  believe  that  the 
French  would  invade  Portugal.  He  was  also  to  lay  heavy 
contributions  on  Madrid  and  Toledo.  In  fact,  the  capi- 
tal was  to  be  held  only  as  long  as  it  could  be  squeezed. 

Such  were  the  plans.  They  show  clearly  that  the 
Emperor  was  impressed  with  the  need  of  crushing  the 
rising  in  the  north  of  Spain  ;  for  he  ordered  as  great  a 
force  against  Mina  and  his  troublesome  bands  as  he 
deemed  necessary  to  watch  the  Portuguese  frontier. 
Clausel  was  charged  to  stamp  out  the  northern  rising, 
and  Napoleon  seems  to  have  judged  that  this  hardy 
fighter  would  end  this  tedious  task  before  Wellington 
dealt  any  serious  blows.  The  miscalculation  was  to  be 
fatal.  Mina  was  not  speedily  to  be  beaten,  nor  was  the 
British  general  the  slow  unenterprising  leader  that  the 
Emperor  took  him  to  be.  And  then  again,  in  spite  of  all 
the  experiences  of  the  past,  Napoleon  failed  to  allow  for 

1 "  M^moires  du  Roi  Joseph,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  195. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  279 

the  delays  caused  by  the  capture  of  his  couriers,  or  by 
their  long  detours.  Yet,  never  were  these  more  serious. 
Clarke's  first  urgent  despatch,  that  of  January  4th,  did 
not  reach  the  King  until  February  16th.1  When  its 
directions  were  being  doubtfully  obe}Ted,  those  quoted 
above  arrived  on  March  12th,  and  led  to  changes  in  the 
disposition  of  the  troops.  Thus  the  forces  opposed  to 
Wellington  were  weakened  in  order  to  crush  the  northern 
revolt,  and  yet  these  detachments  were  only  sent  north  at 
the  close  of  March  for  a  difficult  enterprise  which  was  not 
to  be  completed  before  the  British  leader  threw  his  sword 
decisively  into  the  scales  of  war. 

Joseph  has  been  severely  blamed  for  his  tardy  action  : 
but,  in  truth,  he  was  in  a  hopeless  impasse :  on  all  sides 
he  saw  the  walls  of  his  royal  prison  house  closing  in.  The 
rebels  in  the  north  cut  off  the  French  despatches,  thus 
forestalling  his  movements  and  delaying  by  some  weeks 
his  execution  of  Napoleon's  plans.  Worst  of  all,  the 
Emperor  withdrew  the  pith  and  marrow  of  his  forces  : 
1,200  officers,  6,000  non-commissioned  officers,  and  some 
24,000  of  the  most  seasoned  soldiers  filed  away  towards 
France  to  put  strength  and  firmness  into  the  new  levies 
of  the  line,  or  to  fill  out  again  the  skeleton  battalions  and 
squadrons  of  the  Imperial  Guard.2 

It  is  strange  that  Napoleon  did  not  withdraw  all  his 
troops  from  Spain.  They  still  exceeded  150,000  men  ; 
and  yet,  after  he  had  flung  away  army  after  army,  the 
Spaniards  were  everywhere  in  arms,  except  in  Valencia. 
The  north  defied  all  the  efforts  of  Clausel  for  several 
weeks,  until  he  declared  that  it  would  take  50,000  men 
three  months  to  crush  the  mountaineers.3  Above  all, 
Wellington  was  known  to  be  mustering  a  formidable  force 
on  the  Portuguese  borders.  In  truth,  Napoleon  seems 
long  to  have  been  afflicted  with  political  colour  blindness 
in    Spanish   affairs.     Even   now   he  only  dimly  saw  the 

1  Napier  and  Alison  say  March  18th,  which  is  refuted  by  the  "M6ms. 
du  Roi  Joseph,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  131. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  ix.,  p.  464. 

8  As  a  matter  of  fact  he  had  50,000  there  for  three  months,  and  did  not 
succeed.  See  Clarke's  letter  to  Clausel,  "Mgms.  du  Roi  Joseph,"  vol. 
ix.,  p.  251. 


280  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

ridiculous  falsity  of  his  brother's  position  —  a  parvenu 
among  the  proudest  nobility  in  the  world,  a  bankrupt 
King  called  upon  to  keep  up  regal  pomp  before  a  ceremoni- 
ous race,  a  benevolent  ruler  forced  to  levy  heavy  loans 
and  contributions  on  a  sensitive  populace  whose  goodwill 
he  earnestly  strove  to  gain,  an  easy-going  epicure  spurred 
on  to  impetuous  action  by  orders  from  Paris  which  he 
dared  not  disregard  and  could  not  execute,  a  peace-loving 
valetudinarian  upon  whom  was  thrust  the  task  of  controll- 
ing testy  French  Marshals,  and  of  holding  a  nation  in 
check  and  Wellington  at  bay. 

The  concentration  on  which  Napoleon  laid  such  stress 
would  doubtless  have  proved  a  most  effective  step  had  the 
French  forces  on  the  Douro  been  marshalled  by  an  able 
leader.  But  here,  again,  the  situation  had  been  fatally 
compromised  by  the  recall  of  the  ablest  of  the  French 
commanders  in  Spain.  Wellington  afterwards  said  that 
Soult  was  second  only  to  Massena  among  the  French  Mar- 
shals pitted  against  him.  He  had  some  defects.  "  He 
did  not  quite  understand  a  field  of  battle  :  he  was  an 
excellent  tactician,  knew  very  well  how  to  bring  his  troops 
up  to  the  field,  but  not  so  well  how  to  use  them  when 
he  had  brought  them  up."1  But  the  fact  remains  that, 
with  the  exception  of  his  Oporto  failure,  Soult  came  with 
credit,  if  not  glory,  out  of  every  campaign  waged  against 
Wellington.     Yet  he  was  now  recalled. 

Indeed,  this  vain  and  ambitious  man  had  mortally 
offended  King  Joseph.  After  Salamanca  he  had  treated 
him  with  gross  disrespect.  Not  only  did  he,  at  first, 
refuse  to  move  from  Andalusia,  but  he  secretly  revealed 
to  six  French  generals  his  fears  that  Joseph  was  betraying 
the  French  cause  by  treating  with  the  Spanish  national 
government  at  Cadiz.  He  even  warned  Clarke  of  the 
King's  supposed  intentions,  in  a  letter  which  by  chance 
fell  into  Joseph's  hands.2  The  hot  blood  of  the  Bona- 
partes  boiled  at  this  underhand  dealing,  and  he  at  once 
despatched  Colonel  Desprez  to  Napoleon  to  demand  Soult's 
instant  recall.  The  Emperor,  who  was  then  at  Moscow, 
temporized.     Perhaps  he  was  not  sorry  to  have  in  Spain 

1  Stanhope's  "Conversations  with  Wellington,"  p.  20. 

2  "  Memoires  du  Roi  Joseph,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  60. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  281 

so  vigilant  an  informer  ;  and  he  made  the  guarded  reply- 
that  Soult's  suspicions  did  not  much  surprise  him,  that 
they  were  shared  by  many  other  French  generals,  who 
thought  King  Joseph  preferred  Spain  to  France,  and  that 
he  could  not  recall  Soult,  as  he  had  "  the  only  military 
head  in  Spain."  The  threatening  war-cloud  in  Central 
Europe  led  Napoleon  to  change  his  resolve.  Soult  was 
recalled,  but  not  disgraced,  and,  after  the  death  of  Bes- 
sieres,  he  received  the  command  of  the  Imperial  Guard. 

The  commander  who  now  bore  the  brunt  of  responsi- 
bility was  Jourdan,  who  acted  as  major-general  at  the 
King's  side,  a  post  which  he  had  held  once  before,  but  had 
forfeited  owing  to  his  blunders  in  the  summer  of  1809. 
The  victor  of  Fleurus  was  now  fifty-one  years  of  age,  and 
his  failing  health  quite  unfitted  him  for  the  Herculean 
tasks  of  guiding  refractory  generals  and  of  propping  up 
a  tottering  monarchy.  For  Jourdan's  talents  Napoleon 
had  expressed  but  scanty  esteem,  whereas  on  many  occa- 
sions he  extolled  the  abilities  of  Suchet,  who  was  now 
holding  down  Valencia  and  Catalonia.  Certainly  Suchet's 
tenacity  and  administrative  skill  rendered  his  stay  in  those 
rich  provinces  highly  desirable.  But  the  best  talent  was 
surely  needed  on  Wellington's  line  of  advance,  namely,  at 
Valladolid.  To  the  shortcomings  and  mishaps  of  Joseph 
and  Jourdan  in  that  quarter  may  be  chiefly  ascribed  the 
collapse  of  the  French  power. 

In  fact,  the  only  part  of  Spain  that  now  really  interested 
Napoleon  was  the  north  and  north-east.  So  long  as  he 
firmly  held  the  provinces  north  of  the  Ebro,  he  seems  to 
have  cared  little  whether  Joseph  reigned,  or  did  not  reign, 
at  Madrid.  All  that  concerned  him  was  to  hold  the  Brit- 
ish at  bay  from  the  line  of  the  Douro,  while  French  au- 
thority was  established  in  the  north  and  north-east.  This 
he  was  determined  to  keep  ;  and  probably  he  had  already 
formed  the  design,  later  on  to  be  mooted  to  Ferdinand  VII. 
at  Valeneay,  of  restoring  him  to  the  throne  of  Spain  and 
of  indemnifying  him  with  Portugal  for  the  loss  of  the 
north-eastern  provinces.  This  scheme  may  even  have 
formed  part  of  a  plan  of  general  pacification  ;  for  at  Dres- 
den, on  May  17th,  he  proposed  to  Austria  the  admission  of 
representatives  of  the  Spanish  insurgents  to  the  European 


282  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Congress.  But  it  is  time  to  turn  from  the  haze  of  conjec- 
ture to  the  sharp  outlines  of  Wellington's  campaign.1 

While  the  French  cause  in  Spain  was  crumbling  to 
pieces,  that  of  the  patriots  was  being  firmly  welded  to- 
gether by  the  organizing  genius  of  Wellington.  By 
patient  efforts,  he  soon  had  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
contingents  in  an  efficient  condition  :  and,  as  large  rein- 
forcements had  come  from  England,  he  was  able  early  in 
May  to  muster  70,000  British  and  Portuguese  troops  and 
30,000  Spaniards  for  a  move  eastwards.  Murray's  force 
tied  Suchet  fast  to  the  province  of  Valencia  ;  Clausel  was 
fully  employed  in  Navarre,  and  thus  Joseph's  army  on  the 
Douro  was  left  far  too  weak  to  stem  Wellington's  tide  of 
war.  Only  some  45,000  French  were  ready  in  the  dis- 
tricts between  Salamanca  and  Valladolid.  Others  re- 
mained in  the  basin  of  the  Tagus  in  case  the  allies  should 
burst  in  by  that  route. 

Wellington  kept  up  their  illusions  by  feints  at  several 
points,  while  he  prepared  to  thrust  a  mighty  force  over 
the  fords  of  the  Tonnes  and  Esla.  He  completely  suc- 
ceeded. While  Joseph  and  Jourdan  were  haltingly  mus- 
tering their  forces  in  Leon,  the  allies  began  that  series  of 
rapid  flanking  movements  on  the  north  which  decided  the 
campaign.  Swinging  forward  his  powerful  left  wing,  he 
manoeuvred  the  French  out  of  one  strong  position  after 
another.  The  Tormes,  the  Esla,  the  Douro,  the  Carrion, 
the  Pisuerga,  none  of  these  streams  stopped  his  advance. 
Joseph  nowhere  showed  fight  ;  he  abandoned  even  the 
castle  of  Burgos,  and,  fearing  to  be  cut  off  from  France, 
retired  behind  the  upper  Ebro. 

The  official  excuse  given  for  this  rapid  retreat  was  the 
lack  of  provisions  :  but  the  diaries  of  two  British  officers, 
Tomkinson  and  Simmons,  show  that  they  found  the  coun- 
try between  the  Esla  and  the  Ebro  for  the  most  part  well 
stocked  and  fertile.  Simmons,  who  was  with  the  famous 
Light  Division,  notes  that  the  Rifles  did  not  fire  a  shot 
after  breaking  up  their  winter  quarters,  until  they  skir- 
mished with  the  French  in  the  hills  near  the  source  of  the 
Ebro.     The  French  retreat  was  really  necessary  in  order 

1  Thiers,  bk.  xlix. ;  "  Nap.  Corresp.,"  No.  20019  ;  Baumgarten,  vol.  i., 
p.  577. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE    ARMISTICE  283 

to  bring  the  King's  forces  into  touch  with  the  corps  of 
Generals  Clausel  and  Foy,  in  Navarre  and  Biscay  respec- 
tively. Joseph  had  already  sent  urgent  orders  to  call  in 
these  corps  ;  for,  as  he  explained  to  Clarke,  the  supreme 
need  now  was  to  beat  Wellington  ;  that  done,  the  partisan 
warfare  would  collapse. 

But  Clausel  and  Foy  took  their  orders,  not  from  the 
King,  but  from  Paris  ;  and  up  to  June  5th,  Joseph  heard 
not  a  word  from  Clausel.  At  last,  on  June  15th,  that 
general  wrote  from  Pamplona  that  he  had  received  Jo- 
seph's commands  of  May  30th  and  June  7th,  and  would 
march  to  join  him.  Had  he  at  once  called  in  his  mobile 
columns  and  covered  with  all  haste  the  fifty  miles  that 
separated  him  from  the  King,  the  French  army  would  have 
been  the  stronger  by  at  least  14,000  men.  But  his  con- 
centration was  a  work  of  some  difficulty,  and  he  finally 
drew  near  to  Vittoria  on  June  22nd,  when  the  French 
cause  was  irrecoverably  lost.1 

Wellington,  meanwhile,  had  foreseen  the  supreme  need 
of  despatch.  Early  in  the  year  he  had  urged  our  naval 
authorities  to  strengthen  our  squadron  on  the  north  of 
Spain,  so  that  he  might  in  due  course  make  Santander  his 
base  of  supplies.  Naval  support  was  not  forthcoming  to 
the  extent  that  he  expected  ;2  but  after  leaving  Burgos  he 
was  able  to  make  some  use  of  the  northern  ports,  thereby 
shortening  his  line  of  communications.  In  fact,  the  Vit- 
toria campaign  illustrates  the  immense  advantages  gained 
by  a  leader,  who  is  sure  of  his  rear  and  of  one  flank,  over 
an  enemy  who  is  ever  nervous  about  his  communications. 
The  British  squadron  acted  like  a  covering  force  on  the 
north  to  Wellington  :  it  fed  the  guerilla  warfare  in  Bis- 
cay, and  menaced  Joseph  with  real  though  invisible  dan- 
gers. This  explains,  in  large  measure,  why  our  commander 
moved  forward  so  rapidly,  and  pushed  forward  his  left 
wing  with  such  persistent  daring.  Mountain  fastnesses 
and  roaring  torrents  stayed  not  the  advance  of  his  light 
troops  on  that  side.     Near  the  sources  of  the  Ebro,  the 

1  "M^moires  du  Roi  Joseph,"  vol.  ix.,  pp.  284,  294.  Joseph's  iirst 
order  to  Clausel  was  sent  under  protection  of  an  escort  0/1,600  men. 

2  See  Lord  Melville's  complaint  as  to  Wellington's  unreasonable  charges 
on  this  head  in  the  "  Letters  of  Sir  H.  Martin  "  ("  Navy  Records,"  1898). 


284  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

French  again  felt  their  communications  with  France  threat- 
ened, and  falling  back  from  the  main  stream,  up  the  defile 
carved  out  by  a  tributary,  the  Zadora,  they  halted  wearily 
in  the  basin  of  Vittoria. 

There  Joseph  and  Jourdan  determined  to  fight.  As 
usual,  there  had  been  recriminations  at  headquarters. 
"  Jourdan,  ill  and  angry,  kept  his  room  ;  and  the  King 
was  equally  invisible."1  Few  orders  were  given.  The 
town  was  packed  with  convoys  and  vehicles  of  all  kinds, 
and  it  was  not  till  dawn  of  that  fatal  midsummer's  day 
that  the  last  convoy  set  out  for  France,  under  the  escort 
of  3,000  troops.  Nevertheless,  Joseph  might  hope  to  hold 
his  own.  True,  he  had  but  70,000  troops  at  hand,  or  per- 
haps even  fewer ;  yet  on  the  evening  of  the  19th  he  heard 
that  Clausel  had  set  out  from  Pamplona. 

At  once  he  bade  him  press  on  his  march,  but  that 
message  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.2  Relying,  then,  on 
help  which  was  not  to  arrive,  Joseph  confronted  the  allied 
army.  It  numbered,  in  all,  83,000  men,  though  Napier 
asserts  that  not  more  than  60,000  took  part  in  the  fight- 
ing. The  French  left  wing  rested  on  steep  hills  near 
Puebla,  which  tower  above  the  River  Zadora,  and  leave 
but  a  narrow  defile.  Their  centre  held  a  less  precipitous 
ridge,  which  trends  away  to  the  north  parallel  to  the 
middle  reaches  of  that  stream.  Higher  up  its  course, 
the  Zadora  describes  a  sharp  curve  that  protects  the 
ridge  on  its  northern  flank ;  and  if  a  daring  foe  drove 
the  defenders  away  from  these  heights,  they  could  still 
fall  back  on  two  lower  ridges  nearer  Vittoria.  But  these 
natural  advantages  were  not  utilized  to  the  full.  The 
bridges  opposite  the  French  front  were  not  broken,  and 
the  defenders  were  far  too  widely  spread  out.  Their 
right  wing,  consisting  of  the  "  Army  of  Portugal "  under 
General  Reille,  guarded  the  bridge  north  of  Vittoria, 
and  was  thus  quite  out  of  touch  with  the  main  force 
that  held  the  hills  five  miles  away  to  the  west. 

1  Miot  de  Melito,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  xviii. 

2  Clausel  afterwards  complained  that  if  he  had  received  any  order  to 
that  effect  he  could  have  pushed  on  so  as  to  be  at  Vittoria  ("M6ms.  du 
Roi  Joseph,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  454).  The  muster-rolls  of  the  French  were  lost 
at  Vittoria.  Napier  puts  their  force  at  70,000  ;  Thiers  at  54,000  ;  Jourdan 
at  50,000. 


XXXIV 


VITTORIA   AND   THE    ARMISTICE 


285 


The  dawn  broke  heavily ;  the  air  was  thick  with  rain 
and  driving  mists,  under  cover  of  which  Hill's  command 
moved  up  against  the  steeps  of  Puebla.  A  Spanish 
brigade,  under  General  Morillo,  nimbly  scaled  those 
slopes  on  the  south-west,  gained  a  footing  near  the 
summit,  and,  when  reinforced,  firmly  held  their  ground. 
Meanwhile  the  rest  of  Hill's  troops  threaded  their  way 
beneath  through  the  pass  of  Puebla,  and,  after  a  tough 


Stanford's  Geograpk- Eetab* Condon, 

fight,  wrested  the  village  of  Subijana  from  the  foe.  In 
vain  did  Joseph  and  Jourdan  bring  up  troops  from  the 
centre  ;  the  British  and  Spaniards  were  not  to  be  driven 
either  from  the  village  or  from  the  heights.  Wellington's 
main  array  Avas  also  advancing  to  attack  the  French 
centre  occupying  the  ridge  behind  the  Zadora ;  and  Gra- 
ham, after  making  a  long  detour  to  the  north  through 
very  broken  country,  sought  to  surprise  Reille  and  drive 
him  from  the  bridge  north  of  Vittoria.  In  this  advance 
the  guidance  of  the  Spanish  irregulars,  under  Colonel 
Longa,  was   of   priceless  value.       So  well    was    Graham 


286  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

covered  by  their  bands,  that,  up  to  the  moment  of  at- 
tack, Reille  knew  not  that  a  British  division  was  also 
at  hand.  At  the  centre,  too,  a  Spanish  peasant  informed 
Wellington  that  the  chief  bridge  of  Tres  Puentes  was 
unguarded,  and  guided  Kemp's  brigade  through  rocky- 
ground  to  within  easy  charging  distance. 

The  bridge  was  seized,  Joseph's  outposts  were  com- 
pletely turned,  and  time  was  given  for  the  muster  of 
Picton's  men.  Stoutly  they  breasted  the  slopes,  and 
unsteadied  the  weakened  French  centre,  which  was  also 
assailed  on  its  northern  flank.  At  the  same  time  Joseph's 
left  wing  began  to  waver  under  Hill's  repeated  onslaughts ; 
and,  distracted  by  the  distant  cannonade,  which  told  of  a 
stubborn  fight  between  Graham  and  Reille,  the  King  now 
began  to  draw  in  his  lines  towards  Vittoria.  For  a  time 
the  French  firmly  held  the  village  of  Arinez,  but  Picton's 
men  were  not  to  be  denied.  They  burst  through  the  rear- 
guard, and  the  battle  now  became  a  running  fight,  extend- 
ing over  some  five  miles  of  broken  country.  At  the  last 
slopes,  close  to  Vittoria,  the  defenders  made  a  last  heroic 
stand,  and  their  artillery  dealt  havoc  among  the  assail- 
ants ;  but  our  fourth  division,  rushing  forward  into  the 
smoke,  carried  a  hill  that  commanded  their  left,  and  the 
day  was  won.  Nothing  now  remained  for  the  French  but 
a  speedy  retreat,  while  the  gallant  Reille  could  still  hold 
Graham's  superior  force  at  bay. 

There,  too,  the  fight  at  last  swirled  back,  albeit  with 
many  a  rallying  eddy,  into  Vittoria.  That  town  was  no 
place  of  refuge,  but  a  death-trap ;  for  Graham  had  pushed 
on  a  detachment  to  Durana,  on  the  high-road  leading 
direct  to  France,  and  thus  blocked  the  main  line  of  re- 
treat. Joseph's  army  was  now  in  pitiable  plight.  Pent 
up  in  the  choked  streets  of  Vittoria,  torn  by  cannon-shot 
from  the  English  lines,  the  wreckage  of  its  three  armies 
for  a  time  surged  helplessly  to  and  fro,  and  then  broke 
away  eastwards  towards  Pamplona.  On  that  side  only 
was  safety  to  be  found,  for  British  hussars  scoured  the 
plain  to  the  north-east,  lending  wings  to  the  fight.  The 
narrow  causeway,  leading  through  marshes,  was  soon 
blocked,  and  panic  seized  on  all :  artillerymen  cut  their 
traces   and   fled ;   carriages   crowded   with   women,   once 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  287 

called  gay,  but  now  frantic  with  terror,  wagons  laden 
with  ammunition,  stores,  treasure-chests,  and  the  booty 
amassed  by  generals  and  favourites  during  five  years  of 
warfare  and  extortion,  all  were  left  pell-mell.  Jourdan's 
Marshal's  baton  was  taken,  and  was  sent  by  Wellington 
to  the  Prince  Regent,  who  acknowledged  it  by  conferring 
on  the  victor  the  title  of  Field-Marshal. 

Richly  was  the  title  deserved.  After  four  years  of  bat- 
tling with  superior  numbers,  the  British  leader  at  last 
revealed  the  full  majesty  cf  his  powers  now  that  the 
omens  were  favourable.  In  six  weeks  he  marched  more 
than  five  hundred  miles,  crossed  six  rivers,  and,  using 
the.Navarrese  revolt  as  the  anvil',  dealt  the  hammer  stroke 
of  Vittoria.  It  cost  Napoleon  151  pieces  of  cannon,  nearly 
all  the  stores  piled  up  for  his  Peninsular  campaigns  —  and 
Spain  itself.1 

As  for  Joseph,  he  left  his  carriage  and  fled  on  horseback 
towards  France,  reaching  St.  Jean  de  Luz  "with  only  a 
napoleon  left."  He  there  also  assured  his  queen  that  he 
had  always  preferred  a  private  station  to  the  grandeur 
and  agitations  of  public  life.2  This,  indeed,  was  one  of 
the  many  weak  points  of  his  brother's  Spanish  policy.  It 
rested  on  the  shoulders  of  an  amiable  man  who  was  better 
suited  to  the  ease  of  Naples  than  to  the  Herculean  toils  of 
Madrid.  Napoleon  now  saw  the  magnitude  of  his  error. 
On  July  1st  he  bade  Soult  leave  Dresden  at  once  for 
Paris.  There  he  was  to  call  on  Clarke,  with  him  repair 
to  Cambacere\s  ;  and,  as  Lieutenant-General,  take  steps  to 
re-establish  the  Emperor's  affairs  in  Spain.  A  Regency 
was  to  govern  in  place  of  Joseph,  who  was  ordered  to 
remain,  according  to  the  state  of  affairs,  either  at  Burgos  (!) 
or  St.  Sebastian  or  Ba}ronne. 

"  All  the  follies  in  Spain  "  (he  wrote  to  Cambaceres  on  that  day) 
"are  due  to  the  mistaken  consideration  I  have  shown  the  King,  who 
not  only  does  not  know  how  to  command,  but  does  not  even  know 
his  own  value  enough  to  leave  the  military  command  alone." 

1  Wellington's  official  account  of  the  fight  states  that  the  French  got 
away  only  two  of  their  cannon;  and  Simmons,  "A  British  Rifleman," 
asserts  that  the  last  of  these  was  taken  near  Pamplona  on  the  24th. 
Wellington  generously  assigned  much  credit  to  the  Spanish  troops  —  far 
[more  than  Napier  will  allow. 

2  Ducasse,  "  Les  rois,  freres  de  Napoleon." 


288  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

And  to  Savary  he  wrote  two  days  later  : 

"  It  is  hard  to  imagine  anything  so  inconceivable  as  what  is  now 
going  on  in  Spain.  The  King  could  have  collected  100,000  picked 
men :  they  might  have  beaten  the  whole  of  England." 

Reflection,  however,  showed  him  that  the  fault  was 
his  own  ;  that  if,  as  had  occurred  to  him  when  he  left 
Paris,  he  had  intrusted  the  supreme  command  in  Spain 
to  Soult,  the  disaster  would  never  have  happened.1  His 
belief  in  Soult's  capacity  was  justified  by  the  last  events 
of  the  Peninsular  War.  But  neither  his  splendid  rally  of 
the  scattered  French  forces,  nor  the  skilful  movements 
of  Clausel  and  Suchet,  nor  the  stubborn  defence  of 
Pamplona  and  San  Sebastian,  could  now  save  the  French 
cause.  The  sole  result  of  these  last  operations  was  to 
restore  the  lustre  of  the  French  arms  and  to  keep 
150,000  men  in  Spain  when  the  scales  of  war  were 
wavering  in  the  plains  of  Saxony. 

Napoleon's  letters  betray  the  agitation  which  he  felt 
even  at  the  first  vague  rumours  of  the  disaster  of  Vit- 
toria.  On  the  first  three  days  of  July  he  penned  at 
Dresden  seven  despatches  on  that  topic  in  a  style  so 
vehement  that  the  compilers  of  the  "  Correspondance  de 
Napoleon"  have  thought  it  best  to  omit  them.  He 
further  enjoined  the  utmost  reserve,  and  ordered  the 
official  journals  merely  to  state  that,  after  a  brisk  engage- 
ment at  Vittoria,  the  French  army  was  concentrating  in 
Arragon,  and  that  the  British  had  captured  about  a 
hundred  guns  and  wagons  left  behind  in  the  town  for 
lack  of  horses. 

There  was  every  reason  for  hiding  the  truth.  He  saw 
how  seriously  it  must  weaken  his  chances  of  browbeating 
the  Eastern  Powers,  and  of  punishing  Austria  for  her 
armed  mediation.  Hitherto  there  seemed  every  chance 
of  his  succeeding.  The  French  standards  flew  on  all 
the  fortresses  of  the  Elbe  and  Oder.  Hamburg  was  fast 
becoming  a  great  French  camp,  and  Denmark  was  ranged 
on  the  side  of  France. 

Indeed,  on  reviewing  the  situation  on  June  4th,  the 
German   publicist,  Gentz,  came    to   the   conclusion    that 

1  "  Lettres  infidites  de  Napoleon,"  July  1st,  3rd,  15th,  and  20th. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  289 

the  Emperor  Francis  would  probably  end  his  vacillations 
by  some  inglorious  compromise.  The  Kaiser  desired 
peace  ;  but  he  also  wished  to  shake  off  the  irksome 
tutelage  of  his  son-in-law,  and  regain  Illyria.  For  the 
present  he  wavered.  Before  the  news  of  Liitzen  reached 
him,  he  undoubtedly  encouraged  the  allies  :  but  that 
reverse  brought  about  a  half  left  turn  towards  Napo- 
leon. "  Bonev's  success  at  Liitzen,"  wrote  Sir  G.  Jackson 
in  his  Diary,  "has  made  Francis  reconsider  his  half- 
formed  resolutions."  Here  was  the  chief  difficulty  for 
the  allies.  Their  fortunes,  and  the  future  of  Europe, 
rested  largely  on  the  decision  of  a  man  whose  natural 
irresolution  of  character  had  been  increased  by  adver- 
sity. Fortunately,  the  news  from  Spain  finally  helped 
to  incline  him  towards  war ;  but  for  some  weeks  his 
decision  remained  the  unknown  quantity  in  European 
politics.  Fortunately,  too,  he  was  amenable  to  the  gentle 
but  determining  pressure  of  the  kind  which  Metternich 
could  so  skilfully  exert.  That  statesman,  as  usual, 
schemed  and  balanced.  He  saw  that  Austria  had  much 
to  gain  by  playing  the  waiting  game.  Her  forces  were 
improving  both  in  numbers  and  efficiency,  and  under 
cover  of  her  offer  of  armed  mediation  were  holding 
strong  positions  in  Bohemia.  In  fact,  she  was  regaining 
her  prestige,  and  might  hope  to  impose  her  will  on  the 
combatants  at  the  forthcoming  European  Congress  at 
Prague.  Metternich,  therefore,  continued  to  pose  as  the 
well-wisher  of  both  parties  and  the  champion  of  a 
reasonable  and  therefore  durable  compromise. 

He  had  acted  thus,  not  onlv  in  his  choice  of  measures, 
but  in  his  selection  of  men.  He  had  sent  to  Napoleon's 
headquarters  at  Dresden  Count  Bubna,  whose  sincere 
and  resolute  striving  for  peace  served  to  lull  animosity 
and  suspicions  in  that  place.  But  to  the  allied  head- 
quarters, now  at  Reichenbach,  he  had  despatched  Count 
Stadion,  who  worked  no  less  earnestly  for  war.  While 
therefore  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  and 
London  hoped,  from  Stadion's  language,  that  Austria 
meant  to  draw  the  sword,  Napoleon  inclined  to  the  belief 
that  she  would  never  do  more  than  rattle  her  scabbard, 
and  would  finally  yield  to  his  demands. 

VOL.    II U 


290  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Stadion's  letters  to  Metternich  show  that  he  feared  this 
result.  He  pressed  him  to  end  the  seesaw  policy  of  the 
last  six  months.  "  These  people  are  beaten  owing  to  our 
faults,  our  half  wishes,  our  half  measures,  and  presently 
they  will  get  out  of  the  scrape  and  leave  us  to  pay  the 
price."  As  for  Austria's  forthcoming  demand  of  Illyria, 
who  would  guarantee  that  the  French  Emperor  would  let 
her  keep  it  six  months,  if  he  remained  master  of  Germany 
and  Italy  ?  Only  by  a  close  union  with  the  allies  could 
she  be  screened  from  Napoleon's  vengeance,  which  must 
otherwise  lead  to  her  utter  destruction.  Let,  then,  all 
timid  counsellors  be  removed  from  the  side  of  the  Emperor 
Francis.  "  I  cling  to  my  oft-expressed  conviction  that  we 
are  no  longer  masters  of  our  oWn  affairs,  and  that  the  tide 
of  events  will  carry  us  along."1 

If  we  may  judge  from  Metternich's  statements  in  his 
"  Memoirs,"  written  many  years  later,  he  was  all  along 
in  secret  sympathy  with  these  views.  But  his  actions 
and  his  official  despatches  during  the  first  six  weeks  of 
the  armistice  bore  another  complexion  ;  they  were  almost 
colourless,  or  rather,  they  were  chameleonic.  At  Dresden 
they  seemed,  on  the  whole,  to  be  favourable  to  France : 
at  Reichenbach,  when  coloured  by  Stadion,  they  were 
thought  to  hold  out  the  prospect  of  another  European 
coalition. 

A  new  and  important  development  was  given  to  Austrian 
policy  when,  on  June  7th,  Metternich  drew  up  the  condi- 
tions on  which  Austria  would  insist  as  the  basis  of  her 
armed  mediation.  They  were  as  follows:  (1)  Dissolu- 
tion of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw ;  (2)  A  consequent  recon- 
struction of  Prussia,  with  the  certainty  of  recovering 
Danzig ;  (3)  Restitution  of  the  Illyrian  provinces,  in- 
cluding Dalmatia,  to  Austria ;  (4)  Re-establishment  of 
the  Hanse  Towns,  and  an  eventual  arrangement  as  to 
the  cession  of  the  other  parts  of  the  32nd  military  divi- 
sion [the  part  of  North  Germany  annexed  by  Napoleon 
in  1810],  To  these  were  added  two  other  conditions  on 
which  Austria  would  lay  great  stress,  namely :  (5)  Dis- 
solution of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  ;  (6)  Recon- 

1  Stadion  to  Metternich,  May  30th,  June  2nd  and  8th ;  in  Luckwaldt, 
p.  382. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE'  ARMISTICE  291 

struction  of  Prussia  comformably  with  her  territorial 
extent  previous  to  1805. 

At  first  sight  these  terms  seem  favourable  to  the  allied 
cause  ;  but  they  were  much  less  extensive  than  the  pro- 
posals submitted  by  Alexander  in  the  middle  of  May. 
Therefore,  when  they  were  set  forth  to  the  allies  at 
Reichenbach,  they  were  unfavourably  received,  and  for 
some  days  suspicion  of  Austria  overclouded  the  previous 
goodwill.  It  was  removed  only  by  the  labours  of  Stadion 
and  by  the  tact  which  Metternich  displayed  during  an 
interview  with  the  Czar  at  Opotschna  (June  17th). 

Alexander  came  there  prejudiced  against  Metternich 
as  a  past  master  in  the  arts  of  double-dealing:  he  went 
away  convinced  that  he  meant  well  for  the  allies.  "  What 
will  become  of  us,"  asked  the  Czar,  "  if  Napoleon  accepts 
your  mediation?"  To  which  the  statesman  replied:  "If 
he  refuses  it,  the  truce  will  be  at  an  end,  and  you  will  find 
us  in  the  ranks  of  your  allies.  If  he  accepts  it,  the  nego- 
tiations will  prove  to  a  certainty  that  Napoleon  is  neither 
wise  nor  just ;  and  the  issue  will  be  the  same."  Alexander 
knew  enough  of  his  great  enemy's  character  to  discern  the 
sagacity  of  Metternich's  forecast ;  and  both  Frederick  Will- 
iam and  he  agreed  to  the  Austrian  terms.1  Accordingly, 
on  June  27th,  a  treaty  was  secretly  signed  at  Reichenbach, 
wherein  Austria  pledged  herself  to  an  active  alliance  with 
Russia  and  Prussia  in  case  Napoleon  should  not,  by  the 
end  of  the  armistice,  have  acceded  to  her  four  conditioner 
sine  quibus  non.  To  these  was  now  added  a  demand  for 
the  evacuation  of  all  Polish  and  Prussian  fortresses  by 
French  troops,  a  stipulation  which  it  was  practically  cer- 
tain that  Napoleon  would  refuse.2 

The  allies  meanwhile  were  gaining  the  sinews  of  war 

1  Cathcart's  "most  secret"  despatch  of  June  ^  from  Reichenbach. 
Just  a  month  earlier  he  reported  that  the  Czar's  proposals  to  Austria  in- 
cluded all  these  terms  in  an  absolute  form,  and  also  the  separation  of 
Holland  from  France,  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  to  Spain,  and 
"  L'ltalie  libre  dans  toutes  ses  parties  du  Gouvemement  et  de  l'influence 
de  la  France."  Such  were  also  Metternich's  private  wishes,  with  the 
frontier  of  the  Oglio  on  the  S.W.  for  Austria.  See  Oncken,  vol.  ii., 
p.  644.  The  official  terms  were  in  part  due  to  the  direct  influence  of  the 
Emperor  Francis. 

2  In  a  secret  article  of  the  Treaty  we  promised  to  advance  to  Austria  a 
subsidy  of  £500,000  as  soon  as  she  should  join  the  allies. 


292  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

from  England.  The  Czar  had  informed  Cathcart  at 
Kalisch  that,  though  he  did  not  press  our  Government  for 
subsidies,  yet  he  would  not  be  able  to  wage  a  long  cam- 
paign without  such  aid.  On  June  14th  and  15th,  pur 
ambassador  signed  treaties  with  Russia  and  Prussia, 
whereby  we  agreed  to  aid  the  former  by  a  yearly  subsidy 
of  £1,133,334,  and  the  latter  by  a  sum  of  half  that  amount, 
and  to  meet  all  the  expenses  of  the  Russian  fleet  then  in 
our  harbours.  The  Czar  and  the  King  of  Prussia  bound 
themselves  to  maintain  in  the  field  (exclusive  of  garrisons) 
160,000  and  80,000  men  respectively.1 

There  was  every  reason  for  these  preparations.  Every- 
thing showed  that  Napoleon  was  bent  on  browbeating  the 
allies.  On  June  17th  Napoleon's  troops  destroyed  or 
captured  Liitzow's  volunteers  at  Kitzen  near  Leipzig. 
The  excuse  for  this  act  was  that  Liitzow  had  violated  the 
armistice  ;  but  he  had  satisfied  Nisas,  the  French  officer 
there  in  command,  that  he  was  loyally  observing  it. 
Nevertheless,  his  brigade  was  cut  to  pieces.  The  protests 
of  the  allies  received  no  response  except  that  Liitzow's 
men  might  be  exchanged  —  as  if  they  had  been  captured 
in  fair  fight.  Finally,  Napoleon  refused  to  hear  the  state- 
ment of  Nisas  in  his  own  justification,  reproached  him  for 
casting  a  slur  on  the  conduct  of  French  troops,  and 
deprived  him  of  his  command.2 

1  Martens,  vol.  ix.,  pp.  568-575.  Our  suspicion  of  Prussia  reappears 
(as  was  almost  inevitable  after  her  seizure  of  Hanover),  not  only  in  the 
smallness  of  the  sum  accorded  to  her  —  for  we  granted  £2,000,000  in  all 
to  the  Swedish,  Hanseatic,  and  Hanoverian  contingents  —  but  also  in  the 
stipulation  that  she  should  assent  to  the  eventual  annexation  of  the  for- 
merly Prussian  districts  of  East  Frisia  and  Hildesheim  to  Hanover.  We 
also  refused  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Reichenbach  until  she,  most  unwillingly, 
assented  to  this  prospective  cession.  This  has  always  been  thought  in 
Germany  a  mean  transaction  ;  but,  as  Castlereagh  pointed  out,  those  dis- 
tricts were  greatly  in  the  way  of  the  development  of  Hanover.  Prussia 
was  to  have  an  indemnity  for  the  sacrifice  ;  and  we  bore  the  chief  burden 
in  the  issue  of  "federative  paper  notes,"  which  enabled  the  allies  to  pre- 
pare for  the  campaign  ("  Castlereagh  Papers,"  2nd  series,  vol.  iv.,  p.  355  ; 
3rd  series,  vol.  i.,  pp.  7-17  ;  and  "  Bath  Archives,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  86).  More- 
over, we  were  then  sending  30,000  muskets  to  Stralsund  and  Colberg  for 
the  use  of  Prussian  troops  (Despatch  from  "  F.  O.,"  July  28th,  to  Thorn- 
ton, "Sweden,"  No.  79).  On  July  6th  we  agreed  to  pay  the  cost  of  a 
German  Legion  of  10,000  men  under  the  Czar's  orders.  Its  Commissary 
was  Colonel  Lowe. 

2  For  the  official  reports  see  Garden,  vol.  xiv.,  pp.  486-499  ;  also  Baus- 
set's  account,  "  Cour  de  Napoleon." 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  293 

But  it  was  Napoleon's  bearing  towards  Metternich,  in 
an  interview  held  on  June  26th  at  the  Marcolini  Palace  at 
Dresden,  that  most  clearly  revealed  the  inflexibility  of  his 
policy.  Ostensibly,  the  interview  was  fixed  in  order  to 
arrange  the  forms  of  the  forthcoming  Congress  that  was 
to  insure  the  world's  peace.  In  reality,  however,  Napo- 
leon hoped  to  intimidate  the  Austrian  statesman,  and  to 
gather  from  him  the  results  of  his  recent  interview  with 
the  Czar.  Carrying  his  sword  at  his  side  and  his  hat 
under  his  arm,  he  received  Metternich  in  state.  After  a 
few  studied  phrases  about  the  health  of  the  Emperor 
Francis,  his  brow  clouded  and  he  plunged  in  medias  res : 
"  So  you  too  want  war  :  well,  you  shall  have  it.  I  have 
beaten  the  Russians  at  Bautzen  :  now  you  wish  your  turn 
to  come.  Be  it  so,  the  rendezvous  shall  be  in  Vienna. 
Men  are  incorrigible  :  experience  is  lost  upon  you.  Three 
times  I  have  replaced  the  Emperor  Francis  on  his  throne. 
I  have  promised  always  to  live  at  peace  with  him  :  I 
have  married  his  daughter.  At  the  time  I  said  to  myself 
—  you  are  perpetrating  a  folly ;  but  it  was  done,  and  now 
I  repent  of  it." 

Metternich  saw  his  advantage:  his  adversary  had  lost 
his  temper  and  forgotten  his  dignity.  He  calmly  re- 
minded Napoleon  that  peace  depended  on  him ;  that  his 
power  must  be  reduced  within  reasonable  limits,  or  he 
would  fall  in  the  ensuing  struggle.  No  matador  fluttered 
the  cloak  more  dextrously.  Napoleon  rushed  on.  No 
coalition  should  daunt  him :  he  could  overpower  any 
number  of  men  —  everything  except  the  cold  of  Russia  — 
and  the  losses  of  that  campaign  had  been  made  good. 
He  then  diverged  into  stories  about  that  war,  varied  by 
digressions  as  to  his  exact  knowledge  of  Austria's  arma- 
ments, details  of  which  were  sent  to  him  daily.  To  end 
this  wandering  talk,  Metternich  reminded  him  that  his 
troops  now  were  not  men  but  boys.  Whereupon  the 
Emperor  passionately  replied  :  "  You  do  not  know  what 
goes  on  in  the  mind  of  a  soldier  ;  a  man  such  as  I  does 
not  take  much  heed  of  the  lives  of  a  million  of  men,"  — 
and  he  threw  aside  his  hat.    Metternich  did  not  pick  it  up. 

Napoleon  noticed  the  unspoken  defiance,  and  wound 
up  by  saying :   "  When  I  married  an  Archduchess  I  tried 


294  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

to  weld  the  new  with  the  old,  Gothic  prejudices  with  the 
institutions  of  my  century  :  I  deceived  myself,  and  this 
day  I  see  the  whole  extent  of  my  error.  It  may  cost 
me  my  throne,  but  I  will  bury  the  world  beneath  its 
ruins."  In  dismissing  Metternich,  the  Emperor  used  the 
device  which,  shortly  before  the  rupture  with  England  in 
1803,  he  had  recommended  Talleyrand  to  employ  upon 
Whitworth,  namely,  after  trying  intimidation  to  resort  to 
cajolery.  Touching  the  Minister  on  the  shoulder,  he  said 
quietly :  "  Well,  now,  do  you  know  what  will  happen  ? 
You  will  not  make  war  on  me  ? "  To  which  came  the 
quick  reply  :  "  You  are  lost,  Sire ;  I  had  the  presenti- 
ment of  it  when  I  came :  now,  in  going,  I  have  the 
certainty."  In  the  anteroom  the  generals  crowded  around 
the  illustrious  visitor.  Berthier  had  previously  begged 
him  to  remember  that  Europe,  and  France,  urgently 
needed  peace ;  and  now,  on  conducting  him  to  his 
carriage,  he  asked  him  whether  he  was  satisfied  with 
Napoleon.  "Yes,"  was  the  answer,  "he  has  explained 
everything  to  me:   it  is  all  over  with  the  man."1 

Substantially,  this  was  the  case.  Napoleon's  resent- 
ment against  Austria,  not  unnatural  under  the  circum- 
stances, had  hurried  him  into  outbursts  that  revealed 
the  inner  fires  of  his  passion.  In  a  second  interview,  on 
June  30th,  he  was  far  more  gracious,  and  allowed 
Austria  to  hope  that  she  would  gain  Illyria.  He  also 
accepted  Austria's  mediation ;  and  it  was  stipulated  that 
a  Congress  should  meet  at  Prague  for  the  discussion  of 
a  general  pacification.  Metternich  appeared  highly 
pleased  with  this  condescension,  but  he  knew  by  ex- 
perience that  Napoleon's  caresses  were  as  dangerous  as 
his  wrath ;  and  he  remained  on  his  guard.  The  Emperor 
soon  disclosed  his  real  aim.     In  gracious  tones  he  added  : 

1  Any  account  of  a  private  interview  between  two  astute  schemers  must 
be  accepted  with  caution  ;  and  we  may  well  doubt  whether  Metternich 
really  was  as  firm,  not  to  say  provocative,  as  he  afterwards  represented  in 
his  '«  Memoirs."  But,  on  the  whole,  his  account  is  more  trustworthy  than 
that  of  Fain,  Napoleon's  secretary,  in  his  "Manuscrit  de  1813,"  vol.  ii., 
ch.  ii.  Fain  places  the  interview  on  June  28th  ;  in  "  Napoleon's  Cor- 
resp."  it  is  reprinted,  but  assigned  to  June  23rd.  The  correct  date  is 
shown  by  Oncken  to  have  been  June  26th.  Bignon's  account  of  it  (vol. 
xii.,  ch.  iv.)  is  marked  by  his  usual  bias. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE    ARMISTICE     '  295 

"  But  this  is  not  all  :  I  must  have  a  prolongation  of  the 
armistice.  How  can  we  between  July  5th  and  20th  end 
a  negotiation  which  ought  to  embrace  the  whole  world  ?  " 
He  proposed  August  20th  as  the  date  of  its  expiration. 
To  this  Metternich  demurred  because  the  allies  already 
thought  the  armistice  too  long  for  their  interests. 
August  10th  was  finally  agreed  on,  but  not  without 
much  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  allied  generals,  who 
insisted  that  such  a  prolongation  would  greatly  em- 
barrass them. 

Outwardly,  this  new  arrangement  seemed  to  portend 
peace :  but  it  is  significant  that  on  June  28th  Napoleon 
wrote  to  Eugene  that  all  the  probabilities  appeared  for 
war  ;  and  on  June  30th  he  wrote  his  father-in-law  a  cold 
and  almost  threatening  letter.1 

Late  on  that  very  evening  came  to  hand  the  first  report 
of  the  disaster  of  Vittoria.  Despite  all  Napoleon's  pre- 
cautions, the  news  leaked  out  at  Dresden.  Bubna's 
despatches  of  July  5th,  6th,  and  7th  soon  made  it  known 
to  the  Emperor  Francis,  then  at  Brandeis  in  Bohemia. 
Thence  it  reached  the  allied  monarchs  and  Bernadotte  on 
July  12th  at  Trachenberg  in  the  midst  of  negotiations 
which  will  be  described  presently.  The  effect  of  the  news 
was  very  great.  The  Czar  at  once  ordered  a  Te  Deum  to 
be  sung :  "  It  is  the  first  instance,"  wrote  Cathcart,  "  of 
a  Te  Deum  having  been  sung  at  this  Court  for  a  victory 
in  which  the  forces  of  the  Russian  Empire  were  not  en- 
gaged." 2  But  its  results  were  more  than  ceremonial  : 
they  were  practical.  Our  envoy,  Thornton,  who  followed 
Bernadotte  to  Trachenberg,  states  that  Bubna  had  learnt 
that  Wellington  had  completely  routed  three  French  corps 
with  a  debandade  like  that  of  the  retreat  from  Moscow. 
Thornton  adds  :  "  The  Prince  Royal  [Bernadotte]  thinks 
that  the  French  army  will  be  very  soon  withdrawn  from 
Silesia  and  that  Buonaparte  must  soon  commence  his 
retreat  nearer  the  Rhine.  I  have  no  doubt  of  its  effect 
upon  Austria.     This  is  visible  in  the  answer  of  the  Em- 

1  Cathcart  reported  on  July  8th,  that  Schwarzenberg  had  urged  an 
extension  of  the  armistice,  so  that  Austria  might  meet  the  "  vast  and  un- 
expected "  preparations  of  France  ("  Russia,"  No.  86). 

2  "Russia,"  No.  86. 


296  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

peror  [Francis]  to  the  Prince,  which  came  to-day  from  the 
Austrian  headquarters."  That  letter,  dated  July  9th,  was 
indeed  of  the  most  cordial  character.  It  expressed  great 
pleasure  at  hearing  that  "  the  obstacles  which  seemed  to 
hinder  the  co-operation  of  the  forces  under  your  Royal 
Highness  are  now  removed.  I  regard  this  co-operation  as 
one  of  the  surest  supports  of  the  cause  which  the  Powers 
may  once  more  be  called  on  to  defend  by  a  war  which 
can  only  offer  chances  of  success  unless  sustained  by  the 
greatest  and  most  unanimous  measures."1  Further  than 
this  Francis  could  scarcely  go  without  pledging  himself 
unconditionally  to  an  alliance ;  and  doubtless  it  was  the 
news  of  Vittoria  that  evoked  these  encouraging  assurances. 

It  is  even  more  certain  that  the  compact  of  Trachen- 
berg  also  helped  to  end  the  hesitations  of  Austria.  This 
compact  arose  out  of  the  urgent  need  of  adopting  a 
general  plan  of  campaign,  and,  above  all,  of  ending  the 
disputes  between  the  allied  sovereigns  and  Bernadotte. 
The  Prince  Royal  of  Sweden  had  lost  their  confidence 
through  his  failure  to  save  Hamburg  from  the  French  and 
Danes.  Yet,  on  his  side,  he  had  some  cause  for  complaint. 
In  the  previous  summer,  Alexander  led  him  to  expect  the 
active  aid  of  thirty-five  thousand  Russian  troops  for  a 
campaign  in  Norway  :  but,  mainly  at  the  instance  of  Eng- 
land, he  now  landed  in  Pomerania  and  left  Sweden  exposed 
to  a  Danish  attack  on  the  side  of  Norway.  He  therefore 
suggested  an  interview  with  the  allied  sovereigns,  a 
request  which  was  warmly  seconded  by  Castlereagh.2 
Accordingly  it  took  place  at  Trachenberg,  a  castle  north 
of  Breslau,  with  the  happiest  results.  The  warmth  of  the 
great  Gascon's  manner  cleared  away  all  clouds,  and  won 
the  approval  of  Frederick  William. 

There  was  signed  the  famous  compact,  or  plan,  of  Trach- 
enberg (July  12th).  It  bound  the  allies  to  turn  their 
main  forces  against  Napoleon's  chief  army,  wherever  it 
was  :  those  allied  corps  that  threatened  his  flanks  or  com- 
munications were  to  act  on  the  line  that  most  directly  cut 
into  them  :  and  the  salient  bastion  of  Bohemia  was  ex- 

1  Thornton's  despatch  of  July  12th  ("Castlereagh  Papers,"  2nd  Se- 
ries, vol.  lv.,  ad  fin.). 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  383  and  405. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA    AND   THE    ARMISTICE  297 

pressly  named  as  offering  the  greatest  advantages  for 
attacking  Napoleon's  main  force.  The  first  and  third  of 
these  axioms  were  directly  framed  so  as  to  encourage 
Austria  :  the  second  aimed  at  concentrating  Bernadotte's 
force  on  the  main  struggle  and  preventing  his  waging  war 
merely  against  Denmark. 

The  plan  went  even  further  :  100,000  allied  troops  were 
to  be  sent  into  Bohemia,  as  soon  as  the  armistice  should 
cease,  so  as  to  form  in  all  an  army  of  200,000  men.  On  the 
north,  Bernadotte,  after  detaching  a  corps  towards  Ham- 
burg, was  to  advance  with  a  Russo-Prusso-Swedish  army 
of  70,000  men  towards  the  middle  course  of  the  Elbe,  his 
objective  being  Leipzig  ;  and  the  rest  of  the  allied  forces, 
those  remaining  in  Silesia,  were  to  march  towards  Torgau, 
and  thus  threaten  Napoleon's  positions  in  Saxony  from  the 
East.  This  plan  of  campaign  was  an  immense  advance  on 
those  of  the  earlier  coalitions.  There  was  no  reliance 
here  on  lines  and  camps  :  the  days  of  Mack  and  Phull 
were  past  :  the  allies  had  at  last  learnt  from  Napoleon  the 
need  of  seeking  out  the  enemy's  chief  army,  and  of  fling- 
ing at  it  all  the  available  forces.  Politically,  also,  the 
compact  deserves  notice.  In  concerting  a  plan  of  offen- 
sive operations  from  Bohemia,  the  allies  were  going  far  to 
determine  the  conduct  of  Austria. 

On  that  same  day  the  peace  Congress  was  opened  at 
Prague.  Its  proceedings  were  farcical  from  the  outset. 
Only  Anstett  and  Humboldt,  the  Russian  and  Prussian 
envoys,  were  at  hand  ;  and  at  the  appointment  of  the 
former,  an  Alsatian  by  birth,  Napoleon  expressed  great 
annoyance.  The  difficulties  about  the  armistice  also  gave 
him  the  opportunity,  which  lie  undoubtedly  sought,  of 
further  dela\ing  negotiations.  In  vain  did  Metternich 
point  out  to  the  French  envoy,  Narbonne,  at  Prague,  that 
these  frivolous  delays  must  lead  to  war  if  matters  were 
not  amicably  settled  by  August  10th,  at  midnight. *     In 

1  For  details  see  Oncken,  Luckwaldt,  Thiers,  Fain,  and  the  "Mems." 
of  the  Due  de  Broglie  ;  also  Gentz,  "  Briefe  an  Pilat,"  of  July  16th-22nd, 
1813.  Humboldt,  the  Prussian  ambassador,  reported  on  July  13th  to  Berlin 
that  Metternich  looked  on  war  as  quite  unavoidable"  and  on  the  Congress 
merely  as  a  means  of  convincing  the  Emperor  Francis  of  the  impossibility 
of  gaining  a  lasting  peace. 


, 


298  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

vain  did  Narbonne  and  Caulaincourt  beg  their  master  to 
seize  this  opportunity  for  concluding  a  safe  and  honour- 
able peace.  It  was  not '  till  the  middle  of  July  that  he 
appointed  them  his  plenipotentiaries  at  the  Congress  ;  and, 
even  then,  he  retained  the  latter  at  Dresden,  while  the 
former  fretted  in  forced  inaction  at  Prague.  "  I  send  you 
more  powers  than  power"  wrote  Maret  to  Narbonne  with 
cynical  jauntiness  :  "  you  will  have  your  hands  tied,  but 
your  legs  and  mouth  free  so  that  you  may  walk  about  and 
dine." 1  At  last,  on  the  26th,  Caulaincourt  received  his 
instructions  ;  but  what  must  have  been  the  anguish  of  this 
loyal  son  of  France  to  see  that  Napoleon  was  courting  war 
with  a  united  Europe.  Austria,  said  his  master,  was  act- 
ing as  mediator  :  and  the  mediator  ought  not  to  look  for 
gains  :  she  had  made  no  sacrifice  and  deserved  to  gain 
nothing  at  all  :  her  claims  were  limitless  ;  and  every  con- 
cession granted  by  France  would  encourage  her  to  ask  for 
more  :  he  was  disposed  to  make  peace  with  Russia  on  sat- 
isfactory terms  so  as  to  punish  Austria  for  her  bad  faith 
in  breaking  the  alliance  of  1812.2 

Such  trifling  with  the  world's  peace  seems  to  belong, 
not  to  the  sphere  of  history,  but  to  the  sombre  domain  of 
Greek  tragedy,  where  mortals  full  blown  with  pride  rush 
blindly  on  the  embossed  bucklers  of  fate.  For  what  did 
Austria  demand  of  him?  She  proposed  to  leave  him  master 
of  all  the  lands  from  the  swamps  of  the  Ems  down  to  the 
Roman  Campagna  :  Italy  was  to  be  his,  along  with  as  much 
of  the  Iberian  Peninsula  as  he  could  hold.  His  control  of 
Illyria,  North  Germany,  and  the  Rhenish  Confederation  he 
must  give  up.  But  France,  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Italy 
would  surely  form  a  noble  realm  for  a  man  who  had  lost 
half  a  million  of  men,  and  was  even  now  losing  Spain.  Yet 
his  correspondence  proves  that,  even  so,  he  thought  little 
of  his  foes,  and,  least  of  all,  of  the  Congress  at  Prague. 

Leaving  his  plenipotentiaries  tied  down  to  the  discus- 
sion of  matters  of  form,  he  set  out  from  Dresden  on  July 
24th  for  a  visit  to  Mainz,  where  he  met  the  Empress  and 
reviewed  his  reserves.     Every  item  of  news  fed  his  war- 

1  Thiers  ;  Ernouf's  "  Maret,  Due  de  Bassano,"  p.  571. 

2  Bignon,  "  Hist,  de  France,"  vol.  xii.,  p.  199 ;  Lefebvre,  "  Cabinets  de 
l'Europe,"  vol.  v.,  p.  555. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE   ARMISTICE  299 

like  resolve.  Soult,  with  nearly  100,000  men,  was  about 
to  relieve  Pamplona  (so  he  wrote  to  Caulaincourt)  :  the 
English  were  retiring  in  confusion  :  12,000  veteran  horse- 
men from  his  armies  in  Spain  would  soon  be  on  the  Rhine  ; 
but  they  could  not  be  on  the  Elbe  before  September.  If 
the  allies  wanted  a  longer  armistice,  he  (Napoleon)  would 
agree  to  it  :  if  they  wished  to  fight,  he  was  equally  ready, 
even  against  the  Austrians  as  well.1  To  Davoust,  at 
Hamburg,  he  expressed  himself  as  if  war  was  certain  ; 
and  he  ordered  Clarke,  at  Paris,  to  have  110,000  muskets 
made  by  the  end  of  the  year,  so  that,  in  all,  400,000  would 
be  ready.  Letters  about  the  Congress  are  conspicuous  by 
their  absence  ;  and  everything  proves  that,  as  he  wrote  to 
Clarke  at  the  beginning  of  the  armistice,  he  purposed  strik- 
ing his  great  blows  in  September.  Little  by  little  we  see 
the  emergence  of  his  final  plan  —  to  overthrow  Russia  and 
Prussia,  while,  for  a  week  or  two,  he  amused  Austria  with 
separate  overtures  at  Prague. 

But,  during  eight  years  of  adversity,  European  states- 
men had  learnt  that  disunion  spelt  disaster  ;  and  it  was 
evident  that  Napoleon's  delays  were  prompted  solely  by 
the  need  of  equipping  and  training  'his  new  cavalry  bri- 
gades. As  for  the  Congress,  no  one  took  it  seriously. 
Gentz,  who  was  then  in  close  contact  with  Metternich,  saw 
how  this  tragi-comedy  would  end.  "  We  believe  that  on 
his  return  to  Dresden,  Napoleon  will  address  to  this  Court 
a  solemn  Note  in  which  he  will  accuse  everybody  of  the 
delays  which  he  himself  has  caused,  and  will  end  up  by 
proclaiming  a  sort  of  ultimatum.  Our  reply  will  be  a 
declaration  of  war."  2 

This  was  what  happened.  As  July  wore  on  and 
brought  no  peaceful  overtures,  but  rather  a  tightening  of 
Napoleon's  coils  in  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  Illyria,  the  Em- 
peror Francis  inclined  towards  war.  As  late  as  July  18th 
he  wrote  to  Metternich  that  he  was  still  for  peace,  pro- 
vided that  Illyria  could  be  gained.3     But  the  French  mili- 

1  Letter  of  July  29th. 

2  Gentz  to  Sir  G.  Jackson,  August  4th  ("  Bath  Archives,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  199). 
For  a  version  nattering  to  Napoleon,  see  Ernoufs  "  Maret "  (pp.  579-587), 
which  certainly  exculpates  the  Minister. 

8  Metternich,  "Memoirs,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  546  (Eng.  ed.). 


300  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

tary  preparations  decided  him,  a  few  days  later,  to  make 
war,  unless  every  one  of  the  Austrian  demands  should  be 
conceded  by  August  10th.  His  counsellors  had  already 
come  to  that  conclusion,  as  our  records  prove.  On  July 
20th  Stadion  wrote  to  Cathcart  urging  him  to  give  pecun- 
iary aid  to  General  Nugent,  who  would  wait  on  him  to 
concert  means  for  rousing  a  revolt  against  Napoleon  in 
Tyrol  and  North  Italy  ;  and  our  envoy  agreed  to  give 
£  5,000  a  month  for  the  "  support  of  5,000  Austrians  act- 
ing in  communication  with  our  squadron  in  the  Adriatic." 
This  step  met  with  Metternich's  approval  ;  and,  when 
writing  to  Stadion  from  Prague  (July  25th),  he  coun- 
selled Cathcart  to  send  a  despatch  to  Wellington  and  urge 
him  to  make  a  vigorous  move  against  the  south  of  France. 
He  (Metternich)  would  have  the  letter  sent  safely  through 
Switzerland  and  the  south  of  France  direct  to  our  general.1 

With  the  solemn  triflings  of  the  Congress  we  need  not  con- 
cern ourselves.  The  French  plenipotentiaries  saw  clearly 
that  their  master  "  would  allow  of  no  peace  but  that  which 
he  should  himself  dictate  with  his  foot  on  the  enemy's  neck." 
Yet  they  persevered  in  their  thankless  task,  for  "  who  could 
tell  whether  the  Emperor,  when  he  found  himself  placed 
between  highly  favourable  conditions  and  the  fear  of  hav- 
ing 200,000  additional  troops  against  him,  might  not  hesi-. 
tate  ;  whether  just  one  grain  of  common  sense,  one  spark 
of  wisdom,  might  not  enter  his  head  ?  "  Alas  !  That 
brain  was  now  impervious  to  advice  ;  and  the  young  De 
Broglie,  from  whom  we  quote  this  extract,  sums  up  the 
opinion  of  the  French  plenipotentiaries  in  the  trenchant 
phrase,  "the  devil  was  in  him."2 

But  there  was  method  in  his  madness.  In  the  Dresden 
interview  he  had  warned  Metternich  that  not  till  the 
eleventh  hour  would  he  disclose  his  real  demands.  And 
now  was  the  opportunity  of  trying  the  effect  of  a  final 
act  of  intimidation.  On  August  4th  he  was  back  again 
in  Dresden  :  on  the  next  day  he  dictated  the  secret  con- 

1  "  F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  86.    A  letter  of  General  Nugent  (July  27th),  from 
Prague,  is  inclosed.    When  he  (N.)  expressed  to  Metternich  the  fear  that 
Caulaincourt's  arrival  there  portended  peace,  M.  replied  that  this  would 
make  no  alteration,  "  as  the  proposals  were  such  that  they  certainly  would  | 
not  be  accepted,  and  they  would  even  be  augmented." 

2  ••  Souvenirs  du  Due  de  Broglie,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  v. 


xxxiv  VITTORIA   AND   THE.  ^UiMKJTieR—  301""" 

ditions  on  which  he  would  accept  Austria's  mediation  ; 
and,  on  August  6th,  Caulaincourt  paid  Metternich  a 
private  visit  to  find  out  what  Austria's  terms  really  were. 
After  a  flying  visit  to  the  Emperor  Francis  at  Brandeis, 
the  Minister  brought  back  as  an  ultimatum  the  six 
terms  drawn  up  on  June  7th  (see  p.  290)  ;  and  to  these 
he  now  added  another  which  guaranteed  the  existing 
possessions  of  every  State,  great  or  small. 

Napoleon  was  taken  aback  by  this  boldness,  which 
he  attributed  to  the  influence  of  Spanish  affairs  and  to 
English  intrigues.1  On  August  9th  he  summoned  Bubna 
and  offered  to  give  up  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  —  provided 
that  the  King  of  Saxony  gained  an  indemnity  —  also  the 
Illyrian  Provinces  (but  without  Istria),  as  well  as  Danzig, 
if  its  fortifications  were  destroyed.  As  for  the  Hanse 
Towns  and  North  Germany,  he  would  not  hear  of  letting 
them  go.  Bubna  thought  that  Austria  would  acquiesce. 
But  she  had  said  her  last  word  :  she  saw  that  Napoleon 
was  trifling  with  her  until  he  had  disposed  of  Russia 
and  Prussia.  And,  at  midnight  of  August  10th,  beacon 
fires   on    the   heights   of    the    Riesengebirge    flashed  the 

1  British  aims  at  this  time  are  well  set  forth  in  the  instructions  and  the 
accompanying  note  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  our  ambassador  designate  at  Vienna, 
dated  Foreign  Office,  August  6th,  1813  :  ".  ...  Your  Lordship  will  collect 
from  these  instructions  that  a  general  peace,  in  order  to  provide  adequately 
for  the  tranquillity  and  independence  of  Europe,  ought,  in  the  judgment 
of  His  Majesty's  Government,  to  confine  France  at  least  within  the 
Pyrenees,  the  Alps,  and  the  Rhine  :  and  if  the  other  Great  Powers  of 
Europe  should  feel  themselves  enabled  to  contend  for  such  a  Peace, 
Great  Britain  is  fully  prepared  to  concur  with  them  in  such  a  line  of 
policy.  If,  however,  the  Powers  most  immediately  concerned  should 
determine,  rather  than  encounter  the  risks  of  a  more  protracted  struggle, 
to  trust  for  their  own  security  to  a  more  imperfect  arrangement,  it  never 
has  been  the  policy  of  the  British  Government  to  attempt  to  dictate  to 
other  States  a  perseverance  in  war,  which  they  did  not  themselves  recog- 
nize to  be  essential  to  their  own  as  well  as  to  the  common  safety."  As 
regards  details,  we  desired  to  see  the  restoration  of  Venetia  to  Austria,  of 
the  Papal  States  to  the  Pope,  of  the  north-west  of  Italy  to  the  King  of 
Sardinia,  but  trusted  that  "a  liberal  establishment1'  might  be  found 
for  Murat  in  the  centre  of  Italy.  Napoleon  knew  that  we  desired  to  limit 
France  to  the  "  natural  frontiers,"  and  that  we  were  resolved  to  insist  on 
our  maritime  claims.  As  our  Government  took  this  unpopular  line,  and 
went  further  than  Austria  in  its  plans  for  restricting  French  influence,  he 
had  an  excellent  opportunity  for  separating  the  Continental  Powers  from 
us.  But  he  gave  out  that  those  Powers  were  bought  by  England,  and 
that  we  were  bent  on  humiliating  France. 


302  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxxir 

glad  news  to  the  allies  in  Silesia  that  they  might  begin 
to  march  their  columns  into  Bohemia.  The  second  and 
vaster  Act  in  the  drama  of  liberation  had  begun. 

Did  Napoleon  remember,  in  that  crisis  of  his  destiny, 
that  it  was  exactly  twenty-one  years  since  the  downfall 
of  the  old  French  monarchy,  when  he  looked  forth  on 
the  collapse  of  the  royalist  defence  at  the  Tuileries  and 
the  fruitless  bravery  of  the  Swiss  Guards? 


CHAPTER   XXXV 

DRESDEN    AND  LEIPZIG 

The  militant  Revolution  had  now  attained  its  majority. 
It  had  to  confront  an  embattled  Europe.     Hitherto  the 
jealousies  or  fears  of  the  Eastern  Powers  had  prevented 
any  effective  union.     The  Austro-Prussian  league  of  1792 
was  of  the  loosest  description  owing  to  the  astute  neu- 
trality of  the  Czarina  Catherine.     In  1798  and  1805  Prus- 
sia seemed  to  imitate  her  policy,  and  only  after  Austria 
had  been  crushed  did  the  army  of  Frederick  the  Great  try 
conclusions  with  Napoleon.     In  the  Jena  and  Friedland 
campaigns,  the  Hapsburgs  played  the  part  of  the  sulking 
Achilles,  and  met  their  natural  reward  in  1809.     The  war 
of  1812  marshalled  both  Austria  and  Prussia  as  vassal 
States  in  Napoleon's  crusade  against  Russia.      But  it  also 
brought  salvation,  and  Napoleon's  fateful  obstinacy  during 
the  negotiations  at  Prague  virtually  compelled  his  own 
father-in-law  to  draw  the  sword  against  him.     Ostensibly, 
the  points  at  issue  were  finally  narrowed  down  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  the  ownership  of 
North  Germany,  and  a  few  smaller  points.      But  really 
^here  was  a  deeper  cause,  the  character  of  Napoleon. 
The  vindictiveness  with  which  he  had  trampled  on  his 
oes,  his  almost  superhuman  lust  of  domination,  and  the 
alting  way  in  which  he  met  all  overtures  for  a  compro- 
ise — this  it  was  that  drove  the  Hapsburgs  into  an  alli- 
nce  with  their   traditional  foes.      His  conduct  may  be 
Explained  on  diverse  grounds,  as  springing  from  the  ven- 
letta  instincts  of  his  race,  or  from  his  still  viewing  events 
through  the  distorting  medium  of  the  Continental  System, 
!>r  from  his  ingrained  conviction  that,  at  bottom,  rulers  are 
influenced  only  by  intimidation. 

In  any  case,  he  had  now  succeeded  in  bringing  about 
,  pe  very  thing  which  Charles  James  Fox  had  declared  to 

303 


304  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

be  impossible.  In  opening  the  negotiations  for  peace  with 
France  in  April,  1806,  our  Foreign  Minister  had  declared 
to  Talleyrand  that  "the  project  of  combining  the  whole  of 
Europe  against  France  is  to  the  last  degree  chimerical." 
Yet  Great  Britain  and  the  Spanish  patriots,  after  strug- 
gling alone  against  the  conqueror  from  1808  to  1812,  saw 
Russia,  Sweden,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  successively  range 
themselves  on  their  side.  It  is  true,  the  Germans  of  the 
Rhenish  Confederation,  the  Italians,  Swiss,  and  Danes, 
were  still  enrolled  under  the  banners  of  the  new  Charle- 
magne ;  but,  with  the  exception  of  the  last,  they  fought 
wearily  or  questioningly,  as  for  a  cause  that  promised 
naught  but  barren  triumphs  and  unending  strife. 

Truly,  the  years  that  witnessed  Napoleon's  fall  were 
fruitful  in  paradox.  The  greatest  political  genius  of  the 
age,  for  lack  of  the  saving  grace  of  moderation,  had  banded 
Europe  against  him  :  and  the  most  calculating  of  com- 
manders had  also  given  his  enemies  time  to  frame  an 
effective  military  combination.  The  Prussian  General 
von  Boyen  has  told  us  in  his  Memoirs  how  dismayed 
ardent  patriots  were  at  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  in 
June,  and  how  slow  even  the  wiser  heads  were  to  see  that 
it  would  benefit  their  cause.  If  Napoleon  needed  it  in 
order  to  train  his  raw  conscripts  and  organize  new  bri- 
gades of  cavalry,  the  need  of  the  allies  was  even  greater. 
Their  resources  were  far  less  developed  than  his  own.  At 
Bautzen,  their  army  was  much  smaller  ;  and  Boyen  states 
that  had  the  Emperor  pushed  them  hard,  driven  the  Rus- 
sians back  into  Poland  and  called  the  Poles  once  more  to 
arms,  the  allies  must  have  been  in  the  most  serious  straits.1 

Napoleon,  it  is  true,  gained  much  by  the  armistice.  His 
conscripts  profited  immensely  by  the  training  of  those 
nine  weeks  :  his  forces  now  threatened  Austria  on  the 
side  of  Bavaria  and  Illyria,  as  well  as  from  the  newly 
intrenched  camp  south  of  Dresden  :  his  cavalry  was  re- 
covering its  old  efficiency  :  Murat,  in  answer  to  his  impe- 
rious summons,  ended  his  long  vacillations  and  joined  the 
army  at  Dresden  on  August  14th. 

Above  all,  the  French  now  firmly  held  that  great  mili-  j 
tary  barrier,  the  River  Elbe.     Napoleon's  obstinacy  during 

1  Boyen,  "  Erinnerungen,"  Pt.  III.,  p.  66. 


xxxv  DRESDEN  AND  LEIPZIG  305 

the  armistice  was  undoubtedly  fed  by  his  boundless  confi- 
dence in  the  strength  of  his  military  position.  In  vain  did 
his  Marshals  remind  him  that  he  was  dangerously  far  from 
France ;  that,  if  Austria  drew  the  sword,  she  could  cut 
him  off  from  the  Rhine,  and  that  the  Saale,  or  even  the 
Rhine  itself,  would  be  a  safer  line  of  defence.  —  Ten  bat- 
tles lost,  he  retorted,  would  scarcely  force  him  to  that  last 
step.  True,  he  now  exposed  his  line  of  communications 
with  France  ;  but  if  the  art  of  war  consisted  in  never 
running  any  risk,  glory  would  be  the  pri^e  of  mediocre 
minds.  He  must  have  a  complete  triumph.  The  question 
was  not  of  abandoning  this  or  that  province  :  his  political 
superiority  was  at  stake.  At  Marengo,  Austerlitz,  and 
Wagram,  he  was  in  greater  danger.  His  forces  now  were 
not  in  the  air ;  they  rested  on  the  Elbe,  on  its  fortresses, 
and  on  Erfurt.  Dresden  was  the  pivot  on  which  all  his 
movements  turned.  His  enemies  were  spread  out  on  a 
circumference  stretching  from  Prague  to  Berlin,  while  he 
was  at  the  centre  ;  and,  operating  on  interior  and  there- 
fore shorter  lines,  he  could  outmarch  and  outmanoeuvre 
them.  "  But"  he  concluded,  "where  I  am  not  my  lieuten- 
ants must  wait  for  me  without  trusting  anything  to  chance. 
The  allies  cannot  long  act  together  on  lines  so  extended, 
and  can  I  not  reasonably  hope  sooner  or  later  to  catch  them 
in  some  false  move  ?  If  they  venture  between  my  fortified 
lines  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Rhine,  I  will  enter  Bohemia  and 
thus  take  them  in  the  rear."  1 

The  plan  promised  much.  The  central  intrenched 
camps  of  Dresden  and  Pirna,  together  with  the  fortresses 
of  Konigstein  above,  and  of  Torgau  below,  the  Saxon 
capital,  gave  great  strategic  advantages.  The  corps  of 
St.  Cyr  at  Konigstein  and  those  of  Vandamme,  Poniatow- 
ski,  and  Victor  further  to  the  east,  watched  the  defiles 
leading  from  Bohemia.  The  corps  of  Macdonald,  Lauris- 
ton,  Ney,  and  Marmont  held  in  check  Bliicher's  army  of 
Silesia.  On  Napoleon's  left,  and  resting  on  the  fortresses 
of  Wittenberg  and  Magdeburg,  the  corps  of  Oudinot,  Ber- 
trand,  and  Reynier  threatened  Berlin  and  Bernadotte's 
army  of  the  north  cantonned  in  its  neighbourhood  ;  while 

1  Fain,  vol.  ii.,  p.  27.  The  italicized  words  are  given  thus  by  him  ;  but 
they  read  like  a  later  excuse  for  Napoleon's  failures. 

VOL.    H X 


306  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

Davoust  at  Hamburg  faced  Bernadotte's  northern  detach- 
ments and  menaced  his  communications  with  Stralsund. 
Davoust  certainly  was  far  away,  and  the  loss  of  this  ablest 
of  Napoleon's  lieutenants  was  severely  to  be  felt  in  the 
subsequent  complicated  moves  ;  with  this  exception,  how- 
ever, Napoleon's  troops  were  well  in  hand  and  had  the 
advantage  of  the  central  position,  while  the  allies  were,  as 
yet,  spread  out  on  an  extended  arc. 

But  Napoleon  once  more  made  the  mistake  of  underrat- 
ing both  the  numbers  and  the  abilities  of  his  foes.  By 
great  exertions  they  now  had  close  on  half  a  million  of 
men  under  arms,  near  the  banks  of  the  Oder  and  the  Elbe, 
or  advancing  from  Poland  and  Hungary.  True,  many  of 
these  were  reserves  or  raw  recruits,  and  Colonel  Cathcart 
doubted  whether  the  Austrian  reserves  were  then  in 
existence.1  But  the  best  authorities  place  the  total  at 
496,000  men  and  1,443  cannon.  Moreover,  as  was  agreed 
on  at  Trachenberg,  77,000  Russians  and  49,000  Prussians 
now  marched  from  Glatz  and  Schweidnitz  into  Bohemia, 
and  speedily  came  into  touch  with  the  110,000  Austrians 
now  ranged  behind  the  River  Eger.  The  formation  of 
this  allied  Grand  Army  was  a  masterly  step.  Napoleon 
did  not  hear  of  it  before  August  16th,  and  it  was  not  until 
a  week  later  that  he  realized  how  vast  were  the  forces  that 
would  threaten  his  rear. 

For  the  present  his  plan  was  to  hold  the  Bohemian 
passes  south  of  Bautzen  and  Pirna,  so  as  to  hinder  any 
invasion  of  Saxony,  while  he  threw  himself  in  great  force 
on  the  Army  of  Silesia,  now  95,000  strong,  though  he 
believed  it  to  number  only  50,000. 2  While  he  was  crush- 
ing Bliicher,  his  lieutenants,  Oudinot,  Reynier,  and  Ber- 
trand,  were  charged  to  drive  Bernadotte's  scattered  corps 
from  Berlin  ;  whereupon  Davoust  was  to  cut  him  off  from 
the  sea  and  relieve  the  French  garrisons  at  Stettin  and 
Kustrin.  Thus  Napoleon  proposed  to  act  on  the  offensive 
in  the  open  country  towards  Berlin  and  in  Silesia,  remain- 
ing at  first  on  the  defensive  at  Dresden  and  in  the  Lusa- 

1  "  Commentaries  on  the  War  in  Russia  and  Germany,"  p.  195. 

2  In  his  letters  of  August  16th  to  Macdonald  and  Ney  he  assumed  that 
the  allies  might  strike  at  Dresden,  or  even  as  far  west  as  Zwickau  :  but 
meanwhile  he  would  march  "pour  enlever  Bliicher." 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  307 

tian  mountains.  This  was  against  the  advice  of  Marmont, 
who  urged  him  to  strike  first  at  Prague,  and  not  to  intrust 
his  lieutenants  with  great  undertakings  far  away  from 
Dresden.  The  advice  proved  to  be  sound  ;  but  it  seems 
certain  that  Napoleon  intended  to  open  the  campaign  by  a 
mighty  blow  dealt  at  Blucher,  and  then  to  lead  a  great 
force  through  the  Lusatian  defiles  into  Bohemia  and  drive 
the  allies  before  him  towards  Vienna. 

But  what  did  he  presume  that  the  allied  forces  in 
Bohemia  would  be  doing  while  he  overwhelmed  Blucher 
in  Silesia?  Would  not  Dresden  and  his  communications 
with  France  be  left  open  to  their  blows?  He  decided  to 
run  this  risk.  He  had  100,000  men  among  the  Lusatian 
hills  between  Bautzen  and  Zittau.  St.  Cyr's  corps  was 
strongly  posted  at  Pirna  and  the  small  fortress  of  Konig- 
stein,  while  his  light  troops  watched  the  passes  north 
of  Teplitz  and  Karlsbad.  If  the  allies  sought  to  invade 
Saxony,  they  would,  so  Napoleon  thought,  try  to  force 
the  Zittau  road,  which  presented  few  natural  difficulties. 
If  they  threatened  Dresden  by  the  passages  further  west, 
Vandamme  would  march  from  near  Zittau  to  reinforce  St. 
Cyr,  or,  if  need  be,  the  Emperor  himself  would  hurry 
back  from  Silesia  with  his  Guards.  If  the  enemy  invaded 
Bavaria,  Napoleon  wished  them  bon  voyage  :  they  would 
soon  come  back  faster  than  they  went ;  for,  in  that  case, 
he  would  pour  his  columns  down  from  Zittau  towards 
Prague  and  Vienna.  The  thought  that  he  might  for  a 
time  be  cut  off  from  France  troubled  him  not :  "  400,000 
men,"  he  said,  "resting  on  a  system  of  strongholds,  on  a 
river  like  the  Elbe,  are  not  to  be  turned."  In  truth,  he 
thought  little  about  the  Bohemian  army.  If  40,000  Rus- 
sians had  entered  Bohemia,  they  would  not  reach  Prague 
till  the  25th ;  so  he  wrote  to  St.  Cyr  on  the  17th,  the  day 
when  hostilities  could  first  begin  ;  and  he  evidently  be- 
lieved that  Dresden  would  be  safe  till  September.  Its 
defence  seemed  assured  by  the  skill  of  that  master  of 
defensive  warfare,  St.  Cyr,  by  the  barrier  of  the  Erz 
Mountains,  and  still  more  by  Austrian  slowness. 

Of  this  characteristic  of  theirs  he  cherished  great  hopes. 
Their  finances  were  in  dire  disorder ;  and  Fouche,  who 
had  just  returned  from  ta  tour  in  the  Hapsburg  States, 


308  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap, 

reported  that  the  best  way  of  striking  at  that  Power 
would  be  "  to  affect  its  paper  currency,  on  which  all 
its  armaments  depend."1  And  truly  if  the  transport  of 
a  great  army  over  a  mountain  range  had  depended  solely 
on  the  almost  bankrupt  exchequer  at  Vienna,  Dresden 
would  have  been  safe  until  Michaelmas ;  but,  beside  the 
material  aid  brought  by  the  Russians  and  Prussians  into 
Bohemia,  England  also  gave  her  financial  support.  In 
pursuance  of  the  secret  article  agreed  on  at  Reichenbach, 
Cathcart  now  advanced  £  250,000  at  once ;  and  the  know- 
ledge that  our  financial  support  was  given  to  the  federa- 
tive paper  notes  issued  by  the  allies  enabled  the  Court 
of  Vienna  privately  to  raise  loans  and  to  wage  war  with, 
a  vigour  wholly  unexpected  by  Napoleon.2 

Certainly  the  allied  Grand  Army  suffered  from  no  lack 
of  advisers.  The  Czar,  the  Emperor  Francis,  and  the 
King  of  Prussia  were  there  ;  as  a  compliment  to  Austria, 
the  command  was  intrusted  to  Field-Marshal  Schwarzen- 
berg,  a  man  of  diplomatic  ability  rather  than  of  military 
genius.  By  his  side  were  the  Russians,  Wittgenstein, 
Barclay,  and  Toll,  the  Prussian  Knesebeck,  the  Swiss 
Jomini,  and,  above  all,  Moreau. 

The  last-named,  as  we  have  seen,  came  over  on  the  in- 
ducement of  Bernadotte,  and  was  received  with  great 
honour  by  the  allied  sovereigns.  Jomini  also  was  wel- 
comed for  his  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war.  This  great 
writer  had  long  served  as  a  French  general  ;  but  the  ill- 
treatment  that  he  had  lately  suffered  at  Berthier's  hands 
led  him,  on  August  14th,  to  quit  the  French  service  and 
pass  over  to  the  allies.  His  account  of  his  desertion,  how- 
ever, makes  it  clear  that  he  had  not  penetrated  Napoleon's 
designs,  for  the  best  of  all  reasons,  because  the  Emperor 
kept  them  to  himself  to  the  very  last  moment.3 

The  second  part  of  the  campaign  opens  with  the  curious 

1  "  Lettres  in^dites  de  Napoleon."  The  Emperor  forwarded  this  sug- 
gestion to  Savary  (August  11th)  :  it  doubtless  meant  an  issue  of  false 
paper  notes,  such  as  had  been  circulated  in  Russia  the  year  before. 

2  Cathcart,  "Commentaries,"  p.  206. 

8  "  Extrait  d'un  Memoire  sur  la  Campagne  de  1813."  With  char- 
acteristic inaccuracy  Marbot  remarks  that  the  defection  of  Jomini,  with 
Napoleon' 's  plans,  was  "  a  disastrous  blow."  The  same  is  said  by  Dedein 
de  Gelder,  p.  328. 


XXXV 


DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG 


309 


sight  of  immense  forces,  commanded  by  experienced  leaders, 
acting  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  moves  of  the  enemy 
only  some  fifty  miles  away.  Leaving  Bautzen  on  August 
17th,  Napoleon  proceeded  eastwards  to  Gorlitz,  turned  off 
thence  to  Zittau,  and  hearing  a  false  rumour  that  the 
Russo-Prussian  force  in  Bohemia  was  only  40,000  strong, 
returned  to  Gorlitz  with  the  aim  of  crushing  Bliicher. 
Disputes  about  the  armistice  had  given  that  enterprising 
leader  the  excuse  for  entering  the  neutral  zone  before  its 
expiration  ;  and  he  had  had  sharp  affairs  with  Macdonald 

CAMPAIGN     op  1813 


SCALE     OF   MILES 

o       io      co      ao     *o     w 


Stanford's  Geograph-  SrtaS* 

and  Ney  near  Lowenberg  on  the  River  Bober.  Napoleon 
hurried  up  with  his  Guards,  eager  to  catch  Bliicher  ; x  the 
French  were  now  140,000  strong,  while  the  allies  had 
barely  95,000  at  hand.  But  the  Prussian  veteran,  usually 
as  daring  as  a  lion,  was  now  wily  as  a  fox.  tinder  cover 
of  stiff  outpost  affairs,  he  skilfully  withdrew  to  the  south- 
east, hoping  to  lure  the  French  into  the  depths  of  Silesia 
and  so  give  time  to  Schwarzenberg  to  seize  Dresden. 

1  The  Emperor's  eagerness  is  seen  by  the  fact  that  on  August  21st  he 
began  dictating  despatches,  at  Lauban,  at  :>  a.m.  On  the  previous  day  he 
had  dictated  seventeen  despatches  ;  twelve  at  Zittau,  four  after  his  ride 
to  Gorlitz,  and  one  more  on  his  arrival  at  Lauban  at  midnight. 


310  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

But  Napoleon  was  not  to  be  drawn  further  afield.  See- 
ing that  his  foes  could  not  be  forced  to  a  pitched  battle, 
he  intrusted  the  command  to  Macdonald,  and  rapidly  with- 
drew with  Ney  and  his  Guard  towards  Gorlitz;  for  he  now 
saw  the  possible  danger  to  Dresden  if  Schwarzenberg  struck 
home.  If,  however,  that  leader  remained  on  the  defensive, 
the  Emperor  determined  to  fall  back  on  what  had  all  along 
been  his  second  plan,  and  make  a  rush  through  the  Lusa- 
tian  defiles  on  Prague.1  But  a  despatch  from  St.  Cyr, 
which  reached  him  at  Gorlitz  late  at  night  on  the  23rd, 
showed  that  Dresden  was  in  serious  danger  from  the 
gathering  masses  of  the  allies.  This  news  consigned  his 
second  plan  to  the  limbo  of  vain  hopes.  Yet,  as  will 
appear  a  little  later,  his  determination  to  defend  by  taking 
the  offensive  soon  took  form  in  yet  a  third  design  for  the 
destruction  of  the  allies. 

It  is  a  proof  of  the  quenchless  pugnacity  of  his  mind 
that  he  framed  this  plan  during  the  fatigues  of  the  long 
forced  march  back  towards  Dresden,  amidst  pouring  rain 
and  the  discouragement  of  knowing  that  his  raid  into 
Silesia  had  ended  merely  in  the  fruitless  wearying  of  his 
choicest  troops.  Accompanied  by  the  Old  Guard,  the 
Young  Guard,  a  division  of  infantr}-,  and  Latour-Mau- 
bourg's  cavalry,  he  arrived  at  Stolpen,  south-east  of  Dres- 
den, before  dawn  of  the  25th.  Most  of  the  battalions 
had  traversed  forty  leagues  in  little  more  than  forty-eight 
hours,  and  that,  too,  after  a  partial  engagement  at  Lowen- 
berg  and  despite  lack  of  regular  rations.  Leaving  him 
for  a  time,  we  turn  to  glance  at  the  fortunes  of  the  war  in 
Brandenburg  and  Silesia. 

Napoleon  had  bidden  Oudinot,  with  his  own  corps  and 
those  of  Reynier  and  Bertrand,  in  all  about  70,000  men, 
to  fight  his  way  to  Berlin,  disperse  the  Landwehr  and  the 
"  mad  rabble "  there,  and,  if  the  city  resisted,  set  it  in 
flames  by  the  fire  of  fifty  howitzers.  That  Marshal  found 
that  a  tough  resistance  awaited  him,  although  the  allied 
commander-in-chief,  Bernadotte,  moved  with  the  utmost 
caution,  as  if  he  were  bent  on  justifying  Napoleon's  recent 
sneer  that  he  would  "  only  make  a  show  "  (piaffer).  It  is 
true  that  the  position  of  the  Swedish  Prince,  with  Davoust 

1  Letters  of  August  2:jrd  to  Berthier. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND    LEIPZIG  311 

threatening  his  rear,  was  far  from  safe  ;  but  he  earned  the 
dislike  of  the  Prussians  by  playing  the  grand  seigneur.1 
Meanwhile  most  of  the  defence  was  carried  out  by  the 
Prussians,  who  flooded  the  flat  marshy  land,  thus  delay- 
ing Oudinot's  advance  and  compelling  him  to  divide  his 
corps.  Nevertheless,  it  seemed  that  Bernadotte  was  about 
to  evacuate  Berlin. 

At  this  there  was  general  indignation,  which  found  vent 
in  the  retort  of  the  Prussian  General,  von  Biilow  :  "  Our 
bones  shall  bleach  in  front  of  Berlin,  not  behind  it."  See- 
ing an  opportune  moment,  while  Oudinot's  other  corps 
were  as  yet  far  off,  Biilow  sharply  attacked  Reynier's 
corps  of  Saxons  at  Grossbeeren,  and  gained  a  brilliant 
success,  taking  1,700  prisoners  with  26  guns,  and  thus  com- 
pelling Oudinot's  scattered  array  to  fall  back  in  confusion 
on  Wittenberg  (August  23rd).2  Thither  the  Crown  Prince 
cautiously  followed  him.  Four  days  later,  a  Prussian 
column  of  Landwehr  fought  a  desperate  fight  at  Hagel- 
berg  with  Girard's  conscripts,  finally  rushing  on  them 
with  wolf-like  fury,  stabbing  and  clubbing  them,  till  the 
foss  and  the  lanes  of  the  town  were  piled  high  with  dead 
and  wounded.  Scarce  1,700  out  of  Girard's  9,000  made 
good  their  flight  to  Magdeburg.  The  failures  at  Gross- 
beeren and  Hagelberg  reacted  unfavourably  on  Davoust. 
That  leader,  advancing  into  Mecklenburg,  had  skirmished 
with  Walmoden's  corps  of  Hanoverians,  British,  and 
Hanseatics  ;  but,  hearing  of  the  failure  of  the  other 
attempts  on  Berlin,  he  fell  back  and  confined  himself 
mainly  to  a  defensive  which  had  never  entered  into  the 
Emperor's  designs  on  that  side,  or  indeed  on  any  side. 

Even  when  Napoleon  left  Macdonald  facing  Bliicher  in 
Silesia,  his  orders  were,  not  merely  to  keep  the  allies  in 
check  :  if  possible,    Macdonald   was   to   attack   him   and 

1Boyen,  vol.  iii.,  p.  85.  But  see  Wiehr,  "Nap.  unci  Bernadotte  in 
1813,"  who  proves  how  risky  was  B.'s  position,  with  the  Oder  fortresses, 
held  by  the  French,  on  one  flank,  and  Davoust  and  the  Danes  on  the  other. 
He  disposes  of  many  of  the  German  slanders  against  Bernadotte. 

2  Hausser,  pp.  260-267.  Oudinot's  "  Memoirs  "  throw  the  blame  on  the 
slowness  of  Bertrand  in  effecting  the  concentration  on  Grossbeeren  and 
on  the  heedless  impetuosity  of  Reynier.  Wiehr  (pp.  74-116)  proves  from 
despatches  that  Bernadotte  meant  to  attack  the  French  south  of  Berlin : 
he  discredits  the  "  bones  "  anecdote. 


312  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

drive  him  beyond  the  town  of  Jauer.1  This  was  what  the 
French  Marshal  attempted  to  do  on  the  26th  of  August. 
The  conditions  seemed  favourable  to  a  surprise.  Bliicher's 
army  was  stationed  amidst  hilly  country  deeply  furrowed 
by  the  valleys  of  the  Katzbach  and  the  "raging  Neisse."2 
Less  than  half  of  the  allied  army  of  95,000  men  was  com- 
posed of  Prussians  :  the  Russians  naturally  obeyed  his 
orders  with  some  reluctance,  and  even  his  own  country- 
man, Yorck,  grudgingly  followed  the  behests  of  the 
"  hussar  general." 

Macdonald  also  hoped  to  catch  the  allies  while  they 
were  sundered  by  the  deep  valley  of  the  Neisse.  The 
Prussians  with  the  Russian  corps  led  by  Sacken  were  to 
the  east  of  the  Neisse  near  the  village  of  Eichholz,  the 
central  point  of  the  plateau  north  of  Jauer,  which  was  the 
objective  of  the  French  right  wing  ;  while  Langeron's 
Russian  corps  was  at  Hennersdorf,  some  three  miles 
away  and  on  the  west  of  that  torrent.  On  his  side, 
Blucher  was  planning  an  attack  on  Macdonald,  when  he 
heard  that  the  French  had  crossed  the  Neisse  near  its 
confluence  with  the  Katzbach,  and  were  struggling  up 
the  streaming  gullies  that  led  to  Eichholz. 

Driving  rain-storms  hid  the  movements  on  both  sides, 
and  as  Souham,  who  led  the  French  right,  Jiad  neglected 
to  throw  out  flanking  scouts,  the  Prussian  staff-officer, 
Muffling,  was  able  to  ride  within  a  short  distance  of  the 
enemy's  columns  and  report  to  his  chief  that  they  could 
be  assailed  before  their  masses  were  fully  deployed  on 
the  plateau.  While  Souham's  force  was  still  toiling  up, 
Sacken's  artillery  began  to  ply  it  with  shot,  and  had 
Yorck  charged  quickly  with  his  corps  of  Prussians,  the 
day  might  have  been  won  forthwith.  But  that  opinion- 
ated general  insisted  on  leisurely  deploying  his  men. 
Souham  was  therefore  able  to  gain  a  foothold  on  the 
plateau  :  Sebastiani's  men  dragged  up  twenty-four  light- 
cannon  :  and  at  times  the  devoted  bravery  of  the  French 
endangered  the  defence.  But  the  defects  in  their  posi- 
tion slowly  but  surely  told  against  them,  and  the  vigour 
of  their  attack  spent  itself.     Their  cavalry  was  exhausted 

1  Letters  of  August  23rd. 

2  So  called  to  distinguish  it  from  the  two  other  Neisses  in  Silesia. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  313 

by  the  mud  :  their  muskets  were  rendered  wellnigh 
useless  by  the  ceaseless  rain  ;  and  when  Blucher  late  in 
the  afternoon  headed  a  dashing  charge  of  Prussian  and 
Russian  horsemen,  the  wearied  conscripts  gave  way,  fled 
pell-mell  down  the  slopes,  and  made  for  the  fords  of  the 
Neisse  and  the  Katzbach,  where  many  were  engulfed  by 
the  swollen  waters.  Meanwhile  the  Russians  on  the 
allied  left  barely  kept  off  Lauriston's  onsets,  and  on  that 
side  the  day  ended  in  a  drawn  fight.  Macdonald,  how- 
ever, seeing  Lauriston's  rear  threatened  by  the  advance 
of  the  Prussians  over  the  Katzbach,  retreated  during  the 
night  with  all  his  forces.  On  the  next  few  days,  the 
allies,  pressing  on  his  wearied  and  demoralized  troops, 
completed  their  discomfiture,  so  that  Blucher,  on  the 
1st  of  September,  was  able  thus  to  sum  up  the  results  of 
the  battle  and  the  pursuit  —  two  eagles,  103  cannon, 
18,000  men,  and  a  vast  quantity  of  ammunition  and 
stores  captured,  and  Silesia  entirely  freed  from  the  foe.1 

We  now  return  to  the  events  that  centred  at  Dresden. 
When,  on  August  21st  and  22nd,  the  allies  wound  their 
way  through  the  passes  of  the  Erz,  they  were  wholly 
ignorant  of  Napoleon's  whereabouts.  The  generals, 
Jomini  and  Toll,  who  were  acquainted  with  the  plan  of 
operations,  agree  in  stating  that  the  aim  of  the  allies  was 
to  seize  Leipzig.  The  latter  asserts  that  they  believed 
Napoleon  to  be  there,  while  the  Swiss  strategist  saw  in 
this  movement  merely  a  means  of  effecting  a  junction 
with  Bernadotte's  army,  so  as  to  cut  off  Napoleon  from 
the  Rhine.2  Unaware  that  the  rich  prize  of  Dresden  was 
left  almost  within  their  grasp  by  Napoleon's  eastward 
move,  the  allies  plodded  on  towards  Freiberg  and 
Chemnitz,  when,  on  the  23rd,  the  capture  of  one  of 
St.  Cyr's  despatches  flashed  the  truth  upon  them. 

At  once  they  turned  eastwards  towards  Dresden  ;  but 
so  slow  was  their  progress  over  the  wretched  cross-roads 
now  cut  up  by  the  rains,  that  not  till   the  early  morn- 

1  Blasendorf's  "Blucher";  Muffling's  "Aus  meinem  Leben  "  and 
"Campaigns  of  the  Silesian  Army  in  1813  and  1814";  Bertin's  "La 
Campagne  de  1813."  Hausser  assigns  to  the  French  close  on  60,000  at 
the  battle  ;  to  the  allies  about  70,000. 

2  Jomini,  "  Vie  de  Napoleon,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  380  ;  "  Toll,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  124. 


314  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ing  of  the  25th  did  the  heads  of  their  columns  appear  on 
the  heights  south-west  of  the  Saxon  capital.  Yet,  even 
so,  the  omens  were  all  in  their  favour.  On  their  right, 
Wittgenstein  had  already  carried  the  French  lines  at 
Pirna,  and  was  now  driving  in  St.  Cyr's  outposts 
towards  Dresden.  The  daring  spirits  at  Sehwarzen- 
berg's  headquarters  therefore  begged  him  to  push  on  the 
advantage  already  gained,  while  Nappleon  was  still  far 
away.  Everything,  they  asserted,  proved  that  the 
French  were  surprised :  Dresden  could  not  long  hold 
out  against  an  attack  by  superior  numbers :  its  position 
in  a  river  valley  dominated  by  the  southern  and  western 
slopes,  which  the  allies  strongly  held,  was  fatal  to  a  pro- 
longed defence  :  the  thirteen  redoubts  hastily  thrown  up 
by  the  French  could  not  long  keep  an  army  at  ba}%  and 
of  these  only  five  were  on  the  left  side  of  the  Elbe  on 
which  the  allies  were  now  encamped. 

Against  these  manly  counsels  the  voice  of  prudence 
pleaded  for  delay.  It  was  not  known  how  strong  were 
St.  Cyr's  forces  in  Dresden  and  in  the  intrenched  camp 
south  of  the  city.  Would  it  not  therefore  be  better  to 
await  the  development  of  events?  Such  was  the  advice 
of  Toll  and  Moreau,  the  latter  warning  the  Czar,  with  an 
earnestness  which  we  may  deem  fraught  with  destiny  for 
himself  —  "  Sire,  if  we  attack,  we  shall  lose  20,000  men  and 
break  our  nose." i  The  multitude  of  counsellors  did  not  tend 
to  safety.  Distracted  by  the  strife  of  tongues,  Schwarzen- 
berg  finally  took  refuge  in  that  last  resort  of  weak  minds, 
a  tame  compromise.  He  decided  to  wait  until  further 
corps  reached  the  front,  and  at  four  o'clock  of  the  follow- 
ing afternoon  to  push  forward  five  columns  for  a  general 
reconnaissance  in  force.  As  Jomini  has  pointed  out,  this 
plan  rested  on  sheer  confusion  of  thought.  If  the  com- 
mander meant  merely  to  find  out  the  strength  of  the 
defenders,  that  could  be  ascertained  at  once  by  sending 

1"Toll,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  144.  Cathcart  reports  (p.  216)  that  Moreau 
remarked  to  him  :  "  We  are  already  on  Napoleon's  communications  ;  the 
possession  of  the  town  [Dresden]  is  no  object;  it  will  fall  of  itself  at  a 
future  time."  If  Moreau  said  this  seriously  it  can  only  be  called  a  piece 
of  imbecility.  The  allies  were  far  from  safe  until  they  had  wrested  from 
Napoleon  one  of  his  strong  places  on  the  Elbe  ;  it  was  certainly  not  enough 
to  have  seized  Pima. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  315 

forward  light  troops,  screened  by  skirmishers,  at  the  im- 
portant points.  If  he  wished  to  attack  in  force,  his 
movement  was  timed  too  late  in  ihe  day  safely  to  effect 
a  lodgment  in  a  large  city  held  by  a  resolute  foe.  More- 
over the  postponement  of  the  attack  for  thirty  hours 
gave  time  for  the  French  Emperor  to  appear  on  the 
scene  with  his  Guards. 

As  we  have  seen,  Napoleon  reached  Stolpen,  a  town 
distant  some  sixteen  miles  from  Dresden,  very  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  25th.  His  plans  present  a  telling 
contrast  to  the  slow  and  clumsy  arrangements  of  the 
allies.  He  proposed  to  hurl  his  Guards  at  their  rear  and 
cut  them  off  from  Bohemia.  Crossing  the  Elbe  at 
Konigstein,  he  would  recover  the  camp  of  Pirna,  hold 
the  plateau  further  west  and  intercept  Schwarzenberg's 
retreat.1  For  the  success  .of  this  plan  he  needed  a  day's 
rest  for  his  wearied  Guards  and  the  knowledge  that 
Dresden  could  hold  out  for  a  short  time.  His  veterans 
could  perhaps  dispense  with  rest ;  where  their  Emperor 
went  they  would  follow ;  but  Dresden  was  the  unknown 
quantity.  Shortly  after  midnight  of  the  25th  and  26th,  he 
heard  from  St.  Cyr  that  Dresden  would  soon  be  attacked 
in  such  force  that  a  successful  defence  was  doubtful. 

At  once  he  changed  his  plan  and  at  1  A.M.  sent  off 
four  despatches  ordering  his  Guards  and  all  available 
troops  to  succour  St.  Cyr.  Vandamme's  corps  alone 
was  now  charged  with  the  task  of  creeping  round  the 
enemy's  rear,  while  the  Guards  long  before  dawn  re- 
sumed their  march  through  the  rain  and  mud.  The 
Emperor  followed  and  passed  them  at  a  gallop,  reaching 
the  capital  at  9  a.m.  with  Latour-Maubourg's  cuirassiers ; 
and,  early  in  the  afternoon,  the  shakos  of  the  Guards 
were  seen  on  the  heights  east  of  Dresden,  while  the  dark 
masses  of  the  allies  were  gathering  on  the  south  and  west 
for  their  reconnaissance  in  force. 

Lowering  clouds  and  pitiless  rain  robbed  the  scene  of 
all  brilliance,  but  wreathed  it  with  a  certain  sombre 
majesty.  On  the  one  side  was  the  fair  city,  the  centre 
of  German  art  and  culture,  hastily  girdled  with  redoubts 
and   intrenchments   manned    now    by  some    120,000    de- 

1  "Corresp.,"  No.  20461. 


316 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I 


CHAP. 


fenders.  Fears  and  murraurings  had  vanished  as  soon 
as  the  Emperor  appeared  ;  and  though  in  many  homes 
men  still  longed  for  the  triumph  of  the  allies,  yet  loyalty 
to  their  King  and  awe  of  Napoleon  held  the  great  mass 
of  the  citizens  true  to  his  alliance.  As  for  the  French 
soldier}',  their  enthusiasm  was  unbounded.  As  regiment 
after  regiment  tramped  in  wearily  from  the  east  over  the 
Elbe  bridge  and  the  men  saw  that  well-known  figure  in 
the  gray  overcoat,  fatigues  and  discomforts  were  for- 
gotten ;  thunderous  shouts  of  "  Vive  l'Empereur "  rent 
the  air  and  rolled  along  the  stream,  carrying  inspiration 


Srasiibrdt  Gx*graph* Estal'.lonJen 


to  the  defenders,  doubt  and  dismay  to  the  hostile  lines. 
Yet  these  too  were  being  strengthened,  until  they  finally 
mustered  close  on  200,000  men,  who  crowned  the  slopes 
south  of  Dresden  with  a  war-cloud  that  promised  to 
sweep  away  its  hasty  defences — had  not  Napoleon  been 
there. 

The  news  of  his  arrival  shook  the  nerves  of  the 
Russian  Emperor,  and  it  was  reserved  for  the  usually 
diffident  King  of  Prussia  to  combat  all  notion  of  retreat. 
Schwarzenberg's  reconnaissance  in  force  therefore  took 
place  punctually  at  four  o'clock,  when  the  French,  after 
a   brief   rest,  were    well    prepared  to  meet    them.      The 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  317 

Prussians  had  already  seized  the  "  Great  Garden  "  which 
lines  the  Pirna  road  ;  and  from  this  point  of  vantage 
they  now  sought  to  drive  St.  Cyr  from  the  works  thrown 
up  on  its  flank  and  rear.  But  their  masses  were  torn  by 
a  deadly  fire  and  finally  fell  back  shattered.  The 
Russians,  on  their  right,  fared  no  better.  At  the  allied 
centre  and  left,  the  attack  at  one  time  promised  success. 
Under  cover  of  a  heavy  cannonade  from  their  slopes,  the 
Austrians  carried  two  redoubts  :  but,  with  a  desperate 
charge,  the  Old  Guard  drove  in  through  the  gorges  of 
these  works  and  bayoneted  the  victors  of  an  hour.  As 
night  fell,  the  assailants  drew  off  baffled,  after  sustaining 
serious  losses. 

Nevertheless,  the  miseries  of  the  night,  the  heavy  rains 
of  the  dawning  day,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  strength 
of  the  enemy's  position  in  front  and  of  Vandamme's 
movement  in  their  rear  failed  to  daunt  their  spirits.  If 
they  were  determined,  Napoleon  was  radiant  with  hope. 
His  force,  though  smaller,  held  the  inner  line  and  spread 
over  some  three  miles  ;  while  the  concave  front  of  the 
allies  extended  over  double  that  space,  and  their  left 
wing  was  separated  from  the  centre  by  the  stream  and 
defile  of  Plauen.  From  his  inner  position  he  could 
therefore  readily  throw  an  overpowering  mass  on  any 
part  of  their  attenuated  array.  He  prepared  to  do  so 
against  their  wings.  At  those  points  everything  prom- 
ised success  to  his  methods  of  attack. 

Never,  perhaps,  in  all  modern  warfare  has  the  musket 
been  so  useless  as  amidst  the  drenching  rains  which  beat 
upon  the  fighters  at  the  Katzbach  and  before  Dresden. 
So  defective  was  its  firing  arrangement  then  that  after  a 
heavy  storm  only  a  feeble  sputter  came  from  whole  bat- 
talions of  foot  :  and  on  those  two  eventful  days  the 
honours  lay  with  the  artillery  and  Varme  blanche.  As 
for  the  infantrymen,  they  could  effect  little  except  in  some 
wild  snatches  of  bayonet  work  at  close  quarters.  This 
explains  the  course  of  events  both  at  the  Katzbach  on  the 
26th,  and  at  Dresden  on  the  following  day.  The  allied 
centre  was  too  strongly  posted  on  the  slopes  south  of 
Dresden  to  be  assailed  with  much  hope  of  success.  But, 
against  the  Russian  vanguard  on  the  allied  right,  Napo- 


318  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

leon  launched  Mortier's  corps  and  Nansouty's  cavalry 
with  complete  success,  until  Wittgenstein's  masses  on  the 
heights  stayed  the  French  onset.  Along  the  centre,  some 
thousand  cannon  thundered  against  one  another,  but  with 
no  very  noteworthy  result,  save  that  Moreau  had  his  legs 
carried  away  by  a  shot  from  a  field  battery  that  suddenly 
opened  upon  the  Czar's  suite.  It  was  the  first  shot  that 
dealt  him  this  fatal  wound,  but  several  other  balls  fell 
among  the  group  until  Alexander  and  his  staff  moved  away. 

Meanwhile  the  great  blow  was  struck  by  Napoleon  at 
the  allied  left.  There  the  Austrian  wing  was  sundered 
from  the  main  force  by  the  difficult  defile  of  Plauen  ; 
and  it  was  crushed  by  one  of  the  Emperor's  most  brilliant 
combinations.  Directing  Victor  with  20,000  men  of  all 
arms  to  engage  the  white-coats  in  front,  he  bade  Murat, 
with  10,000  horsemen,  steal  round  near  the  bank  of  the 
Elbe  and  charge  their  flank  and  rear.  The  division  of 
Count  Metzko  bore  the  brunt  of  this  terrible  onset. 
Nobly  it  resisted.  Though  not  one  musket  in  fifty  would 
fire,  the  footmen  in  one,  place  beat  off  two  charges  of 
Latour-Maubourg's  cuirassiers,  until  he  headed  his  line 
with  lancers,  who  mangled  their  ranks  and  opened  a  way 
for  the  sword.1  Then  all  was  slaughter ;  and  as  Murat's 
squadrons  raged  along  their  broken  lines,  10,000  footmen, 
cut  off  from  the  main  body,  laid  down  their  arms.  News 
of  this  disaster  on  the  left  and  the  sound  of  Vandamme's 
cannon  thundering  among  the  hills  west  of  Pirna  decided 
the  allied  sovereigns  and  Schwarzenberg  to  prepare  for 
a  timely  retreat  into  Bohemia.  Yet  so  bold  a  front  did 
they  keep  at  the  centre  and  right  that  the  waning  light 
showed  the  combatants  facing  each  other  there  on  even 
terms. 

During  the  night,  the  rumbling  of  wagons  warned 
Marmont's  scouts  that  the  enemy  were  retreating  ; 2  and 

1  Cathcart's  "Commentaries,"  p.  230;  Bertin,  "La  Campagne  de 
1813,"  p.  100;  Marmont,  "Mems.,"  bk.  xvii. ;  Sir  Evelyn  Wood's 
"  Achievements  of  Cavalry." 

2  It  is  clear  from  Napoleon's  letters  of  the  evening  of  the  27th  that  he 
was  not  quite  pleased  with  the  day's  work,  and  thought  the  enemy  would 
hold  firm,  or  even  renew  the  attack  on  the  morrow.  They  disprove 
Thiers'  wild  statements  about  a  general  pursuit  on  that  evening,  thousands 
of  prisoners  swept  up,  etc. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  319 

the  Emperor,  coming  up  at  break  of  day,  ordered  that 
Marshal  and  St.  Cyr  to  press  directly  on  their  rear,  while 
Murat  pursued  the  fugitives  along  the  Freiburg  road  fur- 
ther to  the  west.  The  outcome  of  these  two  days  of  fight- 
ing was  most  serious  for  the  allies.  They  lost  35,000 
men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  —  a  natural  result 
of  their  neglect  to  seize  Fortune's  bounteous  favours  on 
the  25th  ;  a  result,  too,  of  Napoleon's  rapid  movements 
and  unerring  sagacity  in  profiting  by  the. tactical  blunders 
of  his  foes. 

It  was  the  last  of  his  great  victories.  And  even  here 
the  golden  fruit  which  he  hoped  to  cull  crumbled  to  bitter 
dust  in  his  grasp.  As  has  been  pointed  out,  he  had 
charged  General  Vandamme,  one  of  the  sternest  fighters 
in  the  French  army,  to  undertake  with  38,000  men  a  task 
which  he  himself  had  previously  hoped  to  achieve  with 
more  than  double  that  number.  This  was  to  seize  Pirna 
and  the  plateau  to  the  west,  which  commands  the  three 
roads  leading  towards  Teplitz  in  Bohemia.  The  best  of 
these  roads  crosses  the  Erzgebirge  by  way  of  Nollendorf 
and  the  gorge  leading  down  to  Kulm,  the  other  by  the 
Zinnwald  pass,  while  between  them  is  a  third  and  yet 
more  difficult  track.  Vandamme  was  to  take  up  a  position 
west  or  south-west  of  Pirna,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of 
the  foe. 

Accordingly,  he  set  out  from  Stolpen  at  dawn  of  the 
26th,  and  on  the  next  two  days  fought  his  way  far  round 
the  rear  of  the  allied  Grand  Army.  A  Russian  force  of 
14,000  men,  led  by  the  young  Prince  Eugene  of  Wiirtem- 
berg  and  Count  Ostermann,  sought  in  vain  to  stop  his 
progress  :  though  roughly  handled  on  the  28th  by  the 
French,  the  Muscovites  disengaged  themselves,  fell  back 
ever  fighting  to  the  Nollendorf  pass,  and  took  up  a  strong 
position  behind  the  village  of  Kulm.  There  they  received 
timely  support  from  the  forces  of  the  Czar  and  Frederick 
William,  who,  after  crossing  by  the  Zinnwald  pass,  heard 
the  firing  on  the  east  and  divined  the  gravity  of  the 
crisis.  Unless  they  kept  Vandamme  at  bay,  the  Grand 
Army  could  with  difficulty  struggle  through  into  Bohe- 
mia. But  now,  with  the  supports  hastily  sent  him,  Oster- 
mann finally  beat  back  Vandamme's  utmost  efforts.     The 


320  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

defenders  little  knew  what  favours  fortune  had  in 
store. 

A  Prussian  corps  under  Kleist  was  slowly  plodding  up 
the  middle  of  the  three  defiles,  when,  at  noonday  of  the 
29th,  an  order  came  from  the  King  to  hurry  over  the 
ridge  and  turn  east  to  the  support  of  Ostermann.  This 
was  impossible  :  the  defile  was  choked  with  wagons  and 
artillery:  but  one  of  Kleist's  staff-officers  proposed  the 
daring  plan  of  plunging  at  once  into  cross  tracks  and 
cutting  into  Vandamme's  rear.  This  novel  and  romantic 
design  was  carried  out.  While,  then,  the  French  general 
was  showering  his  blows  against  the  allies  below  Kulm, 
the  Prussians  swarmed  down  from  the  heights  of  Nollen- 
dorf  on  his  rear.  Even  so,  the  French  struggled  stoutly 
for  liberty.  Their  leader,  scorning  death  or  surrender, 
flung  himself  with  his  braves  on  the  Russians  in  front, 
but  was  borne  down  and  caught,  fighting  to  the  last. 
Several  squadrons  rushed  up  the  steeps  against  the  Prus- 
sians and  in  part  hewed  their  way  through.  Four  thou- 
sand footmen  held  their  own  on  a  natural  stronghold 
until  their  bullets  failed,  and  the  survivors  surrendered. 
Many  more  plunged  into  the  woods  and  met  various  fates, 
some  escaping  through  to  their  comrades,  others  falling 
before  Kleist's  rearguard.  Such  was  the  disaster  of 
Kulm.  Apart  from  the  unbending  heroism  shown  by  the 
conquered,  it  may  be  called  the  Caudine  Forks  of  modern 
war.  A  force  of  close  on  40,000  men  was  nearly  de- 
stroyed :  it  lost  all  its  cannon  and  survived  only  in 
bands  of  exhausted  stragglers.1 

Who  is  to  be  blamed  for  this  disaster  ?  Obviously,  it 
could  not  have  occurred  had  Vandamme  kept  in  touch 
with  the  nearest  French  divisions  :  otherwise,  these  could 
have  closed  in  on  Kleist's  rear  and  captured  him.  Napo- 
leon clearly  intended  to  support  Vandamme  by  the  corps 
of  St.  Cyr,  who,  early  on  the  28th,  was  charged  to  co- 
operate with  that  general,  while  Mortier  covered  Pirna. 
But  on  that  same  morning  the  Emperor  rode  to  Pirna, 
found  that  St.  Cyr,  Marmont,  and  Murat  were  sweeping 

1  Vandamme  on  the  28th  received  a  reinforcement  of  eighteen  battal- 
ions, and  thenceforth  had  in  all  sixty-four ;  yet  Marbot  credits  him  with 
only  20,000  men. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND    LEIPZIG  321 

in  crowds  of  prisoners,  and  directed  Berthier  to  order 
Vandamme  to  "  penetrate  into  Bohemia  and  overwhelm 
the  Prince  of  Wurtemberg."  1  Then,  without  waiting 
to  organize  the  pursuit,  he  forthwith  returned  to  Dresden, 
either  because,  as  some  say,  the  rains  of  the  previous  days 
had  struck  a  chill  to  his  system,  or  as  Marmont,  with 
more  reason,  asserts,  because  of  his  concern  at  the  news 
of  Macdonald's  disaster  on  the  Katzbach.  Certain  it  is 
that  he  recalled  his  Old  Guard  to  Dresden,  busied  him- 
self with  plans  for  a  march  on  Berlin,  and  at  5.30  next 
morning  directed  Berthier  to  order  St.  Cyr  to  "  pursue 
the  foe  to  Maxen  and  in  all  directions  that  he  has  taken." 
This  order  led  St.  Cyr  westwards,  in  pursuit  of  Barclay's 
Russians,  who  had  diverged  sharply  in  that  direction  in 
order  to  escape  Vandamme. 

The  eastern  road  to  Teplitz  was  thus  left  comparatively 
clear,  while  the  middle  road  was  thronged  with  pursuers 
and  pursued.2  No  directions  were  given  by  Napoleon  to 
warn  Vandamme  of  the  gap  thus  left  in  his  rear :  neither 
was  Mortier  at  Pirna  told  to  press  on  and  keep  in  touch 
with  Vandamme  now  that  St.  Cyr  was  some  eight  miles 
away  to  the  west.  Doubtless  St.  Cyr  and  Mortier  ought 
to  have  concerted  measures  for  keeping  in  touch  with 
Vandamme,  and  they  deserve  censure  for  their  lack  of 
foresight ;  but  it  was  not  usual,  even  for  the  Marshals,  to 
take  the  initiative  when  the  Emperor  was  near  at  hand. 
To  sum  up  :  the  causes  of  Vandamme's  disaster  were, 
firstly,  his  rapid  rush  into  Bohemia  in  quest  of  the  Mar- 
shal's baton  which  was  to  be  his  guerdon  of  victory:  sec- 
ondly, the  divergence  of  St.  Cyr  westward  in  pursuance 
of  Napoleon's  order  of  the  29th  to  pursue  the  enemy 
towards  Maxen  :  thirdly,  the  neglect  of  St.  Cyr  and 
Mortier  to  concert  measures  for  the  support  of  Vandamme 
along  the  Nollendorf  road :  but,  above  all,  the  return  of 

1  Thiers  gives  Berthier's  despatch  in  full.     See  also  map,  p.  300. 

2  Marmont,  bk.  xvii.,  p.  158.  He  and  St.  Cyr  ("Mems.,"  vol.  iv., 
pp.  120-123)  agree  as  to  the  confusion  of  their  corps  when  crowded 
together  on  this  road.  Napoleon's  aim  was  to  insure  the  capture  of  all 
the  enemy's  cannon  and  stores  ;  but  his  hasty  orders  had  the  effect  of 
blocking  the  pursuit  on  the  middle  road.  St.  Cyr  sent  to  headquarters 
for  instruction  ;  but  these  were  now  removed  to  Dresden  ;  hence  the 
fatal  delay. 

VOL.  II  —  T 


322  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Napoleon  to  Dresden,  and  his  neglect  to  secure  a  timely 
co-operation  of  his  forces  along  the  eastern  line  of  pur- 
suit.1 

The  disaster  at  Kulm  ruined  Napoleon's  campaign. 
While  Vandamme  was  making  his  last  stand,  his  master 
at  Dresden  was  drawing  up  a  long  Note  as  to  the  respec- 
tive advantages  of  a  march  on  Berlin  or  on  Prague.  He 
decided  on  the  former  course,  which  would  crush  the 
national  movement  in  Prussia,  and  bring  him  into  touch 
with  Davoust  and  the  French  garrisons  at  Kiistrin  and 
Stettin.  "  Then,  if  Austria  begins  her  follies  again,  I 
shall  be  at  Dresden  with  a  united  army." 

He  looked  on  Austria  as  cowed  by  the  blows  dealt  her 
south  of  Dresden,  which  would  probably  bring  her  to  sue 
for  peace,  and  he  hoped  that  one  more  great  battle  would 
end  the  war.  The  mishaps  to  Macdonald  and  Vandamme 
dispelled  these  dreams.  Still,  with  indomitable  energy, 
he  charged  Ney  to  take  command  of  Oudinot's  army  (a 
post  of  which  this  unfortunate  leader  begged  to  be  re- 
lieved) and  to  strike  at  Berlin.  He  ordered  Friant  with 
a  column  of  the  Old  Guard  to  march  to  Bautzen  and 
drive  in  Macdonald's  stragglers  with  the  butt  ends  of 
muskets.2  Then,  hearing  how  pressing  was  the  danger 
of  this  Marshal,  he  himself  set  out  secretly  with  the  cav- 
alry of  the  Guard  in  hope  of  crushing  Blucher.  But 
again  that  leader  retreated  (September  4th  and  5th),  and 
once  more  the  allied  Grand  Army  thrust  its  columns 
through  the  Erz  and  threatened  Dresden.  Hurrying  back 
in  the  worst  of  humours  to  defend  that  city,  Napoleon 
heard  bad  news  from  the  north.  On  September  6th  Ney 
had  been  badly  beaten  at  Dennewitz.     In  truth,  that  brave 

1  Thiers  has  shown  that  Mortier  did  not  get  the  order  from  Berthier  to 
support  Vandamme  until  August  30th.  The  same  is  true  of  St.  Cyr,  who 
did  not  get  it  till  11.30  a.m.  on  that  day.  St.  Cyr's  best  defence  is  Napo- 
leon's letter  of  September  1st  to  him  ("  Lettres  in^dites  de  Napoleon  ")  : 
"That  unhappy  Vandamme,  who  seems  to  have  killed  himself,  had  not  a 
sentinel  on  the  mountains,  nor  a  reserve  anywhere.  ...  I  had  given 
him  positive  orders  to  intrench  himself  on  the  heights,  to  encamp  his 
troops  on  them,  and  Qnly  to  send  isolated  parties  of  men  into  Bohemia  to 
worry  the  enemy  and  collect  news."  With  this  compare  Napoleon's 
approving  statement  of  August 29th  to  Murat  ("  Corresp.,"  No.  20486): 
"  Vandamme  was  marching  on  Teplitz  viith  all  his  corps." 

2  "  Lettres  inedites  de  Napoleon,'1  September  3rd. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND    LEIPZIG  323 

fighter  was  no  tactician  :  his  dispositions  were  worse  than 
those  of  Oudinot,  and  the  obstinate  bravery  of  the  Prus- 
sians, led  by  Biilow  and  Tauenzien,  wrested  a  victory  from 
superior  numbers.  Night  alone  saved  Ney's  army  from 
complete  dissolution  :  as  it  was,  he  lost  some  9,000  killed 
and  wounded,  15,000  prisoners  along  with  eighty  cannon, 
and  frankly  summed  up  the  situation  thus  to  his  master  : 
"  I  have  been  totally  beaten,  and  still  do  not  know  whether 
my  army  has  reassembled."  1  Ultimately  his  army  assem- 
bled and  fell  back  behind  the  Elbe  at  Torgau. 

Thus  in  a  fortnight  (August  23rd-September  6th),  Na- 
poleon had  gained  a  great  success  at  Dresden,  while,  on 
the  circumference  of  operations,  his  lieutenants  had  lost 
five  battles  —  Grossbeeren,  Hagelberg,  Katzbach,  Kulm, 
and  Dennewitz.  The  allies  could  therefore  contract  that 
circumference,  come  into  closer  touch,  and  threaten  his 
central  intrenched  camps  at  Pirna  and  Dresden.  Yet  still, 
in  pursuance  of  a  preconcerted  plan,  they  drew  back  where 
he  advanced  in  person.  Thus,  when  he  sought  to  drive 
back  Schwarzenberg's  columns  into  Bohemia,  that  leader 
warily  retired  to  the  now  impregnable  passes  ;  and  the 
Emperor  fell  back  on  Dresden,  wearied  and  perplexed. 
As  he  said  to  Marmont :  "  The  chess-board  is  very  con- 
fused :  it  is  only  I  who  can  know  where  I  "am."  Yet  once 
more  he  plunged  into  the  Erzgebirge,  engaged  in  a  fruit- 
less skirmish  in  the  defile  above  Kulm,  and  again  had  to 
lead  his  troops  back  to  Pirna  and  Dresden.  A  third 
move  against  Blucher  led  to  the  same  wearisome  result. 

The  allies,  having  worn  down  the  foe,  planned  a  daring 
move.  Blucher  persuaded  the  allied  sovereigns  to  strike 
from  Bohemia  at  Leipzig,  thus  turning  the  flank  of  the 
defensive  works  that  the  French  had  thrown  up  south  of 
Dresden,  and  cutting  their  communications  with  France. 
He  himself  would  march  north-west,  join  the  northern 
army,  and  thereafter   meet  them  at  Leipzig.     This  ren- 

1  Hausser,  vol.  iv.,  p.  343,  and  Boyen,  "  Erinnerungen,"  vol.  ii.,  pp. 
345-357,  for  Bernadotte's  suspicious  delays  on  this  day  ;  also  Marmont, 
bk.  xviii.,  for  a  critique  on  Ney.  Napoleon  sent  for  Lejeune,  then  lead- 
ing a  division  of  Ney's  army,  to  explain  the  disaster ;  but  when  Lejeune 
reached  the  headquarters  at  Dohna,  south  of  Dresden,  the  Emperor 
bade  him  instantly  return,  a  proof  of  his  impatience  and  auger  at  these 
reverses. 


324  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

dezvous  he  kept,  as  later  he  staunchly  kept  troth  with 
Wellington  at  Waterloo  ;  and  we  may  detect  here,  as  in 
1815,  the  strategic  genius  of  Gneisenau  as  the  prime 
motive  force. 

Leaving  a  small  force  to  screen  his  former  positions  at 
Bautzen,  the  veteran,  with  65,000  men,  stealthily  set  out 
on  his  flank  march  towards  Wittenberg,  threw  two  pontoon 
bridges  over  the  Elbe  at  Wartenburg,  about  ten  miles  above 
that  fortress,  drove  away  Bertrand's  battalions  who  hin- 
dered the  crossing,  and  threw  up  earthworks  to  protect  the 
bridges  (October  3rd).  This  done,  he  began  to  feel  about 
for  Bernadotte,  and  came  into  touch  with  him  south  of 
Dessau.  By  this  daring  march  he  placed  two  armies, 
amounting  to  160,000  men,  on  the  north  of  Napoleon's 
lines  ;  and  his  personal  influence  checked,  even  if  it  did 
not  wholly  stop,  the  diplomatic  loiterings  of  the  Swedish 
Crown  Prince.1  Bernadotte's  hesitations  were  finally 
overcome  by  the  news  that  Blucher  was  marching  south 
towards  Leipzig.  Finally  he  gave  orders  to  follow  him  ; 
but  we  may  judge  how  easy  would  have  been  the  task  of 
overthrowing  Bernadotte's  discordant  array  if  Napoleon 
could  have  carried  out  his  project  of  September  30th. 

As  it  was,  the  disaster  of  Kulm  kept  the  Emperor 
tethered  for  some  days  within  a  few  leagues  of  Dresden, 
while  Biilow  and  Blucher  saved  the  campaign  for  the  allies 
in  the  north,  thereby  exciting  a  patriotic  ferment  which 
drove  Jerome  Bonaparte  from  Cassel  and  kept  Davoust  to 
the  defensive  around  Hamburg.  There  the  skilful  moves 
of  Walmoden  with  a  force  of  Russians,  British,  Swedes, 
and  North  Germans  kept  in  check  the  ablest  of  the  French 
Marshals,  and  prevented  his  junction  with  the  Emperor, 
for  which  the  latter  never  ceased  to  struggle. 

Meanwhile  the  Grand  Army  of  the  allies,  strengthened 
by  the  approach  from  Poland  of  50,000  Russians  of  the 
Army  of  Reserve,  was  creeping  through  the  western 
passes  of  the  Erz  into  the  plains  south  of  Leipzig.  This 
move  was  not  unexpected  by  Napoleon.     The  importance 

1  Thornton,  our  envoy  at  Bernadotte's  headquarters,  wrote  to  Castle- 
reagh  that  that  leader's  desire  was  to  spare  the  Swedish  corps ;  he  ex- 
pected that  Bernadotte  would  aim  at  the  French  crown  ("  Castlereagh 
Papers,"  3rd  series,  vol.  i.,  pp.  48-59).    See  too  Boyen,  vol.  ii.,  p.  378. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  325 

of  that  city  was  obvious.  Situated  in  the  midst  of  the 
fertile  Saxon  plain,  the  centre  of  a  great  system  of  roads, 
its  position  and  its  wealth  alike  marked  it  out  as  the  place 
likely  to  be  seized  by  a  daring  foe  who  should  seek  to  cut 
Napoleon  off  from  France. 

As  fortune  turned  against  him,  he  became  ever  more 
nervous  about  Leipzig.  Yet,  for  the  present,  the  north- 
ward march  of  Blucher  riveted  his  attention.  It  puzzled 
him.  Even  as  late  as  October  2nd  he  had  not  fathomed 
Blucher's  real  aim.1  But  four  days  later  he  heard  that 
the  Prussian  leader  had  crossed  the  Elbe.  At  once  he 
hurried  north-west  with  the  Guard  to  crush  him,  and  to 
resume  the  favourite  project  of  threatening  Berlin  and 
joining  hands  with  Davoust.  Charging  St.  Cyr  with 
the  defence  of  Dresden,  and  Murat  with  the  defence  of 
Leipzig,  he  took  his  stand  at  Diiben,  a  small  town  on 
the  Mulde,  nearly  midway  between  Leipzig  and  Witten- 
berg. Thence  he  reinforced  Ney's  army,  and  ordered 
that  Marshal  northwards  to  fall  on  the  rear  of  Berna- 
dotte  and  Blucher;  while  he  himself  waited  in  a  moated 
castle  at  Diiben  to  learn  the  issue  of  events. 

The  Saxon  Colonel,  von  Odeleben,  has  left  us  a  vivid 
picture  of  the  great  man's  restlessness  during  those  four 
days.  Surrounded  by  maps  and  despatches,  and  waited 
on  by  his  watchful  geographer  and  apprehensive  secre- 
tary, he  spent  much  of  the  time  scrawling  large  letters 
on  a  sheet  of  paper,  uneasily  listening  for  the  tramp  of 
a  courier.  In  truth,  few  days  of  his  life  were  more  criti- 
cal than  those  spent  amidst  the  rains,  swamps,  and  fogs  of 
Diiben.  Could  he  have  caught  Bernadotte  and  Blucher 
far  apart,  he  might  have  overwhelmed  them  singly,  and 
then  have  carried  the  war  into  the  heart  of  Prussia. 
But  he  knows  that  Dresden  and  Leipzig  are  far  from 
safe.  The  news  from  that  side  begins  to  alarm  him : 
and  though,  on  the  north,  Ney,  Bertrand,   and   Reynier 

1  Thiers  asserts  that  he  had.  But  if  so,  how  could  the  Emperor  have 
written  to  Macdonald  (October  2nd)  that  the  Silesian  army  had  made  a 
move  on  Grossenhain  :  "  It  appears  that  this  is  so  as  to  attack  the  in- 
trenched camp  [at  Dresden]  by  the  side  of  the  plain,  by  the  roads  of 
Berlin  and  Meissen  "  ?  On  the  same  day  he  scoffs  at  Lefebvre-Desnoettes 
for  writing  that  Bernadotte  had  crossed  the  Elbe,  and  retorts  that  if  he 
had,  it  would  be  so  much  the  worse  for  him :  the  war  would  soon  be  over. 


326  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

cut  up  the  rearguard  of  the  allies,  he  learns  with  some 
disquiet  that  Bliicher  is  withdrawing  westwards  behind 
the  River  Saale,  a  move  which  betokens  a  wish  to  come 
into  touch  with  Schwarzenberg  near  Leipzig. 

Yet  this  disconcerting  thought  spurs  him  on  to  one  of 
his  most  daring  designs.  "  As  a  means  of  upsetting  all 
their  plans,  I  will  march  to  the  Elbe.  There  I  have  the 
advantage,  since  I  have  Hamburg,  Magdeburg,  Witten- 
berg, Torgau,  and  Dresden."1  What  faith  he  had  in  the 
defensive  capacities  of  a  great  river  line  dotted  with 
fortresses !  His  lieutenants  did  not  share  it.  Caulain- 
court  tells  us  that  his  plan  of  dashing  at  Berlin  roused 
general  consternation  at  headquarters,  and  that  the  staff 
came  in  a  body  to  beg  him  to  give  it  up  and  march  back 
to  protect  Leipzig.  Reluctantly  he  abandons  it,  and  then 
only  to  change  it  for  one  equally  venturesome.  He  will 
crush  Bernadotte  and  Bliicher,  or  throw  them  beyond  the 
Elbe,  and  then,  himself  crossing  the  Elbe,  ascend  its  right 
bank,  recross  it  at  Torgau,  and  strike  at  Schwarzenberg's 
rear  near  Leipzig. 

The  plan  promised  well,  provided  that  his  men  were 
walking  machines,  and  that  Schwarzenberg  did  nothing  in 
the  interval.  But  gradually  the  truth  dawns  on  him  that, 
while  he  sits  weaving  plans  and  dictating  despatches  —  he 
sent  off  six  in  the  small  hours  of  October  12th  —  Bliicher 
and  Schwarzenberg  are  drawing  near  to  Leipzig.  On 
that  day  he  prepared  to  fall  back  on  that  city,  a  resolve 
strengthened  on  the  morrow  by  the  capture  of  one  of  the 
enemy's  envoys,  who  reported  that  they  had  great  hopes 
of  detaching  Bavaria  from  the  French  cause. 

The  news  was  correct.  Five  days  earlier,  the  King  of 
Bavaria  had  come  to  terms  with  Austria,  offering  to  place 
36,000  troops  at  her  disposal,  while  she,  in  return,  guaran- 
teed his  complete  sovereignty  and  a  full  territorial  indem- 
nity for  any  districts  that  he  might  be  called  on  to  restore 
to  the  Hapsburgs.2     Napoleon  knew  not  as  yet  the  full 

1  Letter  of  October  10th  to  Reynier.  This  and  his  letter  to  Maret  seem 
to  me  to  refute  Bernhardi's  contention  ("Toll,"  vol.  iii.,  pp. 385-388)  that 
Napoleon  only  meant  to  drive  the  northern  allies  across  the  Elbe,  and  then 
to  turn  on  Schwarzenberg.  The  Emperor's  plans  shifted  every  few  hours  : 
but  the  plan  of  crossing  the  Elbe  in  great  force  was  distinctly  prepared  for. 

2  Martens,  "Traites,"  vol.   ix.,   p.  610.     This  secret  bargain  cut  the 


J 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  327 

import  of  the  news,  and  it  is  quite  incorrect  to  allege,  as 
some  heedless  admirers  have  done,  that  this  was  the  only 
thing  that  stayed  his  conquering  march  northwards.1  His 
retreat  to  Leipzig  was  arranged  before  he  heard  the  first 
rumour  as  to  Bavaria's  defection.  But  the  tidings  sad- 
dened his  men  on  their  miry  march  southwards  ;  and, 
strange  to  say,  the  Emperor  published  it  to  all  his  troops 
at  Leipzig  on  the  15th,  giving  it  as  the  cause  why  they 
were  about  to  fall  back  on  the  Rhine. 

There  was  much  to  depress  the  Emperor  when,  on  the 
14th,  he  drew  near  to  Leipzig.  With  him  came  the  King 
and  Queen  of  Saxony,  who  during  the  last  days  had  re- 
signedly moved  along  in  the  tail  of  this  comet,  which  had 
blasted  their  once  smiling  realm.  Outside  the  city  they 
parted,  the  royal  pair  seeking  shelter  under  its  roofs,  while 
the  Emperor  pressed  on  to  Murat's  headquarters  near 
Wachau.  There,  too,  the  news  was  doubtful.  The  King 
of  Naples  had  not,  on  that  day,  shown  his  old  prowess. 
Though  he  disposed  of  larger  masses  of  horsemen  than 
those  which  the  allies  sent  out  to  reconnoitre,  he  chose 
his  ground  of  attack  badly,  and  led  his  brigades  in  so  loose 
an  array  that,  after  long  swayings  to  and  fro,  the  fight 
closed  with  advantage  to  the  allies.2  It  was  not  without 
reason  that  Napoleon  on  that  night  received  his  Marshals 
rather  coolly  at  his  modest  quarters  in  the  village  of  Reud- 
nitz.  Leaning  against  the  stove,  he  ran  over  several 
names  of  those  who  were  now  slack  in  their  duty  ;  and 
when  Augereau  was  announced,  he  remarked  that  he  was 
not  the  Augereau  of  Castiglione.  "Ah  !  give  me  back  the 
old  soldiers  of  Italy,  and  I  will  show  you  that  I  am," 
retorted  the  testy  veteran. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Napoleon  was  not  the  old  Napoleon, 
not  even  the  Napoleon  of  Dresden.  There  he  had  over- 
whelmed the  foe  by  a  rapid  concentration.  Now  nothing 
decisive  was  done  on  the  15th,  and  time  was  thereby  given 
the  allies  to  mature  their  plans.    Early  on  that  day  Blucher 

ground  from  under  the  German  unionists,  like  Stein,  who  desired  to 
make  away  with  the  secondary  princes,  or  strictly  to  limit  their  powers. 

1  Thiers  and  Bernhardi  ("  Toll,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  388)  have  disposed  of  this 
fiction. 

2  Sir  E.  Wood,  "  Achievements  of  Cavalry." 


328  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

heard  that  on  the  morrow  Schwarzenberg  would  attack 
Leipzig  from  the  south-east,  but  would  send  a  corps  west- 
wards to  threaten  it  on  the  side  of  Lindenau.  The  Prus- 
sian leader  therefore  hurried  on  from  the  banks  of  the 
Saale,  and  at  night  the  glare  of  his  watch-fires  warned 
Marmont  that  Leipzig  would  be  assailed  also  from  the 
north-west.  Yet,  despite  the  warnings  which  Napoleon 
received  from  his  Marshal,  he  refused  to  believe  that  the 
north  side  was  seriously  threatened  ;  and,  as  late  as  the 
dawn  of  the  16th,  he  bade  his  troops  there  to  be  ready  to 
march  through  Leipzig  and  throw  themselves  on  the  masses 
of  Schwarzenberg.1  Had  Napoleon  given  those  orders  on 
the  15th,  all  might  have  gone  well ;  for  all  his  available 
forces,  except  Ney's  and  Reynier's  corps,  were  near  at 
hand,  making  a  total  of  nearly  150,000  men,  while 
Schwarzenberg  had  as  yet  not  many  more.  But  those 
orders  on  the  16th  were  not  only  belated :  they  contributed 
to  the  defeat  on  the  north  side. 

The  Emperor's  thoughts  were  concentrated  on  the  south. 
There  his  lines  stretched  in  convex  front  along  undulating 
ground  near  Wachau  and  Liebertwolkwitz,  about  a  league 
to  the  south  and  south-east  of  the  town.  His  right  was 
protected  by  the  marshy  ground  of  the  small  river  Pleisse  ; 
his  centre  stretched  across  the  roads  leading  towards  Dres- 
den, while  his  left  rested  on  a  small  stream,  the  Parthe, 
which  curves  round  towards  the  north-west  and  forms  a 
natural  defence  to  the  town  on  the  north.  Yet  to  cautious 
minds  his  position  seemed  unsafe  ;  he  had  in  his  rear 
a  town  whose  old  walls  were  of  no  military  value,  a  town 
on  which  several  roads  converged  from  the  north,  east,  and 
south,  but  from  which,  in  case  of  defeat,  he  could  retire 
westward  only  by  one  road,  that  leading  over  the  now 
flooded  streams  of  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster.  But  the 
great  captain  himself  thought  only  of  victory.  He  had 
charged  Macdonald  and  Ney  to  march  from  Taucha  to  his 
support :  Marmont  was  to  do  the  same  ;  and,  with  these 
concentrated  forces  acting  against  the  far  more  extended 
array  of  Schwarzenberg,  he  counted  on  overthrowing  him 

1  "Corresp.,"  No.  20814.  Marmont,  vol.  v.,  p.  281,  acutely  remarks 
that  Napoleon  now  regarded  as  true  only  that  which  entered  into  his  com- 
binations and  his  thoughts. 


XXIV 


DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG 


329 


on  the  morrow,  and  then  crushing  the  disunited  forces  of 
Bliicher  and  Bernadotte.1 

The  Emperor  and  Murat  were  riding  along  the  ridge 
near  Liebertwolkwitz,  when,  at  nine  o'clock,  three  shots 
fired  in  quick  succession  from  the  allies  on  the  opposite 
heights  opened  the  series  of  battles  fitly  termed  the  Bat- 
tle of  the  Nations.  For  six  hours  a  furious  cannonade 
shook  the  earth,  and  the  conflict  surged  to  and  fro  with 
little  decisive  result ;  but  when  Macdonald's  corps  struck 
in  from  the  north-east,  the  allies  began  to  give  ground. 


SCALE      OF     M 
O  Jfe  I 


Stanford*  Gr^y/qpn  S<itai  ,Lond»*/. 


Thereupon  Napoleon  launched  two  cavalry  corps,  those  of 
Latour-Maubourg  and  Pajol,  against  the  allied  centre. 

Then  was  seen  one  of  the  most  superb  sights  of  war. 
Rising  quickly  from  behind  the  ridge,  12,000  horsemen 
rode  in  two  vast  masses  against  a  weak  point  in  the  oppos- 
ing lines.  They  were  led  by  the  King  of  Naples  with  all 
his  wonted  dash.  Panting  up  the  muddy  slopes  opposite, 
they  sabred  the  gunners,  enveloped  the  Russian  squares, 

1  Bernadotte  was  only  hindered  from  retreat  across  the  Elbe  by  the 
remonstrances  of  his  officers,  by  the  forward  move  of  Bliicher,  and  by 
the  fact  that  the  Elbe  bridges  were  now  held  by  the  French.  For  the  coun- 
cil of  war  at  Kothen  on  October  14th,  see  Boyen,  vol.  ii.,  p.  377. 


330  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

and  the  three  allied  sovereigns  themselves  had  to  beat  a 
hasty  retreat  to  avoid  capture.  But  the  horses  were  soon 
spent  by  the  furious  pace  at  which  Murat  careered  along ; 
and  a  timely  charge  by  Pahlen's  Cossacks  and  the  Silesian 
cuirassiers,  brought  up  from  the  allied  reserves  beyond  the 
Pleisse,  drove  the  French  brigades  back  in  great  disorder, 
with  the  loss  of  their  able  corps  leaders.  The  allies  by  a  final 
effort  regained  all  the  lost  ground,  and  the  day  here  ended  in 
a  drawn  fight,  with  the  loss  of  about  20,000  men  to  either  side. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  west  side  of  Leipzig,  Bertrand  had 
beaten  off  the  attack  of  Giulay's  Austrian  corps  on  the 
village  of  Lindenau.  But,  further  north,  Marmont  sus- 
tained a  serious  reverse.  In  obedience  to  Napoleon's 
order,  he  was  falling  back  towards  Leipzig,  when  he  was 
sharply  attacked  by  Yorck's  corps  at  Mockern.  Between 
that  village  and  Eutritzsch  further  east  the  French  Mar- 
shal offered  a  most  obstinate  resistance.  Blucher,  hoping 
to  capture  his  whole  corps,  begged  Sir  Charles  Stewart 
to  ride  back  to  Bernadotte  and  request  his  succour.  The 
British  envoy  found  the  Swedish  Prince  at  Halle  and  con- 
jured him  to  make  every  exertion  not  to  be  the  only  leader 
left  out  of  the  battle.1  It  was  in  vain :  his  army  was  too 
far  away  ;  and  only  after  the  village  of  Mockern  had  been 
repeatedly  taken  and  re-taken,  was  Marmont  finally  driven 
out  by  Yorck's  Prussians.2 

In  truth,  Marmont  lacked  the  support  of  Ney's  corps, 
which  Berthier  had  led  him  to  expect  if  he  were  attacked 
in  force.  But  the  orders  were  vague  or  contradictory. 
Ney  had  been  charged  to  follow  Macdonald  and  impart 
irresistible  momentum  to  the  onset  which  was  to  have 
crushed  Schwarzenberg's  right  wing.  He  therefore  only 
detached  one  weak  division  to  cover  Marmont's  right 
flank,  and  with  the  other  divisions  marched  away  south, 
when  an  urgent  message  from  Mockern  recalled  him  to  that 
side  of  Leipzig,  with  the  result  that  his  15,000  men  spent 
the  whole  day  in  useless  marches  and  countermarches.3 

1  Muffling,  "  Campaign  of  1813." 

2  Colonel  Lowe,  who  was  present,  says  it  was  won  and  lost  five  times 
(unpublished  "  Memoirs  "). 

8  Napoleon's  bulletin  of  October  16th,  1813,  blames  Ney  for  this  waste 
of  a  great  corps ;  but  it  is  clear,  from  the  official  orders  published  by 
Marmont    (vol.   v.,  pp.  373-378),  that  Napoleon  did  not  expect  any 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  331 

The  mishap  was  most  serious.  Had  he  strengthened  Mac- 
donald's  outflanking  move,  the  right  wing  of  the  allied 
(hand  Army  might  have  been  shattered.  Had  he  rein- 
forced Marmont  effectively,  the  position  on  the  north 
might  have  been  held.  As  it  was,  the  French  fell  back 
from  Mockern  in  confusion,  losing  53  cannon ;  but  they 
had  inflicted  on  Yorck's  corps  a  loss  of  8,000  men  out  of 
21,000.  Relatively  to  the  forces  engaged,  Albuera  and 
Mockern  are  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the  Napoleonic  wars. 
On  the  whole,  Napoleon  had  dealt  the  allies  heavier 
losses  than  he  had  sustained.  But  they  could  replace 
them.  On  the  morrow  Bennigsen  was  near  at  hand  on 
the  east  with  41,000  Russians  of  the  Army  of  Reserve ; 
Colloredo's  Austrian  corps  had  also  come  up ;  and,  in  the 
north,  Bernadotte's  Army  of  the  North,  60,000  strong,  was 
known  to  be  marching  from  Halle  to  reinforce  Blucher. 
Napoleon,  however,  could  only  count  on  Reynier's  corps 
of  15,000  men,  mostly  Sa*xons,  who  marched  in  from 
Diiben.  St.  Cyr's  corps  of  27,000  men  was  too  far  away, 
at  Dresden ;  and  Napoleon  must  have  bitterly  rued  his 
rashness  in  leaving  that  Marshal  isolated  on  the  south- 
east, while  Davoust  was  also  cut  off  at  Hamburg.  He 
now  had  scarcely  150,000  effectives  left  after  the  slaughter 
of  the  16th  ;  and  of  these,  the  German  divisions  were  mur- 
muring at  the  endless  marches  and  privations.  Every- 
thing helped  to  depress  men's  minds.  On  that  Sabbath 
morning  all  was  sombre  desolation  around  Leipzig,  while 
within  that  city  naught  was  heard  but  the  groans  of  the 
wounded  and  the  lamentations  of  the  citizens.  Still  Napo- 
leon's spirit  was  unquenched.  Amidst  the  steady  rain  he 
paced  restlessly  with  Murat  along  the  dykes  of  the  Pleisse. 
The  King  assured  him  that  the  enemy  had  suffered  enor- 
mous losses.  Then,  the  dreary  walk  ended,  the  Emperor 
shut  himself  in  his  tent.  His  resolve  was  taken.  He 
would  try  fortune  once  more.1 

pitched  battle  on  the  north  side  on  the  10th.  He  thought  Bertrand's 
corps  would  suffice  to  defend  the  north  and  west,  and  left  the  defence  on 
that  side  in  a  singularly  vague  state. 

1  Dedein  de  Gelder,  "  Mems.,"  p.  345,  severely  blames  Napoleon's 
inaction  on  the  17th  ;  either  he  should  have  attacked  the  allies  before 
Bennigsen  and  Bernadotte  came  up,  or  have  retreated  while  there  was 
time. 


332  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

Among  the  prisoners  was  the  Austrian  General  Mer 
veldt,  over  whom  Napoleon  had  gained  his  first  diplomatic 
triumph,  that  at  Leoben.  He  it  was,  too,  who  had  brought 
the  first  offers  of  an  armistice  after  Austerlitz.  These 
recollections  touched  the  superstitious  chords  in  the  great 
Corsican's  being  ;  for  in  times  of  stress  the  strongest  nature 
harks  back  to  early  instincts.  This  harbinger  of  good  for- 
tune the  Emperor  now  summoned  and  talked  long  and 
earnestly  with  him.1  First,  he  complimented  him  on  his 
efforts  of  the  previous  day  to  turn  the  French  left  at 
Dolitz ;  next,  he  offered  to  free  him  on  parole  in  order  to 
return  to  the  allied  headquarters  with  proposals  for  an 
armistice.  Then,  after  giving  out  that  he  had  more  than 
200,000  men  round  Leipzig,  he  turned  to  the  European 
situation.  Why  had  Austria  deserted  him?  At  Prague 
she  might  have  dictated  terms  to  Europe.  But  the  Eng- 
lish did  not  want  peace.  To  this  Merveldt  answered  that 
they  needed  it  sorely,  but  it  must  be  not  a  truce,  but  a 
peace  founded  on  the  equilibrium  of  Europe.  - —  "  Well," 
replied  Napoleon,  "  let  them  give  me  back  my  isles  and  I 
will  give  them  back  Hanover ;  I  will  also  re-establish  the 
Hanse  Towns  and  the  annexed  departments  [of  North 
Germany].  .  .  .  But  how  treat  with  England,  who 
wishes  to  bind  rne  not  to  build  more  than  thirty  ships 
of  the  line  in  my  ports?"2 

As  for  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  those  States 
might  secede  that  chose  to  do  so  :  but  never  would  he 
cease  to  protect  those  that  wanted  his  protection.  As  to 
giving  Holland  its  independence,  he  saw  a  great  difficulty  : 
that  land  would  then  fall  under  the  control  of  England. 
Italy  ought  to  be  under  one  sovereign  ;  that  would  suit 

1  Lord  Burghersh,  Sir  George  Jackson,  Odeleben,  and  Fain  all  assign 
this  conversation  to  the  night  of  the  16th  ;  but  Merveldt's  official  account 
of  it  (inclosed  with  Lord  Cathcart's  despatches),  gives  it  as  on  October 
17th,  at  2  p.m.  ("F.  O.,"  Russia,  No.  86).  I  follow  this  version  rather 
than  that  given  by  Fain. 

2  That  the  British  Ministers  did  not  intend  anything  of  the  kind,  even 
in  the  hour  of  triumph,  is  seen  by  Castlereagh's  despatch  of  November 
13th,  1813,  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  our  envoy  at  the  Austrian  Court  :  "  We 
don't  wish  to  impose  any  dishonourable  condition  upon  France,  which 
limiting  the  number  of  her  ships  would  be  :  but  she  must  not  be  left  in 
possession  of  this  point  [Antwerp]  "  ("Castlereagh  Papers,"  3rd  series, 
vol.  i.,  p.  76). 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  333 

the  European  system.  As  he  had  abandoned  Spain,  that 
question  was  thereby  decided.  Why  then  should  not 
peace  be  the  result  of  an  armistice?  —  The  allied  sover- 
eigns thought  differently,  and  at  once  waved  aside  the 
proposal.     No  answer  was  sent. 

In  fact,  they  had  Napoleon  in  their  power,  as  he  sur- 
mised. Late  on  that  Sunday,  he  withdrew  his  drenched 
and  half-starved  troops  nearer  to  Leipzig  ;  for  Bliicher 
had  gained  ground  on  the  north  and  threatened  the  French 
line  of  retreat.  Why  the  Emperor  did  not  retreat  during 
the  night  must  remain  a  mystery.  All  the  peoples  of 
Europe  were  now  closing  in  on  him.  On  the  north  were 
Prussians,  Russians,  Swedes,  and  a  few  British  troops. 
To  the  south-east  were  the  dense  masses  of  the  allied 
Grand  Army  drawn  from  all  the  lands  between  the  Alps 
and  the  Urals  ;  and  among  Bennigsen's  array  on  the  east 
of  Leipzig  were  to  be  seen  the  Bashkirs  of  Siberia,  whose 
bows  and  arrows  gained  them  from  the  French  soldiery 
the  sobriquet  of  les  Amours. 

To  this  ring  of  300,000  fighters  Napoleon  could  oppose 
scarcely  half  as  many.  Yet  the  French  fought  on,  if  not 
for  victory,  yet  for  honour  ;  and,  under  the  lead  of  Prince 
Poniatowski,  whose  valour  on  the  16th  had  gained  him  the 
coveted  rank  of  a  Marshal  of  France,  the  Poles  once  more 
clutched  desperately  at  the  wraith  of  their  national  inde- 
pendence. Napoleon  took  his  stand  with  his  staff  on  a 
hill  behind  Probstheyde  near  a  half- ruined  windmill,  fit 
emblem  of  his  fortunes  ;  while,  further  south,  the  three 
allied  monarchs  watched  from  a  higher  eminence  the  vast 
horse-shoe  of  smoke  slowly  draw  in  towards  the  city.  In 
truth,  this  immense  conflict  baffles  all  description.  On 
the  north-east,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden  gradually 
drove  his  columns  across  the  Parthe,  while  Bliicher  ham- 
mered at  the  suburbs. 

Near  the  village  of  Paunsdorf,  the  allies  found  a  weak 
place  in  the  defence,  where  Reynier's  Saxons  showed  signs 
of  disaffection.  Some  few  went  over  to  the  Russians  in 
the  forenoon,  and  about  3  p.m.  others  marched  over  with 
loud  hurrahs.  They  did  not  exceed  3,000  men,  with  10 
cannon,  but  these  pieces  were  at  once  effectively  used 
against  the  French.     Napoleon  hurried  towards  the  spot 


334  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

with  part  of  his  Guards,  who  restored  the  fight  on  that 
side.  But  it  was  only  for  a  time.  The  defence  was 
everywhere  overmatched. 

Even  the  inspiration  of  his  presence  and  the  desperate 
efforts  of  Murat,  Poniatowski,  Victor,  Macdonald,  and 
thousands  of  nameless  heroes  barely  held  off  the  masses 
of  the  allied  Grand  Army.  On  the  north  and  north-east, 
Marmont  and  Ney  were  equally  overborne.1  Worst  of  all 
the  supply  of  cannon  balls  was  running  low.  With  par- 
donable exaggeration  the  Emperor  afterwards  wrote  to 
Clarke  :  "  If  I  had  then  had  30,000  rounds,  I  should 
to-day  be  the  master  of  the  world." 

At  nightfall,  the  chief  returned  weary  and  depressed  to 
the  windmill,  and  instructed  Berthier  to  order  the  retreat. 
Then,  bedside  a  watch-fire,  he  sank  down  on  a  bench  into  a 
deep  slumber,  while  his  generals  looked  on  in  mournful 
silence.  All  around  them  there  surged  in  the  darkness 
the  last  cries  of  battle,  the  groans  of  the  wounded,  and  the 
dull  rumble  of  a  retreating  host.  After  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  he  awoke  with  a  start  and  threw  an  astonished  look 
on  his  staff  ;  then,  recollecting  himself,  he  bade  an  officer 
repair  to  the  King  of  Saxony  and  tell  him  the  state  of 
affairs. 

Early  next  morning,  he  withdrew  into  Leipzig,  and, 
after  paying  a  brief  visit  to  the  King,  rode  away  towards 
the  western  gate.  It  was  none  too  soon.  The  conflux  of 
his  still  mighty  forces,  streaming  in  by  three  high-roads, 
produced  in  all  the  streets  of  the  town  a  crush  which 
thickened  every  hour.  The  Prussians  and  Swedes  were 
breaking  into  the  northern  suburbs,  while  the  white-coats 
drove  in  the  defenders  on  the  south.  Slowly  and  pain- 
fully the  throng  of  fugitives  struggled  through  the  town 
towards  the  western  gate.  On  that  side  the  confusion 
became  ever  worse,  as  the  shots  of  the  allies  began  to  whiz 
across  the  arches  and  causeway  that  led  over  the  Pleisse 

1  Boyden  describes  the  surprising  effects  of  the  fire  of  the  British  rocket 
battery  that  served  in  Bernadotte's  army.  Captain  Boyd  brought  it  for- 
ward to  check  the  charge  of  a  French  column  against  the  Swedes.  He  was 
shot  down,  but  Lieutenant  Strengways  poured  in  so  hot  a  fire  that  the  col- 
umn was  "  blown  asunder  like  an  ant-heap,"  the  men  rushing  back  to  cover 
amidst  the  loud  laughter  of  the  allies. 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  335 

and  the  Elster,  while  the  hurrahs  of  the  Russians  drew 
near  on  the  north.  Ammunition  wagons,  gendarmes, 
women,  grenadiers  and  artillery,  cavalry  and  cattle,  the 
wounded,  the  dying,  Marshals  and  sutlers,  all  were  wedged 
into  an  indistinguishable  throng  that  fought  for  a  foothold 
on  that  narrow  road  of  safety  ;  and  high  above  the  din 
came  the  clash  of  merry  bells  from  the  liberated  suburbs, 
bells  that  three  days  before  had  rung  forced  peals  of  tri- 
umph at  Napoleon's  orders,  but  now  bade  farewell  for 
ever  to  French  domination.  To  increase  the  rout,  a  tem- 
porary bridge  thrown  over  the  Elster  broke  down  under 
the  crush  ;  and  the  rush  for  the  roadway  became  more 
furious.  In  despair  of  reaching  it,  hundreds  threw  them- 
selves into  the  flooded  stream,  but  few  reached  the  further 
shore  :  among  the  drowned  was  that  flower  of  Polish  chiv- 
alry, Prince  Poniatowski. 

But  this  mishap  was  soon  to  be  outdone.  A  corporal 
of  engineers,  in  the  absence  of  his  chief,  had  received 
orders  to  blow  up  the  bridge  outside  the  western  gate,  as 
soon  as  the  pursuers  were  at  hand  ;  but,  alarmed  by  the 
volleys  of  Sacken's  Russians,  whom  Blucher  had  sent  to 
work  round  by  the  river  courses  north-west  of  the  town,  the 
bewildered  subaltern  fired  the  mine  while  the  rearguard 
and  a  great  crowd  of  stragglers  were  still  on  the  eastern 
side.1  This  was  the  climax  of  this  day  of  disaster,  which 
left  in  the  hands  of  the  allies  as  many  as  thirty  generals, 

1  The  premature  explosion  was  of  course  due,  not  to  Napoleon,  but  to 
the  flurry  of  a  serjeant  and  the  skilful  flanking  move  of  Sacken's  light 
tropps,  for  which  see  Cathcart  and  Marmont.  The  losses  at  Leipzig  were 
rendered  heavier  by  Napoleon's  humane  refusal  to  set  fire  to  the  suburbs 
so  as  to  keep  off  the  allies.  He  rightly  said  he  could  have  saved  many 
thousand  French  had  he  done  so.  This  is  true.  But  it  is  strange  that  he 
had  given  no  order  for  the  construction  of  other  bridges.  Pelet  and  Fain 
affirm  that  he  gave  a  verbal  order  ;  but,  as  Marbot  explains,  Berth ier,  the 
Chief  of  the  Staff,  had  adopted  the  pedantic  custom  of  never  acting  on 
anything  less  than  a  xoritten  order,  which  was  not  given.  The  neglect  to 
secure  means  for  retreat  is  all  the  stranger  as  the  final  miseries  at  the 
Beresina  were  largely  due  to  official  blundering  of  the  same  kind.  Wel- 
lington's criticism  on  Napoleon's  tactics  at  Leipzig  is  severe  (despatch  of 
January  10th,  1814)  :  "  If  Bonaparte  had  not  placed  himself  in  a  position 
that  every  other  officer  would  have  avoided,  and  remained  in  it  longer 
than  was  consistent  with  any  ideas  of  prudence,  he  would  have  retired  in 
such  a  state  that  the  allies  could  not  have  ventured  to  approach  the 
Rhine." 


336  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

including  Lauriston  and  Reynier,  and  33,000  of  the  rank 
and  file,  along  with  260  cannon  and  870  ammunition 
wagons.  From  the  village  of  Lindenau  Napoleon  gazed 
back  at  times  over  the  awesome  scene,  but  in  general  he 
busied  himself  with  reducing  to  order  the  masses  that  had 
struggled  across.  The  Old  Guard  survived,  staunch  as 
ever,  and  had  saved  its  120  cannon,  but  the  Young  Guard 
was  reduced  to  a  mere  wreck.  Amidst  all  the  horrors  of 
that  day,  the  Emperor  maintained  a  stolid  composure,  but 
observers  saw  that  he  was  bathed  in  sweat.  Towards 
evening,  he  turned  and  rode  away  westwards  ;  and  from 
the  weary  famished  files,  many  a  fierce  glance  and  mut- 
tered curse  shot  forth  as  he  passed  by.  Men  remembered 
that  it  was  exactly  a  year  since  the  Grand  Army  broke  up 
from  Moscow. 

Yet,  despite  the  ravages  of  typhus,  the  falling  away  of 
the  German  States,  and  the  assaults  of  the  allied  horse, 
the  retreating  host  struggled  stoutly  on  towards  the 
Rhine.  At  Hanau  it  swept  aside  an  army  of  Bavarians 
and  Austrians  that  sought  to  bar  the  road  to  France  ; 
and,  early  in  November,  40,000  armed  men,  with  a  larger 
number  of  unarmed  stragglers,  filed  across  the  bridge 
at  Mainz.  Napoleon  had  not  only  lost  Germany  ;  he 
left  behind  in  its  fortresses  as  many  as  190,000  troops, 
of  whom  nearly  all  were  French ;  and  of  the  1,300 
cannon  with  which  he  began  the  second  part  of  the 
campaign,  scarce  200  were  now  at  hand  for  the  defence 
of  his  Empire. 

The  causes  of  this  immense  disaster  are  not  far  to 
seek.  They  were  both  political  and  military.  In  staking 
all  on  the  possession  of  the  line  of  the  Elbe,  Napoleon 
was  engulfing  himself  in  a  hostile  land.  At  the  first 
signs  of  his  overthrow,  the  national  spirit  of  Germany 
was  certain  to  inflame  the  Franconians  and  Westphalians 
in  his  rear,  and  imperil  his  communications.  In  regard 
to  strategy,  he  committed  the  same  blunder  as  that  per- 
petrated by  Mack  in  1805.  He  trusted  to  a  river  line 
that  could  easily  be  turned  by  his  foes.  As  soon  as 
Austria  declared  against  him,  his  position  on  the  Elbe 
was  fully  as  perilous  as  Mack's  lines  of  the  Iller  at  Ulm. 
And  yet,  in  spite  of  the  obvious  danger  from  the  great 


xxxv  DRESDEN   AND   LEIPZIG  337 

mountain  bastion  of  Bohemia  that  stretched  far  away  in 
his  rear,  the  Emperor  kept  his  troops  spread  out  from 
Konigstein  to  Hamburg,  and  ventured  on  long  and 
wearying  marches  into  Silesia,  and  north  to  Diiben, 
which  left  his  positions  in  Saxony  almost  at  the  mercy 
of  the  allied  Grand  Army.1  By  emerging  from  the 
mighty  barrier  of  the  Erzgebirge,  that  army  compelled 
him  three  times  to  give  up  his  offensive  moves  and 
hastily  to  fall  back  into  the  heart  of  Saxony. 

The  plain  truth  is  that  he  was  out-generalled  by  the 
allies.  The  assertion  may  seem  to  savour  of  profanity. 
Yet,  if  words  have  any  meaning,  the  phrase  is  literally 
correct.  His  aim  was  primarily  to  maintain  himself  on  the 
line  of  the  Elbe,  but  also,  though  in  the  second  place,  to 
keep  up  his  communication  with  France.  Their  aim  was 
to  leave  him  the  Elbe  line,  but  to  cut  him  off  from  France. 
Even  at  the  outset  they  planned  to  strike  at  Leipzig  : 
their  attack  on  Dresden  was  an  afterthought,  timidly 
and  slowly  carried  out.  As  long,  however,  as  their 
Grand  Army  clung  to  the  Urz  Mountains,  they  paralyzed 
his  movements  to  the  east  and  north,  which  merely 
played  into  their  hands. 

As  regards  the  execution  of  the  allied  plans,  the  honours 
must  unquestionably  rest  with  Bliicher  and  Gneisenau. 
Their  tactful  retreats  before  Napoleon  in  Silesia,  their 
crushing  blow  at  Macdonald,  above  all,  their  daring  flank 
march  to  Wartenburg  and  thence  to  Halle,  are  exploits 
of  a  very  high  order  ;  and  doubtless  it  was  the  emergence 
of  this  unsuspected  volcanic  force  from  the  unbroken 
flats  of  continental  mediocrity  that  nonplussed  Napoleon 
and  led  to  the  results  described  above.  Truly  heroic  was 
Bliicher's  determination  to  push  on  to  Leipzig,  even  when 
the  enemy  was  seizing  the  Elbe  bridges  in  his  rear.  The 
veteran  saw  clearly  that  a  junction  with  Schwarzenberg 
near  Leipzig  was  the  all-important  step,  and  that  it 
must  bring  back  the  French  to  that  point.  His  judg- 
ment was  as  sound  as  his   strokes  were   trenchant  ;  and 

1  Sir  Charles  Stewart  wrote  (March  22nd,  1814):  "On  the  Elbe 
Napoleon  was  quite  insane,  and  his  lengthened  stay  there  was  the 
cause  of  the  Battle  of  Leipzig  and  all  his  subsequent  misfortunes" 
(" Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  373). 

VOL.   II — Z 


338  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap,  xxxt 

owing  to  the  illusions  which  Napoleon  still  cherished  as 
to  the  saving  strength  of  the  Elbe  line,  the  French  arrived 
on  that  mighty  battle-field  half-famished  and  wearied 
by  fruitless  marches  and  countermarches.  Of  all  Napo- 
leon's campaigns,  that  of  the  second  part  of  1813  must 
rank  as  by  far  the  weakest  in  conception,  the  most  fer- 
tile in  blunders,  and  the  most  disastrous  in  its  results  for 
France. 


CHAPTER   XXXVI 

FROM  THE   RHINE  TO  THE  SEINE 

"  The  Emperor  Napoleon  must  become  King  of  France. 
■Up  to  now  all  his  work  has  been  done  for  the  Empire. 
He  lost  the  Empire  when  he  lost  his  army.  When  he  no 
longer  makes  war  for  the  army,  he  will  make  peace  for 
the  French  people,  and  then  he  will  become  King  of 
France."  —  Such  were  the  words  of  the  most  sagacious  of 
French  statesmen  to  Schwarzenberg.  They  were  spoken 
on  April  15th,  1813,  when  it  still  seemed  likely  that 
Napoleon  would  meet  half-way  the  wishes  of  Austria. 
Such,  at  least,  was  Talleyrand's  ardent  hope.  He  saw  the 
innate  absurdity  of  attempting  to  browbeat  Austria,  and 
strangle  the  infant  Hercules  of  German  nationality,  after 
the  Grand  Army  had  been  lost  in  Russia. 

If  this  was  reasonable  in  the  spring  of  1813,  it  was  an 
imperative  necessity  at  the  close  of  the  year.  Napoleon 
had  in  the  meantime  lost  400,000  men  :  and  he  could 
not  now  say,  as  he  did  to  Metternich  of  his  losses 
in  Russia,  that  "nearly  half  were  Germans."  The 
men  who  had  fallen  in  Saxony,  or  who  bravely  held  out 
in  the  Polish,  German,  and  Spanish  fortresses,  were 
nearly  all  French.  They  were,  what  the  triarii  were  to 
the  Roman  legion,  the  reserves  of  the  fighting  manhood 
of  France.  That  unhappy  land  was  growing  restless 
under  its  disasters.  In  Spain,  Wellington  had  blockaded 
Pamplona,  stormed  St.  Sebastian,  thrown  Soult  back  on 
the  Pyrenees  in  a  series  of  desperate  conflicts,  and 
planted  the  British  flag  on  the  soil  of  France,  eleven 
days  before  Napoleon  was  overthrown  at  Leipzig.  Then, 
pressing  northwards,  in  compliance  with  the  urgent 
appeals  of  the  allied  sovereigns,  our  great  commander 
assailed  the  lines  south  of  the  Nivelle,  on  which  the 
French   had   been  working  for   three  months,  drove  the 

339 


340  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

enemy  out  of  them  and  back  over  the  river,  with  a  loss 
of  4,200  men  and  51  guns  (November  10th).1 

The  same  tale  was  told  in  the  north.  The  allies  were 
welcomed  by  the  secondary  German  princes,  who,  in 
return  for  compacts  guaranteeing  their  sovereignty, 
promised  to  raise  contingents  that  amounted  in  all  to 
upwards  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  men.  Bernadotte 
inarched  against  the  Danes  and  cut  off  Davoust  in 
Hamburg,  where  that  Marshal  bravely  held  out  to  the 
end  of  the  war.  Elsewhere  in  the  north  Napoleon's 
domination  quickly  mouldered  away.  Billow,  aided  by  a% 
small  British  force,  invaded  Holland  early  in  November; 
and,  with  the  old  cry  of  Orange  boven,  the  Dutch  tore 
down  the  French  tricolour  and  welcomed  back  the  Prince 
of  Orange.  In  Italy,  Eugene  remained  faithful  to  his 
step-father  and  repulsed  all  the  overtures  of  the  allies  : 
but  Murat,  whose  allegiance  had  already  been  shaken  by 
the  secret  offers  of  the  allies,  now  began  to  show  signs  of 
going  over  to  them,  as  he  did  at  the  dawn  of  the  New 
Year.2 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  arrived  at  Paris  (November 
9th).      He   found   his   capital   sunk   in   depression,    and 

1  Napier,  vol.  v.,  pp.  368-378. 

2  On  November  10th  Lord  Aberdeen,  our  ambassador  at  the  Austrian 
Court,  wrote  to  Castlereagh  :  "...  As  soon  as  he  [Murat]  received  the 
last  communication  addressed  to  him  by  Prince  Metternich  and  myself  at 
Prague,  he  wrote  to  Napoleon  and  stated  that  the  affairs  cf  his  kingdom 
absolutely  demanded  his  presence.  Without  waiting  for  any  answer,  he 
immediately  began  his  journey,  and  did  not  halt  a  moment  till  he  arrived 
at  Basle.  While  on  the  road  he  sent  a  cyphered  despatch  to  Prince 
Cariati,  his  Minister  at  Vienna,  in  which  he  informs  him  that  he  hopes  to 
be  at  Naples  on  the  4th  of  this  month  :  that  he  burns  with  desire  to  re- 
venge himself  of  [sic]  all  the  injuries  he  has  received  from  Bonaparte, 
and  to  connect  himself  with  the  cause  of  the  allies  in  contending  for  a 
just  and  stable  peace.  He  proposes  to  declare  war  on  the  instant  of  his 
arrival.'1  Again,  on  December  19th,  Aberdeen  writes:  "You  may  con- 
sider the  affair  of  Murat  as  settled.  ...  It  will  probably  end  in  Austria 
agreeing  to  his  having  a  change  of  frontier  on  the  Papal  territory,  just 
enough  to  satisfy  his  vanity  and  enable  him  to  show  something  to  his 
people.  I  doubt  much  if  it  will  be  possible,  with  the  claims  of  Sicily, 
Sardinia,  and  Austria  herself  in  the  north  of  Italy,  to  restore  to  him  the 
three  Legations:  but  something  adequate  must  be  done"  ("Austria," 
No.  102).  The  disputes  between  Murat  and  Napoleon  will  be  cleared  up 
in  Baron  Lumbroso's  forthcoming  work,  "Murat."  Meanwhile  see 
Bignon,  vol.  xiii.,  pp.  181  et  seq. ;  Desvernois,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xx.  ;  and 
Chaptal  (p.  305),  for  Fouch6's  treacherous  advice  to  Murat. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  341 

indignant  at  the  author  of  its  miseries.  Peace  was  the 
dearest  wish  of  all.  Marie  Louise  confessed  it  by  her 
tears,  Cambaceres  by  his  tactful  reserve,  and  the  people 
by  their  cries,  while  the  sullen  demeanour  or  bitter  words 
of  the  Marshals  showed  that  their  patience  was  ex- 
hausted. Evidently  a  scapegoat  was  needed  :  it  was 
found  in  the  person  of  Maret,  Due  de  Bassano,  whose 
devotion  to  Napoleon  had  reduced  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  a  highly  paid  clerkship.  For  the 
crime  of  not  bending  his  master's  inflexible  will  at 
Dresden,  he  was  now  cast  as  a  sop  to  the  peace  party  ; 
and  his  portfolio  was  intrusted  to  Caulaincourt,  Due  de 
Vicenza  (November  20th).  The  change  was  salutary. 
The  new  Minister,  when  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
had  been  highly  esteemed  by  the  Czar  for  his  frank, 
chivalrous  demeanour.  Our  countrywoman,  Lady  Burg- 
hersh,  afterwards  testified  to  his  personal  charm  :  "  I 
never  saw  a  countenance  so  expressive  of  kindness, 
sweetness,  and  openness."1  And  these  gifts  were  forti- 
fied by  a  manly  intelligence,  a  profound  love  of  France, 
and  by  devotion  to  her  highest  interests.  The  first  of  her 
interests  was  obviously  peace  ;  and  there  now  seemed 
some  chance  of  his  conferring  this  boon  on  her  and  on  the 
world  at  large. 

On  November  the  8th  and  9th  Metternich  had  two 
interviews  at  Frankfurt  with  Baron  St.  Aignan,  a  brother- 
in-law  of  Caulaincourt,  and  formerly  the  French  envoy  at 
Weimar.  The  Austrian  Minister  assured  him  of  the 
moderation  of  the  allies,  especially  of  England,  and  of 
their  wish  for  a  lasting  peace  founded  on  the  principle 
of  the  balance  of  power.  France  must  give  up  all 
control  of  Spain,  Italy,  and  Germany,  and  return  to 
her  natural  frontiers,  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the 
Pyrenees.  Lord  Aberdeen,  our  ambassador  to  Austria, 
and  Count  Nesselrode,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  were  present  at  the  second  interview,  and  as- 
sented to  this  statement,  the  latter  pledging  his  word 
that  it  had  the  approval  of  Prussia.  Aberdeen  added 
his  assurance  that  England  was  prepared  to  relax  her 
maritime   code   and  sacrifice  many  of   her    conquests   in 

i  Lady  Burgtaersh's  "Journal,"  p.  182. 


342  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

order  to  attain  a  durable  peace.  To  these  Frankfurt 
overtures  Napoleon  charged  Maret  to  answer  in  vaguely 
favourable  terms,  and  to  suggest  the  meeting  of  a 
European  Congress  at  Mannheim.  The  effect  of  this 
Note  (November  16th)  was  marred  by  the  strange  state- 
ment —  "a  peace  based  on  the  independence  of  all 
nations,  both  from  the  continental  and  the  maritime 
point  of  view,  has  always  been  the  constant  object  of  the 
desires  and  policy  of  the  Emperor  [Napoleon]."1 

Metternich  in  reply  pointed  out  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment had  not  accepted  the  proposed  terms  as  a  basis  for 
negotiations.  The  new  Foreign  Minister,  Caulaincourt, 
sent  off  (December  2nd)  an  acceptance  which  was  far 
more  frank  and  satisfactory  ;  but  the  day  before  he 
penned  it,  the  allies  had  virtually  withdrawn  their  offer, 
as  they  had  told  him  they  would  do  if  it  was  not  speedily 
accepted.  They  had  all  along  decided  not  to  stay  the 
military  operations  ;  and,  as  these  were  still  flowing 
strongly  in  their  favour,  they  could  not  be  expected  to 
keep  open  an  offer  which  was  exceedingly  favourable  to 
Napoleon  even  at  the  time  when  it  was  made,  that  is, 
before  the  support  of  the  Dutch,  of  the  Swiss,  and  of 
Murat  was  fully  assured. 

It  may  be  well  to  pause  for  a  moment  to  inquire  what 
were  the  views  of  the  allied  Governments,  and  of  Napo- 
leon himself,  at  this  crisis  when  Europe  was  seething  in 
the  political  crucible.  Had  Metternich  the  full  assent 
of  those  Governments  when  he  offered  the  French  Em- 
peror the  natural  frontiers  ?  Here  we  must  separate  the 
views  of  Lord  Aberdeen  from  those  of  the  British  Cabinet, 
as  represented  by  its  Foreign  Minister,  Lord  Castlereagh  : 
and  we  must  also  distinguish  between  the  Emperor 
Alexander  and  his  Minister,  Nesselrode,  a  man  of  weak 
character,  in  whom  he  had  little  confidence.  Certainly 
the  British  Cabinet  was  not  disposed  to  leave  Antwerp  in 
Napoleon's  hands. 


11 


1  Fain,  "Manuscrit  de  1814,"  pp.  48-63.  Ernouf,  "Vie  de  Maret, 
p.  606,  states  that  Napoleon  touched  up  Maret's  note  ;  the  sentence 
quoted  above  is  doubtless  the  Emperor's.  The  same  author  proves  that 
Maret's  advice  had  always  been  more  pacific  than  was  supposed,  and  that 
now,  in  his  old  position  of  Secretary  of  State,  he  gave  Caulaincourt 
valuable  help  during  the  negotiations  at  Chatillon. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  343 

"  This  nation,"  wrote  Castlereagh  to  Aberdeen  on  November  13th, 
"  is  likely  to  view  with  disfavour  any  peace  which  does  not  confine 
France  within  her  ancient  limits.  .  .  .  We  are  still  ready  to  en- 
counter, with  our  allies,  the  hazards  of  peace,  if  peace  can  be  made  on 
the  basis  proposed,  satisfactorily  executed  [s*c]  ;  and  we  are  not  in- 
clined to  go  out  of  our  way  to  interfere  in  the  internal  government  of 
France,  however  much  we  might  desire  to  see  it  placed  in  more  pacific 
hands.  But  I  am  satisfied  we  must  not  encourage  our  allies  to  patch 
up  an  imperfect  arrangement.  If  they  will  do  so,  we  must  submit ; 
but  it  should  appear  in  that  case,  to  be  their  own  act,  and  not 
ours.  ...  I  must  particularly  entreat  you  to  keep  your  attention 
upon  Antwerp.  The  destruction  of  that  arsenal  is  essential  to  our 
safety.  To  leave  it  in  the  hands  of  France  is  little  short  of  imposing 
upon  Great  Britain  the  charge  of  a  perpetual  war  establishment."  * 

Thenceforth  British  policy  inclined,  though  tentatively 
and  with  some  hesitations,  to  the  view  that  it  was  needful 
in  the  interests  of  peace  to  bring  France  back  to  the  limits 
of  1791,  that  is,  of  withdrawing  from  her,  not  only  Hol- 
land, the  Rhineland,  and  Italy,  but  also  Belgium,  Savoy, 
and  Nice.  The  Prussian  patriots  were  far  more  decided. 
They  were  determined  that  France  should  not  dominate 
the  Rhineland  and  overawe  Germany  from  the  fortresses  of 
Mainz,  Coblenz,  and  Wesel.  On  this  subject  Arndt  spoke 
forth  with  no  uncertain  sound  in  a  pamphlet — "  The 
Rhine,  Germany's  river,  not  her  boundary  "  —  which 
proved  that  the  French  claim  to  the  Rhine  frontier  was 
consonant  neither  with  the  teachings  of  history  nor  the 
distribution  of  the  two  peoples.  The  pamphlet  had  an 
immense  effect  in  stirring  up  Germans  to  attack  the  cher- 
ished French  doctrine  of  the  natural  frontiers,  and  it 
clinched  the  claim  which  he  had  put  forward  in  his 
"Fatherland"  song  of  the  year  before.  It  bade  Germans 
strive  for  Treves  and  Cologne,  aye,  even  for  Strassburg 
and  Metz.    Hardenberg  and  Stein,  differing  on  most  points, 

1  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  3rd  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  74.  This  was  written, 
of  course,  before  he  heard  of  the  Frankfurt  proposals  ;  but  it  anticipates 
them  in  a  remarkable  way.  Thiers  state?  that  Castlereagh,  after  hearing 
of  them,  sent  Aberdeen  new  instructions.  I  cannot  find  any  in  our 
archives.  This  letter  warned  Aberdeen  against  any  compromise  on  the 
subject  of  Antwerp;  but  it  is  clear  that  Castlereagh,  when  he  came  to  the 
allied  headquarters,  was  a  partisan  of  peace,  as  compared  witli  the  Czar 
and  the  Prussian  patriots.  Schwarzenberg  wrote  (January  26th)  at 
Langres:  "We  ought  to  make  peace  here:  our  Kaiser,  also  Stadion. 
Metternich,  even  Castlereagh,  are  fully  of  this  opinion  —  but  Kaiser 
Alexander  1 " 


344  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

united  in  praising  this  work.  Even  before  it  appeared, 
the  former  chafed  at  the  thought  of  Napoleon  holding  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  On  hearing  of  Metternich's 
Frankfurt  offer  to  the  French  Emperor,  he  wrote  in  his 
diary  :  "  Propositions  of  peace  without  my  assent  —  Rhine, 
Alps,  Pyrenees  :  a  mad  business."  1 

Frederick  William's  views  were  less  pronounced  :  in 
fact,  his  proneness  to  see  a  lion  in  every  path  earned  for 
him  the  sobriquet  of  Cassandra  in  his  Chancellor's  diary. 
But  in  the  main  he  was  swayed  by  the  Czar  ;  and  that 
autocrat  was  now  determined  to  dictate  at  Paris  a  peace 
that  would  rid  him  of  all  prospect  of  his  great  rival's 
revenge.  Vanity  and  fear  alike  prescribed  such  a  course 
of  action.  He  longed  to  lead  his  magnificent  Guards  to 
Paris,  there  to  displa}^  his  clemency  in  contrast  to  the 
action  of  the  French  at  Moscow  ;  and  this  sentiment  was 
fed  by  fear  of  Napoleon.  The  latter  motive  was  concealed, 
of  course,  but  Lord  Aberdeen  gauged  its  power  during  a 
private  interview  that  he  had  with  Alexander  at  Freiburg 
(December  24th)  :  "  He  talked  with  great  freedom  :  he 
is  more  decided  than  ever  as  to  the  necessity  of  persever- 
ance, and  puts  little  trust  in  the  fair  promises  of  Bonaparte. 
— '■So  long  as  he  lives  there  can  be  no  security  '  — he  repeated 
it  two  or  three  times."  2  We  can  therefore  understand  his 
concern  lest  the  Frankfurt  terms  should  be  accepted  out- 
right by  Napoleon.  Metternich,  however,  assured  him  that 
the  French  Emperor  would  not  assent  ;  3  and,  as  in  regard 
to  the  Prague  Congress,  he  was  substantially  correct. 

Here  again  we  touch  on  the  disputed  question  whether 
Metternich  played  a  fair  game  against  Napoleon,  or  whether 
he  tempted  him  to  play  with  loaded  dice  while  his  throne 
was  at  stake.  The  latter  supposition  for  a  long  time  held 
the  field  ;  but  it  is  untenable.  On  several  occasions  the 
Austrian  statesman  warned  Napoleon,  or  his  trusty  advis- 
ers, that  the  best  course  open  to  him  was  to  sign  peace  at 
once.  He  did  so  at  Dresden,  and  he  did  so  now.  On 
November  10th  he  sent  Caulaincourt  a  letter,  of  which 
these  are  the  most  important  sentences  : 

1  Fournier,  "  Der  Congress  von  Chatillon,"  p.  242. 

2  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  loc.  cit.,  p.  112. 
8  Metternich,  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  214. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  345 

"...  M.  de  St.  Aignan  will  speak  to  you  of  my  conversations  [with 
him].  I  expect  nothing  from  them,  but  I  shall  have  done  my  duty. 
France  will  never  sign  a  more  fortunate  peace  than  that  which  the 
Powers  will  make  to-day,  and  to-morrow  if  they  have  reverses.  New 
successes  may  extend  their  views.  ...  I  do  not  doubt  that  the  ap- 
proach of  the  allied  armies  to  the  frontiers  of  France  may  facilitate 
the  formation  of  great  armaments  by  her  Government.  The  questions 
will  become  problematical  for  the  civilized  world ;  but  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  will  not  make  peace.  There  is  my  profession  of  faith,  and 
I  shall  never  be  happier  than  if  I  am  wrong." 

The  letter  rings  true  in  every  part.  Metternich  made 
no  secret  of  sending  it,  but  allowed  Lord  Aberdeen  to  see 
it.1  And  by  good  fortune  it  reached  Caulaincourt  about 
the  time  when  he  assumed  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Its  substance  must  therefore  have  been  known  to  Napo- 
leon ;  and  the  tone  of  the  Frankfurt  proposals  ought  to 
have  convinced  him  of  the  need  of  speedily  making  peace 
while  Austria  held  out  the  olive  branch  from  across  the 
Rhine.  But  Metternich's  gloomy  forecast  was  only  too 
true.  During  his  sojourn  at  Paris  he  had  tested  the  rigid- 
ity of  that  cast-iron  will. 

In  fact,  no  one  who  knew  the  Emperor's  devotion  to 
Italy  could  believe  that  he  would  give  up  Piedmont  and 
Liguria.  His  own  despatches  show  that  he  never  contem- 
plated such  a  surrender.  On  November  20th  he  gave 
orders  for  the  enrolling  of  forty-six  thousand  Frenchmen 
of  mature  age  —  "  not  Italians  or  Belgians  "  —  who  were  to 
reinforce  Eugene  and  help  him  to  defend  Italy  ;  that,  too, 
at  a  time  when  the  defence  of  Champagne  and  Langue- 
doc  was  about  to  devolve  on  lads  of  eighteen. 

He  was  equally  determined  not  to  give  up  Holland. 
On  the  possession  of  this  maritime  and  industrious  com- 
munity he  had  always  laid  great  stress.  He  once  remarked 
to  Roederer  that  the  ruin  of  the  French  Bourbons  was 
due  to  three  events  —  the  battle  of  Rossbach,  the  affair  of 
the  diamond  necklace,  and  the  victory  of  Anglo-Prussian 
influence  over  that  of  France  in  Dutch  affairs  (1787). 
He  even  appealed  to  Nature  to  prove  that  that  land  must 
form  part  of  the  French  Empire.  "  Holland,"  said  one  of 
his  Ministers  in  1809,  "  is  the  alluvium  of  the  Rhine, 
Meuse,  and  Scheldt  —  in  other  words,  one  of  the    great 

i  "F.  O.,"  Austria,  No.  102. 


346  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

arteries  of  the  Empire."  Before  the  last  battle  at  Leipzig 
he  told  Mer veldt  that  he  could  not  grant  Holland  its  inde- 
pendence, for  it  would  fall  under  the  tutelage  of  England. 
And  even  while  his  Empire  was  crumbling  away  after  that 
disaster,  he  wrote  to  his  mother  :  "  Holland  is  a  French 
country,  and  will  remain  so  for  ever."  1 

Russia,  Prussia,  and  Britain  were  equally  determined 
that  the  Dutch  should  be  independent  ;  and  if  Metter- 
nich  wavered  on  the  subject  of  Dutch  independence,  his 
hesitation  was  at  an  end  by  the  middle  of  December  ; 
for  a  memorandum  of  the  Russian  diplomatist,  Pozzo  di 
Borgo,  states  that  Metternich  then  regarded  the  Rhine 
boundary  as  ending  at  Diisseldorf  :  "  after  that  town  the 
river  takes  the  name  of  Waal."2  Such  juggling  with 
geography  was  surely  superfluous  ;  for  by  that  time  the 
Frankfurt  terms  had  virtually  lapsed,  owing  to  Napoleon's 
belated  acceptance  ;  and  Metternich  had  joined  the  other 
allied  Governments  that  now  demanded  a  more  thorough 
solution  of  the  boundary  question. 

In  fact,  the  allies  were  now  able  to  make  political  capital 
out  of  their  recent  moderation.3  On  December  1st  they 
issued  an  appeal  to  the  French  nation  to  the  following 
effect :  "  We  do  not  make  war  on  France,  but  we  are  cast- 
ing off  the  yoke  which  your  Government  imposed  on  our 
countries.  We  hoped  to  have  found  peace  before  touching 
your  soil  :  we  now  go  to  find  it  there." 

If  the  sovereigns  hoped  by  means  of  this  declaration 
to  separate  France  from  Napoleon,  they  erred.  To  cross 
the  Rhine  was  to  attack,  not  Napoleon,  but  the  French 
Revolution.  Belgium  and  the  Rhine  boundary  had  been 
won  by  Dumouriez,  Jourdain,  Pichegru,  and  Moreau,  at  a 
time  when  Bonaparte's  name  was  unknown  outside  Corsica 
and  Provence.  France  had  looked  on  wearily  at  Napo- 
leon's wars  in  Germany,  Spain,  and  Russia  :  they  con- 
cerned him,  not  her.  But  when  the  "sacred  soil"  was 
threatened,  citizens  began  to  close  their  ranks  :  they  ceased 
their  declamations  against  the  crushing  taxes  and  youth- 

1  "Lettres  incites"  (November  6th,  1813). 

2  The  memorandum  is  endorsed,  "  Extract  of  Instructions  delivered 
to  me  by  Gen.  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  18  Dec,  1813"  ("  Russia."  No.  02). 

3  Metternich's  letter  to  Hiulclist,  in  Fournier,  p.  242. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  347 

slaying  conscription  :  they  submitted  to  heavier  taxes  and 
levies  of  still  younger  lads.  In  fact,  by  doffing  the  mask 
of  Charlemagne,  the  Emperor  became  once  more  the 
Bonaparte  of  the  days  of  Marengo. 

He  counted  on  some  such  change  in  public  opinion ; 
and  it  enabled  him  to  defy  with  impunity  the  begin- 
nings of  a  Parliamentary  opposition.  The  Senate  had 
been  puffily  obsequious,  as  usual;  but  the  Corps  Legis- 
latif  had  mistaken  its  functions.  Summoned  to  vote 
new  taxes,  it  presumed  to  give  advice.  A  commission 
of  its  members  agreed  to  a  report  on  the  existing  situa- 
tion, drawn  up  by  Laine,  which  gave  the  Emperor  great 
offence.  Its  crime  lay  in  its  outspoken  requests  that  peace 
should  be  concluded  on  the  basis  of  the  natural  frontiers, 
that  the  rigours  of  the  conscription  should  be  abated,  and 
that  the  laws  which  guaranteed  the  free  exercise  of  politi- 
cal rights  should  be  maintained  intact.  The  Emperor  was 
deeply  incensed,  and,  despite  the  advice  of  his  Ministers, 
determined  to  dissolve  the  Chamber  forthwith  (Decem- 
ber 31st).  Not  content  with  this  exercise  of  arbitrary 
power,  he  subjected  its  members  to  a  barrack-like  rebuke 
at  the  official  reception  on  New  Year's  Day.  —  He  had  con- 
voked them  to  do  good,  and  they  had  done  evil.  Two 
battles  lost  in  Champagne  would  not  have  been  so  harm- 
ful as  their  last  action.  What  was  their  mandate  com- 
pared with  his?  France  had  twice  chosen  him  by  some 
millions  of  votes  :  while  they  were  nominated  only  by  a 
few  hundreds  apiece.  They  had  flung  mud  at  him  :  but 
he  was  a  man  who  might  be  slain,  never  dishonoured. 
He  would  fight  for  the  nation,  hurl  back  the  foe,  and  con- 
clude an  honourable  peace.  Then,  for  their  shame,  he 
would  print  and  circulate  their  report.  —  Such  was  the 
gist  of  this  diatribe,  which  he  shot  forth  in  strident  tones 
and  with  flashing  eyes.  He  had  the  copies  of  the  report 
destroyed,  and  dismissed  the  deputies  to  their  homes 
throughout  France. 

The  country,  in  the  main,  took  his  side  ;  and  doubt- 
less the  national  instinct  was  sound;  for  the  allies  had 
crossed  the  Rhine,  and  France  once  more  was  in  danger. 
As  in  1793,  when  the  nation  welcomed  the  triumph  of 
the  dare-devil  Jacobins  over  the  respectable  parliamentary 


348  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

Girondins,  as  promising  a  vigorous  rule  and  the  expulsion 
of  the  monarchical  invaders,  so  now  the  soldiers  and  peas- 
ants, if  not  the  middle  classes,  rejoiced  at  the  discomfiture 
of  the  talkers  by  the  one  necessary  man  of  action.  The 
general  feeling  was  pithily  expressed  by  an  old  peasant : 
"It's  no  longer  a  question  of  Bonaparte.  Our  soil  is 
invaded :  let  us  go  and  fight." 

This  was  the  feeling  which  the  Emperor  ruthlessly 
exploited.  He  decreed  the  enrolment  of  a  great  force  of 
National  Guards,  exacted  further  levies  for  the  regular 
army,  and  ordered  a  levee  en  masse  for  the  eastern  Depart- 
ments. The  difficulties  in  his  way  were  enormous.  But 
he  flung  himself  at  the  task  with  incomparable  verve. 
Soldiers  were  wanting :  youths  were  dragged  forth,  even 
from  the  royalist  districts  of  the  extreme  north  and  west 
and  south.  Money  was  wanting  :  it  was  extorted  from 
all  quarters,  and  Napoleon  not  only  lavished  55,000,000 
francs  from  his  own  private  hoard,  but  seized  that  of  his 
parsimonious  mother.1  Cannon,  muskets,  uniforms  were 
wanting  :  their  manufacture  was  pushed  on  with  feverish 
haste :  Napoleon  ordered  his  War  Office  to  "  procure  all 
the  cloth  in  France,  good  and  bad,"  so  as  to  have  200,000 
uniforms  ready  by  the  end  of  February ;  and  he  counted 
on  having  half  a  million  of  effectives  in  the  field  at  the 
close  of  spring. 

Among  these  he  reckoned  —  so,  at  least,  he  wrote  to 
Melzi  —  "  nearly  200,000  "  French  soldiers  from  Arragon, 
Catalonia,  and  at  Bayonne.  Even  if  we  allow  for  his 
desire  to  encourage  his  officials  in  Italy,  the  estimate  is 
curious.  Wellington  at  that  time,  it  is  true,  had  lessened 
his  numbers  by  sending  back  across  the  Pyrenees  all  his 
Spanish  troops,  whose  atrocities  endangered  that  good 
understanding  with  the  French  peasantry  which  our  great 
leader,  for  political  motives,  was  determined  to  cultivate.2 
Yet,  despite  the  shrinkage  in  numbers,  he  drove  the  French 
from  the  banks  of  the  River  Nive,  and  inflicted  on  them 
severe  losses  in  desperate  conflicts  near  Bayonne  (Decem- 
ber 9th-13th).     In  fact,  the  intrenched  camp  in  front  of 

1  Houssaye's  "  1814,"  p.  14  ;  Metternich,  "  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  308. 

2  "  Our  success  and  everything  depends  upon  our  moderation  and  jus- 
tice," he  wrote  to  Lord  Bathurst  (Napier,  bk.  xxiii.,  ch.  ii.). 


xxxvi  FROM   THE   RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  349 

that  town  was  now  the  sole  barrier  to  Wellington's  advance 
northwards,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  Soult  clung  to 
this  position.  The  peasantry,  too,  finding  that  they  were 
far  better  treated  by  Wellington's  troops  than  by  their  own 
soldiers,  began  to  favour  the  allied  cause,  with  results  that 
will  shortly  appear.  Yet  these  disquieting  symptoms  did 
not  daunt  Napoleon  ;  for  he  now  based  his  hopes  of  resist- 
ing the  British  advance  on  a  compact  which  he  had  con- 
cluded with  Ferdinand  VII.,  the  rightful  King  of  Spain. 
As  soon  as  he  returned  to  St.  Cloud  after  the  Leipzig 
campaign  he  made  secret  overtures  to  that  unhappy 
exile  ; 1  and  by  the  Treaty  of  Valencay  (December  11th, 
1813)  he  agreed  to  recognize  him  as  King  of  the  whole  of 
Spain,  provided  that  British  and  French  troops  evacu- 
ated that  land.  His  imagination  ran  riot  in  picturing  the 
results  of  this  treaty.  Ferdinand  was  to  enter  Spain  ; 
Suchet,  then  playing  a  losing  game  in  Catalonia,  was 
quietly  to  withdraw  his  columns  through  the  Pyrenees, 
while  Wellington  would  have  his  base  of  operations  cut 
from  under  him,  and  thenceforth  be  a  negligeable  quan- 
tity.2 These  pleasing  fancies  all  rested  on  the  acceptance 
of  the  new  treaty  by  the  Spanish  Regency  and  Cortes. 
But,  alas  for  Napoleon  !  they  at  once  rejected  it,  declar- 
ing null  and  void  all  acts  of  Ferdinand  while  he  was  a 
prisoner,  and  forbidding  all  negotiations  with  France 
while  French  troops  remained  in  the  Peninsula  (Janu- 
ary 8th). 

1  "Lettres  inedites"  (November  12th).  The  date  is  important :  it  re- 
futes Napier's  statement  (bk.  xxiii.,  ch.  iv.)  that  the  Emperor  had  planned 
that  Ferdinand  should  enter  Spain  early  in  November  when  the  disputes 
between  Wellington  and  the  Cortes  at  Madrid  were  at  their  height.  Big- 
non  (vol.  xiii.,  p.  88  et  spq.)  says  that  Talleyrand's  indiscretion  revealed 
the  negotiations  to  the  Spanish  Cortes  and  Wellington  ;  but  our  general's 
despatches  show  that  he  did  not  hear  of  them  before  January  9th  or  10th. 
He  then  wrote  :  "  I  have  long  suspected  that  Bonaparte  would  adopt  this 
expedient  ;  and  if  he  had  had  less  pride  and  more  common  sense,  it  would 
have  succeeded." 

2  On  January  14th  the  Emperor  ordered  Soult,  as  soon  as  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  was  known,  to  set  out  northwards  from  Bayonne  "  with 
all  his  army,  only  leaving  what  is  necessary  to  form  a  screen."  Suchet 
was  likewise  to  hurry  with  10,000  foot,  en  poBte,  and  two-thirds  of  his 
horse,  to  Lyons.  On  the  22nd  the  Emperor  blames  both  Marshals  for  not 
sending  off  the  infantry,  though  the  Spanish  treaty  had  not  been  ratified. 
After  long  delays  Ferdinand  set  out  for  Spain  on  March  18th,  when  the 
war  was  almost  over. 


350  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

Equally  disappointing  were  affairs  in  Italy.  On  the 
11th  of  January,  Murat  made  an  alliance  with  Austria, 
and  promised  to  aid  her  with  a  corps  of  30,000  Neapoli- 
tans, while  she  guaranteed  him  his  throne  and  a  slice  of 
the  Roman  territory.  Napoleon  directed  Eugene,  as  soon 
as  this  bad  news  was  confirmed,  to  prepare  to  fall  back  on 
the  Alps.  But,  in  order  to  clog  Murat's  movements,  the 
Emperor  resolved  to  make  use  of  the  spiritual  power, 
which  for  six  years  he  had  slighted.  He  gave  orders  that 
the  aged  Pope  should  be  released  from  his  detention  at 
Fontainebleau,  and  hurried  secretly  to  Rome.  "  Let  him 
burst  on  that  place  like  a  clap  of  thunder,"  he  wrote  to 
Savary  (January  21st).  But  this  stagey  device  was  not 
to  succeed.  Even  now  Napoleon  insisted  on  conditions 
with  which  Pius  VII.  could  not  conscientiously  comply, 
and  he  was  still  detained  at  Tarrascon  when  his  captor 
was  setting  out  for  Elba. 

Three  days  after  Murat's  desertion,  Denmark  fell  away 
from  Napoleon.  Overborne  by  the  forces  of  Bernadotte, 
the  little  kingdom  made  peace  with  England  and  Sweden, 
agreeing  to  yield  up  Norway  to  the  latter  Power  in  con- 
sideration of  recovering  an  indemnity  in  Germany.  To 
us  the  Danes  ceded  Heligoland.  Thus,  within  three 
months  of  the  disaster  at  Leipzig,  all  Napoleon's  allies 
forsook  him,  and  all  but  the  Danes  were  now  about  to 
fight  against  him  —  a  striking  proof  of  the  artificiality  of 
his  domination. 

By  this  time  it  was  clear  that  even  France  would  soon 
be  stricken  to  the  heart  unless  Napoleon  speedily  concen- 
trated his  forces.  On  the  north  and  east  the  allies  were 
advancing  with  a  speed  that  nonplussed  the  Emperor. 
Accustomed  to  sluggish  movements  on  their  part,  he  had 
not  expected  an  invasion  in  force  before  the  spring,  and 
here  it  was  in  the  first  days  of  January.  Bulow  and 
Graham  had  overrun  Holland.  The  allies,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Czar,  had  no  scruples  about  infringing  the 
neutrality  of  Switzerland,  as  Napoleon  had  consistently 
done,  and  the  constitution,  which  he  had  imposed  upon 
that  land  eleven  years  before,  now  straightway  collapsed. 
Detaching  a  strong  corps  southwards  to  hold  the  Sim- 
plon  and  Great  St.   Bernard  Passes  and  threaten  Lyons, 


xxxvi  FROM   THE   RHINE  TO   THE   SEINE  351 

Scbwarzenberg  led  the  allied  Grand  Army  into  France  by 
way  of  Basel,  Belfort,  and  Langres.  The  prompt  seizure 
of  the  Plateau  of  Langres  was  an  important  success. 
The  allies  thereby  turned  the  strong  defensive  lines  of  the 
Vosges  Mountains,  and  of  the  Rivers  Moselle  and  Meuse, 
so  that  Blucher,  with  his  "Army  of  Silesia,"  was  able 
rapidly  to  advance  into  Lorraine,  and  drive  Victor  from 
Nancy.  Toul  speedily  surrendered,  and  the  sturdy  veteran 
then  turned  to  the  south-west,  in  order  to  come  into  touch 
with  Schwarzenberg's  columns.  Neither  leader  delayed 
before  the  eastern  fortresses.  The  allies  had  learnt  from 
Napoleon  to  invest  or  observe  them  and  press  on,  a  course 
which  their  vast  superiority  of  force  rendered  free  from 
danger.  Schwarzenberg,  on  the  25th,  had  150,000  men 
between  Langres,  Chaumont,  and  Bar-sur-Aube  ;  while 
Blucher,  with  about  half  those  numbers,  crossed  the 
Marne  at  St.  Dizier,  and  was  drawing  near  to  Brienne. 
In  front  of  them  were  the  weak  and  disheartened  corps  of 
Marmont,  Ney,  Victor,  and  Macdonald,  mustering  in  all 
about  50,000  men.  Desertions  to  the  allies  were  frequent, 
and  Blucher,  wishing  to  show  that  the  war  was  practically 
over,  dismissed  both  deserters  and  prisoners  to  their 
homes.1 

But  the  war  was  far  from  over  :  it  had  not  yet  begun. 
Hitherto  Napoleon  had  hurried  on  the  preparations  from 
Paris,  but  the  urgency  of  the  danger  now  beckoned  him 
eastwards.  As  before,  he  left  the  Empress  as  Regent  of 
France,  but  appointed  King  Joseph  as  Lieutenant-General 
of  France.  On  Sunday,  January  23rd,  he  held  the  last 
reception.  It  was  in  the  large  hall  of  the  Tuileries,  where 
the  Parisian  rabble  had  forced  Louis  XVI.  to  don  the 
bonnet  rouge.  Another  dynasty  was  now  tottering  to  its 
fall  ;  but  none  could  have  read  its  doom  in  the  faces  of  the 
obsequious  courtiers,  or  of  the  officers  of  the  Parisian 
National  Guards,  who  offered  their  homage  to  the  heir  of 
the  Revolution. 

He  came  forward  with  the  Empress  and  the  King  of 
Rome,  a  flaxen-haired  child  of  three  winters,  clad  in  the 
uniform  of  the  National  Guard.  Taking  the  boy  by  the 
hand  into  the  midst  of  the  circle,  he  spoke  these  touching 

JJIoussaye's  "1814,"  ch.  ii.  ;  Miiffling's  "Campaign  of  1814." 


352  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

words  :  "Gentlemen,  —  I  am  about  to  set  out  for  the  army. 
I  intrust  to  you  what  I  hold  dearest  in  the  world  —  my 
wife  and  my  son.  Let  there  be  no  political  divisions." 
He  then  carried  him  amidst  his  dignitaries  and  officers, 
while  sobs  and  shouts  bespoke  the  warmth  of  the  feelings 
kindled  by  this  scene.  And  never,  surely,  since  the  young 
Maria  Theresa  appealed  in  person  to  the  Hungarian  mag- 
nates to  defend  her  against  rapacious  neighbours,  had  any 
monarch  spoken  so  straight  to  the  hearts  of  his  lieges. 
The  secret  of  his  success  is  not  far  to  seek.  He  had  not 
commanded  as  Emperor  :  he  had  appealed  as  a  father  to 
fathers  and  mothers. 

It  is  painful  to  have  to  add  that  many  who  there  swore 
to  defend  him  were  even  then  beginning  to  plot  his  over- 
throw. Most  painful  of  all  is  it  to  remember  that  when, 
before  dawn  of  the  25th,  Marie  Louise  bade  him  farewell, 
it  was  her  last  farewell  :  for  she,  too,  deserted  him  in  his 
misfortunes,  refused  to  share  his  exile,  and  ultimately 
degraded  herself  by  her  connection  with  Count  Neipperg. 

Heedless  of  all  that  the  future  might  bring,  and  con- 
centrating his  thoughts  on  the  problems  of  the  present, 
the  great  warrior  journeyed  rapidly  eastwards  to  Chalons- 
sur-Marne,  and  opened  the  most  glorious  of  his  campaigns. 
And  yet  it  began  with  disaster.  At  Brienne,  among  the 
scenes  of  his  school-days,  he  assailed  Blucher  in  the  hope 
of  preventing  the  junction  of  the  Army  of  Silesia  with 
that  of  Schwarzenberg  further  south  (January  29th). 
After  sharp  fighting,  the  Prussians  were  driven  from  the 
castle  and  town.  But  the  success  was  illusory.  Blucher 
withdrew  towards  Bar-sur-Aube,  in  order  to  gain  support 
from  Schwarzenberg,  and,  three  days  later,  turned  the 
tables  on  Napoleon  while  the  latter  was  indulging  in  hopes 
that  the  allies  were  about  to  treat  seriously  for  peace.1 
Nevertheless,  though  surprised  by  greatly  superior  num- 
bers, the  40,000  French  clung  obstinately  to  the  village  of 
La  Rothiere  until  their  thin  lines  were  everywhere  driven 
in  or  outflanked,  with  the  loss  of  73  cannon  and  more  than 
3,000  prisoners.  Each  side  lost  about  5,000  killed  and 
wounded  —  a  mere  trifle  to  the  allies,  but  a  grave  disaster 
to  the  defenders. 

1  Letter  of  January  31st  to  Joseph. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  363 

The  Emperor  was  much  discouraged.  He  had  put 
forth  his  full  strength,  exposed  his  own  person  to  the 
hottest  fire,,  so  as  to  encourage  his  men,  and  yet  failed 
to  prevent  the  union  of  the  allied  armies,  or  to  hold  the 
line  of  the  River  Aube.  Early  on  the  morrow  he  left 
the  castle  of  Brienne,  and  took  the  road  for  Troyes ; 
while  Marmont,  with  a  corps  now  reduced  to  less  than 
3,000  men,  bravely  defended  the  passage  of  the  Voire  at 
Rosnay,  and,  after  delaying  the  pursuit,  took  post  at 
Arcis-sur-Aube.  The  means  of  defence,  both  moral  and 
material,  seemed  wellnigh  exhausted.  When,  on  Febru- 
ary 3rd,  Napoleon  entered  Troyes,  scarcely  a  single  vivat 
was  heard.  Even  the  old  troops  were  cast  down  by  de- 
feat and  hunger,  while  as  many  as  6,000  conscripts  are 
said  to  have  deserted.  The  inhabitants  refused  to  supply 
the  necessaries  of  life  except  upon  requisition.  "  The 
army  is  perishing  of  famine,"  writes  the  Emperor  at 
Troyes.  Again  at  Nogent :  "  Twelve  men  have  died  of 
hunger,  though  we  have  used  fire  and  sword  to  get  food 
on  our  way  here."  And,  now,  into  the  space  left  unde- 
fended between  the  Marne  and  the  Aube,  Blucher  began 
to  thrust  his  triumphant  columns,  with  no  barrier  to  check 
him  until  he  neared  the  environs  of  Paris.  Once  more 
the  Prussian  and  Russian  officers  looked  on  the  war  as 
over,  and  invited  one  another  to  dinner  at  the  Palais- 
Royal  in  a  week's  time.1 

But  it  was  on  this  confidence  of  the  old  hussar-general 
that  Napoleon  counted.  He  knew  his  proneness  to  daring 
movements,  and  the  strong  bias  of  Schwarzenberg  towards 
delay  :  he  also  divined  that  they  would  now  separate  their 
forces,  Blucher  making  straight  for  Paris,  while  other  col- 
umns would  threaten  the  capital  by  way  of  Troyes  and 
Sens.  That  was  why  he  fell  back  on  Troyes,  so  as  directly 
to  oppose  the  latter  movement,  "  or  so  as  to  return  and 
manoeuvre  against  Blucher  and  stay  his  march."  2  Another 
motive  was  his  expectation  of  finding  at  Nogent  the  15,000 
veterans  whom  he  had  ordered  Soult  to  send  northwards. 
And  doubtless  the  final  reason  was  his  determination  to 
use  the  sheltering   curve    of   the    Seine,   which    between 

1  "  M£ms.  de  Langeron,"  in  Houssaye,  p.  62  ;  but  see  Muffling. 

2  Letter  of  February  2nd  to  Clarke. 

vol.  ii  —  2  a 


354  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Troyes  and  Nogent  flows  within  twenty  miles  of  the 
high-road  that  Bliicher  must  Use  if  he  struck  at  Paris. 
At  many  a  crisis  Napoleon  had  proved  the  efficacy  of  a 
great  river  line.  From  Rivoli  to  Friedland  his  career 
abounds  in  examples  of  riverine  tactics.  The  war  of 
1813  was  one  prolonged  struggle  for  the  line  of  the 
Elbe.  He  still  continued  the  war  because  he  could  not 
yet  bring  himself  to  sign  away  the  Rhenish  fortresses : 
and  he  now  hoped  to  regain  that  "  natural  boundary " 
by  blows  showered  on  divided  enemies  from  behind  the 
arc  of  the  Seine. 

With  wonderful  prescience  he  had  guessed  at  the  gen- 
eral plan  of  the  allies.  But  he  could  scarcely  have  dared 
to  hope  that  on  that  very  day  (February  2nd)  they  were 
holding  a  council  of  war  at  Brienne,  and  formally  resolved 
that  Bliicher  should  march  north-west  on  Paris  with  about 
50,000  men,  while  the  allied  Grand  Army  of  nearly  three 
times  those  numbers  was  to  diverge  south-west  towards 
Bar-sur-Seine  and  Sens.  So  unequal  a  partition  of  forces 
seemed  to  court  disaster.  It  is  true  that  the  allies  had  no 
magazines  of  supplies  :  they  could  not  march  in  an  undi- 
vided host  through  a  hostile  land  where  the  scanty  de- 
fenders themselves  were  nearly  starving.  If,  however, 
they  decided  to  move  at  all,  it  was  needful  to  allot  the 
more  dangerous  task  to  a  powerful  force.  Above  all,  it 
was  necessary  to  keep  their  main  armies  well  in  touch 
with  one  another  and  with  the  foe.  Yet  these  obvious 
precautions  were  not  taken.  In  truth,  the  separation  of 
the  allies  was  dictated  more  by  political  jealousy  than  by 
military  motives.  To  these  political  affairs  we  must  now 
allude  ;  for  they  had  no  small  effect  in  leading  Napoleon 
on  to  an  illusory  triumph  and  an  irretrievable  overthrow. 
We  will  show  their  influence,  first  on  the  conduct  of  the 
allies,  and  then  on  the  actions  of  Napoleon. 

The  alarm  of  Austria  at  the  growing  power  of  Russia 
and  Prussia  was  becoming  acute.  She  had  drawn  the 
sword  only  because  Napoleon's  resentment  was  more  to  be 
feared  than  Alexander's  ambition.  But  all  had  changed 
since  then.  The  warrior  who,  five  months  ago,  still  had 
his  sword  at  the  throat  of  Germany,  was  now  being  pur- 
sued across  the  dreary  flats  of  Champagne.     And  his  east- 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  355 

era  rival,  who  then  plaintively  sued  for  Austria's  aid,  now 
showed  a  desire  to  establish  Russian  control  over  all  the 
Polish  lands,  indemnifying  Prussia  for  losses  in  that  quar- 
ter by  the  acquisition  of  Saxony.  Both  of  these  changes 
would  press  heavily  on  Austria  from  the  north  ;  and  she 
was  determined  to  prevent  them  as  far  as  possible.  Then 
there  was  the  vexed  question  of  the  reconstruction  of  Ger- 
many, to  which  we  shall  recur  later  on.  Smaller  matters, 
involving  the  relations  of  the  allies  to  Bernadotte,  Denmark, 
and  Switzerland  further  complicated  the  situation  :  but, 
above  all,  there  was  the  problem  of  the  future  limits  and 
form  of  government  of  France. 

On  that  topic  there  were  two  chief  parties  :  those  who 
desired  merely  to  clip  Napoleon's  wings,  and  those  who 
sought  to  bring  back  France  to  her  old  boundaries.  The 
Emperor  Francis  was  still  disposed  to  leave  him  the  "  natu- 
ral frontiers,"  provided  he  gave  up  all  control  of  Germany, 
Holland,  and  Italy.  On  the  other  side  were  the  Czar  and 
the  forward  wing  of  the  Prussian  patriots.  Frederick 
William  was  more  cautious,  but  in  the  main  he  deferred 
to  the  Czar's  views  on  the  boundary  question.  Still,  so 
powerful  was  the  influence  of  the  Emperor  Francis,  Metter- 
nich,  and  Schwarzenberg,  that  the  two  parties  were  evenly 
balanced  and  beset  by  many  suspicions  and  fears,  until 
the  arrival  of  the  British  Foreign  Minister,  Castlereagh, 
began  to  restore  something  like  confidence  and  concord. 

The  British  Cabinet  had  decided  that,  as  none  of  our 
three  envoys  then  at  the  allied  headquarters  had  much 
diplomatic  experience,  our  Minister  should  go  in  person  to 
supervise  the  course  of  affairs.  He  reached  headquarters 
in  the  third  week  of  January,  and  what  Thiers  has  called 
the  proud  simplicity  of  his  conduct,  contrasting  as  it  did 
with  the  uneasy  finesse  of  Metternich  and  Nesselrode,  im- 
parted to  his  counsels  a  weight  which  they  merited  from 
their  disinterestedness.  Great  Britain  was  in  a  very 
strong  position.  She  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  struggle 
before  the  present  coalition  took  shape  :  apart  from  some 
modest  gains  to  Hanover,  she  was  about  to  take  no  part 
in  the  ensuing  territorial  scramble  :  she  even  offered  to 
give  up  many  of  her  oceanic  conquests,  provided  that  the 
European  settlement  would  be  such  as  to  guarantee  a  last- 


356  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ing  peace.1  And  this,  the  British  Minister  came  to  see, 
could  not  be  attained  while  Napoleon  reigned  over  a  Great 
France  :  the  only  sure  pledge  of  peace  would  be  the  return 
of  that  country  to  its  old  frontiers,  and  preferably  to  its 
ancient  dynasty. 

On  the  question  of  boundaries  the  Czar's  views  were  not 
clearly  defined  ;  they  were  personal  rather  than  territorial. 
He  was  determined  to  get  rid  of  Napoleon  ;  but  he  would 
not,  as  yet,  hear  of  the  re-establishment  of  the  Bourbons. 
He  disliked  that  dynasty  in  general,  and  Louis  XVIII.  in 
particular.  Bernadotte  seemed  to  him  a  far  fitter  succes- 
sor to  Napoleon  than  the  gouty  old  gentleman  who  for 
three  and  twenty  years  had  been  morosely  flitting  about 
Europe  and  issuing  useless  proclamations. 

Here,  indeed,  was  Napoleon's  great  chance  :  there  was 
no  man  fit  to  succeed  him,  and  he  knew  it.  Scarcely  any- 
one but  Bernadotte  himself  agreed  with  the  Czar  as  to  the 
fitness  of  the  choice  just  named.  To  the  allies  the  Prince 
Royal  of  Sweden  was  suspect  for  his  loiterings,  and  to 
Frenchmen  he  seemed  a  traitor.  We  find  that  Stein  dis- 
agreed with  the  Czar  on  this  point,  and  declared  that  the 
Bourbons  were  the  only  alternative  to  Napoleon.  As- 
suredly, this  was  not  because  the  great  German  loved  that 
family,  but  simply  because  he  saw  that  their  very  medioc- 
rity would  be  a  pledge  that  France  would  not  again  over- 
flow her  old  limits  and  submerge  Europe. 

Here,  then,  was  the  strength  of  Castlereagh's  position. 
Amidst  the  warping  disputes  and  underhand  intrigues  his 
claims  were  clear,  disinterested,  and  logically  tenable. 
Besides,  they  were  so  urged  as  to  calm  the  disputants. 
He  quietly  assured  Metternich  that  Britain  would  resist 
the  absorption  of  the  whole  of  Poland  and  Saxony  by  Rus- 
sia and  Prussia  ;  and  on  his  side  the  Austrian  statesman 
showed  that  he  would  not  oppose  the  return  of  the  Bour- 
bons to  France  "  from  any  family  considerations,"  provided 
that  that  act  came  as  the  act  of  the  French  nation.2  And 
this  was  a  proviso  on  which  our  Government  and  Welling- 
ton already  laid  great  stress. 

1  Metternich  said  of  Castlereagh,  "  I  can't  praise  him  enough  :  his 
views  are  most  peaceful,  in  our  sense  "  (Fournier,  p.  252). 

2  Castlereagh  to  Lord  Liverpool,  January  22nd  and  30th,  1814. 


xxxvi  FROM  THE   RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  357 

Castlereagh's  straightforward  behaviour  had  an  immense 
influence  in  leading  Metternich  to  favour  a  more  drastic 
solution  of  the  French  question  than  he  had  previously 
advocated.  The  Frankfurt  proposals  were  now  quietly 
waived,  and  Metternich  came  to  see  the  need  of  withdraw- 
ing Belgium  from  France  and  intrusting  it  to  the  House 
of  Orange.  Still,  the  Austrian  statesman  was  for  conclud- 
ing peace  with  Napoleon  as  soon  as  might  be,  though  he 
confessed  in  his  private  letters  that  peace  did  not  depend 
on  the  Chatillon  parleys.  Some  persons,  he  wrote,  wanted 
the  Bourbons  back  :  still  more  washed  for  a  Regency  {i.e., 
Marie  Louise  as  Regent  for  Napoleon  II.)  :  others  said  : 
"  Away  with  Napoleon,  no  peace  is  possible  with  him  "  : 
the  masses  cried  out  for  peace,  so  as  to  end  the  whole 
affair  :  but  added  Metternich  :  "  The  riddle  will  be  solved 
before  or  in  Paris.,,1  There  spoke  the  discreet  opportunist, 
always  open  to  the  logic  of  facts  and  the  persuasion  of 
Castlereagh. 

Our  Minister  found  the  sovereigns  of  Russia  and  Prus- 
sia far  less  tractable  ;  and  he  only  partially  succeeded  in 
lulling  their  suspicions  that  Metternich  was  hand  and 
glove  with  Napoleon.  So  deep  was  the  Czar's  distrust  of 
the  Austrian  statesman  and  commander-in-chief  that  he 
resolved  to  brush  aside  Metternich's  diplomatic  pourparlers, 
to  push  on  rapidly  to  Paris,  and  there  dictate  peace.2 

But  it  was  just  this  eagerness  of  the  Czar  and  the  Prus- 
sians to  reach  Paris  which  kept  alive  Austrian  fears.  A 
complete  triumph  to  their  arms  would  seal  the  doom  of 
Poland  and  Saxony  ;  and  it  has  been  thought  that 
Schwarzenberg,  who  himself  longed  for  peace,  not  only 
sought  to  save  Austrian  soldiers  by  keeping  them  back, 
but  that  at  this  time  he  did  less  than  his  duty  in  keeping 
touch  with  Blucher.  Several  times  during  the  ensuing 
days  the  charge  of  treachery  was  hurled  by  the  Prussians 
against  the  Austrians,  and  once  at  least  by  Frederick 
William  himself.     But  it  seems  more  probable  that  Met- 

1  Letter  to  Hudelist  (February  3rd),  in  Fimrnier,  p.  255. 

2  Stewart's  Mem.  of  January  27,  1814,  in  '«  Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol. 
ix.,  p.  535.  On  that  day  Hardenberg  noted  in  his  diary  :  "  Discussion  on 
the  plan  of  operations,  and  misunderstandings.  Intrigue  of  Stein  to  get 
the  army  straight  to  Paris,  as  the  Czar  wants.  The  Austrians  oppose 
this  :  others  don't  know  what  they  want"  (Founder,  p.  301). 


358  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chxp 

ternich  and  Schwarzenberg  held  their  men  back  merely 
for  prudential  motives  until  the  resumption  of  the  nego- 
tiations with  France  should  throw  more  light  on  the 
tangled  political  jungle  through  which  the  allies  were 
groping.  It  is  significant  that  while  Schwarzenberg  cau- 
tiously felt  about  for  Napoleon's  rearguard,  of  which  he 
lost  touch  for  two  whole  days,  Metternich  insisted  that  the 
peace  Congress  must  be  opened.  Caulaincourt  had  for 
several  days  been  waiting  near  the  allied  headquarters  ; 
and,  said  the  Austrian  Minister,  it  would  be  a  breach  of 
faith  to  put  him  off  any  longer  now  that  Castlereagh  had 
arrived.  Onl}r  when  Austria  threatened  to  withdraw  from 
the  Coalition  did  Alexander  concede  this  point,  and  then 
with  a  very  bad  grace  ;  for  the  resumption  of  the  negotia- 
tions virtually  tied  him  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Chatillon- 
sur-Seine,  the  town  fixed  for  the  Congress,  while  Bliicher 
was  rapidly  moving  towards  Paris  with  every  prospect  of 
snatching  from  the  imperial  brow  the  coveted  laurel  of 
a  triumphal  entry. 

•  To  prevent  this  interference  with  his  own  pet  plans,  the 
susceptible  autocrat  sent  off  from  Bar-sur-Seine  (February 
7th)  an  order  that  Bliicher  was  not  to  enter  Paris,  but 
must  await  the  arrival  of  the  sovereigns.  The  order  was 
needless.  Napoleon,  goaded  to  fury  by  the  demands 
which  the  allies  on  that  very  day  formulated  at  Chatillon, 
flung  himself  upon  Bliicher  and  completely  altered  the 
whole  military  situation.  But  before  describing  this 
wonderful  effort,  we  must  take  a  glance  at  the  diplomatic 
overtures  which  spurred  him  on. 

The  Congress  of  Chatillon  opened  on  February  5th,  and 
on  that  day  Castlereagh  gained  his  point,  that  questions 
about  our  maritime  code  should  be  completely  banished 
from  the  discussions.  Two  days  later  the  allies  declared 
that  France  must  withdraw  within  the  boundaries  of  1791, 
with  the  exception  of  certain  changes  made  for  mutual 
convenience  and  of  some  colonial  retrocessions  that  Eng- 
land would  grant  to  France.  The  French  plenipoten- 
tiary, Caulaincourt,  heard  this  demand  with  a  quiet  but 
strained  composure  :  he  reminded  them  that  at  Frankfurt 
they  had  proposed  to  leave  France  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps  ; 
he  inquired  what  colonial  sacrifices  England  was  prepared 


xxxvi  FROM   THE    RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  359 

to  make  if  she  cooped  up  France  in  her  old  limits  in 
Europe.  To  this  our  plenipotentiaries  Aberdeen,  Cath- 
cart,  and  Stewart  refused  to  reply  until  he  assented  to  the 
present  demand  of  the  allies.  He  very  properly  refused 
to  do  this  ;  and,  despite  his  eagerness  to  come  to  an  ar- 
rangement and  end  the  misfortunes  of  France,  referred 
the  matter  to  his  master.1 

What  were  Napoleon's  views  on  these  questions  ?  It  is 
difficult  to  follow  the  workings  of  his  mind  before  the 
time  when  Caulaincourt's  despatch  flashed  the  horrible 
truth  upon  him  that  he  might,  after  all,  leave  France 
smaller  and  weaker  than  he  found  her.  Then  the  light- 
nings of  his  wrath  flash  forth,  and  we  see  the  tumult  and 
anguish  of  that  mighty  soul :  but  previously  the  storm- 
wrack  of  passion  and  the  cloud-bank  of  his  clinging  will 
are  lit  up  by  few  gleams  of  the  earlier  piercing  intelli- 
gence. On  January  the  4th  he  had  written  to  Caulain- 
court  that  the  policy  of  England  and  the  personal  rancour 
of  the  Czar  would  drag  Austria  along.  If  Fortune 
betrayed  him  (Napoleon)  he  would  give  up  the  throne  :• 
never  would  he  sign  any  shameful  peace.  But  he  added : 
"  You  must  see  what  Metternich  wants  :  it  is  not  to  Aus- 
tria's interest  to  push  matters  to  the  end."  In  the  accom- 
panying instructions  to  his  plenipotentiary,  he  seems  to 
assent  to  the  Alpine  and  Rhenish  frontiers,  but  advises 
him  to  sign  the  preliminaries  as  vaguely  as  possible,  "  as 
we  have  everything  to  gain  by  delay.'"  The  Rhine  frontier 
must  be  so  described  as  to  leave  France  the  Dutch  for- 
tresses: and  Savona  and  Spezzia  must  also  count  as  on  the 
French  side  of  the  Alps.  These,  be  it  observed,  are  his 
notions  when  he  has  not  heard  of  the  defection  of  Murat, 
or  the  rejection  of  his  Spanish  bargain  by  the  Cortes. 

Twelve  days  later  he  proposes  to  Metternich  an  armis- 
tice, and  again  suggests  that  it  is  not  to  Austria's  interest 
to  press  matters  too  far.  But  the  allies  are  too  wary  to 
leave  such  a  matter  to  Metternich :  at  Teplitz  they  bound 

1  Stewart's  notes  in  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  pp.  541-548.  On  February 
17th  Castlereagh  promised  to  give  back  all  our  conquests  in  the  West 
Indies,  except  Tobago,  and  to  try  to  regain  for  France  Guadaloupe  and 
Cayenne  from  Sweden  and  Portugal  ;  also  to  restore  all  the  French  posses- 
sions east  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  except  the  lies  de  France  (Mauritius) 
and  de  Bourbon  (Fournier,  p.  381). 


360  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

themselves  to  common  action ;  and  the  proposal  only  shows 
them  the  need  of  pushing  on  fast  while  their  foe  is  still 
unprepared.  Once  more  his  old  optimism  asserts  itself. 
The  first  French  success,  that  at  Brienne,  leads  him  to  hope 
that  the  allies  will  now  be  ready  to  make  peace.  Even 
after  the  disaster  at  La  Rothiere,  he  believes  that  the 
mere  arrival  of  Caulaincourt  at  the  allied  headquarters 
will  foment  the  discords  which  there  exist.1  Then,  writ- 
ing amidst  the  unspeakable  miseries  at  Troyes  (February 
4th),  he  upbraids  Caulaincourt  for  worrying  him  about 
"  powers  and  instructions  when  it  is  still  doubtful  if  the 
enemy  wants  to  negotiate.  His  terms,  it  seems,  are  deter- 
mined on  beforehand.  As  soon  as  you  have  them,  you 
have  the  power  to  accept  them  or  to  refer  them  to  me 
within  twenty-four  hours." 

After  midnight,  he  again  directs  him  to  accept  the 
terms,  if  acceptable :  "  in  the  contrary  case  we  will  run 
the  risks  of  a  battle ;  even  the  loss  of  Paris,  and  all  that 
will  ensue."  Later  on  that  day  he  allows  Maret  to  send 
a  despatch  giving  Caulaincourt  "  carte  blanche "  to  con- 
clude peace.2  But  the  plenipotentiary  dared  not  take  on 
himself  the  responsibility  of  accepting  the  terms  offered 
by  the  allies  two  days  later.  The  last  despatch  was  too 
vague  to  enable  him  to  sign  away  many  thousands  of  square 
miles  of  territory  :  it  contradicted  the  tenor  of  Napoleon's 
letters,  which  empowered  him  to  assent  to  nothing  less 
than  the  Frankfurt  terms.  And  thus  was  to  slip  away 
one  more  chance  of  bringing  about  peace  —  a  peace  that 
would  strip  the  French  Empire  of  frontier  lands  and  alien 
peoples,  but  leave  it  to  the  peasants'  ruler,  Napoleon. 

In  truth,  the  Emperor's  words  and  lelters  breathed 
nothing  but  warlike  resolve.  Famine  and  misery  accom- 
pany him  on  his  march  to  Nogent,  and  there,  on  the  7th, 
he  hears  tidings  that  strike  despair  to  every  heart  but  his. 
An  Anglo-German  force  is  besieging  the  staunch  old  Car- 
not  in  Antwerp ;  Biilow  has  entered  Brussels  ;  Belgium  is 

1  Letters  of  January  31st  and  February  2nd  to  Joseph. 

2  Printed  in  Napoleon's  "Corresp."  of  February  17th.  I  cannot  agree 
with  Ernouf,  "Vie  de  Maret,"  and  Founder,  that  Caulaincourt  could 
have  signed  peace  merely  on  Maret's  "carte  blanche"  despatch.  The 
man  who  had  been  cruelly  duped  by  Napoleon  in  the  D'Enghien  affair 
naturally  wanted  an  explicit  order  now. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE   RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  361 

lost :  Macdonald's  weak  corps  is  falling  back  on  Epernay, 
hard  pressed  by  Yorck,  while  Bliicher  is  heading  for 
Paris.  Last  of  all  comes  on  the  morrow  Caulaincourt's 
despatch  announcing  that  the  allies  now  insist  on  France 
returning  to  the  limits  of  1791. 

Never,  surely,  since  the  time  of  Job  did  calamity  shower 
her  blows  so  thickly  on  the  head  of  mortal  man  :  and  never 
were  they  met  with  less  resignation  and  more  undaunted 
defiance.  After  receiving  the  black  budget  of  news  the 
Emperor  straightway  shut  himself  up.  For  some  time  his 
Marshals  left  him  alone :  but,  as  Caulaincourt's  courier 
was  waiting  for  the  reply,  Berthier  and  Maret  ventured 
to  intrude  on  his  grief.  He  tossed  them  the  letter  con- 
taining the  allied  terms.  A  long  silence  ensued,  while 
they  awaited  his  decision.  As  he  spoke  not  a  word,  they 
begged  him  to  give  way  and  grant  peace  to  France.  Then 
his  pent-up  feelings  burst  forth  :  "  What,  }-ou  would  have 
me  sign  a  treaty  like  that,  and  trample  under  foot  my 
coronation  oath  !  Unheard-of  disasters  may  have  snatched 
from  me  the  promise  to  renounce  my  conquests  :  but,  give 
up  those  made  before  me  —  never!  God  keep  me  from 
such  a  disgrace.  Repty  to  Caulaincourt  since  you  wish 
it,  but  tell  him  that  I  reject  this  treaty.  I  prefer  to  run 
the  uttermost  risks  of  war."  He  threw  himself  on  his 
camp  bed.  Maret  waited  by  his  side,  and  gained  from 
him  in  calmer  moments  permission  to  write  to  Caulain- 
court in  terms  that  allowed  the  negotiation  to  proceed. 
At  dawn  on  the  9th  Maret  came  back  hoping  to  gain 
assent  to  despatches  that  he  had  been  drawing  up  dur- 
ing the  night.  To  his  surprise  he  found  the  Emperor 
stretched  out  over  large  charts,  compass  in  hand.  "Ah, 
there  you  are,"  was  his  greeting;  "now  it's  a  question  of 
very  different  matters.  1  am  going  to  beat  Bliicher:  if 
I  succeed,  the  state  of  affairs  will  entirely  change,  and  then 
we  will  see." 

The  tension  of  his  feelings  at  this  time,  when  rage 
and  desperation  finally  gave  way  to  a  fixed  resolve  to 
stake  all  on  a  blow  at  Bliicher's  flank,  finds  expression  in 
a  phrase  which  has  been  omitted  from  the  official  corre- 
spondence.1    In  one  of  the  five  letters  which  he  wrote  to 

1  Given  by  Ducasse,  "Les  Rois  Freres  de  Napoleon,"  p.  64. 


362  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

Joseph  on  the  9th,  he  remarked  :  "  Pray  the  Madonna  of 
armies  to  be  for  us  :  Louis,  who  is  a  saint,  may  engage  to 
give  her  a  lighted  candle."  A  curiously  sarcastic  touch, 
probably  due  to  his  annoyance  at  the  Misereres  and 
"prayers  forty  hours  long"  at  Paris  which  he  bade  his 
Ministers  curtail.  Or  was  it  a  passing  flash  of  that 
religious  sentiment  which  he  professed  in  his  declining 
years  ? 

He  certainly  counted  on  victory  over  Blticher.  A  week 
earlier,  he  had  foreseen  the  chance  that  that  leader  would 
expose  his  flank  :  on  the  7th  he  charged  Marmont  to 
occupy  Sezanne,  where  he  would  be  strongly  supported ; 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  9th  he  set  out  from  Nogent  to 
reinforce  his  Marshal  ;  and  on  the  morrow  Marmont  and 
Ney  fell  upon  one  of  Blucher's  scattered  columns  at 
Champaubert.  It  was  a  corps  of  Russians,  less  than  5,000 
strong,  with  no  horsemen  and  but  twenty-four  cannon; 
the  Muscovites  offered  a  stout  resistance,  but  only  1,500 
escaped.1  Blucher's  line  of  march  was  now  cut  in  twain. 
He  himself  was  at  Vertus  with  the  last  column  ;  his  fore- 
most corps,  under  Sacken,  was  west  of  Montmirail,  while 
Yorck  was  far  to  the  north  of  that  village  observing 
Macdonald's  movements  along  the  Chateau-Thierry  road. 

The  Emperor  with  20,000  men  might  therefore  hope 
to  destroy  these  corps  piecemeal.  Leaving  Marmont  along 
with  Grouchy's  horse  to  hold  Blucher  in  check  on  the 
east,  he  struck  westwards  against  Sacken's  Russians  near 
Montmirail.  The  shock  was  terrible  ;  both  sides  were 
weary  with  night  marches  on  miry  roads,  along  which 
cannon  had  to  be  dragged  by  double  teams  :  yet,  though 
footsore  and  worn  with  cold  and  hunger,  the  men  fought 
with  sustained  fury,  the  French  to  stamp  out  the  barbar- 
ous invaders  who  had  wasted  their  villages,  the  Russians 
to  hold  their  position  until  Yorck's  Prussians  should 
stretch  a  succouring  hand  from  the  north.  Many  a  time 
did  the  French  rush  at  the  village  of  Marchais  held  by 
Sacken  :  they  were  repeatedly  repulsed,  until,  as  darkness 
came  on,  Ney  and  Mortier  with  the  Guard  stormed  a  large 
farmhouse   on    their   left.     Then,  at   last,  Sacken's   men 

1  Hausser,  p.  603.  According  to  Napoleon,  6,000  men  and  forty  cannon 
were  captured ! 


xxxvi  FROM   THE   RHINE   TO   THE    SEINE  363 

drew  off  in  sore  plight  north-west  across  the  fields,  where 
Yorck's  tardy  advent  alone  saved  them  from  destruction. 
The  next  day  completed  their  discomfiture.  Napoleon  and 
Mortier  pursued  both  allied  corps  to  Chateau-Thierry, 
and,  after  sharp  fighting  in  the  streets  of  that  place, 
drove  them  across  the  Marne.  The  townsfolk  hailed  the 
advent  of  their  Emperor  with  unbounded  joy  :  they  had 
believed  him  to  be  at  Troyes,  beaten  and  dispirited  ;  and 
here  he  was  delivering  them  from  the  brutal  licence  of  the 
eastern  soldiery.     Nothing  was  impossible  to  him. 

Next  it  was  Blucher's  turn.  Leaving  Mortier  to  pursue 
the  fugitives  of  Sacken  and  Yorck  along  the  Soissons 
road,  Napoleon  left  Chateau-Thierry  late  at  night  on  the 
13th,  following  the  mass  of  his  troops  to  reinforce  Mar- 
mont.  That  Marshal  had  yielded  ground  to  Blucher's 
desperate  efforts,  but  was  standing  at  bay  at  Vauchamps, 
when  Napoleon  drew  near  to  the  scene  of  the  unequal 
fight.  Suddenly  a  mighty  shout  of  "  Vive  l'Empereur  " 
warned  the  assailants  that  they  now  had  to  dp  with  Napo- 
leon. Yet  no  precipitation  weakened  the  Emperor's  blow : 
not   until   his   cavalry  greatly  outnumbered  that  of   the 

•  allies  did  he  begin  the  chief  attack.  Stoutly  it  was  beaten 
off  by  the  allied  squares  :  but  Drouot's  artillery  ploughed 
through  their  masses,  while  swarms  of  horsemen  were 
ready  to  open  out  those  ghastly  furrows.  There  was 
nothing  for  it  but  retreat,  and  that  across  open  country, 
where  the  charges  and  the  pounding  still  went  on.  But 
nothing  could  break  that  stubborn  infantry  :  animated  by 
their  leader  the  Prussians  and  Russians  plodded  steadily 
eastwards,  until,  as  darkness  drew  on,  they  found  Grouchy's 
horse  barring  the  road  before  Etoges.  "  Forward  "  was 
still  the  veteran's  cry :  and  through  the  cavalry  they  cut 
their  way :  through  hostile  footmen  that  had  stolen  round 
to  the  village  they  also  burst,  and  at  last  found  shelter 
near  Bergeres.  "  Words  fail  me,"  wrote  Colonel  Hudson 
Lowe,  "to  express  my  admiration  at  their  undaunted  and 
manly  behaviour." 

This  gallant  retreat  shed  lustre  over  the  rank  and  file. 
But  the  sins  of  the  commanders  had  cost  the  allies  dear. 

J  In  four  days  the  army  of  Silesia  lost  fully  15,000  men, 
and    its    corps   were    driven    far    asunder    by    Napoleon's 


364  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

incursion.  His  brilliant  moves  and  trenchant  strokes 
astonished  the  world.  With  less  than  30,000  men  he  had 
burst  into  Bliicher's  line  of  march,  and  scattered  in  flight 
50,000  warriors  advancing  on  Paris  in  full  assurance  of 
victory.  It  was  not  chance,  but  science,  that  gave  him 
these  successes.  Acting  from  behind  the  screen  of  the 
Seine,  he  had  thrown  his  small  but  undivided  force  against 
scattered  portions  of  a  superior  force.  It  was  the  strategy 
of  Lonato  and  Castiglione  over  again  ;  and  the  enthusiasm 
of  those  days  bade  fair  to  revive. 

His  men,  who  previously  had  tramped  downheartedly 
over  wastes  of  snow  and  miry  cross-roads,  now  marched 
with  head  erect  as  in  former  days  ;  the  villagers,  far  from 
being  cowed  by  the  brutalities  of  the  Cossacks,  formed 
bands  to  hang  upon  the  enemies'  rear  and  entrap  their 
foragers.  Above  all,  Paris  was  herself  once  more.  Be- 
fore he  began  these  brilliant  moves,  he  had  to  upbraid 
Cambaceres  forhis  unmanly  conduct.  "  I  see  that  instead 
of  sustaining  the  Empress,  you  are  discouraging  her. 
Why  lose  your  head  thus?  What  mean  these  Miserere 
and  these  prayers  of  forty  hours  ?  Are  you  going  mad 
at  Paris  ?  "  Now  the  capital  again  breathed  defiance  to 
the  foe,  and  sent  the  Emperor  National  Guards.  Many 
of  these  from  Brittany,  it  is  true,  came  "  in  round  hats 
and  sabots  ":  they  had  no  knapsacks  :  but  they  had  guns, 
and  they  fought. 

Could  he  have  pursued  Bliicher  on  the  morrow  he  might 
probably  have  broken  up  even  that  hardy  infantry,  now 
in  dire  straits  for  want  of  supplies.  But  bad  news  came 
to  hand  from  the  south-west.  Under  urgent  pressure 
from  the  Czar,  Schwarzenberg  had  pushed  forward  two 
columns  from  Troyes  towards  Paris  :  one  of  them  had 
seized  the  bridge  over  the  Seine  at  Bray,  a  day's  march 
below  Nogent  :  the  other  was  nearing  Fontainebleau. 
Napoleon  was  furious  at  the  neglect  of  Victor  to  guard 
the  crossing  at  Bray,  and  reluctantly  turned  away  from 
Bliicher  to  crush  these  columns.  His  men  marched  or 
were  carried  in  vehicles,  by  way  of  Meaux  and  Guignes, 
to  reinforce  Victor  :  on  the  17th  they  drove  back  the 
outposts  of  Schwarzenberg's  centre,  while  Macdonald  and 
Oudinot  marched  towards  Nogent  to  threaten  his  right. 


xxxvi  FROM   THE   RHINE   TO   THE   SEINE  366 

These  rapid  moves  alarmed  the  Austrian  commander, 
whose  left,  swung  forward  on  Fontainebleau,  was  in  some 
danger  of  being  cut  off.  He  therefore  sued  for  an  armis- 
tice. It  was  refused  ;  and  the  request  drew  from  Napo- 
leon a  letter  to  his  brother  Joseph  full  of  contempt  for 
the  allies  (February  18th).  "  It  is  difficult,"  he  writes, 
"  to  be  so  cowardly  as  that  !  He  [Schwarzenberg]  had 
constantly,  and  in  the  most  insulting  terms,  refused  a 
suspension  of  arms  of  any  kind,  .  .  .  and  yet  these 
wretches  at  the  first  check  fall  on  their  knees.  I  will 
grant  no  armistice  till  my  territory  is  clear  of  them."  He 
adds  that  he  now  expected  to  gain  the  "  natural  fron- 
tiers "  offered  by  the  allies  at  Frankfurt — the  minimum 
that  he  could  accept  with  honour  ;  and  he  closes  with 
these  memorable  words,  which  flash  a  searchlight  on  his 
pacific  professions  of  thirteen  months  later  :  "  If  I  had 
agreed  to  the  old  boundaries,  I  should  have  rushed  to 
arms  two  years  later,  telling  the  nation  that  I  had  signed 
not  a  peace,  but  a  capitulation."1 

The  events  of  the  18th  strengthened  his  resolve.  He 
then  attacked  the  Crown  Prince  of  Wurtemberg  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Seine,  opposite  Montereau,  overthrew 
him  by  the  weight  of  the  artillery  of  the  Guard,  where- 
upon a  brilliant  charge  of  Pajol's  horsemen  wrested  the 
bridge  from  the  South  Germans  and  restored  to  the  Em- 
peror the  much-needed  crossing  over  the  river.  Napo- 
leon's activity  on  that  day  was  marvellous.  He  wrote  or 
dictated  eleven  despatches,  six  of  them  long  before  dawn, 
gave  instructions  to  an  officer  who  was  to  encourage 
Eugene  to  hold  firm  in  Italy,  fought  a  battle,  directed  the 
aim  of  several  cannon,  and  wound  up  the  day  by  severe 
rebukes  to  Marshal  Victor  and  two  generals  for  their 
recent  blunders.  Thus,  on  a  brief  winter's  day,  he  fills 
the  rSle  of  Emperor,  organizer,  tactician,  cannoneer,  and 
martinet  ;  in  fact,  he  crowns  it  by  pardoning  Victor,  when 
that  brave  man  vows  that  he  cannot  live  away  from  the  army, 
and  will  fight  as  a  common  soldier  among  the  Guards  :  he 
then  and  there  assigns  to  him  two  divisions  of  the  Guard. 
To  the  artillerymen  the  camaraderie  of  the  Emperor  gave 
a  new  zest :  and  when  they  ventured  to  reproach  him  for 

1  Letter  of  February  18th,  1814. 


366  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xxxvi 

thus  risking  his  life,  he  replied  with  a  touch  of  the  fatal- 
ism which  enthralls  a  soldier's  mind  :  "  Ah  !  don't  fear  : 
the  ball  is  not  cast  that  will  kill  me." 

Yes  :  Napoleon  displayed  during  these  last  ten  days  a 
fertility  of  resource,  a  power  to  drive  back  the  tide  of 
events,  that  have  dazzled  posterity,  as  they  dismayed  his 
foes.  We  may  seek  in  vain  for  a  parallel,  save  perhaps  in 
the  careers  of  Hannibal  and  Frederick.  Alexander  the 
Great's  victories  were  won  over  Asiatics  :  Caesar's  mag- 
nificent rally  of  his  wavering  bands  against  the  onrush  of 
the  Nervii  was  but  one  effort  of  disciplined  valour  crush- 
ing the  impetuosity  of  the  barbarian.  Marlborough  and 
Wellington  often  triumphed  over  great  odds  and  turned 
the  course  of  history.  But  their  star  had  never  set  so  low 
as  that  of  Napoleon's  after  La  Rothiere,  and  never  did  it 
rush  to  the  zenith  with  a  splendour  like  that  which  blinded 
the  trained  hosts  of  Bliicher  and  Schwarzenberg.  What- 
ever the  mistakes  of  these  leaders,  and  they  were  great, 
there  is  something  that  defies  analysis  in  Napoleon's  sud- 
den transformation  of  his  beaten  dispirited  band  into  a 
triumphant  array  before  which  four  times  their  numbers 
sought  refuge  in  retreat.  But  it  is  just  this  transcendent 
quality  that  adds  a  charm  to  the  character  and  career  of 
Napoleon.     Where  analysis  fails,  there  genius  begins. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

THE   FIRST  ABDICATION 

It  now  remained  to  be  seen  whether  Napoleon  would 
make  a  wise  use  of  his  successes.  While  the  Grand 
Army  drew  in  its  columns  behind  the  sheltering  line  of 
the  Seine  at  Troyes,  the  French  Emperor  strove  to 
reap  in  diplomacy  the  fruits  of  his  military  prowess.  In 
brief,  he  sought  to  detach  Austria  from  the  Coalition. 
From  Nogent  he  wrote,  on  the  21st,  to  the  Emperor 
Francis,  dwelling  on  the  impolicy  of  Austria  continuing 
the  war.  Why  should  she  subordinate  her  policy  to 
that  of  England  and  to  the  personal  animosities  of  the 
Czar  ?  Why  should  she  see  her  former  Belgian  provinces 
handed  over  to  a  Protestant  Dutch  Prince  about  to  be 
allied  with  the  House  of  Brunswick  by  marriage  ?  France 
would  never  give  up  Belgium  ;  and  he,  as  French  Em- 
peror, would  never  sign  a  peace  that  would  drive  her 
from  the  Rhine  and  exclude  her  from  the  circle  of  the 
Great  Powers.  But  if  Austria  really  wished  for  the 
equilibrium  of  Europe,  he  (Napoleon)  was  ready  to  for- 
get the  past  and  make  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  Frank- 
furt terms.1 

Had  these  offers  been  rather  less  exacting,  and  reached 
the  allied  headquarters  a  week  earlier,  they  might  have 
led  to  the  break  up  of  the  Coalition.  For  the  political 
situation  of  the  allies  had  been  even  more  precarious 
than  that  of  their  armies.  The  pretensions  of  the  Czar 
had  excited  indignation  and  alarm.     Swayed  to  and  fro 

1  At  Elba  Napoleon  told  Colonel  Campbell  that  he  would  have  made 
peace  at  Chatillon  had  not  England  insisted  on  his  giving  up  Antwerp, 
and  that  England  was  therefore  the  cause  of  the  war  continuing.  This 
letter,  however,  proves  that  he  was  as  set  on  retaining  Mainz  as  Antwerp. 
Caulaincourt  then  wished  him  to  make  peace  while  he  could  do  so  with 
credit  ("  Castlereagh  Papers,"    vol.  ix.,  p.  287). 

307 


368  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

between  the  counsels  of  his  old  tutor,  Laharpe,  now 
again  at  his  side,  and  his  own  autocratic  instincts,  he 
declared  that  he  would  push  on  to  Paris,  consult  the  will 
of  the  French  people  by  a  plebiscite,  and  abide  by  its 
decision,  even  if  it  gave  a  new  lease  of  power  to  Napo- 
leon. But  side  by  side  with  this  democratic  proposal 
came  another  of  a  more  despotic  type,  that  the  military 
Governor  of  Paris  must  be  a  Russian  officer. 

The  amusement  caused  by  these  odd  notions  was  over- 
shadowed by  alarm.  Metternich,  Castlereagh,  and  Har- 
denberg  saw  in  them  a  ruse  for  foisting  on  France  either 
Bernadotte,  or  an  orientalized  Republic,  or  a  Muscovite 
version  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  Then  again,  on  Feb- 
ruary 9th,  Alexander  sent  a  mandate  to  the  pleni- 
potentiaries at  Chatillon,  requesting  that  their  sessions 
should  be  suspended,  though  he  had  recently  agreed  at 
Langres  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  France,  provided 
that  the  military  operations  were  not  suspended.  Evi- 
dently, then,  he  was  bent  on  forcing  the  hands  of  his 
allies,  and  Austria  feared  that  he  might  at  the  end  of  the 
war  insist  on  her  taking  Alsace,  as  a  set-off  to  the  loss 
of  Eastern  Galicia  which  he  wished  to  absorb.  So  keen 
was  the  jealousy  thus  aroused,  that  at  Troyes  Metternich 
and  Hardenberg  signed  a  secret  agreement  to  prevent 
the  Czar  carrying  matters  with  a  high  hand  at  Paris 
(February  14th)  ;  and  on  the  same  day  they  sent  him  a 
stiff  Note  requesting  the  resumption  of  the  negotiations 
with  Napoleon.  Indeed,  Austria  formally  threatened  to 
withdraw  her  troops  from  the  war,  unless  he  limited  his 
aims  to  the  terms  propounded  by  the  allies  at  Chatillon. 
Alexander  at  first  refused  ;  but  the  news  of  Bliicher's 
disasters  shook  his  determination,  and  he  assented  on 
that  day,  provided  that  steps  were  at  once  taken  to 
lighten  the  pressure  on  the  Russian  corps  serving  under 
Bliicher.  Thus,  by  February  14th,  the  crisis  was  over.1 
Schwarzenberg  cautiously  pushed  on  three  columns  to 
attract  the  thunderbolts  that  otherwise  would  have  de- 
stroyed the  Silesian  Army  root  and  branch  ;  and  he  suc- 
ceeded. True,  his  vanguard  was  beaten  at  Montereau ; 
but,  by  drawing  Napoleon  south  and  then  east  of  the  Seine, 

i  Fournier,  pp.  132-137,  284-294,  299. 


A 


M 


CAMPAI 


Stan/brria  G^yroph' Estn-f.  CtmSHk 


F    1814. 


vj 


o 


VT 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  369 

he  gave  time  to  Bliicher  to  strengthen  his  shattered  array 
and  resume  the  offensive.  Meanwhile  Billow,  with  the 
northern  army,  began  to  draw  near  to  the  scene  of  action, 
and  on  the  23rd  the  allies  took  the  wise  step  of  assigning 
his  corps,  along  with  those  of  Winzingerode,  Woronzoff, 
and  Strogonoff,  to  the  Prussian  veteran.  The  last  three 
corps  were  withdrawn  from  the  army  of  Bernadotte,  and 
that  prince  was  apprised  of  the  fact  by  the  Czar  in  a 
rather  curt  letter. 

The  diplomatic  situation  had  also  cleared  up  before  Na- 
poleon's letter  reached  the  Emperor  Francis.  The  nego- 
tiations with  Caulaincourt  were  resumed  at  Chatillon  on 
February  the  17th  ;  and  there  is  every  reason  to  think  that 
Austria,  England,  Prussia,  and  perhaps  even  Russia  would 
now  gladly  have  signed  peace  with  Napoleon  on  the  basis  of 
the  French  frontiers  of  1791,  provided  that  he  renounced 
all  claims  to  interference  in  the  affairs  of  Europe  outside 
those  limits.1 

These  demands  would  certainly  have  been  accepted  by 
the  French  plenipotentiary  had  he  listened  to  his  own 
pacific  promptings.  But  he  was  now  in  the  most  painful 
position.  Maret  had  informed  him,  the  day  after  Mont- 
mirail,  that  Napoleon  was  set  on  keeping  the  Rhenish  and 
Alpine  frontiers.2  He  could,  therefore,  do  nothing  but 
temporize.  He  knew  how  precarious  was  the  military 
supremacy  just  snatched  by  his  master,  and  trusted  that  a 
few  days  more  would  bring  wisdom  before  it  was  too  late. 
But  his  efforts  for  delay  were  useless. 

While  he  was  marking  time,  Napoleon  was  sending  him 
despatches  instinct  with  pride.  "  I  have  made  30,000  to 
40,000  prisoners,"  he  wrote  on  the  17th  :  "  I  have  taken 
200  cannon,  a  great  number  of  generals,  and  destroyed 
several  armies,  almost  without  striking  a  blow.  I  yester- 
day checked  Schwarzenberg's  army,  which  I  hope  to 
destroy  before  it  recrosses  my  frontier."  And  two  days 
later,  after  hearing  the  allied  terms,  he  wrote  that  they 
would  make  the  blood  of  every  Frenchman  boil  with  in- 
dignation, and  that  he  would   dictate  his  ultimatum   at 

1  See  Metternich's  letter  to  Stadion  of  February  15th  in  Fournier, 
pp.  319,  327. 

a  Houssaye,  p.  102. 

vol.  ii — 2  b 


370  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Troyes  or  Chatillon.  Of  course,  Caulaincourt  kept  these 
diatribes  to  himself,  but  his  painfully  constrained  demean- 
our betrayed  the  secret  that  he  longed  for  peace  and  that 
his  hands  were  tied. 

On  all  sides  proofs  were  to  be  seen  that  Napoleon  would 
never  give  up  Belgium  and  the  Rhine  frontier.  When 
the  allies  (at  the  suggestion  of  Schwarzenberg,  and  with  the 
approval  of  the  Czar)  sued  for  an  armistice,  he  forbade  his 
envoys  to  enter  into  any  parleys  until  the  allies  agreed  to 
accept  the  "  natural  frontiers  "  as  the  basis  for  a  peace,  and 
retired  in  the  meantime  on  Alsace,  Lorraine,  and  Holland.1 
These  last  conditions  he  agreed  three  days  later  to  relax  ; 
but  on  the  first  point  he  was  inexorable,  and  he  knew  that 
the  military  commissioners  appointed  to  arrange  the  truce 
had  no  power  to  agree  to  the  political  article  which  he  made 
a  sine  qud  non. 

Accordingly,  no  armistice  was  concluded,  and  his  un- 
bending attitude  made  a  bad  impression  on  the  Emperor 
Francis,  who,  on  the  27th,  replied  to  his  son-in-law  in 
terms  which  showed  that  his  blows  were  welding  the 
Coalition  more  firmly  together.2 

In  fact,  while  the  plenipotentiaries  at  Chatillon  were 
exchanging  empty  demands,  a  most  important  compact 
was  taking  form  at  Chaumont :  it  was  dated  from  the  1st 
of  March,  but  definitively  signed  on  the  9th.  Great  Brit- 
ain, Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  thereby  bound  themselves 
not  to  treat  singly  with  France  for  peace,  but  to  continue 
the  war  until  France  was  brought  back  to  her  old  fron- 
tiers, and  the  complete  independence  of  Germany,  Hol- 
land, Switzerland,  and  Spain  was  secured.  Each  of  the 
four  Powers  must  maintain  150,000  men  in  the  field  (ex- 
clusive of  garrisons)  ;  and  Britain  agreed  to  aid  her  allies 
with  equal  yearly  subsidies  amounting  in  all  to  £5,000,000 
for  the  year  1814.3     The  treaty  would  be  only  defensive 

instructions  of  February  24th  to  Flahaut,  "Corresp.,"  No.  21359; 
Hardenberg's  "  Diary,"  in  Fournier,  pp.  363-364. 

2  Fournier,  pp.  170,  385. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  178-181,  304  ;  Martens,  vol.  ix.,  p.  683.  Castlereagh,  vol. 
ix.,  p.  336,  calls  it  "  my  treaty,"  and  adds  that  England  was  practically 
supplying  300,000  men  to  the  Coalition.  One  secret  article  invited  Spain 
and  Sweden  to  accede  to  the  treaty  ;  another  stated  that  Germany  was  to 
consist  of  a  federation  of  sovereign  princes,  that  Holland  must  receive  Q 


xxxvii  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  371 

if  Napoleon  accepted  the  allied  terms  formulated  at 
Chatillon  :  otherwise  it  would  be  offensive  and  hold 
good,  if  need  be,  for  twenty  years. 

Undoubtedly  this  compact  was  largely  the  work  of 
Castlereagh,  whose  tact  and  calmness  had  done  wonders 
in  healing  schisms ;  but  so  intimate  a  union  could  never 
have  been  formed  among  previously  discordant  allies  but 
for  their  overmastering  fear  of  Napoleon.  Such  a  treaty 
was  without  parallel  in  European  history  ;  and  the  strin- 
gency of  its  clauses  serves  as  the  measure  of  the  prowess 
and  perversity  of  the  French  Emperor.  It  is  puerile  to 
say,  as  Mollien  does,  that  England  bribed  the  allies  to  this 
last  effort.  Experiences  of  the  last  months  had  shown 
them  that  peace  could  not  be  durable  as  long  as  Napoleon 
remained  in  a  position  to  threaten  Germany.  Even  now 
they  were  ready  to  conclude  it  with  Napoleon  on  the 
basis  of  the  old  frontiers  of  France,  provided  that  he 
assented  before  the  11th  of  March  ;  but  the  most  pacific 
of  their  leaders  saw  that  the  more  they  showed  their  de- 
sire for  peace,  the  more  they  strengthened  Napoleon's 
resolve  to  have  it  only  on  terms  which  they  saw  to  be 
fraught  with  future  danger.1 

While  the  conferences  at  Chatillon  followed  one  an- 
other in  fruitless  succession,  Bliicher,  with  48,000  effec- 
tives, was  once  more  resuming  the  offensive.  Napoleon 
heard  the  news  at  Troyes  (February  25th).  He  was 
surprised  at  the  veteran's  temerity  :  he  had  pictured  him 
crushed  and  helpless  beyond  Chalons,  and  had  cherished 
the  hope  of  destroying  Schwarzenberg.  —  "If,"  he  wrote 
to  Clarke  on  the  morrow,  "  I  had  had  a  pontoon  bridge, 

"suitable"  military  frontier,  and  that  Italy,  Spain,  and  Switzerland  must 
be  independent,  that  is,  of  France  ;  a  third  bound  the  allies  to  keep  their 
armies  on  a  war  footing  for  a  suitable  time  after  the  peace. 

1  See  his  instructions  of  March  2nd  to  Caulaincourt :  "Nothing  will 
bring  France  to  do  anything  that  degrades  her  national  character  and  de- 
poses her  from  the  rank  she  has  held  in  the  world  for  centuries."  But  it 
was  precisely  that  rank  which  the  allies  were  resolved  to  assign  to  her, 
neither  more  nor  less.  The  joint  allied  note  of  February  29th  to  the 
negotiators  at  Chatillon  bade  them  "  announce  to  the  French  negotiator 
that  you  are  ready  to  discuss,  in  a  spirit  of  conciliation,  every  modification 
that  he  might  be  authorized  to  propose"  ;  but  that  any  essential  depar- 
ture from  the  terms  already  proposed  by  them  must  lead  to  a  rupture  of 
the  negotiations. 


372  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  war  would  be  over,  and  Schwarzenberg's  army  would 
no  longer  exist.  .  .  .  For  want  of  boats,  I  could  not 
pass  the  Seine  at  the  necessary  points.  It  was  not  50 
boats  that  I  needed,  only  20."  —  With  this  characteristic 
outburst  against  his  War  Minister,  whose  neglect  to  send 
up  twenty  boats  from  Paris  had  changed  the  world's  his- 
tory, the  Emperor  turned  aside  to  overwhelm  Blucher. 
The  Prussian  commander  was  near  the  junction  of  the 
Seine  and  the  Aube ;  and  seemed  to  offer  his  flank  as 
unguardedly  as  three  weeks  before. 

Napoleon  sent  Ney,  Victor,  and  Arrighi  northwards  to 
fall  on  his  rear,  and  on  the  27th  repaired  to  Arcis-sur- 
Aube  to  direct  the  operations.  What,  then,  was  his 
annoyance  when,  in  pursuance  of  the  allied  plan  formed 
on  the  23rd,  Blucher  skilfully  retired  northwards,  with- 
drew beyond  the  Marne  and  broke  the  bridges  behind 
him.  Then,  after  failing  to  drive  Marmont  and  Mortier 
from  Meaux  and  the  line  of  the  Ourcq,  the  Prussian 
leader  marched  towards  Soissons,  near  which  town  he 
expected  to  meet  the  northern  army  of  the  allies.  For 
some  hours  he  was  in  grave  danger :  Marmont  hung  on 
his  rear,  and  Napoleon  with  35,000  hardy  troops  was  pre- 
paring to  turn  his  right  flank.  In  fact,  had  he  not  broken 
the  bridge  over  the  Marne  at  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  and 
thereby  delayed  the  Emperor  thirty-six  hours,  he  would 
probably  have  been  crushed  before  he  could  cross  the 
River  Aisne.  His  men  were  dead  beat  by  marching  night 
and  day  over  roads  first  covered  by  snow  and  now  deep  in 
slush  :  for  a  week  they  had  had  no  regular  rations,  and 
great  was  their  joy  when,  at  the  close  of  the  2nd,  they 
drew  near  to  the  42,000  troops  that  Billow  and  Winzin- 
gerode  mustered  near  the  banks  of  the  Aisne  and  Vesle. 

On  that  day  Napoleon,  when  delayed  at  La  Ferte,  con- 
ceived the  daring  idea  of  rushing  on  the  morrow  after 
Blucher,  who  was  "very  embarrassed  in  the  mire,"  and 
then  of  carrying  the  war  into  Lorraine,  rescuing  the 
garrisons  of  Verdun,  Toul,  and  Metz,  and  rousing  the 
peasantry  of  the  east  of  France  against  the  invaders.  It 
mattered  not  that  Schwarzenberg  had  dealt  Oudinot  and 
Gerard  a  severe  check  at  Bar-sur-Aube,  as  soon  as  Napo- 
leon's back  was  turned.     That  cautious  leader  would  be 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST    ABDICATION  373 

certain,  he  thought,  to  beat  a  retreat  towards  the  Rhine 
as  soon  as  his  rear  was  threatened  ;  and  Napoleon  pictured 
France  rising  as  in  1793,  shaking  off  her  invaders  and 
dictating  a  glorious  peace. 

Far  different  was  the  actual  situation.  Bliicher  was 
not  to  be  caught ;  a  sharp  frost  on  the  3rd  improved  the 
roads  ;  and  his  complete  junction  with  the  northern  army 
was  facilitated  by  the  surrender  of  Soissons  on  that  same 
afternoon.  This  fourth-rate  fortress  was  ill-prepared  to 
withstand  an  attack  ;  and,  after  a  short  bombardment  by 
Winzingerode,  two  allied  officers  made  their  way  to  the 
Governor,  praised  his  bravery,  pointed  out  the  uselessness 
of  further  resistance,  and  offered  to  allow  the  garrison  to 
march  out  with  the  honours  of  war  and  rejoin  the  Em- 
peror, where  they  could  fight  to  more  advantage.  The 
Governor,  who  bore  the  ill-starred  name  of  Moreau,  finally 
gave  way,  and  his  troops,  nearly  all  Poles,  marched  out  at 
4  p.m.,  furious  at  his  "treason"  ;  for  the  distant  thunder 
of  Marmont's  cannon  was  already  heard  on  the  side  of 
Oulchy.  Rumour  said  that  they  were  the  Emperor's 
cannon,  but  rumour  lied.  At  dawn  Napoleon's  troops 
had  begun  to  cross  the  temporary  bridge  over  the  Marne, 
thirty-five  miles  away  ;  but  by  great  exertions  his  out- 
posts on  that  evening  reached  Rocourt,  only  some  twenty 
miles  south  of  Soissons.1 

The  fact  deserves  notice  :  for  it  disposes  of  the  strange 
statement  of  Thiers  that  the  surrender  of  Soissons  was, 
next  to  Waterloo,  the  most  fatal  event  in  the  annals  of 
France.  The  gifted  historian,  as  also,  to  some  extent, 
M.  Houssaye,  assumed  that,  had  Soissons  held  out,  Bliicher 
and  Biilow  could  not  have  united  their  forces.  But 
Biilow  had  not  relied  solely  on  the  bridge  at  Soissons  for 
the  union  of  the  armies  ;  on  the  2nd  he  had  thrown  a 
bridge  over  the  Aisne  at  Vailly,  some  distance  above  that 
city,  and  another  on  the  3rd  near  to  its  eastern  suburb.2 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  two  armies,  numbering  in  all 
over  100,000  men,  could  have  joined  long  before  Napo- 

1  Letters  of  March  2nd,  3rd,  4th,  to  Clarke. 

2  Houssaye,  p.  156,  note.  So  too  Muffling,  "  Aus  meinem  Leben," 
shows  that  Bliicher  could  have  crossed  the  Aisne  there  or  at  Pontavaire 
or  Berry-au-Bac. 


374  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

leon,  Marmont,  and  Mortier  were  in  a  position  to  attack. 
Before  the  Emperor  heard  of  the  surrender,  he  had 
marched  to  Fismes,  and  had  detached  Corbineau  to  oc- 
cupy Rheims,  evidently  with  the  aim  of  cutting  Bliicher's 
communications  with  Schwarzenberg,  and  opening  up  the 
way  to  Verdun  and  Metz. 

For  that  plan  was  now  his  dominant  aim,  while  the  re- 
pulse of  Bliicher  was  chiefly  of  importance  because  it 
would  enable  him  to  stretch  a  hand  eastwards  to  his 
beleaguered  garrisons.1  But  Bliicher  was  not  to  be  thus 
disposed  of.  While  withdrawing  from  Soissons  to  the 
natural  fortress  of  Laon,  he  heard  that  Napoleon  had 
crossed  the  Aisne  at  Berry-au-Bac,  and  was  making  for 
Craonne.  Above  that  town  there  rises  a  long  narrow 
ridge  or  plateau,  which  Bliicher  ordered  his  Russian  corps 
to  occupy.  There  was  fought  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles 
of  the  war  (March  7th).  The  aim  of  the  allies  was  to 
await  the  French  attack  on  the  plateau,  while  10,000 
horsemen  and  sixty  guns  worked  round  and  fell  on  their 
rear.  The  plan  failed,  owing  to  a  mistake  in  the  line  of 
march  of  this  flanking  force  :  and  the  battle  resolved  itself 
into  a  soldiers'  fight.  Five  times  did  Ney  lead  his  braves 
up  those  slopes,  only  to  be  hurled  back  by  the  dogged 
Muscovites.  But  the  Emperor  now  arrived  ;  a  sixth 
attack  by  the  cavalry  and  artillery  of  the  Guard  battered 
in  the  defence  ;  and  Bliicher,  hearing  that  the  flank  move 
had  failed,  ordered  a  retreat  on  Laon.  This  confused  and 
desperate  fight  cost  both  sides  about  7,000  men,  nearly 
a  fourth  of  the  numbers  engaged.  Victor,  Grouchy,  and 
six  French  generals  were  among  the  wounded.2 

Nevertheless,  Napoleon  struggled  on  :  he  called  up 
Marmont  and  Mortier,  gave  out  that  he  was  about  to 
receive  other  large  reinforcements,  and  bade  his  garri- 
sons in  Belgium  and  Lorraine  fall  on  the  rear  of  the  foe. 
One  more  victory,  he  thought,  would  end  the  war,  or  at 
least  lower  the  demands  of  the  allies.  It  was  not  to  be. 
Bliicher  and  Biilow  held  the  strong  natural  citadel  of 
Laon ;  and  all  Napoleon's  efforts  on  March  the  9th  and 
10th  failed  to  storm  the  southern  approaches.     Marmont 


1  See  Napoleon's  letters  to  Clarke  of  March  4th-6th. 

2  Houssaye,  pp.  176-188. 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  375 

fared  no  better  on  the  east;  and  when,  at  nightfall,  the 
weary  French  fell  back,  the  Prussians  resolved  to  try  a 
night  attack  on  Marmont's  corps,  which  was  far  away 
from  the  main  body.  Never  was  a  surprise  more  suc- 
cessful ;  Marmont  was  quite  off  his  guard  ;  horse  and 
foot  fled  in  wild  confusion,  leaving  2,500  prisoners  and 
forty-five  cannon  in  the  hands  of  the  victorious  Yorck. 
Could  the  allies  have  pressed  home  their  advantage,  the 
result  must  have  been  decisive  ;  but  Blucher  had  fallen 
ill,  and  a  halt  was  called.1 

Alone,  among  the  leaders  in  this  campaign,  the  Emperor 
remained  unbroken.  All  the  allied  leaders  had  at  one 
time  or  another  bent  under  his  blows  ;  and  the  French 
Marshals  seemed  doomed,  as  in  1813,  to  fail  wherever 
their  Emperor  was  not.  Ney,  Victor,  and  Mortier  had 
again  evinced  few  of  the  qualities  of  a  commander,  except 
bravery.  Augereau  was  betraying  softness  and  irresolu- 
tion in  the  Lyonnais  in  front  of  a  smaller  Austrian  force. 
Suchet  and  Davoust  were  shut  up  in  Catalonia  and  Ham- 
burg. St.  Cyr  and  Vandamme  were  prisoners.  Soult 
had  kept  a  bold  front  near  Bayonne  :  but  now  news  was 
to  hand  that  Wellington  had  surprised  and  routed  him  at 
Orthez.  On  the  Seine,  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  failed  to 
hold  Troyes  against  the  masses  of  Schwarzenberg.  Of  all 
the  French  Marshals,  Marmont  had  distinguished  himself 
the  most  in  this  campaign,  and  now  at  Laon  he  had  been 
caught  napping.  Yet,  while  all  others  failed,  Napoleon 
seemed  invincible.  Even  after  Marmont's  disaster,  the 
allies  forbore  to  attack  the  chief  ;  and,  just  as  a  lion  that 
has  been  beaten  off  by  a  herd  of  buffaloes  stalks  away, 
mangled  but  full  of  fight  and  unmolested,  so  the  Emperor 
drew  off  in  peace  towards  Soissons.  Thence  he  marched 
on  Rheims,  gained  a  victory  over  a  Russian  division  there, 
and  hoped  to  succour  his  Lorraine  garrisons,  when,  on  the 
17th,  the  news  of  Schwarzenberg's  advance  towards  Paris 
led  him  southwards  once  more. 

1  Muffling  says  that  Blucher  and  Gneisenau  feared  an  attack  by  Berna- 
dotte  on  their  rear.  Napoleon  on  February  25th  advised  Joseph  to  try 
and  gain  over  that  prince,  who  had  some  very  suspicious  relations  with 
the  French  General  Maison  in  Belgium.  Probably  Gneisenau  wished  to 
spare  his  men  for  political  reasons. 


376  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

Yielding  to  the  remonstrances  of  the  Czar,  the  Austrian 
leader  had  purposed  to  march  on  the  French  capital,  if 
everything  went  well ;  but  he  once  more  drew  back  on 
receiving  news  of  Napoleon's  advance  against  his  right 
flank.  While  preparing  to  retire  towards  Brienne,  he 
heard  that  his  great  antagonist  had  crossed  that  river  at 
Plancy  with  less  than  20,000  troops.  To  retrace  his  steps, 
fall  upon  this  handful  of  weary  men  with  100,000,  and 
drive  them  into  the  river,  was  not  a  daring  conception : 
but  so  accustomed  were  the  allies  to  dalliance  and  delay 
that  a  thrill  of  surprise  ran  through  the  host  when  he 
began  to  call  up  its  retiring  columns  for  a  fight.1 

Napoleon  also  was  surprised :  he  believed  the  Grand 
Army  to  be  in  full  retreat,  and  purposed  then  to  dash 
on  Vitry  and  Verdun.2  But  the  allies  gave  him  plenty 
of  time  to  draw  up  Macdonald's  and  Oudinot's  corps, 
while  they  themselves  were  still  so  widely  sundered  as 
at  first  scarcely  to  stay  his  onset.  The  fighting  behind 
Arcis  was  desperate  :  Napoleon  exposed  his  person  freely 
to  snatch  victory  from  the  deepening  masses  in  front. 
At  one  time  a  shell  burst  in  front  of  him,  and  his  staff 
shivered  as  they  saw  his  figure  disappear  in  the  cloud  of 
smoke  and  dust ;  but  he  arose  unhurt,  mounted  another 
charger  and  pressed  on  the  fight.  It  was  in  vain  :  he  was 
compelled  to  draw  back  his  men  to  the  town  (March  20th). 
On  the  morrow  a  bold  attack  by  Schwarzenberg  could  have 
overwhelmed  Napoleon's  30,000  men  ;  but  his  bold  front 
imposed  on  the  Austrian  leader,  while  the  French  were 
drawn  across  the  river,  only  the  rearguard  suffering  heavily 
from  the  belated  attack  of  the  allies.  With  the  loss  of 
4,000  men,  Napoleon  fell  back  northwards  into  the  wasted 
plains  of  Sezanne.     Hope  now  vanished  from  every  breast 

1  Bernhardi's  "Toll,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  697.  Lord  Burghersh  wrote  from 
Troyes  (March  12th)  :  "  I  am  convinced  this  army  will  not  be  risked  in  a 
general  action.  .  .  .  S.  would  almost  wish  to  be  back  upon  the  Rhine." 
So  again  on  the  19th  he  wrote  to  Colonel  Hudson  Lowe  from  Pougy  :  "  I 
cannot  say  much  for  our  activity  ;  I  am  unable  to  explain  the  causes  of 
our  apathy  — the  facts  are  too  evident  to  be  disputed.  We  have  been  ten 
days  at  Troyes,  one  at  Pont-sur-Seine,  two  at  Arcis,  and  are  now  at  this 
place.  We  go  to-morrow  to  Brienne"  ("Unpublished  Mems.  of  Sir 
H.  Lowe").  Stewart  wittily  said  that  Napoleon  came  to  Arcis  to  feel 
Schwarzenberg's  pulse. 

2  Letters  of  March  20th  to  Clarke. 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  377 

but  his.  And  surely  if  human  weakness  had  ever  found  a 
place  in  that  fiery  soul,  it  might  now  have  tempted  him 
to  sue  for  peace.  He  had  flung  himself  first  north,  then 
south,  in  order  to  keep  for  France  the  natural  frontiers 
that  he  might  have  had  as  a  present  last  November ;  he 
had  failed  ;  and  now  he  might  with  honour  accept  the 
terms  of  the  victors.     But  once  more  he  was  too  late. 

The  negotiations  at  Chatillon  had  ended  on  March  19th, 
that  is,  nine  days  later  than  had  been  originally  fixed  by 
the  allies.  The  extension  of  time  was  due  mainly  to  their 
regard  and  pity  for  Caulaincourt ;  and,  indeed,  he  was  in 
the  most  pitiable  position,  a  plenipotentiary  without  full 
powers,  a  Minister  kept  partly  in  the  dark  by  his  sover- 
eign, and  a  patriot  unable  to  rescue  his  beloved  France 
from  the  abyss  towards  which  Napoleon's  infatuation  was 
hurrying  her.  He  knew  the  resolve  of  the  allies  far 
better  than  his  master's  intentions.  It  was  from  Lord 
Aberdeen  that  he  heard  of  the  failure  of  the  parleys  for 
an  armistice  :  from  him  also  he  learnt  that  Napoleon  had 
written  a  "  passionate  "  letter  to  Kaiser  Francis,  and  he 
expressed  satisfaction  that  the  reply  was  firm  and  decided.1 
His  private  intercourse  at  Chatillon  with  the  British  pleni- 
potentiaries was  frank  and  friendly,  as  also  with  Stadion. 
He  received  frequent  letters  from  Metternich,  advising 
him  quickly  to  come  to  terms  with  the  allies ; 2  and  the 
Austrian  Minister  sent  Prince  Esterhazy  to  warn  him  that 
the  allies  would  never  recede  from  their  demand  of  the 
old  frontiers  for  France,  not  even  if  the  fortune  of  war 
drove  them  across  the  Rhine  for  a  time.  "  Is  there,  then, 
no  means  to  enlighten  Napoleon  as  to  his  true  situation, 
or  to  save  him  if  he  persists  in  destroying  himself?  Has 
he  irrevocably  staked  his  own  and  his  son's  fate  on  the 
last  cannon  ?  "  —  Let  Napoleon,  then,  accept  the  allied  pro- 
posal by  sending  a  counter-project,  differing  only  very 
slightly  from  theirs,  and  peace  would  be  made.3  Caulain- 
court needed  no  spur.     "  He  works  tooth  and  nail  for  a 

1  "  Castlereagh  Papers,'1  vol.  ix.,  pp.  325,  332. 

2  These  letters  were  written  in  pairs  —  the  one  being  official,  the  other 
confidential.  Caulaincourt's  replies  show  that  he  appreciated  them  highly 
(see  Fain,  Appendix). 

3  From  Caulaincourt's  letter  of  March  3rd  to  Napoleon ;  Bignon,  vol. 
xiii.,  p.  379. 


378  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

peace,"  wrote  Stewart,  "  as  far  as  depends  on  him.  He 
dreads  Bonaparte's  successes  even  more  than  ours,  lest 
they  should  make  him  more  impracticable."1 

But,  unfortunately,  his  latest  and  most  urgent  appeal  to 
the  Emperor  reached  the  latter  just  after  the  Pyrrhic 
victory  at  Craonne,  which  left  him  more  stubborn  than 
ever.  Far  from  meeting  the  allies  half-way,  he  let  fall 
words  that  bespoke  only  injured  pride  :  "  If  one  must 
receive  lashes,"  he  said  within  hearing  of  the  courier,  "  it 
is  not  for  me  to  offer  my  back  to  them."  On  the  morrow 
he  charged  Maret  to  reply  to  his  distressed  plenipoten- 
tiary that  he  (Napoleon)  knew  best  what  the  situation 
demanded ;  the  demand  of  the  allies  that  France  should 
retire  within  her  old  frontiers  was  only  their  first  word: 
Caulaincourt  must  get  to  know  their  ultimatum  :  if  this 
was  their  ultimatum,  he  must  reject  it.  He  (Napoleon) 
would  possibly  give  up  Dutch  Brabant  and  the  fortresses 
of  Wesel,  Castel  (opposite  Mainz),  and  Kehl,  but  would 
make  no  substantial  changes  on  the  Frankfurt  terms. 
Still,  Caulaincourt  struggled  on.  When  the  session  of 
March  10th  was  closing,  he  produced  a  declaration  offer- 
ing to  give  up  all  Napoleon's  claims  to  control  lands  be- 
yond the  natural  limits. 

The  others  divined  that  it  was  his  own  handiwork, 
drawn  up  in  order  to  spin  out  the  negotiations  and  leave 
his  master  a  few  days  of  grace.2  They  respected  his  in- 
tentions, and  nine  days  of  grace  were  gained  ;  but  the 
only  answer  that  Napoleon  vouchsafed  to  Caulaincourt's 
appeals  was  the  missive  of  March  17th  from  Rheims  :  "  I 
have  received  your  letters  of  the  13th.  I  charge  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  to  answer  them  in  detail.  I  give  you 
directly  the  power  to  make  the  concessions  which  would 
be  indispensable  to  keep  up  the  activity  of  the  negotia- 
tions, and  to  get  to  know  at  last  the  ultimatum  of  the 
allies,  it  being  well  understood  that  the  treaty  would  have 
for  result  the  evacuation  of  our  territory  and  the  release 

1  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  555. 

2  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol.  ix.,  pp.  835,  559.  Caulaincourt's  project 
of  March  15th  much  resembled  that  dictated  by  Napoleon  three  days 
later;  Austria  was  to  have  Venetia  as^  far  «,s  the  Adige,  the  kingdom  of 
Italy  to  go  to  Eugene,  and  the  Duchy 'of  Warsaw  to  the  King  of  Saxony, 
etc.     The  allies  rejected  it  (Fain,  p.  388). 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  379 

of  all  prisoners  on  both  sides."  The  instructions  which 
he  charged  the  Duke  of  Bassano  to  send  to  Caulaincourt 
were  such  as  a  victor  might  have  dictated.  The  allies 
must  evacuate  his  territory  and  give  up  all  the  fortresses 
as  soon  as  the  preliminaries  of  peace  were  signed  :  if  the 
negotiations  were  to  break  off  they  had  better  break  off 
on  this  question.  He  himself  would  cease  to  control  lands 
beyond  the  natural  frontiers,  and  would  recognize  the 
independence  of  Holland  :  as  regards  Belgium,  he  would 
refuse  to  cede  it  to  a  prince  of  the  House  of  Orange,  but 
he  hinted  that  it  might  well  go  to  a  French  prince  as  an 
indemnity  —  evidently  Joseph  Bonaparte  was  meant.  If 
this  concession  were  made,  he  expected  that  all  the  French 
colonies,  including  the  He  de  France,  would  be  restored. 
Nothing  definite  was  said  about  the  Rhine  frontier. 

The  courier  who  carried  these  proposals  from  Rheims  to 
Chatillon  was  twice  detained  by  the  Russians,  and  had 
not  reached  the  town  when  the  Congress  came  to  an  end 
(March  19th).  Their  only  importance,  therefore,  is  to 
show  that,  despite  all  the  warnings  in  which  the  Prague 
negotiations  were  so  fruitful,  Napoleon  clung  to  the  same 
threatening  and  dilatory  tactics  which  had  then  driven 
Austria  into  the  arms  of  his  foes.  He  still  persists  in 
looking  on  the  time  limit  of  the  allies  as  meaningless,  on 
their  ultimatum  as  their  first  word,  from  which  they  will 
soon  shuffle  away  under  the  pressure  of  his  prowess  —  and 
this,  too,  when  Caulaincourt  is  daily  warning  him  that  the 
hours  are  numbered,  that  nothing  will  change  the  resolve 
of  his  foes,  and  that  their  defeats  only  increase  their  exas- 
peration against  him. 

If  anything  could  have  increased  this  exasperation,  it 
was  the  discovery  that  he  was  playing  with  them  all  the 
time.  On  the  20th  the  allied  scouts  brought  to  head- 
quarters a  despatch  written  by  Maret  the  day  before  to 
Caulaincourt  which  contained  this  damning  sentence : 
"  The  Kmperor's  desires  remain  entirely  vague  on  every- 
thing relating  to  the  delivering  up  of  the  strongholds, 
Antwerp,  Mayence,  and  Alessandria,  if  you  should  be 
obliged  to  consent  to  these  cessions,  as  he  has  the  inten- 
tion, even  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  to  take 
counsel  from  the  military  situation  of  affairs.     Wait  for 


380  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  last  moment."1  Peace,  then,  was  to  be  patched  up  for 
Napoleon's  convenience  and  broken  by  him  at  the  first 
seasonable  opportunity.  Is  it  surprising  that  on  that 
same  day  the  Ministers  of  the  Powers  decided  to  have  no 
more  negotiations  with  Napoleon,  and  that  Metternich 
listened  not  unfavourably  to  the  emissary  of  the  Bour- 
bons, the  Count  de  Vitrolles,  whom  he  had  previously 
kept  at  arm's  length? 

In  truth,  Napoleon  was  now  about  to  stake  everything 
on  a  plan  from  which  other  leaders  would  have  recoiled, 
but  which,  in  his  eyes,  promised  a  signal  triumph.  This 
was  to  rally  the  French  garrisons  in  Lorraine  and  throw 
himself  on  Schwarzenberg's  rear.  It  was,  indeed,  his  only 
remaining  chance.  With  his  band  of  barely  40,000  men, 
kept  up  to  that  number  by  the  arrival  of  levies  that  im- 
paired its  solidity,  he  could  scarcely  hope  to  beat  back  the 
dense  masses  now  marshalled  behind  the  Aube,  the  Seine, 
and  the  Marne. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  behind  those  rivers 
the  allies  could  creep  up  within  striking  distance  of  Paris, 
while  from  his  position  north  of  the  Aube  he  could  attack 
them  only  by  crossing  one  or  other  of  those  great  streams, 
the  bridges  of  which  were  in  their  hands.  He  still  held 
the  central  position ;  but  it  was  robbed  of  its  value  if  he 
could  not  attack.  Warfare  for  him  was  little  else  than 
the  art  of  swift  and  decisive  attack  ;  or,  as  he  tersely 
phrased  it,  "  The  art  of  war  is  to  march  twelve  leagues, 
fight  a  battle,  and  march  twelve  more  in  pursuit."  As 
this  was  now  impossible  against  the  fronts  and  flanks  of 
the  allies,  it  only  remained  to  threaten  the  rear  of  the 
army  which  was  most  likely  to  be  intimidated  by  such  a 
manoeuvre.  And  this  was  clearly  the  army  led  by 
Schwarzenberg.     From  Blucher  and  Biilow  naught  but 

1  Fournier,  p.  232,  rebuts,  and  I  think  successfully,  Houssaye's  ob- 
jections (p.  287)  to  its  genuineness.  Besides,  the  letter  is  on  the  same 
moral  level  with  the  instructions  of  January  4th  to  Caulaincourt,  and 
resembles  them  in  many  respects.  No  forger  could  have  known  of  those 
instructions.  At  Elba,  Napoleon  admitted  that  he  was  wrong  in  not 
making  peace  at  this  time.  "  3Iais  je  me  croyais  assez  fort  pour  ne  pas 
la  /aire,  et  je  me  suis  trompe"'''  (Lord  Holland's  "Foreign  Rem.," 
p.  319).  The  same  writer  states  (p.  296)  that  he  saw  the  official  corre- 
spondence about  Chatillon :  it  gave  him  the  highest  opinion  of  Caulain- 
court, but  N.'s  conduct  was  "  full  of  subterfuge  and  artifice." 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  381 

defiance  to  the  death  was  to  be  expected,  and  their  rear 
was  supported  by  the  Dutch  strongholds. 

But  the  Austrians  had  shown  themselves  as  soft  in  their 
strategy  as  in  their  diplomacy.  Everyone  at  the  allied 
headquarters  knew  that  Schwarzenberg  was  unequal  to  the 
load  of  responsibility  thrust  on  him,  that  the  incursion  of 
a  band  of  Alsatian  peasants  on  his  convoys  made  him 
nervous,  and  that  he  would  not  move  on  Paris  as  long  as 
his  "  communications  were  exposed  to  a  movement  by 
Chalons  and  Vitry."1  What  an  effect,  then,  would  be 
produced  on  that  timid  commander  by  an  "  Imperial 
Vendee  "  in  Alsace,  Lorraine,  and  Franche-Comte  ! 

And  such  a  rising  might  then  have  become  fierce  and 
widespread.  The  east  and  centre  were  the  strongholds  of 
French  democracy,  as  they  had  been  the  hotbed  of  feudal 
and  monarchical  abuses ;  and  at  this  very  time  the  Bour- 
bon princes  declared  themselves  at  Nancy  and  Bordeaux. 
The  tactless  Comte  d'Artois  was  at  Nancy,  striving  to 
whip  up  royalist  feeling  in  Lorraine,  and  his  eldest  son, 
the  Due  d'Angouleme,  entered  Bordeaux  with  the  British 
red-coats  (March  12th). 

To  explain  how  this  last  event  was  possible  we  must 
retrace  our  steps.  After  Soult  was  driven  by  Wellington 
from  the  mountains  at  the  back  of  the  town  of  Orthez,  he 
drew  back  his  shattered  troops  over  the  River  Adour,  and 
then  turned  sharply  to  the  east  in  order  to  join  hands  with 
Suchet's  corps.  This  move,  excellent  as  it  was  in  a  mili- 
tary sense,  left  Bordeaux  open  to  the  British  ;  and  Well- 
ington forthwith  sent  Beresford  northwards  with  12,000 
troops  to  occupy  that  great  city.  He  met  with  a  warm 
greeting  from  the  French  royalists,  as  also  did  the  Due 
d'Angouleme,  who  arrived  soon  after.  The  young  prince 
at  once  proclaimed  Louis  XVIII.  King  of  France,  and 
allowed  the  royalist  mayor  to  declare  that  the  allies  were 
advancing  to  Paris  merely  in  order  to  destroy  Napoleon 
and  replace  him  by  the  rightful  monarch.  Strongly  as 
Wellington's  sympathies  ran  with  the  aim  of  this  declara- 
tion, he  emphatically  repudiated  it.  Etiquette  compelled 
him  to  do  so  ;  for  the  allies  were  still  negotiating  with 
Napoleon  ;  and  his  own  tact  warned  him  that  the  Bour- 

1  Castlereagh  to  Clancarty,  March  18th. 


382  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

bons  must  never  come  into  France  under  the  cloak  of  the 
allies. 

The  allied  sovereigns  had  as  yet  done  nothing  to  favour 
their  cause  ;  and  the  wiser  heads  among  the  French  royal- 
ists saw  how  desirable  it  was  that  the  initiative  should 
come  from  France.  The  bad  effects  of  the  Bordeaux 
manifesto  were  soon  seen  in  the  rallying  of  National 
Guards  and  peasants  to  the  tricolour  against  the  hated 
fieur-de-lys  ;  and  Beresford's  men  could  do  little  more  than 
hold  their  own.1  If  that  was  the  case  in  the  monarchical 
south,  what  might  not  Napoleon  hope  to  effect  in  the  east, 
now  that  the  Bourbon  "  chimsera  "  threatened  to  become  a 
fact? 

The  news  as  to  the  state  of  Paris  was  less  satisfactory. 
That  fickle  populace  cheered  royalist  allusions  at  the 
theatres,  hissed  off  an  "  official "  play  that  represented 
Cossack  marauders,2  and  caused  such  alarm  to  Savary  that 
he  wrote  to  warn  his  master  of  the  inability  of  the  police 
to  control  the  public  if  the  war  rolled  on  towards  Paris. 
Whether  Savary's  advice  was  honestly  stupid,  or  whether, 
as  Lavalette  hints,  Talleyrand's  intrigues  were  undermin- 
ing his  loyalty  to  Napoleon,  it  is  difficult  to  say.  But  cer- 
tainly the  advice  gave  Napoleon  an  additional  reason  for 
flinging  himself  on  Schwarzenberg's  rear  and  drawing  him 
back  into  Lorraine.  He  had  reason  to  hope  that  Auge- 
reau,  reinforced  by  some  of  Suchet's  troops,  would  march 
towards  Dijon  and  threaten  the  Austrians  on  the  south, 
while  he  himself  pressed  on  them  from  the  north-east.  In 
that  case,  would  not  Austria  make  peace,  and  leave  Alex- 
ander and  Bliicher  at  his  mercy?  And  might  he  not  hope 
to  cut  off  the  Comte  d'Artois,  and  possibly  also  catch 
Bernadotte,  who  had  been  angling  unsuccessfully  for 
popular  support  in  the  north-east? 

But,  while  basing  all  his  hopes  on  the  devotion  of  the 
French  peasantry  and  the  pacific  leanings  of  Austria, 
the  French  Emperor  left  out  of  count  the  eager  hatred  of 
the  Czar  and  the  Prussians.  "  Bliicher  would  be  mad  if 
he  attempted  any  serious  movement,"  so  Napoleon  wrote 

1  Napier,  bk.  xxiv.,  ch.  iii.  Wellington  seems  to  have  thought  that  the 
allies  would  probably  make  peace  with  Napoleon. 

2  Broglie,  "Mems.,"  bk.  iii.,  ch.  i. 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST  ABDICATION  383 

to  Berthier  on  the  20th,  apparently  on  the  strength  of  his 
former  suggestion  that  Joseph  should  persuade  Bernadotte 
to  desert  the  allies  and  attack  Bliicher's  rear.1  At  least, 
it  is  difficult  to  find  any  other  reason  for  Napoleon's  strange 
belief  that  Blucher  would  sit  still  while  his  allies  were  being 
beaten ;  unless,  indeed,  we  accept  Marmont's  explanation 
that  Napoleon's  brain  now  rejected  all  unpleasing  news 
and  registered  wishes  as  facts. 

Fortune  seemed  to  smile  on  his  enterprise.  Though  he 
failed  to  take  Vitry  from  the  allied  garrison,  yet  near  St. 
Dizier  he  fell  on  a  Prussian  convoy,  captured  800  men  and 
400  wagons  filled  with  stores.  Everywhere  he  ordered  the 
tocsin  to  proclaim  a  levee  en  masse,  and  sent  messengers  to 
warn  his  Lorraine  garrisons  to  cut  their  way  to  his  side. 
His  light  troops  spread  up  the  valley  of  the  Marne  towards 
Chaumont,  capturing  stores  and  couriers  ;  and  he  seized 
this  opportunity,  when  he  pictured  the  Austrians  as  thor- 
oughly demoralized,  to  send  Caulaincourt  from  Doulevant 
with  offers  to  renew  the  negotiations  for  peace  (March 
25th).2      But  while  Napoleon  awaits  the  result  of  these 

1  Letter  of  February  25th  to  Joseph.  Thi6bault  gives  us  an  odd  story 
that  Bernadotte  sent  an  agent,  Rainville,  to  persuade  Davoust  to  join  him 
in  attacking  the  rear  of  the  allies  ;  but  that  Rainville's  nerve  so  .forsook 
him  in  Davoust's  presence  that  he  turned  and  bolted  for  his  life  ! 

2  Caulaincourt  to  Metternich  on  March  25th  :  "  Arrived  only  this  [last] 
night  near  the  Emperor,  His  Majesty  has  .  .  .  given  me  all  the  powers 
necessary  to  sign  peace  with  the  Ministers  of  the  allied  Courts  "  (Fain, 
p.  345  ;  Ernouf,  "  Vie  de  Maret,"  p.  634). 

Thiers  does  not  mention  these  overtures  of  Napoleon,  which  are  surely 
most  characteristic.  His  whole  eastward  move  was  motived  by  them. 
Efforts  have  been  made  {e.g.,  by  M.  de  Bacourt  in  Talleyrand's  "  Mems.," 
pt.  vii.,  app.  4)  to  prove  that  on  the  25th  Napoleon  was  ready  to  agree  to 
all  the  allied  terms,  and  thus  concede  more  than  was  done  by  Louis  XVIII. 
But  there  is  no  proof  that  he  meant  to  do  anything  of  the  sort.  The  terms 
of  Caulaincourt's  note  were  perfectly  vague.  Moreover,  even  on  the  28th, 
when  Napoleon  was  getting  alarmed,  he  had  an  interview  with  a  captured 
Austrian  diplomatist,  Wessenberg,  whom  he  set  free  in  order  that  he  might 
confer  with  the  Emperor  Francis.  He  told  the  envoy  that  France  would 
yet  give  him  support :  he  wanted  the  natural  frontiers,  but  would  probably 
make  peace  on  less  favourable  terms,  as  he  wished  to  end  the  war :  "  I  am 
ready  to  renounce  all  the  French  colonies  if  I  can  thereby  keep  the  mouth 
of  the  Scheldt  for  France.  England  will  not  insist  on  my  sacrificing  Ant- 
werp if  Austria  does  not  support  her  "  (Arneth's  "  Wessenberg,"  vol.  i., 
p.  188).  This  extract  shows  no  great  desire  to  meet  the  allied  terms,  but 
rather  to  separate  Austria  from  her  allies.  According  to  Lady  Burghersh 
("Journals,"  p.  216),  Napoleon  admitted  to  Wessenberg  that  his  position 
was  desperate.     I  think  this  was  a  pleasing  fiction  of  that  envoy.     There 


384  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

proposals,  his  rear  is  attacked :  he  retraces  his  steps,  falls 
on  the  assailants,  and  finds  that  they  belong  to  Blucher. 
But  how  can  Prussians  be  there  in  force?  Is  not  Blucher 
resting  on  the  banks  of  the  Aisne  ?  And  where  is  Schwar- 
zenberg?  The  Emperor  pushes  a  force  on  to  Vitry  to 
solve  this  riddle,  and  there  the  horrible  truth  unfolds 
itself  little  by  little  that  he  stands  on  the  brink  of  ruin. 

It  is  a  story  instinct  with  an  irony  like  that  of  the 
infatuation  of  King  CEdipus  in  the  pages  of  Sophocles. 
Every  step  that  the  warrior  has  taken  to  snatch  at  vic- 
tory increases  the  completeness  of  the  disaster.  The 
Emperor  Francis,  scared  by  the  approach  of  the  French 
horsemen,  and  not  wishing  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  his 
son-in-law,  has  withdrawn  with  Metternich  to  Dijon. 
Napoleon's  letter  to  him  is  lost.1  Metternich,  well 
guarded  by  Castlereagh,  is  powerless  to  meet  Caulain- 
court's  offer,  and  their  flight  leaves  Schwarzenberg  under 
the  influence  of  the  Czar.2  Moreover,  Blucher  has  not 
been  idle.  While  Napoleon  is  hurrying  eastwards  to 
Vitry,  the  Prussian  leader  drives  back  Marmont's  weak 
corps,  his  vanguard  crosses  the  Marne  near  Epernay  on 
the  23rd,  his  Cossacks  capture  a  courier  bearing  a  letter 
written  on  that  day  by  Napoleon  to  Marie  Louise.  It 
ends  thus  :  "  I  have  decided  to  march  towards  the  Marne, 
in  order  to  push  the  enemy's  army  further  from  Paris, 
and  to  draw  near  to  my  fortresses.  I  shall  be  this  even- 
ing at  St.  Dizier.  Adieu,  my  friend !  Embrace  my 
son."  Warned  by  this  letter  of  Napoleon's  plan,  Blucher 
pushes  on  ;  his  outposts  on  the  morrow  join  hands  with 
those  of  Schwarzenberg,  and  send  a  thrill  of  vigour  into 
the  larger  force. 

That  leader,  held  at  bay  by  Macdonald's  rearguard, 
was  groping  after  Napoleon,  when  the  capture  of  a  French 
despatch,  and  the  news  forwarded  by  Blucher,  informed 
him  of  the  French  Emperor's  eastward  march.  A  council 
of  war  was  therefore  held  at  Pougy  on  the  afternoon  of 

is  no  proof  that  Napoleon  was  wholly  cast  down  till  the  29th,  when  he 
heard  of  La  Fere-Champenoise  (Macdonald's  "Souvenirs"). 

1  Bignon,  vol.  xiii.,  pp.  436,  437. 

2  On  hearing  of  their  withdrawal  Stein  was  radiant  with  joy  :  "  Now," 
he  said,  "  the  Czar  will  go  on  to  Paris,  and  all  will  soon  be  at  an  end  " 
(Tourgueneff,  quoted  by  Ilausscr.  vol.  iv.,  p.  553). 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  385 

the  23rd,  when  the  Czar  and  the  bolder  spirits  led  Schwar- 
zenberg  to  give  up  his  communications  with  Switzerland, 
and  stake  everything  on  joining  Bliicher,  and  following 
Napoleon's  40,000  with  an  array  of  180,000  men.  But 
the  capture  of  another  French  despatch  a  few  hours  later 
altered  the  course  of  events  once  more.  This  time  it  was 
a  budget  of  official  news  from  Paris  to  Napoleon,  describ- 
ing the  exhaustion  of  the  finances,  the  discontent  of  the 
populace,  and  the  sensation  caused  by  Wellington's  suc- 
cesses and  the  capture  of  Bordeaux.  These  glad  tidings 
inspired  Alexander  with' a  far  more  incisive  plan  —  to 
march  on  Paris.  This  suggestion  had  been  pressed  on  him 
on  the  17th  by  Baron  de  Vitrolles,  a  French  royalist  agent, 
at  the  close  of  a  long  interview ;  and  now  its  advantages 
were  obvious.  Accordingly,  at  Sommepuis,  on  the  24th, 
he  convoked  his  generals,  Barclay,  Volkonski,  Toll,  and 
Diebitsch,  to  seek  their  advice.  Barclay  was  for  follow- 
ing Napoleon,  but  the  two  last  voted  for  the  advance  to 
Paris,  Toll  maintaining  that  only  10,000  horsemen  need 
be  left  behind  to  screen  their  movements.  The  Czar 
signified  his  warm  approval  of  this  plan  ;  a  little  later  the 
King  of  Prussia  gave  his  assent,  and  Schwarzenberg 
rather  doubtfully  deferred  to  their  wishes.  Thus  the 
result  of  Napoleon's  incursion  on  the  rear  of  the  allies 
signally  belied  his  expectations.  Instead  of  compelling 
the  enemy  to  beat  a  retreat  on  the  Rhine,  it  left  the  road 
open  to  his  capital.1 

At  dawn  on  the  25th,  then,'  the  allied.  Grand  Army 
turned  to  the  right-about,  while  Blucher's  men  marched 
joyfully  on  the  parallel  road  from  Chalons.  Near  La 
Fere-Champenoise,  on  that  day,  a  cloud  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  horse  harassed  Marmont's  and  Mortier's  corps, 
and  took  2,500  prisoners  and  fifty  cannon.     Further  to 

1  Bernhardi's  "Toll,"  vol.  iv.,  pp.  737  et  seq. ;  Houssaye,  pp.  354-302; 
also  Nesselrode's  communication  published  in  Talleyrand's  "  Mems." 
Thielen  and  Radetzky  have  claimed  that  the  initiative  in  this  matter  was 
Schwarzenberg's  ;  and  Lord  Burghersh,  in  his  despatch  of  March  26th 
("Austria,"  No.  110),  agrees  with  them.  Stein  supports  Toll's  claim. 
I  cannot  agree  with  Houssaye  (p.  407)  that  "Napoleon  had  resigned  him- 
self to  the  sacrifice  of  Paris."  His  intercepted  letter,  and  also  the  official 
letters,  Nos.  21508,  21513,  21516,  21526,  21538,  show  that  he  believed  the 
allies  would  retreat  and  that  his  communications  with  Paris  would  be 
safe. 

VOL.  II  —  2c 


386  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  north,  Blucher's  Cossacks  swooped  on  a  division  of 
4,500  men,  mostly  National  Guards,  that  guarded  a  large 
convoy.  Stoutly  the  French  formed  in  squares,  and  beat 
them  off  again  and  again.  Thereupon  Colonel  Hudson 
Lowe  rode  away  southwards,  to  beg  reinforcements  from 
Wrede's  Bavarians. 

They,  too,  failed  to  break  that  indomitable  infantry. 
The  180  wagons  had  to  be  left  behind  ;  but  the  recruits 
plodded  on,  and  seemed  likely  to  break  through  to  Mar- 
mont,  when  the  Czar  came  on  the  scene.  At  once  he 
ordered  up  artillery,  riddled  their  ranks  with  grapeshot, 
and  when  their  commander,  Pacthod,  still  refused  to 
surrender,  threatened  to  overwhelm  their  battered  squares 
by  the  cavalry  of  his  Guard.  Pacthod  thereupon  ordered 
his  square  to  surrender.  Another  band  also  grounded 
arms  ;  but  the  men  in  the  last  square  fought  on,  reckless 
of  life,  and  were  beaten  down  by  a  whirlwind  of  sabring, 
stabbing  horsemen,  whose  fury  the  generous  Czar  vainly 
strove  to  curb.  "  I  blushed  for  my  very  nature  as  a 
man,"  wrote  Colonel  Lowe,  "  at  witnessing  this  scene  of 
carnage."  The  day  was  glorious  for  France,  but  it  cost 
her,  in  all,  more  than  5,000  killed  and  wounded,  4,000 
prisoners,  and  80  cannon,  besides  the  provisions  and 
stores  designed  for  Napoleon's  army.1  Nothing  but  the 
wreck  of  Marmont's  and  Mortier's  corps,  about  12,000 
men  in  all,  now  barred  the  road  to  Paris.  Meeting  with 
no  serious  resistance,  the  allies  crossed  the  Marne  at 
Meaux,  and  on  the  29th  reached  Bondy,  within  striking 
distance  of  the  French  capital. 

In  that  city  the  people  were  a  prey,  first  to  sheer  in- 
credulity, then  to  the  wildest  dismay.  To  them  history 
was  but  a  melodrama  and  war  a  romance.  Never  since 
the  time  of  Jeanne  d'Arc  had  a  foreign  enemy  come  within 
sight  of  their  spires.  For  ramparts  they  had  octroi  walls, 
and  in  place  of  the  death-dealing  defiance  of  1792  they 
now  showed   only   the  spasmodic  vehemence  or  ironical 

1  I  take  this  account  largely  from  Sir   Hudson  Lowe's  unpublished 

memoirs.     Napoleon  blamed   Marmont  for  not  marching  to  Rheims  as 

■  wis  mill  red  to  do.     At  Elba,  Napoleon  told  Colonel  Campbell  that 

i  urn  mi's   disobedience  spoilt  the  eastern  movement,   and  ruined  the 

c '  nna'.gn.     lint  had  Marmont  and  Mortier  joined  Napoleon  at  Vitry, 

I       -   \  iii'd  ' 'live  been  absolutely  open  to  the  allies. 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  387 

resignation  of  an  over-cultivated  stock.  As  M.  Charles 
de  Re'musat  finely  remarks  on  their  varying  moods,  "  The 
despotism  which  makes  a  constant  show  of  prosperity 
gives  men  little  fortitude  to  meet  adversity."  Doubtless 
the  royalists,  with  Talleyrand  as  their  factotum,  worked 
to  paralyze  the  defence  ;  but  they  formed  a  small  minor- 
ity, and  the  masses  would  have  fought  for  Napoleon  had 
he  been  present  to  direct  everything.  But  he  was  far 
away,  rushing  back  through  Champagne  to  retrieve  his 
blunder,  and  in  his  place  they  had  Joseph.  The  ex-King 
of  Spain  was  not  the  man  for  the  hour.  He  was  no 
hero  to  breathe  defiance  into  a  bewildered  crowd,  nor  was 
he  well  seconded.  Clarke,  and  Moncey,  the  commander 
of  the  12,000  National  Guards,  had  not  armed  one-half  of 
that  doubtful  militia.  Marmont  and  Mortier  were  at 
hand,  and,  with  the  garrison  and  National  Guards,  mus- 
tered some  42,000  men. 

But  what  were  these  against  the  trained  host  of  more 
than  100,000  men  now  marching  against  the  feeble  bar- 
riers on  the  north  and  east  ?  Moreover,  Joseph  and  the 
Council  of  Regency  had  dispirited  the  defenders  by  caus- 
ing the  Empress  Regent  and  the  infant  King  of  Rome  to 
leave  the  capital  along  with  the  treasure.  In  Joseph's 
defence  it  should  be  said  that  Napoleon  had  twice  warned 
him  to  transfer  the  seat  of  Government  to  the  south  of 
the  Loire  if  the  allies  neared  Paris,  and  in  no  case  to 
allow  the  Empress  and  the  King  of  Rome  to  be  captured. 
"  Do  not  leave  the  side  of  my  son  :  I  had  rather  know 
that  he  was  in  the  Seine  than  in  the  hands  of  the  enemies 
of  France."  The  Emperor's  views  as  to  the  effect  of  the 
capture  of  Paris  were  also  well  known.  In  January  he 
remarked  to  Mollien,  the  Minister  of  the  Treasure,  "  My 
dear  fellow,  if  the  enemy  reaches  the  gates  of  Paris,  the 
Empire  is  no  more."  * 

Oppressed  by  these  gloomy  omens,  the  defenders  awaited 
the  onset  of  the  allies  at  Montreuil,  Romainville,  Pantin, 
and  on  the  northern  plain  (March  30th).    At  some  points 

1  Houssaye,  pp.  485  et  seq.  ;  Napoleon's  letters  of  February  8th  and 
March  16th  ;  Mollien,  vol.  iv.,  p.  128.  In  Napoleon's  letter  of  April  2ml 
to  Joseph  ("New  Letters")  there  is  not  a  word  of  reproach  to  Joseph 
for  leaving  Paris. 


388  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

French  valour  held  up  successfully  against  the  dense 
masses  ;  but  in  the  afternoon  Marmont,  seeing  his  thin 
lines  overlapped,  and  in  imminent  danger  of  being  cut 
off  at  Belleville,  sent  out  a  request  for  a  truce,  as  Joseph 
had  empowered  him  to  do  if  affairs  proved  to  be  irre- 
trievable. At  all  points  resistance  was  hopeless ;  Mortier 
was  hard  pressed  on  the  northeast ;  at  the  Clichy  gate 
Moncey  and  his  National  Guards  fought  only  for  honour ; 
and  so,  after  a  whole  day  of  sanguinary  conflicts,  the 
great  city  surrendered  on  honourable  terms.     . 

And  thus  ended  the  great  impulse  which  had  gone  forth 
from  Paris  since  1789,  which  had  flooded  the  plains  of 
Germany,  the  plateaux  of  Spain,  the  cities  of  Italy,  and 
the  steppes  of  Russia,  levelling  the  barriers  of  castes  and 
creeds,  and  binding  men  in  a  new  and  solid  unity.  The 
reaction  against  that  great  centrifugal  and  international 
movement  had  now  become  centripetal  and  profoundly 
national.  Thanks  to  Napoleon's  statecraft,  the  peoples  of 
Europe  from  the  Volga  to  the  Tagus  were  now  embattled 
in  a  mighty  phalanx,  and  were  about  to  enter  in  triumph 
the  city  that  only  twenty-five  years  before  had  heralded 
the  dawn  of  their  nascent  liberties. 

And  what  of  Napoleon,  in  part  the  product  and  in  part 
the  cause,  of  this  strange  reaction  ?  By  a  strange 
Nemesis,  his  military  genius  and  his  overweening  con- 
tempt of  Schwarzenberg  drew  him  aside  at  the  very  time 
when  the  allies  could  strike  with  deadly  effect  at  the 
heart  of  his  centralized  despotism.  On  the  29th  he  hears 
of  disaffection  at  Paris,  of  the  disaster  at  La  Fere- 
Champenoise,  and  of  the  loss  of  Lyons  by  Augereau.  He 
at  once  sees  the  enormity  of  his  blunder.  His  weary 
Guards  and  he  seek  to  annihilate  space.  They  press  on 
by  the  unguarded  road  by  way  of  Troyes  and  Fontaine- 
bleau,  thereby  cutting  off  all  chance  of  the  Emperor 
Francis  and  Metternich  sending  messages  from  Dijon  to 
Paris.  By  incredible  exertions  the  men  cover  seventeen 
leagues  on  the  29th  and  reach  Troyes. 

Napoleon,  accompanied  by  Caulaincourt,  Drouot, 
Flahaut,  and  Lefebvre,  rushes  on,  wearing  out  horses  at 
every  stage :  at  Fontainebleau  on  the  30th  he  hears  that 
his  consort  has  left  Paris ;  at  Essonne,  that  the  battle  is 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  389 

raging.  Late  at  night,  near  Athis,  he  meets  a  troop  of 
horse  under  General  Belliard  :  eagerly  he  questions  this 
brave  officer,  and  learns  that  Joseph  has  left  Paris,  and 
that  the  battle  is  over.  "  Forward  then  to  Paris  :  every- 
where where  I  am  not  they  act  stupidly."  —  "But,  sire," 
says  the  general,  "it  is  too  late :  Paris  has  capitulated." 

The  indomitable  will  is  not  yet  broken.  He  must  go 
on ;  he  will  sound  the  tocsin,  rouse  the  populace,  tear  up 
the  capitulation,  and  beat  the  insolent  enemy.  The  sight 
of  Mortier's  troops,  a  little  further  on,  at  last  burns  the 
truth  into  his  brain  :  he  sends  on  Caulaincourt  with  full 
powers  to  treat  for  peace,  and  then  sits  up  for  the  rest  of 
the  night,  poring  over  his  maps  and  measuring  the  devo- 
tion of  his  Guard  against  the  inexorable  bounds  of  time 
and  space.  He  is  within  ten  miles  of  Paris,  and  sees  the 
glare  of  the  enemy's  watch-fires  all  over  the  northern  sky. 

On  the  morrow  he  hears  that  the  allied  sovereigns  are 
about  to  enter  Paris,  and  Marmont  warns  him  by  letter 
that  public  opinion  has  much  changed  since  the  with- 
drawal, first  of  the  Empress,  and  then  of  Joseph,  Louis, 
and  Jerome.  This  was  true.  The  people  were  disgusted 
by  their  flight ;  Blucher  now  had  eighty  cannon  planted 
on  the  heights  of  Montmartre ;  and  men  knew  that  he 
would  not  spare  Paris  if  she  hazarded  a  further  effort. 
And  thus,  when,  on  that  same  morning,  the  Czar,  with 
the  King  of  Prussia  on  his  right,  and  Schwarzenberg  on 
his  left,  rode  into  Paris  at  the  head  of  the  Russian  and 
Prussian  Guards,  they  met  with  nothing  worse  than  sullen 
looks  on  the  part  of  the  masses,  while  knots  of  enthusias- 
tic royalists  shouted  wildly  for  the  Bourbons,  and  women 
flung  themselves  to  kiss  the  boots  of  the  liberating  Em- 
peror. The  Bourbon  party,  however,  was  certainly  in  the 
minority ;  but  at  places  along  the  route  their  demonstra- 
tions were  effective  enough  to  influence  an  impressionable 
populace,  and  to  delight  the  conquerors.  — "  The  white 
cockade  appeared  very  universally  :  "  —  wrote  Stewart 
with  suspicious  emphasis  —  "  many  of  the  National  Guards, 
whom  I  saw,  wore  them."1 

Fearing  that  the    Elysee  Palace  had  been   mined,  the 
Czar  installed  himself  at  Talleyrand's  mansion,  opposite 

1  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  420 ;  Pasquier,  vol.  iii.,  ch.  xiii. 


390  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

the  Place  de  la  Concorde  ;  and  forthwith  there  took  place 
a  most  important  private  council.  The  two  monarchs 
were  present,  along  with  Nesselrode  and  Napoleon's 
Corsican  enemy,  Pozzo  di  Borgo.  Princes  Schwarzenberg 
and  Lichtenstein  represented  Austria;  while  Talleyrand 
and  Dalberg  were  there  to  plead  for  the  House  of  Bour- 
bon :  De  Pradt  and  Baron  Louis  were  afterwards  sum- 
moned. The  Czar  opened  the  deliberations  by  declaring 
that  there  were  three  courses  open,  to  make  peace  with 
Napoleon,  to  accept  Marie  Louise  as  Regent  for  her  son, 
or  to  recall  the  Bourbons.1  The  first  he  declared  to  be 
impossible ;  the  second  was  beset  by  the  gravest  difficul- 
ties; and,  while  stating  the  objections  to  the  Bourbons, 
he  let  it  be  seen  that  he  now  favoured  this  solution,  pro- 
vided that  it  really  was  the  will  of  France.  He  then 
called  on  Talleyrand  to  speak ;  and  that  pleader  set  forth 
the  case  of  the  Bourbons  with  his  usual  skill.  The 
French  army,  he  said,  was  more  devoted  to  its  own  glory 
than  to  Napoleon.  France  longed  for  peace,  and  she  could 
only  find  it  with  due  sureties  under  her  old  d}^nasty.  If 
the  populace  had  not  as  yet  declared  for  the  Bourbons, 
who  could  wonder  at  that,  when  the  allies  persisted  in 
negotiating  with  Napoleon?  But  let  them  declare  that 
they  will  no  more  treat  with  him,  and  France  would  at 
once  show  her  real  desires.  For  himself,  he  would  answer 
for  the  Senate.  The  Czar  was  satisfied;  Frederick 
William  assented  ;  the  Austrian  princes  said  not  a  word 
on  behalf  of  the  claims  of  Marie  Louise ;  and  the  cause  of 
the  House  of  Bourbon  easily  triumphed.2 

On  the  morrow  appeared  in  the  "  Journal  des  Debats  " 
a  decisive  proclamation,  signed  by  Alexander  on  behalf  of 

1  We  do  not  know  definitely  why  Alexander  dropped  Bernadotte  so 
suddenly.  On  March  17th  he  had  assured  the  royalist  agent,  Baron  de 
Vitrolles,  that  he  would  not  hear  of  the  Bourbons,  and  that  he  had  first 
thought  of  establishing  Bernadotte  in  France,  and  then  Eugene.  We  do 
know,  however,  that  Bernadotte  had  made  suspicious  overtures  to  the 
French  General  Maison  in  Belgium  ("Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol.  ix.,  pp. 
383,  445,  512). 

2De  Pradt,  "  Restauration  de  la  Royaute\  le  31  Mars,  1814";  Pas- 
quier,  vol.  iii.,  ch.  xiii.  Vitrolles  ("Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  95-101)  says 
that  Metternich  assured  him  on  March  15th  that  Austria  would  not  insist 
on  the  Regency  of  Marie  Louise,  but  would  listen  to  the  wishes  of 
France. 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  391 

all  the  allied  Powers;  but  we  must  be  permitted  to  doubt 
whether  the  Emperor  Francis,  if  present,  would  have 
allowed  it  to  appear,  especially  if  his  daughter  were  pres- 
ent in  Paris  as  Regent.  The  proclamation  set  forth  that 
the  allies  would  never  again  treat  with  "  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte "  or  any  member  of  his  family  ;  that  they  would 
respect  the  integrity  of  France  as  it  existed  under  its  law- 
ful kings,  and  would  recognize  and  guarantee  the  consti- 
tution which  the  French  nation  should  adopt. 

Accordingly,  they  invited  the  Senate  at  once  to  appoint 
a  Provisional  Government.  Talleyrand,  as  Grand  Elector 
of  the  Empire,  had  the  power  to  summon  that  guardian  of 
the  commonwealth,  whose  vote  would  clearly  be  far  more 
expeditious  than  the  plebiscite  on  which  Alexander  had 
previously  set  his  heart.  Of  the  140  Senators  only  64 
assembled,  but  over  them  Talleyrand's  influence  was 
supreme.  He  spake,  and  they  silently  registered  his 
suggestions.  Thus  it  was  that  the  august  body,  taught 
by  ten  years  of  despotism  to  bend  gracefully  before  every 
breeze,  fulfilled  its  last  function  in  the  Napoleonic  regime 
by  overthrowing  the  very  constitution  which  it  had  been 
expressly  charged  to  uphold.  The  date  was  the  1st  of 
April.  Talleyrand,  Dalberg,  Beurnonville,  Jaucourt,  and 
l'Abbe  de  Montesquiou  at  once  formed  a  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment ;  but  the  soul  of  it  was  Talleyrand.  The  Czar 
gave  the  word,  and  Talleyrand  acted  as  scene-shifter. 
The  last  tableau  of  this  constitutional  farce  was  reached 
on  the  following  day,  when  the  Senate  and  the  Corps 
Legislatif  declared  that  Napoleon  had  ceased  to  reign. 

Such  was  the  ex-bishop's  revenge  for  insults  borne  for 
many  a  year  with  courtly  tact,  but  none  the  less  bitterly 
felt.  Napoleon  and  he  had  come  to  regard  each  other 
with  instinctive  antipathy  ;  but  while  the  diplomatist  hid 
his  hatred  under  the  cloak  of  irony,  the  soldier  blurted 
forth  his  suspicions.  Before  leaving  Paris,  the  Emperor 
had  wound  up  his  last  Council-meeting  by  a  diatribe 
against  enemies  left  in  the  citadel;  and  his  words  be- 
came all  the  hotter  when  he  saw  that  Talleyrand,  who  \v;is 
then  quietly  conversing  with  Joseph  in  a  corner,  took  no 
notice  of  the  outburst.  From  Champagne  he  sent  off  an 
order  to  Savary  to  arrest  the  ex-Minister,  but  that  function- 


392  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

ary  took  upon  himself  to  disregard  the  order.  Probably 
there  was  some  understanding  between  them.  And  thus, 
after  steering  past  many  a  rock,  the  patient  schemer  at  last 
helped  Europe  to  shipwreck  that  mighty  adventurer  when 
but  a  league  or  two  from  port. 

But  all  was  not  over  yet.  Napoleon  had  fallen  back»on 
Fontainebleau,  in  front  of  which  town  he  was  assembling 
a  force  of  nearly  60,000  men.  Marie  Louise,-  with  the 
Ministers,  was  at  Blois,  and  desired  to  make  her  way  to 
the  side  of  her  consort.  Had  she  done  so,  and  had  her 
father  been  present  at  Paris,  a  very  interesting  and  deli- 
cate situation  would  have  been  the  result ;  and  we  may 
fancy  that  it  would  have  needed  all  Metternich's  finesse 
and  Castlereagh's  common  sense  to  keep  the  three  mon- 
archs  united.  But  Francis  was  still  at  Dijon  ;  and  Met- 
ternich  and  Castlereagh  did  not  reach  Paris  until  April 
10th ;  so  that  everything  in  these  important  days  was 
decided  by  the  Czar  and  Talleyrand,  both  of  them  irrec- 
oncilable foes  of  Napoleon.  It  was  in  vain  that  Caulain- 
court  (April  1st)  begged  the  Czar  to  grant  peace  to 
Napoleon  on  the  basis  of  the  old  frontiers.  "  Peace  with 
him  would  only  be  a  truce,"  was  the  reply. 

The  victor  did  not  repulse  the  idea  of  a  Regency  so 
absolutely,  and  the  faithful  Minister  at  once  hurried  to 
Fontainebleau  to  persuade  his  master  to  abdicate  in  favour 
of  his  son.  Napoleon  repulsed  the  offer  with  disdain  : 
rather  than  that,  he  would  once  more  try  the  hazards  of 
war.  He  knew  that  the  Old  and  the  Young  Guard,  still 
nearly  9,000  strong  in  all,  burned  to  revenge  the  insult  to 
French  pride ;  and  at  the  close  of  a  review  held  on  the 
3rd  in  the  great  court  of  the  palace,  the}r  shouted,  "To 
Paris  !  "  and  swore  to  bury  themselves  under  its  ruins. 
It  needed  not  the  acclaim  of  his  veterans  to  prompt  him 
to  the  like  resolve.  When,  on  April  1st,  he  received  a 
Verbal  Note  from  Alexander,  stating  that  the  allies  would 
no  longer  treat  with  him,  except  on  his  private  and  family 
concerns,  he  exclaimed  to  Marmont,  at  the  line  of  the 
Essonne,  that  he  must  fight,  for  it  was  a  necessity  of  his 
position.  He  also  proposed  to  that  Marshal  to  cross  the 
Seine  and  attack  the  allies,  forgetting  that  the  Marne,  with 
its  bridges  held  by  them,  was  in  the  way.     Marmont,  en- 


xxxvii  THE   FIRST   ABDICATION  393 

dowed  with  a  keen  and  sardonic  intelligence,  had  already 
seen  that  his  master  was  more  and  more  the  victim  of 
illusions,  never  crediting  the  existence  of  difficulties  that 
he  did  not  actually  witness.  And  when,  on  the  3rd,  or 
perhaps  earlier,  offers  came  from  the  royalists,  the  Mar- 
shal promised  to  help  them  in  the  way  that  will  shortly 
appear. 

Napoleon's  last  overtures  to  the  Czar  came  late  on  the 
following  day.  On  that  morning  he  had  a  long  and  heated 
discussion  with  Berthier,  Ney,  Oudinot,  and  Lefebvre. 
Caulaincourt  and  Maret  were  present  as  peacemakers. 
The  Marshals  upbraided  Napoleon  with  the  folly  of 
marching  on  Paris.  Angered  by  their  words  Napoleon 
at  last  said  :  "The  army  will  obey  me."  "No,"  retorted 
Ney,  "it  will  obey  its  commanders." 

Macdonald,  who  had  just  arrived  with  Ms  weary  corps, 
took  up  their  case  with  his  usual  frankness.  "  Our  horses," 
he  said,  "  can  go  no  further  :  we  have  not  enough  ammu- 
nition for  one  skirmish,  and  no  means  of  procuring  more. 
If  we  fail,  as  we  probably  shall,  the  whole  of  France  will 
be  destroyed.  We  can  still  impose  on  the  enemy  :  let  us 
retain  our  attitude.  .  .  .  We  have  had  enough  of  war 
without  kindling  civil  war."  Finally  the  Emperor  gave 
way,  and  drew  up  a  declaration  couched  in  these  terms  : 
"  The  allied  Powers  having  proclaimed  that  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  was  the  sole  obstacle  to  the  re-establishment  of 
peace  in  Europe,  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  faithful  to  his 
oaths,  declares  that  he  is  ready  to  descend  from  the  throne, 
to  leave  France,  and  even  give  up  his  life,  for  the  good  of 
the  fatherland,  inseparable  from  the  rights  of  his  son,  of 
those  of  the  regency  of  the  Empress  and  of  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  laws  of  the  Empire."  1 

A  careful  reading  of  this  document  will  show  that  it 
was  not  an  act  of  abdication,  but  merely  a  conditional 
offer  to  abdicate,  which  would  satisfy  those  undiplomatic 
soldiers  and  gain  time.  Macdonald  also  relates  that,  after 
drawing  it  up,  the  Emperor  threw  himself  on  the  sofa, 
struck  his  thigh,  and  said  :  "  Nonsense,  gentlemen  !  let  us 
leave  all  that  alone  and  march  to-morrow,  we  shall  beat 

1  For  the  first  draft  of  this  Declaration,  see  "  Corresp.,"  No.  21555 
(note). 


394  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap. 

them."  But  they  held  him  to  his  promise  ;  and  Caulain- 
court,  Ney,  and  Macdonald  straightway  proceeding  to  Paris, 
beset  the  Czar  with  many  entreaties  andNsome  threats  to 
recognize  the  Regency. 

In  their  interview,  late  at  night  on  the  4th,  they  seemed 
to  make  a  great  impression,  especially  when  they  reminded 
him  of  his  promise  not  to  force  any  government  on  France. 
Next,  the  Czar  called  in  the  members  of  the  Provisional 
Government,  and  heard  their  arguments  that  a  Regency 
must  speedily  give  wa}r  before  the  impact  of  the  one 
masterful  will.  Yet  again  Alexander  listened  to  the  elo- 
quence of  Caulaincourt,  and  finally  to  the  pleadings  of 
the  now  anxious  provisionals.  So  the  night  wore  on  at 
Talleyrand's  mansion,  the  Czar  finally  stating  that,  after 
hearing  the  Prussian  monarch's  advice,  he  would  give  his 
decision.  And  shortly  before  dawn  came  the  news  that 
Marmont's  corps  had  marched  over  to  the  enemy.  "  You 
see,"  said  Alexander  to  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  "  it  is  Providence 
that  wills  it :  no  more  doubt  or  hesitation  now."  1 

On  that  same  night,  in  fact,  Marmont's  corps  of  12,000 
men  was  brought  from  Essonne  within  the  lines  of  the 
allies,  by  the  Marshal's  generals.  Marmont  himself  was 
then  in  Paris,  having  been  induced  by  Ney  and  Macdonald 
to  come  with  them,  so  as  to  hinder  the  carrying  out  of 
his  treasonable  design  ;  but  his  generals,  who  were  in 
the  secret,  were  alarmed  by  the  frequency  of  Napoleon's 
couriers,  and  carried  out  the  original  plan.  Thus,  at 
dawn  of  the  5th,  the  rank  and  file  found  themselves 
amidst  the  columns  and  squadrons  of  the  allies.  It  was 
now  too  late  to  escape ;  the  men  swore  at  their  leaders 
with  helpless  fury;  and  12,000  men  were  thus  filched 
from  Napoleon's  array.2 

If  this  conduct  be  viewed  from  the  personal  standpoint, 
it  must  be  judged  a  base  betrayal  of  an  old  friend  and 
benefactor ;  and  it  is  usually  regarded  in  that  light  alone. 
And  yet  Marmont  might  plead  that  his  action  was  neces- 

1  Pasquier,  vol.  iii.,  ch.  xv. ;  Macdonald,  "Souvenirs." 

2  Houssaye,  pp.  593-623  ;  Marmont,  vol.  vi.,  pp.  254-272  ;  Macdonald, 
chs.  xxvii.-xxviii.  At  Elba,  Napoleon  told  Lord  Ebrington  that  Mar- 
mont's troops  were  among  the  best,  and  his  treachery  ruined  everything 
("Macmillan's  Mag.,"  Dec,  1894). 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST  ABDICATION  395 

sary  to  prevent  Napoleon  sacrificing  his  troops,  and  per- 
haps also  his  capital,  to  a  morbid  pride  and  desire  for 
revenge.  The  Marshal  owed  something  to  France.  The 
Chambers  had  pronounced  his  master's  abdication,  and 
Paris  seemed  to  acquiesce  in  their  decision  :  Bordeaux 
and  Lyons  had  now  definitely  hoisted  the  white  flag  : 
Wellington  had  triumphed  in  the  south  ;  Schwarzenberg 
marshalled  140,000  men  around  the  capital ;  and  Mar- 
rnont  knew,  perhaps,  better  than  any  of  the  Marshals, 
the  obstinacy  of  that  terrible  will  which  had  strewn  the 
roads  between  Moscow,  Paris,  and  Lisbon  with  a  million 
of  corpses.  Was  it  not  time  that  this  should  end  ?•  And 
would  it  end  as  long  as  Napoleon  saw  any  chance  of 
snatching  a  temporary  success  ? 

However  we  may  regard  Marmont's  conduct,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  it  helped  on  Napoleon's  fall.  The  Czar 
was  too  subtle  a  diplomatist  to  attach  much  importance  to 
Napoleon's  declaration  cited  above.  He  must  have  seen 
in  it  a  device  to  gain  time.  But  he  himself  also  wished 
for  a  few  more  hours'  respite  before  flinging  away  the  scab- 
bard ;  and  we  may  regard  his  lengthy  balancings  between 
the  pleas  of  Caulaincourt  and  Talleyrand  as  prompted 
partly  by  a  wish  to  sip  to  the  full  the  sweets  of  revenge  for 
the  occupation  of  Moscow,  but  mainly  by  the  resolve  to 
mark  time  until  Marmont's  corps  had  been  brought  over. 

Now  that  the  head  was  struck  off  Napoleon's  lance,  the 
Czar  repulsed  all  notion  of  a  Regency,  but  declared  that 
he  was  ready  to  grant  generous  terms  to  Napoleon  if 
the  latter  abdicated  outright.  "  Now,  when  he  is  in 
trouble,"  he  said,  "  I  will  become  once  more  his  friend 
and  will  forget  the  past."  In  conferences  with  Napo- 
leon's representatives,  Alexander  decided  that  Napoleon 
must  keep  the  title  of  Emperor,  ahd  receive  a  suitable 
pension.  The  islands  of  Corfu,  Corsica,  and  Elba  were 
considered  for  his  future  abode  :  the  last  offered  the 
fewest  objections ;  and  though  Metternich  later  on  pro- 
tested against  the  choice  of  Elba,  the  Czar  felt  his  honour 
pledged  to  this  arrangement.1 

Napoleon  himself  now  began  to  yield  to  the  inevitable. 

1  Pasquier,  vol.  iii.,  ch.  xvi.;  "  Castlereagh  Papers,"  vol.  ix.,  p.  442. 
Alison  wrongly  says  that  Napoleon  chose  Elba. 


390  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

On  hearing  the  news  of  Marmont's  defection,  he  sat  for 
some  time  as  if  stupefied,  then  sadly  remarked  :  "  The 
ungrateful  man  :  well !  he  will  be  more  unhappy  than  I." 
But  once  more,  on  the  6th,  the  fighting  instinct  comes 
uppermost.  He  plans  to  retire  with  his  faithful  troops 
beyond  the  Loire,  and  rally  the  corps  of  Augereau,  Suchet, 
and  Soult.  "Come,"  he  cries  to  his  generals,  "let  us 
march  to  the  Alps."  Not  one  of  them  speaks  in  reply. 
"  Ah,"  replies  the  Emperor  to  their  unspoken  thoughts; 
"you  want  repose:  have  it  then.  Alas!  you  know  not  how 
many  disappointments  and  dangers  await  you  on  your 
beds  of  down."     He  then  wrote  his  formal  abdication : 

"  The  allied  Powers  having  declared  that  the  Emperor  was  the 
sole  obstacle  to  the  re-establishment  of  peace  in  Europe,  the  Emperor, 
faithful  to  his  oaths,  declares  that  he  renounces,  for  himself  and  his 
heirs,  the  thrones  of  France  and  Italy,  and  that  there  is  no  sacrifice, 
not  even  that  of  life,  which  he  is  not  ready  to  make  for  the  interest 
of  France." 

The  allies  made  haste  to  finish  the  affair ;  ■  for  even  now 
they  feared  that  the  caged  lion  would  burst  his  bars.  In- 
deed, the  trusty  secretary  Fain  asserts  that  when  on  Easter 
Monday,  the  11th,  Caulaincourt  brought  back  the  allies' 
ratification  of  this  deed,  Napoleon's  first  demand  was  to 
retract  the  abdication.  It  would  be  unjust,  however,  to 
lay  too  much  stress  on  this  strange  conduct  ;  for  at  that 
time  the  Emperor's  mind  was  partly  unhinged  by  mad- 
dening tumults. 

His  anguish  increased  when  he  heard  the  final  terms 
of  the  allies.  They  allotted  to  him  the  isle  of  Elba ;  to 
his  consort  and  heir,  the  duchies  of  Parma,  Placentia,  and 
Guastalla,  and  two  millions  of  francs  as  an  annual  subsidy, 
divided  equally  between  himself  and  her.  They  were  to 
keep  the  title  of  Emperor  and  Empress;  but  their  son 
would  bear  the  name  of  Duke  of  Parma,  etc.  The  other 
Bonapartes  received  an  annual  subsidy  of  2,500,000  francs, 
this  and  the  former  sum  being  paid  by  France.  Four 
hundred  soldiers  might  accompany  him  to  Elba.  A 
"  suitable  establishment "  was  to  be  provided  for  Eugene 
outside  of  France.1  For  some  hours  Napoleon  refused  to 
ratify  this  compact.     All  hope  of  resistance  was  vain,  for 

1  Martens,  vol.  ix.,  p.  696. 


xxxvn  THE    FIRST   ABDICATION  397 

Oudinot,  Victor,  Lefebvre,  and,  finally,  Ney  and  Berthier, 
had  gone  over  to  the  royalists :  even  the  soldiery  began 
to  waver.  But  a  noble  pride  held  back  the  mighty  con- 
queror from  accepting  Elba  and  signing  a  money  compact. 
It  is  not  without  a  struggle  that  a  Csesar  sinks  to  the 
level  of  a  Sancho  Panza. 

He  then  talked  to  Caulaincourt  with  the  insight  that 
always  illumined  his  judgments.  Marie  Louise  ought  to 
have  Tuscany,  he  said  :  Parma  would  not  befit  her  dig- 
nity. Besides,  if  she  had  to  traverse  other  States  to  come 
to  him,  would  she  ever  do  so  ?  He  next  talked  of  his 
Marshals.  Massena's  were  the  greatest  exploits :  but 
Suchet  had  shown  himself  the  wisest  both  in  war  and 
administration.  Soult  was  able,  but  too  ambitious. 
Berthier  was  honest,  sensible,  the  model  of  a  chief  of  the 
staff;  and  "yet  he  has  now  caused  me  much  pain."  Not 
a  word  escaped  him  about  Davoust,  still  manfully  strug- 
gling at  Hamburg.  Not  one  of  his  Ministers,  he  com- 
plained, had  come  from  Blois  to  bid  him  farewell.  He 
then  spoke  of  his  greatest  enemy  —  England.  "  She  has 
done  me  much  harm,  doubtless,  but  I  have  left  in  her 
flanks  a  poisoned  dart.  It  is  I  who  have  made  this  debt, 
that  will  ever  burden,  if  not  crush,  future  generations." 
Finally,  he  came  back  to  the  hateful  compact  which  Cau- 
laincourt pressed  him  in  vain  to  sign.  How  could  he  take 
money  from  the  allies.  How  could  he  leave  France  so 
small,  after  receiving  her  so  great ! 

That  same  night  he  sought  to  end  his  life.  On  Febru- 
ary the  8th  he  had  warned  his  brother  Joseph  that  he 
would  do  so  if  Paris  were  captured.  During  the  retreat 
from  Moscow  he  had  carried  about  a  phial  which  was  said 
to  contain  opium,  and  he  now  sought  to  end  his  miseries. 
But  Caulaincourt,  his  valet  Constant,  and  the  surgeon 
Ivan  were  soon  at  hand  with  such  slight  cures  as  were 
possible.  After  violent  sickness  the  Emperor  sank  into 
deep  prostration  ;  but,  when  refreshed  by  tea,  and  by  the 
cool  air  of  dawning  day,  he  gradually  revived.  "  Fate 
has  decided,"  he  exclaimed:  "I  must  live  and  await  all 
that  Providence  has  in  store  for  me."1     He  then  signed 

1  Thiers  and  Constant  assign  this  event  to  the  night  of  llth-12th.  T 
follow  Fain  and  Macdonald  in  referring  it  to  the  next  night. 


398  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

the  treaty  with  the  allies,  presented  Macdonald  with  the 
sword  of  Murad  Bey,  and  calmly  began  to  prepare  for  his 
departure. 

Marie  Louise  did  not  come  to  see  him.  Her  decision  to 
do  so  was  overruled  by  her  father,  in  obedience  to  whose 
behests  she  repaired  from  Blois  to  Rambouillet.  There, 
guarded  by  Cossacks,  she  saw  Francis,  Alexander,  and 
Frederick  William  in  turn.  What  passed  between  them 
is  not  known  :  but  the  result  was  that,  on  April  23rd,  she 
set  out  for  Vienna,  whence  she  finally  repaired  to  Parma ; 
she  manifested  no  great  desire  to  see  her  consort  at  Elba, 
but  soon  consoled  herself  with  the  Count  de  Neipperg. 

No  doubts  as  to  her  future  conduct,  no  qualms  of  con- 
science as  to  the  destiny  of  France  now  ruffled  Napoleon's 
mind.  Like  a  sky  cleared  by  a  thunder-storm,  once  more 
it  shone  forth  with  clear  radiance.  Those  who  saw  him 
now  were  astonished  at  his  calmness,  except  in  some 
moments  when  he  declaimed  at  his  wife  and  child  being 
kept  from  him  by  Austrian  schemes.  Then  he  stormed 
and  wept  and  declared  that  he  would  seek  refuge  in 
England,  which  General  Roller,  the  Austrian  commis- 
sioner appointed  to  escort  him  to  Elba,  strongly  advised 
him  to  do.  But  for  the  most  part  he  showed  remarkable 
composure.  When  Bausset  sought  to  soothe  him  by  re- 
marking that  France  would  still  form  one  of  the  finest  of 
realms,  he  replied  —  "with  remarkable  serenity  —  'I  abdi- 
cate and  I  yield  nothing.'  " 1  The  words  hide  a  world  of 
meaning  :  they  inclose  the  secret  of  the  Hundred  Days. 

On  the  20th,  he  bade  farewell  to  his  Guard :  in  thrill- 
ing words  he  told  them  that  his  mission  thenceforth  would 
be  to  describe  to  posterity  the  wonders  they  had  achieved  : 
he  then  embraced  General  Petit,  kissed  the  war-stained 
banner,  and,  wafted  on  his  way  by  the  sobs  of  these  un- 
conquered  heroes,  set  forth  for  the  Mediterranean.  In 
the  central  districts,  and  as  far  as  Lyons,  he  was  often 
greeted  by  the  well-known  shouts,  but,  further  south,  the 
temper  of  the  people  changed. 

At  Orange  they  cursed  him  to  his  face,  and  hurled 
stones  at  the  windows  of  the  carriage  ;  Napoleon,  pro- 
tected by  Bertrand,  sat  huddled  up  in  the  corner,  "  ap- 

1  Bausset,  "  Cour  de  Napole'on." 


xxxvn  THE   FIRST  ABDICATION  399 

parently  very  much  frightened."  After  forcing  a  way 
through  the  rabble,  the  Emperor,  when  at  a  safe  distance, 
donned  a  plain  greatcoat,  a  Russian  cloak,  and  a  plain 
round  hat  with  a  white  cockade  :  in  this  or  similar  dis- 
guises he  sought  to  escape  notice  at  every  village  or  town, 
evincing,  says  the  British  Commissioner,  Colonel  Camp- 
bell, "much  anxiety  to  save  his  life." 

By  a  detour  he  skirted  the  town  of  Avignon,  where  the 
mob  thirsted  for  his  blood ;  and  by  another  device  he 
disappointed  the  people  of  Orgon,  who  had  prepared  an 
effigy  of  him  in  uniform,  smeared  with  blood,  and  pla- 
carded with  the  words :  "  Voila  done  l'odieux  tyran ! 
Tot  ou  tard  le  crime  est  puni."1  In  this  humiliating 
way  he  hurried  on  towards  the  coast,  where  a  British 
frigate,  the  "  Undaunted,"  was  waiting  for  him.  There 
some  suspicious  delays  ensued,  which  aroused  the  fears  of 
the  allied  commissioners,  especially  as  bands  of  French 
soldiers  began  to  draw  near  after  the  break-up  of  Eugene's 
army.2 

At  last,  on  the  28th,  accompanied  by  Counts  Bertrand 
and  Drouot,  he  set  sail  from  Frejus.  It  was  less  than 
fifteen  years  since  he  had  landed  there  crowned  with  the 
halo  of  his  oriental  adventures. 

1  Sir  Neil  Campbell's  "Journal,"  p.  192. 

2  Ussher,  "  Napoleon's  Last  Voyages,"  p.  29. 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII 

ELBA  AND  PARIS 

If  it  be  an  advantage  to  pause  in  the  midst  of  the  rush 
of  life  and  take  one's  bearings  afresh,  then  Napoleon  was 
fortunate  in  being  drifted  to  the  quiet  eddy  of  Elba.  He 
there  had  leisure  to  review  his  career,  to  note  where  he 
had  served  his  generation  and  succeeded,  where  also  he 
had  dashed  himself  fruitlessly  against  the  fundamental 
instincts  of  mankind.  Undoubtedly  he  did  essay  this 
mental  stock-taking.  He  remarked  to  the  conscientious 
Drouot  that  he  was  wrong  in  not  making  peace  at  the 
Congress  of  Prague ;  that  trust  in  his  own  genius  and  in 
his  soldiery  led  him  astray ;  "  but  those  who  blame  me 
have  never  drunk  of  Fortune's  intoxicating  cup."  When 
a  turn  of  her  wheel  brought  him  uppermost  again,  he  con- 
fessed that  at  Elba  he  had  heard,  as  in  a  tomb,  the  verdict 
of  posterity  ;  and  there  are  signs  that  his  maturer  convic- 
tions thenceforth  strove  to  curb  the  old  domineering 
instincts  that  had  wrecked  his  life. 

Introspection,  however,  was  alien  to  his  being ;  he  was 
made  for  the  camp  rather  than  the  study ;  his  critical 
powers,  if  turned  in  for  a  time  on  himself,  quickly  swung 
back  to  work  upon  men  and  affairs ;  and  they  found  the 
needed  exercise  in  organizing  his  Liliputian  Empire  and 
surveying  the  course  of  European  politics.  In  the  first 
weeks  he  was  up  at  dawn,  walking  or  riding  about  Porto 
Ferrajo  and  its  environs,  planning  better  defences,  or 
tracing  out  new  roads  and  avenues  of  mulberry  trees. 
"I  have  never  seen  a  man,"  wrote  Campbell,'  "  with  so 
much  activity  and  restless  perseverance :  he  appears  to 
take  pleasure  in  perpetual  movement,  and  in  seeing  those 
who  accompany  him  sink  under  fatigue."  About  seven 
hundred  of  his  Guards  were  brought  over  on  British 
transports ;  and  these,  along  with  Corsicans  and  Tuscans, 

400 


chap,  xxxvm  ELBA   AND   PARIS  401 


guarded  him  against  royalist  plotters,  real  or  supposed. 
In  a  short  time  he  purchased  a  few  small  vessels,  and 
annexed  the  islet  of  Pianosa.  These  affairs  and  the  forma- 
tion of  an  Imperial  Court  for  the  delectation  of  his  mother 
and  his  sister  Pauline,  who  now  joined  him,  served  to 
drive  away  ennui ;  but  he  bitterly  resented  the  Emperor 
Francis's  refusal  to  let  his  wife  and  son  come  to  him. 
Whether  Marie  Louise  would  have  come  is  more  than 
doubtful,  for  her  relations  to  Count  Neipperg  were  already 
notorious ;  but  the  detention  of  his  son  was  a  heartless 
action  that  aroused  general  sympathy  for  the  lonely  man. 
The  Countess  Walewska  paid  him  a  visit  for  some  days, 
bringing  the  son  whom  she  had  borne  him.1 

Meanwhile  Europe  was  settling  down  uneasily  on  its 
new  political  foundations.  .  Considering  that  France  had 
been  at  the  mercy  of  the  allies,  she  had  few  just  grounds 
of  complaint  against  them.  The  Treaties  of  Paris  (May 
30th,  1814)  left  her  with  rather  wider  bounds  than  those 
of  1791 ;  and  she  kept  the  art  treasures  reft  by  Napoleon. 
Perfidious  Albion  yielded  up  all  her  French  colonial  con- 
quests, except  Mauritius,  Tobago,  and  St.  Lucia.  Britons 
grumbled  at  the  paltry  gains  brought  by  a  war  that  had 
cost  more  than  £600,000,000 :  but  Castlereagh  justified 
the  policy  of  conciliation.  "It  is  better,"  said  he,  "for 
France  to  be  commercial  and  pacific  than  a  warlike  and 
conquering  State."  We  insisted  on  her  ceding  Belgium 
to  the  House  of  Orange,  while  we  retained  the  Dutch 
colonies  conquered  by  us,  the  Cape,  Demerara,  and 
Curagoa  —  paying  £6,000,000  for  them. 

The  loss  of  the  Netherlands,  the  Rhineland,  and  Italy 
galled  French  pride.  Loud  were  the  murmurs  of  the 
throngs  of  soldiers  that  came  from  the  fortresses  of  Ger- 
imany,  or  the  prisons  of  Spain,  Russia,  and  England  — 
'70,000  crossed  over  from  our  shores  alone  —  at  the  harsh- 
ness of  the  allies  and  the  pusillanimity  of  the  Bourbons. 

1  A  quondam  Jacobin,  Pons  (de  1' H6rau.lt) ,  Commissioner  of  Mines  at 
Elba,  has  left  "Souvenirs  de  Pile  .d'Elbe,"  which  are  of  colossal  credu- 
lity. In  ch.  xi.  he  gives  tales  of  plots  to  murder  Napoleon  —  some  of 
them  very  silly.  In  pt.  ii.,  ch.  i.,  he  styles  him  "  essentiellement 
feUigieux,"  and  a  most  tender-hearted  man,  who  was  compelled  by  pru- 
lence  to  hide  his  sensibility !  Yet  Campbell's  official  reports  show  that 
Pons,  at  that  time,  was  far  from  admiring  Napoleon. 

vol.  ii  —  2d 


402  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

The  return  from  war  to  peace  is  always  hard;  and  now 
these  gaunt  warriors  came  back  to  a  little  France  that  per- 
force discharged  them  or  placed  them  on  half-pay.  Per- 
haps they  might  have  been  won  over  by  a  tactful  Court : 
but  the  Bourbons,  especially  that  typical  SmigrS,  the  Comte 
d'Artois,  were  nothing  if  not  tactless,  witness  their  shelv- 
ing of  the  Old  Guard  and  formation  of  the  Maison  du  Roi, 
a  privileged  and  highly  paid  corps  of  6,000  nobles  and 
royalist  gentlemen.  The  peasants,  too,  were  uneasy,  es- 
pecially those  who  held  the  lands  of  nobles  confiscated  in 
the  Revolution.  To  indemnify  the  former  owners  was 
impossible  in  face  of  the  torrent  of  exorbitant  claims  that 
flowed  in.  And  the  year  1814,  which  began  as  a  soul- 
stirring  epic,  ended  with  sordid  squabbles  worthy  of  a 
third-rate  farce. 

Moreover,  at  this  very  time,  the  former  allies  seemed  on 
the  brink  of  war.  The  limits  of  our  space  admit  only  of 
the  briefest  glance  at  the  disputes  of  the  Powers  at  the 
Congress  of  Vienna.  The  storm  centre  of  Europe  was  the 
figure  of  the  Czar.  To  our  ambassador  at  Vienna,  Sir 
Charles  Stewart,  he  declared  his  resolve  to  keep  Western 
Poland  and  never  to  give  up  7,000,000  of  his  "  Polish  sub- 
jects."1 Strange  to  say,  he  ultimately  gained  the  assent 
of  Prussia  to  this  objectionable  scheme,  provided  that  she 
acquired  the  whole  of  Saxony,  while  Frederick  Augustus 
was  to  be  transplanted  to  the  Rhineland  with  Bonn  as 
capital.  To  these  proposals  Austria,  England,  and  France 
offered  stern  opposition,  and  framed  a  secret  compact  (Janu- 
ary 3rd,  1815)  to  resist  them  if  need  be  with  armies  amount- 
ing to  450,000  men.  But,  though  swords  were  rattled  in 
their  scabbards,  they  were  not  drawn.  When  news  reached 
Vienna  of  the  activity  of  Bonapartists  in  France  and  of 
Murat  in  Italy,  the  Powers  agreed  (February  8th)  to  the 
Saxon-Polish  compromise  which  took  shape  in  the  map  of 
Eastern  Europe.  The  territorial  arrangements  in  the  west 
were  evidently  inspired  by  the  wish  to  build  up  bulwarks 

1  "  F.  O.,"  Austria,  No.  117.  Talleyrand,  in  his  letters  to  Louis  XVIII., 
claims  to  have  broken  up  the  compact  of  the  Powers.  But  it  is  clear  that 
fear  of  Russia  was  more  potent  than  Talleyrand's  finesse.  Before  the 
Congress  began  Castlereagh  and  Wellington  advised  friendship  with 
France  so  as  to  check  "undue  pretensions"  elsewhere. 


XXXVIII 


ELBA   AND   PARIS  403 


against  France.  Belgium  was  tacked  on  to  Holland  ;  Ger- 
many was  huddled  into  a  Confederation,  in  which  the 
princes  had  complete  sovereign  powers  ;  and  the  King- 
dom of  Sardinia  grew  to  more  than  its  former  bulk  by 
recovering  Savoy  and  Nice  and  gaining  Genoa. 

This  piling  up  of  artificial  barriers  against  some  future 
Napoleon  was  to  serve  the  designs  of  the  illustrious  exile 
himself.  The  instinct  of  nationality,  which  his  blows  had 
aroused  to  full  vigour,  was  now  outraged  by  the  sovereigns 
whom  it  carried  along  to  victory.  Belgians  strongly 
objected  to  Dutch  rule,  and  German  "unitarians,"  as 
•Metternich  dubbed  them,  spurned  a  form  of  union  which 
subjected  the  Fatherland  to  Austria  and  her  henchmen. 
Hardest  of  all  was  the  fate  of  Italy.  After  learning  the 
secret  of  her  essential  unity  under  Napoleon,  she  was  now 
parcelled  out  among  her  former  rulers  ;  and  thrills  of  rage 
shot  through  the  peninsula  when  the  Hapsburgs  settled 
down  at  Venice  and  Milan,  while  their  scions  took  up  the 
reins  at  Modena,  Parma,  and  Florence. 

It  was  on  this  popular  indignation  that  Murat  now  built 
his  hopes.  After  throwing  over  Napoleon,  he  had  looked 
to  find  favour  with  the  allies  ,  but  his  movements  in  1814 
had  been  so  suspicious  that  the  fate  of  his  kingdom  re- 
mained hanging  in  the  balance.  The  Bourbons  of  Paris 
and  Madrid  strove  hard  to  effect  his  overthrow  ;  but  Aus- 
tria and  England,  having  tied  their  hands  early  in  1814  by 
treaties  with  him,  could  only  wait  and  watch  in  the  hope 
that  the  impetuous  soldier  would  take  a  false  step.  He 
did  so  in  February,  1815,  when  he  levied  forces,  sum- 
moned Louis  XVIII.  to  declare  whether  he  was  at  war 
with  him,  and  prepared  to  march  into  Northern  Italy. 

The  disturbed  state  of  the  peninsula  caused  the  Powers 
much  uneasiness  as  to  the  presence  of  Napoleon  at  Elba. 
Louis  XVIII.  in  his  despatches,  and  Talleyrand  in  private 
conversations,  two  or  three  times  urged  his  removal  to  the 
Azores  ;  but,  with  the  exception  of  Castlereagh,  who  gave 
a  doubtful  assent,  the  plenipotentiaries  scouted  the  thought 
of  it.  Metternich  entirely  opposed  it,  and  the  Czar  would 
certainly  have  objected  to  the  reversal  of  his  Elba  plan, 
had  Talleyrand  made  a  formal  proposal  to  that  effect.  But 
he  did  not  do  so.     The  official  records  of  the  Congress 


404  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

contain  not  a  word  on  the  subject.  Equally  unfounded 
were  the  newspaper  rumours  that  the  Congress  was  con- 
sidering the  advisability  of  removing  Napoleon  to  St. 
Helena.  On  this  topic  the  official  records  are  also  silent ; 
and  we  have  the  explicit  denial  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
(who  reached  Vienna  on  the  1st  of  February  to  relieve 
Castlereagh)  that  "  the  Congress  ever  had  any  intention 
of  removing  Bonaparte  from  Elba  to  St.  Helena."1 

Napoleon's  position  was  certainly  one  of  unstable  equi- 
librium, that  tended  towards  some  daring  enterprise,  or 
inglorious  bankruptcy.  The  maintenance  of  his  troops 
cost  him  more  than  1,000,000  francs  a  year,  while  his  rev- 
enue was  less  than  half  of  that  sum.  He  ought  to  have 
received  2,000,000  francs  a  year  from  Louis  XVIII. ;  but 
that  monarch,  while  confiscating  the  property  of  the  Bona- 
partes  in  France,  paid  not  a  centime  of  the  sums  which 
the  allies  had  pledged  him  to  pay  to  the  fallen  House. 
Both  the  Czar  and  our  envoy,  Castlereagh,  warmly  re- 
proached Talleyrand  with  his  master's  shabby  conduct ; 
to  which  the  plenipotentiary  replied  that  it  was  dangerous 
to  furnish  Napoleon  with  money  as  long  as  Italy  was  in  so 
disturbed  a  state.  Castlereagh,  on  his  return  to  England 
by  way  of  Paris,  again  pressed  the  matter  on  Louis 
XVIII.,  who  promised  to  take  the  matter  in  hand.  But 
he  was  soon  quit  of  it  :  for,  as  he  wrote  to  Talleyrand  on 
March  7th,  Bonaparte's  landing  in  France  spared  him  the 
trouble? 

To  assert,  however,  that  Napoleon's  escape  from  Elba 
was  prompted  by  a  desire  to  avoid  bankruptcy,  is  to  credit 
him  with  respectable  bourgeois  scruples  by  which  he  was 
never  troubled.     Though  "Madame  Mere"  and  Pauline 

1  Stanhope's  "Conversations,"  p.  26.  In  our  archives  ("Russia," 
No.  95)  is  a  suspicious  letter  of  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  dated  Paris,  July  £§,  1814, 
to  Castlereagh  (it  is  not  in  his  Letters)  containing  this  sentence  :  "  IS  ex- 
istence de  Napoleon,  comme  il  £tait  ais6  a  pr^voir,  est  un  inconvenient  qui 
se  rencontre  partout."  For  Fouche^s  letter  to  Napoleon,  begging  him 
voluntarily  to  retire  to  the  New  World,  see  Talleyrand's  "Mems.,"  pt. 
vii.,  app.  iv.  Lafayette  ("  Mems.,"  vol.  v.,  p.  345)  asserts  that  French 
royalists  were  plotting  his  assassination.  Brulart,  Governor  of  Corsica, 
was  suspected  by  Napoleon,  but,  it  seems,  wrongly  (Houssaye's  "  1815," 
p.  172). 

2  Pallain,  "  Correspondance  de  Louis  XVIII.  avec  Talleyrand,"  pp.  307, 
316. 


xxxvm  ELBA   AND   PAKIS  405 

complained  bitterly  to  Campbell  of  the  lack  of  funds  at 
Elba,  the  Emperor  himself  was  far  from  depressed.  "  His 
spirits  seem  of  late,"  wrote  Campbell  on  December  28th, 
"  rather  to  rise,  and  not  to  yield  in  the  smallest  degree  to 
the  pressure  of  pecuniary  difficulties."  Both  Campbell 
and  Lord  John  Russell,  who  then  paid  the  Emperor  a  fly- 
ing visit,  thought  that  he  was  planning  some  great  move, 
and  warned  our  Ministers.1  But  they  shared  the  view  of 
other  wiseacres,  that  Italy  would  be  his  goal,  and  that 
too,  when  Campbell's  despatches  teemed  with  remarks 
made  to  him  by  Napoleon  as  to  the  certainty  of  an  out- 
break in  France.     Here  are  two  of  them  : 

"  He  said  that  there  would  be  a  violent  outbreak,  similar  to  the 
Revolution,  in  consequence  of  their  present  humiliation  :  every  man 
in  France  considers  the  Rhine  to  be  the  natural  frontier  of  France, 
and  nothing  can  alter  this  opinion.  If  the  spirit  of  the  nation  is 
roused  into  action  nothing  can  oppose  it.  It  is  like  a  torrent.  .  .  . 
The  present  Government  of  France  is  too  feeble :  the  Bourbons 
should  make  war  as  soon  as  possible  so  as  to  establish  themselves 
upon  the  throne.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  recover  Belgium.  It  is 
only  for  the  British  troops  there  that  the  French  army  has  the  small- 
est awe"  (sic). 

His  final  resolve  to  put  everything  to  the  hazard  was 
formed  about  February  13th,  when,  shortly  after  receiv- 
ing tidings  as  to  the  unrest  in  Italy,  the  discords  of  the 
Powers,  and  the  resolve  of  the  allied  sovereigns  to  leave 
»  Vienna  on  the  20th,  he  heard  news  of  the  highest  im- 
portance from  France.  On  that  day  one  of  his  former 
officials,  Fleury  de  Chaboulon,  landed  in  Elba,  and  in- 
formed him  of  the  hatching  of  a  plot  by  military  malcon- 
tents, under  the  lead  of  Fouche,  for  the  overthrow  of 
Louis  XVIII.2  Napoleon  at  once  despatched  his  inform- 
ant to  Naples,  and  ordered  his  brig,  "  L'lnconstant,"  to 
be  painted  like  an  English  vessel.     Most  fortunately  for 

1  "Recollections,"  p.  16  ;  "F.O.,"  France,  No.  114.  The  facts  given 
above  seem  to  me  to  refute  the  statements  often  made  that  the  allies  vio- 
lated the  Elba  arrangement  and  so  justified  his  escape.  The  facts  prove 
that  the  allies  sought  to  compel  Louis  XVIII.  to  pay  Napoleon  the  stipu- 
lated sum,  and  that  the  Emperor  welcomed  the  non-payment.  His  words 
to  Lord  Ebrington  on  December  6th  breathe  the  conviction  that  France 
would  soon  rise. 

2  Fleury  de  Chaboulon's  "Mems.,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  105-140;  Lafayette, 
vol.  v.,  p.  355. 


406  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

him,  Campbell  on  the  15th  set  sail  for  Tuscany  —  "  for  his 
health  and  on  private  affairs  "  —  on.  the  small  war- vessel, 
"  Partridge,"  to  which  the  British  Government  had  in- 
trusted the  supervision  of  Napoleon.  Captain  Adye,  of 
that  vessel,  promised,  after  taking  Campbell  to  Leghorn, 
to  return  and  cruise  off  Elba.  He  called  at  Porto  Ferrajo 
on  the  2-ith,  and  to  Bertrand's  question,  when  he  was  to 
bring  Campbell  back,  returned  the  undiplomatic  answer 
that  it  was  fixed  for  the  26th.  The  news  seems  to  have 
decided  Napoleon  to  escape  on  that  day,  when  the  "  Par- 
tridge "  would  be  absent  at  Leghorn.  Meanwhile  Camp- 
bell, alarmed  by  the  news  of  the  preparations  at  Elba,  was 
sending  off  a  request  to  Genoa  that  another  British  war- 
ship should  be  sent  to  frustrate  the  designs  of  the  "  rest- 
less villain." 

But  it  was  now  too  late.  On  that  Sunday  night  at 
9  p.m.,  the  Emperor,  with  1,050  officers  and  men,  em- 
barked at  Porto  Ferrajo  on  the  "  Inconstant  "  and  six 
smaller  craft.  Favoured  by  the  light  airs  that  detained 
the  British  vessel,  his  flotilla  glided  away  northwards  ; 
and  not  before  the  28th  did  Adye  and  Campbell  find  that 
the  imperial  eagle  had  flown.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  had 
eluded  the  French  guard-ship,  "  Fleur-de-Lys,"  and 
ordered  his  vessels  to  scatter.  On  doubling  the  north  of 
Corsica,  he  fell  in  with  another  French  cruiser,  the 
"  Zephyr,"  which  hailed  his  brig  and  inquired  how  the 
great  man  was.  "  Marvellously  well,"  came  the  reply, 
suggested  by  Napoleon  himself  to  his  captain.  The 
royalist  cruiser  passed  on  contented.  And  thus,  thanks 
to  the  imbecility  of  the  old  Governments  and  of  their 
servants,  Napoleon  was  able  to  land  his  little  force  safely 
in  the  Golfe  de  Jouan  on  the  afternoon  of  March  1st.1  Is 
it  surprising  that  foreigners,  who  had  not  yet  fathomed 
the  eccentricities  of  British  officialdom,  should  have  be- 
lieved that  we  connived  at  Napoleon's  escape  ?  It  needed 
the  blood  shed  at  Waterloo  to  wipe  out  the  misconcep- 
tion. 

"I  shall  reach  Paris  without  firing  a  shot."  Such  was 
the  prophecy  of  Napoleon  to  his  rather  questioning  fol- 
lowers as  they  neared  the  coast  of  Provence.     It  seemed 

1  Campbell's  "Journal  "  ;  Peyrusse,  "Memorial,"  p.  276. 


xxxviii  ELBA  AND   PARIS  407 

the  wildest  of  dreams.  Could  the  man,  who  had  been 
wellnigh  murdered  by  the  rabble  of  Avignon  and  Orgon, 
hope  to  march  in  peace  through  that  royalist  province? 
And,  if  he  ever  reached  the  central  districts  where  men 
loved  him  better,  would  the  soldiery  dare  to  disobey  the 
commands  of  Soult,  the  new  Minister  of  War,  of  Ney, 
Berthier,  Macdonald,  St.  Cyr,  Suchet,  Augereau,  and  of 
many  more  who  were  now  honestly  serving  the  Bourbons  ? 
The  King  and  his  brothers  had  no  fears.  They  laughed 
at  the  folly  of  this  rash  intruder. 

At  first  their  confidence  seemed  justified.  Napoleon's 
overtures  to  the  officer  and  garrison  of  Antibes  were  re- 
pulsed, and  the  small  detachment  which  he  sent  there  was 
captured.  Undaunted  by  this  check,  he  decided  to'  hurry 
on  by  way  of  Grasse  towards  Grenoble,  thus  forestalling 
the  news  of  his  first  failure,  and  avoiding  the  royalist  dis- 
tricts of  the  lower  Rhone. 

Napoleon  was  visibly  perturbed  as  he  drew  near  to 
Grenoble.  There  the  officer  in  command,  General  Mar- 
chand,  had  threatened  to  exterminate  this  "band  of 
brigands "  ;  and  his  soldiers  as  yet  showed  no  signs  of 
defection.  But,  by  some  bad  management,  only  one 
battalion  held  the  defile  of  Laffray  on  the  south.  As 
the  bear-skins  of  the  Guard  came  in  sight,  the  royalist 
ranks  swerved  and  drew  back.  Then  the  Emperor 
came  forward,  and  ordered  his  men  to  lower  their 
arms.  "There  he  is:  fire  on  him,"  cried  a  royalist 
officer.  Not  a  shot  rang  out.  — "  Soldiers,"  said  the 
well-known  voice,  "  if  there  is  one  among  you  who 
wishes  to  kill  his  Emperor,  he  can  do  so.  Here  I  am." 
At  once  a  great  shout  of  "Vive  l'Empereur"  burst 
forth :  and  the  battalion  broke  into  an  enthusiastic  rush 
towards  the  idol  of  the  soldiery. 

That  scene  decided  the  whole  course  of  events.  A 
little  later,  a  young  noble,  Labedoyere,  leads  over  his 
regiment;  at  Grenoble  the  garrison  stands  looking  on 
and  cheering  while  the  Bonapartists  batter  in  the  gates ; 
and  the  hero  is  borne  in  amidst  a  whirlwind  of  cheers. 
At  Lyons,  the  Comte  d'Artois  and  Macdonald  seek  safety 
in  flight;  and  soldiers  and  workmen  welcome  their  chief 
with  wild  acclaim ;  but  amidst  the  wonted  cries  are  heard 


408  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

threats  of  "The  Bourbons  to  the  guillotine,"  "Down  with 
the  priests !  " 

The  shouts  were  ominous  :  they  showed  that  the  Jaco- 
bins meant  to  use  Napoleon  merely  as  a  tool  for  the  over- 
throw of  the  Bourbons.  The  "  have-nots  "  cheered  him, 
but  the  "  haves  "  shivered  at  his  coming,  for  every  think- 
ing man  knew  that  it  implied  war  with  Europe.1  Napo- 
leon saw  the  danger  of  relying  merely  on  malcontents  and 
sought  to  arouse  a  truly  national  feeling.  He  therefore 
on  March  13th  issued  a  series  of  popular  decrees  that 
declared  the  rule  of  the  Bourbons  at  an  end,  dissolved 
the  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  summoned  the 
"  electoral  colleges "  of  the  Empire  to  a  great  assembly, 
or  Champ  de  Mai,  at  Paris.  He  further  proscribed  the 
white  flag,  ordered  the  wearing  of  the  tricolour  cockade, 
disbanded  the  hated  "  Maison  du  Roi,"  abolished  feudal 
titles,  and  sequestered  the  domains  of  the  Bourbon  princes. 
In  brief,  he  acted  as  the  Bonaparte  of  1799.  He  then  set 
forth  for  Paris,  at  the  head  of  14,000  men. 

Ney  was  at  the  same  time  marching  with  6,000  men 
from  Besancon  "to  bring  him  back  iu  an  iron  cage." 
The  Nemesis  that  haunts  the  steps  of  braggarts  was 
already  dogging  him.  His  soldiers  kept  a  sullen  silence. 
At  Bourg  the  leading  regiment  deserted ;  and  while  beset 
by  difficulties,  the  Marshal  received  from  Napoleon  the 
assurance  that  he  would  be  received  as  he  was  on  the  day 
after  the  Moskwa  (Borodino).  This  was  enough.  He 
drew  his  troops  around  him,  and,  to  their  lively  joy,  de- 
clared for  the  Emperor  (March  14th).  Napoleon  was 
as  good  as  his  word.  Never  prone  to  petty  malice,  he 
now  received  with  equal  graciousness  those  officers  who 
flung  themselves  at  his  feet,  and  those  who  staunchly 
served  the  King  to  the  very  last.  Before  this  sunny 
magnanimity  the  last  hopes  of  the  Bourbons  melted  away. 
Greeted  on  all  sides  by  soldiers  and  peasants,  the  en- 
chanter advances  on  Paris,  whence  the  King  and  Court 
beat  a  hasty  retreat  towards  Lille. 

Crowds  of  peasants  line  and  almost  block  the  road  from 
Fontainebleau  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  gray  coat ;  and, 
to  expedite  matters  he  drives  on  in  a  cabriolet  with  his 

1  Houssaye's  "  1815,"  p.  277. 


xxxvm  ELBA   AND   PARIS  409 

faithful  Caulaincourt.  Escorted  by  a  cavalcade  of  officers 
he  enters  Paris  after  nightfall ;  but  there  the  tone  of  the 
public  is  cool  and  questioning,  until  the  front  of  the 
Tuileries  facing  the  river  is  reached.1  Then  a  mighty 
shout  arises  from  the  throng  of  jubilant  half-pay  officers 
as  the  well-known  figure  alights :  he  passes  in,  and  is  half 
carried  up  the  grand  staircase,  "  his  eyes  half  closed,"  says 
Lavalette,  "his  hands  extended  before  him  like  a  blind 
man,  and  expressing  his  joy  only  by  a  smile."  Ladies  are 
there  also,  who  have  spent  the  weary  hours  of  waiting  in 
stripping  off  Jleurs-de-lys,  and  gleefully  exposing  the  N's 
and  golden  bees  concealed  by  cheap  Bourbon  upholstery. 
Anon  they  fly  back  to  this  task ;  the  palace  wears  its 
wonted  look ;  and  the  brief  spell  of  Bourbon  rule  seems 
gone  for  ever. 

To  his  contemporaries  this  triumph  of  Napoleon  ap- 
peared a  miracle  before  which  the  voice  of  criticism  must 
be  dumb.  And  yet,  if  we  remember  the  hollowness  of 
the  Bourbon  restoration,  the  tactlessness  of  the  princes 
and  the  greed  of  their  partisans,  it  seems  strange  that 
the  house  of  cards  reared  by  the  Czar  and  Talleyrand 
remained  standing  even  for  eleven  months.  Napoleon 
correctly  described  the  condition  of  France  when  he  said 
to  his  comrades  on  the  "  Inconstant " :  r  There  is  no  his- 
toric example  that  induces  me  to  venture  on  this  bold 
enterprise  :  but  I  have  taken  into  account  the  surprise 
that  will  seize  on  men,  the  state  of  public  feeling,  the 
resentment  against  the  allies,  the  love  of  my  soldiers,  in 
fine,  all  the  Napoleonic  elements  that  still  germinate  in 
our  beautiful  France."2 

Still  less  was  he  deceived  by  the  seemingly  overwhelm- 
ing impulse  in  his  favour.  He  looked  beyond  the  hysteria 
of  welcome  to  the  cold  and  critical  fit  which  follows  ;  and 
he  saw  danger  ahead.  When  Mollien  complimented  him 
on  his  return,  he  replied,  alluding  to  the  general  indiffer- 
ence at  the  departure  of  the  Bourbons  :  "  My  dear  fellow! 
People  have  let  me  come,  just  as  they  let  the  others  go." 
The  remark  reveals  keen  insight  into   the   workings  of 

1  Guizot,  "Mems.,"  ch.  iii.  ;  De  Broglie,  "Mems.,"  bk.  ii.,  ch.  ii.; 
Fleury,  vol.  i.,  p.  259. 

2  Peyrusse,  "  Memorial,"  p.  277. 


410  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

French  public  opinion.  The  whole  course  of  the  Revo- 
lution had  shown  how  easy  it  was  to  destroy  a  govern- 
ment, how  difficult  to  rebuild.  In  truth,  the  events  of 
March,  1815,  may  be  called  the  epilogue  of  the  revolu- 
tionary drama.  The  royal  House  had  offended  the  two 
most  powerful  of  French  interests,  the  military  and  the 
agrarian,  so  that  soldiers  and  peasants  clutched  eagerly  at 
Napoleon  as  a  mighty  lever  for  its  overthrow. 

The  Emperor  wisely  formed  his  Ministry  before  the 
first  enthusiasm  cooled  down.  Maret  again  became  Sec- 
retary of  State ;  Decres  took  the  Navy ;  Gaudin  the 
finances  ;  Mollien  was  coaxed  back  to  the  Treasury,  and 
Davoust  reluctantly  accepted  the  Ministry  of  War. 
Savary  declined  to  be  burdened  with  the  Police,  and 
Napoleon  did  not  press  him :  for  that  clever  intriguer, 
Fouche,  was  pointed  out  as  the  only  man  who  could  rally 
the  Jacobins  around  the  imperial  throne :  to  him,  then, 
Napoleon  assigned  this  important  post,  though  fully  aware 
that  in  his  hands  it  was  a  two-edged  tool.  Carnot  was 
finally  persuaded  to  become  Minister  for  Home  Affairs. 

Napoleon's  fate,  however,  was  to  be  decided,  not  at 
Paris,  but  by  the  statesmen  assembled  at  Vienna.  There 
time  was  hanging  somewhat  heavily,  and  the  news  of 
Napoleon's  escape  was  welcomed  at  first  as  a  grateful 
diversion.  Talleyrand  asserted  that  Napoleon  would  aim 
at  Italy,  but  Metternich  at  once  remarked :  "  He  will 
make  straight  for  Paris."  When  this  prophecy  proved 
to  be  alarmingly  true,  a  drastic  method  was  adopted  to 
save  the  Bourbons.  The  plenipotentiaries  drew  up  a 
declaration  that  Bonaparte,  having  broken  the  compact 
which  established  him  at  Elba  —  the  only  legal  title 
attaching  to  his  existence  —  had  placed  himself  outside 
the  bounds  of  civil  and  social  relations,  and,  as  an  enemy 
and  disturber  of  the  peace  of  the  world,  was  consigned 
to  "public  prosecution"  (March  13th).1  The  rigour  of 
this  decree   has  been  generally  condemned.     But,  after 

1As  Wellington  pointed  out  ("Despatches,"  May  5th,  1815),  the 
phrase  "  il  s'est  livre"  a  la  vindicte  publique"  denotes  public  justice  not 
public  vengeance.  At  St.  Helena,  Napoleon  told  Gourgaud  that  he  came 
back  too  soon  from  Elba,  believing  that  the  Congress  had  dissolved  t 
(Gourgaud's  "Journals,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  323.) 


XX.WIII 


ELBA   AND    PARIS  411 


all,  it  did  not  exceed  in  harshness  Napoleon's  own  act 
of  proscription  against  Stein ;  it  was  a  desperate  attempt 
to  stop  the  flight  of  the  imperial  eagle  to  Paris  and  to 
save  France  from  war  with  Europe. 

Public  considerations  were  doubtless  commingled  with 
the  promptings  of  personal  hatred.  We  are  assured  that 
Talleyrand  was  the  author  of  this  declaration,  which  had 
the  complete  approval  of  the  Czar.  But  Napoleon  had 
one  enemy  more  powerful  than  Alexander,  more  insidious 
than  Talleyrand,  and  that  was  —  his  own  past.  Every- 
where the  spectre  of  war  rose  up  before  the  imagination 
of  men.  The  merchant  pictured  his  ships  swept  off  by 
privateers  :  the  peasant  saw  his  homestead  desolate  :  the 
housewife  dreamt  of  her  larder  emptied  by  taxes,  and.  sons 
carried  off  for  the  war.  At  Berlin,  wrote  Jackson,  all  was 
agitation,  and  everybody  said  that  the  work  of  last  year 
would  have  to  be  done  over  again. 

In  England  the  current  of  public  feeling  was  some- 
what weakened  by  the  drifts  and  eddies  of  party  politics. 
Many  of  the  Whigs  made  a  popular  hero  of  Napoleon, 
some  from  a  desire  to  overthrow  the  Liverpool  Ministry 
that  proscribed  him  ;  others  because  they  believed,  or  tried 
to  believe,  that  the  return  of  Napoleon  concerned  only 
France,  and  that  he  would  leave  Europe  alone  if  Europe 
left  him  alone.  Others  there  were  again,  as  Hazlitt,  who 
could  not  ignore  the  patent  fact  that  Napoleon  was  an 
international  personage  and  had  violated  a  European  com- 
pact, yet  nevertheless  longed  for  his  triumph  over  the  bad 
old  governments  and  did  not  trouble  much  as  to  what 
would  come  next.  But,  on  the  whole,  the  judgment  of 
well-informed  people  may  be  summed  up  in  the  conclusion 
of  that  keen  lawyer,  Crabbe  Robinson  :  "  The  question  is, 
peace  with  Bonaparte  now,  or  war  with  him  in  Germany 
two  years  hence."  1  The  matter  came  to  a  test  on  April 
28th,  when  Whitbread's  motion  against  war  was  rejected 
by  273  to  72.2 

If  that  was  the  general  opinion  in  days  when  Ministers 
and  diplomatists  alone  knew  the  secrets  of  the  game,  it 
was  certain  that  the  initiated,  who  remembered  his  wrong- 

1  "Diary,"  April  15th  and  18th,  1815. 

2  "Pari.  Debates  ;"   Bomilly'a  "  Diary,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  3G0. 


412  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

headed  refusals  to  make  peace  even  in  the  depressing  days 
of  1814,  would  strive  to  crush  him  before  he  could  gather 
all  his  strength.  In  vain  did  he  protest  that  he  had  learnt 
by  sad  experience  and  was  a  changed  man.  They  inter- 
preted his  pacific  speeches  by  their  experience  of  his 
actions  ;  and  thus  his  overweening  conduct  in  the  past 
blotted  out  all  hope  of  his  crowning  a  romantic  career  by 
a  peaceful  and  benignant  close.  The  declaration  of  out- 
lawry was  followed,  on  March  25th,  by  the  conclusion  of 
treaties  between  the  Powers,  which  virtually  renewed 
those  framed  at  Chaumont.  In  quick  succession  the 
smaller  States  gave  in  their  adhesion  ;  and  thus  the  coali- 
tion which  tact  and  diplomacy  had  dissolved  was  revivified 
by  the  fears  which  the  mighty  warrior  aroused.  Napoleon 
made  several  efforts  to  sow  distrust  among  the  Powers  ; 
and  chance  placed  in  his  hands  a  veritable  apple  of  dis- 
cord. 

The  Bourbons  in  their  hasty  flight  from  Paris  had  left 
behind  several  State  papers,  among  them  being  the  recent 
secret  compact  against  Russia  and  Prussia.  Napoleon 
promptly  sent  this  document  to  the  Czar  at  Vienna  ;  but 
his  hopes  of  sundering  the  allies  were  soon  blighted. 
Though  Alexander  and  Metternich  had  for  months  refused 
to  exchange  a  word  or  a  look,  yet  the  news  of  Napoleon's 
adventure  brought  about  a  speedy  reconciliation  ;  and 
when  the  compromising  paper  from  Paris  was  placed  in 
the  Czar's  hands,  he  took  the  noble  revenge  of  sending 
for  Metternich,  casting  it  into  the  fire,  and  adjuring  the 
Minister  to  forget  recent  disputes  in  the  presence  of  their 
common  enemy.  Napoleon  strove  to  detach  Austria  from 
the  Coalition,  as  did  also  Fouche  on  his  own  account;  but 
the  overtures  led  to  no  noteworthy  result,  except  that 
Napoleon,  on  finding  out  Fouche's  intrigue,  threatened  to 
have  him  shot  —  a  threat  which  that  necessary  tool  treated 
with  quiet  derision. 

A  few  acts  of  war  occurred  at  once  ;  but  Austria  and 
Russia  pressed  for  delay,  the  latter  with  the  view  of  over- 
throwing Murat.  That  potentate  now  drew  the  sword  on 
behalf  of  Napoleon,  and  summoned  the  Italians  to  struggle 
for  their  independence.  But  he  was  quickly  overpowered 
at  Tolentino  (May  3rd),  and  fled  from  his  kingdom,  dis- 


xxxvin  ELBA   AND   PARIS  413 

guised  as  a  sailor,  to  Toulon.  There  he  offered  his  sword 
to  Napoleon  ;  but  the  Emperor  refused  his  offer  and 
blamed  him  severely,  alleging  that  he  had  compromised 
the  fortunes  of  France  by  rendering  peace  impossible. 
The  charge  must  be  pronounced  not  proven.  The  allies 
had  taken  their  resolve  to  destroy  Napoleon  on  March  13th, 
and  Murat's  adventure  merely  postponed  the  final  struggle 
for  a  month  or  so. 

Napoleon  used  this  time  of  respite  to  form  his  army 
and  stamp  out  opposition  in  France.  The  French 
royalist  bands  gave  him  little  trouble.  In  the  south- 
west the  fleur-de-lys  was  speedily  beaten  down  ;  but  in 
La  Vendee  royalism  had  its  roots  deep-seated.  Headed 
by  the  two  Larochejacqueleins,  the  peasants  made  a  brave 
fight ;  and  20,000  regulars  failed  to  break  them  up  until 
the  month  of  June  was  wearing  on.  What  might  not 
those  20,000  men,  detained  in  La  Vendee,  have  effected 
on  the  crest  of  Waterloo  ? 

Napoleon's  preoccupation,  however,  was  the  conduct 
of  the  Jacobins  in  France,  who  had  been  quickened  to 
immense  energy  by  the  absurdities  of  the  royalist  reac- 
tion and  felt  that  they  had  the  new  ruler  in  their  power. 
A  game  of  skill  ensued,  which  took  up  the  greater  part 
of  the  "  Hundred  Days "  of  Napoleon's  second  reign. 
His  conduct  proved  that  he  was  not  sure  of  success. 
He  felt  out  of  touch  with  this  new  liberty-loving  France, 
so  different  from  the  passively  devoted  people  whom  he 
had  left  in  1814  ;  he  bridled  his  impetuous  nature, 
reasoning  with  men,  inviting  criticism,  and  suggesting 
doubts  as  to  his  own  proposals,  in  a  way  that  contrasted 
curiously  with  the  old  sledge-hammer  methods. 

"He  seemed,"  writes  Mollien,  "habitually  calm,  pensive,  and 
preserved  without  affectation  a  serious  dignity,  with  little  of  that  old 
audacity  and  self-confidence  which  had  never  met  with  insuperable 
obstacles.  ...  As  his  thoughts  were  cramped  in  a  narrow  space  girt 
with  precipices  instead  of  soaring  freely  over  a  vast  horizon  of  powrr, 
they  became  laborious  and  painful.  ...  A  kind  of  lassitude,  that  he 
had  never  known  before,  took  hold  of  him  after  some  hours  of  work." 

This  Pegasus  in  harness  chafed  at  the  unwonted  yoke  ; 
and  at  times  the  old  instincts  showed  themselves.      On 


414  THE  LIEE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

one  occasion,  when  the  subject  turned  on  the  new  passion 
for  liberty,  he  said  to  Lavalette  with  a  question  in  his 
voice  :  "  All  this  will  last  two  or  three  years  ? "  "  Your 
Majesty,"  replied  the  Minister,  "mast  not  believe  that. 
It  will  last  for  ever." 

The  first  grave  difficulty  was  to  frame  a  constitu- 
tion, especially  as  his  Lyons  decrees  led  men  to  believe 
that  it  would  emanate  from  the  people,  and  be  sanc- 
tioned by  them  in  a  great  Champ  de  Mai.  Perhaps 
this  was  impossible.  A  great  part  of  France  was  a 
prey  to  civil  strifes  ;  and  it  was  a  skilful  device  to 
intrust  the  drafting  of  a  constitution  to  Benjamin  Con- 
stant. 

This  brilliant  writer  and  talker  had  now  run  through 
the  whole  gamut  of  political  professions.  A  pronounced 
Jacobin  and  free-thinker  during  the  Consulate,  he  sub- 
sequently retired  to  Germany,  where  he  unlearnt  his 
politics,  his  religion,  and  his  philosophy.  The  sight  of 
Napoleon's  devastations  made  him  a  supporter  of  the 
throne  and  altar,  compelled  him  to  recast  his  treatises, 
and  drove  him  to  consort  with  the  quaint  circle  of 
pietists  who  prayed  and  grovelled  with  Madame  de 
Krudener.  Returning  to  France  at  the  Restoration,  he 
wielded  his  facile  pen  in  the  cause  of  the  monarchy,  and 
fluttered  after  the  fading  charms  of  Madame  Recamier, 
confiding  to  his  friend,  De  Broglie,  that  he  knew  not 
whether  to  trust  most  to  divine  or  satanic  agencies 
for  success  in  this  lawless  chase.  In  March,  1815,  he 
thundered  in  the  Press  against  the  brigand  of  Elba  — 
until  the  latter  won  him  over  in  the  space  of  a  brief 
interview,  and  persuaded  him  to  draft,  with  a  few  col- 
leagues, the  final  constitution  of  the  age. 

Not  that  Constant  had  a  free  hand  :  he  worked  under 
imperial  inspiration.  The  present  effort  was  named  the 
Additional  Act  —  additional,  that  is,  to  the  Constitutions 
of  the  Empire  (April  22nd,  1815).  It  established  a 
Chamber  of  Peers  nominated  by  Napoleon,  with  heredi- 
tary rights,  and  a  Chamber  of  Representatives  elected 
on  the  plan  devised  in  August,  1802.  The  Emperor  was 
to  nominate  all  the  judges,  including  the  juqes  de  paix,'\ 
the  jury  system  was  maintained,  and  liberty  of  the  Press, 


xxxvm  ELBA   AND   PARIS  415 

was  granted:     The  Chambers  also  gained  somewhat  wider 
control  over  the  Ministers.1 

This  Act  called  forth  a  hail  of  criticisms.  When  the 
Council  of  State  pointed  out  that  there  was  no  guarantee 
against  confiscations,  Napoleon's  eyes  flashed  fire,  and  he 
burst  forth  : 

"  You  are  pushing  me  in  a  way  that  is  not  mine.  You  are  weaken- 
ing and  chaining  me.  France  looks  for  me  and  does  not  find  me. 
Public  opinion  was  excellent :  now  it  is  execrable.  France  is  asking 
what  has  come  to  the  Emperor's  arm,  this  arm  which  she  needs  to 
master  Europe.  Why  speak  to  me  of  goodness,  abstract  justice,  and 
of  natural  laws?  The  first  law  is  necessity:  the  first  justice  is  the 
public  safety." 

The  councillors  quailed  under  this  tirade  and  conceded 
the  point  —  though  we  may  here  remark  that  Napoleon 
showed  a  wise  clemency  towards  his  foes,  and  confiscated 
the  estates  of  only  thirteen  of  them. 

Public  opinion  became  more  and  more  "execrable." 
Some  historians  have  asserted  that  the  decline  of  Napo- 
leon's popularity  was  due,  not  to  the  Additional  Act,  but 
to  the  menaces  of  war  from  a  united  Europe  :  this  may  be 
doubted.  Miot  de  Melito,  who  was  working  for  the  Em- 
peror in  the  West,  states  that  "  never  had  a  political  error 
more  immediate  effects  "  than  that  Act  ;  and  Lavalette, 
always  a  devoted  adherent,  asserts  that  Frenchmen  thence- 
forth "  saw  only  a  despot  in  the  Emperor  and  forgot  about 
the  enemy." 

As  a  display  of  military  enthusiasm,  the  Champ  de  Mai, 
of  June  1st,  recalled  the  palmy  days  gone  by.  Veterans 
and  conscripts  hailed  their  chief  with  jubilant  acclaim,  as 
with  a  few  burning  words  he  handed  them  their  eagles. 
But  the  people  on  the  outskirts  cheered  only  when  the 
troops  cheered.  Why  should  they,  or  the  "  electors  "  of 
France,  cheer?  They  had  hoped  to  give  her  a  constitu- 
tion ;  and  they  were  now  merely  witnesses  to  Napoleon's 

1  Napoleon  told  Cockburn  during  his  last  voyage  that  he  bestowed  this 
constitution,  not  because  it  was  a  wise  measure,  but  as  a  needful  con- 
cession to  popular  feeling.  The  continental  peoples  were  not  tit  for 
representative  government  as  England  was  ("Last  Voyages  of  Nap.," 
pp.  115,  137).  So,  too,  he  said  to  Gourgaud  lie  was  wrong  in  summon- 
ing the  Chambers  at  all  "  especially  as  I  meant  to  disiniss  them  as  soon  as 
I  was  a  conqueror"  (Gourgaud,  "  Journal,"  vol.  i.,  p.  93). 


416  THE   LIFE   OE   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xxxviii 

oath  that  he  would  obey  the  constitution  of  his  own  mak- 
ing. As  a  civic  festival,  it  was  a  mockery  in  the  eyes  of 
men  who  remembered  the  "  Feast  of  Pikes  "  and  were  not 
to  be  dazzled  by  the  waving  of  banners  and  the  gorgeous 
costumes  of  Napoleon  and  his  brothers.  The  opening  of 
the  Chambers  six  days  later  gave  an  outlet  to  the  general 
discontent.  Lucien  Bonaparte,  the  official  nominee  for 
the  Presidency  of  the  Lower  House,  was  rejected  in  favour 
of  that  honest  democrat,  Lanjuinais.  Everything  por- 
tended a  constitutional  crisis,  when  the  summons  to  arms 
rang  forth  ;  and  the  chief,  warning  the  deputies  not  to 
imitate  the  Greeks  of  the  late  Empire  by  discussing 
abstract  propositions  while  the  battering-ram  thundered 
at  their  gates,  cut  short  these  barren  debates  by  that  ap- 
peal to  the  sword  which  had  rarely  belied  his  hopes. 


CHAPTER   XXXIX 

LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS 

A  less  determined  optimist  than  Napoleon  might  well 
have  hoped  for  success  over  the  forces  of  the  new  coalition. 
True,  they  seemed  overwhelmingly  great.  But  many  a 
coalition  had  crumbled  away  under  the  alchemy  of  his 
statecraft ;  and  the  jealousies  that  had  raged  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  inspired  the  hope  that  Austria,  and  per- 
haps England,  might  speedily  be  detached  from  their 
present  allies.  Strange  as  it  seems  to  us,  the  French 
people  opined  that  Napoleon's  escape  from  Elba  was  due 
to  the  connivance  of  the  British  Government ;  and  Captain 
Mercer  states  that,  even  at  Waterloo,  many  of  the  French 
cliing  to  the  belief  that  the  British  resistance  would  be  a 
matter  of  form.  Napoleon  cherished  no  such  illusion  :  but 
he  certainly  hoped  to  surprise  the  British  and  Prussian 
forces  in  Belgium,  and  to  sever  at  one  blow  an  alliance 
which  he  judged  to  be  ill  cemented.  Thereafter  he  would 
separate  Austria  from  Russia,  a  task  that  was  certainly 
possible  if  victory  crowned  the  French  eagles.1 

His  military  position  was  far  stronger  than  it  had  been 
since  the  Moscow  campaign.  The  loss  of  Germany  and 
Spain  had  really  added  to  his  power.  No  longer  Avere  his 
veterans  shut  up  in  the  fortresses  of  Europe  from  Danzig 
to  Antwerp,  from  Hamburg  to  Ragusa  ;  and  the  Peninsu- 
lar War  no  longer  engulfed  great  armies  of  his  choicest 
troops.  In  the  eyes  of  Frenchmen  he  whs  not  beaten  in 
1814 ;  he  was  only  tripped  up  by  a  traitor  when  on  the 
point  of  crushing  his  foes.  And,  now  that  peace  had 
brought  back  garrisons  and  prisoners  of  war,  as  many  as 
180,000  well-trained  troops  were  ranged   under  the   im- 

1  Mercer's  "  Waterloo  Campaign,"  vol.  i.,  p.  352.  For  Fleury  de  Cha- 
boulon's  mission  to  sound  Austria,  see  his  "  Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  and  Madelin's 
"Fouchey  ch.  xxv. 

vol.  ii  —  2e  417 


418  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

perial  eagles.  He  hoped  by  the  end  of  June  to  have  half 
a  million  of  devoted  soldiers  ready  for  the  field. 

The  difficulties  that  beset  him  were  enough  to  daunt 
any  mind  but  his.  Some  of  the  most  experienced  Mar- 
shals were  no  longer  at  his  side.  St.  Cyr,  Macdonald, 
Oudinot,  Victor,  Marmont,  and  Augereau  remained  true 
to  Louis  XVIII.  Berthier,  on  hearing  of  Napoleon's  re- 
turn from  Elba,  forthwith  retired  into  Germany,  and,  in  a 
fit  of  frenzy,  threw  himself  from  the  window  of  a  house 
in  Bamberg  while  a  Russian  corps  was  passing  through 
that  town.  Junot  had  lost  his  reason.  .  Massena  and 
Moncey  were  too  old  for  campaigning ;  Mortier  fell  ill 
before  the  first  shots  were  fired.  Worst  of  all,  the  unend- 
ing task  of  army  organization  detained  Davoust  at  Paris. 
Certainly  he  worked  wonders  there ;  but,  as  in  1813  and 
1814,  Napoleon  had  cause  to  regret  the  absence  of  a  lieu- 
tenant equally  remarkable  for  his  acuteness  of  perception 
and  doggedness  of  purpose,  for  a  good  fortune  that  rarely 
failed,  and  a  devotion  that  never  faltered.  Doubtless  it 
was  this  last  priceless  quality,  as  well  as  his  organizing 
gifts,  that  marked  him  out  as  the  ideal  Minister  of  War 
and  Governor  of  Paris.  Besides  him  he  left  a  Council 
charged  with  the  government  during  his  absence,  com- 
posed of  Princes  Joseph  and  Lucien  and  the  Ministers. 

But,  though  the  French  army  of  1815  lacked  some  of 
the  names  far  famed  in  story,  numbers  of  zealous  and  able 
officers  were  ready  to  take  their  place.  The  first  and 
second  corps  were  respectively  assigned  to  Drouet,  Count 
d'Erlon,  and  Reille,  the  former  of  whom  was  the  son  of 
the  postmaster  of  Varennes,  who  stopped  Louis  XVIII.'s 
flight.  Vandamme  commanded  the  third  corps  ;  Gerard, 
the  fourth  ;  Rapp,  the  fifth ;  while  the  sixth  fell  to  Mou- 
ton,  better  known  as  Count  Lobau.  Rapp's  corps  was 
charged  with  the  defence  of  Alsace ;  other  forces,  led  by 
Brune,  Decaen,  and  Clausel,  protected  the  southern  borders, 
while  Suchet  guarded  the  Alps  ;  but  the  rest  of  these  corps 
were  gradually  drawn  together  towards  the  north  of  France, 
and  the  addition  of  the  Guard,  20,800  strong,  brought  the 
total  of  this  army  to  125,000  men. 

There  was  one  post  which  the  Emperor  found  it  most 
difficult  to  fill,  that  of  Chief  of  the  Staff.      There  the  loss 


xxxix  LIGNY  AND   QUATRE   BKAS  419 

of  Berthier  was  irreparable.  While  lacking  powers  of 
initiative,  he  had  the  faculty  of  lucidly  and  quickly  draft- 
ing Napoleon's  orders,  which  insures  the  smooth  work- 
ing of  the  military  machine.  Who  should  succeed  this 
skilful  and  methodical  officer  ?  After  long  hesitation 
Napoleon  chose  Soult.  In  a  military  sense  the  choice 
was  excellent.  The  Duke  of  Dalmatia  had  a  glorious 
military  record ;  in  his  nature  activity  was  blended  with 
caution,  ardour  with  method  ;  but  he  had  little  experi- 
ence of  the  special  duties  now  required  of  him  ;  and  his 
orders  were  neither  drafted  so  clearly  nor  transmitted  so 
promptly  as  those  of  Berthier. 

The  concentration  of  this  great  force  proceeded  with 
surprising  swiftness  ;  and,  in  order  to  lull  his  foes  into 
confidence,  the  Emperor  delayed  his  departure  from  Paris 
to  the  last  moment  possible.  As  dawn  was  flushing  the 
eastern  sky,  on  June  12th,  he  left  his  couch,  after  four 
hours'  sleep,  entered  his  landau,  and  speedily  left  his 
slumbering  capital  behind.  In  twelve  hours  he  was  at 
Laon.  There  he  found  that  Grouchy's  four  ca\7alry  bri- 
gades were  not  sharing  in  the  general  advance  owing  to 
Soult's  neglect  to  send  the  necessary  orders.  The  horse- 
men were  at  once  hurried  on,  several  regiments  covering 
twenty  leagues  at  a  stretch  and  exhausting  their  steeds. 
On  the  14th  the  army  was  well  in  hand  around  Beaumont, 
within  striking  distance  of  the  Prussian  vanguard,  from 
which  it  was  separated  by  a  screen  of  dense  woods.  There 
the  Emperor  mounted  his  charger  and  rode  along  the  ranks, 
raising  such  a  storm  of  cheers  that  he  vainly  called  out  : 
"Not  so  loud,  my  children,  the  enemy  will  hear  you." 
There,  too,  on  this  anniversary  of  Marengo  and  Friedland, 
he  inspired  his  men  by  a  stirring  appeal  on  behalf  of  the 
independence  of  Poles,  Italians,  the  smaller  German  States, 
and,  above  all,  of  France  herself.  "  For  every  French- 
man of  spirit  the  time  has  come  to  conquer  or  die." 

What,  meanwhile,  was  the  position  of  the  allies  ?  An 
Austro-Sardinian  force  threatened  the  south-east  of  France. 
Mighty  armies  of  170,000  Russians  and  250,000  Austrians 
were  rolling  slowly  on  towards  Lorraine  and  Alsace  re- 
spectively ;  120,000  Prussians,  under  Bliieher,  were  can- 
toned between  Liege  and  Charleroi  ;  while  Wellington's 


420  THE   LIFE   OF   NAl'OLEO.N    I  chap. 

composite  array  of  British,  German,  and  Dutch-Belgian 
troops,  about  100,000  strong,  lay  between  Brussels  and 
Mons.1  The  original  plan  of  these  two  famous  leaders 
was  to  push  on  rapidly  into  France  ;  but  the  cautious 
influences  of  the  Military  Council  sitting  at  Vienna  pre- 
vailed, and  it  was  finally  decided  not  to  open  the  cam- 
paign until  the  Austrians  and  Russians  should  approach 
the  frontiers  of  France.  Even  as  late  as  June  15th  we 
find  Wellington  writing  to  the  Czar  in  terms  that  assume 
a  co-operation  of  all  the  allies  in  simultaneous  moves  towards 
paris  —  movements  which  Schwarzenberg  had  led  him  to 
expect  would  begin  about  the  20th  of  Ju?ie.2 

From  this  prolonged  and  methodical  warfare  Europe 
was  saved  by  Napoleon's  vigorous  offensive.  His  political 
instincts  impelled  him  to  strike  at  Brussels,  where  he 
hoped  that  the  populace  would  declare  for  union  with 
France  and  severance  from  the  detested  Dutch.  In  this 
war  he  must  not  only  conquer  armies,  he  must  win  over 
public  opinion  ;  and  how  could  he  gain  it  so  well  as  in 
the  guise  of  a  popular  liberator?  But  there  were  other 
advantages  to  be  gained  in  Belgium.  By  flinging  him- 
self on  Wellington  and  the  Prussians,  and  driving  them 
asunder,  he  would  compel  Louis  XVIII.  to  another  un- 
dignified flight ;  and  he  would  disorganize  the  best  pre- 
pared armies  of  his  foes,  and  gain  the  material  resources 
of  the  Low  Countries.  He  seems  even  to  have  cherished 
the  hope  that  a  victory  over  Wellington  would  dispirit  the 
British  Government,  unseat  the  Ministry,  and  install  in 
power  the  peace-loving  Whigs. 

And  this  victory  was  almost  within  his"  grasp.  While 
his  host  drew  near  to  the  Prussian  outposts  south  of  Char- 
leroi  and  Thuin,  the  allies  were  still  spread  out  in  canton- 

i  In  the  "English  Hist.  Review"  for  July,  1901,  I  have  published  the 
correspondence  between  Sir  Hudson  Lowe  (Quartermaster-General  of 
our  forces  in  Belgium  up  to  May,  1815)  and  Gneisenau,  Muffling,  and 
Kleist.  These  two  last  were  most  reluctant  to  send  forward  Prussian 
troops  into  Belgium  to  guard  the  weak  frontier  fortresses  from  a  coup  de 
main :  but  Lowe's  arguments  prevailed,  thus  deciding  the  main  features 
of  the  war.  _  ,       ,  .  _. 

2  "F.  O.,"  France,  No.  116.  On  June  9th  the  Duke  charged  Stuart, 
our  envoy  at  Ghent,  to  defend  this  course,  on  the  ground  that  Bliicher  and 
he  had  many  raw  troops,  and  could  not  advance  into  France  with  safety 
and  invest  fortresses  until  the  Russians  and  Austrians  co-operated. 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BUAS  421 

raents  that  extended  over  one  hundred  miles,  namely, 
from  Liege  on  Bliicher's  left  to  Audenarde  on  Welling- 
ton's right.  This  wide  dispersion  of  troops,  when  an 
enterprising  foe  was  known  to  be  almost  within  striking 
distance,  has  been  generally  condemned.  Thus  General 
Kennedy,  in  his  admirable  description  of  Waterloo,  ad- 
mits that  there  was  an  "  absurd  extension  "  of  the  canton- 
ments. Wellington,  however,  was  bound  to  wait  and  to 
watch  the  three  good  high-roads,  by  any  one  of  which 
Napoleon  might  advance,  namely,  those  of  Tournay, 
Mons,  and  Charleroi.  The  Duke  had  other  causes  for 
extending  his  lines  far  to  the  west :  he  desired  to  cover 
the  roads  from  Ostend,  whence  he  was  expecting  rein- 
forcements, and  to  stretch  a  protecting  wing  over  the 
King  of  France  at  Ghent. 

There  are  many  proofs,  however,  that  Wellington  was 
surprised  by  Napoleon.  The  narratives  of  Sir  Hussey 
Vivian  and  Captain  Mercer  show  that  the  final  orders  for 
our  advance  were  carried  out  with  a  haste  and  flurry  that 
would  not  have  happened  if  the  army  had  been  well  in 
hand,  or  if  Wellington  had  been  fully  informed  of  Napo- 
leon's latest  moves.1  There  is  a  wild  story  that  the  Duke 
was  duped  b}r  Fouche,  on  whom  he  was  relying  for  news 
from  Paris.  But  it  seems  far  more  likely  that  he  was 
misled  by  the  tidings  sent  to  Louis  XVIII.  at  Ghent  by 
zealous  royalists  in  France,  the  general  purport  of  which 
was  that  Napoleon  would  wage  a  defensive  campaign.'1  On 
the  13th  June,  Wellington  wrote :  "  1  have  accounts  from 
Paris  of  the  10th,  on  which  day  he  [Bonaparte]  was  still 
there  ;  and  I  judge  from  his  speech  to  the  Legislature 
that  his  departure  was  not  likely  to  be  immediate.  I 
think  we  are  now  too  strong  for  him  here."  And,  in 
later  years,  he  told  Earl  Stanhope  that  Napoleon  "was 
certainly  wrong  in  attacking  at  all  "  ;  for  the  allied  armies 
must  soon  have  been  in  great  straits  for  want  of  food  if 
they  had  advanced  into  France,  exhausted  as  she  was  by 

1  Sir  H.  Vivian  states  ("Waterloo  Letters,"  No.  70)  that  the  Duke 
intended  to  give  a  ball  on  June  21st,  the  anniversary  of  Vittoria.  See 
too  Sir  E.  Wood's  "  Cavalry  in  the  Waterloo  Campaign, "  ch.  ii. 

2  "  F.  0.,"  France,  No.  115.  A  French  royalist  seni  a  report,  dated 
June  1st,  recommending  "point  d'engagement  avec  Bonaparte.  .  .  . 
II  faut  user  Pannee  tie  Bonaparte  :  die  ne  pent  plus  se  recruter." 


4-22 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I 


CHAP. 


the   campaign  of  1814.     "  But,"  he  added,  "  the  fact  is, 
Bonaparte  never  in  his  life  had  patience  for  a  defensive 


war. 


The  Duke's  forces  would,  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign, 
PLAN  OF  THE  WATERLOO  CAMPAICN 


have  been  in  less  danger,  if  the  leaders  at  the  Prussian 
outposts,  Dornberg  and  Pirch  II.,  had  given  timely  warn- 
ing of  the  massing  of  the  enemy  near  the  Sambre  early  on 
the  15th  of  June.  By  some  mischance  this  was  not  done ; 
and  our  leader  only  heard  from  Hardinge,  at  the  Prussian 
headquarters,  that  the  enemy  seemed  about  to  begin  the 


xxxix  L1GNY   AND   QUATRE   BKAS  423 

offensive.  He  therefore  waited  for  more  definite  news 
before  concentrating  upon  any  one  line. 

About  6  p.m.  on  the  15th  he  ordered  his  divisions  and 
brigades  to  concentrate  at  Vilvorde,  Brussels,  Ninove, 
Grammont,  Ath,  Braine-le-Comte,  Hal,  and  Nivelles  —  the 
first  four  of  which  were  somewhat  remote,  while  the  others 
were  chosen  with  a  view  to  defending  the  roads  leading 
northwards  from  Mons.  Not  a  single  British  brigade  was 
posted  on  the  Waterloo-Charleroi  road,  which  was  at  that 
time  guarded  only  by  a  Dutch-Belgian  division,  a  fact 
which  supports  Mr.  Ropes's  contention  that  no  definite 
plan  of  co-operation  had  been  formed  by  the  allied  leaders. 
Or,  if  there  was  one,  the  Duke  certainly  refused  to  act 
upon  it  until  he  had  satisfied  himself  that  the  chief  attack 
was  not  by  way  of  Mons  or  Ath.  More  definite  news 
reached  Brussels  near  midnight  of  the  15th,  whereupon  he 
gave  a  general  left  turn  to  his  advance,  namely,  towards 
Nivelles. 

Clausewitz  maintains  that  he  should  already  have  re- 
moved his  headquarters  to  Nivelles ;  had  he  done  so  and 
hurried  up  all  available  troops  towards  the  Soignies-Quatre 
Bras  line,  his  Waterloo  fame  would  certainly  have  gained 
in  solidity.  A  dash  of  romance  was  added  by  his  attend- 
ing the  Duchess  of  Richmond's  ball  at  Brussels  on  the 
night  of  the  15th-16th;  lovers  of  the  picturesque  will  al- 
ways linger  over  the  scene  that  followed  with  its  "  hurry- 
ing to  and  fro  and  tremblings  of  distress  "  ;  but  the  more 
prosaic  inquirer  may  doubt  whether  Wellington  should 
not  then  have  been  more  to  the  front,  feeling  every  throb 
of  Bellona's  pulse.1 

Bliicher's  army,  comprising  90,000  men,  also  covered  a 
great  stretch  of  country.  The  first  corps,  that  of  Ziethen, 
held  the  bridges  of  the  Sambre  at  and  near  Charleroi  ;  but 
the  corps  of  Pirch  I.  and  Thielmann  were  at  Namur  and 
Ciney  ;  while,  owing  to  a  lack  of  stringency  in  the  orders 
sent  by  Gneisenau,  chief  of  the  staff,  to  Biilow,  his  corps 
of  32,000  men  was  still  at  Liege.  Early  on  the  15th, 
Pirch  1.  and  Thielmann  began  hastily  to  advance  towards 

1  Ropes's  "  Campaign  of  Waterloo,"  ch.  v.  ;  Chesney,  "  Waterloo 
Lectures,"  p.  100;  Sir  H.  Maxwell's  "Wellington"  (vol.  ii.,  p.  14); 
and  O'Connor  Morris,  "Campaign  of  1815,"  p.  97. 


424  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Sombref  ;  and  Ziethen,  with  32,000  men,  prepared  to  hold 
the  line  of  the  Sambre  as  long  as  possible.  His  chief  of 
staff,  General  Reiche,  states  that  one-third  of  the  Prussians 
were  new  troops,  drafted  in  from  the  Landwehr ;  but  all 
the  corps  gloried  in  their  veteran  Field-Marshal,  and  were 
eager  to  fight. 

Such,  then,  was  the  general  position.  Wellington  was 
unaware  of  his  danger;  Blucher  was  straining  every 
nerve  to  get  his  army  together;  while  32,000  Prussians 
were  exposed  to  the  attack  of  nearly  four  times  their 
number.  It  is  clear  that,  had  all  gone  well  with  the 
French  advance,  the  fortunes  of  Wellington  and  Blucher 
must  have  been  desperate.  But,  though  the  concentra- 
tion of  125,000  French  troops  near  Beaumont  and  Mau- 
beuge  had  been  effected  with  masterly  skill  (except  that 
Gerard's  and  D'Erlon's  corps  were  late),  the  final  moves 
did  not  work  quite  smoothly.  An  accident  to  the  officer 
who  was  to  order  Vandamme's  corps  to  march  at  2  a.m. 
on  the  15th  caused  a  long  delay  to  that  eager  fighter.1 
The  4th  corps,  that  of  Gerard,  was  also  disturbed  and 
delayed  by  an  untoward  event.  General  Bourmont, 
whose  old  Vendean  opinions  seemed  to  have  melted  away 
completely  before  the  sun  of  Napoleon's  glory,  rewarded 
his  master  by  deserting  with  several  officers  to  the  Prus- 
sians, very  early  on  that  morning.  The  incident  was 
really  of  far  less  importance  than  is  assigned  to  it  in  the 
St.  Helena  Memoirs,  which  falsely  ascribe  it  to  the  14th  : 
the  Prussians  were  already  on  the  qui  vive  before  Bour- 
mont's  desertion  ;  but  it  clogged  the  advance  of  Gerard's 
corps  and  fostered  distrust  among  the  rank  and  file. 
When,  on  the  morrow,  Gerard  rejoined  his  chief  at  the 
mill  of  Fleurus,  the  latter  reminded  him  that  he  had 
answered  for  Bourmont's  fidelity  with  his  own  head ; 
and,  on  the  general  protesting  that  he  had  seen  Bourmont 
fight  with  the  utmost  devotion,  Napoleon  replied  :  "  Bah  ! 
A  man  who  has  been  a  white  will  never  become  a  blue  : 
and  a  blue  will  never  be  a  white."  Significant  words, 
that  show  the  Emperor's  belief  in  the  ineradicable  strength 
of  instinct  and  early  training.2 

1  Janin,  "  Campasne  de  Waterloo,"  p.  7. 

2  P6tiet,  ''Souvenirs  militaires,"  p.  195. 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  425 

Despite  these  two  mishaps,  the  French  on  the  morning 
of  the  15th  succeeded  in  driving  Ziethen's  men  from  the 
banks  of  the  Sambre  about  Thuin,  while  Napoleon  in 
person  broke  through  their  line  at  Charleroi.  After  suf- 
fering rather  severely,  the  defenders  fell  back  on  Gilly, 
whither  Napoleon  and  his  main  force  followed  them  ; 
while  the  left  wing  of  the  French  advance,  now  intrusted 
to  Ney,  was  swung  forward  against  the  all-important 
position  of  Quatre  Bras. 

We  here  approach  one  of  the  knotty  questions  of  the  cam- 
paign. Why  did  not  Ney  occupy  the  cross-roads  in  force 
on  the  evening  of  the  15th?  We  may  note  first  that  not 
till  the  11th  had  Napoleon  thought  fit  to  summon  Ney  to 
the  army,  so  that  the  Marshal  did  not  come  up  till  the 
afternoon  of  this  very  day.  He  at  once  had  an  interview 
with  the  Emperor,  who,  according  to  General  Gourgaud, 
gave  the  Marshal  verbal  orders  to  take  command  of  the 
corps  of  Reille  and  D'Erlon,  to  push  on  northwards,  take 
up  a  position  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  throw  out  advanced 
posts  beyond  on  the  Brussels  and  Namur  roads  ;  but  it 
seems  unlikely  that  the  Emperor  would  have  given  one 
of  the  most  venturesome  of  his  Marshals  an  absolute 
order  to  push  on  so  far  in  advance,  unless  the  French 
right  wing  had  driven  the  Prussians  back  beyond  the 
Sombref  position.  Otherwise,  Ney  would  have  been 
dangerously  far  in  advance  of  the  main  bod}r,  and  exposed 
to  blows  either  from  the  Prussians  or  the  British. 

However  this  may  be,  Ney  certainly  felt  insecure,  and 
did  not  push  on  with  his  wonted  dash  ;  while,  fortunately 
for  the  allies,  an  officer  was  at  hand,  Prince  Bernard  of 
Saxe- Weimar,  who  saw  the  need  of  holding  Quatre  Bras 
at  all  costs.1  The  3roung  leader  imposed  on  the  foe  by 
making  the  most  of  his  men  —  they  were  but  4,500  all 
told,  and  had  only  ten  bullets  apiece  —  and  he  succeeded. 
For  once,  Ney  was  prudent  to  a  fault,  and  did  not  push 
home  the  attack.     In  his  excuse  it  may  be  said  that  the 

1  Credit  is  primarily  due  to  Constant  de  Rebecque,  a  Belgian,  chief  of 
staff  to  the  Prince  of  Orange,  for  altering  the  point  of  concentration  from 
Nivelles,  as  ordered  by  Wellington,  to  Quatre  Bras;  also  to  General  Per- 
poncher  for  supporting  the  new  movement.  The  Belgian  side  of  the 
campaign  has  been  well  set  forth  by  Boulger  in  "  The  Belgians  at  Water- 
loo" (1901). 


426  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

men  of  Reille's  corps,  on  whom  he  had  to  rely  —  for 
D'Erlon's  corps  was  still  far  to  the  rear — had  been 
marching  and  fighting  ever  since  dawn,  and  were  too 
weary  for  another  battle.  Moreover,  the  roar  of  cannon 
on  the  south-east  warned  him  that  the  right  wing  of  the 
French  advance  was  hotly  engaged  between  Gilly  and 
Fleurus  ;  until  it  beat  back  the  Prussians,  his  own  posi- 
tion was  dangerously  "  in  the  air "  ;  and,  as  but  two 
hours  of  daylight  remained,  he  drew  back  on  Frasnes. 
He  is  also  said  to  have  sent  word  to  the  Emperor  that 
"  he  was  occupying  Quatre  Bras  by  an  advanced  guard, 
and  that  his  main  body  was  close  behind."  If  he  de- 
ceived his  chief  by  any  such  report,  he  deserves  the  sever- 
est censure  ;  but  the  words  quoted  above  were  written 
later  at  St.  Helena  by  General  Gourgaud,  when  Ney  had 
come  to  figure  as  the  scapegoat  of  the  campaign.1  Ney 
sent  in  a  report  on  that  evening ;  but  it  has  been  lost.2 
Judging  from  the  orders  issued  by  Napoleon  and  Soult 
early  on  the  16th,  there  was  much  uncertainty  as  to  Ney's 
position.  The  Emperor's  letter  bids  him  post  his>  first 
division  "two  leagues  in  front  of  les  Quatres  Chemins"; 
but  Soult's  letter  to  Grouchy  states  that  Ney  is  ordered 
to  advance  to  the  cross-roads.  Confusion  was  to  be  ex- 
pected from  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Ney  did  not 
know  his  staff-officers,  and  he  hastily  took  command  of 
the  left  wing  when  in  the  midst  of  operations  whose  suc- 
cess, as  Janin  points  out,  largely  depended  on  that  of  the 
right.  He  therefore  played  a  cautious  game,  when,  as  we 
now  know,  caution  meant  failure  and  daring  spelt  safety. 
Meanwhile  the  French  right  wing,  of  which  Grouchy 
had  received  the  command,  though  Napoleon  in  person 
was  its  moving  force,  had  been  pressing  the  Prussians 
hard  near  Gilly.  Yet  here,  too,  the  assailants  were  weak- 
ened by  the  absence  of  the  corps  of  Vandamme  and 
Gerard.  Irritated  by  Ziethen's  skilful  withdrawal,  the 
Emperor  at  last  launched  his  cavalry  at  the  Prussian 
rear  battalions,  four  of  which  were  severely  handled 
before  they  reached  the  covert  of  a  wood.  With  the 
loss,  on  the  whole,   of  nearly  2,000  men,  the  Prussians 

1  Gourgaud,  "Campagne  de  1815,"  ch.  iv. 

2  Houssaye,  "  1815,"  pp.  133-138,  186,  notes. 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATKE    BRAS  427 

fell  back  towards  Ligny,  while  Grouchy 's  vanguard 
bivouacked  near  the  village  of  Fleurus. 

Napoleon  might  well  be  satisfied  with  the  work  done  on 
June  15th  :  he  rode  back  to  his  headquarters  at  Charle- 
roi,  "  exhausted  with  fatigue,"  after  spending  wellnigh 
eighteen  hours  in  the  saddle,  but  confident  that  he  had 
sundered  the  allies.  This  was  certainly  his  aim  now,  as 
it  had  been  in  the  campaign  of  1796.  After  two  decisive 
blows  at  their  points  of  connection,  he  purposed  driving 
them  on  divergent  lines  of  retreat,  just  as  he  had  driven 
the  Austrians  and  Sardinians  down  the  roads  that  bifur- 
cate near  Montenotte.  True,  there  were  in  Belgium  no 
mountain  spurs  to  prevent  their  reunion  ;  but  the  roads 
on  which  they  were  operating  were  far  more  widely  diver- 
gent.1 He  also  thought  lightly  of  Wellington  and  Bliicher. 
The  former  he  had  pronounced  "  incapable  and  unwise  "  ; 
as  for  Bliicher,  he  told  Campbell  at  Elba  that  he  was  "  no 
general  "  ;  but  that  he  admired  the  pluck  with  which  "the 
old  devil "  came  on  again  after  a  thrashing. 

Unclouded  confidence  is  seen  in  every  phrase  of  the 
letters  that  he  penned  at  Charleroi  early  on  the  16th. 
He  informs  Ney  that  he  intends  soon  to  attack  the  Prus- 
sians at  Sombref,  if  he  finds  them  there,  to  clear  the  road 
as  far  as  Gembloux,  and  then  to  decide  on  his  further 
actions  as  the  case  demands.  Meanwhile  Ney  is  to  sweep 
the  road  in  front  of  Quatre  Bras,  placing  his  first  division 
two  leagues  beyond  that  position,  if  it  seemed  desirable, 
with  a  view  to  marching  on  Brussels  during  the  night 
with  his  whole  force  of  about  50,000  men.  The  Guard 
is  to  be  kept  in  reserve  as  much  as  possible,  so  as  to  sup- 
port either  Napoleon  on  the  Gembloux  road,  or  Ney  on 
the  Brussels  road  ;  and  "  if  any  skirmish  takes  place  with 
the  English,  it  is  preferable  that  the  work  should  fall 
on  the  Line  rather  than  on  the  Guard."  As  for  the  Prus- 
sian resistance,  Napoleon  rated  it  almost  as  lightly  as  that 
of  the  English  ;  for  he  regards  it  as  probable  that  he  will 
in  the  evening  march  on  Brussels  with  his  Guard. 

While  he  pictured  his  enemies  hopelessly  scattered  or 
in  retreat,  they  were  beginning  to  muster  at  the  very 
points  which  he  believed  to  be  within  his  grasp.      At 

1  Haruley,  "Operations  of  War,"  p.  187. 


428  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xxxix 

11  a.m.  only  Ziethen's  corps,  now  but  28,000  strong,  was 
in  position  at  Sombref,  but  the  corps  of  Pirch  I.  and 
Thielmann  came  up  shortly  after  midday.  Had  Napoleon 
pushed  on  early  on  the  16th,  he  must  easily  have  gained 
the  Ligny-Sombref  position.  What,  then,  caused  the  de- 
lay in  the  French  attack  ?  It  can  be  traced  to  the  slow- 
ness of  Gerard's  advance,  to  the  Emperor's  misconception 
of  the  situation,  and  to  his  despatch  to  Grouchy.  In  this 
he  reckoned  the  Prussians  at  40,000  men,  and  ordered 
Grouchy  to  repair  with  the  French  right  wing  to  Sombref. 

"...  I  shall  be  at  Fleurus  between  10  and  11  a.m.:  I  shall  proceed 
to  Sombref,  leaving  my  Guard,  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  at  Fleurus : 
I  would  not  take  it  to  Sombref,  unless  it  should  be  necessary.  If  the 
enemy  is  at  Sombref,  I  mean  to  attack  him :  I  mean  to  attack  him 
even  at  Gembloux,  and  to  gain  this  position  also,  my  aim  being,  after 
having  known  about  these  two  positions,  to  set  out  to-night,  and  to 
operate  with  my  left  wing,  under  the  command  of  Marshal  Ney, 
against  the  English. 

The  Emperor  did  not  reach  Fleurus  until  close  on  11  A.M., 
and  was  undoubtedly  taken  aback  to  find  Grouchy  still 
there,  held  in  check  by  the  enemy  strongly  posted  around 
Ligny.  Grouchy  has  been  blamed  for  not  having  already 
attacked  them ;  but  surely  his  orders  bound  him  to  wait 
for  the  Emperor  before  giving  battle :  besides,  the  corps 
of  Gerard,  which  had  been  assigned  to  him,  was  still  far 
away  in  the  rear  toward  Chatelet.1  The  absence  of  Ge- 
rard, and  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  enemy's  aims,  annoyed 
the  Emperor.  He  mounted  the  windmill  situated  on  the 
outskirts  of  Fleurus  to  survey  the  enemy's  position. 

It  was  a  fair  scene  that  lay  before  him.  Straight  in 
front  ran  the  high-road  which  joined  the  Namur-Nivelles 
chaussee,  some  six  miles  away  to  the  north-east.  On  either 
side  stretched  cornfields,  whose  richness  bore  witness  alike 
to  the  toils  and  the  warlike  passions  of  mankind.  Further 
ahead  might  be  seen  the  dark  lines  of  the  enemy  ranged 
along  slopes  that  formed  an  irregular  amphitheatre,  dotted 
with  the  villages  of  Bry  and  Sombref.     In  the  middle  dis- 

1  For  Gerard's  delays  see  Houssaye,  p.  158,  and  Horsburgh,  "Water- 
loo," p.  36.  Napoleon's  tardiness  is  scarcely  noticed  by  Houssaye  or  by 
Gourgaud  ;  but  it  has  been  censured  by  Jomini,  Charras,  Clausewitz,  and 
Lord  VVolseley. 


430  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

tance,  from  out  a  hollow  that  lay  concealed,  rose  the  steeples 
and  a  few  of  the  higher  roofs  of  Ligny.  Further  to  the 
left  and  on  higher  ground  lay  St.  Ainand,  with  its  outlying 
hamlets.  All  was  bathed  in  the  shimmering,  sultry  heat 
of  midsummer,  the  harbinger,  as  it  proved,  of  a  violent 
thunderstorm.  The  Prussian  position  was  really  stronger 
than  it  seemed.  Napoleon  could  not  fully  see  either  the 
osier  beds  that  fringed  the  Ligny  brook,  or  its  steep  banks, 
or  the  many  strong  buildings  of  Ligny  itself.  He  saw  the 
Prussians  on  the  slope  behind  the  village,  and  was  at  first 
puzzled  by  their  exposed  position.  "The  old  fox  keeps 
to  earth,"  he  was  heard  to  mutter.  And  so  he  waited 
until  matters  should  clear  up,  and  Gerard's  arrival  should 
give  him  strength  to  compass  Blucher's  utter  overthrow 
while  in  the  act  of  stretching  a  feeler  towards  Wellington. 
From  the  time  when  the  Emperor  came  on  the  scene  to 
the  first  swell  of  the  battle's  roar,  there  was  a  space  of 
more  than  four  hours. 

This  delay  was  doubly  precious  to  the  allies.  It  gave 
Blucher  time  to  bring  up  the  corps  of  Pirch  I.  and  Thiel- 
mann  under  cover  of  the  high  ground  near  Sombref, 
thereby  raising  his  total  force  to  about  87,000  men  ;  and 
it  enabled  the  two  allied  commanders  to  meet  and  hastily 
confer  on  the  situation.  Wellington  had  left  Brussels 
that  morning  at  8  o'clock,  and  thanks  to  Ney's  inaction, 
was  able  to  reach  the  crest  south  of  Quatre  Bras  a  little 
after  10,  long  before  the  enemy  showed  any  signs  of  life. 
There  he  penned  a  note  to  Blucher,  asking  for  news  from 
him  before  deciding  on  his  operations  for  the  day.1  He 
then  galloped  over  to  the  windmill  of  Bussy  to  meet 
Blucher.  It  was  an  anxious  meeting  ;  the  heads  of  the 
advancing  French  columns  were  already  in  sight ;  and  the 

1  Ollech  (p.  125)  sees  in  it  an  offer  of  help  to  Blucher.  But  on  what 
ground  ?  It  states  that  the  Prince  of  Orange  has  one  division  at  Quatre 
Bras  and  other  troops  at  Nivelles  :  that  the  British  reserve  would  reach 
Genappe  at  noon,  and  their  cavalry  Nivelles  at  the  same  hour.  How  could 
Blucher  hope  for  help  from  forces  so  weak  and  scattered  ?  See  too  Ropes 
(note  to  ch.  x.).  Horsburgh  (ch.  v.)  shows  that  Wellington  believed  his 
forces  to  be  more  to  the  front  than  they  were  :  he  traces  the  error  to  De 
Lancey,  chief  of  the  staff.  But  it  is  fair  to  add  that  Wellington  thought 
very  highly  of  De  Lancey,  and  after  his  death  at  Waterloo  severely  blamed 
subordinates. 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  431 

Duke  saw  with  dismay  the  position  of  the  Prussians  on 
a  slope  that  must  expose  them  to  the  full  force  of  Napo- 
leon's cannon  —  or,  as  he  whispered  to  Hardinge,  "they 
will  be  damnably  mauled  if  they  fight  here."1  In  more 
decorous  terms,  but  to  the  same  effect,  he  warned  Blucher, 
and  said  nothing  to  encourage  him  to  hold  fast  to  his  posi- 
tion. Neither  did  he  lead  him  to  expect  aid  from  Quatre 
Bras.  The  utmost  that  Gneisenau  could  get  from  him 
was  the  promise,  "  Well  !  I  will  come  provided  I  am  not 
attacked  myself."  Did  these  words  induce  the  Prussians 
to  accept  battle  at  Ligny  ?  It  is  impossible  to  think  so. 
Everything  tends  to  show  that  Blucher  had  determined 
to  fight  there.  The  risk  was  great  ;  for,  as  we  learn  from 
General  Reiche,  the  position  was  seen  to  admit  of  no  vig- 
orous offensive  blows  against  the  French.  But  fortune 
smiled  on  the  veteran  Field-Marshal,  and  averted  what 
might  have  been  an  irretrievable  disaster.2 

.It  would  seem  that  the  inequalities  of  the  ground  hid 
the  strength  of  Pirch  I.  and  Thielmann  ;  for  Napoleon  still 
believed  that  he  had  ranged  against  him  at  Ligny  only 
a  single  corps.  At  2  p.m.  Soult  informed  Ney  that  the 
enemy  had  united  a  corps  between  Sombref  and  Bry,  and 
that  in  half  an  hour  Grouchy  would  attack  it.  Ney  was 
therefore  to  beat  back  the  foes  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  then 
turn  to  envelop  the  Prussians.  But  if  these  were  driven  in 
first,  the  Emperor  would  move  towards  Ney  to  hasten  his 
operations.^  Not  until  the  battle  was  about  to  begin  does 
the  Emperor  seem  to  have  realized  that  he  was  in  presence 
of  superior  forces.4  But  after  2  p.m.  their  masses  drew 
down  over  the  slopes  of  Bry  and  Sombref,  their  foremost 
troops  held  the  villages  of  Ligny  and  St.  Amand,  while 
their  left  crowned  the  ridge  of  Tongrines.     Napoleon  re- 

1  Stanhope,  "Conversations,"  p.  109. 

2  Reiche,  "  Memoiren,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  183. 

8  The  term  corps  is  significant.  Not  till  3.15  did  Soult  use  the  term 
armee  in  speaking  of  IJliicher's  forces.  The  last  important  sentence  of 
the  2  p.m.  despatch  is  not  given  by  Houssaye  (p.  159),  but  is  printed  by 
Ropes  (p.  383),  Siborne  (vol.  i.,  p.  453),  Charras  (vol.  i.,  p.  136),  and 
Ollech  (p.  131).  It  proves  that  as  late  as  2  p.m.  Napoleon  expected  an 
easy  victory  over  the  Prussians. 

4  The  best  authorities  give  the  Prussians  87,000  men,  and  the  French 
78,000  ;  but  the  latter  estimate  includes  the  corps  of  Lobau,  10,000  strong, 
which  did  not  reach  Fleurus  till  dark. 


432  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

formed  his  lines,  which  had  hitherto  been  at  right  angles 
to  the  main  road  through  Fleurus.  Vandamme's  corps 
moved  off  towards  St.  Amand  ;  and  Gerard,  after  ranging 
his  corps  parallel  to  that  road,  began  to  descend  towards 
Ligny,  Grouchy  meanwhile  marshalling  the  cavalry  to  pro- 
tect their  flank  and  rear.  Behind  all  stood  the  imposing 
mass  of  the  Imperial  Guard  on  the  rising  ground  near 
Fleurus. 

The  fiercest  shock  of  battle  fell  upon  the  corps  of 
Vandamme  and  Gerard.  Three  times  were  Gerard's 
men  driven  back  by  the  volleys  of  the  Prussians  holding 
Ligny.  But  the  French  cannon  open  fire  with  terrific 
effect.  Roofs  crumble  away,  and  buildings  burst  into 
flame.  Once  more  the  French  rush  to  the  onset,  and  a 
furious  hand-to-hand  scuffle  ensues.  Half  stifled  by  heat, 
smoke,  and  dust,  the  rival  nations  fight  on,  until  the 
defenders  give  way  and  fall  back  on  the  further  part  of 
the  village  behind  the  brook  ;  but,  when  reinforced,  they 
rally  as  fiercely  as  ever,  and  drive  the  French  over  its 
banks ;  lane,  garden,  and  attic  once  more  become  the 
scene  of  struggles  where  no  man  thinks  of  giving  or 
taking  quarter. 

Higher  up  the  stream,  at  St.  Amand,  Vandamme's 
troops  fared  no  better ;  for  Blucher  steadily  fed  that 
part  of  his  array.  In  so  doing,  however,  he  weakened 
his  reserves  behind  Ligny,  thereby  unwittingly  favour- 
ing Napoleon's  design  of  breaking  the  Prussian  centre, 
and  placing  its  wreckage  and  the  whole  of  their  right 
wing  between  two  fires.  The  Emperor  expected  that, 
by  6  o'clock,  Ney  would  have  driven  back  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  forces,  and  would  be  ready  to  envelop  the  Prus- 
sian right.  That  was  the  purport  of  Soult's  despatch  of 
3.15  P.M.  to  Ney:  "This  army  [the  Prussian]  is  lost,  if 
you  act  with  vigour.    The  fate  of  France  is  in  your  hands." 

But  at  5.30,  when  part  of  the  Imperial  Guard  was 
about  to  strengthen  Gerard  for  the  decisive  blow  at  the 
Prussian  centre,  Vandamme  sent  word  that  a  hostile  force 
of  some  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  men  was  marching 
towards  Fleurus.  This  strange  apparition  not  only 
unsteadied  the  French  left :  it  greatly  perplexed  the 
Emperor.     As  he  had  ordered  first  Ney  and  then  D'Erlon 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  433 

to  march,  not  on  Fleurus,  but  against  the  rear  of  the 
Prussian  right  wing,  he  seems  to  have  concluded  that 
this  new  force  must  be  that  of  Wellington  about  to  deal 
the  like  deadly  blow  against  the  French  rear.1  Accord- 
ingly he  checked  the  advance  of  the  Guard  until  the 
riddle  could  be  solved.  After  the  loss  of  nearly  two 
hours  it  was  solved  by  an  aide-de-camp,  who  found  that 
the  force  was  D'Erlon's,  and  that  it  had  retired. 

Meanwhile  the  battle  had  raged  with  scarcely  a  pause, 
the  French  guns  working  frightful  havoc  among  the 
dense  masses  on  the  opposite  slope.  And  yet,  by  with- 
drawing troops  to  his  right,  Bliicher  had  for  a  time  over- 
borne Vandamme's  corps  and  part  of  the  Young  Guard, 
unconscious  that  his  insistence  on  this  side  jeopardized 
the  whole  Prussian  army.  His  great  adversary  had  long 
marked  the  immense  extension  of  its  concave  front,  the 
massing  of  its  troops  against  St.  Amand,  and  the  remote- 
ness of  its  left  wing,  which  Grouchy's  horsemen  still 
held  in  check :  and  he  nojv  planned  that,  while  Bliicher 
assailed  St.  Amand  and  its  hamlets,  the  Imperial  Guard 
should  crush  the  Prussian  centre  at  Ligny,  thrust  its 
fragments  back  towards  St.  Amand,  and  finally  shiver 
the  greater  part  of  the  Prussian  army  on  the  anvil  which 
D'Erlon's  corps  would  provide  further  to  the  west.  He 
now  felt  assured  of  victory ;  for  the  corps  of  Lobau  was 
nearing  Fleurus  to  take  the  place  of  the  Imperial  Guard  ; 
and  the  Prussians  had  no  supports.  "  They  have  no 
reserve,"  he  remarked,  as  he  swept  the  hostile  position 
with  his  glass.  This  was  true  :  their  centre  consisted  of 
troops  that  for  four  hours  had  been  either  torn  by  artil- 
lery or  exhausted  by  the  fiendish  strife  in  Ligny. 

And  now,  as  if  the  pent-up  powers  of  Nature  sought 
to  cow  rebellious  man  into  awe  and  penitence,  the  artil- 
lery of  the  sky  pealed  forth.  Crash  after  crash  shook  the 
ground  ;  flash  upon  flash  rent  the  sulphur-laden  rack  ; 
darkness  as  of  night  stole  over  the  scene  ;  and  a  deluge 

1 1  follow  Houssaye's  solution  of  this  puzzle  as  the  least  unsatisfactory, 
but  it  does  not  show  why  Napoleon  should  have  been  so  perplexed. 
D'Erlon  debouched  from  the  wood  of  Villers  Perwin  exactly  where  he 
might  have  been  expected.  Was  Napoleon  puzzled  because  the  corps 
was  heading  south-east  instead  of  east  ? 

VOL.   II  —  2  F 


434  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  rain  washed  the  blood-stained  earth.  The  storm  served 
but  to  aid  the  assailants  in  their  last  and  fiercest  efforts. 
Amidst  the  gloom  the  columns  of  the  Imperial  Guard  crept 
swiftly  down  the  slope  towards  Ligny,  gave  new  strength 
to  Gerard's  men,  and  together  with  them  broke  through  the 
defence.  A  little  higher  up  the  stream,  Milhaud's  cuiras- 
siers struggled  across,  and,  animated  by  the  Emperor's 
presence,  poured  upon  the  shattered  Prussian  centre.  No 
timely  help  could  it  now  receive  either  from  Blucher  or 
Thielmann  ;  for  the  darkness  of  the  storm  had  shrouded 
from  view  the  beginnings  of  the  onset,  and  Thielmann  had 
just  suffered  from  a  heedless  assault  on  Grouchy's  wing. 

As  the  thunder-clouds  rolled  by,  the  gleams  of  the  set- 
ting sun  lit  up  the  field  and  revealed  to  Blucher  the  full 
extent  of  his  error.1  His  army  was  cut  in  twain.  In 
vain  did  he  call  in  his  troops  from  St.  Amand  :  in  vain 
did  he  gallop  back  to  his  squadrons  between  Bry  and  Som- 
bref  and  lead  them  forward.  Their  dashing  charge  was 
suddenly  checked  at  the  brink;  of  a  hollow  way  ;  steady 
volleys  tore  away  their  front ;  and  the  cuirassiers  com- 
pleted their  discomfiture.  Blucher's  charger  was  struck 
by  a  bullet,  and  in  his  fall  badly  bruised  the  Field-Mar- 
shal ;  but  his  trusty  adjutant,  Nostitz,  managed  to  hide 
him  in  the  twilight,  while  the  cuirassiers  swept  onwards 
up  the  hill.  Other  Prussian  squadrons,  struggling  to  save 
the  day,  now  charged  home  and  drove  back  the  steel-clad 
ranks.  Some  Uhlans  and  mounted  Landwehr  reached 
the  place  where  the  hero  lay  ;  and  Nostitz  was  able  to 
save  that  precious  life.  Sorely  battered,  but  still  defiant 
like  their  chief,  the  Prussian  cavalry  covered  the  retreat 
at  the  centre  ;  the  wings  fell  back  in  good  order,  the 
right  holding  on  to  the  village  of  Bry  till  past  mid- 
night ;  but  several  battalions  of  disaffected  troops  broke 
up  and  did  not  rejoin  their  comrades.  About  14,000 
Prussians  and  11,000  French  lay  dead  or  wounded  on 
that  fatal  field.2 

1  Delbriick  ("  Gneisenau,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  190)  shows  how  the  storm  fa- 
voured the  attack. 

2  I  here  follow  Delbriick's  "  Gneisenau  "  (vol.  ii.,  p.  194)  and  Charras 
(vol.  i.,  p.  163).  Reiche  ("  Mems.,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  193)  says  that  his  corps 
of  30,800  men  lost.  12,480  on  the  15th  and  16th  :  he  notes  that  Blucher 
and  Nostitz  probably  owed  their  escape  to  the  plainness  of  their  uniforms 
and  headgear. 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  435 

Napoleon,  as  he  rode  back  to  Fleurus  after  nightfall, 
could  claim  that  he  had  won  a  great  victory.  Yet  he 
had  not  achieved  the  results  portrayed  in  Soult's  de- 
spatch of  3.15  to  Ney.  This  was  due  partly  to  Ney's 
failure  to  fulfil  his  part  of  the  programme,  and  partly  to 
the  apparition  of  D'Erlon's  corps,  which  led  to  the  post- 
ponement of  Napoleon's  grand  attack  on  Ligny. 

The  mystery  as  to  the  movements  of  D'Erlon  and  his 
20,000  men  has  never  been  fully  cleared  up.  The  evi- 
dence collected  by  Houssaye  leaves  little  doubt  that,  as 
soon  as  the  Emperor  realized  the  serious  nature  of  the  con- 
flict at  Ligny,  he  sent  orders  to  D'Erlon,  whose  vanguard 
was  then  near  Frasnes,  to  diverge  and  attack  Bliicher's 
exposed  flank.  That  is  to  say,  D'Erlon  was  now  called  on 
to  deal  the  decisive  blow  which  had  before  been  assigned 
to  Ney,  who  was  now  warned,  though  very  tardily,  not  to 
rely  on  the  help  of  D'Erlon's  corps.  Misunderstanding 
his  order,  D'Erlon  made  for  Fleurus,  and  thus  alarmed 
Napoleon  and  delayed  his  final  blow  for  wellnigh  two 
hours.  Moreover,  at  6  p.m.,  when  D'Erlon  might  have 
assailed  Bliicher's  right  with  crushing  effect,  he  received 
an  urgent  command  from  Ney  to  return.  Assuredly  he 
should  not  have  hesitated  now  that  St.  Amand  was  almost 
within  cannon-shot,  while  Quatre  Bras  could  scarcely  be 
reached  before  nightfall  ;  but  he  was  under  Ney's  com- 
mand ;  and,  taking  a  rather  pedantic  view  of  the  situation, 
he  obeyed  his  immediate  superior.  Lastly,  no  one  has 
explained  why  the  Emperor,  as  soon  as  he  knew  the  errant 
corps  to  be  that  of  D'Erlon,  did  not  recall  him  at  once, 
bidding  him  fall  on  the  exposed  wing  of  the  Prussians. 
Doubtless  he  assumed  that  D'Erlon  would  now  fulfil  his 
instructions  and  march  against  Bry ;  but  he  gave  no  order 
to  this  effect,  and  the  unlucky  corps  vanished. 

At  that  time  a  desperate  conflict  was  drawing  to  a  close 
at  Quatre  Bras.  Ney  had  delayed  his  attack  until  2  p.m.  ; 
for,  firstly,  Reille's  corps  alone  was  at  hand — D'Erlon's 
rearguard  early  on  that  morning  being  still  near  Thuin  — 
and,  secondly,  the  Marshal  heard  at  10  a.m.  that  Prussian 
columns  were  marching  westwards  from  Sombref,  a  move 
that  would  endanger  his  rear  behind  Frasnes.  Further- 
more, the  approach  to  Quatre    Bras  was  flanked  by  the 


436  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

extensive  Bossu  Wood,  and  by  a  spinney  to  the  right  of 
the  highway.  Reille  therefore  counselled  caution,  lest  the 
affair  should  prove  to  be  "  a  Spanish  battle  where  the  Eng- 
lish show  themselves  only  when  it  is  time."  When,  how- 
ever, Reille's  corps  pushed  home  the  attack,  the  weakness 
of  the  defence  was  speedily  revealed.  After  a  stout  stand, 
the  7,000  Dutch-Belgians  under  the  Prince  of  Orange  were 
driven  from  the  farm  of  Gemioncourt,  which  formed  the 
key  of  the  position,  and  many  of  them  fled  from  the  field. 

But  at  this  crisis  the  Iron  Duke  himself  rode  up  ;  and 
the  arrival  of  a  Dutch-Belgian  brigade  and  of  Picton's 
division  of  British  infantry,  about  3  p.m.,  sufficed  to 
snatch  victory  from  the  Marshal's  grasp.1  He  now  opened 
a  destructive  artillery  fire  on  our  front,  to  which  the  weak 
Dutch-Belgian  batteries  could  but  feebly  reply.  Noth- 
ing, however,  could  daunt  the  hardihood  of  Picton's  men. 
Shaking  off  the  fatigue  of  a  twelve  hours'  march  from 
Brussels  under  a  burning  sun,  they  steadily  moved  down 
through  the  tall  crops  of  rye  towards  the  farm  and  beat 
off  a  fierce  attack  of  Pire's  horsemen.  On  the  allied  left, 
the  95th  Rifles  (now  the  Rifle  Brigade)  and  Brunswickers 
kept  a  clutch  on  the  Namur  road  which  nothing  could 
loosen.  But  our  danger  was  mainly  at  the  centre.  Under 
cover  of  the  farmhouse,  French  columns  began  to  drive  in 
our  infantry,  whose  ammunition  was  already  running  low. 
Wellington  determined  to  crush  this  onset  by  a  counter- 
attack in  line  of  Picton's  division,  the  "  fighting  division  " 
of  the  Peninsula.  With  threatening  shouts  they  advanced 
to  the  charge  ;  and  before  that  moving  wall  the  foe  fell 
back  in  confusion  beyond  the  rivulet. 

Still,  the  French  drove  back  the  Dutch  in  the  wood,  and 
the  Brunswickers  on  its  eastern  fringe,  killing  the  brave 
young  Duke  of  Brunswick  as  he  attempted  to  rally  his 
raw  recruits.  Into  the  gap  thus  left  the  French  horsemen 
pushed  forward,  making  little  impression  upon  our  foot- 
men, but  compelling  them  to  keep  in  a  close  formation, 
which  exposed  them  in  the  intervals  between  the  charges 
to  heavy  losses  from  the  French  cannon. 

1  "  Waterloo  Letters,"  Nos.  163  and  169,  prove  that  the  time  was  3  p.m. 
and  not  3.30 ;  see  also  Kincaid's  account  in  Fitchett's  "  Wellington's  Men  " 
(p.  120). 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  437 

So  the  afternoon  wore  on.  Between  5  and  6  o'clock 
our  weary  troops  were  reinforced  by  Alten's  division.  A 
little  later,  a  brigade  of  Kellermann's  heavy  cavalry  came 
up  from  the  rear  and  renewed  Ney's  striking  power  —  but 
again  too  late.  Already  he  was  maddened  by  the  tidings 
that  D'Erlon's  corps  had  been  ordered  off  towards  Ligny, 
and  next  by  Napoleon's  urgent  despatch  of  3.15  p.m.  bid- 
ding him  envelop  Bliicher's  right.  Blind  with  indignation 
at  this  seeming  injustice,  he  at  once  sent  an  imperative 
summons  to  D'Erlon  to  return  towards  Quatre  Bras,  and 
launched  a  brigade  of  Kellermann's  cuirassiers  at  those 
stubborn  squares. 

The  attack  nearly  succeeded.  The  horsemen  rushed 
upon  our  69th  Regiment  just  when  the  Prince  of  Orange 
had  foolishly  ordered  it  back  into  line,  caught  it  in  confu- 
sion, and  cut  it  up  badly.  Another  regiment,  the  33rd, 
fled  into  the  wood,  but  afterwards  re-formed  ;  the  other 
squares  beat  off  the  onset.  The  torrent,  however,  only 
swerved  aside  :  on  it  rushed  almost  to  the  cross-roads, 
there  to  be  stopped  by  a  flanking  fire  from  the  wood  and 
from  the  92nd  (Gordon)  Highlanders  lining  the  roadway 
in  front.  —  "  Ninety-second,  don't  fire  till  I  tell  you,"  ex- 
claimed the  Duke.  The  volley  rang  out  when  the  horse- 
men were  but  thirty  paces  off.  The  effect  was  magical. 
Their  front  was  torn  asunder,  and  the  survivors  made  off 
in  a  panic  that  spread  to  Foy's  battalions  of  foot  and  dis- 
ordered the  whole  array.1 

Ney  still  persisted  in  his  isolated  assaults  ;  but  rein- 
forcements were  now  at  hand  that  brought  up  Welling- 
ton's total  to  31,000  men,  while  the  French  were  less 
than  21,000.  At  nightfall  the  Marshal  drew  back  to 
Frasnes  ;  and  there  D'Erlon's  errant  corps  at  last  ap- 
peared. Thanks  to  conflicting  orders,  it  had  oscillated 
between  two  battles  and  taken  part  in  neither  of  them. 

Such  was  the  bloody  fight  of  Quatre  Bras.  It  cost 
Wellington  4,600  killed  and  wounded,  mainly  from  the 
flower  of  the  British  infantry,  three  Highland  regiments 
losing  as  many  as  878  men.  The  French  losses  were 
somewhat  lighter.  Few  conflicts  better  deserve  the 
name    of    soldiers'    battles.       On    neither   side    was   the 


i  " 


Waterloo  Letters,"  No.  169. 


438  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

generalship  brilliant.  Twilight  set  in  before  an  adequate 
lorce  of  British  cavalry  and  artillery  approached  the  field 
where  their  comrades  on  foot  had  for  five  hours  held  up 
in  unequal  contest  against  cannon,  sabre,  and  lance.  The 
victory  was  due  to  the  strange  power  of  the  British  soldier 
to  save  the  situation  when  it  seems  past  hope. 

Still  less  did  it  redound  to  the  glory  of  Ney.  Once 
more  he  had  merited  the  name  of  bravest  of  the  brave. 
At  the  crisis  of  the  fight,  when  the  red  squares  in  front 
defied  his  utmost  efforts,  he  brandished  his  sword  in 
helpless  wrath,  praying  that  the  bullets  that  flew  by 
might  strike  him  down.  The  rage  of  battle  had,  in  fact, 
partly  obscured  his  reason.  He  was  now  a  fighter, 
scarcely  a  commander  ;  and  to  this  cause  we  may  attribute 
his  neglect  adequately  to  support  Kellermann's  charge. 
Had  this  been  done,  Quatre  Bras  might  have  ended  like 
Marengo.  Far  more  serious,  however,  was  his  action . 
in  countermanding  the  Emperor's  orders  by  recalling 
D'Erlon  to  Quatre  Bras  ;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  it  robbed 
his  master  of  the  decisive  victory  that  he  had  the  right 
to  expect  at  Ligny.  Yet  this  error  must  not  be  unduly 
magnified.  It  is  true  that  Napoleon  at  3.15  sent  a 
despatch  to  Ney  bidding  him  envelop  Bliicher's  flank  ; 
but  the  order  did  not  reach  him  until  some  time  after 
5,  when  the  allies  were  pressing  him  hard,  and  when 
he  had  just  heard  of  D'Erlon's  deflection  towards  the 
Emperor's  battle.1  He  must  have  seen  that  his  master 
misjudged  the  situation  at  Quatre  Bras  ;  and  in  such 
circumstances  a  Marshal  of  France  was  not  without 
excuse  when  he  corrected  an  order  which  he  saw  to  be 
based  on  a  misunderstanding.  Some  part  of  the  blame 
must  surely  attach  to  the  slow-paced  D'Erlon  and  to  the 
Emperor  himself,  who  first  underrated  the  difficulties 
both  at  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras,  and  then  changed  his 
plans  when  Ney  was  in  the  midst  of  a  furious  fight. 

Nevertheless,  the  general  results  obtained  on  June  the 
16th  were  enormously  in  favour  of  Napoleon.  He  had 
inflicted  losses  on  the  Prussians  comparable  with  those 
of  Jena-Auerstiidt  ;  and  he  retired  to  rest  at  Fleurus 
with  the  conviction  that  they  must  hastily  fall  back  on 

1  See  Houssaye,  p.  205,  for  the  sequence  of  these  events. 


xxxix  LIGNY  AND  QUATRE   BRAS  439 

their  immediate  bases  of  supply,  Namur  and  Liege, 
weaving  Wellington  at  his  mercy.  The  rules  of  war  and 
the  dictates  of  humdrum  prudence  certainly  prescribed 
this  course  for  a  beaten  army,  especially  as  Billow's  corps 
was  known  to  be  on  the  Liege  road. 

Scarcely  had  the  Prussian  retreat  begun  in  the  dark- 
ness, when  officers  pressed  up  to  Gneisenau,  on  whom 
now  devolved  all  responsibility,  for  instructions  as  to  the 
line  of  march.  At  once  he  gave  the  order  to  push  north- 
wards to  Tilly.  General  Reiche  thereupon  pointed  out 
that  this  village  was  not  marked  upon  the  smaller  maps 
with  which  colonels  were  provided  ;  whereupon'  the  com- 
mand was  given  to  march  towards  the  town  of  Wavre, 
farther  distant  on  the  same  road.  An  officer  was  posted 
at  the  junction  of  roads  to  prevent  regiments  straying 
towards  Namur  ;  but  some  had  already  gone  too  far  on 
this  side  to  be  recalled  —  a  fact  which  was  to  confuse  the 
French  pursuers  on  the  morrow.  The  greater  part  of 
Thielmann's  corps  had  fallen  back  on  Gembloux  ;  but, 
with  these  exceptions,  the  mass  of  the  Prussians  made  for 
Tilly,  near  which  place  they  bivouacked.  Early  on  the 
next  morning  their  rearguard  drew  off  from  Sombref  ; 
and,  thanks  to  the  inertness  of  their  foes,  the  line  of 
retreat  remained  unknown.  During  the  march  to  Wavre, 
their  columns  were  cheered  by  the  sight  of  the  dauntless 
old  Field-Marshal,  who  was  able  to  sit  a  horse  once  more. 
Thielmann's  corps  did  not  leave  Gembloux  till  2  p.m., 
but  reached  Wavre  in  safety.  Meanwhile  Billow's  power- 
ful corps  was  marching  unmolested  from  the  Roman  road 
near  Hannut  to  a  position  two  miles  east  of  Wavre,  where 
it  arrived  at  nightfall.  Equally  fortunate  was  the  reserve 
ammunition  train,  which,  unnoticed  by  the  French  cavalry, 
wound  northwards  by  cross-roads  through  Gembloux,  and 
reached  the  army  by  5  P.M.1 

In  his  "  Commentaries,"  written  at  St.  Helena,  Napo- 
leon sharply  criticised  the  action  of  Gneisenau  in  retreat- 

1  Ollech,  pp.  167-171.  Colonel  Basil  Jackson,  in  his  "Waterloo  and 
St.  Helena"  (printed  for  private  circulation),  p.  04,  states  that  he  had 
been  employed  in  examining  and  reporting  on  the  Belgian  roads  and  did  so 
on  the  road  leading  south  from  Wavre.  This  report  had  been  sent  to  Gneise- 
nau, and  must  have  given  him  greater  confidence  on  the  night  of  the  16th. 


440  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

ing  northwards  to  Wavre,  because  that  town  is  farther 
distant  from  Wellington's  line  of  retreat  than  Sombref  is 
from  Quatre  Bras,  and  is  connected  with  it  only  by  diffi- 
cult cross-roads.  He  even  asserted  that  the  Prussians 
ought  to  have  made  for  Quatre  Bras,  a  statement  which 
presumes  that  Gneisenau  could  have  rallied  his  army 
sufficiently  after  Ligny  to  file  away  on  the  Quatre  Bras 
ehaussee  in  front  of  Napoleon's  victorious  legions.  But 
the  Prussian  army  was  virtually  cut  in  half,  and  could 
not  have  reunited  so  as  to  attempt  the  perilous  flank 
march  across  Napoleon's  front.  We  shall,  therefore, 
probably  not  be  far  wrong  if  we  say  of  this  criticism  that 
the  wish  was  father  to  the  thought.  A  march  on  Quatre 
Bras  would  have  been  a  safe  means  of  throwing  away  the 
Prussian  army.1 

To  the  present  writer  it  seems  probable  that  Gneise- 
nau's  action,  in  the  first  instance,  was  undertaken  as  the 
readiest  means  of  reuniting  the  Prussian  wings.  But 
Gneisenau  cannot  have  been  blind  to  the  advantages  of  a 
reunion  with  Wellington,  which  a  northerly  march  would 
open  out.  The  report  which  he  sent  to  his  Sovereign 
from  Wavre  shows  that  by  that  time  he  believed  the 
Prussian  position  to  be  "  not  disadvantageous  "  ;  while  in 
a  private  letter  written  at  noon  on  the  17th  he  expressly 
states  that  the  Duke  will  accept  battle  at  Waterloo  if  the 
Prussians  help  him  with  two  army  corps.  Gneisenau's 
only  doubts  seem  to  have  been  whether  Wellington  would 
fight  and  whether  his  own  ammunition  would  be  to  hand 
in  time.  Until  he  was  sure  on  these  two  points  caution 
was  certainly  necessary. 

The  results  of  this  prompt  rally  of  the  Prussians  were 
infinitely  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  Wellington  soon  found 
it  out,  while  Napoleon  did  not  grasp  its  full  import  until 

1  O'Connor  Morris,  p.  176,  approves  Napoleon's  criticism,  and  censures 
Gneisenau's  move  on  Wavre  :  but  surely  Wavre  combined  more  advantages 
than  any  other  position.  It  was  accessible  for  the  whole  Prussian  army 
(including  Biilow)  ;  it  was  easily  defensible  (as  the  event  proved)  ;  and 
it  promised  a  reunion  with  Wellington  for  the  defence  of  Brussels.  Hous- 
saye  says  (p.  233)  that  Gneisenau  did  not  at  once  foresee  the  immense 
consequences  of  his  action.  Of  course  he  did  not,  because  he  was  not  sure 
of  Wellington  ;  but  he  took  all  the  steps  that  might  lead  to  immense  con- 
sequences, if  all  went  well. 


xxxix  LIGNY  AND  QUATRE  BRAS  441 

he  was  in  the  thick  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  To  the 
final  steps  that  led  up  to  this  dramatic  finale  we  must  now 
briefly  refer. 

It  is  strange  that  Gneisenau,  on  the  night  of  the  16th, 
took  no  steps  to  warn  his  allies  of  the  Prussian  retreat, 
and  merely  left  them  to  infer  it  from  his  last  message, 
that  he  must  do  so  if  he  were  not  succoured.  Muffling, 
indeed,  says  that  a  Prussian  officer  was  sent,  but  was  shot 
by  the  French  on  the  British  left  wing.  Seeing,  however, 
that  Wellington  had  beaten  back  Ney's  forces  before  the 
Prussian  retreat  began,  the  story  may  be  dismissed  as  a 
lame  excuse  of  Gneisenau's  neglect.1 

From  the  risk  of  being  crushed  by  Napoleon,  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  forces  were  saved  by  the  vigilance  of  their  leader 
and  the  supineness  of  the  enemy.  After  a  brief  rest  at 
Genappe,  the  Duke  was  back  at  the  front  at  dawn,  and 
despatched  two  cavalry  patrols  towards  Sombref  to  find 
out  the  results  of  the  battle.  The  patrol,  which  was 
accompanied  by  the  Duke's  aide-de-camp,  Colonel  Gordon, 
came  into  touch  with  the  Prussian  rear.  On  his  return 
soon  after  10,  the  staff-officer,  3asil  Jackson,  was  at  once 
sent  to  bid  Picton  immediately  prepare  to  fall  back  on 
Waterloo,  an  order  which  that  veteran  received  very  sulk- 
ily.2 Shortly  after  Gordon's  return,  a  Prussian  orderly 
galloped  up  and  confirmed  the  news  of  their  retreat, 
which  drew  from  the  Duke  the  remark  :  "  Bliicher  has 
had  a  d — d  good  licking  and  gone  back  to  Wavre.  .  .  . 
As  he  has  gone  back,  we  must  go  too."  The  infantry 
now  began  to  file  off  by  degrees  behind  hedges  or  under 
cover  of  a  screen  of  cavalry  and  skirmishers,  these  keep- 
ing Ney's  men  busy  in  front,  until  the  bulk  of  the  army 
was  well  through  the  narrow  and  crowded  street  of 
Genappe. 

And  how  came  it  that  Napoleon  and  Ney  missed  this 
golden  opportunity  ?  In  the  first  case,  it  was  due  to  their 
chiefs  of  staff,  who  had  not  sent  overnight  any  tidings  as 
to  the  results  of  their  respective  battles.  Until  Count 
Flahaut    returned   to    the    Imperial    headquarters   about 

1  Miiffling,  "Passages,"  p.  238:  Charras,  vol.  i.,  p.  226,  discredits  it. 

2  Basil  Jackson,  op.  cit.,  p.  24;  Cotton,  "A  Voice  from  Waterloo," 
p.  20. 


442  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap 

8  A.M.,  Napoleon  knew  nothing  as  to  the  position  of  affairs 
at  Quatre  Bras  ;  while  a  similar  carelessness  on  Soult's 
part  left  Ney  powerless  to  attempt  anything  against 
Wellington  until  somewhat  later  in  the  morning. 

But  Napoleon's  inaction  lasted  nearly  up  to  11.30. 
How  is  this  to  be  accounted  for  ?  In  reply,  some  attrib- 
ute his  conduct  to  illness  of  body  and  torpor  of  mind  —  a 
topic  that  will  engage  our  attention  presently  ;  others 
assert  that  the  army  urgently  needed  rest  ;  but  the  effec- 
tive cause  was  his  belief  that  the  Prussians  were  retreating 
eastwards  away  from  Wellington.  This  was  the  uni- 
versal belief  at  headquarters.  He  had  ordered  Grouchy 
to  follow  them  at  dawn  ;  Grouchy's  lieutenant,  Pajol, 
struck  to  the  south-east,  and  by  4  a.m.  reported  that 
Bliicher  was  heading  for  Namur.  Such  was  the  news  that 
the  Emperor  heard  from  Grouchy  about  8  a.m. — he  re- 
fused to  grant  him  an  audience  earlier.  Forthwith  he 
dictated  a  letter  to  Ney  to  the  following  effect :  that  the 
Prussians  had  been  routed  and  were  being  pursued  towards 
Namur  ;  that  the  British  could  not  attack  him  (Ney)  at 
Quatre  Bras,  for  the  Emperor  would  in  that  case  march 
on  their  flank  and  destroy  them  in  an  instant ;  that  he 
heard  with  pain  how  isolated  Ney's  troops  had  been  on 
the  16th,  and  ordered  him  to  close  up  his  divisions  and 
occupy  Quatre  Bras.  If  he  could  not  effect  that  task,  he 
must  warn  the  Emperor,  who  would  then  come.  Finally, 
he  warned  him  that  "  the  present  day  is  needed  to  finish 
this  operation,  to  complete  the  munitions  of  war,  to  rally 
stragglers  and  call  in  detachments." 

A  singular  day's  programme  this  for  the  man  who 
had  trebled  the  results  of  the  victory  of  Jena  by  the  re- 
morseless energy  of  the  pursuit.  After  dictating  this 
despatch,  he  ordered  Lobau  to  take  a  division  of  infantry 
for  the  support  of  Pajol  on  the  Namur  road.  He  then 
set  out  for  St.  Amand  in  his  carriage.  On  arriving  at 
the  place  of  carnage  he  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  slowly 
over  the  battle-field,  seeing  to  the  needs  of  the  wounded 
of  both  nations  with  kindly  care,  and  everywhere  receiv- 
ing the  enthusiastic  acclaim  of  his  soldiery.  This  done, 
he  dismounted  and  talked  long  and  earnestly  with 
Grouchy,  Gerard,  and   others   on   the   state   of  political 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  443 

parties  at  Paris.  They  listened  with  ill-concealed  rest- 
lessness. At  Fleurus  Grouchy  asked  for  definite  orders, 
and  received  the  brusque  reply  that  he  must  wait.  But 
now,  towards  11  o'clock,  the  Emperor  hears  that  Welling- 
ton is  still  at  Quatre  Bras,  that  Pajol  has  captured  eight 
Prussian  guns  on  the  Namur  road,  and  that  Excelmans 
has  seen  masses  of  the  enemy  at  Gembloux.  At  once  he 
turns  from  politics  to  war. 

His  plan  is  formed.  While  he  himself  falls  on  the 
British,  Grouchy  is  to  pursue  the  Prussians  with  the  corps 
of  Gerard  and  Vandamme,  the  division  of  Teste  (from 
Lobau's  command),  and  the  cavalry  corps  of  Pajol, 
Excelmans,  and  Milhaud.  The  Marshal  begged  to  be 
relieved  of  the  task,  setting  forth  the  danger  of  pursuing 
foes  that  were  now  reunited  and  far  away.  It  was  in 
vain.  About  11.30  the  Emperor  developed  his  verbal 
instructions  in  a  written  order  penned  by  Bertrand.  It 
bade  Grouchy  proceed  to  Gembloux  with  the  forces 
stated  above  (except  Milhaud's  corps  and  a  division  of 
Vandamme's  corps,  which  were  to  follow  Napoleon)  to 
reconnoitre  on  the  roads  leading  to  Namur  and  Maes- 
tricht,  to  pursue  the  enemy,  and  inform  the  Emperor  as 
to  their  intentions.  If  they  have  evacuated  Namur,  it  is 
to  be  occupied  by  the  National  Guards.  "  It  is  im- 
portant to  know  what  Blucher  and  Wellington  mean  to 
do,  and  whether  they  propose  reuniting  their  armies  in 
order  to  cover  Brussels  and  Liege,  by  trying  their  fortune 
in  another  battle.   .   .   .M1 

As  Napoleon's  fate  was  to  depend  largely  on  an  in- 
telligent carrying  out  of  this  order,  we  may  point  out 
that  it  consisted  of  two  chief  parts  —  the  general  aim  and 
the  means  of  carrying  out  that  aim.  The  aim  was  to  find 
out  the  direction  of  the  Prussians'  retreat,  and  to  prevent 
them  joining  Wellington,  whether  for  the  defence  of 
Brussels  or  of  Liege.  The  means  were-  an  advance  to 
Gembloux  and  scouting  along  the  Namur  and  Maestricht 
roads.  The  chance  that  the  allies  might  reunite  for  the 
defence  of  Brussels  was  alluded  to,  but  no  measures 
were  prescribed  as  to  scouting  in  that  direction  :  these 
were  left  to  Grouchy's  discretion.     It  must  be  confessed 

1  Grouchy  suppressed  this  despatch,  but  it  was  published  in  1842. 


444  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

that  the  order  was  far  from  clear.  To  name  the  towns 
of  Brussels  and  Liege  (which  are  sixty  miles  apart)  was 
sufficiently  distracting  ;  and  to  suggest  that  only  the 
eastern  and  south-eastern  roads  should  be  explored  was 
certain  to  limit  Grouchy's  immediate  attention  to  those 
roads  alone.  For  he  distrusted  alike  his  own  abilities 
and  the  power  of  the  force  placed  at  his  disposal  ;  and 
an  officer  thus  situated  is  sure  to  inclose  himself  in  the 
strict  letter  of  his  instructions.  This  was  what  he  did, 
with  disastrous  results. 

Grouchy  had  hitherto  held  no  important  command. 
As  a  cavalry  general  he  had  done  brilliant  service  ;  but 
now  he  was  launched  on  a  duty  that  called  for  strategic 
insight.  His  force  was  scarcely  equal  to  the  work.  True, 
it  was  strong  for  scouting,  having  nearly  6,000  light  horse ; 
but  the  27,000  footmen  of  Vandamme's  and  Gerard's 
corps  had  been  exhausted  by  the  deadly  strife  in  the 
villages  and  were  expecting  a  day's  rest.  Their  com- 
manders also  resented  being  placed  under  Grouchy.  In 
fact,  leaders  and  men  disliked  the  task,  and  set  about  it 
in  a  questioning,  grumbling  way.  The  infantry  did  not 
start  till  about  3  o'clock  and  only  reached  Gembloux  late 
that  evening  —  nine  miles  in  six  hours  !  The  cavalry,  too, 
was  so  badly  handled  by  Excelmans  around  Gembloux 
that  Thielmann's  corps  slipped  away  northward.  The 
rain  fell  in  torrents,  obscuring  the  view  ;  but  it  seems 
strange  that  the  direction  of  the  Prussian  retreat  was  not 
surmised  until  about  nightfall. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  French  left  wing,  Ney  had  been 
equally  lax.  He  must  have  received  Napoleon's  order 
to  occupy  Quatre  Bras,  "if  there  was  only  a  rearguard 
there,"  a  little  before  10  A.M.  ;  but  he  took  no  steps  be- 
yond futile  skirmishing,  and  apparently  knew  not  that  the 
British  were  slipping  away. 

About  2  p.m.,  when  the  British  cavalry  was  ready  to 
turn  rein,  the  Duke  and  Sir  H.  Vivian  saw  the  glint  of 
cuirasses  along  the  Sombref  road.  It  was  the  vanguard 
of  the  Emperor's  advance.  Furious  that  his  foes  were 
escaping  from  his  clutches,  Napoleon  had  left  his  carriage 
and  was  pressing  on  with  the  foremost  horsemen.  To 
Ney  he  sent  an  imperative  summons  to  advance,  and  when 


xxxix  LIGNY   AND   QUATRE   BRAS  445 

that  Marshal  came  up,  greeted  him  with  the  words  "  You 
have  ruined  France."  But  it  was  time  for  deeds,  not 
words  :  and  he  now  put  forth  all  his  strength.  At  once 
he  flung  his  powerful  cavalry  at  the  British  rear  ;  and 
even  now  it  might  have  gone  hard  with  Wellington  had 
not  the  lowering  clouds  burst  in  a  deluge  of  rain.  Quickly 
the  road  was  ploughed  up  ;  and  the  cornfields  became 
impassable  for  the  French  horsemen. 

While  the  pursuers  struggled  in  the  mire  and  aimed 
wildly  through  the  pelting  haze,  the  British  rearguard 
raced  for  safety.  Says  Captain  Mercer  of  the  artillery  : 
"  We  galloped  for  our  lives  through  the  storm,  striving 
to  gain  the  hamlets,  Lord  Uxbridge  urging  us  on,  crying 
*■  Make  haste  ;  for  God's  sake  gallop,  or  you  will  be  taken.' " * 
Gaining  on  the  pursuit,  they  reached  Genappe,  and,  filing 
over  its  bridge  and  up  the  narrow  street,  prepared  to 
check  the  French.  At  this  time  the  Emperor  galloped  up, 
drenched  to  the  skin,  his  gray  overcoat  streaming  with 
rain,  his  hat  bent  out  of  all  shape  by  the  storm.2  He  was 
once  more  the  artillery  officer  of  Toulon.  "  Fire  on  them," 
he  shouted  to  his  gunners,  "  they  are  English."  A  sharp 
skirmish  ensued,  in  which  our  7th  Hussars,  charging  down 
into  the  village,  were  worsted  by  the  French  lancers,  "  an 
arm,"  says  Cotton,  "  with  which  we  were  quite  unac- 
quainted." In  their  retreat  they  were  saved  by  the  Life 
Guards,  whose  weight  and  strength  carried  all  before 
them. 

At  last,  on  the  ridge  of  Waterloo,  Wellington's  force 
turned  at  bay.  Napoleon,  coming  up  at  6.30  to  the  brow 
of  the  opposite  slope,  ordered  a  strong  force  to  advance 
into  the  sodden  clay  of  the  valley.  It  was  promptly  torn 
by  a  heavy  cannonade  ;  and  the  truth  was  borne  in  on  him 
that  the  British  had  escaped  him  for  that  day. 

1  Mercer,  vol.  i.,  p.  270. 

8  P6tiet,  "  Souvenirs  militaires,"  p.  204. 


446  THE   LIFE   OE   NAPOLEON   I  chap 


NAPOLEON'S    HEALTH   IN   THE   WATERLOO    CAMPAIGN 

As  many  writers  assert  that  Napoleon  at  this  time  was  but  the 
shadow  of  his  former  self,  we  must  briefly  review  the  evidence  of  con- 
temporaries on  this  subject ;  for  if  the  assertion  be  true,  the  battle  of 
Waterloo  deserves  little  notice. 

It  seems  that  for  some  time  past  there  had  been  a  slight  falling  off 
in  his  mental  and  bodily  powers  ;  but  when  it  began  and  how  far  it 
progressed  is  matter  of  doubt.  Some  observers,  including  Chaptal, 
date  it  from  the  hardships  of  the  retreat  from  Moscow.  This  is  very 
doubtful.  He  ended  that  campaign  in  a  better  state  of  health  than 
he  had  enjoyed  during  the  advance.  Besides,  in  none  of  his  wars  did 
he  show  such  vitality  and  fertility  of  resource  as  in  the  desperate 
struggle  of  1814,  which  Wellington  pronounced  his  masterpiece. 
After  this  there  seems  to  have  been  a  period  of  something  like  relapse 
at  Elba.  In  September,  1814,  Sir  Neil  Campbell  reported  :  "  Napoleon 
seems  to  have  lost  all  habits  of  study  and  sedentary  application.  He 
occasionally  falls  into  a  state  of  inactivity  never  known  before,  and 
sometimes  reposes  in  his  bedroom  of  late  for  several  hours  in  the  day ; 
takes  exercise  in  a  carriage  and  not  on  horseback.  His  health  excel- 
lent and  his  spirits  not  at  all  depressed  "  ("F.  O.,"  France,  No.  114). 
During  his  ten  months  at  Elba  he  became  very  stout  and  his  cheeks 
puffy. 

On  his  return  to  France  he  displayed  his  old  activity;  and  the  most 
credible  witnesses  assert  that  his  faculties  showed  no  marked  decline. 
Guizot,  who  saw  a  good  deal  of  him,  writes :  "  I  perceive  in  the  intel- 
lect and  conduct  of  Napoleon  during  the  Hundred  Days  no  sign  of 
enfeebling :  I  find  in  his  judgment  and  actions  his  accustomed 
qualities."  In  a  passage  quoted  above  (p.  413)  Mollien  notes  that  his 
master  was  a  prey  to  lassitude  after  some  hours  of  work,  but  he  says 
nothing  on  the  subject  of  disease  ;  and  in  a  man  of  forty-six,  who  had 
lived  a  hard  life  and  a  "fast"  life,  we  should  not  expect  to  find  the 
capacity  for  the  sustained  intellectual  efforts  of  the  Consulate.  Mene- 
val  noticed  nothing  worse  in  his  master's  condition  than  a  tendency 
to  "  reverie  " :  he  detected  no  disease.  The  statement  of  Pasquier 
that  his  genius  and  his  physical  powers  were  in  a  profound  decline  is 
a  manifest  exaggeration,  uttered  by  a  man  who  did  not  once  see  him 
before  Waterloo,  who  was  driven  from  Paris  by  him,  and  strove  to 
discourage  his  supporters.  Still  less  can  we  accept  the  following  melo- 
dramatic description,  by  Thiebault,  of  Napoleon's  appearance  on  Sun- 
day, June  11th  :  "His  iook,  once  so  formidable  and  piercing,  had  lost 
its  strength  and  even  its  steadiness  :  his  face  had  lost  all  expression 
and  all  its  force:  his  mouth,  compressed,  had  none  of  its  former 
witchery  :  and  his  gait  was  as  perplexed  as  his  demeanour  and  ges- 
tures were  undecided  :  the  ordinary  pallor  of  his  skin  was  replaced  by 
a  strongly  pronounced  greenish  tinge  which  struck  me." 

Let  us  follow  this  wreck  of  a  man  to  the  war  and  see  what  he 
accomplished.     At  dawn  on  June  12th  he  entered  his  landau  and 


xxxix      HIS   HEALTH   IN   THE    WATERLOO   CAMPAIGN  447 

drove  to  Laon,  a  distance  of  some  seventy  miles.  On  the  next  day 
he  got  through  an  immense  amount  of  work,  and  proceeded  to 
Beaumont.  On  the  15th  of  June  he  was  up  at  dawn,  mounted  his 
horse,  and  remained  on  horseback,  directing  the  operations  against 
the  Prussians,  for  nearly  eighteen  hours.  This  time  was  broken  by 
one  spell  of  rest.  Near  Charleroi,  says  Baudus,  an  officer  of  Soult's 
staff,  he  was  overcome  by  sleep  and  heeded  not  the  cheers  of  a 
passing  column  :  at  this  Baudus  was  indignant,  but  most  unjustly 
so.  Napoleon  needed  these  snatches  of  sleep  as  a  relief  to  prolonged 
mental  tension.  At  night  he  returned  to  Charleroi,  "overcome  with 
fatigue."  On  the  next  day  he  was  still  very  weary,  says  Segur ;  he 
did  not  exert  himself  until  the  battle  of  Ligny  began  at  2.30 ;  but 
he  then  rode  about  till  nightfall,  through  a  time  of  terrible  heat. 
Fatigue  showed  itself  again  early  on  the  morrow,  when  he  declined 
to  see  Grouchy  before  8  a.m.  Yet  his  review  of  the  troops  and  his 
long  discussions  on  Parisian  politics  were  clearly  due,  not  to  torpor, 
but  to  the  belief  that  jie  had  sundered  the  allies,  and  could  occupy 
Brussels  at  will ;  for  when  he  found  out  his  mistake,  he  showed  all 
the  old  energy,  riding  with  the  vanguard  from  Quatre  Bras  to  La 
Belle  Alliance  through  the  violent  rain. 

Whatever,  then,  were  his  ailments,  they  were  not  incompatible 
with  great  and  sustained  activity.  What  were  those  ailments? 
He  is  said  to  have  suffered  from  intermittent  affections  of  the 
lower  bowel,  of  the  bladder,  and  of  the  skin,  the  two  last  resulting 
in  ischury  (Dorsey  Gardner's  "Quatre  Bras,  Ligny,  and  Waterloo," 
pp.  31-37;  O'Connor  Morris,  pp.  164-166,  note).  The  list  is  for- 
midable; but  it  contains  its  own  refutation.  A  man  suffering  from 
these  diseases,  unless  in  their  earliest  and  mildest  stages,  could 
not  have  done  what  Napoleon  did.  Ischury,  if  at  all  pronounced, 
is  a  bar  to  horse  exercise.  Doubtless  his  long  rides  aggravated 
any  trouble  that  he  had  in  this  respect,  for  Petiet,  who  was  at- 
tached to  the  staff,  noticed  that  he  often  dismounted  and  sat  before 
a  little  table  that  was  brought  to  him  for  the  convenience  of  exam- 
ining maps;  but  Petiet  thought  this  was  due,  not  to  ill  health  (about 
which  he  says  nothing),  but  to  his  corpulence  ("Souvenirs  mili- 
taires,"  pp.  196  and  212).  Prince  Jerome  and  a  surgeon  of  the 
imperial  staff  assured  Thiers  that  Napoleon  was  suffering  from  a 
disease  of  the  bladder;  but  this  was  contradicted  by  the  valet, 
Marchand ;  and  if  he  really  was  suffering  from  all,  or  any  one,  of 
the  maladies  named  above,  it  is  very  strange  that  the  surgeon  allowed 
him  to  expose  himself  to  the  torrential  rain  of  the  night  of  the  17th- 
18th  for  a  purpose  which  a  few  trusty  officers  could  equally  well  have 
discharged  (see  next  chapter).  Furthermore,  Baron  Larrey,  Chief 
Surgeon  of  the  army,  who  saw  Napoleon  before  the  campaign  began 
and  during  its  course,  says  not  a  word  about  the  Emperor's  health  ("  Re- 
lation medicale  des  Campagnes,  1815-1840,"  pp.  5-11). 

Again,  the  intervals  of  drowsiness  on  the  15th  and  18th  of  June, 
on  which  the  theory  of  physical  collapse  is  largely  based,  may  be 
explained  far  more  simply.  Napoleon  had  long  formed  the  habit 
of  working  a  good  deal  at  night  and  of  seeking  repose  during  a  busy 
day  by  brief  snatches  of  slumber.     The  habit  grew  on  him  at  Elba: 


448  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap,  xxxix 

and  this,  together  with  his  activity  since  daybreak,  accounts  for  his 
sleeping  near  Charleroi.  The  same  explanation  probably  holds  good 
as  to  his  occasional  drowsiness  at  Waterloo.  He  scarcely  closed  his 
eyes  before  3.30  a.m.  ;  and  he  cannot  have  been  physically  fit  for  the 
unexpectedly  long  and  severe  strain  of  that  Sunday.  That  he  began 
the  day  well  we  know  from  a  French  soldier  named  Barral  (grand- 
father of  the  author  of  "  L'Epopee  de  Waterloo"),  who  looked  at  him 
carefully  at  9.30  a.m.,  and  wrote :  "  He  seemed  to  me  in  very  good 
health,  extraordinarily  active  and  preoccupied."  Decoster,  the  peas- 
ant guide  who  was  with  Napoleon  the  whole  day,  afterwards  told  Sir 
W.  Scott  that  he  was  calm  and  confident  up  to  the  crisis.  Gourgaud, 
who  clung  to  him  during  the  flight  to  Paris  and  thence  to  Rochefort, 
notes  nothing  moi'e  serious  than  great  fatigue;  Captain  Maitland, 
when  he  received  him  on  board  the  "  Bellerophon,"  thought  him  "  a 
remarkably  strong,  well-built  man."  During  the  voyage  to  St.  Helena 
he  suffered  from  nothing  worse  than  mal  de  mer ;  he  ate  meat  in  excep- 
tional quantity,  even  in  the  tropics. 

Very  noteworthy,  too,  is  Lavalette's  narrative.  When  he  saw  Napo- 
leon before  his  departure  from  Paris  to  the  Belgian  frontier,  he  found 
him  suffering  from  depression  and  a  pain  in  the  chest ;  but  he  avers 
that,  on  the  return  from  Waterloo,  apart  from  one  "  frightful  epileptic 
laugh,"  Napoleon  speedily  settled  down  to  his  ordinary  behaviour: 
not  a  word  is  added  as  to  his  health.  (Sir  W.  Scott,  "  Life  of  Napo- 
leon," vol.  viii.,  p.  496;  Gourgaud,  "Campagne  de  1815,"  and  "Jour- 
nal de  St.  Helene,"  vol.  ii.,  Appendix  32 ;  "  Narrative  of  Captain 
Maitland,"  p.  208 ;  Lavalette,  "  Mems.,"  ch.  xxxiii. ;  Houssaye  ridicules 
the  stories  of  his  ill-health.) 

What  is  the  upshot  of  it  all?  The  evidence  seems  to  show  that, 
whatever  was  Napoleon's  condition  before  the  campaign,  he  was  in 
his  usual  health  amidst  the  stern  joys  of  war.  And  this  is  consonant 
with  his  previous  experience :  he  throve  on  events  which  wore  ordi- 
nary beings  to  the  bone  :  the  one  thing  that  he  could  not  endure  was 
the  worry  of  parliamentary  opposition,  which  aroused  a  nervous  irrita- 
tion not  to  be  controlled  and  concealed  without  infinite  effort.  During 
the  campaign  we  find  very  few  trustworthy  proofs  of  his  decline  and 
much  that  points  to  energy  of  resolve  and  great  rallying  power  after 
exertion.  If  he  was  suffering  from  three  illnesses,  they  were  assuredly 
of  a  highly  intermittent  nature. 


CHAPTER  XL 

WATERLOO 

Would  Wellington  hold  on  to  his  position  ?  This  was 
the  thought  that  troubled  the  Emperor  on  the  night  after 
the  wild  chase  from  Quatre  Bras.  Before  retiring  to  rest 
at  the  Caillou  farm,  he  went  to  the  front  with  Bertrand 
and  a  young  officer,  Gudin  by  name,  and  peered  at  the 
enemy's  fires  dimly  seen  through  the  driving  sheets  of 
rain.  Satisfied  that  the  allies  were  there,  he  returned  to 
the  farm,  dictated  a  few  letters  on  odious  parliamentary 
topics,  and  then  sought  a  brief  repose.  But  the  same 
question  drove  sleep  from  his  eyes.  At  one  o'clock  he 
was  up  again  and  with  the  faithful  Bertrand  plashed  to 
the  front  through  long  rows  of  drenched  recumbent  forms. 
Once  more  they  strained  their  ears  to  catch  through  the 
hiss  of  the  rain  some  sound  of  a  muffled  retirement. 
Strange  thuds  came  now  and  again  from  the  depths  of 
the  wood  of  Hougoumont  :  all  else  was  still.  At  last, 
over  the  slope  on  the  north-east  crowned  by  the  St.  Lam- 
bert Wood  there  stole  the  first  glimmer  of  gray  ;  little  by 
little  the  murky  void  bodied  forth  dim  shapes,  and  the 
watch-fires  burnt  pale  against  the  orient  gleams.  It  was 
enough.  He  turned  back  to  the  farm.  Wellington  could 
scarcely  escape  him  now. 

While  the  Emperor  was  making  the  round  of  his  out- 
posts, a  somewhat  cryptic  despatch  from  Grouchy  readied 
headquarters.  The  Marshal  reported  from  Genibloux, 
at  10  p.m.  of  the  17th,  that  part  of  the  Prussians  had 
retired  towards  Wavre,  seemingly  with  a  view  to  joining 
Wellington  ;  that  their  centre,  led  by  Bliicher,  had  fallen 
back  on  Perwez  in  the  direction  of  Liege  ;  while  a  col- 
umn with  artillery  had  made  for  Namur ;  if  he  found  the 
enemy's  chief  force  to  be  on  the  Liege  chaussSe,  he  would 
pursue  them  along  that  road ;  if  towards  Wavre,  he 
vol.  ii  —  2g  449 


450      .  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

would  follow  them  thither  "  in  order  that  they  may  not 
gain  Brussels,  and  so  as  to  separate  them  from  Welling- 
ton." This  last  phrase  ought  surely  to  have  convinced 
Napoleon  that  Grouchy  had  not  fully  understood  his 
instructions ;  for  to  inarch  on  Wavre  would  not  stop  the 
Prussians  joining  Wellington,  if  they  were  in  force.1 

Moreover,  Napoleon  now  knew,  what  Grouchy  did  not 
know,  that  the  Prussians  were  in  force  at  Wavre.  It 
seems  strange  that  the  Emperor  did  not  send  this  impor- 
tant news  to  his  Marshal ;  but  perhaps  we  may  explain 
this  by  his  absence  at  the  outposts.  As  it  was,  no  clear 
statement  of  the  facts  of  the  case  was  sent  off  to  Grouchy 
until  10  a.m.  of  the  \%th.  He  then  informed  his  Marshal 
that,  according  to  all  the  reports,  three  bodies  of  Prus- 
sians had  made  for  Wavre.  Grouchy  "must  therefore 
move  thither  —  in  order  to  approach  us,  to  put  yourself 
within  the  sphere  of  our  operations,  and  to  keep  up  your 
communications  with  us,  pushing  before  you  those  bodies 
of  Prussians  which  have  taken  this  direction  and  which 
may  have  stopped  at  Wavre,  where  you  ought  to  arrive 
as  soon  as  possible."  Grouchy,  however,  was  not  to 
neglect  Bliicher's  troops  that  were  on  his  right,  but  must 
pick  up  their  stragglers  and  keep  up  his  communications 
with  Napoleon. 

Such  was  the  letter ;  and  again  we  must  pronounce  it 
far  from  clear.  Grouchy  was  not  bidden  to  throw  all 
his  efforts  on  the  side  of  Wavre  ;  and  he  was  not  told 
whether  he  must  attack  the  enemy  at  that  town,  or  inter- 
pose a  wedge  between  them  and  Wellington,  or  support 
Napoleon's  right.  Now  Napoleon  would  certainly  have 
prescribed  an  immediate  concentration  of  Grouchy's  force 
towards  the  north-west  for  one  of  the  last  two  objects, 
had  he  believed  Blucher  about  to  attempt  a  flank  march 
against  the  chief  French  army.  Obviously  it  had  not  yet 
entered  his  thoughts  that  so  daring  a  step  would  be  taken 
by  a  foe  whom  he  pictured  as  scattered  and  demoralized 
by  defeat.2 

1  Ropes,  pp.  212,  246,  359.  I  follow  the  "received"  version  of  this 
despatch.  For  a  comparison  of  it  with  the  "  Grouchy "  version  see 
Horsburgh,  p.  155,  note. 

a  Ropes,  pp.  266,  288 :  Houssaye,  p.  316,  with  a  good  note. 


XL  WATERLOO  461 

As  we  have  seen,  the  Prussians  were  not  demoralized  ; 
they  had  not  gone  off  in  three  directions  ;  and  Bliicher 
was  not  making  for  Liege.  He  was  at  Wavre  and  was 
planning  a  master-stroke.  At  midnight,  he  had  sent  to 
Wellington,  through  Muffling,  a  written  promise  that  at 
dawn  he  would  set  the  corps  of  Biilow  in  motion  against 
Napoleon's  right ;  that  of  Pirch  I.  was  to  follow  ;  while 
the  other  two  corps  would  also  be  ready  to  set  out.  Wel- 
lington received  this  despatch  about  3  A.M.  of  the  18th, 
and  thereupon  definitely  resolved  to  offer  battle.  A  simi- 
lar message  was  sent  off  from  Wavre  at  9.30  a.m.,  but 
with  a  postscript,  in  which  we  may  discern  Gneisenau's 
distrust  of  Wellington,  begging  Muffling  to  find  out  accu- 
rately whether  the  Duke  really  had  determined  to  fight  at 
Waterloo.  Meanwhile  Billow's  corps  had  begun  its  march 
from  the  south-east  of  Wavre,  but  with  extreme  slowness, 
which  was  due  to  a  fire  at  Wavre,  to  the  crowded  state  of 
the  narrow  road,  and  also  to  the  misgivings  of  Gneisenau. 
It  certainly  was  not  owing  to  fear  of  Grouchy  ;  for  at  that 
time  the  Prussian  leaders  believed  that  only  15,000  French 
were  on  their  track.  Not  until  midday,  when  the  cannon- 
ade on  the  west  grew  to  a  roar,  did  Gneisenau  decide  to 
send  forward  Ziethen's  corps  towards  Ohain,  on  Welling- 
ton's left ;  but  thereafter  the  defence  of  the  Dyle  against 
Grouchy  was  left  solely  to  Thielmann's  corps.1 

While  this  storm  was  brewing  in  the  east,  everything 
in  front  of  the  Emperor  seemed  to  portend  a  prosperous 
day.  High  as  he  rated  Wellington's  numbers,  he  had  no 
doubt  as  to  the  result.  "  The  enemy's  army,"  he  remarked 
just  after  breakfast,  "  outnumbers  ours  by  more  than  a 
fourth ;  nevertheless  we  have  ninety  chances  out  of  a 
hundred  in  our  favour."  Ney,  who  then  chanced  to  come 
in,  quickly  remarked  :    "  No  doubt,  sire,    if   Wellington 

1  Ollech,  pp.  187-192;  Delbriick's  "Gneisenau,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  205.  I 
cannot  credit  the  story  told  by  Hardinge  in  1887  to  Earl  Stanhope  ("  Con- 
versations," p.  110),  that,  on  the  night  of  the  l(5th  June,  Gneisenau 
sought  to  dissuade  Bliicher  from  joining  Wellington.  Hardinge  only  had 
the  story  at  second  hand,  and  wrongly  assigns  it  to  Wavre.  On  the  after- 
noon of  the  17th  Gneisenau  ordered  Ziethen  to  keep  open  cornmunicatimis 
with  Wellington  (Ollech,  p.  170).  The  story  that  Wellington  rode  over 
to  Wavre  on  the  night  of  the  18th  on  his  horse  "  Copenhagen  "  is  of  course 
a  myth. 


452  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

were  simple  enough  to  wait  for  you  ;  but  I  come  to  inform 
you  that  he  is  retreating."  "  You  have  seen  wrong,"  was 
the  retort,  "the  time  is  gone  for  that."  Soult  did  not 
share  his  master's  assurance  of  victory,  and  once  more 
begged  him  to  recall  some  of  Grouchy's  force;  to  which 
there  came  the  brutal  reply:  "Because  you  have  been 
beaten  by  Wellington  you  think  him  a  great  general. 
And  I  tell  you  that  Wellington  is  a  bad  general,  that  the 
English  are  bad  troops,  and  that  this  will  be  the  affair  of 
a  dSjeuner."  "I  hope  it  may,"  said  Soult.  Reille  after- 
wards came  in,  and,  finding  how  confident  the  Emperor 
was,  mentioned  the  matter  to  D'Erlon,  Avho  advised  his 
colleague  to  return  and  caution  him.  "  What  is  the  use," 
rejoined  Reille  ;  "he  would  not  listen  to  us." 

In  truth,  Napoleon  was  in  no  mood  to  receive  advice. 
He  admitted  on  the  voyage  to  St.  Helena  that  "  he  had 
not  exactly  reconnoitred  Wellington's  position."1  And, 
indeed,  there  seemed  to  be  nothing  much  to  reconnoitre. 
The  Mont  St.  Jean,  or  Waterloo,  position  does  not  im- 
press the  beholder  with  any  sense  of  strength.  The  so- 
called  valley,  separating  the  two  arrays,  is  a  very  shallow 
depression,  nowhere  more  than  fifty  feet  below  the  top  of 
the  northern  slope.  It  is  divided  about  half-way  across 
by  an  undulation  that  affords  good  cover  to  assailants 
about  to  attack  La  Haye  Sainte.  Another  slight  rise 
crosses  the  vale  half-way  between  this  farm  and  Hougou- 
mont,  and  facilitates  the  approach  to  that  part  of  the 
ridge.  In  fact,  only  on  their  extreme  left  could  the  de- 
fenders feel  much  security ;  for  there  the  slope  is  steeper, 
besides  being  protected  in  front  by  marshy  ground, 
copses,  and  the  hamlets  of  Papelotte,  La  Haye,  and 
Smohain. 

Napoleon  paid  little  attention  to  the  left  wing  of  the 
allies.  The  centre  and  right  centre  were  evidently 
Wellington's  weak  points,  and  there,  especially  near 
the  transverse  rise,  our  leader  chiefly  massed  his  troops. 
Yet  there,  too,  the  defence  had  some  advantages.  The 
front  of  the  centre  was  protected  by  La  Haye  Sainte,  "  a 
strong  stone  and  brick  building,"  says  Cotton,  "  with   a 

1  "  Blackwood's  Magazine,"  October,  1896;  "Cornhill,"  January, 
1901. 


XL  WATERLOO  45:i 

narrow  orchard  in  front  and  a  small  garden  in  the  rear, 
both  of  which  were  hedged  around,  except  on  the  east 
side  of  the  garden,  where  there  was  a  strong  wall  running 
along  the  high-road."  It  is  generally  admitted  that 
Wellington  gave  too  little  attention  to  this  farm,  which 
Napoleon  saw  to  be  the  key  of  the  allied  position.  Loop- 
holes were  made  in  its  south  and  east  walls,  but  none  in 
the  western  wall,  and  half  of  the  barn-door  opening  on 
the  fields  had  been  torn  off  for  firewood  by  soldiers  over- 
night. The  place  was  held  at  first  by  376  men  of  the 
King's  German  Legion,  who  threw  up  a  barricade  at  the 
barn-door,  as  also  on  the  high-road  outside  the  orchard  ; 
but,  as  the  sappers  and  carpenters  were  removed  to 
Hougoumont,  little  could  be  done. 

Far  stronger  was  the  chateau  of  Hougoumont,  which 
had  been  built  with  a  view  to  defence.  The  outbuildings 
were  now  loopholed,  and  scaffolds  were  erected  to  enable 
our  men  to  fire  over  the  garden  walls  which  commanded 
the  orchard.  The  defence  was  intrusted  to  the  light 
companies  of  the  second  battalions  of  Coldstreams  and 
Foot  Guards  (now  the  Grenadier  Guards)  ;  while  the 
wood  in  front  was  held  by  Nassauers  and  Hanoverians. 
Chassis  Dutch-Belgians  were  posted  at  the  village  of 
Braine  la  Leud  to  give  further  security  to  Wellington's 
right.1  Napoleon's  intention  was  to  pierce  the  allied 
centre  behind  La  Haye  Sainte,  where  their  lines  were 
thin.  But  he  did  not  know  that  behind  the  crest  ran  a 
sunken  cross-road,  which  afforded  excellent  cover,  and 
that  the  ground,  sloping  away  towards  Wellington's  rear, 
screened  his  second  line  and  reserves. 

It  was  this  peculiarity  of  the  ground,  so  different  from 
that  of  the  exposed  slope  behind  Ligny,  that  helped  the 
great  master  of  defensive  tactics  secretly  to  meet  and 
promptly  to  foil  every  onset  of   his   mighty  antagonist. 

1  Beamish' s  "King's  German  Legion,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  352.  Sir  Hussey 
Vivian  asserts  that  the  allied  position  was  by  no  means  strong;  but 
General  Kennedy,  in  his  "Notes  on  Waterloo"  (p.  08),  pronounces  it 
"good  and  well  occupied."  A  year  previously  Wellington  noted  it  as  a 
good  position.  Sir  Hudson  Lowe  then  suggested  that  it  should  be  forti- 
fied :  "Query,  in  respect  to  the  construction  of  a  work  at  Mt.  Jean,  being 
the  commanding  point  at  the  junction  of  two  principal  chaussees " 
("  Unpublished  Memoirs"). 


454  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

While  under-estimating  the  strength  of  Wellington's 
position  Napoleon  over-rated  his  numbers.  As  we  have 
seen,  he  remarked  that  the  allies  exceeded  the  French  by 
more  than  a  fourth.  Now,  as  his  own  numbers  were  fully 
'  74,000,  he  credited  the  allies  with  upwards  of  92,000.  In 
reality,  they  were  not  more  than  67,000,  as  Wellington 
had  left  17,000  at  Hal ;  but  if  this  powerful  detachment 
had  been  included,  Napoleon's  estimate  would  not  have 
been  far  wrong.  At  St.  Helena  he  gave  out  that  his  de- 
spatch of  cavalry  towards  Hal  had  induced  Wellington  to 
weaken  his  army  to  this  extent ;  but  Houssaye  has  shown 
that  the  statement  is  an  entire  fabrication.  The  Emperor 
certainly  believed  that  all  Wellington's  troops  were  close 

at  hand.1 

The  Duke,  on  his  side,  would  doubtless  have  retreated 
had  he  known  that  the  Prussian  advance  would  be  as  slow 
as  it  was.  His  composite  forces,  in  which  five  languages 
were  spoken,  were  unfit  for  a  long  contest  with  Napoleon's 
army.  The  Dutch-Belgian  troops,  numbering  17,000, 
were  known  to  be  half-hearted ;  the  2,800  Nassauers, 
who  had  served  under  Soult  in  1813,  were  not  above 
suspicion ;  the  11,000  Hanoverians  and  5,900  Bruns- 
wickers  were  certain  to  do  their  best,  but  they  were 
mostly  raw  troops.  In  fact,  Wellington  could  thoroughly 
rely  only  on  his  23,990  British  troops  and  the  5,800  men 
of  the  King's  German  Legion  ;  and  among  our  men  there 
was  a  large  proportion  of  recruits  or  drafts  from  militia 
battalions.  Events  were  to  prove  that  this  motley  gather- 
ing could  hold  its  own  while  at  rest;  but  during  the 
subsequent  march  to  Paris  Wellington  passed  the  scathing 
judgment  that,  with  the  exception  of  his  Peninsular  men, 
it  was  "the  worst  equipped  army,  with  the  worst  staff, 

i  Wellington  has  been  censured  by  Clausewitz,  Kennedy,  and  Chesney 
for  leaving  so  large  a  force  at  Hal.  Perhaps  he  desired  to  protect  the 
Kino-  of  France  at  Ghent,  though  he  was  surely  relieved  of  responsibility 
by  his  despatch  of  June  18th,  3  a.m.,  begging  the  Due  de  Berri  to  retire 
with  the  King  to  Antwerp.  It  seems  to  me  more  likely  that  he  was  so 
confident  of  an  early  advance  of  the  Prussians  (see  his  other  despatch  of 
the  same  hour  and  Sir  A.  Frazer's  statement—  "  Letters,"  p.  553—  "  We 
expected  the  Prussian  co-operation  early  in  the  day")  as  to  assume  that 
Napoleon  would  stake  all  on  an  effort  against  his  right ;  and  in  that  case 
the  Hal  force  would  have  crushed  the  French  rear,  though  it  was  very  far 
off. 


xl  WATERLOO  455 

ever  brought  together."1  This  was  after  he  had  lost  De 
Lancey,  Picton,  Ponsonby,  and  many  other  able  officers ; 
but  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  there  was  no  lack  of  skill 
in  the  placing  of  the  troops,  witness  General  Kennedy's 
arrangement  of  Alten's  division  so  that  it  might  readily 
fall  into  the  "  chequer  "  pattern,  which  proved  so  effective 
against  the  French  horsemen. 

Napoleon's  confidence  seemed  to  be  well  founded  :  he 
had  246  cannon  against  the  allies'  156,  and  his  preponder- 
ance in  cavalry  of  the  line  was  equally  great.  Above 
all,  there  were  the  13,000  footmen  of  the  Imperial  Guard, 
flanked  by  3,000  cavaliers.  The  effective  strength  of  the 
two  armies  has  been  reckoned  by  Kennedy  as  in  the  pro- 
portion of  four  to  seven.  Why,  then,  did  he  not  attack 
at  once?  There  were  two  good  reasons:  first  that  his 
men  had  scattered  widely  overnight  in  search  of  food 
and  shelter,  and  now  assembled  very  slowly  on  the  pla- 
teau ;  second,  that  the  rain  did  not  abate  until  8  a.m., 
and  even  then  slight  drizzles  came  on,  leaving  the  ground 
totally  unfit  for  the  movements  of  horse  and  artillery. 
Leaving  the  troops  time  to  form  and  the .  ground  to 
improve,  the  Emperor  consulted  his  charts  and  took  a 
brief  snatch  of  sleep.  He  then  rode  to  the  front ;  and, 
as  the  gray-coated  figure  passed  along  those  imposing 
lines,  the  enthusiasm  found  vent  in  one  rolling  roar  of 
"  Vive  l'Empereur,"  which  was  wafted  threateningly  to 
the  thinner  array  of  the  allies.  There  the  leader  received 
no  whole-hearted  acclaim  save  from  the  men  who  knew 
him;  but  among  these  there  was  no  misgiving.  "If," 
wrote  Major  Simmons  of  the  95th,  "  you  could  have  seen 
the  proud  and  fierce  appearance  of  the  British  at  that  tre- 
mendous moment,  there  was  not  one  eye  but  gleamed  with 

joy-"2 

1  Wellington  to  Earl  Bathurst,  June  25th,  1815.  The  Earl  of  Elles- 
mere,  who  wrote  under  the  Duke's  influence,  stated  that  not  more  than 
7,000  of  the  British  troops  had  seen  a  shot  fired.  This  is  incorrect. 
Picton's  division,  still  5,000  strong,  had  all  served  in  Spain  except  the 
32nd ;  and  Lambert's  brigade  counted  2,200  veterans ;  many  of  the 
Guards  had  seen  fire,  and  the  52nd  was  a  seasoned  regiment.  Toinkinson 
(p.  296')  reckons  all  the  5.220  British  and  1,730  King's  German  troopers 
as  "efficient,"  and  Wellington  himself,  so  Mercer  affirms,  told  Bliicher 
he  had  6,000  of  the  finest  cavalry  in  the  world. 

2  "  A  British  Rifleman,"  p.  307. 


456  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

The  first  shots  were  fired  at  11.50  to  cover  the  assault 
on  the  wood  of  Hougoumont  by  Prince  Jerome  Bona- 
parte's  division   of    Reille's   corps.     The  Nassauers  and 
Hanoverians  briskly  replied,  and  Cleeve's   German  bat- 
tery opened  fire  with  such  effect  that  the  leading  column 
fell  back.     Again  the  assailants  came  on  in  greater  force 
under  shelter  of  a  tremendous  cannonade  :  this  time  they 
gained  a  lodgment,  and  step  by  step  drove  the  defenders 
back  through  the  copse.     Though  checked  for  a  time  by 
the  Guards,  they  mastered  the  wood  south  of  the  house 
by  about  one  o'clock.     There  they  should  have  stopped. 
Napoleon's  orders  were  for  them  to  gain  a  hold  only  on 
the  wood  and  throw  out  a  good  line  of  skirmishers :  all 
that  he  wanted  on  this  side  was  to  prevent  any  turning 
movement  from  Wellington's  advanced  outposts.     Reille 
also   sent   orders   not   to   attack  the   chateau;    but    the 
Prince  and  his  men  rushed  on  at  those  massive  walls,  only 
to  meet  with  a  bloody  repulse.     A  second  attack  fared  no 
better;  and  though  some  12,000  of  Reille's  men  finally 
attacked   the   mansion   on   three  sides,  yet  our  Guards, 
when   reinforced,  beat   off   every  onset  of   wellnigh  ten 
times  their  numbers. 

For  some  time  the  Emperor  paid  little  heed  to  this  waste 
of  energy;  at  2  p.m.  he  recalled  Jerome  to  his  side.  He 
now  saw  the  need  of  husbanding  his  resources  ;  for  a  dis- 
aster had  overtaken  the  French  right  centre.  He  had  fixed 
one  o'clock  for  a  great  attack  on  La  Haye  Sainte  by  D'Er- 
lon's  corps  of  nearly  20,000  men.  But  a  delay  occurred 
owing  to  a  cause  that  we  must  now  describe. 

Before  his  great  battery  of  eighty  guns  belched  forth  at 
the  centre  and  blotted  out  the  view,  he  swept  the  horizon 
with  his  glass,  and  discerned  on  the  skirts  of  the  St.  Lam- 
bert Wood,  six  miles  away,  a  dark  object.  Was  it  a  spin- 
ney, or  a  body  of  troops  ?  His  staff  officers  could  not 
agree  ;  but  his  experienced  eye  detected  a  military  forma- 
tion. Thereupon  some  of  the  staff  asserted  that  they  must 
be  Blucher's  men,  others  that  they  were  Grouchy's.  Here 
he  could  scarcely  be  in  a  doubt.  Not  long  after  10  a.m. 
he  received  from  Grouchy  a  despatch,  dated  from  Gem- 
bloux  at  3  A.M.,  reporting" that  the  Prussians  were  retiring 
in  force  on  Brussels  to  concentrate  or  to  join  Wellington, 


XL  WATERLOO  457 

and  that  he  (Grouchy)  was  on  the  point  of  starting  for 
Sart-a-Walhain  and  Wavre.  He  said  nothing  as  to  pre- 
venting any  flank  march  that  the  enemy  might  make  from 
Wavre  with  a  view  to  joining  their  allies  straightway. 
Therefore  he  was  not  to  be  looked  for  on  this  side  of  Wavre, 
and  those  troops  must  consequently  be  Prussians.1 

All  doubts  were  removed  when  a  Prussian  hussar  officer, 
captured  by  Marbot's  vedettes  near  Lasne,  was  brought  to 
Napoleon.  He  bore  a  letter  from  Biilow  to  Muffling,  stat- 
ing that  the  former  was  on  the  march  to  attack  the  French 
right  wing.  In  reply  to  Napoleon's  questions  the  captain 
stated  that  Biilow's  whole  corps  was  in  motion,  but  wisely 
said  nothing  about  the  other  two  corps  that  were  follow- 
ing. Such  as  it  was,  the  news  in  no  way  alarmed  the 
Emperor.  As  Biilow  was  about  to  march  against  the 
French  flank,  Grouchy  must  march  on  his  flank  and  take 
his  corps  en  flagrant  delit.  That  is  the  purport  of  the 
postscript  added  to  a  rather  belated  reply  that  was  about 
to  be  sent  off  to  Grouchy  at  1  p.m.  It  did  not  reach  him 
till  5  p.m.,  too  late  to  influence  the  result,  even  had  he 
desisted  from  his  attack  on  Wavre,  which  he  did  not.2 

We  return  to  the  Emperor's  actions  at  half-past  one. 
Domont's  and  Subervie's  light  horsemen  were  sent  out 
towards  Frischermont  to  observe  the  Prussians ;  the  great 
battery  of  eighty  guns,  placed  on  the  intermediate  rise, 
now  opened  fire  ;  and  under  cover  of  its  deadly  blasts 
D'Erlon's  four  divisions  dipped  down  into  the  valley. 
They  were  ranged  in  closely  packed  battalions  spread  out 
in  a  front  of  some  two  hundred  men,  a  formation  that  Na- 
poleon had  not  suggested,  but  did  not  countermand.     The 

1  I  distrust  the  story  told  by  Zenovvicz,  and  given  by  Thiers,  that  Na- 
poleon at  10  a.m.  was  awaiting  Grouchy  with  impatience  ;  also  Marbot's 
letter  referred  to  in  his  "  Memoirs,"  ad  Jin.,  in  which  he  says  the  Emperor 
bade  him  push  on  boldly  towards  Wavre,  as  the  troops  near  St.  Lambert 
"  could  be  nothing  else  than  the  corps  of  Grouchy."  Grouchy \s  despatch 
and  the  official  reply  show  that  Napoleon  knew  Grouchy  to  be  somewhere 
between  Gembloux  and  Wavre.  Besides,  Biilow's  report  (Ollech,  p.  102) 
states  that,  while  at  St.  Lambert,  he  sent  out  two  strong  patrols  to  the 
S.W.,  and  was  not  observed  by  the  French,  "  who  appeared  to  have  no 
idea  of  our  existence."     This  completely  disposes  of  Marbot's  story. 

2  Houssaye,  ch.  vii.  In  the  "  Eng.  Hist.  Rev."  for  October,  1000,  p.  815, 
Mr.  H.  George  gives  a  proof  of  this,  citing  the  time  it  took  him  to  pace  the 
roads  by  which  Grouchy  might  have  advanced. 


458  THE  LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

left  column,  that  of  Alix,  was  supported  by  cavalry  on  its 
flank.  Part  of  this  division  gained  the  orchard  of  La 
Haye  Sainte,  and  attacked  the  farm  buildings  on  all  sides. 
From  his  position  hard  by  a  great  elm  above  the  farm, 
Wellington  had  marked  this  onset,  and  now  sent  down  a 
Hanoverian  battalion  to  succour  their  compatriots  ;  but  in 
the  cutting  of  the  main  road  it  was  charged  and  routed  by 
Milhaud's  cuirassiers,  who  pursued  them  up  the  slope  until 
the  rally  sounded.  Farther  to  the  east,  the  French  seemed 
still  surer  of  victory.  Bylandt's  Dutch-Belgians,  some 
3,000  strong,  after  suffering  heavily  in  their  cruelly  ex- 
posed position,  wavered  at  the  approach  of  Donzelot's  col- 
umn, and  finally  broke  into  utter  rout,  pelted  in  their 
flight  with  undeserved  gibes  from  the  British  in  their  rear. 
These  consisted  of  Picton's  division,  the  heroes  of  Quatre 
Bras.  Here  they  had  as  yet  sustained  little  loss,  thanks 
to  the  shelter  of  the  hollow  cross-road  and  a  hedge. 

The  French  columns  now  topped  the  ridge,  uttering 
shouts  of  triumph,  and  began  to  deploy  into  line  for  the 
final  charge.  This  was  the  time,  as  Picton  well  knew,  to 
pour  in  a  volley  and  dash  on  with  the  cold  steel ;  but  as 
he  cheered  on  his  men,  a  bullet  struck  him  in  the  temple 
and  cut  short  his  brilliant  career.  His  tactics  were  suc- 
cessful at  some  points,  while  at  others  our  thin  lines 
barely  held  up  against  the  masses.  Certainly  no  decisive 
result  could  have  been  gained  but  for  the  timely  onset  of 
Ponsonby's  Union  Brigade  —  the  1st  Royal  Dragoons, 
the  Scots  Greys,  and  the  Inniskillings. 

At  the  time  when  Lord  Uxbridge  gave  the  order, 
"Royals  and  Inniskillings  charge,  the  Greys  support," 
Alix's  division  was  passing  the  cross-road.  But  as  the 
Royals  dashed  in,  "the  head  of  the  column  was  seized 
with  a  panic,  gave  us  a  fire  which  brought  down  about 
twenty  men,  then  went  instantly  about  and  endeavoured 
to  regain  the  opposite  side  of  the  hedges ;  but  we  were 
upon  and  amongst  them,  and  had  nothing  to  do  but  press 
them  down  the'slope."  So  wrote  Captain  Clark  Kennedy, 
who  sabred  the  French  colour-bearer  and  captured  the 
eagle.  Equally  brilliant  was  the  charge  of  the  Innis- 
killings, in  the  centre  of  the  brigade.  They  rode  down 
Donzelot's  division,  jostled  its  ranks  into  a  helpless  mass, 


XL  WATERLOO  469 

and  captured  a  great  number  of  prisoners.  The  Scots 
Greys,  too,  succouring  the  hard-pressed  Gordons,  fell 
fiercely  on  Marcognet's  division.  "  Both  regiments," 
wrote  Major  Winchester  of  the  92nd,  "  charged  together 
calling  out  '  Scotland  for  ever '  ;  the  Scots  Greys  actually 
walked  over  this  column,  and  in  less  than  three  minutes  it 
was  totally  destroyed.  The  grass  field,  which  was  only 
an  instant  before  as  green  and  smooth  as  Phoenix  Park, 
was  covered  with  killed  and  wounded,  knapsacks,  arms, 
and  accoutrements."1 

Meanwhile,  on  the  left  of  the  brigade,  Vandeleur's  horse 
and  some  Dutch-Belgian  dragoons  drove  back  Durutte's 
men  past  Papelotte.  On  its  right,  the  2nd  Life  Guards 
cut  up  the  cuirassiers  while  disordered  by  the  sudden  dip 
of  the  hollow  cross-road  ;  and  further  to  the  west,  the  1st 
Dragoon  Guards  and  1st  Life  Guards  met  them  at  the  edge 
of  the  plateau,  clashed  furiously,  burst  through  them,  and 
joined  in  the  wild  charge  of  Ponsonby's  brigade  up  the 
opposite  slope,  cutting  the  traces  of  forty  French  cannon 
and  sabring  the  gunners. 

But  Napoleon  was  awaiting  the  moment  for  revenge, 
and  now  sent  forward  a  solid  force  of  lancers  and  dra- 
goons, who  fell  on  our  disordered  bands  with  resistless 
force,  stabbing  the  men  and  overthrowing  their  wearied 
steeds.  Here  fell  the  gallant  Ponsonby  with  hundreds  of 
his  men,  and,  had  not  Vandeleur's  horse  checked  the  pur- 
suit, very  few  could  have  escaped.  Still,  this  brigade  had 
saved  the  day.  Two  of  D'Erlon's  columns  had  gained  a 
hold  on  the  ridge,  until  the  sudden  charge  of  our  horsemen 
turned  victory  into  a  disastrous  rout  that  cost  the  French 
upwards  of  5,000  men. 

As  if  exhausted  by  this  eager  strife,  both  armies  relaxed 
their  efforts  for  a  space  and  re-formed  their  lines.  Wel- 
lington ordered  Lambert's  brigade  of  2,200  Peninsular 
veterans,  who  had  only  arrived  that  morning,  to  fill  the 
gaps  on  his  left.  The  Emperor,  too,  was  uneasy,  as  he 
showed  by  taking  copious  pinches  of  snuff.  He  mounted 
his  horse  and  rode  to  the  front,  receiving  there  the  cheers 

1  "  Waterloo  Letters,"  pp.  60-63,  70-77,  81-84,  383.  The  whole  brigade 
was  hardly  1,000  sabres  strong.  Sir  E.  Wood,  pp.  126-146 ;  Siborne,  vol. 
ii.,  pp.  20-45. 


460  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap 

of  his  blood-stained  lancers  and  battered  infantry.  Hav- 
ing received  another  despatch  from  Grouchy  which  gave  no 
hope  of  his  speedy  arrival,  he  ordered  his  cannon  once  more 
to  waste  the  British  lines  and  bombard  Hougoumont,  while 
Ney  led  two  of  D'Erlon's  brigades  that  were  the  least 
shaken  to  resume  the  attack  on  La  Haye  Sainte.  Once 
more  they  were  foiled  at  the  farm  buildings  by  the  hardy 
Germans,  to  whom  Wellington  had  sent  a  timely  reinforce- 
ment.1 At  Hougoumont  also  the  Guards  held  firm,  despite 
the  fierce  conflagration  in  the  barn  and  part  of  the  chapel. 
But  while  his  best  troops  everywhere  stood  their  ground, 
the  Duke  saw  with  concern  the  gaps  in  his  fighting  line. 
Many  of  the  Dutch-Belgians  had  made  off  to  the  rear  ;  and 
Jackson,  when  carrying  an  order  to  a  reserve  Dutch  bat- 
tery to  advance  —  an  order  that  was  disobeyed  —  saw  what 
had  become  of  these  malingerers.  "  I  peeped  into  the 
skirts  of  the  forest  and  truly  felt  astonished  :  entire  com- 
panies seemed  there  with  regularly  piled  arms,  fires  blazing 
under  cooking  kettles,  while  the  men  lay  about  smoking!  "2 
Far  different  was  the  scene  at  the  front.  There  the 
third  act  of  the  drama  was  beginning.  After  half  an 
hour  of  the  heaviest  cannonade  ever  known,  Wellington's 
faithful  troops  were  threatened  by  an  avalanche  of  cavalry, 
and  promptly  fell  into  the  "  chequer  "  disposition  previ- 
ously arranged  for  the  most  exposed  division,  that  of 
Alten.  Napoleon  certainly  hoped  either  to  crush  Wel- 
lington outright  by  a  mighty  onset  of  horse,  or  to  strip 
him  bare  for  the  coup  de  grdee.  At  the  Caillou  farm  in 
the  morning  he  said  :  "  I  will  use  my  powerful  artillery ; 
my  cavalry  shall  charge  ;  and  I  will  advance  with  my  Old 
Guard."  The  use  of  cavalry  on  a  grand  scale  was  no  new 
thing  in  his  wars.  By  it  he  had  won  notable  advantages, 
above  all  at  Dresden  ;  and  he  believed  that  footmen,  when 
badly  shaken  by  artillery,  could  not  stand  before  his 
squadrons.  The  French  cavalry,  15,000  strong  at  the 
outset,  had  as  yet  suffered  little,  and  the  way  had  been 

1  Houssaye,  pp.  354,  499,  admits  the  repulse. 

2  B.  Jackson,  p.  34.  Muffling  says  the  defaulters  numbered  10,000 ! 
While  sympathizing  with  the  efforts  of  Dutch-Belgian  writers  on  behalf  of 
their  kin,  I  must  accept  Jackson's  evidence  as  conclusive  here.  It  is  true 
these  troops  had  been  mauled  at  Quatre  Bras  and  early  at  Waterloo. 


xl  WATERLOO  461 

partly  cleared  by  the  last  assaults  on  Hougoumont  and 
La  Haye  Sainte,  where  the  defenders  were  wholly  occupied 
in  self-defence. 

But  Ney  certainly  pressed  the  first  charge  too  soon. 
Doubtless  he  was  misled  by  the  retirement  of  our  first  line 
a  little  way  behind  the  crest  to  gain  some  slight  shelter 
from  the  iron  storm.  Looking  on  this  prudent  move  as  a 
sign  of  retreat  he  led  forward  the  cuirassiers  of  Alilhaud ; 
and  as  these  splendid  brigades  trotted  forward,  the 
chasseurs  a  cheval  of  the  Guard  and  "  red  "  lancers  joined 
them.  More  than  5,000  strong,  these  horsemen  rode 
into  the  valley,  formed  at  the  foot  of  the  slope,  and  then, 
under  cover  of  their  artillery,  began  to  breast  the  slope. 
At  its  crest  the  guns  of  the  allies  opened  on  them  point- 
blank  ;  but,  despite  their  horrible  losses,  they  swept  on, 
charged  through  the  guns  and  down  the  reverse  slope 
towards  the  squares.  Volley  after  volley  now  tore 
through  with  fearful  effect,  and  the  survivors  swerved  to 
the  intervals.  Their  second  and  third  lines  fared  little 
better  ;  astonished  at  so  stout  a  stand,  where  they  looked 
to  find  only  a  few  last  despairing  efforts,  they  fell  into 
faltering  groups. 

"  As  to  the  so-called  charges,"  says  Basil  Jackson,  "  I  do  not  think 
that  on  a  single  occasion  actual  collision  occurred.  I  many  times  saw 
the  cuirassiers  come  on  with  boldness  to  within  some  twenty  or 
thirty  yards  of  a  square,  when,  seeing  the  steady  firmness  of  our  men, 
they  invariably  edged  away  and  retired.  Sometimes  they  would  halt 
and  gaze  at  the  triple  row  of  bayonets,  when  two  or  three  brave 
officers  would  advance  and  strive  to  urge  the  attack,  raising  their 
helmets  aloft  on  their  sabres  —  but  all  in  vain,  as  no  efforts  could  make 
the  men  close  with  the  terrible  bayonets,  and  meet  certain  destruc- 
tion."1 

After  the  fire  of  the  rear  squares  had  done  its  work, 
our  cavalry  fell  on  the  wavering  masses  ;  and,  as  they 
rode  off,  the  gunners  ran  forth  from  the  squares  and 
plied  them  with  shot.  In  a  few  minutes  the  mounted 
host  that  seemed  to  have  swallowed  up  the  footmen  was 
gone,  the  red  and  blue  chequers  stood  forth  triumphant, 
and  the  guns  that  should  have  been  spiked  dealt  forth 

[B.  Jackson,  p.  35;  "Waterloo  Letters,"  pp.  129-144,296;  Cotton, 
p.  79. 


462  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

death.     Down  below,  the  confused  mass  shaped  itself  for 
a  new  charge  while  its  supports  routed  our  horsemen. 

In  this  second  attack  Ney  received  a  powerful   rein- 
forcement.    The  Emperor  ordered  the  advance  of  Keller- 
mann  and  of  Guyot  with  the  heavy  cavalry  of  the  Guard, 
thus  raising  the  number  of  horsemen  to  about  10,000.     At 
the  head  of  these  imposing  masses  Ney  again  mounted  the 
slope.     But  Wellington  had  strengthened  his  line  by  fresh 
troops,  ordering  up  also  Mercer's  battery  of  six  9-pounders, 
to  support  two  Brunswick  regiments  that  wavered  omi- 
nously as  the  French  cannon-balls   tore  through   them. 
Would  these  bewildered  lads  stand  before  the  wave  of 
horsemen  already  topping  the  crest  ?     It  seemed  impossi- 
ble.    But  just  then  Mercer's  men  thundered  up  between 
them  with  the  guns,  took  post  behind  the  raised  cross- 
road, and  opened  on  the  galloping  horsemen  with  case- 
shot.    At  once  the  front  was  strewn  with  steeds  and  men ; 
and  gunners  and  infantry  riddled  the  successive  ranks, 
that  rushed  on  only  to  pile  up  writhing  heaps  and  bar 
retreat  to  the  survivors  in  front.     Some  of  these  sought 
safety  by  a  dash  through  the  guns,  while  the  greater  num- 
ber struggled  and  even  laid  about  with  their  sabres  to 
hew  their  way  out  of  this  battue. 

Elsewhere  the  British  artillery  was  too  exposed  to  be 
defended,  and  the  gunners  again  fled  back  to  the  squares. 
Once  more  the  cavalry  surrounded  our  footmen,  like 
"heavy  surf  breaking  on  a  coast  beset  with  isolated  rocks, 
against  which  the  mountainous  wave  dashes  with  furious 
uproar,  breaks,  divides,  and  runs  hissing  and  boiling  far 
beyond."  Yet,  as  before,  it  failed  to  break  those  stubborn 
blocks,  and  a  perplexing  pause  occurred,  varied  by  partial 
and  spasmodic  rushes.  "  Will  those  English  never  show 
us  their  backs  "  —  exclaimed  the  Emperor,  as  he  strained 
his  eyes  to  catch  the  first  sign  of  rout.  "  I  fear,"  replied 
Soult,  "  they  will  be  cut  to  pieces  first."  For  the  present, 
it  was  the  cavalry  that  gave  way.  Foiled  by  that  indomi- 
table infantry,  they  were  again  charged  by  British  and 
German  hussars  and  driven  into  the  valley. 

Once  more  Ney  led  on  his  riders,  gathering  up  all  his 
reserves.  But  the  Duke  had  now  brought  up  Adam's 
brigade  and  Duplat's  King's  Germans  to  the  space  behind 


XL  WATERLOO  463 

Hougoumont  ;  their  fire  took  the  horsemen  in  flank  :  the 
blasts  of  grape  and  canister  were  as  deadly  as  before  :  one 
and  all,  the  squares  held  firm,  beating  back  onset  after 
onset  :  and  by  6  o'clock  the  French  cavalry  fell  away 
utterly  exhausted.1 

Who  is  to  be  held  responsible  for  these  wasteful  attacks, 
and  why  was  not  French  infantry  at  hand  to  hold  the  ground 
which  the  cavaliers  seemed  to  have  won  ?  Undoubtedly, 
Ney  began  the  first  attack  somewhat  too  early ;  but  Na- 
poleon himself  strengthened  the  second  great  charge  by 
the  addition  of  Kellermann's  and  Guyot's  brigades,  doubt- 
less in  the  belief  that  the  British,  of  whose  tenacity  he  had 
never  had  direct  personal  proof,  must  give  way  before  so 
mighty  a  mass.  Moreover,  time  after  time  it  seemed  that 
the  attacks  were  triumphant ;  the  allied  guns  on  the  right 
centre,  except  Mercer's,  were  nine  or  ten  times  taken,  their 
front  squares  as  often  enveloped  ;  and  more  than  once  the 
cry  of  victory  was  raised  by  the  Emperor's  staff. 

Why,  then,  was  not  the  attack  clinched  by  infantry  ? 
To  understand  this  we  must  review  the  general  situation. 
Hougoumont  still  defied  the  attacks  of  nearly  the  whole 
of  Reille's  corps,  and  the  effective  part  of  D'Erlon's  corps 
was  hotly  engaged  at  and  near  La  Haye  Sainte.  Above 
all,  the  advent  of  the  Prussians  on  the  French  right  now 
made  itself  felt.  After  ceaseless  toil,  in  which  the  soldiers 
were  cheered  on  by  Bliicher  in  person,  their  artillery  was 
got  across  the  valley  of  the  Lasne  ;  and  at  4.30  Biilow's 
vanguard  debouched  from  the  wood  behind  Frischermont. 
Lobau's  corps  of  7,800  men,  which,  according  to  Janin, 
was  about  to  support  Ney,  now  swung  round  to  the  right  to 
check  this  advance.2  Towards  5  o'clock  the  Prussian  can- 
non opened  fire  on  the  horsemen  of  Domont  and  Subervie, 
who  soon  fell  back  on  Lobau. 

Biilow  pressed  on  with  his  30,000  men,  and,  swinging 
forward  his  left  wing,  gained  a  footing  in  the  village  of 

1  Houssaye,  pp.  365,  371-376;  Kennedy,  pp.  117-120;  Mercer,  vol.  i., 
pp.  311-324. 

2  Gourgaud  (ch.  vi.)  states  that  the  time  of  Lobau's  move  was  4.30, 
though  he  had  reconnoitred  on  his  right  earlier.  Napoleon's  statements 
on  this  head  at  St.  Helena  are  conflicting.  One  says  that  Lobau  moved 
at  1.30,  another  at  4.:!0.  Perhaps  Janin's  statement  explains  why  Lobau 
did  nothing  definite  till  the  later  hour. 


464  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Planchenoit,  while  Lobau  fell  back  towards  La  Belle  Alli- 
ance. This  took  place  between  5.30  and  6  o'clock,  and 
accounts  for  Napoleon's  lack  of  attention  to  the  great 
cavalry  charges.  To  break  the  British  squares  was  highly 
desirable  ;  but  to  ward  off  the  Prussians  from  his  rear  was 
an  imperative  necessity.  He  therefore  ordered  Duhesme 
with  the  4,000  footmen  of  the  Young  Guard  to  regain 
Planchenoit.  Gallantly  they  advanced  at  the  charge, 
and  drove  their  weary  and  half-famished  opponents  out 
into  the  open. 

Satisfied  with  this  advantage,  the  Emperor  turned  his 
thoughts  to  the  British  and  bade  Ney  capture  La  Haye 
Sainte  at  all  costs.  Never  was  duty  more  welcome.  Mis- 
takes and  failures  could  now  be  atoned  by  triumph  or 
a  soldier's  death.  Both  had  as  yet  eluded  his  search. 
Three  horses  had  been  struck  to  the  ground  under  him, 
but,  dauntless  as  ever,  he  led  Donzelot's  men,  with  engi- 
neers, against  the  farm.  Begrimed  with  smoke,  hoarse 
with  shouting,  he  breathed  the  lust  of  battle  into  those 
half-despondent  ranks ;  and  this  time  he  succeeded.  For 
five  hours  the  brave  Germans  had  held  out,  beating  off 
rush  after  rush,  until  now  they  had  but  three  or  four 
bullets  apiece  left.  The  ordinary  British  ammunition  did 
not  fit  their  rifles ;  and  their  own  reserve  supply  could 
not  be  found  at  the  rear.  Still,  even  when  firing  ceased, 
bayonet-thrusts  and  missiles  kept  off  the  assailants  for 
a  space,  even  from  the  half-destroyed  barn-door,  until 
Frenchmen  mounted  the  roof  of  the  stables  and  burst 
through  the  chief  gateway  :  then  Baring  and  his  brave 
fellows  fled  through  the  house  to  the  garden.  "No  par- 
don to  these  green  devils"  was  now  the  cry,  and  those 
who  could  not  make  off  to  the  ridge  were  bayoneted  to  a 
man.1 

This  was  a  grave  misfortune  for  the  allies.  French 
sharpshooters  now  lined  the  walls  of  the  farm  and 
pushed  up  the  ridge,  pressing  our  front  very  hard,  so 

1  Baring's  account  ("King's  German  Legion,"  App.  xxi.)  shows  that 
the  farm  was  taken  about  the  time  of  the  last  great  cavalry  charge. 
Kennedy  (p.  122)  and  Ompteda  (ad  Jin.)  are  equally  explicit;  and  the 
evidence  of  the  French  archives  adduced  by  Houssaye  (p.  378)  places 
the  matter  beyond  doubt. 


XL  WATERLOO  465 

that,  for  a  time,  the  space  behind  La  Haye  Sainte  was 
practically  bare  of  defenders.  This  was  the  news  that 
Kennedy  took  to  Wellington.  He  received  it  with  the 
calm  that  bespoke  a  mighty  soul ;  for,  as  Sir  A.  Frazer 
observed,  however  indifferent  or  apparently  careless  he 
might  appear  at  the  beginning  of  battles,  as  the  crisis 
came  he  rose  superior  to  all  that  could  be  imagined. 
Such  was  his  demeanour  now.  Riding  to  the  Bruns- 
wickers  posted  in  reserve,  he  led  them  to  the  post  of 
danger ;  Kennedy  rallied  the  wrecks  of  Alten's  divi- 
sion and  brought  up  Germans  from  the  left  wing ;  the 
cavalry  of  Vandeleur  and  Vivian,  moving  in  from  the 
extreme  left,  also  helped  to  steady  the  centre ;  and 
the  approach  of  Chasse's  Dutch-Belgian  brigade,  lately 
called  in  from  Braine-la-Leud,  strengthened  our  supports. 

Had  Napoleon  promptly  launched  his  Old  and  Middle 
Guard  at  Wellington's  centre,  victory  might  still  have 
crowned  the  French  eagles.  But  to  Ney's  request  for 
more  troops  he  returned  the  petulant  answer  :  "  Troops  ? 
where  do  you  want  me  to  get  them  from  ?  Am  I  to 
make  them  ? "  At  this  time  the  Prussians  were  again 
masters  of  Planchenoit.  Once  more,  then,  he  turned  on 
them,  and  sent  in  two  battalions,  one  of  the  Old,  the 
other  of  the  Middle  Guard.  In  a  single  rush  with  the 
bayonet  these  veterans  mastered  the  place  and  drove 
Biilow's  men  a  quarter  of  a  mile  beyond,  while  Lobau 
regained  ground  further  north.  But  the  head  of  Pirch's 
corps  was  near  at  hand  to  strengthen  Biilow;  while,  after 
long  delays  caused  by  miry  lanes  and  an  order  from 
Blucher  to  make  for  Planchenoit,  Ziethen's  corps  began 
to  menace  the  French  right  at  Smohain.  Reiche  soon 
opened  fire  with  sixteen  cannon,  somewhat  relieving  the 
pressure  on  Wellington's  left.1 

Still  the  Emperor  was  full  of  hope.  He  did  not  know 
of  the  approach  of  Pirch  and  Ziethen.  Now  and  again 
the  muttering  of  Grouchy's  guns  was  heard  on  the  east, 
and  despite  that  Marshal's  last  despatch,  Napoleon  still 
believed  that  he  would  come  up  and  catch  the  Prussians. 
Satisfied,  then,   with  holding  off  Biilow  for  a  while,  he 

1  Ollech,  pp.  243-246.  Reiche's  exorbitant  claims  (vol.  ii.,  pp.  209-216) 
are  refuted  by  "  Waterloo  Letters,"  p.  22. 

VOL.  II  —  2  H 


460 


THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  CHAP- 


staked  all  on  a  last  effort  with  the  Old  and  Middle  Guard 
Leavfng  two  battalions  of  these  in  Planchenoit,  and  three 
r£ar  Rossomme  as  a  last  reserve,  he  led  forward  nine 
SLKUd  in  hollow  squares.  A  thriH. ranthrough 
the  line  regiments,  some  of  whom  were  falling  back,  as 
hy  saw  thf  bearskins  move  forward  ;  and,  to  revive  their 
spirits    the  Emperor  sent  on  Labedoyere  with  the  news 

ISSX  W  deferred,  which  renders 

Waterloo  unique  among  battles,  rose  to  its  climax.     Each 
ridf had  striven  furiously  for  eight  hours  in  the  belie 
that  the  Prussians,  or  Grouchy,  must  come  ;  and ^now^t 
thP  last  ao-onv,  came  the  assurance  that  final  triumph  was 

td°S  troops  of  »™»^*°^™££Z 
clutched  at  victory  on  the  crest  behind  La  He Samte  or 
beneath  the  walls  of  Hougoumont  while  the .squares  ot 
the  Guard  struck  obliquely  across  the  vale  in  the  tract  oi 
the  Seat  cavalry  charges.  On  the  rise  south-west  of  La 
Hay!  Sainte,  Napoleon  halted  one  battalion  and handed 
over  to  Ney  the  command  of  the  remaining  eight,  that 
hilled  him  as  they  passed  with  enthusiastic  shouts  Two 
aSTdeTaxnp  Jul  ?hen  galloped  up  from  tibe  ngh £  o  tell 
him  of  the  Prussian  advance,  but  he  refused  to  listen  to 
thpm  and  bent  his  eyes  on  the  Guards. 

Under  cover  of  a  whirlwind  of  shot  the  veterans  pressed 
on      Having  suffered  very  little  at  Ligny,  they  numbered 
fully  4  000,  and  formed  at  first  one  column   some  seventy 
men  in  width.     The  front  battalions  headed  for  a  point  a 
Se  to  The  west  of  the  present  Belgian  ™—^\l 
for  some  unexplained  reason  th  ere  ar  po  rtion  diverge  do 
the  left  and  breasted  the  slope  later  than  the  others  ana 
u^are    Hougoumont.     Flanked  by  light  guns  that  opened 
abrTsk  fire    and  most  gallantly  supported  by  Donzelot 
div     on  close  on  their  right,  the  leading  column  strugg  ed 
'      on!  despite  the  grape  and  canister jwhich .poured tan  the 
batteries  of  Bolton  and  Bean,  making  it  wave     like  coin 
blown  by  the  wind."     Friant,  the  Commander  o    the  Old 
Guard,  was   severely  wounded;  Ney'B  horse  f^dei 
him,  but  the  gallant  fighter  rose  undaunted,  and  waved  on 
1Lacoste  (Decoster),  Napoleon's  Flemish  guide,  told  this  to  Sir  W. 
Scott,  "Life  of  Napoleon,"  vol.  vui.,  p.  496. 


XL  WATERLOO  40V 

his  men  anew.  And  now  they  streamed  over  the  ridge 
and  through  the  British  guns  in  full  assurance  of  triumph. 
Few  troops  seemed  to  be  before  them  ;  for  Maitland's 
men  (2nd  and  3rd  battalions  of  the  1st  Foot  Guards) 
had  lain  down  behind  the  bank  of  the  cross-road  to  get 
some  shelter  from  the  awful  cannonade.  "  Stand  up, 
Guards,  and  make  ready,"  exclaimed  the  Duke  when  the 
French  were  but  sixty  paces  away.  The  volley  that 
flashed  from  their  lengthy  front  staggered  the  column, 
and  seemed  to  force  it  bodily  back.  In  vain  did  the 
French  officers  wave  their  swords  and  attempt  to  deploy 
into  line.  Mangled  in  front  by  Maitland's  brigade,  on  its 
flank  by  our  33rd  and  69th  Regiments  drawn  up  in 
square,  and  by  the  deadly  salvos  of  Chasse's  Dutch- 
Belgians,1  that  stately  array  shrank  and  shrivelled  up. 
"Now's  the  time,  my  boys,"  shouted  Lord  Saltoun ;  and 
the  thin  red  line,  closing  with  the  mass,  drove  it  pell-mell 
down  the  slope. 

Near  the  foot  the  victors  fell  under  the  fire  of  the  rear 
portion  of  the  Imperial  Guards,  who,  undaunted  by  their 
comrades'  repulse,  rolled  majestically  upwards.  Colborne 
now  wheeled  the  52nd  (Oxfordshire)  Regiment  on  the 
crest  in  a  line  nearly  parallel  to  their  advance,  and  opened 
a  deadly  fire  on  their  flank,  which  was  hotly  returned  ; 
Maitland's  men,  re-forming  on  the  crest,  gave  them  a 
volley  in  front  ;  and  some  Hanoverians  at  the  rear  of 
Hougoumont  also  galled  their  rear.  Seizing  the  favour- 
able moment  when  the  column  writhed  in  anguish,  Col- 
borne cheered  his  men  to  the  charge,  and,  aided  by  the 
second  95th  Rifles,  utterly  overthrew  the  last  hope  of 
France.  Continuing  his  advance,  and  now  supported  by 
the  71st  Regiment,  he  swept  our  front  clear  as  far  as  the 
orchard  of  La  Haye  Sainte.2 

1  See  Boulger's  "  The  Belgians  at  Waterloo"  (1001),  p.  33. 

2  The  formation  and  force  of  the  French  Guards  in  this  ;ittack  have 
been  much  discussed.  Thiers  omits  all  notice  of  the  second  column  ; 
Houssaye  limits  its  force  to  a  single  battalion,  but  his  account  is  not  con- 
vincing. On  p.  385  he  says  nine  battalions  of  the  Guard  advanced  into 
the  valley,  but,  on  p.  389,  he  accounts  only  for  six.  Other  authorities 
agree  that  eight  joined  in  the  attack.  As  to  their  formation,  Houssaye 
advances  many  proofs  that  it  was  in  hollow  squares.  Here  is  one  more. 
On  the  19th  Basil  Jackson  rode  along  the  slope  and  ridge  near  the  back 
of  Hougoumont  and  talked  with  some  of  the  wounded  of  the  Imperial 


468  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

The   Emperor   had   at   first  watched   the   charge  with 
feelings   of   buoyant  hope  ;  for   Friant,  who   came   back 
wounded,  reported  that  success  was  certain.     As  the  truth 
forced  itself  on  him,  he  turned  pale  as  a  corpse.     "  Why  ! 
they  are  in  confusion,"  he  exclaimed  ;  "  all  is  lost  for  the 
present."     A  thrill  of  agony  also  shot  through  the  French 
lines.     Donzelot's  onset  had  at  one  time  staggered  Hal- 
kett's  brigade  ;  but  the  hopes  aroused  by  the  charge  of 
the  Guard  and  the  rumour  of  Grouchy's  approach  gave 
place  to  dismay  when  the  veterans  fell  back  and  Ziethen's 
Prussians  debouched  from  Papelotte.     To  the  cry  of  "  The 
Guard  gives  way,"  there  succeeded  shouts  of  "treason." 
The  Duke,  noting  the  confusion,  waved  on  his  whole  line  to 
the  longed-for  advance.     Menaced  in  front  by  the  thin  red 
line,  and  in  rear  by  Colborne's  glorious  charge,  D'Erlon's 
divisions  broke   up  in   general  rout.     For  a  time,  three 
rocks  stood  boldly  forth  above  this  disastrous  ebb.     They 
were  the  battalions  of  the  Guard  previously  repulsed,  and 
that  had  rallied  around  the  Emperor  on  the  rise  south  of 
La  Haye  Sainte.     In  front  of  them  the  three  regiments  of 

Guard.  "As  they  lay  they  formed  large  squares,  of  which  the  centres 
were  hollow"  (p.  57).  Maitland  ("Waterloo  Letters,"  p.  244)  says: 
"  There  was  one  great  column  at  first,  which  separated  into  two  parts." 
Gawler  (p.  292)  adds:  that  "The  second  column  was  subdivided  in  two 
parts,  close  together,  and  that  its  whole  flank  was  much  longer  than  the 
front  of  our  52nd  regiment.'1''  It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  all  this  with  the 
attack  in  hollow  squares;  but  probably  the  squares  (or  oblongs?)  fol- 
lowed each  other  so  closely  as  to  seem  like  a  serried  column.  None  of 
our  men  could  see  whether  the  masses  were  solid  or  hollow,  but  naturally 
assumed  them  to  be  solid,  and  hence  greatly  over-estimated  their  strength. 
A  column  made  up  of  hollow  squares  is  certainly  an  odd  formation,  but 
perhaps  is  not  unsuitable  to  withstand  cavalry  and  overthrow  infantry. 

I  cannot  accept  Houssaye's  statement  (p.  393)  that  the  French  squares 
attacked  our  front  at  four  different  places,  from  the  52nd  regiment  on  our 
right  to  the  Brunswickers  in  our  centre,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  the  east. 
The  only  evidence  that  favours  this  is  Macready's  ("Waterloo  Letters, 
p.  330)  ;  he  says  that  the  men  who  attacked  his  square  (30th  and  73rd 
regiments)  were  of  the  Middle  Guard  ;  for  their  wounded  said  so ;  but 
Kelly,  of  the  same  square,  thought  they  were  Donzelot's  men,  who  cer- 
tainly attacked  there.  Siborne,  seemingly  on  the  strength  of  Macready  s 
statement,  says  that  part  of  the  Guards'  column  diverged  thither :  but 
this  is  unlikely.  Is  it  credible  that  the  Guards,  less  than  4,000  strong, 
should  have  spread  their  attacks  over  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  front  ?  Was 
not  the  column  the  usual  method  of  attack  ?  I  submit,  then,  that  my 
explanation  of  the  Guard  attacking  in  hollow  squares  or  oblongs,  formed 
in  two  chief  columns,  harmonizes  the  known  facts  of  the  case. 


xl  WATERLOO  4G9 

Adam's  brigade  stopped  to  re-form  ;  but  at  the  Duke's 
command  —  "  Go  on,  go  on  ;  they  will  not  stand  "  —  Col- 
borne  charged  them,  and  they  gave  way. 

And  now,  as  the  sun  shot  its  last  gleams  over  the  field, 
the  swords  of  the  British  horsemen  were  seen  to  flash  and 
fall  with  relentless  vigour.  The  brigades  of  Vandeleur 
and  Vivian,  well  husbanded  during  the  day,  had  been 
slipped  upon  the  foe.  The  effect  was  electrical.  The 
retreat  became  a  rout  that  surged  wildly  around  the  last 
squares  of  the  Guard.  In  one  of  them  Napoleon  took 
refuge  for  a  space,  still  hoping  to  effect  a  rally,  while  out- 
side Ney  rushed  from  band  to  band,  brandishing  a  broken 
sword,  foaming  with  fury,  and  launching  at  the  runaways 
the  taunt  "  Cowards  !  have  you  forgotten  how  to  die  ?  " 1 

But  panic  now  reigned  supreme.  Adam's  brigade  was 
at  hand  to  support  our  horsemen  ;  and  shortly  after  nine 
there  knelled  from  Planchenoit  the  last  stroke  of  doom, 
the  shouts  of  Prussians  at  last  victorious  over  the  stubborn 
defence.  "  The  Guard  dies  and  does  not  surrender  "  — 
such  are  the  words  attributed  by  some  to  Michel,  by 
others  to  Cambronne  before  he  was  stretched  senseless  on 
the  ground.2  Whether  spoken  or  not,  some  such  thought 
prompted  whole  companies  to  die  for  the  honour  of  their 
flag.  And  their  chief,  why  did  he  not  share  their  glorious 
fate  ?  Gourgaud  says  that  Soult  forced  him  from  the  field. 
If  so  (and  Houssaye  discredits  the  story)  Soult  never  served 
his  master  worse.  The  only  dignified  course  was  to  act 
up  to  his  recent  proclamation  that  the  time  had  come  for 
every  Frenchman  of  spirit  to  conquer  or  die.  To  belie 
those  words  by  an  ignominious  flight  was  to  court  the 
worst  of  sins  in  French  political  life,  ridicule. 

And  the  flight  was  ignominious.  Wellington's  weary 
troops,  after  several  times  mistaking  friends  for  foes  in 
the  dusk,  halted  south  of  Rossomme  and  handed  over  the 
pursuit  to  the  Prussians,  many  of  whom  had  fought  but 
little  and  now  drank  deep  the  draught  of  revenge.  By 
the  light  of  the  rising  moon  Gneisenau  led  on  his  horse- 
men in  a  pursuit  compared  with  which  that  of  Jena  was 

1  Janin,  p.  45. 

2  Bertrand  at  St.  Helena  said  he  heard  Michel  utter  these  words 
(Montholon,  vol.  iii.,  ch.  iv.). 


470  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

tame.  At  Genappe  Napoleon  hoped  to  make  a  stand  :  but 
the  place  was  packed  with  wagons  and  thronged  with  men 
struggling  to  get  at  the  narrow  bridge.  At  the  blare  of 
the  Prussian  trumpets,  the  panic  became  frightful ;  the 
Emperor  left  his  carriage  and  took  to  horse  as  the  hurrahs 
drew  near.  Seven  times  did  the  French  form  bivouacs, 
and  seven  times  were  they  driven  out  and  away.  At 
Quatre  Bras  he  once  more  sought  to  gather  a  few  troops  ; 
but  ere  he  could  do  so  the  Uhlans  came  on.  With  tears 
trickling  down  his  pallid  cheeks,  he  resumed  his  flight 
over  another  field  of  carnage,  where  ghastly  forms  glinted 
on  all  sides  under  the  pale  light  of  dawn.  After  further 
futile  efforts  at  Charleroi,  he  hurried  on  towards  Paris, 
followed  at  some  distance  by  groups  amounting  to  about 
10,000  men,  the  sorry  remnant  still  under  arms  of  the  host 
that  fought  at  Waterloo  :  25,000  lay  dead  or  wounded 
there  :  some  thousands  were  taken  prisoners  :  the  rest 
were  scattering  to  their  homes.  Wellington  lost  10,360 
killed  and  wounded,  of  whom  6,344  were  British  :  the 
Prussian  loss  was  about  6,000  men. 

The  causes  of  Napoleon's  overthrow  are  not  hard  to 
find.  The  lack  of  timely  pursuit  of  Blucher  and  Wel- 
lington on  the  17th  enabled  those  leaders  to  secure  posts  of 
vantage  and  to  form  an  incisive  plan  which  he  did  not 
fully  fathom  even  at  the  crisis  of  the  battle.  Full  of  over- 
weening contempt  of  Wellington,  he  began  the  fight  heed- 
lessly and  wastefully.  When  the  Prussians  came  on,  he 
underrated  their  strength  and  believed  to  the  very  end 
that  Grouchy  would  come  up  and  take  them  between  two 
fires.  But,  in  the  absence  of  prompt,  clear,  and  detailed 
instructions,  that  Marshal  was  left  a  prey  to  his  fatal 
notion  that  Wavre  was  the  one  point  to  be  aimed  at  and 
attacked.  Despite  the  heavy  cannonade  on  the  west  he 
persisted  in  this  strange  course  ;  while  Napoleon  staked 
everything  on  a  supreme  effort  against  Wellington.  This 
last  was  an  act  of  appalling  hardihood  ;  but  he  explained 
to  Cockburn  on  the  voyage  to  St.  Helena  that,  still  con- 
fiding in  Grouchy's  approach,  he  felt  no  uneasiness  at 
the  Prussian  movements,  "which  were,  in  fact,  already 
checked,  and  that  he  considered  the  battle  to  have  been, 
on  the  whole,  rather  in  his  favour  than  otherwise."     The 


xl  WATERLOO  471 

explanation  has  every  appearance  of  sincerity.  But  would 
any  other  great  commander  have  staked  his  last  reserve 
and  lai,d  bare  his  rear  solely  in  reliance  on  the  ability  of 
an  almost  untried  leader  who  had  sent  not  a  single  word 
that  justified  the  hopes  now  placed  in  him  ? 

We  here  touch  the  weak  points  in  Napoleon's  intel- 
lectual armour.  Gifted  with  almost  superhuman  insight 
and  energy  himself,  he  too  often  credited  his  paladins  with 
possessing  the  same  divine  afflatus.  Furthermore,  he  had 
a  supreme  contempt  for  his  enemies.  Victorious  in  a 
hundred  fights  over  second-rate  opponents  in  his  youth, 
he  could  not  now  school  his  hardened  faculties  to  the  cau- 
tion needed  in  a  contest  with  Wellington,  Gneisenau,  and 
Bliicher.  Only  after  he  had  ruined  himself  and  France 
did  he  realize  his  own  errors  and  the  worth  of  the  allied 
leaders.  During  the  voyage  to  England  he  confessed  to 
Bertrand  :  "  The  Duke  of  Wellington  is  fully  equal  to  m}r- 
self  in  the  management  of  an  army,  with  the  advantage  of 
possessing  more  prudence." x 

1  Maitland's  "Narrative,"  p.  222.  Basil  Jackson,  who  knew  Gour- 
gaud  well  at  St.  Helena,  learnt  from  him  that  he  could  not  finish  his 
account  of  Waterloo,  "as  Napoleon  could  never  decide  on  the  best  way 
of  ending  the  great  battle  :  that  he  (Gourgaud)  had  suggested  no  less  than 
six  different  ways,  but  none  were  satisfactory"  ("Waterloo  and  St. 
Helena,"  p.  102).  Gourgaud's  "Journal  "  shows  that  Napoleon  blamed  in 
turn  the  rain,  Ney,  Grouchy,  Vandamme,  Guyot,  and  Soult ;  but  he  ends 
—  "  it  was  a  fatality ;  for  in  spite  of  all,  I  should  have  won  that  battle." 


CHAPTER   XLI 

FROM  THE  ELYSEE  TO  ST.    HELENA 

Napoleon  was  far  from  accepting  Waterloo  as  a  final 
blow.  At  Philippeville,  on  the  day  after  the  battle,  he 
wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph  that  he  would  speedily  have 
300,000  men  ready  to  defend  France  :  he  would  harness 
his  guns  with  carriage-horses,  raise  100,000  conscripts, 
and  arm  them  with  muskets  taken  from  the  royalists  and 
malcontent  National  Guards :  he  would  arouse  Dauphine, 
Lyonnais,  and  Burgundy,  and  overwhelm  the  enemy. 
"  But  the  people  must  help  me  and  not  bewilder  me.  .  .  . 
Write  to  me  what  effect  this  horrible  piece  of  bad  luck 
has  had  on  the  Chamber.  I  believe  the  deputies  will  feel 
convinced  that,  their  duty  in  this  crowning  moment  is  to 
rally  round  me  and  save  France."1 

The  tenacious  will,  then,  is  only  bent,  not  broken. 
Waterloo  is  merely  a  greater  La  Rothi&re,  calling  for  a 
mightier  defensive  effort  than  that  of  1814.  Such  are 
his  intentions,  even  when  he  knows  not  that  Grouchy  is 
escaping  from  the  Prussians.  The  letter  breathes  a  firm 
resolve.  He  has  no  scruples  as  to  the  wickedness  of 
spurring  on  a  wearied  people  to  a  conflict  with  Europe. 
As  yet  he  forms  no  magnanimous  resolve  to  take  leave 
of  a  nation  whom  his  genius  may  once  more  excite  to 
a  fatal  frenzy.  He  still  seems  unable  to  conceive  of 
France  happy  and  prosperous  apart  from  himself.  In 
indissoluble  union  they  will  struggle  on  and  defy  the 
world. 

Such  was  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  he  reached  the 
Elysee  Palace  early  on  the  21st  of  June.  For  a  time  he 
was  much  agitated.  "  Oh,  my  God  !  "  he  exclaimed  to 
Lavalette,  raising  his  eyes  to  heaven  and  walking  up  and 

1  "Lettres  incites  de  Napoleon." 

472 


chap,  xli        FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  473 

down  the  room.  But  after  taking  a  warm  bath  —  his 
unfailing  remedy  for  fatigue  —  he  became  calm,  and  dis- 
cussed with  the  Ministers  plans  of  a  national  defence. 
The  more  daring  advised  the  prorogation  of  the  Chambers 
and  the  declaration  of  a  state  of  siege  in  Paris  ;  but 
others  demurred  to  a  step  that  would  lead  to  civil  war. 
The  Council  dragged  on  at  great  length,  the  Emperor  only 
once  rousing  himself  from  his  weariness  to  declare  that  all 
was  not  lost  ;  that  he,  and  not  the  Chambers,  could  save 
France.  If  so,  he  should  have  gone  to  the  deputies, 
thrilled  them  with  that  commanding  voice,  or  dissolved 
them  at  once.  Montholon  states  that  this  course  was 
recommended  by  Cambaceres,  Carnot,  and  Maret,  but  that 
most  of  the  Ministers  urged  him  not  to  expose  his  wearied 
frame  to  the  storms  of  an  excited  assembly.  At  St. 
Helena  he  told  Gourgaud  that,  despite  his  fatigue,  he 
would  have  made  the  effort  had  he  thought  success  pos- 
sible, but  he  did  not.1 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  meanwhile  was  acting  with 
vigour.  Agonized  by  the  tales  of  disaster  already  spread 
abroad  by  wounded  soldiers,  it  eagerly  assented  to  Lafay- 
ette's proposal  to  sit  in  permanence  and  declare  any 
attempt  at  dissolution  an  act  of  high  treason.  So 
unblenching  a  defiance,  which  recalled  the  Tennis  Court 
Oath  of  twenty-six  years  before,  struck  the  Emperor 
almost  dumb  with  astonishment.  Lucien  bade  him  pre- 
pare for  a  coup  d'etat :  but  Napoleon  saw  that  the  days  for 
such  an  act  were  passed.  He  had  squandered  the  physical 
and  moral  resources  bequeathed  by  the  Revolution.  Its 
armies  were  mouldering  under  the  soil  of  Spain,  Russia, 
Germany,  and  Belgium  ;  and  a  decade  of  reckless  ambi- 
tion had  worn  to  tatters  Rousseau's  serviceable  theory  of 
a  military  dictatorship.  Exhausted  France  was  turning 
away  from  him  to  the  prime  source  of  liberty,  her  repre- 
sentatives. 

These  were  doubtless  the  thoughts  that  coursed  through 
his  brain  as  he  paced  with  Lucien  up  and  down  the  garden 
of  the  Elysee.  A  crowd  of  fSdSi'Ss  and  workmen  outside 
cheered  him  frantically.  He  saluted  them  with  a  smile  ; 
but,  says   Pasquier,  "  the  expression  of  his  eyes   showed 

1  Gourgaud,  "Journal  inedit  de  Ste.  Helene,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  321,  small  edit. 


474  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

the  sadness  that  filled  his  soul."  True,  he  might  have  led 
that  unthinking  rabble  against  the  Chambers  ;  but  that 
would  mean  civil  war,  and  from  this  he  shrank.  Still 
Lucien  bade  him  strike.  "  Dare,"  he  whispered  with 
Dantonesque  terseness.  "Alas,"  replied  his  brother,  "  I 
have  dared  only  too.much  already."  Davoust  also  opined 
that  it  was  too  late,  now  that  the  deputies  had  firmly 
seized  the  reins  and  were  protected  by  the  National  Guards 
of  Paris. 

And  so  Napoleon  let  matters  drift.  In  truth,  he  was 
"  bewildered  "  by  the  disunion  of  France.  It  was  a  France 
that  he  knew  not,  a  land  given  over  to  idSalogues  and 
traitors.  His  own  Minister,  Fouche,  was  working  to  sap 
his  power,  and  yet  he  dared  not  have  him  shot  !  What 
wonder  that  the  helpless  autocrat  paced  restlessly  to  and 
fro,  or  sat  as  in  a  dream  !  In  the  evening  Carnot  went  to 
the  Peers,  Lucien  to  the  Deputies,  to  appeal  for  a  united 
national  effort  against  the  Coalition,  but  the  simple  earnest- 
ness of  the  one  and  the  fraternal  fervour  of  the  other  alike 
failed.  When  Lucien  finally  exclaimed  against  any  deser- 
tion of  Napoleon,  Lafayette  fiercely  shot  at  him  the  long 
tale  of  costly  sacrifices  which  France  had  offered  up  at 
the  shrine  of  Napoleon's  glory,  and  concluded  :  "  We  have 
done  enough  for  him  :  our  duty  is  to  save  la  patrie." 

On  the  morrow  came  the  news  that  Grouchy  had 
escaped  from  the  Prussians  ;  and  that  the  relics  of  Napo- 
leon's host  were  rallying  at  Laon.  But  would  not  this 
encouragement  embolden  the  Emperor  to  crush  the  con- 
tumacious Chambers  ?  Evidently  the  case  was  urgent. 
He  must  abdicate,  or  they  would  dethrone  him  —  such  was 
the  purport  of  their  .message  to  the  Elysee  ;  but,  as  an  act 
of  grace,  they  allowed  him  an  hour  in  which  to  forestall 
iheir  action.  Shortly  after  midday,  on  the  advice  of  his 
Ministers,  he  took  the  final  step  of  his  official  career. 
Lucien  and  Carnot  begged  him  for  some  time  to  abdicate 
only  in  favour  of  his  son  ; 1  and  he  did  so,  but  with  the 
bitter  remark  :  "  My  son  !  What  a  chimera  !  No,  it  is 
for  the  Bourbons  that  I  abdicate  !  They  at  least  are  not 
prisoners  at  Vienna." 

The   deputies  were   of  his   opinion.      Despite   frantic 

1  Lucien,  "Mems.,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  327. 


xl.  FROM  THE  ELYSEE  TO  ST.  HELENA        475 

efforts  of  the  Bonapartists,  they  passed  over  Napoleon  II. 
without  any  effective  recognition,  and  at  once  appointed 
an  executive  Commission  of  five  —  Carnot,  Caulaincourt, 
Fouche,  Grenier,  and  Quinette.  Three  of  them  were  regi- 
cides, and  Fouche  was  chosen  their  President.  We  can 
gauge  Napoleon's  wrath  at  seeing  matters  thus  promptly 
rolled  back  to  where  they  were  before  Brumaire  by  his 
biting  comment  that  he  had  made  way  for  the  King  of 
Rome,  not  for  a  Directory  which  included  one  traitor  and 
two  babies.  His  indignation  was  just.  An  abdication 
forced  on  by  idealogues  was  hateful  ;  to  be  succeeded  by 
Fouche  seemed  an  unforgivable  insult ;  but  he  touched 
the  lowest  depth  of  humiliation  on  the  25th,  when  he 
received  from  that  despicable  schemer  an  order  to  leave 
Paris. 

He  obeyed  on  that  first  Sunday  after  Waterloo,  driving 
off  quietly  to  Malmaison,  there  to  be  joined  by  Hortense 
Beauharnais  and  a  few  faithful  friends.  At  that  ill- 
omened  abode,  where  Josephine  had  breathed  her  last 
shortly  after  his  first  abdication,  he  spent  four  uneasy 
days.  At  times  he  was  full  of  fight.  He  sent  to  the 
"  Moniteur "  a  proclamation  urging  the  army  to  make 
"some  efforts  more,  and  the  Coalition  will  be  dissolved." 
The  manifesto  was  suppressed  by  Fouche's  orders. 

Meanwhile  the  invaders  pressed  on  rapidly  towards 
Compiegne.  They  met  with  no  attempts  at  a  national 
rising,  a  fact  which  proves  the  welcome  accorded  to  Napo- 
leon in  March  to  have  been  mainly  the  outcome  of  mili- 
tary devotion  and  of  the  dislike  generally  felt  for  the 
Bourbons.  It  is  a  libel  on  the  French  people  to  suppose 
that  a  truly  national  impulse  in  his  favour  would  have 
vanished  with  a  single  defeat.  In  vain  did  the  Provisional 
Government  sue  for  an  armistice  that  would  stay  the  ad- 
vance. Wellington  refused  outright ;  but  Bli'icher  declared 
that  he  would  consider  the  matter  if  Napoleon  were  handed 
over  to  him,  dead  or  alive.  On  hearing  of  this,  Welling- 
ton at  once  wrote  his  ally  a  private  remonstrance,  which 
drew  from  Gneisenau  a  declaration  that,  as  the  Duke  was 
held  back  by  parliamentary  considerations  and  by  the  wish 
to  prolong  the  life  of  the  villain  whose  career  had  extend  , I 
England's  power*  the  Prussians  would  sec  to  it  that   Nape- 


476  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

leon  was  handed  over  to  them  for  execution  conformably 
to  the  declaration  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna.1 

But  the  Provisional  Government  acted  honestly  towards 
Napoleon.  On  the  26th  Fouche  sent  General  Becker  to 
watch  over  him  and  advise  him  to  set  out  for  Rochefort, 
en  route  to  the  United  States,  for  which  purpose  passports 
were  being  asked  from  Wellington.  Becker  found  the 
ex-Emperor  a  prey  to  quickly  varying  moods.  At  one 
time  he  seemed  "  sunk  into  a  kind  of  mollesse,  and  very 
careful  about  his  ease  and  comfort"  :  he  ate  hugely  at 
meals  :  or  again  he  affected  a  rather  coarse  joviality,  show- 
ing his  regard  for  Becker  by  pulling  his  ear.  His  plans 
varied  with  his  moods.  He  declared  he  would  throw  him- 
self into  the  middle  of  France  and  fight  to  the  end,  or  that 
he  would  take  ship  at  Rochefort  with  Bertrand  and  Savary 
alone,  and  steal  past  the  English  squadron ;  but  when 
Mme.  Bertrand  exclaimed  that  this  would  be  cruel  to  her, 
he  readily  gave  up  the  scheme.2 

It  is  not 'easy  to  gauge  his  feelings  at  this  time.  Apart 
from  one  outburst  to  Lavalette  of  pity  for  France,  he 
seems  not  to  have  realized  how  unspeakably  disastrous  his 
influence  had  been  on  the  land  which  he  found  in  a  vic- 
toriously expansive  phase,  and  now  left  prostrate  at  the 
feet  of  the  allies  and  the  Bourbons.  Hatred  and  con- 
tempt of  the  upper  classes  for  their  "  fickle  "  desertion  of 
him,  these,  if  we  may  judge  from  his  frequent  allusions  to 
the  topic  during  the  voyage,  were  the  feelings  uppermost 
in  his  mind  ;  and  this  may  explain  why  he  wavered  between 
the  thought  of  staking  all  on  a  last  effort  against  the  allies 
and  the  plan  of  renewing  in  America  the  career  now  closed 
to  him  in  Europe. 

He  certainly  was  not  a  prey  to  torpor  and  dumb  despair. 
His  brain  still  clutched  eagerly  at  public  affairs,  as  if 
unable  to  realize  that  they  had  slipped  beyond  his  con- 
trol ;  and  his  behaviour  showed  that  he  was  still  un  etre 
politique,  with  whom  power  was  all  in  all.  He  evinced 
few  signs  of  deep  emotion  on  bidding  farewell  to  his  de- 

1  Stuart's  despatch  of  June  28th,  "  F.  0.,"  France,  No.  117  ;  Gneisenau 
to  Muffling,  June  27th,  "Passages,"  App. 

2  Croker  ("Papers,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  67)  had  this  account  from  Jaucourt, 
who  had  it  from  Becker. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  477 

voted  followers :  but  whether  this  resulted  from  inner 
hardness,  or  resentment  at  his  fall,  or  a  sense  of  dignified 
prudence,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  When  Denon,  the  de- 
signer of  his  medals,  sobbed  on  bidding  him  adieu,  he 
remarked  :  Mon  cher,  ne  nous  attendrissons  pas :  il  faut 
dans  les  crises  comme  celle-ci  se  conduire  avec  froid.  This 
surely  was  one  source  of  his  power  over  an  emotional 
people :  his  feelings  were  the  servant,  not  the  master, 
of  his  reason. 

Meanwhile  the  Prussians  were  drawing  near  to  Paris. 
Early  on  the  29th  they  were  at  Argenteuil,  and  Bliicher 
detached  a  flying  column  to  seize  the  bridge  of  Chatou 
over  the  Seine  near  Malmaison  and  carry  off  Napoleon 
on  the  following  night.  But  Davoust  and  Fouche  warded 
off  the  danger.  While  the  Marshal  had  the  nearest  bridges 
of  the  Seine  barricaded  or  burnt,  Fouche  on  the  night  of 
the  28th-29th  sent  an  order  to  Napoleon  to  leave  at  once 
for  Rochefort  and  set  sail  with  two  frigates,  even  though 
the  English  passports  had  not  arrived. 

He  received  the  news  calmly,  and  then  with  unusual 
animation  requested  Becker  to  submit  to  the  Govern- 
ment a  scheme  for  rapidly  rallying  the  troops  around 
Paris,  whereupon  he,  as  General  Bonaparte,  would  sur- 
prise first  Bliicher  and  then  Wellington  —  they  were  two 
days1  marches  apart :  then,  after  routing  the  foe,  he  would 
resume  his  journey  to  the  coast.  The  Commission  would 
have  none  of  it.  The  reports  showed  that  the  French 
troops  were  so  demoralized  that  success  was  not  to  be 
hoped  for.1  And  if  a  second  Montmirail  were  snatched 
from  Bliicher,  would  it  bring  more  of  glory  to  Napoleon 
or  of  useless  bloodshed  to  France?  Those  who  look  on 
the  world  as  an  arena  for  the  exploits  of  heroes  at  the 
cost  of  ordinary  mortals  may  applaud  the  scheme.  But 
could  men  who  were  responsible  to  France  regard  it  as 
anything  but  a  final  proof  of  Napoleon's  perverse  opti- 
mism, or  a  flash  of  his  unquenchable  ambition,  or  a  last 
mad  bid  for  power?  He  showed  signs  of  anger  on  hear- 
ing of  their  refusal,  but  set  out  for  Rochefort  at  6  p.m.  ; 
and  thus  the    Prussians  were  cheated    of   their  prey  by 

1  Ollech,  pp.  350-360.  The  French  cavalry  success  near  Versailles  was 
due  to  exceptional  circumstances. 


478  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

a  few  hours.  Bertrand,  Savary,  Gourgaud,  and  Becker 
accompanied  him. 

The  cheers  of  troops  and  people  at  Niort,  and  again  at 
Rochefort,  where  he  arrived  on  July  3rd,  reawakened  his 
fighting  instincts ;  and  as  the  westerly  winds  precluded 
all  hope  of  the  two  frigates  slipping  quickly  down  either 
of  the  practicable  outlets  so  as  to  elude  the  British  cruisers, 
he  again  sought  permission  to  take  command  of  the  French 
forces,  now  beginning  to  fall  back  from  Paris  behind  the 
line  of  the  Loire.  Again  his  offer  was  refused  ;  and  mes- 
sages came  thick  and  fast  bidding  Becker  get  him  away 
from  the  mainland.  Such  was  the  desire  of  his  best 
friends.  Paris  capitulated  to  the  allies  on  July  4th,  and 
both  French  royalists  and  Prussians  were  eager  to  get 
hold  of  him.  Thus,  while  he  sat  weaving  plans  of  a  cam- 
paign on  the  Loire,  the  tottering  Government  at  Paris 
pressed  on  his  embarkation,  hinting  that  force  would  be 
used  should  further  delays  ensue.  Sadly,  then,  on  July 
8th,  he  went  on  board  the  "  Saale,"  moored  near  L'lle 
d'Aix,  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Charente. 

He  was  now  in  sore  straits.  The  orders  from  Paris 
expressly  forbade  his  setting  foot  again  on  the  mainland, 
and  most  of  the  great  towns  had  already  hoisted  the  white 
flag.  In  front  of  him  was  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  swept  by 
British  cruisers,  which  the  French  naval  officers  had  scant 
hopes  of  escaping.  There  was  talk  among  Napoleon's 
suite,  which  now  included  Montholon,  Las  Cases,  and 
Lallemand,  of  attempting  flight  from  the  Gironde,  or  in 
the  hold  of  a  small  Danish  sloop  then  at  Rochefort,  or  on 
two  fishing  boats  moored  to  the  north  of  LTle  de  Re  ;  but 
these  plans  were  given  up  in  consequence  of  the  close 
watch  kept  by  our  cruisers  at  all  points.  The  next  day 
brought  with  it  a  despatch  from  Paris  ordering  the  ex- 
Emperor  to  set  sail  within  twenty-four  hours. 

On  the  morrow  Napoleon  sent  Savary  and  Las  Cases 
with  a  letter  to  H.M.S.  "  Bellerophon,"  then  cruising  off 
the  main  channel  —  that  between  the  islands  of  Oleron 
and  Re  —  asking  whether  the  permits  for  Napoleon's  voy- 
age to  America  had  arrived,  or  his  departure  would  be 
prevented.  Savary  also  inquired  whether  his  passage  on 
a   merchant-ship   would   be   stopped.      The   commander, 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  479 

Captain  Maitland,  had  received  strict  orders  to  intercept 
Napoleon  ;  but,  seeking  to  gain  time  and  to  bring  Ad- 
miral Hotham  up  with  other  ships,  he  replied  that  he 
would  oppose  the  frigates  by  force  :  neither  could  he  per- 
mit Napoleon  to  set  sail  on  a  merchant-ship  until  he  had 
the  warrant  of  his  admiral  for  so  doing.  The  "  Bellero- 
phon,"  "  Myrmidon,"  and  "  Slaney  "  now  drew  closer  in  to 
guard  the  middle  channel,  while  a  corvette  watched  each 
of  the  difficult  outlets  on  the  north  and  south.1 

Three  days  of  sorrow  and  suspense  now  ensued.  On 
the  12th  came  the  news  of  the  entry  of  Louis  XVIII.  into 
Paris,  the  collapse  of  the  Provisional  Government,  and 
the  general  hoisting  of  the  jieur-de-lys  throughout  France. 
On  the  13th  Joseph  Bonaparte  came  for  a  last  interview 
with  his  brother  on  the  He  d'Aix.  Montholon  states  that 
the  ex-King  offered  to  change  places  with  the  ex-Emperor 
and  thus  allow  him  the  chance  of  escaping  on  a  neutral 
ship  from  the  Gironde.  Gourgaud  does  not  refer  to  any 
such  offer,  nor  does  Bertrand  in  his  letter  of  July  14th  to 
Joseph.  In  any  case,  it  was  not  put  to  the  test  ;  for 
royalism  was  rampant  on  the  mainland,  and  two  of  our 
cruisers  hovered  about  the  Gironde.  Sadly  the  two 
brothers  parted,  and  for  ever.  Then  the  other  schemes 
were  again  mooted  only  to  be  given  up  once  more  ;  and 
late  on  the  13th  Napoleon  dictated  the  following  letter, 
to  be  taken  by  Gourgaud  to  the  Prince  Regent : 

"Exposed  to  the  factions  which  distract  my  country  and  to  the 
enmity  of  the  greatest  Powers  of  Europe,  I  have  closed  my  political 
career,  and  I  come,  like  Themistocles,  to  throw  myself  upon  the  hos- 
pitality of  the  British  people.  I  put  myself  under  the  protection  of 
their  laws,  which  I  claim  from  your  Royal  Highness,  as  the  most  power- 
ful, the  most  constant,  and  the  most  generous  of  my  enemies."  2 

On  the  14th  Gourgaud  and  Las  Cases  took  this  letter 
to  the  "  Bellerophon,"  whereupon  Maitland  assured  them 

1  Maitland's  "  Narrative,"  pp.  23-39,  disproves  Thiers'  assertion  that 
Napoleon  was  not  expected  there.  Maitland's  letter  of  July  10th  to 
Hotham  ("  F.  0.,"  France,  No.  126,  not  in  the  "Narrative")  ends: 
"  It  appears  to  me  from  the  anxiety  the  bearers  express  to  get  away,  that 
they  are  very  hard  pressed  by  the  Government  at  Paris."  Hothain's 
instructions  of  July  8th  to  Maitland  were  most  Btringent 

1  The  date  of  the  letter  disproves  Las  Cases'  statement  that  it  was 


480  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

that  he  would  convey  Napoleon  to  England,  Gourgaud 
preceding  them  on  the  "Slaney";  but  that  the  ex-Em- 
peror would  be  entirely  at  the  disposal  of  our  Government. 
This  last  was  made  perfectly  clear  to  Las  Cases,  who 
understood  English,  though  at  first  he  feigned  not  to  do 
so  ;  but,  unfortunately,  Maitland  did  not  exact  from  him 
a  written  acknowledgment  of  this  understanding.  Gour- 
gaud was  transferred  to  the  "  Slaney,"  which  soon  set 
sail  for  Torbay,  while  Las  Cases  reported  to  Napoleon  on 
L'lle  d'Aix  what  had  happened.  Thereupon  Bertrand 
wrote  to  Maitland  that  Napoleon  would  come  on  board  on 
the  morrow  : 

" .  .  .  If  the  Admiral,  in  consequence  of  the  demand  that  you 
have  addressed  to  him,  sends  you  the  permits  for  the  United  States, 
His  Majesty  will  go  there  with  pleasure ;  but  in  default  of  them,  he 
will  go  voluntarily  to  England  as  a  private  individual  to  enjoy  the 
protection  of  the  laws  of  your  country." 

Now,  either  Las  Cases  misinterpreted  Maitland's  words 
and  acts,  or  Napoleon  hoped  to  impose  on  the  captain  by 
the  statements  just  quoted.  Maitland  had  not  sent  to 
Hotham  for  permits  ;  he  held  out  no  hopes  of  Napoleon's 
going  to  America ;  he  only  promised  to  take  him  to  Eng- 
land to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Prince  Regent.  Napoleon, 
taking  no  notice  of  the  last  stipulation,  now  promised  to 
go  to  England,  not  as  Emperor,  but  as  a  private  individ- 
ual. He  took  this  step  soon  after  dawn  on  the  15th,  when 
any  lingering  hopes  of  his  escape  were  ended  by  the  sight 
of  Admiral  Hotham's  ship,  "  Superb,"  in  the  offing.  On 
leaving  the  French  brig,  "  Epervier,"  he  was  greeted  with 
the  last  cheers  of  Vive  V Empereur,  cheers  that  died  away 
almost  in  a  wail  as  his  boat  drew  near  to  the  "  Bellero- 
phon."  There  he  was  greeted  respectfully,  but  without 
a  salute.  He  wore  the  green  uniform,  with  gold  and 
scarlet  facings,  of  a  colonel  of  the  chasseurs  a  cheval 
of  the  Guard,  with  white  waistcoat  and  military  boots ; 

written  after  his  second  interview  with  Maitland,  and  in  consequence  of 
the  offers  Maitland  had  made  ! 

Napoleon's  reference  to  Themistocles  has  been  much  admired.  But 
why  ?  The  Athenian  statesman  was  found  to  have  intrigued  with  Persia 
against  Athens  in  time  of  peace  ;  he  fled  to  the  Persian  monarch  and  was 
richly  rewarded  as  a  renegade.     No  simile  could  have  been  less  felicitous. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO  ST.    HELENA  481 

and  Maitland  thought  him  "a  remarkably  strong,  well- 
built  man."  Keeping  up  a  cheerful  demeanour,  he  asked 
a  number  of  questions  about  the  ship,  and  requested  to 
be  shown  round  even  thus  early,  while  the  men  were 
washing  the  decks.  He  inquired  whether  the  "  Bellero- 
phon "  would  have  worsted  the  two  French  frigates,  and 
acquiesced  in  Maitland's  affirmative  reply.  He  expressed 
admiration  of  all  that  he  saw,  including  the  portrait  of 
Maitland's  wife  hanging  in  the  cabin  ;  and  the  captain 
felt  the  full  force  of  that  seductive  gift  of  pleasing,  which 
was  not  the  least  important  of  the  great  man's  powers. 

He  was  accompanied  by  General  and  Mme.  Bertrand, 
the  former  a  tall,  slim,  good-looking  man,  of  refined  man- 
ners and  domestic  habits,  though  of  a  sensitive  and  hasty 
temper ;  his  wife,  a  lady  of  slight  figure,  but  stately  car- 
riage, the  daughter  of  an  Irishman  named  Dillon,  who  lost 
his  life  in  the  Revolution.  Her  vivacious  manners  be- 
spoke a  warm  impulsive  nature,  that  had  revelled  in  the 
splendour  of  her  high  ceremonial  station,  and  now  seemed 
strained  beyond  endurance  by  the  trials  threatening  her 
and  her  three  children.  The  Bertrands  had  been  with 
Napoleon  at  Elba,  and  enjoyed  his  complete  confidence. 
Younger  than  they  were  General  (Count)  Montholon  and 
his  wife  —  he,  a  short  but  handsome  man,  his  consort  a 
sweet  unassuming  woman  —  who  showed  their  devotion 
to  the  ex- Emperor  by  exchanging  a  life  of  luxury  for 
exile  in  his  service.  Count  Las  Cases,  a  small  man,  whose 
thin  eager  face  and  furtive  glances  revealed  his  bent  for 
intrigue,  was  the  eldest  of  the  party.  He  had  been  a 
naval  officer,  had  then  lived  in  England  as  an  emigrg,  but 
after  the  Peace  of  Amiens  took  civil  service  under  Napo- 
leon ;  he  now  brought  with  him  his  son,  a  lad  of  fifteen, 
fresh  from  the  Lj^cee.  We  need  not  notice  the  figures  of 
Savary  and  Lallemand,  as  they  were  soon  to  part  com- 
pany. Maingaud  the  surgeon,  Marchand  the  head  valet, 
several  servants,  and  the  bright  little  boy  of  the  Montho- 
lons  completed  the  list. 

The  voyage  passed  without  incident.  Napoleon's  health 
and  appetite  were  on  the  whole  excellent,  and  he  suffered 
less  than  the  rest  from  sea-sickness.  The  delicate  Las 
Cases,  who   had  donned  his  naval   uniform,  was  in  such 

VOL.  II  —  2 1 


482  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

distress  as  to  move  the  mirth  of  the  crew,  whereupon 
Napoleon  sharply  bade  him  appear  in  plain  clothes  so  as 
not  to  disgrace  the  French  navy.  For  the  great  man  him- 
self the  crew  soon  felt  a  very  real  regard  ;  witness  the  final 
confession  of  one  of  them  to  Maitland  :  "  Well,  they  may 
abuse  that  man  as  much  as  they  like,  but  if  the  people  of 
England  knew  him  as  well  as  we  do,  they  would  not  hurt 
a  hair  of  his  head."  —  What  a  tribute  this  to  the  mysteri- 
ous power  of  genius  ! 

On  passing  Ushant,  he  remained  long  upon  deck,  silent 
and  abstracted,  casting  melancholy  looks  at  the  land  he 
was  never  more  to  see.  As  they  neared  Torbay,  the  exile 
was  loud  in  praise  of  the  beauty  of  the  scene,  which  he 
compared  with  that  of  Porto  Ferrajo.  Whatever  misgiv- 
ings he  felt  before  embarking  on  the  "  Bellerophon  "  had 
apparently  disappeared.  He  had  been  treated  with  every 
courtesy  and  had  met  with  only  one  rebuff.  He  prompted 
Mme.  Bertrand,  who  spoke  English  well,  to  sound  Mait- 
land as  to  the  acceptance  of  a  box  containing  his  (Napo- 
leon's) portrait  set  in  diamonds.  This  the  captain  very 
properly  refused.1 

In  Torbay  troubles  began  to  thicken  upon  the  party. 
Gourgaud  rejoined  them  on  the  24th :  he  had  not  been 
allowed  to  land.  Orders  came  on  the  26th  for  the 
"  Bellerophon  "  to  proceed  to  Plymouth  ;  and  the  rumour 
gained  ground  that  St.  Helena  would  be  their  destina- 
tion. It  was  true.  On  July  31st,  Sir  Henry  Bunbury, 
Secretary  to  the  Admiralty,  and  Lord  Keith,  Admiral  in 
command  at  Plymouth,  laid  before  him  in  writing  the 
decision  of  our  Government,  that,  in  order  to  prevent  any 
further  disturbance  to  the  peace  of  Europe,  it  had  been 
decided  to  restrain  his  liberty  —  "  to  whatever  extent  may 
be  necessary  for  securing  that  first  and  paramount  object " 
—  and  that  St.  Helena  would  be  his  place  of  residence, 
as  it  was  healthy,  and  would  admit  of  a  smaller  degree 
of  restraint  than  might  be  necessary  elsewhere. 

Against  this  he  made  a  lengthy  protest,  declaring  that 
he  was  not  a  prisoner  of  war,  that  he  came  as  a  passenger 
on  the  "  Bellerophon  "  "  after  a  previous  negotiation  with 
the  commander,"  that  he  demanded  the  rights  of  a  British 

1  "Narrative,"  p.  244. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  483 

citizen,  and  wished  to  settle  in  a  country  house  far  from 
the  sea,  where  he  would  submit  to  the  surveillance  of  a 
commissioner  over  his  actions  and  correspondence.  St. 
Helena  would  kill  him  in  three  months,  for  he  was  wont 
to  ride  twenty  leagues  a  day  ;  he  preferred  death  to  St. 
Helena.  Maitland's  conduct  had  been  a  deliberate  snare. 
To  deprive  him  (Napoleon)  of  his  liberty  would  be  an 
eternal  disgrace  to  England ;  for  in  coming  to  our  shores 
he  had  offered  the  Prince  Regent  the  finest  page  of  his 
history.  —  Our  officials  then  bowed  and  withdrew.  He 
recalled  Keith,  and  when  the  latter  remarked  that  to  go 
to  St.  Helena  was  better  than  being  sent  to  Louis  XVIII. 
or  to  Russia,  the  captive  exclaimed,  "Russia  !  God  keep 
me  from  that."  * 

It  is  unnecessary  to  traverse  his  statements  at  length. 
The  foregoing  recital  of  facts  will  have  shown  that  he 
was  completely  at  the  end  of  his  resources,  and  that  Mait- 
land  had  not  made  a  single  stipulation  as  to  his  reception 
in  England.  Indeed,  Napoleon  never  reproached  Mait- 
land ;  he  left  that  to  Las  Cases  to  do  ;  and  the  captain 
easily  refuted  these  insinuations,  with  the  approval  of 
Montholon.  If  there  was  any  misunderstanding,  it  was 
certainly  due  to  Las  Cases.2 

Indeed,  the  thought  of  Napoleon  settling  dully  down  in 
the  Midlands  is  ludicrous.  How  could  a  man  who  revelled 
ill  vast  schemes,  whose  mind  preyed  on  itself  if  there  were 
no  facts  and  figures  to  grind,  or  difficulties  to  overcome, 
ever  sink  to  the  level  of  a  Justice  Shallow?  And  if  he 
longed  for  repose,  would  the  Opposition  in  England  and 
the  malcontents  in  France  have  let  him  rest  ?  Inevitably 
he  would  become  a  rallying  point  for  all  the  malcontents 
of  Europe.  Besides,  our  engagements  to  the  allies  bound 
us  to  guard  him  securely ;  and  we  were  under  few  per- 
sonal obligations  to  a  man  who,  during  the  Peace  of 
Amiens,  persistently  urged  us  to  drive  forth  the  Bourbons 
from  our  land,  who  at  its  close  forcibly  detained  10,000 
Britons  in  defiance  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  whose 
ambition  added  £600,000,000  to  our  National  Debt. 

Ministers  had  decided  on  St.  Helena  by  July  28th.    Their 

1  "F.  O.,"  France,  No.  126  ;  Allardyce,  "  Mems.  of  Lord  Keith." 

2  Maitland,  pp.  206,  239-242  ;  Montholon,  vol.  i.,  ch.  iii. 

VOL.  II  —  2  I 


484  THE    LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

decision  was  clinched  by  a  Memorandum  of  General 
Beatson,  late  Governor  of  the  island, '  dated  July  29th, 
recommending  St.  Helena,  because  all  the  landing  places 
were  protected  by  batteries,  and  the  semaphores  recently 
placed  on  the  lofty  cliffs  would  enable  the  approach  of 
a  rescue  squadron  to  be  descried  sixty  miles  off,  and 
the  news  to  be  speedily  signalled  to  the  Governor's 
House.  Napoleon's  appeal  and  protests  were  accordingly 
passed  over  ;  and,  in  pursuance  of  advice  just  to  hand 
from  Castlereagh  at  Paris,  Ministers  decided  to  treat  him, 
not  as  our  prisoner,  but  as  the  prisoner  of  all  the  Powers. 
A  Convention  was  set  in  hand  as  to  his  detention ;  it  was 
signed  on  August  2nd  at  Paris,  and  bound  the  other 
Powers  to  send  Commissioners  as  witnesses  to  the  safety 
of  the  custody.1 

His  departure  from  Plymouth  was  hastened  by  curious 
incidents.  Crowds  of  people  assembled  there  to  see  the 
great  man,  and  shoals  of  boats  —  Maitland  says  more  than 
a  thousand  on  fine  days  —  struggled  and  jostled  to  get  as 
near  the  "  Bellerophon  "  as  the  guard-boats  would  allow. 
Two  or  three  persons  were  drowned  ;  but  still  the  swarm 
pressed  on.  Many  of  the  men  wore  carnations  —  a  hope- 
ful sign  this  seemed  to  Las  Cases  —  and  the  women  waved 
their  handkerchiefs  when  he  appeared  on  the  poop  or  at 
the  open  gangway.  Maitland  was  warned  that  a  rescue 
would  be  attempted  on  the  night  of  the  3rd-4th  ;  and  cer- 
tainly the  Frenchmen  were  very  restless  at  that  time.  They 
believed  that  if  Napoleon  could  only  set  foot  on  shore  he 
must  gain  the  rights  of  Habeas  Corpus.2    And  there  seemed 

1  "Castlereagh  Papers,"  3rd  series,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  434,  438.  Beatson's 
Mem.  is  in  "  F.  O.,"  France,  No.  123.  This  and  other  facts  refute  Lord 
Holland's  statement  ("  Foreign  Reminiscences,"  p.  196)  that  the  Govern- 
ment was  treating  for  the  transfer  of  St.  Helena  from  the  East  India 
Company  early  in  1815. —  Why  does  Lord  Rosebery,  "Napoleon:  last 
Phase,"  p.  58,  write  that  Lord  Liverpool  thought  that  Napoleon  should 
either  (1)  be  handed  over  to  Louis  XVIII.  to  be  treated  as  a  rebel;  or 
(2)  treated  as  vermin  ;  or  (3)  that  we  would  (regretfully)  detain  him  ?  In 
his  letters  to  Castlereagh  at  Paris,  Liverpool  expressly  says  it  would  be 
better  for  us,  rather  than  any  other  Power,  to  detain  him,  and  writes  not 
a  word  about  treating  him  as  vermin.  Lord  Rosebery  is  surely  aware 
that  our  Government  and  Wellington  did  their  best  to  preclude  the  possi- 
bility of  the  Prussians  treating  him  as  vermin. 

*  Keith's  letter  of  August' 1st,  in  "F.  O.."  France,  No.  123:  "The 
General  and   many  of  his  suite  have  an  idea  that  if  they  could  but 


xli  FROM  THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  485 

some  chance  of  his  gaining  them.  Very  early  on  August 
4th  a  man  came  down  from  London  bringing  a  subpoena 
from  the  Court  of  King's  Bench  to  compel  Lord  Keith 
and  Captain  Maitland  to  produce  the  person  of  Napo- 
leon Bonaparte  for  attendance  in  London  as  witness  in 
a  trial  for  libel  then  pending.  It  appears  that  some  one 
was  to  be  sued  for  a  libel  on  a  naval  officer,  censuring 
his  conduct  in  the  West  Indies  ;  and  it  was  suggested 
that  if  he  (the  defendant)  could  get  Napoleon's  evidence 
to  prove  that  the  French  ships  were  at  that  time  un- 
serviceable, his  case  would  be  strengthened.  An  attorney 
therefore  came  down  to  Plymouth  armed  with  a  sub- 
poena, with  which  he  chased  Keith  on  land  and  chased 
him  by  sea,  until  his  panting  rowers  were  foiled  by  the 
stout  crew  of  the  Admiral's  barge.  Keith  also  found 
means  to  let  Maitland  know  how  matters  stood  early  on 
the  4th,  whereupon  the  "  Bellerophon  "  stood  out  to  sea, 
her  guard-boat  keeping  at  a  distance  the  importunate 
man  with  the  writ. 

The  whole  affair  looks  very  suspicious.  What  de- 
fendant in  a  plain  straightforward  case  would  ever  have 
thought  of  so  far-fetched  a  device  as  that  of  getting  the 
ex-Emperor  to  declare  on  oath  that  his  warships  in  the 
West  Indies  had  been  unsea worthy  ?  The  tempting 
thought  that  it  was  a  trick  of  some  enterprising  journalist 
in  search  of  "  copy  "  must  also  be  given  up  as  a  glaring 
anachronism.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain  that 
Napoleon's  well-wishers  in  London  and  Plymouth  were 
moving  heaven  and  earth  to  get  him  ashore,  or  delay  his 
departure.1     In  common  with  Sieyes,  Lavalette,  and  Las 

put  foot  on  shore,  no  power  could  remove  them,  and  they  are  determined 
to  make  the  attempt  if  at  all  possible:  they  are  becoming  most  refrac- 
tory." 

1  In  our  Colonial  Office  archives,  St.  Helena,  No.  1,  is  a  letter  of  August 
2nd,  1815,  from  an  Italian  subject  of  Napoleon  (addressed  to  Mine.  Ber- 
trand,  but  really  for  him),  stating  that  .£1G\00()  had  been  placed  in  good 
hands  for  his  service,  one-fourth  of  which  would  be  at  once  intrusted  to 
firms  at  New  York,  Boston,  "PhUadelfl,"  and  Charlestown,  to  provide 
means  for  effecting  his  escape,  and  claiming  again  "  le  plus  beau  trflne  de 
l'univers."  It  begs  him  to  get  his  departure  from  Plymouth  put  off,  for 
a  plot  had  been  formed  by  discontented  British  officers  to  get  rid  of  the 
Premier  and  one  other  Minister.  Napoleon  must  not  build  any  hopes  on 
the  Prince  Regent:    "  Le  Silene  de  cette  isle.  .  .  .  Je  fonds  done  mon 


486  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap 

Cases,  he  had  hoped  much  from  the  peculiarities,  of 
English  law  ;  and  on  July  28th  he  dictated  to  Las  Cases 
a  paper,  "  suited  to  serve  as  a  basis  to  jurists,"  which  the 
latter  says  he  managed  to  send  ashore.1  If  this  be  true, 
Napoleon  himself  may  have  spurred  on  his  friends  to  the 
effort  just  described.  Or  else  the  plan  may  have  occurred 
to  some  of  his  English  admirers  who  wished  to  embarrass 
the  Ministry.  If  so,  their  attempt  met  with  the  fate 
that  usually  befalls  the  efforts  of  our  anti-national 
cliques  on  behalf  of  their  foreign  heroes  :  it  did  them 
harm  :  the  authorities  acted  more  promptly  than  they 
would  otherwise  have  done  :  the  "  Bellerophon  "  put  to 
sea  a  few  days  before  the  Frenchmen  expected,  with  the 
result  that  they  were  exposed  to  a  disagreeable  cruise 
until  the  "Northumberland"  (the  ship  destined  for  the 
voyage  in  place  of  the  glorious  old  "Bellerophon")  was 
ready  to  receive  them  on  board.2 

Dropping  down  from  Portsmouth,  the  newer  ship  met 
the  "Bellerophon  "  and  "  Tonnant,"  Lord  Keith's  ship,  off 
the  Start.  The  transhipment  took  place  on  the  7th,  under 
the  lee  of  Berry  Head,  Torbay.  After  dictating  a  solemn 
protest  against  the  compulsion  put  upon  him,  the  ex- 
Emperor  thanked  Maitland  for  his  honourable  conduct, 
spoke  of  his  having  hoped  to  buy  a  small  estate  in  Eng- 
land where  he  might  end  his  days  in  peace,  and  declaimed 
bitterly  against  the  Government. 

Rear-Admiral  Sir  George  Cockburn,  of  the  "  North- 
umberland," then  came  by  official  order  to  search  his  bag- 
gage and  that  of  his  suite,  so  as  to  withdraw  any  large 

espoir  avant  tout  sur  les  navires  marchands,  Anglais  comme  autres,  par 
l'apas  du  gain."  The  writer's  name  is  illegible  :  so  is  the  original  post- 
mark :  the  letter  probably  came  from  London  :  it  missed  Mme.  Bertrand 
at  Plymouth,  followed  her  to  St.  Helena,  and  was  opened  by  Sir  G. 
Cockburn,  who  sent  it  back  to  our  Government.  I  have  published  it 
in  extenso  in  the  "Owens  College  Historical  Essays,"  as  also  an  accom- 
panying letter  from  Miss  McKinnon  of  Binfield,  Berks,  to  Napoleon, 
stating  that  her  mother,  still  living,  had  known  him  and  given  him  hospi- 
tality when  a  lieutenant  at  Valence. 

1  Las  Cases,  "  Memorial,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  55,  65. 

2  I  wish  I  had  space  to  give  a  whole  chapter  to  the  relations  between 
Napoleon  and  the  Whigs,  and  to  show  how  their  championship  of  him 
worked  mischief  on  both  sides  in  1803-21,  enticing  him  on  to  many  risky 
ventures,  and  ruining  the  cause  of  Reform  in  England  for  a  generation. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  487 

sums  of  money  that  might  be  thereafter  used  for  effecting 
an  escape.  Savary  and  Marchand  were  present  while  this 
was  done  by  Cockburn's  secretary  with  as  much  delicacy 
as  possible  :  4,000  gold  Napoleons  (80,000  francs)  were 
detained  to  provide  a  fund  for  part  maintenance  of  the 
illustrious  exile.  The  diamond  necklace  which  Hortense 
had  handed  to  him  at  Malmaison  was  at  that  time  con- 
cealed on  Las  Cases,  who  continued  to  keep  it  as  a  sacred 
trust.  The  ex-Emperor's  attendants  were  required  to  give 
up  their  swords  during  the  voyage.  Montholon  states 
that  when  the  same  request  was  made  by  Keith  to  Napo- 
leon, the  only  reply  was  a  flash  of  anger  from  his  eyes, 
under  which  the  Admiral's  tall  figure  shrank  away,  and  his 
head,  white  with  years,  fell  on  his  breast.  Alas,  for  the 
attempt  at  melodrama  !  Maitland  was  expressly  told  by 
Lord  Keith  not  to  proffer  any  such  request  to  the  fallen  chief. 

Apart  from  one  or  two  exclamations  that  he  would  com- 
mit suicide  rather  than  go  to  St.  Helena,  Napoleon  had 
behaved  with  a  calm  and  serenity  that  contrasted  with  the 
peevish  gloom  of  his  officers  and  the  spasms  of  Mme.  Ber- 
trand.  This  unhappy  lady,  on  learning  their  fate,  raved 
in  turn  against  Maitland,  Gourgaud,  Napoleon,  and  against 
her  husband  for  accompanying  him,  and  ended  by  trying 
to  throw  herself  from  a  window.  From  this  she  was 
pulled  back,  whereupon  she  calmed  down  and  secretly 
urged  Maitland  to  write  to  Lord  Keith  to  prevent  Bertrand 
accompanying  his  master.  The  captain  did  so,  but  of 
course  the  Admiral  declined  to  interfere.  Her  shrill  com- 
plaints against  Napoleon  had,  however,  been  heard  on  the 
other  side  of  the  thin  partition,  and  fanned  the  dislike 
which  Montholon  and  Gourgaud  had  conceived  for  her, 
and  in  part  for  her  husband.  These  were  the  officers 
whom  he  selected  as  companions  of  exile.  Las  Cases  was 
to  go  as  secretary,  and  his  son  as  page. 

Savary,  Lallemand,  and  Planat  having  been  proscribed 
by  Louis  XVIII.,  were  detained  by  our  Government,  and 
subsequently  interned  at  Malta.  On  taking  leave  of  Na- 
poleon they  showed  deep  emotion,  while  he  bestowed  the 
farewell  embrace  with  remarkable  composure.  The  sur- 
geon, Maingaud,  now  declined  to  proceed  to  St.  Helena, 
alleging  that  he  had  wanted  to  go  to  America  only  because 


488  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON    I  chap. 

his  uncle  there  was  to  leave  him  a  legacy  !  At  the  same 
time  Bertrand  asked  that  O'Meara,  the  surgeon  of  the 
"Bellerophon,"  might  accompany  Napoleon  to  St.  Helena. 
As  Maingaud's  excuse  was  very  lame,,  and  O'Meara  had 
had  one  or  two  talks  with  Napoleon  in  Italian,  Keith  and 
Maitland  should  have  seen  that  there  was  some  under- 
standing between  them  ;  but  the  Admiral  consented  to 
the  proposed  change.  As  to  O'Meara's  duplicity,  we  may 
quote  from  Basil  Jackson's  "Waterloo  and  St.  Helena": 
"  I  know  that  he  [O'Meara]  was  fully  enlisted  for  Napo- 
leon's service  during  the  voyage  from  Rochefort  to  Eng- 
land." The  sequel  will  show  how  disastrous  it  was  to 
allow  this  man  to  go  with  the  ex-Emperor. 

In  the  admiral's  barge  that  took  him  to  the  "  Northum- 
berland "  the  ex-Emperor  "  appeared  to  be  in  perfect  good 
humour,"  says  Keith,  "  talking  of  Egypt,  St.  Helena,  of 
my  former  name  being  Elphinstone,  and  many  other  sub- 
jects, and  joking  with  the  ladies  about  being  seasick."1 
In  this  firm  matter-of-fact  way  did  Napoleon  accept  the 
extraordinary  change  in  his  fortunes.  At  no  time  of  his 
life,  perhaps,  was  he  so  great  as  when,  forgetting  his  own 
headlong  fall,  he  sought  to  dispel  the  smaller  griefs  of 
Mmes.  Bertrand  and  Montholon.  A  hush  came  over  the 
crew  as  Napoleon  mounted  the  side  and  set  foot  on  the 
deck  of  the  ship  that  was  to  bear  him  away  to  a  life  of 
exile.  It  was  a  sight  that  none  could  behold  unmoved, 
as  the  great  man  uncovered,  received  the  salute,  and  said 
\  with  a  firm  voice  :   "Here  I  am,  General,  at  your  orders." 

The  scene  was  rich,  not  only  in  personal  interest  and 
pathos,  but  also  in  historic  import.  It  marks  the  end  of 
a  cataclysmic  epoch  and  the  dawn  of  a  dreary  and  con- 
fused age.  We  may  picture  the  Muse  of  History,  drawn 
distractedly  from  her  abodes  on  the  banks  of  the  Seine, 
gazing  in  wonder  on  that  event  taking  place  under  the 

1  "  F.  O.,"  France,  No.  123.  Keith  adds  :  "I  accompanied  him  to 
look  at  the  accommodation  on  board  the  'Northumberland,'  with  which  he 
appeared  to  be  well  satisfied,  saying,  '  the  apartments  are  convenient,  and 
you  see  I  carry  my  little  tent-bed  with  me.'  "  The  volume  also  contains 
the  letter  of  Maingaud,  etc.  Bertrand  requested  permission  from  our  Gov- 
ernment to  return  in  a  year  ;  Gourgaud,  when  his  duty  to  his  aged  mother 
recalled  him  ;  O'Meara  stipulated  that  he  should  still  be  a  British  surgeon 
on  full  pay  and  active  service. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  489 

lee  of  Berry  Head,  her  thoughts  flashing  back,  perchance, 
to  the  days  when  William  of  Orange  brought  his  fleet  to 
shore  at  that  same  spot  and  baffled  the  designs  of  the  other 
great  ruler  of  France.  The  glory  of  that  land  is  now  once 
more  to  be  shrouded  in  gloom.  For  a  time,  like  an  uneasy 
ghost,  Clio  will  hover  above  the  scenes  of  Napoleon's  ex- 
ploits and  will  find  little  to  record  but  promises  broken 
and  development  arrested  by  his  unteachable  successors. 

But  the  march  of  Humanity  is  only  clogged  :  it  is  not 
stayed.  Ere  long  it  breaks  away  into  untrodden  paths 
amidst  the  busy  hives  of  industry  or  in  the  track  of  the 
colonizing  peoples.  The  Muse  follows  in  perplexity  :  her 
course  at  first  seems  dull  and  purposeless  :  her  story,  when 
it  bids  farewell  to  Napoleon,  suffers  a  bewildering  fall  in 
dramatic  interest  :  but  at  length  new  and  varied  fields 
open  out  to  view.  Democracy,  embattled  for  seven  sad 
years  by  Napoleon  against  her  sister,  Nationality,  little  by 
little  awakens  to  a  consciousness  of  the  mistake  that  has 
blighted  his  fortune  and  hers,*  and  begins  to  ally  herself 
with  the  ill-used  champion  of  the  Kings.  Industry, 
starved  by  War,  regains  her  strength  and  goes  forth  on 
a  career  of  conquest  more  enduring  than  that  of  the  great 
warrior.  And  the  peoples  that  come  to  the  front  are  not 
those  of  the  Latin  race,  whom  his  wars  have  stunted,  but 
those  of  the  untamable  Teutonic  stock,  the  lords  of  the 
sea  and  the  leaders  of  Central  Europe. 

The  treatment  of  the  ex-Emperor  henceforth  differed 
widely  from  that  which  had  been  hastily  arranged  by 
the  Czar  for  his  sojourn  at  Elba.  In  that  case  he  re- 
tained the  title  of  Emperor;  he  reigned  over  the  island, 
and  was  free  to  undertake  coasting  trips.  As  these 
generous  arrangements  had  entailed  on  Europe  the  loss 
of  more  than  80,000  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  the  British  Ministers  should  now 
have  insisted  on  far  stricter  rules,  especially  as  they  and 
their  Commissioner  had  been  branded  as  accomplices  in 
the  former  escape.  His  comfort  and  dignity  were  now- 
subordinated  to  security.  As  the  title  of  Emperor  would 
enable  him  to  claim  privileges  incompatible  with  any 
measure  of  surveillance,  it  was  firmly  and   consistently 


490  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

denied  to  him;  while  he  as  persistently  claimed  it,  and 
doubtless  for  the  same  reason.  He  was  now  to  rank  as 
a  General  not  on  active  service;  and  Cockburn  received 
orders,  while  treating  him  with  deference  and  assigning 
to  him  the  place  of  honour  at  table,  to  abstain  from  any 
acknowledgment  of  the  imperial  dignity.  Napoleon  soon 
put  this  question  to  the  test  by  rising  from  dinner  before 
the  others  had  finished;  but,  with  the  exception  of  his 
suite,  the  others  did  not  accompany  him  on  deck.  At 
this  he  was  much  piqued,  as  also  at  seeing  that  the  officers 
did  not  uncover  in  his  presence  on  the  quarter-deck ;  but 
when  Cockburn's  behaviour  in  this  respect  was  found  to 
be  quietly  consistent,  the  anger  of  the  exiles  began  to  wear 
off  —  or  rather  it  was  thrust  down. 

One  could  wish  that  the  conduct  of  our  Government 
in  this  matter  had  been  more  chivalrous..  It  is  true  that 
we  had  only  on  two  occasions  acknowledged  the  imperial 
title,  namely  during  the  negotiations  of  1806  and  1814; 
and  to  recognize  it  after  his  public  outlawry  would  have 
been  rather  illogical,  besides  feeding  the  Bonapartists  with 
hopes  which,  in  the  interests  of  France,  it  was  well  abso- 
lutely to  close.  Ministers  might  also  urge  that  he  himself 
had  offered  to  live  in  England  as  a  private  individual, 
and  that  his  transference  to  St.  Helena,  which  allowed 
of  greater  personal  liberty  than  could  be  accorded  in  Eng- 
land, did  not  alter  the  essential  character  of  his  detention. 
Nevertheless,  their  decision  is  to  be  regretted.  The  zeal 
of  his  partisans,  far  from  being  quenched,  was  inflamed 
by  what  they  conceived  to  be  a  gratuitous  insult ;  and 
these  feelings,  artfully  worked  upon  by  tales,  medals,  and 
pictures  of  the  modern  Prometheus  chained  to  the  rock, 
had  no  small  share  in  promoting  unrest  in  France. 

Apart  from  this  initial  friction,  Napoleon's  relations  to 
the  Admiral  and  officers  were  fairly  cordial.  He  chatted 
with  him  at  the  dinner-table  and.  during  the  hour's  walk 
that  they  afterwards  usually  took  on  the  quarter-deck. 
His  conversations  showed  no  signs  of  despair  or  mental 
lethargy.  They  ranged  over  a  great  variety  of  topics, 
general  and  personal.  He  discussed  details  of  navigation 
and  shipbuilding  with  a  minuteness  of  knowledge  that 
surprised  the  men  of  the  sea. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE    TO   ST.    HELENA  491 

From  his  political  conversations  with  Cockburn  we  may 
cull  the  following  remarks.  He  said  that  he  really  meant 
to  invade  England  in  1803-5,  and  to  dictate  terms  of  peace 
at  London.  He  stoutly  defended  his  execution  of  the  Due 
d'Enghien,  and  named  none  of  the  paltry  excuses  that  his 
admirers  were  later  on  to  discover  for  that  crime.  Refer- 
ring to  recent  events,  he  inveighed  against  the  French  Lib- 
erals, declared  that  he  had  humoured  the  Chambers  far  too 
much,  and  dilated  on  the  danger  of  representative  insti- 
tutions on  the  Continent.  However  much  a  Parliament 
might  suit  England,  it  was,  he  declared,  highly  perilous 
in  Continental  States.  With  respect  to  the  future  of 
France,  he  expressed  the  conviction  that,  as  soon  as  the 
armies  of  occupation  were  withdrawn,  there  would  be  a 
general  insurrection  owing  to  the  strong  military  bias  of 
the  people  and  their  hatred  of  the  Bourbons,  now  again 
brought  back  by  devastating  hordes  of  foreigners.1 

This  last,  observation  probably  explains  the  general 
buoyancy  of  his  bearing.  He  did  not  consider  the 
present  settlement  as  final  ;  and  doubtless  it  was  his 
boundless  fund  of  hope  that  enabled  him  to  triumph 
over  the  discomforts  of  the  present,  which  left  his  com- 
panions morose  and  snappish.  "  His  spirits  are  even," 
wrote  Glover,  the  Admiral's  secretary,  at  the  equator, 
"and  he  appears  perfectly  unconcerned  about  his  fate."2 
His  recreations  were  chess,  which  he  played  with  more 
vehemence  than  skill,  and  games  of  hazard,  especially 
vingt-et-un:  he  began  to  learn  "le  wisth"  from  our  officers. 
Sometimes  he  and  Gourgaud  amused  themselves  by  extract- 
ing the  square  and  cube  roots  of  numbers  ;  he  also  began 
to  learn  English  from  Las  Cases.  On  some  occasions  he 
diverted  his  male  companions  with  tales  of  his  adventures, 
both  military  and  amorous.  His  interest  in  the  ship  and 
in  the  events  of  the  voyage  did  not  flag.  When  a  shark 
was  caught  and  hauled  up,  "Bonaparte  with  the  eagerness 
of  a  schoolboy  scrambled  on  the  poop  to  see  it." 

His  health  continued  excellent.  Despite  his  avoidance 
of  vegetables  and  an  excessive  consumption  of  meat,  he 
suffered  little  from  indigestion,  except  during  a  few  days 

1  "Extract  from  a  Diary  of  Sir  G.  Cockburn,"  pp.  21,  51,  94. 

2  "Napoleon's  last  Voyages,"  p.  163. 


492  THE  LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  tierce  sirocco  wind  off  Madeira.  He  breakfasted  about 
10  on  meat  and  wine,  and  remained  in  his  cabin  reading, 
dictating,  or  learning  English,  until  about  3  p.m.,  when 
he  played  games  and  took  exercise  preparatory  to  dinner 
at  5.  After  a  full  meal,  in  which  he  partook  by  prefer- 
ence of  the  most  highly  dressed  dishes  of  meat,  he  walked 
the  deck  for  an  hour  or  more.  On  one  evening,  the 
Admiral  begged  to  be  excused  owing  to  a  heavy  equato- 
rial rain-storm  ;  but  the  ex-Emperor  went  up  as  usual, 
saying  that  the  rain  would  not  hurt  him  any  more  than 
the  sailors  ;  and  it  did  not.  The  incident  claims  some 
notice  :  for  it  proves  that,  whatever  later  writers  may  say 
as  to  his  decline  of  vitality  in  1815,  he  himself  was  un- 
aware of  it,  and  braved  with  impunity  a  risk  that  a  vigor- 
ous naval  officer  preferred  to  avoid.  Moreover,  the  mere 
fact  that  he  was  able  to  keep  up  a  heavy  meat  diet  all 
through  the  tropics  bespeaks  a  constitution  of  exceptional 
strength,  unimpaired  as  yet  by  the  internal  malady  which 
was  to  be  his  doom. 

That  one  element  of  conviviality  was  not  wanting  at 
meals  will  appear  from  the  official  return  of  the  consump- 
tion of  wine  at  the  Admiral's  table  by  his  seven  French 
guests  and  six  British  officers  :  Port,  20  dozen  ;  Claret, 
45  dozen  ;  Madeira,  22  dozen  ;  Champagne,  13  dozen  ; 
Sherry,  7  dozen  ;  Malmsey,  5  dozen.1  The  "  Peruvian  " 
had  been  detached  from  the  squadron  to  Guernsey  to  lay 
in  a  stock  of  French  wines  specially  for  the  exiles  ;  and 
15  dozen  of  claret  —  Napoleon's  favourite  beverage  — 
were  afterwards  sent  on  shore  at  St.  Helena  for  his  use. 

1  I  found  this  return  in  "  Admiralty  Secret  Letters,"  1804-16. 

Lord  Rosebery,  in  his  desire  to  apologize  for  our  treatment  of  Napoleon 
at  every  point,  says  ("Nap.:  last  Phase,"  p.  64)  :  "They  [the  exiles] 
were  packed  like  herrings  in  a  barrel.  The  'Northumberland,'  it  was 
said,  had  been  arrested  on  her  way  back  from  India  in  order  to  convey 
Napoleon  :  all  the  water  on  board,  it  was  alleged,  had  also  been  to  India, 
was  discoloured  and  tainted,  as  well  as  short  in  quantity." — On  the 
contrary,  the  diary  of  Glover,  in  "Last  Voyages  of  Nap.,"  p.  91,  shows 
that  the  ship  was  in  the  Medway  in  July,  and  was  fitted  out  at  Ports- 
mouth (where  it  was  usual  to  keep  supplies  of  water)  :  also  (p.  99)  that 
Captain  Ross  gave  up  his  cabin  to  the  Bertrands,  and  Glover  his  to  the 
Montholons  :  Gourgaud  and  Las  Cases  slept  in  the  after  cabin  until  cabins 
could  be  built  for  them.  We  have  already  seen  (p.  488)  that  Napoleon 
was  well  satisfied  with  his  own  room.  Water,  wine,  cattle,  and  fruit 
were  taken  in  at  Funchal  in  spite  of  the  storm. 


xli  FROM   THE   ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  493 

Doubtless  the  evenness  of  his  health,  which  surprised 
Cockburn,  Warden,  and  O'Meara  alike,  was  largely  due 
to  his  iron  will.  He  knew  that  his  exile  must  be  dis- 
agreeable, but  he  had  that  useful  faculty  of  encasing 
himself  in  the  present,  which  dulls  the  edge  of  care. 
Besides,  his  tastes  were  not  so  exacting,  or  his  tempera- 
ment so  volatile,  as  to  shroud  him  in  the  gloom  that 
besets  weaker  natures  in  time  of  trouble.  Alas  for  him, 
it  was  far  otherwise  with  his  companions.  The  impres- 
sionable young  Gourgaud,  the  thought-wrinkled  Las 
Cases,  the  bright  pleasure-loving  Montholons,  the  gloomy 
Grand  Marshal,  Bertrand,  and  his  mercurial  consort,  over 
whose  face  there  often  passed  "  a  gleam  of  distraction  "  — 
these  were  not  fashioned  for  a  life  of  adversity.  Thence 
came  the  long  spells  of  ennui,  broken  by  flashes  of  temper, 
that  marked  the  voyage  and  the  sojourn  at  St.  Helena. 

The  storm-centre  was  generally  Mme.  Bertrand  ;  her 
varying  moods,  that  proclaimed  her  Irish- Creole  parent- 
age, early  brought  on  her  the  hostility  of  the  others,  in- 
cluding Napoleon  ;  and  as  the  discovery  of  her  little  plot 
to  prevent  Bertrand  going  to  St.  Helena  gave  them  a  con- 
venient weapon,  the  voyage  was  for  her  one  long  struggle 
against  covert  intrigues,  thinly  veiled  sarcasms,  sea- 
sickness, and  despair.  At  last  she  has  to  keep  to  her 
cabin,  owing  to  some  nervous  disorder.  On  hearing  of 
this  Napoleon  remarks  that  it  is  better  she  should  die  — 
such  is  Gourgaud's  report  of  his  words.  Unfortunately, 
she  recovers  :  after  ten  days  she  reappears,  receives  the 
congratulations  of  the  officers  in  the  large  cabin  where 
Napoleon  is  playing  chess  with  Montholon.  He  receives 
her  with  a  stolid  stare  and  goes  on  with  the  game.  After 
a  time  the  Admiral  hands  her  to  her  seat  at  the  dinner- 
table,  on  the  ex-Emperor's  left.  Still  no  recognition  from 
her  chief!  But  the  claret  bottle  that  should  be  in  front 
of  him  is  not  there  :  she  reaches  over  and  hands  it  to  him. 
Then  come  the  looked-for  words  :  "  Ah  !  comment  se 
porte,  madame?" —  That  is  all.1 

For  Bertrand,  even  in  his  less  amiable  moods,  Bona- 
parte ever  had  the  friendly  word  that  feeds  the  well-spring 

1  Gourgaud,  "  Journal,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  47,  59  (small  edition)  ;  "Last  Voy- 
ages of  Nap.,1'  p.  198. 


494  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  devotion.  On  the  "  Bellerophon,"  when  they  hotly 
differed  on  a  trivial  subject,  Bertrand  testily  replied  to 
his  dogmatic  statements  :  "  Oh  !  if  you  reply  in  that 
manner,  there  is  an  end  of  all  argument."  Far  from 
taking  offence  at  this  retort,  Napoleon  soothed  him  and 
speedily  restored  him  to  good  temper  —  a  good  instance 
of  his  forbearance  to  those  whom  he  really  admired. 

Certainly  the  exiles  were  not  happy  among  themselves. 
Even  the  amiable  Mme.  Montholon  was  the  cause  of  one 
quarrel  at  table.  After  leaving  Funchal,  Cockburn  states 
that  a  Roman  Catholic  priest  there  has  offered  to  accom- 
pany the  ex-Emperor.  Napoleon  replies  in  a  way  that 
proves  his  utter  indifference  ;  but  the  ladies  launch  out  on 
the  subject  of  religion.  The  discussion  waxes  hot,  until 
the  impetuous  Gourgaud  shoots  out  the  remark  that  Mon- 
tholon is  wanting  in  respect  for  his  wife.  Whereupon 
the  Admiral  ends  the  scene  by  rising  from  table.  Sir 
George  Bingham,  Colonel  of  the  53rd  Regiment  sailing  in 
the  squadron,  passes  the  comment  in  his  diary  :  "  It  is  not 
difficult  to  see  that  envy,  hatred,  and  all  uncharitableness 
are  firmly  rooted  in  Napoleon's  family,  and  that  their  resi- 
dence in  St.  Helena  will  be  rendered  very  uncomfortable 
by  it."  1 

Intrigues  there  are  of  kaleidoscopic  complexity,  either 
against  the  superior  Bertrands  or  the  rising  influence  of 
Las  Cases.  This  official  has  but  yesterday  edged  his  way 
into  the  Emperor's  inner  circle,  and  Gourgaud  frankly 
reminds  him  of  the  fact  :  "  '  If  I  have  come  [with  the  Em- 
peror] it  is  because  I  have  followed  him  for  four  years, 
except  at  Elba.  I  have  saved  his  life  ;  and  one  loves 
those  whom  one  has  obliged.  .  .  .  But  you,  sir,  he  did 
not  know  you  even  by  sight  :  then,  why  this  great  devo- 
tion of  yours?'  — I  see  around  me,"  he  continues,  "many 
intrigues  and  deceptions.  Poor  Gourgaud,  qu'allais-tu 
/aire  dans  cette  galire  ?  "  2 

The  young  aide-de-camp's  influence  is  not  allowed  to 
wane  for  lack  of  self-advertisement.  Thus,  when  the 
battle  of  Waterloo  is  mentioned  at  table,  he  at  once  gives 

1  Sir  G.  Bingham's  Diary  in  "Blackwood's  Mag.,"  October,  1896,  and 
"Cornhill,"  January,  1901. 

2  Gourgaud,  "Journal,"  vol.  i.,  p.  64. 


xli  FROM   THE    ELYSEE   TO   ST.    HELENA  495 

his  version  of  it,  and  stoutly  maintains  that,  ivhatever  Na- 
poleon may  say  to  the  contrary,  he  (Napoleon)  did  mistake 
the  Prussian  army  for  Grouehy's  force  :  and,  waxing  elo- 
quent on  this  theme,  he  exclaims  to  his  neighbour,  Glover, 
"  that  at  one  time  he  [Gourgaud]  might  have  taken  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  prisoner,  but  he  desisted  from  it,  know- 
ing the  effusion  of  blood  it  would  have  occasioned."  x —  It  is 
charitable  to  assume  that  this  utterance  was  inspired  by 
some  liquid  stronger  than  the  alleged  "  stale  water  that 
had  been  to  India  and  back." 

On  the  whole,  was  there  ever  an  odder  company  of  ship- 
mates since  the  da}rs  of  Noah?  A  cheery  solid  Admiral, 
a  shadowy  Captain  Ross  who  can  navigate  but  does  not 
open  his  lips,  a  talkative  creature  of  the  secretary  type, 
the  soldierly  Bingham,  the  graceful  courtly  Montholons, 
the  young  General  who  out-gascons  the  Gascons,  the  wire- 
drawn subtle  Las  Cases,  the  melancholy  Grand  Marshal 
and  his  spasmodic  consort  —  all  of  them  there  to  guard  or 
cheer  that  pathetic  central  figure,  the  world's  conqueror 
and  world's  exile. 

Meanwhile  France  was  feeling  the  results  of  his  recent 
enterprise.  Enormous  armies  began  to  hold  her  down 
until  the  Bourbons,  whose  nullity  was  a  pledge  for  peace, 
should  be  firmly  re-established.  Blueher,  baulked  of  his 
wish  to  shoot  Bonaparte,  was  with  difficulty  dissuaded  by 
the  protests  of  Wellington  and  Louis  XVIII.  from  blow- 
ing up  the  Pont  de  Jena  at  Paris ;  and  the  fierce  veteran 
voiced  the  general  opinion  of  Germans,  including  Metter- 
nich,  that  France  must  be  partitioned,  or  at  least  give 
back  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  the  Fatherland.  Even  Lord 
Liverpool,  our  cautious  Premier,  wrote  on  July  15th  that, 
if  Bonaparte  remained  at  large,  the  allies  ought  to  retain 
all  the  northern  fortresses  as  a  security.2  But  the  know- 
ledge that  the  warrior  was  in  our  power  led  our  statesmen 
to  bear  less  hardly  on  France.  From  the  outset,  Welling- 
ton sought  to  bring  the  allies  to  reason,  and  on  August 
11th  he  wrote  a  despatch  that  deserves  to  rank  among  his 
highest  titles  to  fame.     While  granting  that  France  was 

1  "  Last  Voyages,"  p.  130. 

2  "  Castlereagh  Papers,"  3rd  series,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  423,  433,  605;  Seeley's 
"Stein,"  vol.  iii.,  pp.  332-344. 


496  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap,  xli 

still  left  "  in  too  great  strength  for  the  rest  of  Europe,"  he 
pointed  out  that  "  revolutionary  France  is  more  likely  to 
distress  the  world,  than  France,  however  strong  in  her 
frontier,  under  a  regular  Government ;  and  that  is  the 
situation  in  which  we  ought  to  endeavour  to  place  her." 

This  generous  and  statesmanlike  judgment,  consorting 
with  that  of  the  Czar,  prevailed  over  the  German  policy 
of  partition ;  and  it  was  finally  arranged  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  of  November  20th,  1815,  that  France  should 
surrender  only  the  frontier  strips  around  Marienburg, 
Saarbriickeni  Landau,  and  Chambery,  also  paying  war 
indemnities  and  restoring  to  their  lawful  owners  all  the 
works  of  art  of  which  Napoleon  had  rifled  the  chief  cities 
of  the  continent.  In  one  respect  these  terms  were  extraor- 
dinarily lenient.  Great  Britain,  after  bearing  the  chief 
financial  strain  of  the  war,  might  have  claimed  some  of 
the  French  colonies  which  she  restored  in  1814,  or  at  least 
have  required  the  surrender  of  the  French  claims  on  part 
of  the  Newfoundland  coast.  Even  this  last  was  not  done, 
and  alone  of  the  States  that  had  suffered  loss  of  valuable 
lives,  we  exacted  no  territorial  indemnity  for  the  war  of 
1815. l  In  truth,  our  Ministers  were  content  with  placing 
France  and  her  ancient  dynasty  in  an  honourable  position, 
in  the  hope  that  Europe  would  thus  at  last  find  peace  ; 
and  the  forty  years  of  almost  unbroken  rest  that  followed 
justified  their  magnanimity. 

But  there  was  one  condition  fundamental  to  the  Treaty 
,  of  Paris  and  essential  to  the  peace  of  Europe,  namely,  that 
Napoleon  should  be  securely  guarded  at  St.  Helena. 

1  See  Gourgaud's  "Journal,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  315,  for  Napoleon's  view  as  to 
our  stupidity  then  :  "  In  their  place  I  would  have  stipulated  that  I  alone 
could  sail  and  trade  in  the  eastern  seas.  It  is  ridiculous  for  them  to  leave 
Batavia  (Java)  to  the  Dutch  and  L'lle  de  Bourbon  to  the  French." 


CHAPTER   XLII 

CLOSING  YEARS 

Aftek  a  voyage  of  sixty-seven  days  the  exiles  sighted 
St.  Helena  — "  that  black  wart  rising  out  of  the  ocean," 
as  Surgeon  Henry  calls  it.  Blank  dismay  laid  hold  of  the 
more  sensitive  as  they  gazed  at  those  frowning  cliffs. 
What  Napoleon's  feelings  were  we  know  not.  Watchful 
curiosity  seemed  to  be  uppermost  ;  for  as  they  drew  near 
to  Jamestown,  he  minutely  scanned  the  forts  through  a 
glass.  Arrangements  having  been  made  for  his  reception, 
he  landed  in  the  evening  of  the  17th  October,  so  as  to 
elude  the  gaze  of  the  inhabitants,  and  entered  a  house 
prepared  for  him  in  the  town. 

On  the  morrow  he  was  up  at  dawn,  and  rode  with  Cock- 
burn  and  Bertrand  to  Longwood,  the  residence  of  the 
Lieutenant-Governor.  The  orders  of  our  East  India  Com- 
pany, to  which  the  island  then  belonged,  forbade  his  appro- 
priation of  Plantation  House,  the  Governor's  residence  ; 
and  a  glance  at  the  accompanying  map  will  show  the 
reason  of  this  prohibition.  This  house  is  situated  not  far 
from  creeks  that  are  completely  sheltered  from  the  south- 
east trade  winds,  whence  escape  by  boat  would  be  easy  ; 
whereas  Longwood  is  nearer  the  surf-beaten  side  and 
offers  far  more  security.  After  conferring  with  Governor 
Wilks  and  others,  Cockburn  decided  on  this  residence. 

"  At  Longwood,"  wrote  Cockburn,  "  an  extent  of  level  ground,  easily 
to  be  secured  by  sentries,  presents  itself,  perfectly  adapted  for  horse 
exercise,  carriage  exercise,  or  for  pleasant  walking,  which  is  not  to  be 
met  with  in  all  the  other  parts  of  the  island.  The  house  is  certainly 
small;  but  ...  I  trust  the  carpenters  of  the  'Northumberland'  will 
in  a  little  time  be  able  to  make  such  additions  to  the  house  as  will 
render  it,  if  not  as  good  as  might  be  wished,  yet  at  least  as  commodi- 
ous as  necessary." x 

1  Forsyth,  "  Captivity  of  Napoleon,"  vol.  i.,  p.  218.  Plantation  House 
was  also  the  centre  of  the  semaphores  of  the  island. 

vol.  ii  —  2  k  497 


498 


THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I 


CHA*. 


"  Napoleon,"  wrote  Glover,  "  seemed  well  satisfied  with 
the  situation  of  Longwood,  and  expressed  a  desire  to 
occupy  it  as  soon  as  possible."  As  he  disliked  the  pub- 
licity of  the  house  in  Jamestown,  Cockburn  suggested  on 
their  return  that  he  should  reside  at  a  pretty  little  bunga- 
low, not  far  from  the  town,  named  "  The  Briars."  He 
readily  assented,  and  took  up  his  abode  there  for  seven 
weeks,  occupying   a   small  adjoining  annexe,  while  Las 


*i   ' 


Cases  and  his  son  established  themselves  in  the  two  gar 
rets.  A  marquee  was  erected  to  serve  as  dining-room. 
It  was  a  narrow  space  for  the  lord  of  the  Tuileries,  but  he 
seems  to  have  been  not  unhappy.  There  he  dictated 
Memoranda  to  Las  Cases  or  Gourgaud  in  the  mornings, 
and  often  joined  the  neighbouring  family  of  the  Balcombes 
for  dinner  and  the  evening.  Mr.  Balcombe,  an  elderly 
merchant,  was  appointed  purveyor  to  the  party  ;  he  and 
his  wife  were  most  hospitable,  and  their  two  daughters,  of 
fifteen  and  fourteen  years,  frequently  beguiled  Napoleon's 
evening  hours  with  games  of  whist  or  naive  questions.    On 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  490 

one  supreme  occasion,  in  order  to  please  the  younger  girl, 
Napoleon  played  at  blindman's  buff  ;  at  such  times  she 
ventured  to  call  him  "Boney";  and,  far  from  taking  / 
offence  at  this  liberty,  he  delighted  in  her  glee.  It  is 
such  episodes  as  these  that  reveal  the  softer  traits  of  his 
character,  which  the  dictates  of  policy  had  stunted  but 
not  eradicated.1 

In  other  respects,  the  time  at  "  The  Briars "  was  dull 
and  monotonous,  and  he  complained  bitterly  to  Cockburn 
of  the  inadequate  accommodation.  The  most  exciting 
times  were  on  the  arrival  of  newspapers  from  Europe. 
The  reports  just  to  hand  of  riots  in-  England  and  royalist 
excesses  in  France  fed  his  hopes  of  general  disorders  or 
revolutions  which  might  lead  to  his  recall.  He  believed 
the  Jacobins  would  yet  lord  it  over  the  Continent.  "It 
is  only  I  who  can  tame  them." 

Equally  noteworthy  are  his  comments  on  the  trials  of 
Labedoyere  and  Ney  for  their  treason  to  Louis  XVIII. 
He  has  little  pity  for  them.  "  One  ought  never  to  break 
one's  word,"  he  remarked  to  Gourgaud,  "  and  I  despise 
traitors."  On  hearing  that  Labedoyere  was  condemned 
to  death,  he  at  first  shows  more  feeling :  but  he  comes 
round  to  the  former  view  :  "  Labedoyere  acted  like  a  man 
without  honour,"  and  "Ney  dishonoured  himself."2 

We  may  hereby  gauge  the  value  which  Napoleon  laid 
on  fidelity.  For  him  it  is  the  one  priceless  virtue.  He 
esteems  those  who  staunchly  oppose  him,  and  seeks  to 
gain  them  over  by  generosity :  for  those  who  come  over 
he  ever  has  a  secret  contempt ;  for  those  who  desert  him, 
hatred.  Doubtless  that  is  why  he  heard  the  news  of  Ney's 
execution  unmoved.  Brilliantly  brave  as  the  Marshal 
was,  he  had  abandoned  him  in  1814,  and  Louis  XVIII. 
in  the  Hundred  Days.  The  tidings  of  Murat's  miserable 
fate,  at  the  close  of  his  mad  expedition  to  Calabria,  leave 
Napoleon  equally  cold.  —  "I  announce  the  fatal  news," 
writes  Gourgaud,  "  to  His  Majesty,  whose  expression  re- 

1  Mrs.  Abell  ("Betsy  "  Balcombe),  "Recollections,"  ch.  vii.  These 
were  compiled  twenty-rive  years  later,  and  are  not,  as  a  rule,  trustworthy, 
but  the  "  blindman's  buff  "  is  named  by  Glover.  Balcombe  later  on 
infringed  the  British  regulations,  along  with  O'Meara. 

2  Gourgaud,  "Journal,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  77,  94,  136,  491. 


500  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

mains  unchanged,  and  who  says  that  Murat  must  have  been 
mad  to  attempt  a  venture  like  that."  — Here  again  his 
thoughts  seem  to  fly  back  to  Murat's  defection  in  1814. 
Later  on,  he  says  he  loved  him  for  his  brilliant  bravery, 
and  therefore  pardoned  his  numerous  follies.  But  his 
present  demeanour  shows  that  he  never  forgave  that  of 

1814.1 

Meanwhile,  thanks  to  the  energy  of  Cockburn  and  his 
sailors,  Longwood  was  ready  for  the  party  (December  9th, 
1815),  and  the  Admiral  hoped  that  their  complaints  would 
cease.  The  new  abode  contained  five  rooms  for  Napo- 
leon's use,  three  for  the  Montholons,  two  for  the  Las  Cases, 
and  one  for  Gourgaud :  it  was  situated  on  a  plateau  1,730 
feet  above  the  sea :  the  air  there  was  bracing,  and  on  the 
farther  side  of  the  plain  dotted  with  gum  trees  stretched 
the  race-course,  a  mile  and  a  half  of  excellent  turf.  The 
only  obvious  drawbacks  were  the  occasional  mists,  and  the 
barren  precipitous  ravines  that  flank  the  plateau  on  all 
sides.  Seeing,  however,  that  Napoleon  disliked  the  pub- 
licity of  Jamestown,  the  isolation  of  Longwood  could 
hardly  be  alleged  as  a  serious  grievance.  The  Bertrands 
occupied  Hutt's  -Gate,  a  small  villa  about  a  mile  distant. 

The  limits  within  which  Napoleon  might  take  exercise 
unaccompanied  by  a  British  officer  formed  a  roughly  tri- 
angular space  having  a  circumference  of  about  twelve 
miles.  Outside  of  those  bounds  he  must  be  so  accompanied ; 
and  if  a  strange  ship  came  in  sight,  he  was  to  return  within 
bounds.  The  letters  of  the  whole  party  must  be  super- 
vised by  the  acting  Governor.  This  is  the  gist  of  the 
official  instructions.  Napoleon's  dislike  of  being  accom- 
panied by  a  British  officer  led  him  nearly  always  to  restrict 
himself  to  the  limits  and  generally  to  the  grounds  of 
Longwood. 

And  where,  we  may  ask,  could  a  less  unpleasant  place 
of  detention  have  been  found  ?  In  Europe  he  must  in- 
evitably have  submitted  to  far  closer  confinement.  For 
what  safeguards  could  there  have  been  proof  against  a 
subtle  intellect  and  a  personality  whose  charm  fired  thou- 
sands of  braves  in  both  hemispheres  with  the  longing  to 

i  Gourgaud,  "  Journal,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  135,  298.  See  too  "  Cornhill "  for 
January,  1901. 


CANTA    BARBARA.    CAi.'     fc»*N»* 

xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  601 

start  him  once  more  on  his  adventures?  The  Tower  of 
London,  the  eyrie  of  Dumbarton  Castle,  even  Fort 
William  itself,  were  named  as  possible  places  of  deten- 
tion. Were  they  suited  to  this  child  of  the  Medi- 
terranean ?  He  needed  sun  ;  he  needed  exercise  ;  he 
needed  society.  All  these  he  could  have  on  the  plateau 
of  Longwood,  in  a  singularly  equable  climate,  where  the 
heat  of  the  tropics  is  assuaged  by  the  south-east  trade 
wind,  and  plants  of  the  sub-tropical  and  temperate  zones 
alike  flourish.1 

But  nothing  pleased  the  exiles.  They  moped  during 
the  rains  ;  they  shuddered  at  the  yawning  ravines ;  they 
groaned  at  the  sight  of  the  red-coats ;  above  all  they 
realized  that  escape  was  hopeless  in  face  of  Cockburn's 
watchful  care.  His  first  steps  on  arriving  at  the  island 
were  to  send  on  to  the  Cape  seventy-five  foreigners  whose 
presence  was  undesirable.  He  also  despatched  the 
"  Peruvian  "  to  hoist  the  British  flag  on  the  uninhabited 
island,  Ascension,  in  order,  as  he  wrote  to  the  Admiralty, 
"  to  prevent  America  or  any  other  nation  from  planting 
themselves  [s^]  there  ...  for  the  purpose  of  favouring 
sooner  or  later  the  escape  of  General  Bonaparte."  Four 
ships  of  war  were  also  kept  at  St.  Helena,  and  no  mer- 
chantmen but  those  of  the  East  India  Company  were  to 
touch  there  except  under  stress  of  weather  or  when  in 
need  of  water. 

These  precautions  early  provoked  protests  from  the 
exiles.  Bertrand  had  no  wish  to  draw  them  up  in  the 
trenchant  style  that  the  ex-Emperor  desired  ;  but  Gour- 
gaud's  "Journal"  shows  that  he  was  driven  on  to  the 
task  (November  5th).  It  only  led  to  a  lofty  rejoinder 
from  Cockburn,  in  which  he  declined  to  relax  his  system, 
but  expressed  the  wish  to  render  their  situation  "as  little 
disagreeable  as  possible."     On  December  21st,  Montholon 

1  Surgeon  Henry  of  the  00th.  in  "  Events  of  a  Military  Life,"  ch.  xxviii., 
writes  that  he  found  side  by  side  at  Plantation  House  the  tea  shrub  and  the 
English  golden-pippin,  the  bread-fruit  tree  and  the  peach  and  plum,  the 
nutmeg  overshadowing  the  gooseberry.  In  ch.  xxxi.  he  notes  the  humidity 
of  the  uplands  as  a  drawback,  "but  the  inconvenience  is  as  nothing 
compared  with  the  comfort,  fertility,  and  salubrity  which  the  clouds 
bestow."  He  found  that  the  soldiers' enjoyed  far  better  health  at  Dead- 
wood  Camp,  behind  Longwood,  than  down  in  Jamestown. 


502  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

returned  to  the  charge  with  a  letter  dictated  by  Napoleon, 
complaining  that  Longwood  was  the  most  barren  spot  on 
the  island,  always  deluged  with  rain  or  swathed  in  mist ; 
that  O'Meara  was  not  to  count  as  a  British  officer  when 
they  went  beyond  the  limits,  and  had  been  reprimanded 
by  the  Admiral  for  thus  acting  ;  and  that  the  treatment 
of  the  exiles  would  excite  the  indignation  of  all  times  and 
all  people.  To  this  the  Admiral  sent  a  crushing  rejoinder, 
declining  to  explain  why  he  had  censured  O'Meara  or  any 
other  British  subject  :  he  asserted  that  Longwood  was 
"  the  most  pleasant  as  welTas  the  most  healthy  spot  of  this 
most  healthful  island,"  expressed  the  hope  that,  when  the 
rains  had  ceased,  the  party  would  change  their  opinion  of 
Longwood,  and  declared  that  the  treatment  of  the  party 
would  "  obtain  the  admiration  of  future  ages,  as  well  as  of 
every  unprejudiced  person  of  the  present." 

We  now  know  that  the  Admiral's  trust  in  the  judicial 
impartiality  of  future  ages  was  a  piece  of  touching  cre- 
dulity, and  that  the  next  generation,  like  his  own,  was 
greedily  to  swallow  sensational  slander  and  to  neglect  the 
prosaic  truth.  But,  arguing  from  present  signs,  he  might 
well  believe  that  Montholon's  letter  was  a  tissue  of  false- 
hoods ;  for  that  officer  soon  confessed  to  him  that  "  it  was 
written  in  a  moment  of  petulance  of  the  General  [Bona- 
parte] .  .  .  and  that  he  [Montholon]  considered  the 
party  to  be  in  point  of  fact  vastly  well  off  and  to  have 
everything  necessary  for  them,  though  anxious  that  there 
should  be  no  restrictions  as  to  the  General  going  unat- 
tended by  an  officer  wherever  he  pleased  throughout  the 
island."  1     On  the  last  point  Cockburn  was  inflexible. 

The  Admiral's  responsibility  was  now  nearly  at  an  end. 
On  April  14th,  1816,  there  landed  at  St.  Helena  Sir  Hud- 
son Lowe,  the  new  Governor,  who  was  to  take  over  the 
powers  wielded  both  by  Cockburn  and  Wilks.  The  new 
arrival,  on  whom  the  storms  of  calumny  were  thenceforth 
persistently  to  beat,  had  served  with  distinction  in  many 
parts.  Born  in  1769,  within  one  month  of  Napoleon,  he 
early  entered  our  army,  and  won  his  commission  by  ser- 
vice in  Corsica  and  Elba,  his  linguistic  and  military  gifts 
soon  raising  him  to  the  command  of  a  corps  of  Corsican 

i  Despatch  of  Jan.  12th,  1816,  in  Colonial  Office,  St.  Helena,  No.  1. 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  603 

exiles  who  after  1795  enlisted  in  our  service.  With  these 
"  Corsican  Rangers "  Lowe  campaigned  in  Egypt  and 
finally  at  Capri,  their  devotion  to  hira  nerving  them  to  a 
gallant  but  unavailing  defence  of  this  islet  against  a  supe- 
rior force  of  Murat's  troops  in  1808. 1  In  1810  Lowe  and 
his  Corsicans  captured  the  Isle  of  Santa  Maura,  which  he 
thereafter  governed  to  the  full  satisfaction  of  the  inhabit- 
ants. Early  in  1813  he  was  ordered  to  Russia,  and  there- 
after served  as  attache  on  Blucher's  staff  in  the  memorable 
advance  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Seine.  He  brought  the 
news  of  Napoleon's  first  abdication  to  England,  was 
knighted  by  the  Prince  Regent,  and  received  Russian 
and  Prussian  orders  of  distinction  for  his  services.  At 
the  close  of  1814  he  was  appointed  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral of  our  forces  in  the  Netherlands  and  received  flatter- 
ing letters  of  congratulation  from  Bliicher  and  Gneisenau, 
the  latter  expressing  his  appreciation  of  "  Your  rare  mili- 
tary talents,  your  profound  judgment  on  the  great  opera- 
tions of  war,  and  your  imperturbable  sangfroid  in  the  day 
of  battle.  These  rare  qualities  and  your  honourable 
character  will  link  me  to  you  eternally."  In  1822,  when 
O'Meara  was  slandering  Lowe's  character,  the  Czar  Alex- 
ander met  his  step-daughter,  the  Countess  Balmain,  at 
Verona,  and  in  reference  to  Sir  Hudson's  painful  duties 
at  St.  Helena,  said  of  him  :  "  Je  l'estime  beaucoup.  Je 
l'ai  connu  dans  les  temps  critiques."2 

Lowe's  firmness  of  character,  command  of  foreign  lan- 
guages, and  intimate  acquaintance  with  Corsicans,  seemed 
to  mark  him  out  as  the  ideal  Governor  of  St.  Helena  in 
place  of  the  mild  and  scholarly  Wilks.  And  yet  the 
appointment  was  in  some  ways  unfortunate.  Though  a 
man  of  sterling  worth,  Lowe  was  reserved,  and  had  little 
acquaintance  with  the  ways  of  courtiers.  Moreover,  the 
superstitious  might  deem  that  all  the  salient  events  of  his 
career  proclaimed  him  an  evil  genius  dogging  the  steps  of 
Napoleon  ;  and,  as  superstition  laid  increasing  hold  on  the 

1  Lord  Rosebery  ("Napoleon:  last  Phase,"  p.  07),  following  French 
sources,  assigns  the  superiority  of  force  to  Lowe  ;  but  the  official  papers 
published  by  Forsyth,  vol.  i„  pp.  397-416,  show  that  the  reverse  was  the' 
case.     Lowe  had  1,-302  men  ;  the  French,  about  3,000. 

8  From  a  letter  in  the  possession  of  Miss  Lowe. 


504  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

great  Corsican  in  his  later  years,  we  may  reasonably  infer 
that  this  feeling  intensified,  if  it  did  not  create,  the  repug- 
nance which  he  ever  manifested  to  la  figure  sinistre  of  the 
Governor.  Lowe  also  at  first  shrank  from  an  appointment 
that  must  bring  on  him  the  intrigues  of  Napoleon  and  of 
his  partisans  in  England.  Only  a  man  of  high  rank  and 
commanding  influence  could  hope  to  live  down  such 
attacks  ;  and  Lowe  had  neither  rank  nor  influence.  He 
was  the  son  of  an  army  surgeon,  and  was  almost  unknown 
in  the  country  which  for  twenty-eight  years  he  had  served 
abroad. 

His  first  visits  to  Longwood  were  unfortunate.  Cock- 
burn  and  he  arranged  to  go  at  9  A.M.,  the  time  when 
Napoleon  frequently  went  for  a  drive.  On  their  arrival 
they  were  informed  that  the  Emperor  was  indisposed  and 
could  not  see  them  until  4  p.m.  of  the  next  day,  and  it 
soon  appeared  that  the  early  hour  of  their  call  was  taken 
as  an  act  of  rudeness.  On  the  following  afternoon  Lowe 
and  Cockburn  arranged  to  go  in  together  to  the  presence  ; 
but  as  Lowe  advanced  to  the  chamber,  Bertrand  stepped 
forward,  and  a  valet  prevented  the  Admiral's  entrance, 
an  act  of  incivility  which  Lowe  did  not  observe.  Proceed- 
ing alone,  the  new  Governor  offered  his  respects  in  French  ; 
but  on  Napoleon  remarking  that  he  must  know  Italian, 
for  he  had  commanded  a  regiment  of  Corsicans,  they  con- 
versed in  Napoleon's  mother-tongue.  The  ex-Emperor's 
first  serious  observation,  which  bore  on  the  character  of 
the  Corsicans,  was  accompanied  by  a  quick  searching 
glance  :  "  They  carry  the  stiletto  :  are  they  not  a  bad 
people  ? "  —  Lowe  saw  the  snare  and  evaded  it  by  the 
reply  :  "  They  do  not  carry  the  stiletto,  having  abandoned 
that  custom  in  our  service  :  I  was  very  well  satisfied  with 
them."  They  then  conversed  a  short  time  about  Egypt  and 
other  topics.  Napoleon  afterwards  contrasted  him  favour- 
ably with  Cockburn  :  "  This  new  Governor  is  a  man  of 
very  few  words,  but  he  appears  to  be  a  polite  man :  how- 
ever, it  is  only  from  a  man's  conduct  for  some  time  that 
you  can  judge  of  him."1 

Cockburn  was  indignant  at  the  slight  put  upon  him  by 
Napoleon  and  Bertrand,  which  succeeded  owing  to  Lowe's 

1  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  pp.  139-147. 


XLII 


CLOSING   YEARS  505 


want  of  ready  perception ;  but  he  knew  that  the  cause  of 
the  exiles'  annoyance  was  his  recent  firm  refusal  to  convey 
Napoleon's  letter  of  complaint  direct  to  the  Prince  Regent, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Ministry.  Failing  to  bend 
the  Admiral,  they  then  sought  to  cajole  the  retiring  Gov- 
ernor, Wilks,  who,  having  borne  little  of  the  responsibility 
of  the  custody,  was  proportionately  better  liked.  First 
Bertrand,  and  then  Napoleon,  requested  him  to  take  this 
letter  without  the  knowledge  of  the  new  Governor.  Wilks  at 
once  repelled  the  request,  remarking  to  Bertrand  that  such 
attempts  at  evasion  must  lead  to  greater  stringency  in  the 
future.  And  this  was  the  case.1  The  incident  naturally 
increased  Lowe's  suspicion  of  the  ex-Fmperor. 

At  first  there  was  an  uneasy  truce  between  them.  Gour- 
gaud,  though  cast  down  at  the  departure  of  the  "  adorable  " 
Miss  Wilks,  found  strength  enough  to  chronicle  in  his 
"  Journal "  the  results  of  a  visit  paid  by  Las  Cases  to 
Lowe  at  Plantation  House  (April  26th)  :  the  Governor 
received  the  secretary  very  well  and  put  all  his  library  at 
the  disposal  of  the  party ;  but  the  diarist  also  notes  that 
Napoleon  took  amiss  the  reception  of  any  of  his  people 
by  the  Governor.  This  had  been  one  of  the  unconscious 
crimes  of  the  Admiral.  With  the  hope  of  brightening 
the  sojourn  of  the  exiles,  he  had  given  several  balls,  at 
which  Mmes.  Bertrand  and  Montholon  shone  resplendent 
in  dresses  that  cast  into  the  shade  those  of  the  officers' 
wives.  Their  triumph  was  short-lived.  When  la  grande 
Marechale  ventured  to  desert  the  Emperor's  table  on  these 
and  other  festive  occasions,  her  growing  fondness  for  the 
English  drew  on  her  sharp  rebukes  from  the  ex-Emperor 
and  a  request  not  to  treat  Longwood  as  if  it  were  an  inn.2 
Many  jottings  in  Gourgaud's  diary  show  that  the  same 
policy  was  thenceforth  strictly  maintained.  Napoleon  kept 
up  the  essentials  of  Tuileries  etiquette,  required  the  at- 
tendance of  his  courtiers,  and  jealously  checked  any  famil- 
iarity with  Plantation  House  or  Jamestown. 

On  some  questions  Lowe  was  more  pliable  than  the 
home  Government,  notably  in  the  matter  of  the  declara- 

1  See  the  interview  in  "Monthly  Rev.,'1  Jan.,  1001. 

2  Bingham's  Diary  in  "Cornhill"  for  Jan.,  1001  ;  Gourgaud,  vol.  i., 
pp.  152,  168. 


506  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

tions  signed  by  Napoleon's  followers.  But  in  one  matter 
he  was  proof  against  all  requests  from  Longwood :  this 
was  the  extension  of  the  twelve-mile  limit.  It  after- 
wards became  the  custom  to  speak  as  if  Lowe  could  have 
granted  this.  Even  the  Duke  of  Wellington  declared  to 
Stanhope  that  he  considered  Lowe  a  stupid  man,  suspicious 
and  jealous,  who  might  very  well  have  let  Napoleon  go 
freely  about  the  island  provided  that  the  six  or  seven  land- 
ing-places were  well  guarded  and  that  Napoleon  showed 
himself  to  a  British  officer  every  night  and  morning.  Now, 
it  is  futile  to  discuss  whether  such  liberty  would  have  en- 
abled Napoleon  to  pass  off  as  someone  else  and  so  escape. 
What  is  certain  is  that  our  Government,  believing  he  could 
so  escape,  imposed  rules  which  Lowe  was  not  free  to  relax. 

Napoleon  realized  this  perfectly  well,  but  in  the  inter- 
view of  April  30th,  1816,  he  pressed  Lowe  for  an  exten- 
sion of  the  limits,  saying  that  he  hated  the  sight  of  our 
soldiers  and  longed  for  closer  intercourse  with  the  inhabit- 
ants. Other  causes  of  friction  occurred,  such  as  Lowe's 
withdrawal  of  the  privilege,  rather  laxly  granted  by  Cock- 
burn  to  Bertrand,  of  granting  passes  for  interviews  with 
Napoleon  ;  or  again  a  tactless  invitation  that  Lowe  sent  to 
"  General  Bonaparte  "  to  meet  the  wife  of  the  Governor- 
General  of  India  at  dinner  at  Plantation  House.  But  in 
the  midst  of  the  diatribe  which  Napoleon  shortly  after- 
wards shot  forth  at  his  would-be  host  —  a  diatribe  be- 
sprinkled with  taunts  that  Lowe  was  sent  to  be  his  execu- 
tioner —  there  came  a  sentence  which  reveals  the  cause  of 
his  fury  :  "  If  you  cannot  extend  my  limits,  you  can  do 
nothing  for  me."  x 

Why  this  wish  for  wider  limits  ?  It  did  not  spring 
from  a  desire  for  longer  drives  ;  for  the  plateau  offered 
nearly  all  the  best  ground  in  the  island  for  such  exercise. 
Neither  was  it  due  to  a  craving  for  wider  social  intercourse. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  he  looked  on  an  extension 
of  limits  as  a  necessary  prelude  to  attempts  at  escape  and 
as  a  means  of  influencing  the  slaves  at  the  outlying  planta- 
tions. Gourgaud  names  several  instances  of  gold  pieces 
being  given  to  slaves,  and  records  the  glee  shown  by  his 
master  on  once  slipping  away  from  the  sentries  and  the 

1  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  pp.  171-177. 


XLII 


CLOSING   YEARS  507 


British  officer.  These  feelings  and  attempts  were  per- 
fectly natural  on  Napoleon's  part  ;  but  it  was  equally 
natural  that  the  Governor  should  regard  them  as  part  of  a 
plan  of  .escape  or  rescue  —  a  matter  that  will  engage  our 
closer  attention  presently. 

Napoleon  had  only  two  more  interviews  with  Lowe, 
namely,  on  July  17th  and  August  18th.  In  the  former  of 
these  he  was  more  conciliatory  ;  but  in  the  latter,  at  which 
Admiral  Sir  Pulteney  Malcolm  was  present,  he  assailed 
the  Governor  with  the  bitterest  taunts.  Lowe  cut  short 
the  painful  scene  by  saying  :  "You  make  me  smile,' sir." 
"  How  smile,  sir  ?  "  "  You  force  me  to  smile  :  your  mis- 
conception of  my  character  and  the  rudeness  of  your 
manners  excite  my  pity.  I  wish  you  good  day."  The 
Admiral  also  retired.1 

Various  causes  have  been  assigned  for  the  hatred  that 
Napoleon  felt  for  Lowe.  His  frequent  taunts  that  he  was 
no  general,  but  only  a  leader  of  Corsican  deserters,  sug- 
gests one  that  has  already  been  referred  to.  It  has  also 
been  suggested  that  Lowe  was  not  a  gentleman,  and 
references  have  been  approvingly  made  to  comparisons  of 
his  physiognomy  with  that  of  the  devil,  and  of  his  eye 
with  "  that  of  a  hysena  caught  in  a  trap."  As  to  this  we 
will  cite  the  opinion  of  Lieutenant  (later  Colonel)  Basil 
Jackson,  who  was  unknown  to  Lowe  before  1816,  and  was 
on  friendly  terms  with  the  inmates  both  of  Longwood  and 
of  Plantation  House  : 

"He  [Lowe]  stood  five  feet  seven,  spare  in  make,  having  good 
features,  fair  hair,  and  eyebrows  overhanging  his  eyes  :  his  look  denoted 
penetration  and  firmness,  his  manner  rather  abrupt,  his  gait  quick,  his 
look  and  general  demeanour  indicative  of  energy  and  decision.  He 
wrote  or  dictated  rapidly,  and  was  fond  of  writing,  was  well  read  in 
military  history,  spoke  French  and  Italian  with  fluency,  was  warm  and 
steady  in  his  friendships,  and  popular  both  with  the  inhabitants  of  the 
isle  and  the  troops.  His  portrait,  prefixed  to  Mr.  Forsyth's  book,  is  a 
perfect  likeness."  2 

i  Lowe's  version  (Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  pp.  247-251)  is  fully  borne,  out  by 
Admiral  Malcolm's  in  Lady  Malcolm's  "  Diary  of  St.  Helena,"  pp.  55-65  ; 
Gourgaud  was  not  present. 

2  B.  Jackson's  ';  Waterloo  and  St.  Helena,"  pp.  00-01.  The  assertion  in 
the  article  on  B.  Jackson,  in  the  "Diet,  of  Nat.  Biography,"  that  he  was 
related  to  Lowe,  and  therefore  partial  to  him,  is  incorrect.  Miss  Lowe 
assures  me  that  he  did  not  see  her  father  before  the  St.  Helena  days. 


508  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

If  overhanging  eyebrows,  a  penetrating  glance,  and 
rather  abrupt  manners  be  thought  to  justify  comparisons 
with  the  devil  or  a  hyaena,  the  art  of  historical  portraiture 
will  assuredly  have  to  be  learnt  over  again  in  conformity 
with  impressionist  methods.  That  Lowe  was  a  gentleman 
is  affirmed  by  Mrs.  Smith  (nee  Grant),  who,  in  later  years, 
when  prejudiced  against  him  by  O'Meards  slanders,  met  him 
at  Colombo  without  at  first  knowing  his  name  : 

"  I  was  taken  in  to  dinner  by  a  grave,  particularly  gentlemanly  man, 
in  a  General's  uniform,  whose  conversation  was  as  agreeable  as  his 
manner.  He  had  been  over  half  the  world,  knew  all  celebrities,  and 
contrived  without  display  to  say  a  great  deal  one  was  willing  to  hear. 
.  .  .  Years  before,  with  our  Whig  principles  and  prejudices,  we  had 
cultivated  in  our  Highland  retirement  a  horror  of  the  great  Napoleon's 
gaoler.  The  cry  of  party,  the  feeling  for  the  prisoner,  the  book  of 
Surgeon  O'Meara,  had  all  worked  my  woman's  heart  to  such  a  pitch 
of  indignation  that  this  maligned  name  [Lowe]  was  an  offence.  We 
were  to  hold  the  owner  in  abhorrence.  Speak  to  him  never  !  Look  at 
him,  sit  in  the  same  room  with  him,  never !  None  were  louder  than  I, 
more  vehement;  yet  here  was  I  beside  my  bugbear  and  perfectly  satis- 
fied with  my  position.     It  was  a  good  lesson." 1 

The  real  cause  of  Napoleon's  hatred  of  Lowe  is  hinted 
at  by  Sir  George  Bingham  in  his  diary  (April  19th). 
After  mentioning  Napoleon's  rudeness  to  Cockburn  on 
parting  with  him,  he  proceeds : 

"  You  have  no  idea  of  the  dirty  little  intrigues  of  himself  [Napo- 
leon] and  his  set :  if  Sir  H.  Lowe  has  firmness  enough  not  to  give  way 
to  them,  he  will  in  a  short  time  treat  him  in  the  same  manner.  For 
myself,  it  is  said  I  am  a  favourite  [of  Napoleon],  though  I  do  not 
understand  the  claim  I  have  to  such."2 

Yes  !  Lowe's  offence  lay  not  in  his  manners,  not  even 
in  his  features,  but  in  his  firmness.  Napoleon  soon  saw 
that  all  his  efforts  to  bend  him  were  in  vain.  Neither  in 
regard  to  the  Imperial  title,  nor  the  limits,  nor  the  trans- 

1  "  Mems.  of  a  Highland  Lady,"  p.  459. 

2  In  "Blackwood's,"  Oct.,  1896,  and  "  Cornhill,"  Jan.,  1901.  I  can- 
not accept  Stunner's  hostile  verdict  on  Lowe  as  that  of  an  impartial  wit- 
ness. The  St.  Helena  Records  show  that  Stunner  persisted  in  evading  the 
Governor's  regulations  by  secretly  meeting  the  French  Generals.  He  was 
afterwards  recalled  for  his  irregularities.  Balmain,  the  Russian,  and 
Montchenu,  the  French  Commissioner,  are  fair  to  him.  The  latter  con- 
stantly pressed  Lowe  to  be  stricter  with  Napoleon  I  See  M.  Firmin-Didot's 
edition  of  Montchenu's  reports  in  "La  Captivite"  de  Ste.  HeUene,"  espe- 
cially App.  iii.  and  viii. 


xlii  CLOSING   YEARS  509 

mission  of  letters  to  Europe,  would  the  Governor  swerve 
a  hair's  breadth  from  his  instructions.  At  the  risk  of 
giving  a  surfeit  of  quotations,  we  must  cite  two  more 
on  this  topic.  Basil  Jackson,  when  at  Paris  in  1828, 
chanced  to  meet  Montholon,  and  was  invited  to  his  Cha- 
teau de  Fremigny  ;  during  his  stay  the  conversation 
turned  upon  their  sojourn  at  St.  Helena,  to  the  following 
effect : 

"  He  [Montholon]  enlarged  upon  what  he  termed  la  politique  de 
Longwood,  spoke  not  unkindly  of  Sir  Hudson  Lowe,  allowing  he  had 
a  difficult  task  to  execute,  since  an  angel  from  Heaven,  as  Governor, 
could  not  have  pleased  them.  When  I  more  than  hinted  that  nothing 
could  justify  detraction  and  departure  from  truth  in  carrying  out  a 
policy,  he  merely  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  reiterated :  '  C'e'tait  noire 
politique ;  et  que  votdez-vous  ? '  That  he  and  the  others  respected  Sir 
Hudson  Lowe,  I  had  not  the  shadow  of  a  doubt :  nay,  in  a  conversa- 
tion with  Montholon  at  St.  Helena,  when  speaking  of  the  Governor,  he 
observed  that  Sir  Hudson  was  an  officer  who  would  always  have  dis- 
tinguished employment,  as  all  Governments  were  glad  of  the  services 
of  a  man  of  his  calibre. 

"  Happening  to  mention  that,  owing  to  his  inability  to  find  an  offi- 
cer who  could  understand  and  speak  French,  the  Governor  was  dis- 
posed to  employ  me  as  orderly  officer  at  Longwood,  Montholon  said  it 
was  well  for  me  that  I  was  not  appointed  to  the  post,  as  they  did  not 
want  a  person  in  that  capacity  who  could  understand  them ;  in  fact, 
he  said,  we  should  have  found  means  to  get  rid  of  you,  and  perhaps 
ruined  you."1 

Las  Cases  also,  in  a  passage  that  he  found  it  desirable  to 
suppress  when  he  published  his  '"Journal"  wrote  as  follows 
(November  30th,  1815)  : 

"  We  are  possessed  of  moral  arms  only  :  and  in  order  to  make  the 
most  advantageous  use  of  these  it  was  necessary  to  reduce  into  a  system 
our  demeanour,  our  words,  our  sentiments,  eren  our  privations,  in  order 
that  we  might  thereby  excite  a  lively  interest  in  a  large  portion  of  the 
population  of  Europe,  and  that  the  Opposition  in  England  might  not 
fail  to  attack  the  Ministry  on  the  violence  of  their  conduct  towards 


us 


"  3 


We  are  now  able  to  understand  the  real  nature  of  the 
struggle  that  went  on  between  Longwood  and  Plantation 
House.       Napoleon    and   his   followers   sought  by   every 

1  "  Waterloo  and  St.  Helena,"  p.  104. 

2  Lowe  had  the  "Journal  "  copied  out  when  it  came  into  his  hands  in 
Dec,  1816.  This  passage  is  given  by  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  p.  5,  and  by  Beaton, 
"  Sir  H.  Lowe  and  Napoleon,"  p.  52. 


510  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chai-. 

means  to  bring  odium  upon  Lowe,  and  to  furnish  the 
Opposition  at  Westminster  with  toothsome  details  that 
might  lead  to  the  disgrace  of  the  Governor,  the  overthrow 
of  the  Ministry,  and  the  triumphant  release  of  the  ex- 
Emperor.  On  the  other  hand,  the  knowledge  of  the 
presence  of  traitors  on  the  island,  and  of  possible  rescuers 
hovering  about  on  the  horizon,  kept  Lowe  ever  at  work 
"  unravelling  the  intricate  plotting  constantly  going  on  at 
Longwood,"  until  his  face  wore  the  preoccupied  worried 
look  that  Surgeon  Henry  describes. 

That  both  antagonists  somewhat  overacted  their  parts 
does  not  surprise  us  when  we  think  of  the  five  years  thus 
spent  within  a  narrow  space  and  under  a  tropical  sun. 
Lowe  was  at  times  pedantic  :  witness  his  refusal  to  forward 
to  Longwood  books  inscribed  to  the  "Emperor  Napoleon," 
and  his  suspicions  as  to  the  political  significance  of  green 
and  white  beans  offered  by  Montholon  to  the  French  Com- 
missioner, Montchenu.  But  such  incidents  can  be  paral- 
leled from  the  lives  of  most  officials  who  bear  a  heavy 
burden  of  responsibility.  And  who  has  ever  borne  a 
heavier  burden  ? 1 

Napoleon  also,  in  his  calmer  moods,  regretted  the  vio- 
lence of  his  language  to  the  Governor.  He  remarked  to 
Montholon  :  "  This  is  the  second  time  in  my  life  that  I 
have  spoilt  my  affairs  with  the  English.  Their  phlegm 
leads  me  on,  and  I  say  more  than  I  ought.  I  should  have 
done  better  not  to  have  replied  to  him."  This  reference 
to  his  attack  on  Whitworth  in  1803  flashes  a  ray  of  light 
on  the  diatribe  against  Lowe.  In  both  cases,  doubtless, 
the  hot  southron  would  have  bridled  his  passion  sooner, 
had  it  produced  any  visible  effect  on  the  colder  man  of 
the  north.     Nevertheless,  the  scene  of  August  18th,  1816, 

1  An  incident  narrated  to  the  present  writer  by  Sir  Hudson  Lowe's 
daughter  will  serve  to  show  how  anxious  was  his  supervision  of  all  details 
and  all  individuals  on  the  island.  A  British  soldier  was  missed  from  the 
garrison  ;  and  as  this  occurred  at  the  time  when  Napoleon  remained  in 
strict  seclusion,  fear  was  felt  that  treachery  had  enabled  him  to  make  off 
in  the  soldier's  uniform.  The  mystery  was  solved  a  few  days  after,  when 
a  large  shark  was  caught  near  the  shore,  and  on  its  being  cut  open  the 
remains  of  the  soldier  were  found  ! 

It  should  be  remembered  that  Lowe  prevailed  on  the  slave-owners  of 
the  island  to  set  free  the  children  of  slaves  born  there  on  and  after  Christ- 
mas Day,  1818. 


xlii  CLOSING   YEARS  511 

had  an  abiding  influence  on  his  relations  with  the  Gov- 
ernor. For  the  rest  of  that  weary  span  of  years  they 
never  exchanged  a  word. 

Lowe's  official  reports  prove  that  he  did  not  cease 
to  consult  the  comfort  of  the  exiles  as  far  as  it  was 
possible.  The  building  of  the  new  house,  however,  re- 
mained in  abeyance,  as  Napoleon  refused  to  give  any 
directions  on  the  subject  :  and  the  much-needed  repairs 
to  Longwood  were  stopped  owing  to  his  complaints  of  the 
noise  of  the  workmen.  But  by  ordering  the  claret  that 
the  ex-Emperor  preferred,  and  by  sending  occasional  pres- 
ents of  game  to  Longwood,  Lowe  sought  to  keep  up  the 
ordinary  civilities  of  life  ;  and  when  the  home  Govern- 
ment sought  to  limit  the  annual  cost  of  the  Longwood 
household  to  £  8,000,  Lowe  took  upon  himself  to  increase 
that  sum  by  one  half. 

Napoleon's  behaviour  in  this  last  affair  is  noteworthy. 
On  hearing  of  the  need  for  greater  economy,  he  readily 
assented,  sent  away  seven  servants,  and  ordered  a  re- 
duction in  the  consumption  of  wine.  A  day  or  two  later, 
however,  he  gave  orders  that  some  of  his  silver  plate 
should  be  sold  in  order  "  to  provide  those  little  comforts 
denied  them."  Balcombe  was  accordingly  sent  for,  and, 
on  expressing  regret  to  Napoleon  at  the  order  for  sale, 
received  the  reply  :  "  What  is  the  use  of  plate  when  you  have 
nothing  to  eat  off  it  f  "  Lowe  quietly  directed  Balcombe 
to  seal  up  the  plate  sent  to  him,  and  to  advance  money  up 
to  its  value  (£250)  ;  but  other  portions  of  the  plate  were 
broken  and  sold  later  on.  O'Meara  reveals  the  reason  for 
these  proceedings  in  his  letter  of  October  10th  :  "  In  this 
he  [Napoleon]  has  also  a  wish  to  excite  odium  against  the 
Governor  by  saying  that  he  has  been  obliged  to  sell  his 
plate  in  order  to  provide  against  starvation,  as  he  himself 
told  me  was  his  object.''''  * 

1  Quoted  by  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  p.  289.  This  letter  of  course  finds  no 
place  in  O'Meara's  later  malicious  production,  "  A  Voice  from  St.  Helena  "  ; 
the  starvation  story  is  there  repeated  as  if  it  were  true! — That  Napoleon 
was  fastidious  to  the  last  is  proved  by  the  archives  of  our  India  Office, 
which  contain  the  entry  (Dec.  11th,  1820)  :  "  The  storekeeper  paid  in  the 
sum  of  £105  on  account  of  48  dozen  of  champagne  rejected  by  General 
Bonaparte  "  (Sir  G.  Birdwood's  "  Report  on  the  Old  Records  of  the  India 
Office,"  p.  97). 


512  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

Another  incident  that  embittered  the  relations  between 
Napoleon  and  the  Governor  was  the  arrival  from  England 
of  more  stringent  regulations  for  his  custody.  The  chief 
changes  thus  brought  about  (October  9th,  1816)  were  a 
restriction  of  the  limits  from  a  twelve-mile  to  an  eight- 
mile  circumference  and  the  posting  of  a  ring  of  sentries 
at  a  slight  distance  from  Longwood  at  sunset  instead  of 
at  9  p.m.1  The  latter  change  is  to  be  regretted  ;  for  it 
marred  the  pleasure  of  Napoleon's  evening  strolls  in  his 
garden;  but,  as  the  Governor  pointed  out,  the  three  hours 
after  sunset  had  been  the  easiest  time  for  escape.  The 
restriction  of  limits  was  needful,  not  only  in  order  to 
save  our  troops  the  labour  of  watching  a  wide  area  that 
was  scarcely  ever  used  for  exercise,  but  also  to  prevent 
underhand  intercourse  with  slaves. 

Was  there  really  any  need  for  these  "  nation-degrad- 
ing "  rules,  as  O'Meara  called  them  ?  Or  were  they 
imposed  in  order  to  insult  the  great  man  ?  A  reference 
to  the  British  archives  will  show  that  there  was  some 
reason  for  them.  Schemes  of  rescue  were  afoot  that 
called  for  the  greatest  vigilance. 

As  we  have  seen  (page  485,  note),  a  letter  had  on 
August  2nd,  1815,  been  directed  to  Mme.  Bertrand  (really 
for  Napoleon)  at  Plymouth,  stating  that  the  writer  had 
placed  sums  of  money  with  well-known  firms  of  Boston, 
New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  Charlestown  on  his  behalf, 
and  that  he  (Napoleon)  had  only  to  make  known  his 
wishes  "  avec  le  the  de  la  Chine  ou  les  mousselines  de 
Vlnde  "  :  for  the  rest,  the  writer  hoped  much  from  Eng- 
lish merchantmen.  This  letter,  after  wide  wanderings, 
fell  into  our  hands  and  caused  our  Government  closely  to 
inspect  all  letters  and  merchandise  that  passed  into,  or 
out  of,  St.  Helena.  Its  attention  was  directed  specially 
to  the  United  States.  There  the  Napoleonic  cult  had 
early  taken  root,  thanks  to  his  overthrow  of  the  kings  and 
his  easy  sale  of  Louisiana  ;  the  glorifying  haze  of  dis- 
tance fostered  its  growth ;  and  now  the  martyrdom  of 
St.  Helena  brought  it  to  full  maturity.  Enthusiasm  and 
money  alike  favoured  schemes  of  rescue. 

In  our  St.  Helena  Records  (No.  4)   are  reports  as  to 

i  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  pp.  330-343,  466-476. 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  513 

two  of  them.  Forwarded  by  the  Spanish  Ambassador  at 
Washington,  the  first  reached  Madrid  on  May  9th,  1816, 
and  stated  that  a  man  named  Carpenter  had  offered  to 
Joseph  Bonaparte  (then  in  the  States)  to  rescue  Napoleon, 
and  had  set  sail  on  a  ship  for  that  purpose.  This  was  at 
once  made  known  to  Lord  Bathurst,  our  Minister  for  War 
and  the  Plantations,  who  forwarded  it  to  Lowe.  In 
August  of  that  year  our  Foreign  Office  also  received  news 
that  four  schooners  and  other  smaller  vessels  had  set  sail 
from  Baltimore  on  June  14th  with  300  men  under  an  old 
French  naval  officer,  named  Fournier,  ostensibly  to  help 
Bolivar,  but  really  to  rescue  Bonaparte.  These  fast-sail- 
ing craft  were  to  lie  out  of  sight  of  the  island  by  day, 
creep  up  at  night  to  different  points,  and  send  boats  to 
shore  ;  from  each  of  these  a  man,  in  English  uniform, 
was  to  land  and  proceed  to  Longwood,  warning  Napo- 
leon of  the  points  where  the  boats  would  be  ready  to 
receive  him.  The  report  concludes :  "  Considerable  sums 
in  gold  and  diamonds  will  be  put  at  his  disposal  to 
bribe  those  who  may  be  necessary  to  him.  They  seem 
to  flatter  themselves  of  a  certain  co-operation  on  the 
part  of  certain  individuals  domiciled  or  employed  at  St. 
Helena."1 

Bathurst  sent  on  to  Lowe  a  copy  of  this  intelligence. 
Forsyth  does  not  name  the  affair,  though  he  refers  to 
other  warnings,  received  at  various  times  by  Bathurst 
and  forwarded  to  the  Governor,  that  there  were  traitors 
in  the  island  who  had  been  won  over  by  Napoleon's  gold 
to  aid  his  escape.2  I  cannot  find  out  that  the  plans  de- 
scribed above  were  put  to  the  test,  though  suspicious 
vessels  sometimes  appeared  and  were  chased  away  by  our 

XI  have  quoted  this  in  extenso  in  "The  Owens  College  Historical 
Essays."  May  not  the  words  "domiciled"  and  "employed"  have 
aroused  Lowe's  suspicions  of  Balcombe  and  O'Meara?  Napoleon  always 
said  that  he  did  not  wish  to  escape,  and  hoped  only  for  a  change  of  Minis- 
try in  England.  But  what  responsible  person  could  trust  his  words  after 
Elba,  where  he  repeatedly  told  Campbell  that  he  had  done  with  the  world 
and  was  a  dead  man  ? 

2  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  p.  310,  vol.  ii.,  p.  142,  vol.  Hi.,  pp.  151,  250  ;  Mon- 
tholon,  "  Captivity  of  Napoleon,"  vol.  iii.,  ch.  v.  ;  Firmin-Didot,  App.  vi. 
The  schemes  named  by  Forsyth  are  ridiculed  by  Lord  Rosebery  ("  Last 
Phase,"  p.  103).  But  would  he  have  ignored  them,  had  he  been  in 
Bathurst' s  place  ? 

VOL.  II  —  2l 


614  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

cruisers.  But  when  we  are  considering  the  question 
whether  Bathurst  and  Lowe  were  needlessly  strict  or  not, 
the  point  at  issue  is  whether  plans  of  escape  or  rescue 
existed,  and  if  so,  whether  they  kneiv  of  them.  As  to  this 
there  cannot  be  the  shadow  of  doubt ;  and  it  is  practically 
certain  that  they  were  the  cause  of  the  new  regulations 
of  October  9th,  1816. 

We  have  now  traced  the  course  of  events  during  the 
first  critical  twelvemonth ;  we  have  seen  how  friction 
burst  into  a  flame,  how  the  chafing  of  that  masterful 
spirit  against  all  restraint  served  but  to  tighten  the  in- 
closing grasp,  and  how  the  attempts  of  his  misguided 
friends  in  America  and  Europe  changed  a  fairly  lax 
detention  into  actual  custody.  It  is  a  vain  thing  to  toy 
with  the  "  might-have-beens "  of  history  ;  but  we  can 
fancy  a  man  less  untamable  than  Napoleon  frankly 
recognizing  that  he  had  done  with  active  life  by  assum- 
ing a  feigned  name  (e.g.,  that  of  Colonel  Muiron,  which 
he  once  thought  of)  and  settling  down  in  that  equable 
retreat  to  the  congenial  task  of  compiling  his  personal  and 
military  Memoirs.  If  he  ever  intended  to  live  as  a  coun- 
try squire  in  England,  there  were  equal  facilities  for  such 
a  life  in  St.  Helena,  with  no  temptations  to  stray  back  into 
politics.  The  climate  was  better  for  him  than  that  of 
England,  and  the  possibilities  for  exercise  greater  than 
could  there  have  been  allowed.  Books  there  were  in 
abundance  —  2,700  of  them  at  last:  he  had  back  files  of 
the  "  Moniteur "  for  his  writings,  and  copies  of  "  The 
Times  "  came  regularly  from  Plantation  House  :  a  piano 
had  been  bought  in  England  for  £120.  Finally  there 
were  the  six  courtiers  whose  jealous  devotion,  varying 
moods,  and  frequent  quarrels  furnished  a  daily  comedietta 
that  still  charms  posterity. 

What  then  was  wanting?  Unfortunately  everything 
was  wanting.  He  cared  not  for  music,  or  animals,  or,  in 
recent  years,  for  the  chase.  He  himself  divulged  the 
secret,  in  words  uttered  to  Gallois  in  the  days  of  his 
power  :  "  Je  rCaime  pas  beaucoup  les  femmes,  ni  le  jeu  — 
enfin  rien :  je  suis  tout  a  fait  un  etre  politique."  —  He  never 
ceased  to  love  politics  and  power.  At  St.  Helena  he 
pictured   himself   as  winning  over  the   English,  had  he 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  515 

settled  there.  Ah  !  if  I  were  in  England,  he  said,  I 
should  have  conquered  all  hearts.1  And  assuredly  he 
would  have  done  so.  How  could  men  so  commonplace 
as  the  Prince  Regent,  Liverpool,  Castlereagh,  and  Bath- 
urst  have  made  head  against  the  influence  of  a  truly  great 
and  enthralling  personality  ?  Or  if  he  had  gone  to  the 
United  States,  who  would  have  competed  with  him  for 
the  Presidency  ? 

As  it  was,  he  chose  to  remain  indoors,  in  order  to  figure 
as  the  prisoner  of  Longwood,2  and  spent  his  time  between 
intrigues  against  Lowe  and  dictation  of  Memoirs.  On  the 
subject  of  Napoleon's  writings  we  cannot  here  enter,  save 
to  say  that  his  critiques  of  Caesar,  Turenne,  and  Frederick 
the  Great  are  of  great  interest  and  value  ;  that  the  records 
of  his  own  campaigns,  though  highly  suggestive,  need  to 
be  closely  checked  by  the  original  documents,  seeing  that 
he  had  not  all  the  needful  facts  and  figures  at  hand;  and 
that  his  record  of  political  events  is  in  the  main  untrust- 
worthy :  it  is  an  elaborate  device  for  enhancing  the  Napo- 
leonic tradition  and  assuring  the  crown  to  the  King  of 
Rome. 

We  turn,  then,  to  take  a  brief  glance  at  his  last  years. 
The  first  event  that  claims  notice  is  the  arrest  of  Las 
Cases.  This  subtle  intriguer  had  soon  earned  the  hatred 
of  Montholon  and  Gourgaud,  who  detested  "the  little 
Jesuit "  for  his  Malvolio-like  airs  of  importance  and  the 
hints  of  Napoleon  that  he  would  have  ceremonial  pre- 
cedence over  them.  His  rapid  rise  into  favour  was  due 
to  his  conversational  gifts,  literary  ability,  and  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  English  people  and  language.  This  last 
was  specially  important.  Napoleon  very  much  wished  to 
learn  our  language,  as  he  hoped  that  any  mail  might  bring 
news  of  the  triumph  of  the  Whigs  and  an  order  for  his 
own  departure  for  England.  His  studies  with  Las  Cases 
were  more  persevering  than  successful,  as  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  curious  letter,  written  apparently  in 
the  watches  of  the  night  :  it  has  been  recently  published 
by  M.  de  Brotonne. 

1  Gourgaud,  "Journal,"  vol.  L,  p.  105. 

3  He  said  to  Gourgaud  that  if  he  had  the  whole  island  for  exercise  he 
would  not  go  out  (Gourgaud's  "Journal,'1  vol.  ii.,  p.  299). 


516  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

"  Count  Lascases, 

"  Since  sixt  week  y  learn  the  English  and  y  do  not  any  progress. 
Sixt  week  do  fourty  and  two  day.  If  might  have  learn  fivty  word,  for 
day,  i  could  know  it  two  thousands  and  two  hundred.  It  is  in  the 
dictionary  more  of  fourty  thousand  :  even  he  could  most  twenty  ;  hot 
much  of  terns.  For  know  it  or  hundred  and  twenty  week,  which  do 
more  two  years.  After  this  you  shall  agree  that  the  study  one  tongue 
is  a  great  labour  who  it  must  do  into  the  young  aged." 

How  much  farther  Napoleon  progressed  in  his  efforts 
to  absorb  our  language  by  these  mathematical  methods 
we  do  not  know  ;  for  no  other  English  letter  of  his  seems 
to  be  extant.  The  arrest  and  departure  of  his  tutor  soon 
occurred,  and  there  are  good  grounds  for  assigning  this 
ultimately  to  the  jealousy  of  the  less  cultured  Generals. 
Thus,  we  find  Gourgaud  asserting  that  Las  Cases  has 
come  to  St.  Helena  solely  "  in  order  to  get  talked  about, 
write  anecdotes,  and  make  money."  Montholon  also  did 
his  best  to  render  the  secretary's  life  miserable,  and  on 
one  occasion  predicted  to  Gourgaud  that  Las  Cases  would 
soon  leave  the  island.1 

The  forecast  speedily  came  true.  The  secretary  in- 
trusted to  his  servant,  a  dubious  mulatto  named  Scott, 
two  letters  for  Europe  sewn  up  in  a  waistcoat  :  one  of 
them  was  a  long  letter  to  Lucien  Bonaparte.  The  ser- 
vant showed  the  letters  to  his  father,  who  in  some  alarm 
revealed  the  matter  to  the  Governor.  It  is  curious  as 
illustrating  the  state  of  suspicion  then  prevalent  at  St. 
Helena,  that  Las  Cases  accused  the  Scotts  of  being  tools 
of  the  Governor  ;  that  Lowe  saw  in  the  affair  the  frayed 
end  of  a  Longwood  scheme  ;  while  the  residents  there 
suspected  Las  Cases  of  arranging  matters  as  a  means  of 
departure  from  the  island.  There  was  much  to  justify 
this  last  surmise.  Las  Cases  and  his  son  were  unwell  ; 
their  position  in  the  household  was  very  uncomfortable  ; 
and  for  a  skilled  intriguer  to  intrust  an  important  letter 
to  a  slave,  who  was  already  in  the  Governor's  black  books, 
was   truly   a   singular    proceeding.       Besides,   after    the 

1  Gourgaud's  "Journal,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  262-270,  316.  Yet  Montholon 
("Captivity  of  Napoleon,"  vol.  i.,  ch.  xiii.)  afterwards  wrote  of  Las 
Cases'  departure  :  "  We  all  loved  the  well-informed  and  good  man,  whom 
we  had  pleasure  in  venerating  as  a  Mentor.  .  .  .  He  was  an  immense  loss 

tO  MS/" 


xlii  CLOSING   YEARS  517 

arrest,  when  the  Governor  searched  Las  Cases'  papers  in 
his  presence,  they  were  found  to  be  in  good  order,  among 
them  being  parts  of  his  "Journal."  Napoleon  himself 
thought  Las  Cases  guilty  of  a  piece  of  extraordinary  folly, 
though  he  soon  sought  to  make  capital  out  of  the  arrest 
by  comparing  the  behaviour  of  our  officers  and  their 
orderlies  with  "  South  Sea  savages  dancing  around  a  pris- 
oner that  they  are  about  to  devour." 1  After  a  short 
detention  at  Ross  Cottage,  when  he  declined  the  Governor  s 
offer  that  he  should  return  to  Longwood,  the  secretary  was 
sent  to  the  Cape,  and  thence  made  his  way  to  France, 
where  a  judicious  editing  of  his  "Memoirs"  and  "Journal" 
gained  for  their  compiler  a  rich  reward. 

Gourgaud  is  the  next  to  leave.  The  sensitive  young 
man  has  long  been  tormented  by  jealousy.  His  diary 
becomes  the  long-drawn  sigh  of  a  generous  but  vain 
nature,  when  soured  by  real  or  fancied  neglect.  Though 
often  unfair  to  Napoleon,  whose  egotism  the  slighted 
devotee  often  magnifies  into  colossal  proportions,  the 
writer  unconsciously  bears  witness  to  the  wondrous  fas- 
cination that  held  the  little  Court  in  awe.  The  least 
attention  shown  to  the  Montholons  costs  "  Gogo  "  a  fit  of 
spleen  or  a  sleepless  night,  scarcely  to  be  atoned  for  on 
the  morrow  by  soothing  words,  by  chess,  or  reversi,  or 
help  at  the  manuscript  of  "Waterloo."  Again  and  again 
Napoleon  tries  to  prove  to  him  that  the  Montholons  ought 
to  have  precedence  :  it  is  in  vain.  At  last  the  crisis 
comes  :  it  is  four  years  since  the  General  saved  the  Em- 
peror from  a  Cossack's  lance  at  Brienne,  and  the  recollec- 
tion renders  his  present  "  humiliations  "  intolerable.  He 
challenges  Montholon  to  a  duel  ;  Napoleon  strictly  for- 
bids it  ;  and  the  aggrieved  officer  seeks  permission  to 
depart. 

Napoleon  grants  his  request.  It  seems  that  the  chief 
is  weary  of  his  moody  humours  ;  he  further  owes  him  a 
grudge  for  writing  home  to  his  mother  frank  statements 
of  the  way  in  which    the    Longwood   exiles  are  treated. 

1  Gourgaud,  vol.  i.,  p.  278  ;  Forsyth,  vol.  i.,  pp.  381-.*J84,  vol.  ii.,  p.  74. 
Bonaparte  wanted  this  "Journal"  to  be  given  back  to  him:  but  Las 
Cases  would  not  hear  of  this,  as  it  contained  " sea  pensees."  It  was  kept 
under  seal  until  Napoleon's  death,  and  then  restored  to  the  compiler. 


518  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   1  chap 

These  letters  were  read  by  Lowe  and  Bathurst,  and  their 
general  purport  seems  to  have  been  known  in  French 
governmental  circles,  where  they  served  as  an  antidote  to 
the  poisonous  stories  circulated  by  Napoleon  and  his  more 
diplomatic  followers.  Clearly  nothing  is  to  be  made  of 
Gourgaud ;  and  so  he  departs  (February  13th,  1818). 
Bidding  a  tearful  adieu,  he  goes  with  Basil  Jackson  to 
spend  six  weeks  with  him  at  a  cottage  near  Plantation 
House,  when  he  is  astonished  at  the  delicate  reserve  shown 
by  the  Governor.  He  then  sets  sail  for  England.  The 
only  money  he  has  is  <£100  advanced  by  Lowe.  Napoleon's 
money  he  has  refused  to  accept.1 

And  yet  he  did  not  pass  out  of  his  master's  life.  Land- 
ing in  England  on  May  1st,  he  had  a  few  interviews  with 
our  officials,  in  which  he  warned  them  that  Napoleon's 
escape  would  be  quite  easy,  and  gave  a  hint  as  to  O'Meara 
being  the  tool  of  Napoleon.  But  soon  the  young  General 
came  into  touch  with  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition.  No 
change  in  his  sentiments  is  traceable  until  August  25th, 
when  he  indited  a  letter  to  Marie  Louise,  asserting  that 
Napoleon  was  dying  "  in  the  torments  of  the  longest  and 
most  frightful  agony,"  a  prey  to  the  cruelty  of  England! 
To  what  are  we  to  attribute  this  change  of  front  ?  The 
editors  of  Gourgaud's  "  Journal  "  maintain  that  there  was 
no  change  ;  they  hint  that  the  "  Journal  "  may  have  been 
an  elaborate  device  for  throwing  dust  into  Lowe's  eyes  ; 
and  they  point  to  the  fact  that  before  leaving  the  island 
Gourgaud  received  secret  instructions  from  Napoleon  bid- 
ding him  convey  to  Europe  several  small  letters  sewn  into 
the  soles  of  his  boots.  Whether  he  acted  on  these  instruc- 
tions may  be  doubted  ;  for  at  his  departure  he  gave  his 
word  of  honour  to  Lowe  that  he  was  not  the  bearer  of  any 
paper,  pamphlet,  or  letter  from  Longwood.  Furthermore, 
we  hear  nothing  of  these  secret  letters  afterwards  ;  and 
he  allowed  nearly  four  months  to  elapse  in  England  before 
he  wrote  to  Marie  Louise.  The  theory  referred  to  above 
seems  quite  untenable  in  face  of  these  facts.2 

How,  then,  are  we  to  explain  Gourgaud's  conduct  at 

1  Henry,  vol.  ii.,  p.  48 ;  B.  Jackson,  pp.  99-101  ;  quoted  by  Seaton, 
pp.  159-162. 

2  Forsyth,  vol.  iii.,  p.  40;  Gourgaud's  "Journal,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  531-537. 


xlii  CLOSING   YEARS  519 

St.  Helena  and  afterwards  ?  Now,  in  threading  the  men- 
dacious labyrinths  of  St.  Helena  literature  it  is  hard  ever 
to  find  a  wholly  satisfactory  clue  ;  but  Basil  Jackson's 
"  Waterloo  and  St.  Helena  "  (p.  103)  seems  to  supply  it 
in  the  following  passage  : 

"  To  finish  about  Gourgaud,  I  may  add  that  on  his  reaching  England, 
after  one  or  two  interviews  with  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  he  fell 
into  the  hands  of  certain  Radicals  of  note,  who  represented  to  him 
the  folly  of  his  conduct  in  turning  against  Napoleon ;  that,  as  his 
adherent,  he  was  really  somebody,  whereas  he  was  only  ruining  him- 
self by  appearing  inimical.  In  short,  they  so  worked  upon  the  poor 
weak  man,  that  he  was  induced  to  try  and  make  it  appear  that  he  was 
still  I'homme  de  VEmpereur;  this  he  did  by  inditing  a  letter  to  Marie 
Louise,  in  which  he  inveighed  against  the  treatment  of  Napoleon  at 
the  hands  of  the  Government  and  Sir  H.  Lowe,  which  being  duly 
published,  Gourgaud  fell  to  zero  in  the  opinion  of  all  right-minded 
persons." 

This  seems  consonant  with  what  we  know  of  Gour- 
gaud's  character  :  frank,  volatile,  and  sensitive,  he  could 
never  have  long  sustained  a  policy  of  literary  and  diplo- 
matic deceit.  He  was  not  a  compound  of  Chatterton  and 
Fouche.  His  "  Journal "  is  the  artless  outpouring  of 
wounded  vanity  and  brings  us  close  to  the  heart  of  the 
hero-worshipper  and  his  hero.  At  times  the  idol  falls 
and  is  shivered,  but  love  places  it  on  the  shrine  again  and 
again,  until  the  fourth  anniversary  of  Brienne  finds  the 
spell  broken.  Even  before  he  leaves  St.  Helena  the  old 
fascination  is  upon  him  once  more  ;  and  then  Napoleon 
seeks  to  utilize  his  devotion  for  the  purpose  of  a  political 
mission.  Gourgaud  declines  the  role  of  agent,  pledges 
his  word  to  the  Governor,  and  keeps  it ;  but,  thanks  to 
British  officialism  or  the  seductions  of  the  Opposition, 
hero-worship  once  more  gains  the  day  and  enrolls  him 
beside  Las  Cases  and  Montholon.  This  we  believe  to  be 
the  real  Gourgaud,  a  genuine,  lovable,  but  flighty  being, 
as  ever}r  page  of  his  "  Journal "  shows. 

One  cannot  but  notice  in  passing  the  extraordinary 
richness  of  St.  Helena  literature.  Nearly  all  the  exiles 
kept  diaries  or  memoirs,  or  wrote  them  when  they  returned 
to  Europe.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  of  all  the  10,000 
Britons  whom  Napoleon  detained  in  France  for  eleven 
years,  not  one  has  left  a  record  that  is  ever  read  to-day. 


520  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

<  'onsequently,  while  the  woes  of  Napoleon  have  been  set 
forth  in  every  civilized  tongue,  the  world  has  forgotten 
the  miseries  causelessly  inflicted  on  10,000  English  families. 
The  advantages  possessed  by  a  memoir-writing  nation  over 
one  that  is  but  half  articulate  could  not  be  better  illus- 
trated. For  the  dumb  Britons  not  a  single  tear  is  ever 
shed  ;  whereas  the  voluble  inmates  of  Longwood  used  their 
pens  to  such  effect  that  half  the  world  still  believes  them 
to  have  been  bullied  twice  a  week  by  Lowe,  plied  with  gifts 
of  poisoned  coffee,  and  nearly  eaten  up  by  rats  at  night. 
On  this  last  topic  we  are  treated  to  tales  of  part  of  a 
slave's  leg  being  eaten  off  while  he  slept  at  Longwood  — 
nay,  of  a  horse's  leg  being  also  gnawed  away  at  night  — 
so  that  our  feelings  are  divided  between  pity  for  the 
sufferers  and  envy  at  the  soundness  of  their  slumbers. 

Longwood  was  certainly  far  from  being  a  suitable  abode  ; 
but  a  word  from  Napoleon  would  have  led  to  the  erection 
of  the  new  house  on  a  site  that  he  chose  to  indicate.  The 
materials  had  all  been  brought  from  England;  but  the 
word  was  not  spoken  until  a  much  later  time  ;  and  the 
inference  is  inevitable  that  he  preferred  to  remain  where 
he  was  so  that  he  could  represent  himself  as  lodged  in 
cette  grange  insalubre.1 

The  third  of  the  Longwood  household  to  depart  was 
the  surgeon,  O'Meara.  The  conduct  of  this  British 
officer  in  facilitating  Napoleon's  secret  correspondence 
has  been  so  fully  exposed  by  Forsyth  and  Seaton  that 
we  may  refer  our  readers  to  their  works  for  proofs  of  his 
treachery.  Gourgaud's  "  Journal "  reveals  the  secret  in- 
fluence that  seduced  him.  Chancing  once  to  refer  to  the 
power  of  money  over  Englishmen,  Napoleon  remarked 
that  that  was  why  we  did  not  want  him  to  draw  sums 
from  Europe,  and  continued  :  "£e  docteur  riest  n  Men 
pour  mot  que  depuis  que  je  lui  donne  mon  argent.  Ah  f  fen 
suis  Men  sur,  de  celui-ld  !  "  2     This  disclosure  enables  us  to 

1 "  Apostille"  of  April  27th,  1818.  As  to  the  new  house,  see  Forsyth, 
vol.  i.,  pp.  212,  270  ;  vol.  Hi.,  pp.  51,  257  ;  it  was  ready  when  Napoleon's 
illness  became  severe  (Jan.,  1821). 

If  the  plague  of  rats  was  really  very  bad,  why  is  it  that  Gourgaud 
made  so  little  of  it  ? 

2  "Journal"  of  Oct.  4th,  1817.  On  the  return  voyage  to  England 
Mme.  Bertrand  told  Surgeon  Henry  that  secret    letters   had  constantly 


XLII 


CLOSING   YEARS  521 


understand  why  the  surgeon,  after  being  found  out  and 
dismissed  from  the  service,  sought  to  blacken  the  char- 
acter of  Sir  Hudson  Lowe  by  every  conceivable  device. 
The  wonder  is  that  he  succeeded  in  imposing  his  version 
of  facts  on  a  whole  generation. 

The  next  physician  who  resided  at  Longwood,  Dr. 
Stokoe,  was  speedily  cajoled  into  disobeying  the  British 
regulations  and  underwent  official  disgrace.  An  attempt 
was  then  made,  through  Montholon,  to  bribe  his  successor, 
Dr.  Verling,  who  indignantly  repelled  it  and  withdrew 
from  his  duty.1 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Napoleon  found  pleasure  in 
these  intrigues.  In  his  last  interview  with  Sturmer,  the 
Austrian  Commissioner  at  St.  Helena,  Gourgaud  said,  in 
reference  to  this  topic  :  "  However  unhappy  he  [Napoleon] 
is  here,  he  secretly  enjoys  the  importance  attached  to  his 
custody,  the  interest  that  the  Powers  take  in  it,  and  the 
care  taken  to  collect  his  least  words."  Napoleon  also  once 
remarked  to  Gourgaud  that  it  was  better  to  be  at  St. 
Helena  than  as  he  was  at  Elba.2  Of  the  same  general 
tenour  are  his  striking  remarks,  reported  by  Las  Cases  at 
the  close  of  his  first  volume  : 

"  Our  situation  here  may  even  have  its  attractions.  The  universe 
is  looking  at  us.  We  remain  the  martyrs  of  an  immortal  cause : 
millions  of  men  weep  for  us,  the  fatherland  sighs,  and  Glory  is  in 
mourning.  We  struggle  here  against  the  oppression  of  the  gods,  and 
the  longings  of  the  nations  are  for  us.  .  .  .  Adversity  was  wanting  to 
my  career.  If  1  had  died  on  the  throne  amidst  the  clouds  of  my 
omnipotence,  I  should  have  remained  a  problem  for  many  men :  to- 
day, thanks  to  misfortune,  they  can  judge  of  me  naked  as  I  am." 

In  terseness  of  phrase,  vividness  of  fancy,  and  keenness 
of  insight  into  the  motives  that  sway  mankind,  this 
passage  is  worthy  of  Napoleon.  He  knew  that  his  exile 
at  St.  Helena  would  dull  the  memory  of  the  wrongs  which 
he  had  done  to  the  cause  of  liberty,  and  that  from  that 
lonely  peak  would  go  forth  the  legend  of  the  new  Prome- 
theus chained  to  the  rock  by  the  kings  and  torn  every 

passed  between  Longwood  and  England,  through  two  military  officers ; 
but  the  passage  above  quoted  shows  who  was  the  culprit. 

i  Forsyth,  vol.  Hi.,  pp.  153,  178-181. 

2  Stunner's  "  Report"  of  March  14th,  1818  ;  Gourgaud's  "Journal  " 
of  Sept.  11th  and  14th,  1817. 


522  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

day  by  the  ravening  vulture.  The  world  had  rejected 
his  gospel  of  force  ;  but  would  it  not  thrill  responsive  to 
the  gospel  of  pity  now  to  be  enlisted  in  his  behalf  ?  His 
surmise  was  amazingly  true.  The  world  was  thrilled. 
The  story  worked  wonders,  not  directly  for  him,  but  for 
his  fame  and  his  dynasty.  The  fortunes  of  his  race  began 
to  revive  from  the  time  when  the  popular  imagination 
transfigured  Napoleon  the  Conqueror  into  Napoleon  the 
Martyr.  Viewed  in  this  light,  and  thrown  up  into  telling 
relief  against  the  sinister  policy  of  the  Holy  Alliance  of 
the  monarchs,  the  dreary  years  spent  at  St.  Helena  were 
not  the  least  successful  of  his  career.  Without  them 
there  could  have  been  no  second  Napoleonic  Empire. 

Not  that  his  life  there  was  a  "long-drawn  agony."  His 
health  was  fairly  good.  There  were  seasons  of  something 
like  enjoyment,  when  he  gave  himself  up  to  outdoor 
recreations.  Such  a  time  was  the  latter  part  of  1819  and 
the  first  half  of  1820  :  we  may  call  it  the  Indian  summer 
of  his  life,  for  he  was  then  possessed  with  a  passion  for 
gardening.  Lightly  clad  and  protected  by  a  broad- 
brimmed  hat,  he  went  about,  sometimes  spade  in  hand, 
superintending  various  changes  in  the  grounds  at  Long- 
wood  and  around  the  new  house  which  was  being 
erected  for  him  hard  by.  Or  at  other  times  he  used  the 
opportunity  afforded  by  the  excavations  to  show  how 
infantry  might  be  so  disposed  on  a  hastily  raised  slope 
as  to  bring  a  terrific  fire  to  bear  on  attacking  cavalry. 
Marshalling  his  followers  at  dawn  by  the  sound  of  a  bell, 
he  made  them  all,  counts,  valets,  and  servants,  dig  trenches 
as  if  for  the  front  ranks,  and  throw  up  the  earth  for  the 
rear  ranks  :  then,  taking  his  stand  in  front,  as  the  shortest 
man,  and  placing  the  tallest  at  the  rear  (his  Swiss  valet, 
Noverraz),  he  triumphantly  showed  how  the  horsemen 
might  be  laid  low  by  the  rolling  volleys  of  ten  ranks.1 
In  May  or  June  he  took  once  more  to  horse  exercise,  and 
for  a  time  his  health  benefited  from  all  this  activity.  His 
relations  with  the  Governor  were  peaceful,  if  not  cordial, 
and  the  limits  were  about  this  time  extended. 

Indoors  there  were  recreations  other  than  work  at  the 

1  Described  by  Bertrand  to  Lowe  on  May  12th,  1821  ("St.  Helena 
Records,"  No.  32.) 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  523 

Memoirs.  He  often  played  chess  and  billiards,  at  the 
latter  using  his  hand- instead  of  the  cue  !  Dinner  was 
generally  at  a  very  late  hour,  and  afterwards  he  took 
pleasure  in  reading  aloud.  Voltaire  was  the  favourite 
author,  and  Montholon  afterwards  confessed  to  Lord 
Holland  that  the  same  plays,  especially  "  Zaire,"  were 
read  rather  too  often. 

"  Napoleon  slept  himself  when  read  to,  but  he  was  very  observant  and 
jealous  if  others  slept  while  he  read.  He  watched  his  audience  vigi- 
lantly, and  '  Mine.  Montholon,  vous  dormez '  was  a  frequent  ejaculation 
in  the  course  of  reading.  He  was  animated  with  all  that  he  read, 
especially  poetry,  enthusiastic  at  beautiful  passages,  impatient  of  faults, 
and  full  of  ingenious  and  lively  remarks  on  style." 1 

During  this  same  halcyon  season  two  priests,  who  had 
been  selected  by  the  Bonapartes,  arrived  in  the  island,  as 
also  a  Corsican  doctor,  Antommarchi.  Napoleon  was  dis- 
appointed with  all  three.  The  doctor,  though  a  learned 
anatomist,  knew  little  of  chemistry,  and  at  an  early  inter- 
view with  Napoleon  passed  a  catechism  on  this  subject  so 
badly  that  he  was  all  but  chased  from  the  room.  The 
priests  came  off  little  better.  The  elder  of  them,  Buona- 
vita  by  name,  had  lived  in  Mexico,  and  could  talk  of 
little  else  :  he  soon  fell  ill,  and  his  stay  in  St.  Helena  was 
short.  The  other,  a  Corsican  named  Vignali,  having 
neither  learning,  culture,  nor  dialectical  skill,  was  tolerated 
as  a  respectable  adjunct  to  the  household,  but  had  little  or 
no  influence  over  the  master.  This  is  to  be  regretted  on 
many  grounds,  and  partly  because  his  testimony  throws 
no  light  on  Napoleon's  religious  views. 

Here  we  approach  a  problem  that  perhaps  can  never 
be  cleared  up.  Unfathomable  on  many  sides  of  his  nature, 
Napoleon  is  nowhere  more  so  than  when  he  confronts  tin* 
eternal  verities.  That  he  was  a  convinced  and  orthodox 
Catholic  few  will  venture  to  assert.  At  Elba  he  said  to 
Lord  Ebrington  :  "  Nous  ne  savons  (Toil  nous  venons,  ee  que 
nous  deviendrons  "  :  the  masses  ought  to  have  some  "  fixed 
point  of  faith  whereon  to  rest  their  thoughts." —  uJe  suis 
Catholique  parce  que  mon  pere  VStoiU  et  parce  que  cStoit  la 
religion  de  la  France."  He  also  once  or  twice  expressed 
to  Campbell  scorn  of  the  popular  creed :  and  during  his 
i  Lord  Holland,  "  Foreign  Reminiscences,"  p.  305. 


524  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON  I  chap. 

last  voyage,  as  we  have  seen,  he  showed  not  the  slightest 
interest  in  the  offer  of  a  priest  at  Funchal  to  accompany 
him.  At  St.  Helena  the  party  seems  to  have  limited  the 
observances  of  religion  to  occasional  reading  of  the  Bible. 
When  Mine.  Montholon  presented  her  babe  to  the  Em- 
peror, he  teasingly  remarked  that  Las  Cases  was  the  most 
suitable  person  to  christen  the  infant ;  to  which  the  mother 
at  once  replied  that  Las  Cases  was  not  a  good  enough 
Christian  for  that. 

Judging  from  the  entries  in  Gourgaud's  "  Journal,"  this 
young  General  pondered  more  than  the  rest  on  religious 
questions  ;  and  to  him  Napoleon  unbosomed  his  thoughts. 
—  Matter,  he  says,  is  everywhere  and  pervades  every- 
thing ;  life,  thought,  and  the  soul  itself  are  but  properties 
of  matter,  and  death  ends  all.  When  Gourgaud  points 
to  the  majestic  order  of  the  universe  as  bearing  witness 
to  a  Creator,  Napoleon  admits  that  he  believes  in  "  superior 
intelligences  "  :  he  avers  that  he  would  believe  in  Chris- 
tianity if  it  had  been  the  original  and  universal  creed: 
but  then  the  Mohammedans  "  follow  a  religion  simpler 
and  more  adapted  to  their  morality  than  ours."  In  ten 
years  their  founder  conquered  half  the  world,  which 
Christianity  took  three  hundred  years  to  accomplish.  Or 
again,  he  refers  to  the  fact  that  Laplace,  Monge,  Berthollet, 
and  Lagrange  were  all  atheists,  though  they  did  not  pro- 
claim the  fact  ;  as  for  himself,  he  finds  the  idea  of  God  to 
be  natural  ;  it  has  existed  at  all  times  and  among  all 
peoples.  But  once  or  twice  he  ends  this  vague  talk  with 
the  remarkable  confession  that  the  sight  of  myriad  deaths 
in  war  has  made  him  a  materialist.  "  Matter  is  every- 
thing." —  "  Vanity  of  vanities  !  "  * 

Mirrored  as  these  dialogues  are  in  the  eddies  of  Gour- 
gaud's moods,  they  may  tinge  his  master's  theology  with 
too  much  of  gloom  :  but,  after  all,  they  are  by  far  the 
most  lifelike  record  of  Napoleon's  later  years,  and  they 
show  us  a  nature  dominated  by  the  tangible.  As  for 
belief  in  the  divine  Christ,  there  seems  not  a  trace.  A 
report  has  come  clown  to  us,  enshrined  in  Newman's  prose, 

1  Gourgaud,  vol.  i.,  pp.  297,  540,  546 ;  vol.  ii.,  pp.  78,  130,  409,  425. 
See  Las  Cases,  "Memorial,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  124,  for  Napoleon's  defence  of 
polygamy. 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  525 

that  Napoleon  once  discoursed  of  the  ineffable  greatness  of 
Christ,  contrasting  His  enduring  hold  on  the  hearts  of  men 
with  the1  evanescent  rule  of  Alexander  and  Cflesar.  One 
hopes  that  the  words  were  uttered ;  but  they  conflict  with 
Napoleon's  undoubted  statements.  Sometimes  he  spoke 
in  utter  uncertainty  ;  at  others,  as  one  who  wished  to  be- 
lieve in  Christianity  and  might  perhaps  be  converted. 
But  in  the  political  testament  designed  for  his  son,  the 
only  reference  to  religion  is  of  the  diplomatic  description 
that  we  should  expect  from  the  author  of  the  "  Concor- 
dat "  :  "  Religious  ideas  have  more  influence  than  certain 
narrow-minded  philosophers  are  willing  to  believe  :  they 
are  capable  of  rendering  great  services  to  Humanity.  By 
standing  well  with  the  Pope,  an  influence  is  still  main- 
tained over  the  consciences  of  a  hundred  millions  of  men." 

Equally  vague  was  Napoleon's  own  behaviour  as  his  end 
drew  nigh.  For  some  time  past  a  sharp  internal  pain  — 
the  stab  of  a  penknife,  he  called  it  —  had  warned  him  of 
his  doom  ;  in  April,  1821,  when  vomiting  and  prostration 
showed  that  the  dread  ancestral  malady  was  drawing  on 
apace,  he  bade  the  Abbe  Vignali  prepare  the  large  dining- 
room  of  Longwood  as  a  chapelle  ardente ;  and,  observing 
a  smile  on  Antommarchi's  face,  the  sick  man  hotly  rebuked 
his  affectation  of  superiority.  Montholon,  on  his  return 
to  England,  informed  Lord  Holland  that  extreme  unction 
was  administered  before  the  end  came,  Napoleon  having 
ordered  that  this  should  be  done  as  if  solely  on  Montho- 
lon's  responsibility,  and  that  the  priest,  when  questioned 
on  the  subject,  was  to  reply  that  he  had  acted  on  Mon- 
tholon's  orders,  without  having  any  knowledge  of  the 
Emperor's  wishes.  It  was  accordingly  administered,  but 
apparently  he  was  insensible  at  the  time.1  In  his  will, 
also,  he  declared  that  he  died  in  communion  with  the 
Apostolical  Roman  Church,  in  whose  bosom  he  was  born. 
There,  then,  we  must  leave  this  question,  shrouded  in  the 
mystery  that  hangs  around  so  much  of  his  life. 

The  decease  of  a  great  man  is  always  affecting  :  but  the 
death  of  the  hero  who  had  soared  to  the  zenith  of  military 
glory  and  civic  achievement  seems  to  touch  the  very  nadir 

1  Lord  Holland's  "Foreign  Reminiscences,"  p.  316;  Colonel  Gorre- 
quer's  report  in  "  Cornhill  "  of  Feb.,  1901. 


526  THE   LIFE   OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

of  calamity.  Outliving  his  mighty  Empire,  girt  around 
by  a  thousand  miles  of  imprisoning  ocean,  guarded  by  his 
most  steadfast  enemies,  his  son  a  captive  at  the  Court  of 
the  Hapsburgs,  and  his  Empress  openly  faithless,  he  sinks 
from  sight  like  some  battered  derelict.  And  Nature  is 
more  pitiless  than  man.  The  Governor  urges  on  him  the 
best  medical  advice  :  but  he  will  have  none  of  it.  He 
feels  the  grip  of  cancer,  the  disease  which  had  carried  off 
his  father  and  was  to  claim  the  gay  Caroline  and  Pauline. 
At  times  he  surmises  the  truth  :  at  others  he  calls  out 
"  le  foie"  "  le  foie"  O'Meara  had  alleged  that  his  pains 
were  due  to  a  liver  complaint  brought  on  by  his  detention 
at  St.  Helena  ;  Antommarchi  described  the  illness  as  gas- 
tric fever  (febbre  gastrica  pituitosd)  ;  and  not  until  Dr. 
Arnott  was  called  in  on  the  1st  of  April  was  the  truth 
fully  recognized. 

At  the  close  of  the  month  the  symptoms  became  most 
distressing,  aggravated  as  they  were  by  the  refusal  of  the 
patient  to  take  medicine  or  food,  or  to  let  himself  be 
moved.  On  May  4th,  at  Dr.  Arnott's  insistence,  some 
calomel  was  secretly  administered  and  with  beneficial 
results,  the  patient  sleeping  and  even  taking  some  food. 
This  was  his  last  rally  :  on  the  morrow,  while  a  storm  was 
sweeping  over  the  island,  and  tearing  up  large  trees,  his 
senses  began  to  fail :  Montholon  thought  he  heard  the 
words  France,  armie,  tete  a"  armie,  JosSphine :  he  lingered 
on  insensible  for  some  hours  :  the  storm  died  down  :  the 
sun  bathed  the  island  in  a  flood  of  glory,  and,  as  it  dipped 
into  the  ocean,  the  great  man  passed  away. 

By  the  Governor's  orders  Dr.  Arnott  remained  in  the 
room  until  the  body  could  be  medically  examined  —  a 
precaution  which,  as  Montchenu  pointed  out,  would  pre- 
vent any  malicious  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Longwood 
servants  to  cause  death  to  appear  as  the  result  of  poison- 
ing. The  examination,  conducted  in  the  presence  of  seven 
medical  men  and  others,  proved  that  all  the  organs  were 
sound  except  the  ulcerated  stomach  ;  the  liver  was  rather 
large,  but  showed  no  signs  of  disease  ;  the  heart,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  rather  under  the  normal  size.  Far  from 
showing  the  emaciation  that  usually  results  from  prolonged 
inability  to  take  food,  the  body  was  remarkably  stout  — 


xlii  CLOSING  YEARS  627 

a  fact  which  shows  that  that  tenacious  will  had  its  roots 
in  an  abnormally  firm  vitality.1  After  being  embalmed, 
the  body  was  laid  out  in  state,  and  all  beholders  were 
struck  with  the  serene  and  beautiful  expression  of  the 
face  :  the  superfluous  flesh  sank  away  after  death,  leaving 
the  well-proportioned  features  that  moved  the  admiration 
of  men  during  the  Consulate. 

Clad  in  his  favourite  green  uniform,  he  fared  forth  to 
his  resting-place  under  two  large  weeping  willow  trees  in 
a  secluded  valley  :  the  coffin,  surmounted  by  his  sword 
and  the  cloak  he  had  worn  at  Marengo,  was  borne  with 
full  military  honours  by  grenadiers  of  the  20th  and  66th 
Regiments  before  a  long  line  of  red-coats  ;  and  their 
banners,  emblazoned  with  the  names  of  "Talavera," 
"  Albuera,"  "  Pyrenees,"  and  "  Orthez,"  were  lowered  in 
a  last  salute  to  our  mighty  foe.  Salvos  of  artillery  and 
musketry  were  fired  over  the  grave  :  the  echoes  rattled 
upwards  from  ridge  to  ridge  and  leaped  from  the  splintery 
peaks  far  into  the  wastes  of  ocean  to  warn  the  world 
beyond  that  the  greatest  warrior  and  administrator  of  all 
the  ages  had  sunk  to  rest. 

His  ashes  were  not  to  remain  in  that  desolate  nook  :  in 
a  clause  of  his  will  he  expressed  the  desire  that  they  should 
rest  by  the  banks  of  the  Seine  among  the  people  he  had 
loved  so  well.  In  1840  they  were  disinterred  in  presence 
of  Bertrand,  Gourgaud,  and  Marchand,  and  borne  to 
France.  Paris  opened  her  arms  to  receive  the  mighty 
dead  ;  and  Louis  Philippe,  on  whom  he  had  once  prophe- 

1  "  Colonial  Office  Records,."  St.  Helena,  No.  32  ;  Henry,  "  Events  of 
a  Military  Life,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  80-84  :  he  also  states  that  Antominarchi, 
when  about  to  sign  the  report  agreed  on  by  the  English  doctors,  was  called 
aside  by  Bertrand  and  Montholon,  and  thei-eafter  declined  to  sign  it:  An- 
tommarchi  afterwards  issued  one  of  his  own,  laying  stress  on  cancer  and 
enlarged  liver,  thus  keeping  up  O'Meara's  theory  that  the  illness  was  due 
to  the  climate  of  St.  Helena  and  want  of  exercise.  In  our  records  is  a  let- 
ter of  Montholon  to  his  wife  of  May  6th,  1821,  which  admits  the  contrary  : 
"  C'est  dans  notre  malheur  une  grande  consolation  pour  nous  d'avoil  ac- 
quis la  preuve  que  sa  mort  n'est,  et  n'a  pu  §tre,  en  aucune  maniere  le 
r^sultat  de  sa  captivity."  Yet,  on  his  return  to  Europe,  Montholon 
stoutly  maintained  that  the  liver  complaint  endemic  to  St.  Helena  had 
been  the  death  of  his  master.  It  is,  however,  noteworthy  that  on  his 
deatii-bed  Napoleon  urged  Bertrand  to  be  reconciled  to  Lowe.  He  and 
Montholon  accordingly  went  to  Plantation  House,  where,  according  to  all 
'ppearance,  the  dead  past  was  buried. 


528  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON   I  chap. 

sied  that  the  crown  of  France  would  one  day  rest,  re- 
ceived the  coffin  in  state  under  the  dome  of  the  Invalided. 
There  he  reposes,  among  the  devoted  people  whom  by  his 
superhuman  genius  he  raised  to  bewildering  heights  of 
glory,  only  to  dash  them  to  the  depths  of  disaster  by  his 
monstrous  errors. 

Viewing  his  career  as  a  whole,  it  seems  just  and  fair  to 
assert  that  the  fundamental  cause  of  his  overthrow  is  to 
be  found,  not  in  the  failings  of  the  French,  for  they 
served  him  with  a  fidelity  that  would  wring  tears  of  pity 
from  Rhadamanthus  ;  not  in  the  treachery  of  this  or  that 
general  or  politician,  for  that  is  little  when  set  against  the 
loyalty  of  forty  millions  of  men  ;  but  in  the  character  of 
the  man  and  of  his  age.  Never  had  mortal  man  so  grand 
an  opportunity  of  ruling  over  a  chaotic  Continent  :  never 
had  any  great  leader  antagonists  so  feeble  as  the  rulers 
who  opposed  his  rush  to  supremacy.  At  the  dawn  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  old  monarchies  were  effete  : 
insanity  reigned  in  four  dynasties,  and  weak  or  time-serv- 
ing counsels  swayed  the  remainder.  For  several  years 
their  counsellors  and  generals  were  little  better.  With 
the  exception  of  Pitt  and  Nelson,  who  were  carried  off  by 
death,  and  of  Wellington,  who  had  but  half  an  army, 
Napoleon  never  came  face  to  face  with  thoroughly  able, 
well-equipped,  and  stubborn  opponents  until  the  year  1812. 

It  seems  a  paradox  to  say  that  his  excess  of  good  for- 
tune largely  contributed  to  his  ruin  :  yet  it  is  true.  His 
was  one  of  those  thick-set  combative  natures  that  need 
timely  restraint  if  their  best  qualities  are  to  be  nurtured 
and  their  domineering  instincts  curbed.  Just  as  the 
strongest  Ministry  prances  on  to  ruin  if  the  Opposition 
gives  no  effective  check,  so  it  was  with  Napoleon.  Had 
he  in  his  early  manhood  taken  to  heart  the  lessons  of 
adversity,  would  he  have  ventured  at  the  same  time  to 
fight  Wellington  in  Spain  and  the  Russian  climate  in  the 
heart  of  the  steppes  ?  Would  he  have  spurned  the  offers 
of  an  advantageous  peace  made  to  him  from  Prague  in 
1813  ?  Would  he  have  let  slip  the  chance  of  keeping  the 
"  natural  frontiers  "  of  France  after  Leipzig,  and  her  old 
boundaries  when  brought  to  bay  in  Champagne ?     Would 


xlii  CLOSING   YEARS  529 

he  have  dared  the  uttermost  at  all  points  at  Waterloo  ? 
In  truth,  after  his  fortieth  year  was  past,  the  fervid  ener- 
gies of  youth  hardened  in  the  mould  of  triumph  ;  and 
thence  came  that  fatal  obstinacy  which  was  his  bane  at  all 
those  crises  of  his  career.  For  in  the  meantime  the  cause 
of  European  independence  had  found  worthy  champions  — 
smaller  men  than  Napoleon,  it  is  true,  but  men  who  knew 
that  his  determination  to  hold  out  everywhere  and  yield 
nothing  must  work  his  ruin.  Finally,  the  same  clinging 
to  unreal  hopes  and  'the  same  love  of  fight  characterized 
his  life  in  St.  Helena  ;  so  that  what  might  have  been  a 
time  of  calm  and  dignified  repose  was  marred  by  fictitious 
clamours  and  petty  intrigues  altogether  unworthy  of  his 
greatness. 

For,  in  spite  of  his  prodigious  failure,  he  was  super- 
latively great  in  all  that  pertains  to  government,  the 
quickening  of  human  energies,  and  the  art  of  war.  His 
greatness  lies,  not  only  in  the  abiding  importance  of  his 
best  undertakings,  but  still  more  in  the  Titanic  force  that 
he  threw  into  the  inception  and  accomplishment  of  all  of 
them -t- a  force  which  invests  the  storm-blasted  monoliths 
strewn  along  the  latter  portion  of  his  career  with  a  majesty 
unapproachable  by  a  tamer  race  of  toilers.  After  all,  the 
verdict  of  mankind  awards  the  highest  distinction,  not  to 
prudent  mediocrity  that  shuns  the  chance  of  failure  and 
leaves  no  lasting  mark  behind,  but  to  the  eager  soul  that 
grandly  dares,  mightily  achieves,  and  holds  the  hearts  of 
millions  even  amidst  his  ruin  and  theirs.  Such  a  wonder- 
worker was  Napoleon.  JThejuan  who  bridled  the  Revolu- 
tion and  remoulded  the  life  of  France,  who  laid  broad  and 
deep  the  foundations  of  a  new  life  in  Italy,  Switzerland, 
and  Germany,  who  rolled  the  West  in  on  the  East  in  the 
greatest  movement  known  since  the  Crusades,  and  finally 
drew  the  yearning  thoughts  of  myriads  to  that  solitary 
rock  in  the  South  Atlantic,  must  ever  stand  in  the  very 
forefront  of  the  immortals  of  human  story. 


VOL.  II — 2  m 


APPENDIX  I 

LIST  OF  THE  CHIEF  APPOINTMENTS  AND  DIGNITIES 
BESTOWED   BY  NAPOLEON 

[An  asterisk  is  affixed  to  the  ?iames  of  his  Marshals.] 

Arrighi.     Due  de  Padua. 
*Augereau.     Due  de  Castiglione. 
*Bernadotte.     Prince  de  Ponte  Corvo. 
♦Berthier.      Chief  of  the  Staff.     Prince  de  Neufchatel.     Prince  de 

Wagram. 
*Bessieres.     Due  d'Istria.     Commander  of  the  Old  Guard. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph.     (King  of  Naples.)     King  of  Spain. 
"  Louis.     King  of  Holland. 

"  Jerome.     King  of  Westphalia. 

*Brune. 

Cambaceres.     Arch-Chancellor.     Due  de  Parma. 

Caulaincourt.     Due  de  Vicenza.     Master  of  the  Horse.     Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  (1814). 

Champagny.     Due  de  Cadore.     Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  (1807- 
1811). 

Chaptal.     Minister  of  the  Interior.     Comte  de  Chanteloupe. 

Clarke.     Minister  of  War.*    Due  de  Feltre. 

Daru.     Comte. 
*Davoust.     Due  d'Auerstadt.     Prince  d'Eckmiihl. 

Drouet.     Comte  d'Erlon. 

Drouot.     Comte.     Aide-Major  of  the  Guard. 

Duroc.     Grand  Mai'shal  of  the  Palace.     Due  de  Friuli. 

Eugene  (Beauharnais).     Mceroy  of  Italy. 

Fesch  (Cardinal).     Grand  Almoner. 

Fouche.     Minister  of  Police  (1804-10).     Due  d'Otranto. 
♦Grouchy.     Comte. 

Jomini.     Baron. 
*Jourdan.     Comte. 

Junot.     Due  d'Abrantes. 
*Kellermann.     Due  de  Valmy. 
*Lannes.     Due  de  Montebello. 

Larrey.     Baron. 

Latour-Maubourg.     Baron. 

Lauriston.     Comte. 

Lavalette.     Comte.     Minister  of  Posts. 

531 


532  THE   LIFE   OF   NAPOLEON   I 

*Lefebvre.     Due  de  Danzig. 
*Macdonald.     Due  de  Taranto. 

Maret.     Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  (1811-14).     Due  de  Bassano. 
*Marmont.     Due  de  Ragusa. 
*Masseua.     (Due  de  Kivoli.)     Prince  d'Essling. 

Miot.     Comte  de  Melito. 

Meneval.     Baron. 

Mollien.     Comte.    Minister  of  the  Treasury. 
♦Moncey.     Due  de  Conegliano. 

Montholon.     Comte. 
*Mortier.     Due  de  Treviso. 

Mouton.     Comte  de  Lobau. 
*Murat.     (Grand  Due  de  Berg.)     King  of  Naples. 
*Ney.     (Due  d'Elchingen.)     Prince  de  la  Moskwa. 
*Oudinot.     Due  de  Reggio. 

Pajol.     Baron. 

Pasquier,  Due  de.     Prefect  of  Police. 
*Perignon. 
*Poniatowski. 

Rapp.     Comte. 

Reynier.     Due  de  Massa. 

Remusat.     Chamberlain. 

Savary.     Due  de  Rovigo.     Minister  of  Police  (1810-14). 

Sebastiani.     Comte. 
*Serurier. 

*Soult.     Due  de  Dalmatia. 
*St.  Cyr,  Marquis  de. 
*Suchet.     Due  d'Albufera. 

Talleyrand.    Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  (1799-1807).    Grand  Cham 
berlain  (1804-8).     Prince  de  Benevento. 

Vandamme.     Comte. 
♦Victor.     Due  de  Belluno. 


INDEX    ' 


Abdication,  the  Second,  ii.  475. 

Abell,  Mrs.,  ii.  499  n. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  ii.  332  n.,  340  n.,  341, 
343,  344-345,  359,  377. 

Aboukir,  i.  176,  184. 

Aboukir,  battle  of,  i.  195. 

Abrantes,  Duchesse  d',  i.  394. 

Acre,  i.  184,  188-192,  381. 

Acton,  Gen.,  i.  401. 

Adams,  Gen.,  ii.  462,  469. 

Adda  River,  i.  84. 

Addington,  i.  286,  296,  372,  387-394, 
418. 

Additional  Act,  the,  ii.  414-415. 

Adige,  i.  92,  98,  112,  113,  114,  120; 
River,  i.  243. 

Adye,  Capt.,  ii.  406. 

Ajaccio,  i.  4-6, 11,  27-29,  31,  33,  35-37, 
197. 

Alessandria,  i.  80,  230-237,  239. 

Alexander  I.,  i.  314. 

Alexander,  Czar,  i.  242,  308,  312-314, 
358-359,  366,  375-378,  387-393,  397- 
399;  ii.  1-3,  5-10,  19,  26-28,  30-33, 
38,  53,  58,  75,  76,  80,  83,  100,  101, 
105-107,  115-121,  124-126,  133-134, 
161,  164-168,  170-171,  186,  189-191, 
193,  211,  213-218,  222-224,  238-239, 
252-254,  262,  267,  273-274,  291-293, 
295-296,  308,  316-318,  319,  343,  344, 
350,  355-358,  368,  376,  382-386,  389- 
390,  392,  395,  398,  402,  411,  412,  496, 
503. 

Alexander  the  Great,  i.  30,  185,  195. 

Alexandria,  i.  171-173,  175,  195. 

Algesiras,  i.  289. 

Alix,  Gen.,  ii.  458. 

Alkmaar,  i.  199. 

Alps,  the,  i.  84. 

Alten,  Gen.,  ii.  437,  460,  465. 

Alvintzy,  i.  Ill,  120-125. 

Amiens,  Treaty  of,  i.  306,  311-328,  374, 
375. 


Ancien  regime,  L',  i.  23,  25,  28. 

Andreossi,  i.  196. 

Angouleme,  Due  d',  ii.  381. 

Ansbach,  ii.  18,  26,  40. 

Antibes,  i.  54;  ii.  407. 

Antigua,  i.  460. 

Antommarchi,  ii.  523,  525. 

Antwerp,  i.  405;  ii.  367  n. 

Apennines,  i.  82,  83,  84. 

Arcis,  battle  of,  ii.  376  n. 

Areola,  i.  113-118. 

Are'na,  i.  280-281,  283. 

Argaum,  i.  349. 

Arisch,  El,  i.  186-187. 

Armed  Neutrality  League,  i.  242,  306. 

Armenia,  i.  184. 

Arndt,  ii.  252,  256,  343. 

Arnott,  Dr.,  ii.  526. 

Arrighi,  ii.  372. 

Arrondissements,  i.  247,  298-299. 

Artois,  Comte  d',  i.  50,  415,  421,  427; 
ii.  381,  382,  402,  407. 

Aspern-Essling,  battle  of,  ii.  176. 

Assaye,  i.  349. 

Assignats,  i.  56. 

Astrakan,  i.  241. 

Auerstiidt,  battle  of,  ii.  90. 

Augereau,  i.  75,  77,  92,  99-106,  114, 
127,  148,  154,  415,  432-433,  453,  471 ; 
ii.  17,  84,  89,  94,  103,  272  n.,  327,  375, 
382,  388,  418. 

Aulic  Council,  i.  97,  111,  120. 

Austerlitz,  battle  of,  ii.  33-38. 

Australia,  i.  351-356,  385;  ii.  98,  160. 

Austria,  i.  32,  34,  48,  51,  52,  70,  72,  79, 
81,  87,  91,  92,  96,  110,  117,  118,  126, 
149,  160,  162-168,  167,  198,  201,  221, 
242,  244,  326,  :k;.-»,  382,  4<i'_>:  ii.  1-3, 
4-5,  8-10,  11,  12-18,  16-24,  26-28,  39, 
41-KI,  53,  H3-K4,  101-102,  105-Kn;. 
116-117,  142.  162-167,  172,  174-186, 
190-191,  260-251,  269-262,  266-207, 
270-272,  290-292,  298-302,  :m,  326- 


533 


534 


INDEX 


327,  336,  350,  354-358,  367-368,  370- 

371,402-403,417. 
Austrian  Netherlands,  i.  129. 
Auxonne,  i.  20,  30. 
Avignon,  i.  125. 

Babeuf,  i.  144,  282. 

Bacciocchi,  i.  140. 

Badajoz,  Treaty  of,  i.  287. 

Baden,  ii.  42,  55. 

Bagration,  ii.  225  n.,  229-230,  232-233. 

Balcorabe,  Mr.,  ii.  498,  511. 

Balearic  Isles,  ii.  68. 

Balmain,  ii.  508  n. 

Barbe'-Marbois,  ii.  55. 

Barclay,  Gen.,  ii.  225  n.,  228-234,  269, 

270,  308,  385. 
Barras,  i.  45,  63,  64,  65,  67,  145,  146, 

146  n.,  153,  158,  165,  201-203,  205, 

416. 
Barrere,  i.  54. 

Bartenstein,  Treaty  of,  ii.  130. 
Barthelemy,  i.  144,  148. 
Bassano,  i,  107. 
Bastia,  i.  27,  37. 

Batavian  Republic.    See  Holland. 
Bathurst,  Earl,  ii.  455  n.,  513,  514,515, 

518. 
Baudin,  Commodore,  i.  352-354. 
Baudus,  Col.,  ii.  447. 
Bausset,  i.  445;    ii.   188,  235  n.,  237, 

398. 
Bautzen,  battle  of,  ii.  268-270. 
Bavaria,  ii.  42,  54,  60,  63,  174, 175,  185, 

326-327. 
Baylen,  ii.  163. 
Baylen,  battle  of,  ii.  156. 
Bayonne,  Conventions  of,  ii.  152,  348 

(battles  of) . 
Beatson,  Gen.,  ii.  484  n. 
Beauharnais,  Eugene,  i.  197,432,462; 

ii.  9,  11,  78,  141,  179,  199,  234,  235, 

240,  257-25(1,  262,  264,  271,  340,  345, 

350,  365,  378  n. 
Beauharnais,  Hortense,  i.  197,  407;  ii. 

475. 
Beaulieu,  i.  75,  76,  77,  78,  83,  84, 92, 93. 
Becker,  Gen.,  ii.  476-478. 
Beethoven,  i.  444. 
Beet-root,  ii.  206. 
Belgium,  i.  129,  285 ;  ii.  32.  50,  343,  357, 

.'560,  367,  370,  379,  401,  403,  405,  420- 

421. 


Belliard,  Gen.,  ii.  389. 

Bennigsen,  Gen.,  ii.  102,  105,  109-111, 
114,  115  n.,  129,  231,  331,  333. 

Beresford,  ii.  381. 

Beresiua,  crossing  of,  ii.  243. 

Berg,  Grand  Duchy  of,  ii.  58. 

Berlier,  i.  279. 

Berlin,  decree  of,  ii.  95-97 :  University 
of,  ii.  209,  253. 

Bernadotte,  i.  202,  204,  227,  415,  416, 
432,  433;  ii.  17-19,  32,  35,  37,  58,  84, 
87,  92-93,  102,  130  n.,  211,  219,  272- 
274,  295-297,  305-307,  308,  310-311, 
323  n.,  324,  325-326,  329-331,  334  n., 
340,  350,  356,  369,  383,  390  n. 

Bernard,  Prince,  ii.  425. 

Berne,  i.  164,  362-365,  368-369. 

Bernier,  i.  217,  252. 

Berthier,  i.  69,  87,  100,  123,  145,  164, 
177,  197,  215,  227,  229,  254,  432-433 ; 
ii.  58,  104,  184,  191,  240,  308,  321  n., 
334,  335  n.,  361, 383,  393,  397,  418,  419. 

Berthollet,  i.  166,  178,  197,  263;  ii. 
524. 

Bertrand,  ii.  17,  29,  104,  258,  269,  305- 
306,  310-311,  325,  330,  331  n.,  398, 
399,  406,  443,  449,  476,  47^482,  488, 
493-495,  497,  500,  501,  504,  522  n., 
527  n. 

Bertrand,  Mme.,  ii.  481,  482,  485  n., 
487,  488,  493, 494,  500,  505.       ■ 

Bessarabia,  ii.  220. 

Bessieres,  i.  177,  196,  238,  432,  433  n,; 
ii.  17,  37,  155,  194  n.,  235,  240,  265  n. 

Beyme,  ii.  83. 

Bialystock,  ii,  124. 

Bingham,  Sir  George,  ii.  494  n.,  505  n., 
508. 

Black  Forest,  ii.  13-15. 

Blucher,  ii.  77,  85,  91,  92,  263-264,  265, 
269,  305-307,  309,  311-313,  322-324, 
825-326,  3:30,  331,  333,  3X5,  337,  351- 
353,  358,  361-364,  369,  372-874,  381, 
382-386,  389,  419-421,  424,  4.'50-435, 
438,  441,  442,  443,  451,  463,  470,  475- 
477,  495,  503. 

Bologna,  i.  71,  93,  109,  117,  120. 

Bon,  i.  167,  191. 

Bonaparte,  Caroline,  ii.  526. 

Bonaparte,  Charles,  i.  5-9. 

Bonaparte,  Elise,  i.  34,  140;  ii.  9. 

Bonaparte  family,  the,  i.  2-11,  15. 

I  !i  >n a | tarte,  Jerome,  i.  410-411, 436, 437; 


INDEX 


535 


ii.  124,  141,  178,  199,  229,  324,  389, 

447,  156. 
Bonaparte,  Joseph,  i.  6,  9,  12,  21,  28, 

29,  67,  140, 315,  325-327,  342-343.  301- 

393,  409-110,  429,  432,  4:30-439;  ii.  9, 

57,  58,  78,  124,  154,  155-157,  100,  170, 

182,  185,  194,  218,  276-280,  281-287, 

351,  362,  365,  379,  383,  387-388,  389, 

418,  472,  479. 
Bonaparte,  Josephine,  i.  67-68,    140- 

143,  197,  202,  280,  302,  304, 427  n.,  428, 

436-438,  439-443;    ii.   119,   122,   168, 

188-190,  475,  526. 
Bonaparte,  Letizia  (Madame   Mere), 

i.  5-7,21,37,433;  ii.  404. 
Bonaparte,  Louis,  i.  30,  56,  114,  140, 

408,  432,  436-438;  ii.  9,  154  n.,  196- 

197,  362,  389. 
Bonaparte,  Lucien,  i.  20  n.,  29  u.,  36, 

164,  205-208,  209,  215,  272,  287,  342- 

343,   408-410,   436-438;    ii.  149,  416, 

418,  473,  474,  516. 
Bonaparte,   Pauline,  i.  140,  334,  337, 

408;  ii.  401,404,  526. 
Borghese,  Prince,'  i.  408. 
Borodino,  hattle  of,  ii.  234-236. 
Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  i.  210,  215,  279, 

282. 
Boulogne,  i.  289,  447-468. 
Bourbon,  lie  de,  i.  332,  345;  ii.  359  n., 

496  n. 
Bourgogne,  Serg.,  ii.  237,  241. 
Bourmont,  Gen.,  i.  217;  ii.  424. 
Bourrienne,  i.  11,  12,  66,  160,  165,  197, 

226,280;  ii.  144,205. 
Boyen,  Gen.  von,  ii.  304. 
Breisgau,  i.  156,  243. 
Brescia,  i.  12,  98,  100,  104,  130,   131, 

239. 
Breslau,  Convention  of,  ii.  255. 
Brest,  i.  147,  348. 
Brienne,  battle  of,  ii.  .352. 
Brienne,  Napoleon  at,  i.  10-13. 
Broglie,  Due  de,   i.   149;    ii.  227  n., 

300  n.,  414. 
Brueys,  Admiral,  i.  167,  176. 
Bruix,  i.  196,  450. 
Brulart,  ii.  404  n. 

Brumaire,  coup  d'etat,  of,  i.  204-209. 
Brune,  Marshal,  i.  61,  164,  217,432;  ii. 

132,  418. 
Brunswick,  Duke  of,  ii.  28,  84-87,  90, 

91,  92. 


Brunswick-Oels,  Duke  of,  ii.  178,  436. 
Bubna,  Count,  ii.  266-267,  289,  296, 301. 
Budberg,  Baron,  ii.  6X. 
Billow,  Gen.  von,  ii.  311,  323,  324,  350, 

360,  369, 372,  380,  423,  451,  457, 457  n., 

163,  465. 
Buonavita.  ii.  523. 
Bufghersh,  Lady,  ii.  341,  383  n. 
Burghersh,  Lord,  ii.  332  n.,  385  n. 
Busaco,  battle  of,  ii.  193. 
Buttafuoco,  Comte  de,  i.  28. 
Bylandt,  Gen.,  ii.  458. 

Cadiz,  i.  461-464,  468. 

Cadoudal,   Georges,    i.    216-218,    412, 

418-421,  423,  434,  435. 
Caesar,  i.  171. 

Caffarelli,  i.  167,  168,  173, 174,  191. 
Cairo,  i.  173-175,  180-182. 
Calder,  i.  460,  464-466. 
Caldiero,  i.  112,  113. 
Cambaceres,  i.  203,  214,  266,  279,  296, 

423,  431.  432 ;  ii.  287,  341,  364,  473. 
Cambronne,  Gen.,  ii.  469. 
Camel  corps,  i.  180. 
Campbell,  Col.,  i.  451  n. ;   ii.  386  n., 

399  n.,  400,  405-406. 
Campbell,  Sir  Neil,  ii.  446. 
Camperdown,  i.  160. 
Campo  Formio,  Treaty  of,  i.  155-157, 

243. 
Canning,  ii.  107,  116,  129-131,  133,  136, 

139  n.,  155,  170,  171,  175  n.,  184  n., 

192. 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  i.  152,  287,  290, 

307,  347,  348,  366,  375,  387,  395;   ii. 

50,  67,  74,  76,  204,  212,  401. 
Caprara,  i.  253. 
Capri,  i.4;  ii.  74,503. 
Carmel,  Mount,  i.  189. 
Carnot,  i.  68,  69,  148,  215,  298,  416,431, 

434;  ii.  110,173,176. 
Carteaux,  i.  43,  44,  47,  64. 
Castiglione,  i.  101. 
Castlerea^li,  i.  310;  ii.  51,  107  n.,  133, 

102,  261,  273,  298,  332  n.,  310  n.,  312, 

::4:;.  .".:><;  368,  369  d.,  368,  371,  :;77  n., 

378  n.,  302,  401,  402  n.,  404,  4M   n., 

515. 
Catalonia,  annexation  of,  ii.  194. 
Cathcart,   Lord,  ii.  107  n.,   132,  133, 

266,  261,  205  ii.,  201  n.,  292,  295,  300, 

306,  308,  335  n.,  359. 


536 


INDEX 


Catherine  II.,  i.  126  n. ;  ii.  252. 

Cattaro,  i.  155. 

Caulaincourt,  i.  423,  427  n.,  432;  ii.  31, 

167,  168,  189,  267,  271,  298,  301,  326, 

341,   342  n.,   344,   345,   358-361,   369, 

377-379,  383-384,  388,  389,  392-394, 

396-397,  409,  475. 
Certificates  of  origin,  ii.  96,  143,  215. 
Cervoni,  i.  87. 
Ceva,  i.  77,  78,  79. 
Ceylon,  i.  287,  290,  307,  317. 
Chaboulon,  Fleury  de,  ii.  405. 
Chamber  of  Peers,  ii.  414. 
Chamber  of  Representatives,  ii.  414. 
Champ  de  Mai,  ii.  408,  414,  415. 
Champagny,  ii.  137  n.,  166,  170,  197. 
Champaubert,  battle  of,  ii.  362. 
Channel  Islands,  the,  i.  152,  159. 
Chaptal,  i.  215,  263,  292;  ii.  200,  202, 

207,446. 
Charlemagne,  i.  441;  ii.  176,  210,  211. 
Charles,  Archduke,  i.  Ill,  126,  179;  ii. 

10,  12,  20,  24,  28-30,  31,  174-177,  179, 

180,  185. 
Charles  IV.,  ii.  146, 148-152. 
Charles  XIII.,  ii.  186,  219. 
Charlotte,  Queen,  i.  402. 
Chasse',  Gen.,  ii.  453,  465,  467. 
Chastel,  ii.  235. 

Chateaubriand,  i.  259,  275,  428. 
Chatham,  Earl,  ii.  184. 
Chatillon,  Congress  of,  ii.  358-361, 368, 

377-379. 
Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  ii.  370,  412. 
Chenier,  i.  416. 
Cherasco,  i.  80,  81. 
Chouans,  i.  281,  283  n. 
Cintra,  Convention  of,  ii.  158. 
Cisalpine  Republic,  i.  130, 138, 139, 152, 

153-155,  232,  243,  295,  319-323. 
Cispadane  Republic,  i.  109,  120,  130, 

137,  139. 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  ii.  278. 
Clarke,  Gen.,  i.  118,  119,  128,  145,  150; 

ii.68n.,  271,277-279,299, 334, 371, 387. 
Clausel,  ii.  278,  279,  282,  283,  284,  288, 

418. 
Clausewitz,  ii.  225  n.,  230,  236  n.,  423, 

429  n.,  454  n. 
Clichy  Club,  i.  145, 147. 
Cleves,  ii.  40. 
Coalition,  Second,  i.  192,  195,  198,  221- 

2'JS. 


Coalition,  Third,  i.  462;  ii.  1,  5-11,  38 

53. 
Cobenzl,  Count,  i.  243;  ii.  1,  3,  41. 
Cockburu,   Admiral,   ii.    415    n.,  470, 

485  n.,  487,  490,  491,  493,  497-506. 
Code  Napoleon,  i.  265-271,  430;  ii.  70. 
Coffee,  price  of,  ii.  201,  206. 
Collingwood,  i.  451. 
Colloredo,  ii.  331. 
Commercial    prohibition,    i.   371-372; 

ii.  96-98,  143-145,  200-203,  207. 
Committee  of  Public  Safety,  i.  40,  59, 

61, 148. 
Concordat,  the  (of  1802),  i.  19,  250-262, 

439;  ii.  525. 
Condorcet,  i.  271. 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  ii.  69,  71, 

77,  84,  95,  124,  179,  211,  221,  255,  290, 

298,  303,  304. 
Coni,  i.  80. 

Consalvi,  Cardinal,  i.  253-257. 
Constant,  Benjamin,  i.  149,  219,  296; 

ii.  414. 
Constant  (the  Valet),  ii.  397. 
Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  ii.  231. 
Constantinople,   i.   166,  184-186,  192; 

ii.  117,  125,  160. 
Constitution  of  1795,  i.  59, 146, 200,203. 
Constitution  of  1799  (Year  VIII.),  i. 

210-214,  218. 
Constitutional  priests,  i.  25,  150,  251, 

252-255,  260. 
Consul,  First,  powers  of,  i.  212-214. 
Consulate  for  life,  i.  297-299,  301. 
Continental  System,  i.  161,  402;  ii.  25, 

44, 45, 70, 95-99, 133, 141-145, 160, 174, 

177, 195-206,  215-217,  218. . 
"  Contrat  Social,  Le,"  i.  16,  19,  24,  39, 

429. 
Convention,  the,  i.  34,  36,49, 52, 53, 60, 

61,  62,  63,  66,  266. 
Copenhagen,  bombardment  of,  ii.  131. 
Corbineau,  Gen.,  ii.  242. 
Corfu,  i.  154,  176,381,388-390,401,451; 

ii.  15,  57,  76,  142,  395. 
Cornwallis,  Lord,  i.  312,  316,  318,  324- 

327,  ."545. 
Cornwallis,  Admiral,  i.  406,  453-454, 

460,463-465. 
Coronation,  i.  439-440,  442-443. 
Corps  Le'gislatif,  i.  211,  249,  281,  295, 

296-300;  ii.  347. 
Corsica,  i.  1,  3-11,  13,  14,  15,20,21,26- 


INDEX 


531 


29,  31-32,  34,  35-39,  51,  55,  56,  199, 

222;  ii.  395. 
Cortes,  ii.  277,  349  n. 
Corvisart,  ii.  188. 
Cotton,  ii.  445,  452. 
Cotton,  price  of,  ii.  201. 
Council  of  Ancients,  i.  61,  205,  206. 
Council  of  Five  Hundred,  i.  61, 145, 148, 

199,  205-208. 
Council  of  State,  i.  211,  215,  218,  245, 

•248, 264,  281-283, 295, 431,  438 ;  ii.  415. 
Court,  Mr.  a,  i.401. 
Craonne,  battle  of,  ii.  374,  378. 
Croatia,  ii.  185. 
Croker,  ii.  476  n. 
Cromwell,  i.  31. 
Cuesta,  ii.  182. 

Curacoa,  i.  287,  288,  307;  ii.  401. 
Cyprus,  i.  197. 
Czartoryski,  i.  241  n.,  378,  379,  391  n. ; 

ii.  4-8,  26,  49  n.,  66  n.,  68,  101,  214. 

Dalberg,  ii.  390,  391. 

Dallemagne,  i.  87. 

Dalmatia,  i.  129, 153-155 ;  ii.  41-43, 185. 

Dandolo,  i.  156-158. 

Danton,  i.  57. 

Dantzig,  siege  of,  ii.  262. 

Danubian  provinces,  ii.  43, 124, 126  n., 

170. 
Daru,  i.  464. 
David,  i.  228. 

Davidovich,  i.  98,  111,  116. 
Davoust,  i.  167,  404,  432;  ii.  17,  35,  84, 

87,  90-93,  103,  104,  109,  112,  178,  180, 

229,  232,  258,  272,  274,  299,  306,  310, 

311,  322,  324,  331,  340,  375,  383  n.,  397, 

410,  418,  472,  477. 
Decaen,  Gen. ,i.  345-348, 350, 352n., 387, 

400;  ii.  418. 
Decoster,  ii.  448. 

Decres,  i.  332, 336,  450, 459 ;  ii.  162, 410. 
Dedem  de  Gelder,  ii.  331  n. 
Defermon,  i.  215. 
Dego,  i.  78. 
Delhi,  i.  184. 

Demerara,  i.  287,  307,  406;  ii.  401. 
D'Enghien,  Due,  i.  412, 422-127 ;  ii.  491. 
Denmark,  i.  58,  242;  ii.  105,  124,  128- 

132,  140,  204,  272,  273,  350. 
Dennewitz,  battle  of,  ii.  322. 
Denon,  i.  197;  ii.  477. 
Departments,  French,  i.  25. 


D'Erlon,  Count,  ii.  418,  424,  425,  4.«, 

435,  437-438,  452,  456,  460,  463,  466, 

468. 
Desaix,  i.  165,  167,  175,  182,  196-197, 

234. 
Desgenettes,  i.  194. 
Desprez,  Col.,  ii.  280. 
Diebitsch,  ii.  385. 
Dijon,  i.  226. 
Directors,  the,  i.  88,  94,  134,  200-203, 

207. 
Directory,  the,  i.  61,  62,  69,  79,  89,  90, 

109,  118,  119,  128,  131,  135,  144-146, 

153-158,  162-165,  196,  209,  277,  301. 
Divorce,  i.  268. 
Divorce,  the  Imperial,  i.  302;  ii.  188- 

189. 
Dolder,  i.  363. 
Dommartin,  i.  43,  79. 
Domont,  Gen.,  ii.  457, 463. 
Donzelot,  ii.  458,  464,  466,  468. 
Doppet,  i.  44,  47. 
Dornberg,  ii.  422. 
Douglas,  Col.,  i.  191. 
Drake,  Francis,  i.  49,419-420;  ii.  2,57. 
Dresden,  battle  of,  ii.  315-320. 
Drissa,  camp  of,  ii.  225,  229. 
Drouot,  ii.  363,  388,  399. 
Ducos,  Roger,  i.  202,  205,  209,  214,  220. 
Dugommier,  i.  47,  48. 
Duhesme,  ii.  464. 
Dumas,  Gen.,  i.  106, 167,  177,  263. 
Dumouriez,  Gen.,  i.  82,  422-424,  449. 
Dundas,  i.  407. 
Dunkirk,  i.  160. 
Duphot,  i.  163. 
Dupont,  Gen.,  i.  64 ;  ii.  21, 113, 155, 156, 

158. 
Duroc,  i.  69,  157,  196,  302, 378, 409,432 ; 

ii.  11,  19,  37,  54,  94,  123,  138,  270. 

Eastern  Question,  i.  314,  375,  377,  378, 
395;  ii.  43,  44,  100. 

East  Indies,  i.  45'.M(». 

Ebrington,  Lord,  ii.  523. 

Eckmiilil,  battle  of,  ii.  176. 

Economists,  i.  159. 

Education,  national,  i.  272-275. 

Egypt,  i.  154,  15!>-1K3,  1K4-1H6,241,288, 
•J'.K),  329,  M'2,  :ih<)-:«4,  :W8-390,  401, 
451;  ii.  128,  WO,  162,  212,488. 

Elba,  i.  243,  290,  360;  ii.  395,  40O-406. 

Elchingen,  ii.  22. 


538 


INDEX 


Ellesmere,  Earl  of,  ii.  455  n. 

Emmett,  i.  470  (App.). 

England,  i. 20, 23, 36, 38, 39, 42,43 n., 49- 
51,  152,  153  n.,  159,  163,  183,  198,  221, 
241,  244,  284-291,  296,  306-313,  324- 
328,  331,  335-336,  338,  345-350,  358- 
359,  371-377,  382-407,  416-420,  424- 
425,  469,  470 ;  ii.  1,  4-8,  44,  50-54,  60- 
62,  63-69,  74-76,  80-82,  83,  96-98, 105, 
106,  115-118,  125,  127-136,  142-145, 
170-171,  175,  183,  192,  195-196,  199- 
206,  212,  215,  260,  292,  296,  301,  308, 
332,  342,  355-356,  358,  367  n.,  370-371, 
383  n.,  397,  400-402,  411,  417,  490491, 
496. 

England,  invasion  of,  i.  160-163,  404- 
407,  445,  448-460. 

Ense,  Varnhagen  von,  ii.  93, 163,  208. 

Erfurt,  meeting  at,  ii.  165-170, 174, 213, 
217. 

Escoiquiz,  ii.  151  n. 

Esterhazy,  Prince,  ii.  377. 

Etruria,  kingdom  of,  i.  243,  309,  359, 
388;  ii.  137,141-145. 

Eugene,  Prince,  of  Wiirtemberg,  ii. 
319,  321. 

Eylau,  battle  of,  ii.  103-105. 

Excelmans,  Gen.,  ii.  442-443. 

Fain,  ii.  332  n.,  335  n.,  342  n. 

Faypoult,  i.  135. 

Ferdinand,  Archduke,  ii.  12-14,  18,  19, 

22, 31.     ' 
Ferdinand,  Prince  Louis,  ii.  86. 
Ferdinand  IV.,  i.  70. 
Ferdinand  VII.  (Spain) ,  ii.  148-153, 349. 
Ferrara,  i.  71,  109. 

Fesch,  Cardinal,  i.  432,  440  n. ;  ii.  189  n. 
Feudalism,  i.  109, 265 ;  ii.  71-72, 163, 171. 
Fichte,  ii.  163,  169,  209,  218,  263. 
Finland,  ii.  160,  162,  170,  217. 
Fiorella,  i.  104. 
Flahaut,  Count,  ii.  388,  441. 
Flinders,  Capt.,  i.  352-353. 
Florence,  i.  70,  95. 
Florence,  Buonapartes  at,  i.  2,  5. 
Florence,  Treaty  of,  i.  243. 
Florida,  i.  338,  341. 
Flotilla,  the  Boulogne,  i.  446-461. 
Fombio,  i.  84. 
Fontainebleau,  Convention  of,  ii.  138, 

147. 
Fontainebleau,  decree  of,  ii.  201. 


Fdntanes,  i.  444. 

Forfait,  i.  215. 

Forsyth,  ii.  497 n.,  507 n.,  511  n.,  512n., 
513  n. 

Fouche,  i.  208,  215,  280  n.,  281,  394  n., 
414,  416,  428,  430,  436,  466 ;  ii.  5,  168, 
172,  196,  307,  404  n.,  410,  412,  474, 
475,  477. 

Fox,  i.  271,  382,  407;  ii.  54,  64-66,  75, 
96,303. 

Foy,  Gen.,  ii.  283. 

France,  i.290. 

France,  He  de,  i.  332,  345, 352 ;  ii.  359  n., 
379. 

France,  Protestantism  in,  i.  261-262. 

France,  University  of,  i.  273. 

Francis  II.,  Emperor,  i.  96,  107,  110, 
128-130,  156,  242,  243,  376,  445;  ii.  3, 
8-9,  13-15,  30,  38,  70,  181,  185-187, 
221,  250-251,  260,  266,  289-290,  296, 
299,  308,  355-357,  367,  377,  383  n., 
388,  392,  398,  401. 

Frazer,  Sir  A.,  ii.  454  n. 

Frederick  William  III.,  ii.  3, 27-30,  38- 
41,  47-50,  59,  77-81,  82-86,  90-92,  99, 
117,  119-120,  163,  219,  249-250,  251- 
255,  291,  308,  316-317,  319,  344,  355- 
357,  398. 

French  Colonies,  i.  331-356. 

French  Republic,  the,  i.  34,  39,  41,  44. 

Fre'jus,  i.  197-199. 

Fre'ron,  i.  49. 

Friant,  ii.  32,  34,  322,  466. 

Friedland,  battle  of,  ii.  110-114. 

Frotte,  i.  216,  218. 

Fructidor,  coup  d'etat,  i.  144,  148-150, 
199,  251. 

Fulton,  i.  446,  447. 

Gallican  Church,  i.  253. 

Gallois,  M.,  ii.  514. 

Gantbeaume,  Admiral,  i.  197,  215,  345, 

447,  450,  452,  45:3-454,  457-460. 
Garda,  Lake,  i.  91,  92,  97,  98,  103. 
Gardane,  Gen.,  i.  234;  ii.  108. 
Gaudin,  i.  215,  248  n. ;  ii.  410. 
Geneva,  i.  164,  227,  3(51. 
Genoa,   i.  4,  7,  50,  54,  55,  68,  75,  76, 

110    n.,  135,  166,  198,  222,  224,  230, 

309,465;  ii.  10-11. 
Gentz,  ii.  84,  288,  297  n. 
Ge'rard,  ii.  418,  424,  426,  429,  432-434, 

442-444. 


INDEX 


53ft 


Gezzar,  i.  188-191. 
Gibraltar,  i.  152,  160;  ii.  138. 
Girard,  Geu.,  ii.  311. 
Girondius,  i.  40-42,  57,  200,  277. 
Glover,  ii.  491,  492  n.,  498,  499  n. 
Gneisenau,  ii.  85, 115, 219,  264,  324, 337, 

420  n.,  423,  431,  439-441,   469,  475, 

503. 
Godoy,  i.  338-339,  404;  ii.  134, 137-138, 

146-148,  149-152. 
Goethe,  ii.  3,  168-169,  256. 
Gohier,  i.  202,  205. 
Gourgaud,  Gen.,  ii.  415  n.,  425, 426, 448, 

463  n.,  469,  473,  478, 480-482,  487,  491, 

493-495,  498,  500,  501,  505,  506,  516, 

517-520,524n.,  527. 
Government,  local,  i.  246-250. 
Gower,  Lord  Leveson,  ii.  41, 115, 118  n., 

120  n.,  133n.,146n. 
Graham,  i.  76,  102,  105;  ii.  285,  350. 
Great  Britain.     See  England. 
Great  St.  Bernard,  i.  226-228. 
Gregoire,  i.  431. 
Grenoble,  Napoleon  at,  ii.  407. 
Grenville,  Lord,  i.  50  n.,  152,  223,  382; 

ii.  54. 
Gross  Gorschen,  ii.  264-266. 
Grossbeeren,  battle  of,  ii.  311  n. 
Grouchy,  ii.  Ill,  114,  235-236,  363,  374, 

419,  426,  428,  429,  432,  433,  442,  443, 

447,  449^151,  457,  466,  468,  470,  474. 
Guadeloupe,  i.  332;  ii.  273. 
Guards,  National,  i.  56,  63,  65. 
Gudin,  ii.  44'.). 
Guiana,  French,  i.  332. 
Guizot,  ii.  446. 

Gustavus  IV.,  ii.  1,  4,  132,  186,  219. 
Guyot,  ii.  462,  463. 

Hagelberg,  battle  of,  ii.  311. 

Hainan,  ambush  at,  ii.  270. 

Hal,  Wellington's  force  at,  ii.  454. 

Halkett,  ii.  468. 

Hamburg.     See  Hanse  Towns. 

Hameln,  ii.  31. 

Hammond,  Lord,  i.  416. 

Hanau,  battle  of,  ii.  336. 

Hanover,  i.  58,  161,402;  ii.  8, 16,  27,  31, 

40,  41-44,  49-52,  5<)-64,  76-79,  81,  84, 

124,  183,  -'.v.,  292  n.,  S32,  365. 
Hanse  Towns,  i.  161 ;   ii.  67,  197,  198 

(annexation   of),  209,  258,  27:3-275, 

290,  332,  :!4(). 


Hardenberg,  ii.  10,  50,  60,  63,  83,  119, 
249,  253,  254,  343,  368. 

Hardinge,  ii.  422,  431,  451  n. 

Harel,  i.  424  n. 

Harrowby,  Earl  of,  ii.  5,  39  n.,  49,  51, 
52. 

Hasslach,  ii.  21. 

Hatzfeld,  Prince,  ii.  249. 

Haugwitz,  i.  399;  ii.  19,  27,  30,  39-42, 
49-50,  60433,  77-78,  79,  83. 

Hauterive,  i.  256-257;  ii.  137. 

Hawkesbury,  Lord,  i.  286, 288-290, 308- 
309,  313-314,  324-327,  366  n.,  374,  390, 
398,  416,417;  ii.  52. 

Hayti.    See  Domingo. 

Hazlitt,  ii.  411. 

Heilsberg,  battle  of,  ii.  109-110. 

Heligoland,  ii.  350. 

Helvetic  Republic.     See  Switzerland. 

Henry,  Surgeon,  ii.  497,  501,  511. 

Hesse-Cassel,  i.  58;  ii.  77. 

Hill,  Gen.,  ii.  285. 

Hobart,  Lord,  i.  349,  358. 

Hoche,  i.  58,  60,  147,  154. 

Hofer,  ii.  178,  185-186. 

Hohenlinden,  i.  239. 

Hohenlohe,  ii.  86-89,  91. 

Holkar,  i.  346,  350. 

Holland,  i.  36,  163,  223,  244,  270,  285, 
290-291,  309-312,  318,  319,  348-349, 
373,  375,  385,  388,  392,  395,  400 n.,  404, 
449,455,464;  ii.  1,  6,  7,  17,  27,  32,  49, 
50,  64,  95,  124-126,  196-198,  332,  340, 
343,  345-346,  350,  370,  378,  401-403. 

Holland,  Lord,  ii.  116  n.,  380 n.,  523  n., 
525  n. 

Holy  Alliance,  ii.  522. 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  i.  129,  156,  243, 
358,  441 ;  ii.  69-70. 

Hood,  Admiral,  i.  46,  50. 

Hostages,  law  of,  i.  202,  211. 

Hotham,  Admiral,  ii.  479-480. 

Hougoumont,  ii.  452-453,  460,  461-466. 

Ilowick,  Earl,  ii.  106. 

Hulin,  Gen.,  i.  426-426. 

Humbert,  Gen.,  i.  470  (App.). 

Humboldt,  ii.  209,  297. 

Hntchinson,  Lord,  ii.  114n. 

Hyde  de  Neuville,  i.  201,  217-218. 

Ibrahim,  i.  172-175. 

niyria,  ii.  289-  290,  294.  298,  299,  .'501. 

[mam  of  Unseal ,  j    is::. 


540 


INDEX 


India,  i.  161,  173, 177, 183, 192,  241,  316, 

345-351,  366,  388,  395-396,  398,  401 ; 

ii.  108,  128,  160,  161,  212. 
Ionian  Isles,  the,  i.  153-155,  162,  290, 

395,  399 ;  ii.  8,  67,  124. 
Ireland,  i.  147,  185-186,  286,  306,  385, 

451-452,  453,  467,  470-471  (App.) ;  ii. 

212. 
Iron  Cross,  Order  of  the,  ii.  256. 
Istria,  i.  129,  153-155;  ii.  42-43. 
Italian  Repuhlic,  i.  359,  388. 
Italy,  i.  70,  72,  88,  91, 195,  243,  244,  319- 

323,  359,  40(M02,  404,  455-459;  ii.  1, 

6,  9-10,  15,  42-43,  64,  81,  95,  138,  142, 

186,  298,  332,  343,  345,  350,  365,  378  n., 

403,404. 
Italy,  army  of,  i.  52,  56,  58,  68,  69,  73, 

74,  112. 
Izquierdo,  Don,  ii.'l37,  149. 

Jackson,  Col.  Basil,  ii.  439  n.,  441,  460, 

461,  467  n.,  488,  507,  509,  519. 
Jackson,  Sir  G.,  ii.  39  n.,  289,  332  n., 

410. 
Jacobins,  the,  i.  29,  32,  33,  39,  41,  42, 

45,  48,  53,  57,  58,  63,  136,  147,  200, 

205,  207-209,  239,  246,  259,  277,  279- 

283,  371,  394,  429,  ii.  413. 
Jaffa,  i.  184,  186-187, 193-195. 
Jamaica,  i.  334. 
Janin,  Count,  ii.  463. 
Jaubert,  i.  380. 
Java,  ii.  496  n. 
Jefferson,  i.  340,  342. 
Jena,  battle  of,  ii.  87-90. 
Jews,  the,  i.  261. 
John,  Archduke,  ii.  180. 
Jomini,  ii.  308,  313  n.,  314,  429  n. 
Jonan,  Golfe  de,  ii.  406. 
Joubert,  i.  120,  123,  127,  201. 
Jouberthon,  Madame,  i.  409. 
Jourdan,  i.  204,  432;  ii.  182,  281,  282, 

284-285. 
Jnges  de  paix,  i.  249,  298 ;  ii.  414. 
Junot,  i.  55,  56,  69,  103,  124,  127,  190, 

394;  ii.  138,147,149,  158,418. 
Junot,  Madame,  i.  58,  165,  494. 

Kalckreuth,  ii.  84,  126. 
Kalisch,  Treaty  of,  ii.  254-255. 
Katzbach,  battle  of  the,  ii.  312. 
Keith,  Lord,  i.  230,  231  n.,  406;  ii.  485, 
487,  488. 


Kellermann,  i.  81,  82,  236,  238,  432;  ii. 

36,  437,  462,  463. 
Kennedy,  Gen.,  ii.  421,  454  n.,  455,  465. 
Kilmaine,  i.  131. 

King's  German  Legion,  ii.  454, 462-463. 
Kleber,  i.  58,  167,  172,  188,  190,  195, 

197. 
Kleist,  ii.  269,  320,  420  n. 
Knesebeck,  Gen.,  ii.  223  n.,  254,  308. 
Koran,  i.  169. 
Korner,  ii.  256. 
Krasnoe,  battle  of,  ii.  242. 
Kray,  Gen.,  i.  225. 
Krudener,  Madame  de,  ii.  414. 
Kulm,  battle  of,  ii.  319-321. 
Kurakin,  Prince,  ii.  220. 
Kutusoff ,  ii.  30,  33, 35,  36, 234-235,  238- 

240,  252. 

Labaume,  ii.  226  n.,  234  n.,  240. 

Labe'doyere,  ii.  466,  499. 

Laborde,  ii.  190  n. 

Labouchere,  ii.  196. 

Labrador,  ii.  151. 

Lafayette,  i.  439;  ii.  404  n.,  473,  474. 

La  Fere  Champenoise,  battle  of,  ii. 

385-386,  388. 
La  Fere  regiment,  the,  i.  14-15. 
Laffray,  defile  of,  ii.  407. 
Laforest,  ii.  60,  61,  78,  80. 
Lagrange,  i.  263;  ii.  524. 
Laharpe,   i.  366,  378,  471  (App.) ;  ii. 

213,  368. 
La  Haye  Sainte,  ii.  452,  456,  458,  460, 

461-466,  467,  468. 
Laine,  ii.  346. 
Lajolais,  Gen.,  i.  420. 
Lake,  Gen.,  i.  349. 
Lallemand,  Count,  ii.  478,  487. 
Lambert,  Gen.,  ii.  455  n.,  459. 
Lampedusa,  i.  390,  392. 
Lancey,  De,  ii.  431  n.,  455. 
Landrieux,  i.  101,  106,  131. 
Langeron,  Gen.,  ii.  312. 
Lanjuinais,  i.  297,  431 ;  ii.  416. 
Lannes,  i.  84,  87,  92,  127, 167,  177,  191, 

195,  196,  229,  230,  232,  236,  416,  433; 

ii.  17,  20,  22,  24,  28,  36,  84,  87-89,  92, 

109-114,  177. 
Laplace,  i.  263,  446;  ii.  524. 
Larochejacquelein,  ii.  413. 
La  Rothiere,  battle  of,  ii.  352. 
Larrey,  i.  194;  ii.  447. 


INDEX 


541 


Las  Cases,  Count,  i.  194;  ii.  478,  479- 

483,  486,  487,  491,  49^495,  498,  500, 

505,  509,  515-517,  519,  521,  524. 
Latouche-Treville,  i.  452. 
Latour-Maubourg,  ii.  113,  310, 315, 318, 

329. 
Lauderdale,  Earl  of,  ii.  75,  76. 
Lauriston,  ii.  217,  238,  259,  268,  305, 

313,  336. 
Lavalette,  i.  135-136,  145, 148, 149,  154, 

196;  ii.  382,  409,  414,  415,  448,  472, 

476,  485. 
Lebanon,  i.  184,  193. 
Lebrun,  i.  215,  279,  423,  432. 
Leclerc,  i.  124,  167,  207,  334-337. 
Lefebvre,  i.  432;  ii.  388. 
Lefebvre-Desnoettes,  ii.  325   n.,  393, 

397. 
Legations,  i.  71,  129, 132, 155,  254,  320; 

ii.  49. 
Leghorn,  i.  94. 
Legion  of  Honour,  i.  262-264,  302,  415 ; 

ii.  169. 
Le'gislatif  Corps,  i.  430,  443. 
Legnago,  i.  97,  104,  116,  120. 
Leipzig,  battle  of,  ii.  328-334. 
Lejeune,  ii.  34  n.,  177  n.,  237  n.,  323  n. 
Leoben,  i.  126,  128,  132. 
Le'peaux-Reveilliere,  La,  i.  68, 145,  163, 

202,  252. 
Lestocq,  Gen.,  ii.  104. 
Letourneur,  i.  68. 
Liberty  of  the  press,  i.  219;  ii.  195, 

414. 
Licences,  commercial,  ii.  203,  205-206. 
Lichtenstein,  ii.  390. 
Ligny,  battle  of,  ii.  431-435. 
Ligurian  Republic,  i.  136,  243,  319,  388, 

465;  ii.  6,  9. 
Lille,  i.  152,  153  n. 
Lindet,  i.  202. 

Linois,  Admiral,  i.  289,  348;  ii.  75. 
Liptay,  i.  84. 

Lithuania,  ii.  225-227,  228. 
Liverpool,  Earl  of,  ii.  411,  484  n.,  495, 

496. 
Lobau,  ii.  431  n.,  442-443,  463, 464,  465. 
Lobau,  Isle  of,  ii.  177-178,  179. 
Lodi,  battle  of,  i.  85-87,  88. 
Loison,  i.  64. 
Lombardy,  i.  82,  83,  87, 130, 403 ;  ii.  19, 

50. 
Lonato,  i.  100,  103. 


London,  Preliminaries  of,  i.  290,  306- 

311. 
Louis,  Baron,  ii.  390. 
Louis  XIV.,  i.  22,  261. 
Louis  XV.,  i.  261,  337. 
Louis  XVI.,  i.  23,  27,  32-33,  65,  261. 
Louis  XVII.,  i.  49,  50,  60. 
Louis  XVIII.,  ii.  381,  390,  391,403,404, 

420-421,495,499. 
Louisa,  Queen,  ii.  79-80,  115  n.,  121- 

123,  209. 
Louisiana,  i.  244,  309, 337-344,  383,  389, 

469  (App.)  ;  ii.  141. 
Lowe,   Sir  Hudson,  i.  4  n.;    ii.   268, 

330  n.,  363,  376  n.,  386, 420  n.,  453  n., 

502,  518-522,  577  n. 
Lucca,  i.  70. 

Lucchesini,  ii.  76,  78,  80, 127. 
Lucerne,  i.  164. 
Luddite  riot,  ii.  203. 
Luueville,  Treaty  of,  i.  243. 
Liitzen,  battle  of,  ii.  263,  264-266. 
Liitzow,  ii.  256,  292. 
Luxemburg,  i.  129. 
Lyce'es,  i.  272-273. 
Lyons,  i.  14,  42,  44,  295. 
Lyons,  Consulta  of,  i.  320-322. 

Macdonald,  i.  240,  415,  433,  434;  ii. 
177  n.,  180,  181,  249,  265,  305,  306  n., 
309-310,  311-313,  328,  334,  351,  361, 
362,  375,  376,  384,  393,  394,  407,  418. 

Mack,  ii.  13-14,  16-24,  336. 

Mackenzie,  Mr.,  ii.  129. 

Madalena  Isles,  the,  i.  35. 

Madras,  i.  348. 

Mahrattas,  the,  i.  346,  349-350,  385;  ii. 
108. 

Maida,  battle  of,  ii.  73-74. 

Maingaud,  ii.  487. 

Maitland,  Capt.,  ii.  448,  479,  480-485, 
488. 

Maitland,  Gen.,  ii.  467,  468  n. 

Malcolm,  Sir  Pulteney,  ii.  507. 

Malet  Conspiracy,  the,  ii.  244,  247. 

Mallet  du  Pan,  i.  164  n. 

Malmaison,  Napoleon  at,  ii.  475-477. 

Malmesbury,  Lord,  i.  152,  153  n. 

Malo-Jaroslavitz,  battle  of,  ii.  240. 

Malta,  i.  1.54,  166, 199.  240-242,  284,  287- 
288,  290,  308,  313-815,  325-326,  373- 
374,  .".75-377.  :m,  387-303,  .'597-398, 
401 :  ii.  7-8,  15,  ."»0,  57,  67,  208. 


542 


INDEX 


Mamelukes,  i.  172-174,  182,  381. 

Manin,  i.  155. 

Mantua,  i.  70,  72,  81,  82,  87,  91,  92,  93, 
96-108,  114,  119,  120,  125,  198,  239. 

Marbot,  i.  234  n.,  465 ;  ii.  38, 177, 308  n., 
335  n.,  457. 

Marchand  (the  Valet),  ii.  447,  527. 

Marchand,  Gen.,  ii.  407,  487. 

Marengo,  battle  of,  i.  234-239. 

Maret,  i.  152-153,  256-257;  ii.  217,  239, 
244,  250,  272,  341,  342,  360-361,  369, 
378,  379,  410,  473. 

Marie  Louise,  ii.  190-191,  210,  341,  352, 
357,  384,  392,  397,  398,  401 ,  518-519. 

Marmont,  i.  55,  56,  58,  69,  90, 104,  114, 
127,  140, 196, 227, 237, 445,  447 ;  ii.  17, 
106,  177  n.,  236,  239,  269,  276,  305- 
307, 320,  321  n.,  323,  328,  330-331,  334, 
335  n.,  351,  353,  362-363,  372,  374,  375, 
385,  386-388,  389,  392,  394-396,  418. 

Marseilles,  i.  32,  41,  44,  52,  166. 

Martinique,  i.  287,  290,  307,  458-459. 

Masse'na,  i.  52,  75,  77,  78,  87, 93,  98, 100, 
102,  105,  107,  108,  112,  114,  123,  127, 
198,  224-225,  230-231,  416,  432,  434 ; 
ii.  16,  24,  28,  56,  74,  176-178, 180, 193, 
280,  397,  418. 

Mauritius,  ii.  401. 

Mediatization,  ii.  71. 

Mehe'e  de  la  Touche,  i.  415-416,  418- 
420,  422. 

Melas,  i.  224-225,  230-239. 

Melito,  Miot  de,  i.  94, 120, 137, 170,431 ; 
ii.  57,  415. 

Melzi,  i.  137,  421  n. ;  ii.  348. 

Merael,  decrees  of,  ii.  163. 

Memmingen,  ii.  13, 16,  22. 

Memphis,  i.  178. 

Menou,  Gen.,  i.  64,  167,  172,  289. 

Mercer,  Capt.,  ii.  417, 421, 445, 462, 463. 

Merlin,  i.  279. 

Merry,  Mr.,  i.  312,  364  n.,  376, 380-381. 

Merveldt,  Gen.,  ii.  332,  346. 

Metternich,  ii.  162  n.,  185, 186-187, 190, 
222  n.,  233,  250-251,  259-260,  266-267, 
289-291,  293-295,  297,  299-301,  339, 
341-342,  344-346,  355-358,  359,  368, 
377,  380,  384,  388,  392,  403,  410,  412, 
495. 

Milan,  i.  70,  72,  84,  87,  96,  98,  131,  133, 
138,  157. 

Milan  decrees,  ii.  144. 

Milhaud,  Count,  ii.  434,  443,  458,  461. 


Miller,  Capt.,  i.  189. 

Millesimo,  i.  77. 

Miloradovitch,  ii.  264. 

Mina,  ii.  277,  278. 

Mincio,  i.  91,  92,  96,  98, 100. 

Minto,  Earl,  i.  391  n. 

Miquelon,  i.  316. 

Mirabeau,  i.  27. 

Missiessy,  i.  452,  454;  ii.  6. 

Mockern,  battle  of,  ii.  330. 

Modena,  i.  70,  108,  109,  133,  156,  243, 

320. 
Modena,  Duke  of,  i.  91. 
Molien,  i.  246  n. ;  ii.  55,  82,  200,  248  n., 

387,  409,  413,  446. 
Moltke,  Von,  i.  97. 
Moncey,  i.  230,  432;  ii.  387,  418. 
Mondovi,  i.  79. 
Monge,  i.  137, 166, 178, 197, 263, 446 ;  ii. 

524. 
Monroe,  i.  342. 
Montagu,  Admiral,  i.  448. 
Montchenu,  ii.  508  n.,  510,  526. 
Montebello,  Castle  of,  i.  136,  145,232. 
Montechiaro,  i.  98,  101. 
Montenotte,  i.  72,  76,  77. 
Montereau,  battle  of,  ii.  365. 
Montesquieu,  i.  23,  25,  38, 169. 
Montholon,   ii.  473,  478-487,  493-495, 

500,  501,  502,  509,  510,  513  n.,  516  n., 

517,  519,  523,  524,  527  n. 
Montholon,  Mme.,  ii.  488, 493, 500, 505. 
Montmirail,  battle  of,  ii.  362. 
Morea,  the,  i.  379,  390,  451,  452. 
Moreau,  i.  58,  93,  96,  129,  201,  225-226, 

415-417, 433-435 ;  ii.  274,  308, 314,  318. 
Morfontaine,  i.  244. 
Morillo,  Gen.,  ii.  285. 
Mortier,  i.  432 ;  ii.  106, 107,  111,  318, 321, 

362,  372,  374,  375,  386-387,  388-389, 

418. 
Moscow,  burning  of,  ii.  236-237. 
Moulin,  i.  202,  205. 
Mouton,  i.  445;  ii.  176.     See  Lobau. 
Muffling,  Gen.  von,  ii.  85,  222,  224  n., 

270, 312,  420  n.,  441  n.,  451,  457,460  n. 
Muiron,  i.  48,  114;  ii.  558. 
Murad,  i.  172-175. 
Murat,  i.  65,  69,  127,  167,  177,  195,  196, 

207,  232,  254,  390,  423,425,  432 ;  ii.  17, 

19,  20,  22,  24,  28,  36,  58,  77,  78,  89,  92. 

104,  110,  112,  124,    149-150,  152-154- 

162,  172,  199,  232-236,  239,  240,  244, 


INDEX 


5-K 


301  n.,  304,  318-319,  320,  325,  327,  329, 
334,  340,  350,  402,  412,  413,  500,  503. 
Muscat,  i.  350-351. 

Nablus,  i.  188. 

Nansouty,  ii.  318. 

Naples,  i.  117,  179,  198,  243,  284,  290, 
400;  ii.  27,  54,  55,  56,  58,  105,  124. 

Napoleon,  first  abdication  of,  ii.  390. 

Narbonne,  ii.  297-298. 

National  Assembly,  i.  25,  27,  33. 

National  Guard,  i.  26,  31-32,  36,  56, 
05. 

Nazareth,  i.  190. 

Necker,  i.  146. 

Neipperg,  Count  de,  ii.  352,  398,  401. 

Nelson,  i.  76  n.,  171,  175-179,  185,  189, 
242,  287,  291,  308,  400,  406,  419,  447, 
450-451 ;  ii.  528. 

Nepean,  i.  417. 

Nesselrode,  Count,  ii.  341,  342,  390. 

Neuchatel,  ii.  40. 

Newfouudlaud,  i.  159,  290,  317;  ii.  496. 

Ney,  i.  366,  404, 432-433,  449;  ii.  17, 19, 
22,  84,  89,  104,  111-113,  179,  194  n., 
226,  232-236,  242,  264,  266,  268-289, 
309,  322,  325,  328,  330,  334,  351,  372, 
374,  393,  394,  397,  408,  425-426,  429, 
430,  431,  435-441,  444,  451,  460,  461- 
466,499. 

Nice,  i.  44,  52, 54, 69,  71, 73, 79, 213, 224, 
225,  288. 

Nile,  battle  of  the,  i.  175-177. 

Nisas,  ii.  292. 

Nivelle,  battle  of  the,  ii.  339. 

Nivose,  affair  of,  i.  280-283. 

Non-intercourse  Act,  ii.  144. 

Non-jurors,  i.  25,  250. 

Norway,  ii.  1,  220,  273-274,  350. 

Noverraz,  ii.  522. 

Novi,  i.  198,201. 

Novossiltzoff,  ii.  5,  7, 10. 

O'Connor,  i.  470-471  (App.). 

Odeleben,  Col.  von,  ii.  265,  325,  332  n. 

Oglio,  i.  129. 

O'Hara,  i.  47,  50. 

Oldenburg,  ii.  124. 

Oldenburg,  annexation  of,  ii.  198,  216- 

218. 
Oldenburg,  Duchy  of,  ii.  168,  190. 
Old  Guard,  ii.  434,  465,  467  n. 
Olivenza,  i.  287,  290. 


O'Meara,  ii.  488,  493,  499  n.,  502,  503, 
508,  511,  518,  520,  526,  527  n. 

Ompteda,  ii.  51. 

Oporto,  ii.  179. 

Orange,  Prince  of,  ii.  431  n.,  436. 

Ordener,  Gen.,  i.  423. 

Orders  in  Council,  ii.  97-99, 143-144, 205. 

"  Organic"  articles,  i.  259. 

Orleans,  New,  i.  338,  341-342,  470 
(App.). 

Orthez,  battle  of,  ii.  381. 

Ossian,  i.  169. 

Ostermann,  ii.  320. 

Otto,  i.  236,  286,  289,  308,  315. 

Oubril,  ii.  66-69,  75. 

Oudinot,  i.  243;  ii.  29,  35-36,  111,  114, 
179,  213,  231,  234,  242-243,  245  n., 
269,  305,  310-311,  323,  375,  376,  393, 
397,  418. 

Ouvrard,  ii.  55,  196. 

Pacthod,  Gen.,  ii.  386. 

Pahlen,  ii.  330. 

Pajol,  ii.  329,  365,  442. 

Palais  Royale,  the,  i.  15. 

Palm,  ii.  82,  169. 

Paoli,  i.  5,  17,  27,  29,  31,  32,  35-39,  54. 

Papal  States,  i.  70;  ii.  141,  210. 

Paris,  i.  12-15,  32-33,  40-41,  56,  59,  60, 

158,  239. 
Paris,  Treaties  of  (1814) ,  ii.  401. 
Paris,  Treaty  of  (1815),  ii.  496. 
Parlements,  i.  25,  247,  248. 
Parma,  i.  70,  339-341,  359. 
Parma,  Duke  of,  i.  91,  118,  243. 
Parthenopaean  Republic,  i.  198. 
Pasquier,  i.  246 n  ;  ii.  137,  257,  446,  473 
Passeriano,  i.  143,  155. 
Paterson,  Miss,  ii.  14. 
Paul,  Czar,  i.  167,  199,  240-242,  287. 
Pavia,  i.  83,  87,  89. 
Pelet,  ii.  335  n. 
Peltier,  i.  372. 

Peninsular  War,  ii.  193-195. 
Perceval,  Mr.,  ii.  192. 
Pe'rignon,  i.  432. 
Perim,  i.  242  n. 
Pennon,  Madame,  i.  58,  67. 
Perponoher,  Gen.,  ii.  425 n. 
Perron,  i.  340. 
Persia,  i.  241  ;  ii.  8,  101. 
IVrsia,  Shah  of,  ii.  108. 
Perthes,  ii.  275  n. 


544 


INDEX 


Peschiera,  i.  92, 103. 

Petiet,  ii.  447. 

Petit,  Gen.,  ii.  398. 

Phe'lippeaux,  i.  189-191. 

Phillip,  Port,  i.  352,  354. 

Phull,  Gen.  von,  ii.  224,  229-230. 

Piacenza,  i.  84. 

Pichegru,  i.  58,  144, 148,  417,  421,  428, 

435. 
Picton,  Gen.,  ii.  286,  436,  441,  455,  458. 
Piedmont,  i.  43,  58,  222,  226. 
Piombiuo,  i.  243. 

Pirch  I.,  ii.  423,  428,  430,  431,  451,  465. 
Pirch  II.,  ii.  422. 
Pitt,  i.  49-51, 152-153,  223,  286,  383,  407, 

417  ;  ii.  5,  7,  13  n,  49,  51-53,  528. 
Pius  VI.,  Pope,  i.  71,  93,  94,  110,  125, 

164   240. 
Pius  VII. ,  Pope,  i.  252-255, 258-259, 439- 

440,  443;  ii.  66,  81,  141-142,  176,  195, 

210,  350. 
Pizzighetone,  i.  85. 
Plague,  the,  i.  188,  191-194. 
Po,  River,  i.  72,  80,  84,  91. 
Poischwitz,  Armistice  of,  ii.  272,  295. 
Poland,  ii.  100-102,  120-121,  178,  185, 

214,  218,  225-227,  250,  252,  271,  304, 

356-357,  402. 
Polignacs,  i.  421,  423, 435. 
Pondicherry,  i.  345. 
Poniatowski,  ii.  232,  234,  261,  305,  333. 
Pons  (de  l'He'rault),  ii.  401  n. 
Ponsonby,  ii.  455,  458,  459. 
Portalis,  i.  267. 

Portland,  Duke  of,  ii.  107,  192. 
Porto  Ferrajo,  ii.  400,  406. 
Portugal,  i.  198, 287-288,404 ;  ii.  98, 134- 

141,  147,  157,  193-194,282. 
Potsdam,  Treaty  of,  ii.  27,  39. 
Poussielgue,  i.  162. 
Power-looms,  ii.  203. 
Pozzo  di  Borgo,  ii.  346,  390,  394,  404  n. 
Praams,  i.  448. 
Pradt,  Abbe  de,  ii.  227, 233  n.,  238,  246, 

390. 
Prague,  Congress  of,  ii.  297,  300,  303, 

400. 
Prefect,  office  of,  i.  247,  248. 
Press,  the,  i.  294. 

Press,  liberty  of  the,  i.  219 ;  ii.  195, 414. 
Pressburg,  Treaty  of,  ii.  42-43. 
Priests,  orthodox,  i.  251-255,  260. 
Provence,  i.  29,  40,  225. 


Provence,  Comte  de,  i.  49-50,  60,  131. 

Provera,  i.  77,  120,  125. 

Prussia,  i.  34, 58, 201,  242, 326,  389, 402 ; 
ii.  1,  3-4,  9,  19,  26-27,  31,  38^1,  44, 
47-50,  59-64,  76-93,  101, 105-106, 116- 
117, 121, 122n.,  124-126,  163-164,  167, 
178,  204,  209,  218-221,  222,  247-250, 
252-256,  258,  260,  290-292,  354-357, 
370,  389,  412. 

Public  works,  i.  292-293. 

Puisaye  Papers,  i.  416,  418  n. 

Pyrenees,  battle  of  the,  ii.  339. 

Pyramids,  battle  of  the,  i.  174-175. 

Quatre  Bras,  battle  of,  ii.  435-437, 470. 
Quosdanovich,  i.  97, 100,  101, 103,  104, 
105,  106. 

Rapp,  ii.  37,  418. 

Rastadt,  Congress  of,  i.  156, 161. 

Ratisbon,  battle  of,  ii.  176. 

Raynal,  M.,  i.  31  n. 

Real,  i.  203,  279,  414,  423,  425,  427  n. 

Rebecque,  Constant  de,  ii.  425  n. 

Reding,  i.  363-364. 

Red  Sea,  i.  166,  182. 

Reggio,  i.  108. 

Regnier,  i.  414,  420. 

Reiche,  Gen.,  ii.  424,  431,  439,  465. 

Reichenbach,  Treaty  of,  ii.  291. 

Reille,  Gen.  ii.  284-286,  418,  426,  436, 

452,  456,  466. 
Religion,  Napoleon's,  i.  18-19.  f 
Re'musat,  Madame  de,  i.  304-305,  428. 
Revolution,  French,  i.  429-430. 
Rewbell,  i.  68,  145,  165,  201,  416. 
Reynier,   i.    167,  174;    ii.  73,  305-306, 

310-311,  325,  328,  331,  333,  336. 
Richter,  Jean  Paul,  ii.  163. 
Riviere,  Marquis  de,  i.  421,  423. 
Rivoli,  battle  of,  i.  120-125. 
Robespierre,   i.  52,  54,  56,  57,  64,  74. 

159. 
Robespierre,  the  younger,  i.  52,  53,  54 
Roederer,  i.  203,  214-215,  281-282,  284 

369,436;  ii.  345. 
Rohan,  Charlotte  de,  i.  422. 
Roland,  Mme.,  i.  41. 
Roll,  Baron  de,  i.  416. 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  i.  250. 
Romantzoff,  ii.  133,  166,  248,  252. 
Rome,  i.  91,  118,  164,  253-255. 
Rome,  King  of,  ii.  210,  351,  387. 


INDEX 


545 


Romilly,  i.  271,294. 

Rose,  George,  ii.  51. 

Rosetta,  i.  172. 

Rossbach,  battle  of,  ii.  260. 

Rousseau,  i.  16-20,  23,  24,  39. 

Riiehel,  Gen.,  ii.  84-85,  87,  89. 

Rue  St.  Honore,  i.  65. 

Rumbold,  Sir  George,  ii.  4. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  ii.  405. 

Russia,  i.  167,  198,  224,  240-242,  291, 
308,  313-315,  326,  358,  389,  392,  397- 
399,  423,  462,  471  (App.) ;  ii.  1,  4-12, 
26-27,  43-44,  49,  80,  83,  101,  105-106, 
120-121,  124-126,  170,  204,  206,  234, 
248-255,  260,  291-292,  354-358,  370, 
412. 

Saalfeld,  battle  of,  ii.  86. 

Saeken,  Gen.,  ii.  312,  335,  362-366. 

St.  Aignan,  Baron,  ii.  341,  345. 

St.  Cloud,  i.  205-208,  209. 

St.  Cyr,  i.  433;  ii.  15,  55,  234,  305-307, 

310,  313-321,  325,  331,  375,  418. 
St.  Domingo,  i.  288,  332-337,  341,  406, 

453,  469  (App.) ;  ii.  74. 
St.  Gotthard,  i.  226,  250. 
St.  Helena,  ii.  404,  497-529. 
St.  Ildefonso,  Convention  of,  i.  339. 
St.  John,  Knights  of.    See  Malta. 
St.  Just,  i.  54,  159. 
St.  Lucia,  i.  406;  ii.  401. 
St.  Marsan,  ii.  222,  249,  254. 
St.  Pierre,  i.  316. 
Salamanca,  battle  of,  ii.  236,  276. 
Salicetti,  i.  36-37,  43,  44-45,  52,  55,  94, 

134-135;  ii.  9  n. 
Salo,  i.  100. 
Salvatori,  i.  132. 

Salzburg,  i.  118, 156;  ii.  42,  49, 185. 
Saragossa,  ii.  156,  163. 
Sardinia,  i.  35,  50-52,  71,  76,  77-79,  81, 

82,  153,  154,  198,  222,  225,  240,  288, 

359,  397;  ii.  6,  7,  27,  105. 
Sarzana,  i.  2. 
Savary,  i.  182,  238, 420, 423,  425-427  n. ; 

ii.  32,  37  n.,  88, 133, 151, 156-157,  274, 

288, 308  n.,  350,  382,  391,  410, 476, 478, 

487. 
Savona,  i.  72,  75,  76,  224,  239. 
Savoy,  i.  34,  71,  81,  225. 
Savoy,  House  of,  i.  79,  82,  312,  318, 

359. 
Saxony,  i.  58;  ii.  77,  81,  84,  86,  99,  124, 

VOL.  II —  2  X 


178,  190,  254,  261,  262,  266,  271,  327, 
337,  355,  356-357,  378  n.,  402. 

Scharnhorst,  ii.  85,  164,  218,  223,  231, 
258,  214. 

Sche'rer,  i.  56,  67. 

Schill,  ii.  178. 

Schiller,  ii.  169. 

Schleiermacher,  ii.  263. 

Sehoubruun,  Treaty  of,  ii.  40,  185. 

Schwarzenberg,  Prince,  ii.  22,259-260, 
295  n.,  308-310,  314-318,  323,  326,  328, 
337,  339,  343  n.,  351,  352,  353,  3554J58, 
364,  370-372,  375-376,  380,  384,  385, 
389-390,  395,  420. 

Scindiah,  i.  346,  349-350. 

Sebastiani,  Geu.,  i.  380-382  n. ;  ii.  312. 

Sebottendorf,  i.  85. 

Secularizations,  i.  358-359;  ii.  48. 

Se'gur,  Count,  ii.  34  n.(  226  n.,  233,447. 

Segur,  Mme.  de,  i.  442. 

Senarmont,  ii.  113. 

Senate,  i.  211-213, 265, 281-282, 295-300, 
430,  431,  438 ;  ii.  347,  391,  408. 

Senatus  consultum,  i.  282,  298, 300, 432. 

Senegal,  i.  382. 

Se'rurier,  i.  79,  98,  104,  432. 

Servan,  i.  33. 

Sicily,  i.  70;  ii.  66-68,  73-76,  78,81,124, 
162, 197. 

Sieyes,  i.  200-214,  416,  431 ;  ii.  485. 

Silesia,  ii.  260,  261,  268,  270. 

Silesia,  army  of,  ii.  305,  311-313,  351, 
364. 

Silk  industry,  ii.  207. 

Simmons,  Major,  ii.  282,  455. 

Simplon,  i.  226,  227,  292. 

Sinai,  Mount,  i.  182. 

Slavery,  in  French  colonies,  i.  333-336. 

Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  i.  185-197;  ii.  74. 

Smolensk,  ii.  232-233. 

Smorgoui,  ii.  244. 

Socotra,  i.  242  n. 

Soissous,  surrender  of,  ii.  373-374. 

Sominepius,  council  at,  ii.  385. 

Somosierra,  battle  of,  ii.  171. 

Sniiham,  Gen.,  ii.  2(4,  312. 

Soult,  i.  224,  482-438;  ii.  17,  19,  35-37, 
84,89,93,  112,  lit!  n..  165  n.,  179, 183, 
193,  236,  278-277,  280-281,  287-288, 
299,  989,  849,  858,  875,381,897,419, 
432.  4:<5,  442,  452,  462.  469. 

"  Souper  de  Beaocatre,  Lb,"  i.41,42n. 

Spain,  i.  42,  4«l-51,58,  118, 152, 163, 196, 


546 


INDEX 


244,  271,  285,  287,  288,  290,  291,  309, 

326,  338-342,  389,  403,  404,  456-458 ; 

ii.  64,  68,  98,  134,  137-138,  141,  162- 

163,  166-167,   171-172,   193-195,   199, 

276,  333,  339,  349,  370. 
Spina,  Monseigneur,  i.  251-253. 
Stadion,  Count,  ii.  182,  186,  266,  289, 

300,  377. 
Stael,  Madame  de,  i.  66, 149-150, 165, 

199,  275. 
Stapfer,  i.  362-365,  370. 
Staps,  ii.  184. 
Steffens,  ii.  253,  254. 
Stein,  ii.  119, 163, 175,218,  252-253, 255, 

343,356. 
Stewart,  Sir  Charles,  ii.  330, 337  n.,  359, 

378,  389,  402. 
Stockholm,  Treaty  of,  ii.  273. 
Stokoe,  Dr.,  ii.  521. 
Stradella,  i.  232. 
Stralsund,  battle  at,  ii.  178. 
Strangford,  Viscount,  ii.  134  n.,  135  n., 

136, 139  n. 
Stuart,  Sir  John,  i.  381;  ii.  73-74. 
Sturmer,  ii.  521. 
Subervie,  Gen.,  ii.  457,  463. 
Suchet,  Marshal,  i.  224,  230-237,  433; 

ii.  276, 281-282,  288,  349, 377,  381,  382, 

418. 
Suez,  i.  166, 177, 180, 182. 
Sugar,  price  of,  ii.  202. 
Suvoroff,  i.  198. 
Swabia,  i.  225,  226;  ii.  41^3. 
Sweden,  i,  242;  ii.  1,4^5, 11  n.,  105, 125, 

129-130,   131-132,   192,  206,  219-220, 

273-274,  296,  350. 
Swiss  Guards,  the,  i.  33. 
Switzerland,  i.  58, 164, 223, 225,  244,270, 

285,  309,  311,  349,  360-370,  373,  374, 

385,  388;  ii.  1,  6,  7,  95, 199,  350,  370. 
Sydney,  i.  351-354. 
Syria,  i.  184-197;  ii.  211. 

Tabor,  Mount,  i.  190. 

Talavera,  battle  of,  ii.  183. 

Talleyrand,  i.  138, 149-153, 159, 162,204, 
215,  256,  271,  281,  282,  312,  315-318, 
331,  334,  338-344,  365,  385,  391-393, 
399,  423,  424,  428,  432,  461 ;  ii.  17,  31, 
40-42,  44  n.,  58,  61-62,  64-66,  73,  76- 
78,  80,  117,  130,  134, 137, 152, 160-168, 
172,  189, 339, 382, 390-392, 402  n.,  403- 
404,410-411. 


Tallien,  i.  143  n.,  416. 

Tallien,  Madame,  i.  67,  142,  409. 

Tauenzien,  ii.  323. 

Terror,  the,  i.  53,  56,  62,  246. 

Tettenborn,  ii.  258. 

Theo-philanthropie,  i.  163,  251-255. 

Thibaudeau,  i.  267,  282,  431. 

ThieTjault,  i.  64,  101  n. ;  ii.  34  n.,  36, 

383  n.,  446. 
Thielmann,  Gen.,  ii.  423,  430,  431,  434, 

439,  444,  451. 
Thornton,  Mr.,  ii.  292  n.,  295,  296  n., 

324  n. 
Thugut,  i.  130. 
Ticino,  i.  83. 
Tilsit,  ii.  114,  116-118. 
Tilsit,  Treaty  of,  ii.  124-126, 133,  143. 
Tippoo  Sahib,  i.  183,  346. 
Tobago,  i.  287,  288,  290,  307,  315,  406; 

ii.  359  n.,  401. 
Tolentino,  i.  125. 
Toll,  ii.  308,  313,  314,  385. 
Tomkinson,  Col.,  ii.  282,  455  n. 
Tormassov,  ii.  225  n. 
Torres  Vedras,  ii.  193. 
Tortona,  i.  80,  232. 

Toulon,  i,  36,  40,  42-51,  63,  74,  165-166. 
Toussaint  l'Ouverture,  i.  333-336,  340. 
Trachenberg,  compact  of,  ii.  295-297. 

306. 
Trafalgar,  battle  of,  ii.  24-25. 
Treves,  i.  129. 

Trianon  Decree,  the,  ii.  199. 
Tribunate,  i.  211,  219, 249, 263-264, 281, 

295-300,  431. 
Trieste,  i.  Ill;  ii.  185. 
Trinidad,  i.  152,  287-289,  290,  307,  317, 

457 ;  ii.  137. 
Tronchet,  i.  267,  297. 
Tugendbund,  ii.  169,  218. 
Tuileries,  i.  65,  148. 
Turin,  i.  72,  77,  80,  81,  230. 
Turkey,  i.  59,  167,  171-172, 

240,  317,  359,  377-379,  388, 

399;  ii.  40,  66-67,  100,  101, 

124-126,  161,  166-167,  191, 

220,  250. 
Tuscany,  i.  58,  94,  118,  243, 

341. 
Tyrol,  1.92;  ii.  41^3,  178. 
Tyrolese,  ii.  174,  185. 

Ulm,  ii.  13-15,  16-24. 


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